Phronesis Volume 6 Issue 1 1961 [Doi 10.2307%2F4181678] Daniel E. Gershenson and Daniel a. Greenberg -- Melissus of Samos in a New Light- Aristotle's Physics 186a10-16

Melissus of Samos in a New Light: Aristotle's "Physics" 186a10-16Author(s): Daniel E. Gershenson and Daniel A. GreenbergSource: Phronesis, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1961), pp. 1-9Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181678 .Accessed: 28/07/2013 10:16

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Melissus of Samos in a New Light: Aristotle's Physics 186aiO-16'

DANIEL E. GERSHENSON

DANIEL A. GREENBERG

1. Introduction: Aristotle on Melissus' Logic

TIHREE TIMES in the de Sophisticis Elenchis 2 Aristotle attacks Melissus for using false logic. Each time the same argument is called in question. Melissus begins

with the true statement (i) that everything that has come into being has a beginning. From this he deduces (2) that everything which-has a beginning has come into being.

What puzzles Aristotle is the steps Melissus used to deduce (2) from (I). He finds three possible false logical arguments which Melissus might have followed: (a) In I 67 b 17- i 8 Aristotle suggests that Melissus might have said: If what has come to be always has a first beginning, then, by simple inversion, what has a first beginning has come to be. Aristotle illustrates the fallacy here by comparing this inversion to the one employed in saying that if a man in a fever is hot, then a man who is hot is in a fever. (b) In I68b39-40 the following is offered as a possible train of thought employed by Melissus: Since tlhat which has conme into being has a beginning, and since that which comes to an end has a beginning,3 then that which has come into being is identical with that which comes to an end (and one can be substituted for the other in any proposition). If, then, that which has a beginning is one and the sanme as that which comes to an end, then that which has a beginning is one and the same as that which comes into being (by substitution). Clearly, the absurdity here is to equate that which has come into being with that which has come to an end, merely because they share an accidental quality, namely, having a beginning. Following this reasoning, Aristotle points out,4 swans and snow will be identical in all respects (and 1 This study was supported in part by a grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. a x67bi3f., 168b3g[., 18ia27f.

Here Aristotle assumes the proposition which he defends at length in the Physics, that that which has a beginning has an end and vice-versa. 4 168b34-3s.

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interchangeable in all propositions) because they both happen to "be white". (c) In i8i a28-29 Melissus is pictured as arguing as follows: If that which has come into being has a beginning, that which has not come into being has no beginning (i.e., that which has a beginning has come into being'). Aristotle's comment on this case of false negation is, "The fallacy of opposites consists in saying that if p implies q, then not-p implies not-q ... This is not, however, so, for the correct negation is that not-q implies not-p."2

Why is Aristotle so concerned with the inference of proposition (2) from proposition (i)? On the one hand, as we have seen, he includes other examples of the above three logical fallacies, andon the other hand, Melissus employs false logic elsewhere 3 which Aristotle might also have drawn upon in refuLting him. Proposition (2), then must have been crucial to Melissus' system and especially offensive to Aristotle. That it was a cornerstone of Melissus' theory, is at least in part suggested by its prominent place among the fragments; that Aristotle felt obliged to combat it so strongly, is seen from i 8 a X 7-20, where he says that it must be dealt with in any scientific treatise because it involves a basic absurdity in viewing the nature of reality. For, indeed, it is not true that everything which has a beginning has come into being, if by coming into being one means, as Melissus and all the Eleatics did, coming into being in an unqualified sense, i.e., the appearance of something existent out of the nonexistent. Everv change and transformation has a beginning, but does not involve the coming-to-be of anything essential. Thus, in order to allow for the obvious changes which take place in Nature, Aristotle feels compelled to show that this argument of Melissus is sophistic and that Melissus does not, in fact, prove that all beginnings imply substantial coming-to-be.

There are, then, according to Aristotle, three possible logical arguments from (X) to (2), all of them specious. The mistake in reasoning in (a) is obvious, and not generally made; that in (b) is intricate, slightly forced and not easily followed; the fallacy in (c) is easy to fall into and easy to understand. Therefore it will be the one to appear in an) treatise not concerned with logic (such as the Physics), in the context of a general attack on Melissus; and it is the one which appears at i 86a i o- i 6.

I This is the correct negation of "that which has not come into being has no beginning.' 2 i8I a26-27, 29-30. 3 Cf. i68b37, 4o-i6ga2.

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11. Some Modern Interpretations of Physics i86a o-i6

The passage in question reads as follows:

6TtL LCV O?v 7=pao tXyL[ET MDLaaog, 8niBov OterXL yap ?LX7ipE , ?C yev61ievov gXeL &pXy'v xacxv, 6TL xxt T'0 [ yev6lievov o0ux 9Xe. Jra xocdL 'ro5to -rrtouv, t4 7atrov 1LvaXL &px-Yv- ro5 7rp&y[L1TO xKL TOX5 yp6vou, xotx yeveaco Xi &X&Xa XOt' OXXo0LCGaEW4, ep oux &cOpo6c, yLyV0OLevT CxaoXc.

The following translations of this passage have been made: Dass nun Melissos einen formellen Fehlschluss macht ist klar; er glaubt naemlich auf der Annahme zu stehen, dass, wenn alles Gewordene einen Anfang hat, darum auch das Ungewordene keinen Anfang habe. Ausserdem ist auch das ungereimt, dass er glaubt, es muesse von allem und jedem Dinge einen Anfang des Dinges selbst geben, dabei aber an die Zeit nicht denkt, und ebenso es muesse einen Anfang des Entstehens, und zwar nicht bloss des schlechthinigen Entstehens, sondern auch der qualitativen Aenderung geben, gerade als gaebe es gar keine zumal vor sich gehende Veraenderung.1

The fallacy of Melissus is obvious. For he supposes that the assumption 'What has come into being always has a beginning', justifies the assumption 'What has not come into being has no beginning'. Then this also is absurd, that in every case there should be a beginning of the thing - not of the time and not only in the case of coming to be in the full sense but also in the case of coming to have a quality - as if change never took place suddenly..2

Dass Melissos falsch schliesst, ist einzusehen. Er meint naemlich, wenn alles Ge- wordene einen Anfang habe, dann habe das nicht Gewordene keinen. Sodann ist es auch nicht folgerichtig fuer jedes Ding einen Anfang anzunehmen, fuer die Zeit aber ein Gleiches zu leugnen, ebenso fuer das Werden, und zwar nicht nur fuer das Werden im Ganzen, sondern auch fuer die Umwandlung, als wenn es ein Werden im Ganzen gar nicht erst gaebe !"

The false reasoning of Melissus is palpable; for, assuming that 'all that comes into existence has a beginning,' he deduces from it 'all that does not come into existence has no beginning.' And, moreover, the assumption itself 'whatever comes into existence has a beginning' is untenable, in so far as 'began some-when' is taken (as Melissus takes it) to be equivalent to 'begins some-where' (so that if the Universe 'had no beginning' it 'can have no limit,' and is 'unbounded'): and again in so far as no distinction is made between the thing itself having to begin-to-be at 'some particular point of time,' and a modification of the thing itself, - as if there could not be a simultaneous modification over the whole field affected.4

1 Prantl, C., Aristoteles' Acht Buecher Physik ,(Leipzig, i854), 7. 2 The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, U. Physica, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, (Oxford, 1930). 3 Gohlke, P., Aristoteles' Physikalische Vorlesung, (Paderborn, 1956), 35. ' Aristotle Physics, trans. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Corford, (Cambridge, 1957), 29.

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Burnet has granted license to each translator to deal with this passage as he will. He writes, "I can make nothing of i86 a I3-I6." 1

Prantl, in defending his translation, adds: "Aristoteles nun wirft ihm (i.e. Melissus) mit Recht vor, dass er fuer die ganze Untersuchung, ob denn jede Veraenderung einen Anfang (sei es in Bezug auf das veraenderte Ding oder in Bezug auf die Zeit der Veraenderung) habe, eigentlich keinen Sinn besitze." 2 Melissus is thus pictured as having said in clear terms the opposite of what he consistently maintained; he everywhere holds that everything is eternal and that no change can exist in nature. Prantl must further assume that Aristotle took the pains to point out such an obvious inconsistency. Ross, on the other hand, postulates that Melissus investigated the details of the process of change, though he denied the existence of change. Ross writes in his note on the passage: "[Melissus] must... have argued that if a change takes place, it must begin at a particular point and then spread." 3

The above interpretations all encounter the following difficulties: In line I 3 all the translators have assumed that the statement that there is a beginning of all things belongs to Melissus, though it is contrary to his well known view. This is, of course, what led Prantl into his curious explanation. Moreover, in line I4 the phrase xo' , toi3 xpovo0u is completely obscure. Again, the relevance of what comes next is puzzling, for why should Melissus assume the existence of "a beginning of qualitative change", in addition to 'a beginning of simple change", if he believes in neither? Also perplexing is the prevailing interpretation of what all have seen to be Aristotle's own comment. Aristotle expresses surprise that Melissus does not know that change is &0p4o;, i.e., according to the interpreters, "sudden". What is this common experience of sudden change to which Aristotle is referring? Certainly, he never mentions it elsewhere in his treatises on natural philosophy.4

1 Burnet, J., Early Greek Philosophy, (London, 1892'), 336, footnote So. 2 Prantl, op. cit., 474, footnote i i. 3 Ross, W. D., Aristotle's Physics, a Revised Text With Introdfuction and Commentary, (Oxford, 1936), 471. 4 The search for such a process of instantaneous change led Prantl, and with him all his successors, to the sole example in Aristotle of change which occurs &Op6oq. In 2S3b 25 we find freezing used as an example of such qualitative change. The regular meaning of &dOp6o is "gathered together,' "thick," "frequent", or "all around," as in this case. Aristotle is saying in Book VIII of the Physics that freezing is not the growth of a single nucleus of ice until it fills the entire volume which the liquid had occupied, but rather the crystallization of the liquid occurring simultaneously in many places. This is a simple statement based on direct observation. The passage was taken, erroneously,

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Most curious, however, is the introduction of the distinction between "some-when" and "some-where" in the Cornford-Wicksteed translation. The concept of space seems not at all to be connected with the argument. This was certainly clear to Burnet in the first edition of Early Greek Philosophy (341).1 How, then, did our passage come to be taken as referring to a confusion of space and time? What brought even Burnet in his later editions to concur in this interpretation? 2

It is not difficult to see how so great a scholar as Burnet was led to such an unlikely position, and why Ross 3 and others followed. Once the words esl'a xom ' OU5TO &Tonov ("this too is absurd, etc." X 86 a I 3) are attributed to Aristotle, only two possibilities remain: either Aristotle is accusing Melissus of having made a statement inconsistent with his usual opinions, or Aristotle himself is holding a particular idea to be absurd. Prantl holds the first alternative, with the following results: that Aristotle attributes to Melissus a view which he is nowhere else said to have held, and that Aristotle finds it necessary to carry on an extended dispute with a philosopher who is not capable of distinguishing a statement from its opposite.

Accordingly, later scholars chose the second alternative. Aristotle is thus represented as saying that it is absurd in general to hold that 7wV has a beginning. If ,t&v is to be taken as meaning "the Universe", its most natural interpretation, then the same difficulty that Prantl faced arises: Melissus will then, according to Aristotle, be blatantly self- contradictory. To meet this difficulty, wasv is taken adjectivally to modify TO yvv60Lvov to be understood, thus giving the meaning "everything which has come into being". In this interpretation, the proposition of Melissus which Aristotle is attacking is at least one which MelisstLis held;

contrary to common experience and to the meaning of the word MiOp6o;, to indicate that water freezes all of a sudden. On the basis of this mistaken rendering of the passage in Book VIII, freezing was then brought as an example of the sudden process of change read into our passage. In losing sight of Aristotle's appeal to the obvious facts of experience, the interpreters have used one error to support another. The fact that an interpreter is forced to seek afar for examples of something which Aristotle takes as obvious to every reader is itself a sign that the passage has been misunderstood. 1 "Melissos has been charged, on the strength of some wrongly interpreted sayings of Aristotle, with confusing spatial and temporal infinity... But surely the human mind is not capable of such an astounding confusion of thought. . n 2 Op. cit. (4th ed.), 32S. 'Aristotle. . . seems to have (believed) .., that Melissos inferred that what is must be infinite in space, because it had neither beginning nor end in time." 3 Op. cit. 471-2.


in fact it is no other than proposition (i) quoted above, that everything that has come into being has a beginning.

This conclusion, however, while restoring dignity to Melissus as a philosopher, poses a new difficulty. Why should Aristotle suLddenly attack proposition (i), which he nowhere else contests, and which seems to be such a universal truth? The only reasonable answer can be that the statement "whatever has come into being has a beginning" is not the truism it appears to be. This means that "beginning" must be taken to refer to other than temporal beginning, for a beginning in tinle is inherent in the definition of "coming-to-be". If, then, a beginning in time is ruled out in proposition (i), all that is left is to make "beginning" mean "beginning in space".

We have now traced the development of this line of interpretation to the point where Aristotle seemns to be saving, "It is absurd (for Melissus) to hold that everything which has come into being has a spatial beginning." What does this statement mean? This school of interpretation, in the attempt to elucidate the passage as it now stands, finds that "to have a spatial beginning" means two different things at the same time: (A) to begin to grow outward from a point in space,1 and (B) to be of finite extent.2 But if this is so, these interpreters again have constructed, for all their pains, an incoherent argument. Their aim was to make Melissus seem to be the good philosopher he was reputed to be, but now it appears again that neither he nor Aristotle can fornm a clear idea of what "spatial beginning" means.

In fact, space does not enter into this argument at all. In the first place, Melissus is nowhere in the fragments seen to deal with problems of type (A), nor do the ancient commentators associate hinm with such views. Then again, Melissus constructs sophisticated arguments to prove that the universe is infinite, and could not have been guilty of such a patently absurd confusion of temporal and spatial infinity.3 Indeed, Aristotle himself elsewhere criticizes a good argument of Melissus against a finite universe.4 Finallv, nowhere does Aristotle refer to such a confusion of space and tinme in Melissus, despite the fact that he

1 See the passage cited above, referred to in footnote 3, page 4. 2 Ross, loc. cit., "He (i.e. Aristotle) represents him (i.e. Melissus) as saying... that that which does not come into being has no spatial &px( i.e. is infinite." 3Cf. Burnet (footnote i, page 5). Samples of Eleatic arguments for the infinity of space are found in Plato's Parmenides. ' Aristotle De Gen. et Corr . 3 2 S a 14.

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discusses Melissus' propositions (i) and (2) three times in the de Soph. El. 1

All of the difficulties encountered in these interpretations stem from the attribution of eIrx xal roiko I-ro-ov xwr. to Aristotle. They vanish when the quotation from Melissus in line I 86 a i i is taken to extend to I 86 a i

III. The Meaning of Physics i 86a io-i6

The simple and natural way to read this passage is this: The statement that it is ridiculous for there to be a beginning of all things,2 is a direct conclusion from the premise that that which has not come into being has not got a beginning,3 with the addition of the minor premise that the world has not come into being, a well known Eleatic doctrine. Aristotle is here merehr continuing to quote the beliefs of Melissus. Melissus is represented as saying that it is ridiculous to assert that there is a beginning of the substance of the universe and not of time. This is the argument: If you allow, as everyone does, that time has no beginning, the basic Eleatic paradox results. For consider that which comes into being. Since time is eternal, there was a time prior to its coming into being; hence, during that prior time it did not exist, so that if one traces the sequence of temporal events from prior to later time, one finds not-being converted into being. According to the Eleatic argument that no thing can ever come out of nothing, we thus find that the commonly accepted view that time has no beginning necessitates the conclusion that the existing universe has not come into being and hence has no beginning.

The addition of the words "and not of time" shows Melissus to have been the first Eleatic to have demonstrated that the proposition "time has no beginning" completes the logical argument of the Eleatics. Melissus' point is that one who holds that the universe has a beginning must, if he is to be logically consistent, hold also that time has a beginning. For the simultaneous appearance of the universe and time makes it impossible to say that the universe came from nothing; for since time appeared together with what exists there is by definition no prior state in which nothingness can be found.4 I See above, Introduction. Ross and Burnet, in his later editions, adduce these passages in support of their argument. We see no evidence that Aristotle is there talking about space. 2 i86a 13. 3 i86a 12. ' Cf. Melissus, fr. i, Diels-Kranz.

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For Melissus the argument is valid for all forms of coming into being- simple coming into being (sc. of matter), as well as the coming into being of qualities.' In all cases once time is taken to be eternal, the conclusion follows that all that exists has no beginning and is unchanging.2

Although the seeming logical soundness of the entire argument led the Eleatics to consider themselves natural scientists,3 Aristotle has nothing but contempt for their pretensions.4 In fact, he denies their competence as logicians as well. Accordingly, these are the two pillars of his argument against them: First, that they reject the obvious evidence of the senses (a scientist cannot allow himself to do this); second, that they make logical errors such as mistaken inversion of logical propositions and failure to distinguish between the two basic senses of the verb to be, namely the potential and the actual.5 Of these two points of attack the first is by far the more important for Aristotle. (If an argument starts from a false premise, it is immaterial to its truth whether the logic employed is correct or not.) This is shown by Aristotle's treatment of these two points in the chief passage dealing with Melissus. There, he makes both points, but deals primarily with the former: "For their first premises are false and they use faulty logic. Moreover, Melissus' argument is unsophisticated and provides no real difficulty. But upon one ridiculous assumption the entire structure is built. For us, our basic premise must be, that those things which exist by nature, either all of them or some of them, are subject to change." 6 In the same way in our passage Aristotle exclaims: "As if change does not take place thick and fast all around us 7

In conclusion, we offer the following version of our passage: It is clear that Melissus reasons falsely, for he thinks, 'It is logically true that if each thing which has come into being has a beginning, then that which has not come into being has no beginning. [Now that which exists has not come into being.8] Therefore, 1 The Eleatic school does not distinguish different types of being. Cf. our article "A Re-evaluation of Eleatic 'Physics'" (to be published). 2 The statement cFro xoxt 'ro5'm &-morov, t6... eIvaL &px*v. ... yvcvacoc xr. is not in contradicition to the statement 'r6 ycv6j?evov EXeL &.pX?v &7nxv. The latter is a logical statement; the former is a conclusion from the preceding arguments and refers to the impossibility of coming-into-being in the world. a So Melissus entitled his book Iflpt 06roEg. ' Aristotle Physics, i84b i6-i 7, where Aristotle opposes Melissus and Parmenides to the physicists. 5 Aristotle Physics, i 86 a 3 and our passage. 6 185a9-i4. 7 i86ai6. 8 This is the premise which is omitted in this enthymeme of Melissus.

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it is true that the universe (everything) has no beginning, i.e. it is absurd that substance should have a beginning while time has not, and that all types of coming to be should ever have originated - not only simple coming to be (of substance) but also qualitative change,"- as if change does not occur thick and fast all around us!

We have in this passage reference to a doctrine first introduced by Melissus. The realisation that the nature of time is integrally connected with the argument about the nature of being is an important step forward in Eleatic thought. For this reason alone we should like to see this passage included in full in the next edition of Diels-Kranz.

Columbia University (Departments of Greek and Latin and of Physics)

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Article Contentsp. 1p. 2p. 3p. 4p. 5p. 6p. 7p. 8p. 9

Issue Table of ContentsPhronesis, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1961), pp. 1-82Front MatterMelissus of Samos in a New Light: Aristotle's "Physics" 186a10-16 [pp. 1-9]The Hedonism in Plato's "Protagoras" [pp. 10-28]Plato's Apology: "Republic" I [pp. 29-36]Note on the Structure of the "Republic" [pp. 37-40]Father Kenny on False Pleasures [pp. 41-45]More on the Structure of the "Philebus" [pp. 46-52]On Aristotle's "Metaphysics" k 7, 1064a29: [pp. 53-58]The Development of Aristotle's Theory of the Classification of Animals [pp. 59-81]Epicurean Prolepsis [p. 82]

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Phronesis Volume 6 Issue 1 1961 [Doi 10.2307%2F4181678] Daniel E. Gershenson and Daniel a. Greenberg -- Melissus of Samos in a New Light- Aristotle's Physics 186a10-16