Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Language on Language Communicationon Language Communication

Kasia M. JaszczoltDTAL, University of Cambridge

http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21

1

Outline

Delimitation of a theory of meaning: current controversies

Interactive compositionality of meaning

Example: first-person reference and cognitive access to oneself (beliefs de se and reports de se)

2

Paul Grice

3

Speaker: conversational implicatureAddressee: pragmatic inference

Everybody read Wittgenstein.Every member of the research group read Wittgenstein.

4

?What is the appropriate scope for the

theory of meaning?

5

Semantic Minimalism

Minimal Semantics

“The truth-conditional semantic theory is governed, not by rich (…) inferential processes, but rather by formally triggered, deductive operations.”

Borg (2004: 8)

 

6

‘That is red’ is true iff the contextually salient object is red.

 

7

Contextualism (currently dominant view)

 

Utterance meaning is determined with the help of many sources of information and through the interaction of various processes.

8

 

These processes are often automatic, ‘default’

Default/Interactive Semantics (Jaszczolt, e. g 2005, 2009, forthcoming e)

 

 9

State of the Art:

 

There are several contextualist approaches to semantics and several minimalist ones and the debate is continuing.

effect on experimental approaches to linguistic communication

10

Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2009, 2010)Interactive Semantics (Jaszczolt, in progress, OUP)

 

Parsimony of Levels Principle (POL):

Levels of senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. A: I’ve cut my finger.B: You are not going to die! 

x The boy is not going to die from this cut. There is nothing to worry about.

 

11

Default Semantics abandons the syntactic constraint:

Primary meaning is defined as the most salient meaning intended by the speaker and recovered by the addressee and it may sometimes override the logical form of the sentence.

 

 12

Merger representations

What is expressed in the lexicon in one language may be expressed by grammar in another.

13

Merger representations

What is expressed in the lexicon in one language may be expressed by grammar in another.

What is expressed overtly in one language may be left to pragmatic inference or default interpretation in another.

14

No ‘or’ in Wari’?Absence of a disjunctive marker presence of some irrealis

marker

’am ’e’ ca ’am mi’ pin caperhaps live 3SG.M. Perhaps givecomplete 3SG.M.

‘Either he will live or he will die.’

from Mauri and van der Auwera (2012: 391)

15

Composition of meaning

Compositionality as a property of semantics Montague and followers, e.g. DRT, DPL,

representationalism Evans and Levinson (2009), generative power

of semantics/pragmatics (conceptual structure)

16

Interactive compositionality

Compositionality is a semantic universal

17

Interlocutors frequently communicate their main intended content through a proposition which is not syntactically restricted.

Experimental evidence:

Nicolle and Clark 1999Pitts 2005Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007Schneider 2009

18

Merger Representation Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called

merger representations.

19

Merger Representation

Primary meanings are modelled as merger representations.

The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing.

20

Merger Representation Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called

merger representations.

The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned.

Merger representations have the status of mental representations.

21

Merger Representation

• Primary meanings are modelled as merger representations.

• The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned.

• Merger representations have the status of mental representations.

• They have a compositional structure.

22

Sources of information for

(i) world knowledge (WK)(ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS)(iii) situation of discourse (SD)(iv) properties of the human inferential system (IS)(v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and

culture (SC)

23

world knowledge (WK)

word meaning and sentence structure (WS)

situation of discourse (SD)

stereotypes and presumptions properties of human inferential system (IS) about society and culture (SC)

Fig. 1: Sources of information contributing to a merger representation Σ

merger representation Σ

24

Mapping between sources and processes

WK SCWD or CPISC SCWD or CPIWS WS (logical form)SD CPIIS CD

In building merger representations DS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components of with a subscript standing for the type of processing.

25

Primary meaning: combination of word meaning and sentence structure (WS)

conscious pragmatic inferencepm

(from situation of discourse, social and social, cultural and cognitive defaults (CD) cultural assumptions, and world world-knowledge defaultspm (SCWDpm) knowledge) (CPIpm) Secondary meanings:

Social, cultural and world-knowledge defaultssm (SCWDsm) conscious pragmatic inferencesm (CPIsm)

Fig. 2: Utterance interpretation according to the processing model of the revised version of Default Semantics

merger representation Σ

26

Merger representations are compositional.

Compositionality is a methodological principle in contextualism and an empirical assumption about human languages

27

Selected applications of DSOrigins: Jaszczolt 1992, 1999. Parsimony of Levels (POL)

Principle: Levels of senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.

First applications: definite descriptions, proper names, and belief reports (Jaszczolt 1997, 1999); negation and discourse connectives (Lee 2002); presupposition, sentential connectives, number terms (Jaszczolt 2005)

Recent applications: temporality, and modality (Jaszczolt 2009; Srioutai 2004, 2006; Jaszczolt and Srioutai 2012; Engemann 2008; Jaszczolt forthcoming a,b); syntactic constraint on primary meaning (Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007; Schneider 2009; Jaszczolt 2012); first-person reference and de se belief reports (Jaszczolt forthcoming c, d)

28

An example:

First-person reference in discourseand cognitive access to oneself

29

The scenario:

‘I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch.’

Perry (1979: 3)

30

Beliefs and expressions de se

(1)The person with a torn bag of sugar is making a mess.

(2) I am making a mess.

31

referential semantics conflates (1) with (2):

 x [make-a-mess (x)] (kasia jaszczolt)

32

? Grammar produces the self-referring function

Chierchia (1989: 28): The cognitive access to oneself is ‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-pronominal) referential expressions. It is systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns. It is systematically and unambiguously associated with the interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and gerunds. It is associated with the interpretation of long-distance reflexives (at least in some languages)’.

33

? Grammar produces the self-referring function

Chierchia (1989: 28): The cognitive access to oneself is ‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-pronominal) referential expressions. It is systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns. It is systematically and unambiguously associated with the interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and gerunds. It is associated with the interpretation of long-distance reflexives (at least in some languages)’.

34

An argument from non-pronominal expressions (but not the one you expect)

x Pace Chierchia, cognitive access to oneself is not so ‘systematically’ excluded from the interpretation of non-pronominal expressions:

 Sammy wants a biscuit.Mummy will be with you in a moment.

 

35

Honorifics: Japanese and Thai: the first-person marker has the characteristics of both a pronoun and a noun. Like nouns, pronouns do not form a closed class; like nouns, they form the plural by adding a plural morpheme;

also e. g. Burmese, Javanese, Khmer, Korean, Malay, or Vietnamese. Typically: ‘slave’, ‘servant’, royal slave’, ‘lord’s servant’, ‘Buddha’s servant’ are used for self-reference with self-denigration;

Thai: 27 forms of first person (‘mouse’)

Siewierska (2004) and Heine and Song (2011)

36

Conflation of the nominal with the pronominal: Acoma (New Mexico), Wari’ (Brazil): no personal pronouns;

Generic one and arbitrary pro:

One can hear the wolves from the veranda.It is scary PRO to hear the wolves from the veranda.

Generic one and arbitrary (non-controlled) PRO express ‘generalizing detached self-reference.’ (Moltmann 2010)

37

Degrees of cognitive access to oneself:

I think I put this book back on the shelf. I think I remember PRO putting this book back on the shelf.

I put this book back on the shelf.I remember PRO putting this book back on the shelf.

Conscious awareness is present to different degrees rather than as a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic.

38

An argument from 1st person pronoun

Kratzer (2009): pronouns can be ambiguous between a referential and a bound-variable interpretation

I’m the only one around here who can take care of my children.

Only I admitted what I did wrong. Only you can eat what you cook.

39

Restriction: Bound-variable uses are rare, restricted, and differ from language to language. 

Tylko ja jeden przyznałem się do błędu.

only 1Sg soleSgMNom admit1SgPastM Refl to mistakeSgMGen

Tylko ja jedna tutaj potrafię zajmowaćsię

Only 1Sg soleSgFNom here can1SgPres careInf Refl

swoimi dziećmi. ReflPronPl Instr childPl Instr

40

An argument from PRO (but not the one you expect)

Lidia wants to be a scientist.no underlying ‘I’-reference ‘I want to be a scientist.’

 

41

Self-referring that involves cognitive access to oneself defies any attempt to fit it squarely into the mould of a single, systematic morphosyntactic device.

42

Interim conclusion:

The cognitive access to oneself is expressed through the lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs.

43

Reports de se

Kasia believes that she is making a mess.

 

44

Towards a (pragmatic) solution

self-ascription (linguistic semantic)self-reference (linguistic pragmatic)self-attribution (epistemic)self-awareness (cognitive)

45

De Se in Default SemanticsJaszczolt, forthcoming c, d

Bel (x,’)

the individual x has the cognitive state represented as an embedded representation ’

46

47

‘I believe I am making a mess.’

x y ’

[Kasia Jaszczolt]CD (x) [Kasia Jaszczolt]CD (y) [y=x]WS, CD [[x]CD [believes]CD ’]WS

’: [[y]CD is making a mess]WS

It1 believed It1+t2 was making a mess.

?/In a sense, It1 believed It1+t2 was making a mess. It1 just didn’t know that the person It1 referred to was It1+t2.

48

Merger representation:

coreference: condition [y=x]WS

the lack of self-awareness: differentiation of indexing on x and y (CD vs CPI) and the non-default use of the belief operator (CPI)

49

‘I believed, in a sense, I was making a mess.’ (marked reading)

50

x y ’

[Kasia Jaszczolt]CD (x) [Kasia Jaszczolt]CPI (y) [y=x]WS [[x]CD [believe]CPI’]WS

’: [[y]CPI is making a mess]WS

‘Kasia believes that she is making a mess.’ (default reading)

51

x y ’

[Kasia Jaszczolt]CD (x) [Kasia Jaszczolt]CD (y) [y=x]WS,CD [[x]CD [believes]CD’]WS

’: [[y]CD is making a mess]WS

‘Kasia believes that she is making a mess.’ (non-default reading)

52

x y ’

[Kasia Jaszczolt]CD (x) [Kasia Jaszczolt]CPI (y) [y=x]WS [[x]CD [believes]CPI ’]WS

’: [[y]CPI is making a mess]WS

Summary and Conclusion

Representing the interaction of various processes that are active in constructing meaning in linguistic communication gives us an adequate theory of meaning only if the compositionality is shifted to the level of the merger of information () as in DS.

53

Select referencesBorg, E. 2004. Minimal Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Chierchia, G. 1989. ‘Anaphora and attitudes de se’. In: R. Bartsch, J. van Benthem and B.

van Emde Boas (eds). Semantics and Contextual Expression. Dordrecht: Foris. 1-31.Chierchia, G. 2004. ‘Scalar implicatures, polarity phenomena, and the syntax/pragmatics

interface’. In: A. Belletti (ed.). Structures and Beyond: The Cartography of Syntactic Structures, vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 39-103.

Evans, N. and S. C. Levinson. 2009. ‘The myth of language universals: Language diversity and its importance for cognitive science’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32. 429-492.

von Fintel, K. and L. Matthewson. 2008. ‘Universals in semantics’. The Linguistic Review 25. 139-201.Grice, P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Groenendijk, J. and M. Stokhof. 1991. ‘Dynamic Predicate Logic’. Linguistics and

Philosophy 14. 39-100.Heine, B. and K.-A. Song. 2011. On the grammaticalisation of personal pronouns. Journal

of Linguistics 47: 587-630.Jaszczolt, K. M. 1999. Discourse, Beliefs, and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and

Propositional Attitude Ascription. Oxford: Elsevier Science.Jaszczolt, K.M. 2005. Default Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Jaszczolt, K. M. 2009a. Representing Time: An Essay on Temporality as

Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Jaszczolt, K. M. 2009b. ‘Cancellability and the primary/secondary meaning distinction’.

Intercultural Pragmatics 6. 259-289.Jaszczolt, K.M. 2010a. ‘Default Semantics’. In: B. Heine and H. Narrog (eds). The Oxford

Handbook of Linguistic Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 193-221.

54

Jaszczolt, K. M. 2010b. ‘Semantics-pragmatics interface’. In: L. Cummings (ed.). The Pragmatics Encyclopedia. London: Routledge. 428-432.

Jaszczolt, K. M. 2012. ' 'Pragmaticising' Kaplan: Flexible inferential bases and fluid characters'. Australian Journal of Linguistics 32. 209-237.

Jaszczolt, K.M. forthcoming a. ‘ ‘Context: Gricean intentions vis-à-vis two-dimensional semantics’. In: R. Finkbeiner, J. Meibauer & P. Schumacher (eds). What is Context? Theoretical and Empirical Approaches. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Jaszczolt, K. M. forthcoming b. ‘Propositional attitude reports: Pragmatic aspects’. In: K. Alan and K. M. Jaszczolt (eds). The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jaszczolt, K. M. forthcoming c. 'Contextualism and minimalism on de se belief ascription'. In: A. Capone and N. Feit (eds). Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

Jaszczolt, K. M. forthcoming d. 'First-person reference in discourse: Aims and strategies'. Intercultural Pragmatics Special Issue 'Focus on the Speaker'.

Jaszczolt, K. M. forthcoming e. Interactive Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Kaplan, D. 1989. ‘Demonstratives’. In: J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds).

Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. 481-563.

Kratzer, A. 2009. ‘Making a pronoun: Fake indexicals and windows into the properties of pronouns’. Linguistic Inquiry 40. 187-237.

Maier, E. 2009. ‘Presupposing acquaintance: A unified semantics for de dicto, de re and de se belief reports’. Linguistics and Philosophy 32. 429-474.

Mauri, C. and J. van der Auwera. 2012. ‘Connectives’. In: K. M. Jaszczolt and K. Allan (eds). The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 377-401.

Moltmann, F. 2010. ‘Generalizing detached self-reference and the semantics of generic one.’ Mind and Language 25. 440-473.

55

Percus, O. and U. Sauerland. 2003. ‘On the LFs of attitude reports’. In: M. Weisgerber (ed.). Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 7. Konstanz: Universität Konstanz. 228-242.

Perry, J. 1979. ‘The problem of the essential indexical’. Noûs 13. 3-21.Perry, J. 2001. Reference and Reflexivity. Stanford: CSLI Publications.Perry J. 2012. ‘Thinking about the self’. In: J. Liu and J. Perry (eds). Consciousness

and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 76-100.Recanati, F. 2005. ‘Literalism and contextualism: Some varieties’. In: G. Preyer

and G. Peter (eds). Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 171-96.

Recanati, F. 2010. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.van der Sandt, R. A. 1992. ‘Presupposition projection as anaphora resolution’.

Journal of Semantics 9. 333-377.Schlenker, P. 2003. ‘A plea for monsters’. Linguistics and Philosophy 26. 29-120.Schlenker, P. forthcoming. ‘Indexicality and de se reports’. In: K. von Heusinger,

P. Portner and C. Maienborn (eds). Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Schneider, A. 2009. Understanding Primary Meaning: A Study with Reference to Requests in Russian and British English. PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge.

Siewierska, A. 2004. Person. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Sysoeva, A. and K. M. Jaszczolt, 2007. ‘Composing utterance meaning: An

interface between pragmatics and psychology’. Paper presented at the 10th International Pragmatics Conference, Göteborg, July 2007.

Szabò, Z. G. 2000. ‘Compositionality as supervenience’. Linguistics and Philosophy 23. 475-505. 56