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Philosophy as an instrument ofinteramerican understandingLeopoldo Zea aa Col. Copilco Universidad , Filosofía y Letras No. 34,Mexico, DF, 04360, MexicoPublished online: 19 Jun 2008.

To cite this article: Leopoldo Zea (1987) Philosophy as an instrument of interamericanunderstanding, Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy, 1:2,123-130, DOI: 10.1080/02691728708578424

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SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY, 1987, VOL. 1, NO. 2, 1 2 3 - 1 3 0

Symposium on ethnocentrism and the production of knowledge

Philosophy as an instrument of interamericanunderstanding

LEOPOLDO ZEA*

In the plenary sessions of the Eleventh Interamerican Congress of Philosophy therelationship of the diverse viewpoints represented by Canada, the United States, andLatin America were examined. In the course ofthat examination, it became apparentthat these philosophies could quite possibly serve as instruments of interamericanunderstanding. On the one side there is the pluralism that is evident in the Canadianand Latin American points of view, and on the other the logicism1 that is upheld byphilosophers from the United States. The latter view arises naturally out of a nationwhich is preoccupied with maintaining scientific and social order, since logicism isappropriate as the center of power for such a system. Dialogue has overcome thisdiversity, and bridges of understanding between these postures have been created. Thephilosophers from the United States did not directly refer to Latin Americanphilosophy; they did it indirectly, obliquely, by means of criticisms directed at the mostrecent expressions of European philosophy. Among those mentioned were France'sstellar philosophical figure Jacques Derrida and the Frankfurt School and itsderivations. Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty evaluated these relativistic philo-sophies, criticizing the relationship which these philosophers try to maintain withpolitical and social concerns. It is their position that philosophy, properly understood,is incongruent with ideology, either political or social. These are precisely the samecriticisms that have been made, and that continue to be made, in Latin America againstthose who are seen as trying to contaminate what is considered to be authenticphilosophical discourse. The demand is for the greatest asepsis, to clean and get rid ofall that is alien to a strictly logical discourse. Delegates from the USA criticized thisEuropean relativism, just as in Latin America there has been criticism of the belief inthe existence of a way of philosophizing indigenous to the region of its origination, withits own peculiar reality.

This way of philosophizing in Europe and Latin America is better understood aspluralistic rather than as simple relativism. Recall how at the end of the First World War

*Author. Leopoldo Zea, CCYDEL, Filosofía y Letras No. 34, Col. Copilco Universidad, 04360 Mexico, DF,Mexico. Translated by René Trujillo Jr, University of Colorado. The Editor would like to thank his mother,Sylvia Fuller, for a preliminary translation of this piece. Contrary to the general policy of this journal, 'man'and male-biased words have been retained as they appear in the original, since they are integral to the style ofthe speech. While Professor Zea no doubt intends these words to refer to humanity in general, their trenchantpresence suggests an ironic commentary on what passes as 'ethnocentric' in certain cultures.

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philosophy expressed a relativism whose major proponent was Oswald Spengler in TheDecline of the West. Here Spengler identified Western Culture as the last greatprotagonist of universal history, destined, as are all living organisms, to die.Confronting this were other cultures, although natural and barbarian, in Asia, Africa,and America - menacing cultures, like carrion birds poised to devour the mortallywounded remains of culture. Relativism was a culture in agony, facing the challenge ofthese other underdeveloped cultures. The post-1945 era gave rise, in Europe, to aphilosophical criticism of philosophy as all-encompassing discourse, upholding a viewof philosophy as a multiple discourse through which all the peoples of the earth couldexpress themselves. This philosophizing, far from being pessimistic about its ownfuture, shows itself to be optimistic, in that it proposes the elaboration of a greatdiscourse. Something that would not be merely another authoritarian discourse, butwhich would embody the capacity to understand the multiple discourses of manthroughout the planet. No longer only the logos, but dialogue as the instrument for thepossibility of a great philosophical discourse which would be authentically universal - aphilosophizing that would coincide with the (now old) Latin American philosophizingwhich undertakes to capture the universality that arises out of its own ineffable identity,the plurality of its own expression.2

The European philosophy that the us philosophers criticize transcends relativismand takes as its point of departure the pluralism of human expression. This point ofdeparture is itself an expression of an understanding of the current framing ofphilosophical questions in Europe. Europe, the great framer of history, is nowconscious of its marginal relations to the new center of power which lies to the west of itsborders — the United States. In Europe, on various occasions, there has been talk, andregret, over the new consciousness of alienation. This demonstrates a closeness with theolder consciousness of alienation experienced in Latin America. This is 'something newand insufferable for us', they say, 'something that Latin Americans have been sufferingfrom for a long time, consequently something to which they should be accustomed.''We will never get accustomed to it', we reply, 'because of it we find ourselves in conflict— time and time again.' This consciousness in Europe was made acutely evident at thetime of the kidnapping of the cruise liner Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean, throughthe seigneurial attitude of the us government towards that of Italy. 'Now', an Italianthinker reflected, 'we Europeans will have to consciously make it clear that we are not acolony of the United States!'

The problem that concerns us here is the potential of philosophy in the Americasacting as an instrument for understanding interamerican and world points of view - anunderstanding which the people and societies of the region could achieve through theirown particular expressiveness. The attempt to find a common element in America,without impairing the unavoidable multiple peculiarities of the region, is the startingpoint for a complete universal understanding, in the best sense of the word. Here, forobvious reasons, many references to contemporary European philosophy andpluralism are made. The question that arises is whether it is possible to arrive at ahorizontal philosophy of tolerance to replace the old vertical philosophy of domination.

Philosophy, since its ancient origins in Greece, has presented itself with anapparently abstract question; the question of Being in general: the question of the beingof beings, and its relation to multiple beings which make up reality. This question, in itsconcrete form, is directed at the only source capable of giving an answer: man. Man isthe only source capable of answering this question, an answer on which the particularexistence of the interrogator depends. Man is the only being that asks and answers

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questions related to the problems that he becomes aware of in his ineffable relation withthe world and other beings. The question of Being is a question that is made by anindividual being that finds himself standing in relation to other beings. It is anontological question which man asks of himself, a question whose answer affirms thepersonal and peculiar identity of the interrogator.

Man is a being who has self-knowledge on the basis of the changes that natureimposes on all beings, but he is also open to what others make of him. In the being whothe question is about, we look for an answer that transcends these changes imposed bynature, and the meaning imposed by others. We seek the being of beings, that is, forthat which stands as the basis for all else. We seek the order that determines the changesin nature, and of man in his relationship with others in nature. It is a question of naturalorder, but also of social order. In this way the interrogator seeks to affirm, in nature andin others, that the answer points to common ground; that it points to the fact that allbeings are subject to the same laws, and that they belong to the same nature. Theinterrogator is a particular being who is concrete, and who seeks to transcend hisconcreteness through knowledge - the logos. He tries to capture Being in general asexpressed by the logos. Logos, or reason, that places he who has it above all others. Thatis, above nature and all other men. He who has the logos in its entirety, and who knowshow to use it, knows much about nature and social order. This is why, from the verybeginning of philosophy, just as it appears in Plato, it has been noted that it is necessarythat philosophers be kings or that kings be philosophers.

Aristotle considered what follows naturally, that the most wise should rule over theless wise. Reason, logos, controls the cosmos and is above all else. Reason, said Aristotle,is fully possessed by God; but man also has it though in a limited way. Because of this hewho possesses it is closer to the divine. Reason is not only found in particular men, but israther a part of all men's natures. Man is a rational animal; this being the case, what isessential in man is reason. But man is appetative as well; he is intemperate by nature,and this is the relation he bears to animals. Phronesis, wisdom, is what makes man fullyman for it triumphs over our appetative drives. Among men it is the philosopher thatmost closely approaches this by virtue of his use of reason; but reason reaches itsmaximum expression only in God. Logos, then, is a most extraordinary instrument ofpower; power over nature and men, especially over those who have yet to win masteryover their appetative natures. Contemporary philosophy has come to denounce thistotalitarian character of philosophy as it has been expressed throughout history.

The French philosopher, Michel Serres, maintains that 'the rationality of any givensystem, is understood from political, social and economic points of view; of course fromany particular point of view it is a rationality of a particular power, or said a differentway, is a rationalization of power.'3 This has been the rational justification of despotismfrom the Republic of Plato to the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Max Horkheimerand Theodor Adorno in the Dialectic of the Enlightenment denounce, equally, thetotalitarian character of philosophy and of reason which expresses it.4 'Wisdom, whichis power', they say, 'knows no limits either in the slavery of creatures nor in its easyacquiescence in men of the world. It is equally taken over by the goals of bourgeoiseconomics, in the factory, and on the battlefield, it is manipulated by these and othersirrespective of their origin . . . What men want is to learn from nature how to use her toachieve an integral dominion over her and man.' François Chatelet5 says: 'To be moreprecise, isn't it time to understand (or at least to recognize) that at its heart all pastphilosophy has always, more or less, been rooted in a discourse of mastery which resultsin our philosophical ancestors having done nothing more (repeated, amplified) than an

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authoritarian discourse?' The rejection of this authoritarian discourse, that appearedto be essential to philosophy, is the basis for affirming another attitude, what apologeticphilosophy calls 'the right to discourse'. This is one's right to express one's owndiscourse, that of the multiplicity of men that constitutes mankind. It is an affirmationof a philosophy that is the antithesis of authoritarian philosophy. This affirmation of aphilosophy of man, of each concrete man, is in a horizontal relation of solidarity ratherthan a vertical relation of dependence.

This philosophizing begins from a different interpretation of the logos. Logos is reason,meaning, a capacity to understand and to make oneself understood. It is The Wordwhich allows for expression, and that through expression allows for understanding andcomprehension. Logos is at the same time reason that understands and word that makesitself understood. In this sense there can be no authoritarian logos that says or dictatespurely and simply, and which by virtue of saying or dictating commands. The Hebrewsunderstand verbs, words, as instruments of creation. In the beginning there wasnothing, says the Bible, but God said become this and it was so. In Hesiod's cosmology,it is said that in the beginning there was chaos, disorder, but The Word brought order,definition, that which gave each thing its place. It is the divine word that puts order inchaos, thus creating the cosmos. Here The Word, or logos, has a totalitarian meaning.Logos, like reason and the word, are expressions of total dominion.

On the contrary, The Word or logos as understanding doesn't only understand, butalso makes itself understood in a relation distinct from that of dominion; throughdialogue. Dialogue is the logos that relates rational beings. It is precisely thisphilosophizing that allows us to consider the problem of philosophy as an instrumentfor interamerican and universal understanding. It implies a recognition of otherdiscourses, apart from itself, a recognition of what all men have in common. Logos is nolonger an instrument for manipulating other men who are considered as part of thatnature which is ours to dominate.

In the diverse regions of the Americas, this latter philosophy seems to becharacteristic. It is a philosophy expressed in the Declaration of Independence of theUnited States of America, a philosophical assertion of the rights of men to their owndiscourse. 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, thatthey are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among theseare Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness . . . that to secure these rights,Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent ofthe governed . . . That whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of theseends, it is the right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute newGovernment, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in sucha form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.' It is hereaffirmed that all men have the right to express a relationship of equality with other men.This is the philosophical demand of a marginal nation; within authoritarian discourse,a demand of the right to its own discourse. A discourse in the face of the center ofimperial power, the logos, as an expression of absolute power is confronted by a logoswhich is multiple and which demands its right to self-expression — an affirmation of anomadic discourse which is outside of the center of power, according to Serres. It is asubversive philosophizing, which is contrary to the institutionalization of knowledge; itis a nomadic philosophy which stands contrary to the institutionalization or thecivilization of the logos. The present activity of philosophy can be understood as thenormalization of thinking. In Europe, notwithstanding, philosophy suffered manyshakeups, the most violent, and probably most decisive, was the one that challenged

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the omnipotence of the logos. The word was 'liberated', in the sense that everyone wasempowered with the right of discourse. It appeared that there would be a regression to theoriginal chaos, but in reality with the multiplicity of expressions of the logos and themultiplicity of words that express it, the relation was brought together through theunderstanding and a new cosmos is forming as a result. Herein lies the worry that ismanifested in the philosophizing expressed in America.

So much the worse for it, the logos, created for understanding and to be understood,the logos as reason and word, will suffer new mutations and with them thejustificationsof dominance that brought it to a new affirmation of the logos as power, as word orauthoritarian discourse, will suffer with it. In 1789 there was a revolution in France,and with it there was an affirmation of the rights of men that spring from the equalitythat all men share - affirmation that is based on Cartesian rationalism, which affirmsthe right of man to express himself through his own discourse. This is a recognition ofthe equality of men based on reason. It is reason or discourse that makes men equal.But this reason or discourse will end up transcending man, who is its bearer. 'All menare equal by virtue of reason or commonsense', says Descartes, 'but different from eachother based on their accidents.' What is accidental is precisely what makes manconcrete, individual, what makes him peculiar with respect to other men. Ethnicbackground, education, social position and so on individuates men. Reason is whatmakes men the same. What distinguishes between them is their biography, which eachman has, as well as their racial and cultural origin. Reason is what is essential in them,and it stands above the many peculiarities of men. Men are men by virtue of beingrational. What distinguishes some men from others is collected in the seat of reason,where reason finds itself immersed in body. It is these distinguishing marks thatDescartes considered accidental, peculiar to individuals. All men are the same on thebasis of reason, but different in their capacity for the good or bad use of reason. TheWhite man will be different from the Black, the rich from the poor, the civilized from thebarbaric, each is limited in its use. What this distinction points to is not reason, which iswhat makes men the same, but to the accidental, the concrete, the peculiar, whichmakes men distinct and which determines the good or bad use of reason. Theseconsiderations will give rise to a new justification for discrimination, and for a new formof domination - colonialism. The same kind of colonialism with which the AmericanRevolution had to deal with in 1776, when it affirmed the right to its own discourse.Nonetheless, beginning with the success achieved by the new nation, there arose aregional discourse that ended up as a new authoritarian discourse. An authoritariandiscourse that will have to be respected by societies that pretend to be independentnations. Beginning with the discourse of the United States, which is madeauthoritative, the validity of other discourses will be determined. Thus Descartes'liberating discourse is transformed into a new totalitarian discourse in Europe as wellas in the United States. In the name of democracy new forms of colonial dominationwill be imposed, in such a way, that they will be subject to the same criticisms made bythe Frankfurt School with respect to colonial domination in general. These criticismsare based on the point of view that the imposed dominion goes against the Reformationphilosophy that was the heart of the two great revolutions in the United States andFrance. The United States will dispute with Europe as to who has the right to maketheir own singular discourse into a totalitarian, imperial, discourse. Neocolonialism wilin this way philosophically justify its taking over the position of power in the space leftopen by European colonialism in the world.

Let us not forget that America entered into the European history under the dominion

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of an authoritarian logos. The logos which the dynamic and most able Hegel expressed.Speaking of America, Hegel noted that: 'What has happened there up until now isnothing more than an echo of the Old World and the reflection of an alien life. What ismore, as a country of the future, America does not interest us because the philosopherdoes not make predictions; with respect to history we must concern ourselves with whathas been and what is. In philosophy, however, not only with what has been and whatwill be, but with what is and what is eternal: Reason. And that is enough.'

Shortly after the discovery of America, Juan Ginés de Sepûlveda and Bartolomé delas Casas argued over the being and the humanity of the indigenous peoples ofAmerica. For the first, the indigenous peoples were nothing more than a homunculus,something less than man, a lesser being of limited reason, and therefore destined toobey those who were the bearers of superior reason. A destiny that was seen as extendedover all who were born in the region, irrespective of their racial or cultural origin. Theentire continent was seen as inferior in comparison to the Old World and its peoples.According to the biological experts of the time, Buffon and De Pauw, the flora andfauna were inferior as well; they related that its people were short on intelligence bynature and through atrophy. The Declaration of Independence of the United Stateswas precisely the first refutation of this limited conception of these people. What isparadoxical is that even the United States, which claimed the right to its own discourse,denied the same right to the indigenous people it encountered, and later to theirneighbors to the south of the continent and finally to other societies of the Earth. Aninferior people, nomads, incapable of imposing dominion over nature, which shouldhave been at their service. People, who because of the way they are, shold be displacedor ruled over by supreme man. There is an affirmation of a model for humanity here,that of the ruler, and a model for society as well, again that of the ruler. The UnitedStates hoists the flag of democracy and of liberty, but it limits itself to its own liberty anddemocracy; intervening in other nations supposedly to force them to be free anddemocratic in an analogous way, under an imposed model. What is established in theirown Declaration of Independence is forgotten: 'that it is men who institutegovernments that derive their just powers from the consent of the governed'. In thisway it is made evident that there is a new and ponderous expression of the authoritariandiscourse, and with it the assumed right of that nation to impose it.

Let us return to Descartes, who maintained that men are equal with respect to reasonand commonsense, but different with respect to the good or bad use of it. Weanticipated that the good or bad use of reason depended on racial composition, socialand cultural situation, and even the sex of the individual.

Aristotle deals with the good and bad use of reason when he distinguishes betweenman as essentially rational and as barbaric and slave, and when he distinguishesbetween man and women and children. The latter are human as well, but they possess alimited level of reason. They are homunculi, 'little men', less than human. It followsfrom this that the most wise should rule over the less wise. In philosophy it is theaccidental features that individuates man; what is essential is reason, that which givesmeaning to man in general, but not to man in the particular. It is according to theconcrete, the individual, that man is judged to be more or less human than other men.Consequently, a man who is capable of using reason well is more human than he whodoes not have that capacity. So it turns out that what is accidental in man is whatdetermines the affirmation of humanity in him. All men are equal with respect toreason, but this equality will not depend on reason, rather on the somatic, on natureand the social and cultural situation of the individual. The man who does not make

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good use of reason is inferior to those who have the capacity. But there is somethingmore. The man that is incapable of making reason the instrument of dominion overnature ends up as a part of nature. He has reason but it is the reason of nature; he isunaware, and consequently, incapable of self-determination or of being free. Such aman, moreover, cannot form part of a society of equals among equals, of like amonglike. He can enter into no relationship that is not one of dependence, of being under thecharge of the colony or of the colonized lands of the past. This is a determination thatembraces not only a man or group of men, but societies and whole nations.

The authoritarian logos of antiquity is now expressed as an imperial logos,colonialism. It is the same logos that places nature at its service and with its naturalman, natural reason and those who express it whether they be individuals or nations. Itis in the face of this authoritarian discourse, that is totalitarianism, domineering, andimperialistic that our America needs to affirm its right to its own discourse - a right toits regional expression which is no less rational than authoritarian discourse, regionaldiscourse which is the antithesis of a totalitarian logos. Latin America has protestedwith the greatest insistence for the right to participate in a discourse that is multiracialand multicultural. Michael Weinstein and George Grant have emphasized thepresence of such a pluralistic discourse in Latin America and Canada.6 It defends theright to dissent, and to expressions other than those established by the authoritariandiscourse. Reason, logos, is not univocal, it is rather the means by which we canunderstand and make ourselves understood without renouncing our individuality.Reason as abstraction is substituted by reason as expression of concrete man. Thedifferences are reconciled in the sameness. Sameness not only in terms of reason, butmainly because of the individual concrete mode of being in man, that which is peculiarto each individual man. And so, there has been an amplification and correction ofDescartes, who maintained the equality of men based on reason. We should now affirmthe equality of man based on the diversity of men.

This is a philosophizing that is not subsumable under the authoritarian discoursethat has its origin in the old world. Rather, it is philosophizing that has arisen in this,our own continent, as a reaction to the logos as an authoritarian and totalitariandiscourse — a discourse which has given rise to wars, repressions, and genocide. Aphilosophy already old in our America, where we have had to fight throughout ourhistory to overthrow a dominion which has been imposed on us. It is philosophizing in astruggle against the totalitarian logos. It was with regard to this totalitarian logos thatHegel condemned America, which he saw as a mere echo and shadow of it. Faced withthis totalitarian philosophizing, America - as much the Anglo-Saxon as the Latinportions - claimed the right to their own expressions in a continental context ofsolidarity, and against dependency. One single great America, from Alaska to thePatagonia, which without failing to be America can express its multiplicity, and thepluralism of its expressions. It is from the standpoint of this philosophy that a meaningarises for the question of philosophizing acting as the instrument for Interamerican anduniversal understanding.

Editorial notes

1. 'Logicism' is the name by which contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy is called in Franceand other Latin countries. It reflects the origins of analytic philosophy (in the work of Bertrand Russell) asa school of metamathematics. For more on this use of 'logicism', see QUINE, W. V. O. 'On what there is', inFrom a Logical Point of View, Harper & Row, New York, (1953), esp. p. 14.

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2. Zea discusses these Utopian, perhaps even Neoplatonist strains in Latin American thought immediatelyafter its political independence from Europe in the nineteenth century in his The Latin American Mind,trans. H. Abbott and L. Dunham, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman (1963), esp. pp. 11-15.

3. Serres, a philosopher of science and Leibnitz scholar, has been one of the most influential recent Frenchphilosophers in Latin America. His work has been anthologized in English as Hermes: Literature, Science, andPhilosophy, trans, and intro. by J. Harari and D. Bell, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (1982).STEVE FULLER has reviewed this book in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 16 (1986), pp. 501-503.

4. ADORNO, THEODOR and HORKHEIMER, MAX The Dialectic of Enlightenment, Seabury, New York (1973).5. FRANÇOIS CHATELET is the general editor of Histoire des Ideologies, 3 vols. Hachette, Paris (1978).6. WEINSTEIN, MICHAEL A. The Polarity of Mexican Thought: Instrumentalism and Finalism, Pennsylvania State

University Press, University Park (1976); GRANT, GEORGE P. Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of CanadianNationalism, Van Nostrand, Princeton (1965).

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