Philippine Constitutional Law I Syllabus of Oscar Franklin Tan (University of the East) (as of June 2013)

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IOscar Franklin Barcelona Tan

University of the East

1st Semester, 2013-2014

Saturday, 9:00 AM – 12:00 Noon

Twitter: @oscarfbtan

Facebook: www.facebook.com/OscarFranklinTan

Grade Distribution for Previous SemesterGrade Number

1.00 2

1.25 0

1.50 0

1.75 1

2.00 0

2.25 0

2.50 0

2.75 0

3.00 2

5.00 or dropped 10

Helpful Notes on Failing

1. If you have no time to read the readings, you should not be in law school.

2.

Relying on textbooks and secondary sources will guarantee a failing grade

because there is currently no major textbook that has been updated.

3.

Students will be called at random for recitation until all have been called, afterwhich another round of recitation will begin. In a 3-hour Saturday class with12 students, a large number of unprepared students readily results in 10-12

failing recitation grades per student per meeting.

4. Unexcused absence from class when called results in a failing grade.

5.

Blatantly reading from material during recitation results in a failing grade.

6. Bad grammar, diction and posture while reciting results in a failing grade.

7.

Repeated absence from class will lead to your being asked to leave the class.

8. Absence from exams results in a failing grade for that exam.

9. The official grade breakdown is: 25% recitation, 35% midterms, 40% finals.

However, you will be credited with strong recitation performance should your

exam scores be worse than your recitation standing.

10. Demonstration of some kind of effort should result in a passing final grade.

11. Failing in a class where recitation questions are given at the beginning of thesemester should be humanly impossible for a student of minimal intelligence.



CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IOscar Franklin Barcelona Tan

University of the East

1st Semester, 2013-2014

Saturday, 9:00 AM – 12:00 Noon

Twitter: @oscarfbtan

Facebook: www.facebook.com/OscarFranklinTan

SYLLABUS

Week 1(June 22, 2013)

PART 1: HOW TO R EAD THE CONSTITUTION (90 minutes)

I. Textualism

“A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it

should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”

--Justice Antonin Scalia, A M ATTER OF I NTERPRETATION (1998)

“There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally.”--Judge Learned Hand (quoted by Chief Justice

Aharon Barak, T HE J UDGE IN A D EMOCRACY (2006))

• CONST. art. VII, § 18

• Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668, Sep. 15, 1989

(majority opinion by Justice Irene Cortes) (focus on executive power

discussion)

• Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, 338 SCRA 81,

Aug. 15, 2000 (focus on commander-in-chief powers discussion)

• David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. 171396, 489 SCRA 161, May 3, 2006

(focus on commander-in-chief powers discussion)

•

CONST. art. IX-C, § 1(1)• Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 201 SCRA 210, Sep. 3, 1991

• Oscar Franklin Tan, Guarding the Guardians, Addressing the Post-1987 Imbalance of Presidential Power and Judicial Review, 86 PHIL. L.J. 523, 536-

39 (2012)

Guide questions

1. You are not required to read the cases in full. Focus on the basic facts only and

these guide questions.

2. Distinguish the approach to interpreting the commander-in-chief powers in

Marcos v. Manglapus and IBP v. Zamora.



3. Was it necessary for the court to interpret the commander-in-chief’s power tosuppress lawless violence in IBP v. Zamora? What was the problem addressed

by the court?

4. How was the court’s interpretation of the commander-in-chief power applied

in David? Was the context similar? Do you think the court in IBP v. Zamora

anticipated their interpretation would be used this way?5.

Was it necessary for the court to interpret the meaning of “practice of law” the

way it did in Cayetano?

6. What does textualist interpretation mean? Does it mean literal interpretation?7. What interpretive philosophy might be the opposite of textualism?

II. Structuralism

“A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great

powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution,

would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the

human mind. … Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be

marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which composethose objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. … [W]e must

never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”--Chief Justice John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)

• Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668, Sep. 15, 1989(majority opinion by Justice Irene Cortes) (focus on executive power

discussion)

• McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)1 (focus on whether the US

Congress had the power to create a bank)

•

De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, Mar. 17, 2010 (focuson midnight appointment of Chief Justice Renato Corona)2

Guide questions

1. You are not required to read the cases in full. Focus on the basic facts only andthese guide questions.

2. Identify the provision in the Constitution that provides for the separation of

powers.

3. Do you think Marcos v. Manglapus demonstrates textualism or structuralism

in its interpretation of the President’s powers?

4.

Describe the reasoning used in McCulloch and De Castro. How did this

reasoning go beyond the text of the Constitution?5. What is structuralist interpretation?

III. Originalism

“The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of

constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the

people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional

construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the

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framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safelyassumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the

explanation offered by the framers.”

-- Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

G.R. No. 78780, 152 SCRA 284, Jul. 23, 1987

“When it appears that the latest ‘rule,’ or ‘three part test,’ or ‘balancing test’ devised

by the Court has placed us on a collision course with such a landmark practice, it is

the former that must be recalculated by us, and not the latter that must be abandoned by our citizens. I know of no other way to formulate a constitutional jurisprudence

that reflects, as it should, the principles adhered to, over time, by the American people, rather than those favored by the personal (and necessarily shifting)

philosophical dispositions of a majority of this Court.”

--Justice Antonin Scalia, Rutan v. Republican Party

of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990) (dissenting)

•

Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 415 SCRA 44, Nov.10, 2003 (focus on use of Constitutional Commission deliberations in

discussing judicial power and the one-year bar in impeachment)

• De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, Mar. 17, 2010 (focuson use of Constitutional Commission deliberations in justifying midnight

appointment of Chief Justice Renato Corona)

• Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203766, Apr. 2,

2013 (focus on use of Constitutional Commission deliberations in determining

whether the party-list system is solely for marginalized sectors)3

• Oscar Franklin Tan, Commentary: Opening up the partylist system, PHIL.

DAILY I NQUIRER , Apr. 7, 2013

4

Guide questions

1. You are not required to read the cases in full. Focus on the basic facts only andthese guide questions.

2. Discuss how Constitutional Commission deliberations were used in each case.How important were these in deciding the case?

3. What is the role of Constitutional Commission deliberations in interpreting

our Constitution?

4. Is originalism more important in the United States or in the Philippines?

5. What is originalism?

6.

Discuss how the three methods of reading the Constitution outlined todaywere used in De Castro. In Atong Paglaum.

PART 2: LINK BETWEEN JUDICIAL R EVIEW AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION

(90 minutes)

I. The legal basis of judicial review in a democracy

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I NQUIRER , Oct. 18, 2012



“[W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assertany superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate

an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to

it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the

Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which

that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved inwhat is termed ‘judicial supremacy’ which properly is the power of judicial review

under the Constitution.”

--Justice Jose P. Laurel, Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936)

“It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what thelaw is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and

interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the

operation of each.”

-- Chief Justice John Marshall, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

•

CONST. art. VIII, § 1

• Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) (focus on the justification for why the Court may invoke the Constitution to strike down the

act of another branch)

• Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)5 (focus on the justification for why

the Court may invoke the Constitution to strike down the act of another

branch)

• Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 786

• ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, 16-23 (1962)

Guide questions1. Justify why judicial review allows unelected justices to strike down the acts of

elected public officials. Why is this not undemocratic?

2. What is the legal basis of judicial review and why is it a power entrusted to the

judiciary?3. What is judicial supremacy? Is the Supreme Court more equal than other co-

equal branches because it can strike down the other branches’ acts?4.

Differentiate the legal basis of judicial review in the Philippines and in the

United States.

II. The expanded certiorari power and the political question

“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessof jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”

--1987 Constitution

“[T]he term ‘political question’ connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary

parlance, namely, a question of policy. … it refers to ‘those questions which, under

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the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or inregard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or

executive branch of the Government.’ It is concerned with issues dependent upon the

wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.”

-- Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957)

“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a

textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate

political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards forresolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of

a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertakingindependent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches

of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision

already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements

by various departments on one question.”

--Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)

• CONST. art. VIII, § 1

• Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957) (focus on the political question)

• Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 415 SCRA 44, Nov.

10, 2003 (focus on discussion of judicial power and the political question)

• Oscar Franklin Tan, The 2004 Canvass: It is Emphatically the Province and Duty of Congress to Say What Congress Is, 79 PHIL. L.J. 39, 75-79 (2004)

Guide questions

1. What is the rationale for the political question?

2.

What are the different types of political question under Baker v. Carr? Underwhat three categories are they summarized?

3. How does Francisco distinguish between a “truly political” and a “not truly

political” question?4. How was the political question doctrine abused during Martial Law and how

did the 1987 Constitution address this abuse? How was judicial powerexpanded?

5. Is the political question doctrine nonexistent under the 1987 Constitution?

Why might the political question doctrine be useful to our democracy?

6. What is the relationship of judicial review and the political question doctrine?

Week 2(June 29, 2013)

PART 3: THE SPECTRUM OF JUDICIAL R EVIEW

(60 minutes)

I. Judicial activism and judicial restraint

“[The] pre-eminent prejudice in favor of human rights induced our constitutionalcommissioners to reexamine the balance of power among the three great branches of

government—the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. The reexamination

easily revealed that under the then existing balance of power, the Executive, thru theadept deployment of the commander-in-chief powers, can run roughshod over our



human rights. It further revealed that a supine legislature can betray the human rightsof the people by defaulting to enact appropriate laws, for there is nothing you can do

when Congress exercises its power to be powerless. It is for this reason and more, that

our Constitutional Commissioners, deemed it wise to strengthen the powers of the

Judiciary, to give it more muscular strength in dealing with the non-use, misuse, and

abuse of authority in government.”--Chief Justice Reynato Puno, “The View from the Mountaintop” (2007)

• CONST. art. VIII, § 5(5)

• Reynato Puno, “The View from the Mountaintop”, Keynote Speech deliveredat National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killing and Enforced

Disappearances, Centennial Hall, Manila Hotel, Jul. 16, 20077

• CONST. art. II, § 16

• Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, Jul. 30, 1993

Guide questions

1.

Do you agree with the Court’s textual basis for the rulemaking power

described in Chief Justice Puno’s speech (and led to the writ of amparo) and

the right to a balanced and healthful ecology in Oposa?

2. What is the main restraint on judicial review in the Constitution? Was thisrestraint breached in either reading above?

3. Is judicial activism within or beyond the court’s power of judicial review?4.

How does the Court calibrate its exercise of judicial review, leading to what is

perceived as judicial activism or judicial restraint?

5. If you were a Justice, would you embrace judicial activism or judicial

restraint? Why?

II. Coordinate constitutional interpretation and popular constitutionalism

“To nudge popular institutions out of the life of the Constitution is to impoverish both

the Constitution and the republican system it is meant to establish.”--Stanford Dean Larry Kramer, We The Court, 115 H ARV . L. R EV . 4 (2001)

• Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 415 SCRA 44, Nov.10, 2003 (Puno, J., separate opinion) (focus on coordinacy theory)

• Franklin Drilon, Judging Congress, 79 PHIL. L.J. 35 (2004)

• Oscar Franklin Tan, The 2004 Canvass: It is Emphatically the Province and

Duty of Congress to Say What Congress Is, 79 PHIL. L.J. 39, 60-72 (2004)• Dean Raul Pangalangan, Passion for Reason: ‘Save the Constitution from the

Court…’, PHIL. DAILY I NQUIRER , Dec. 15, 2011

• Dean Raul Pangalangan, Passion for Reason: Anti-democratic

constitutionalism, PHIL. DAILY I NQUIRER , Jan. 12, 2012

• Oscar Franklin Tan, Commentary: The ‘only boss’ at battleground of principle, PHIL. DAILY I NQUIRER , Dec. 19, 2011

Guide questions

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1. What is coordinate constitutional interpretation and what are its merits? Howis it related to the political question doctrine?

2. Do you believe that the President and Congress have an equal duty to interpret

the Constitution? Is this inconsistent with the Court’s role as final arbiter?

3. What is popular constitutionalism?

4.

Do you believe that the People have a duty to interpret the Constitutionoutside the amendment process in the Constitution?

PART 4: ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY R EQUIREMENT IN JUDICIAL R EVIEW

(120 minutes)

“[J]udicial power … is the right to determine actual controversies arising between

adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction. The right to declare a

law unconstitutional arises because an act of Congress relied upon by one or the other

of such parties in determining their rights is in conflict with the fundamental law. The

exercise of this, the most important and delicate duty of this Court, is not given to it as

a body with revisory power over the action of Congress, but because the rights of thelitigants in justiciable controversies require the court to choose between the

fundamental law and a law purporting to be enacted within constitutional authority, but in fact beyond the power delegated to the legislative branch of the government.”

--Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)

I. Actual case or controversy requirement


• Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-63 (1911) (focus on the

definitions of “case” and “controversy” and the definition of judicial power as“the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants”)

• Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 415 SCRA 44, Nov.10, 2003 (focus on the section “essential requisites of judicial review” and the

Ashwander factors)

• Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. No. 187883, 589 SCRA 356, Jun. 16, 2009 (focuson rationale for the case or controversy requirement and the standing or locus

standi requirement)

Guide questions

1. What is the classic restriction on judicial review? Does this restriction have a

parallel in legislative power? Why or why not?2. Why do we insist that judicial review be exercised only in an adversarial

proceeding where the essential requisites for judicial review are met?3.

Is the Court authorized to resolve hypothetical or academic questions?

4. May the Court issue advisory opinions?5.

How might use of the political question doctrine and standing, ripeness,

mootness and lis mota doctrines preserve the Court’s political capital? Is this

allowed under the wording of CONST. art. VIII, § 1?

II. Ripeness versus prematurity

“It is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed byeither branch before a court may come into the picture. At such a time, it may pass on



the validity of what was done but only ‘when ... properly challenged in an appropriatelegal proceeding.’”

--Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 34161, 43 SCRA 677, Feb. 29, 1972


•

Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 415 SCRA 44, Nov.10, 2003 (focus on the section “ripeness and prematurity”)

Guide questions

1. What is ripeness? What is required before a case is deemed ripe foradjudication and before an act of a branch of government is deemed ripe for

challenge?

2. Why is ripeness required before judicial review is exercised?

3. How is ripeness linked to whether the Court is taking a stance of judicial

activism or judicial restraint?

III. Moot and academic principle

“The ‘moot and academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automaticallydissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and

academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second , theexceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;

third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to

guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition

yet evading review.”

-- David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. 171396, 489 SCRA 161, May 3, 2006

•

CONST. art. VIII, § 1

• Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, 357 SCRA 757, May 10, 2001 (focus on

whether or not the Court ruled whether the state of rebellion after EDSA III

was valid and the effect of the lifting of the state of rebellion)

• Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, 421 SCRA 656, Feb. 3,

2004 (focus on whether or not the Court ruled whether the state of rebellion

after the Oakwood mutiny was valid and the effect of the lifting of the state ofrebellion)


(focus on the section “moot and academic principle” in relation to the state of

national emergency and the effect of the lifting of the state of nationalemergency)

• Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 120293, Mar. 20, 2012 (focus on

whether or not the Court ruled whether the declaration of martial law in

Maguindanao after the Ampatuan massacre was valid and the effect of the

lifting of martial law)

• Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the PhilippinesPeace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008 (focus on

the section “mootness” in relation to the first Memorandum of Agreement

with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the effect of the government’sdeclaration that it no longer intended to sign the MOA-AD)

Guide questions



1. You are not required to read in detail the facts and rulings in the above cases;you will only be asked about the basic facts and rulings. Focus instead on the

Court’s discussion of mootness.

2. What is mootness?

3. Why should the Court avoid deciding cases that have become moot and

academic?4.

What is the exception to the moot and academic principle? What are the four

requirements to invoke this exception?

5. Compare the Court’s approach to declarations of state of rebellion, state ofnational emergency or martial law (each of which were later lifted) in Lacson,

Sanlakas, David and Fortun. Was the Court’s action the same in each case?Justify the differences in the Court’s actions.

6. How was the David doctrine on mootness applied to the first MOA-AD?

7. How is mootness linked to whether the Court is taking a stance of judicial

activism or judicial restraint?

IV. Lis mota

“The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemndeclarations of two of the three grand departments of the governments. Then, there is

that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive.

It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the

Constitution except in a clear case.”

--Justice Jose P. Laurel, People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937)


•

General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, Mar. 29, 2011 (focus on the discussion oflis mota and the section “An acting appointee has no cause of action for quo

warranto against the new appointee”; ignore the discussion distinguishing a

regular and an acting appointment)

Guide questions

1. When is an issue lis mota?

2. Why must the issue be lis mota before it is used to decide a case?

3.

How is lis mota doctrine linked to whether the Court is taking a stance of

judicial activism or judicial restraint?

Week 3(July 6, 2013)


(continued, 180 minutes)

V. Standing

“Standing is not ‘an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable,’ but as we have

said requires … a factual showing of perceptible harm.”

--Justice Antonin Scalia, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 (1992)



“[C]ourts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor arethey free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance. The

rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle. It is

intended ‘to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and, perhaps more

importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the determination of a coordinate,

democratically elected organ of government.’ It thus goes to the very essence ofrepresentative democracies.”

--Justice Reynato Puno, Kilosbayan v. Guingona,

G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994 (dissenting)


• CONST. art. VII, § 18, ¶ 3

• Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. No. 187883, 589 SCRA 356, Jun. 16, 2009 (focus

on rationale for the standing or locus standi requirement)

• Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 415 SCRA 44, Nov.

10, 2003 (focus on standing issues specified below; read footnote 15)

•

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, 421 SCRA 656, Feb. 3,

2004 (focus on standing issues specified below)

• David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. 171396, 489 SCRA 161, May 3, 2006(focus on standing issues specified below)

• Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines

Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008 (focus onstanding issues specified below)

• Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 120293, Mar. 20, 2012 (focus on

standing issues in the context of a declaration of martial law)

Guide questions1. Why must a party have the proper standing before being allowed to raise a

constitutional issue in court?

2. What kind of injury, generally, must a party prove to establish standing?

3. Explain whether each party below had the proper standing:

Decision Party Background Standing Claim

David Prof. Randy David Arrested Direct injury

North

Cotabato

Province of North Cotabato

Province of Zamboanga del Norte

Province of Sultan Kudarat

City of Iligan

City of ZamboangaCity of Isabela

Would be

included in

Bangsamoro

Judicial Entity

Direct injury

Francisco Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Ernesto Francisco, Jr.

Prof. Harry Roque

Arturo de Castro

Lawyers Member of the Bar

Sanlakas Social Justice Society Lawyers Member of the Bar

David Jose Cadiz and other officers of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Lawyers Member of the Bar

Francisco Venicio Flores

Hector Hofileña

Law professors Member of the Bar

Sanlakas Social Justice Society Law professors Member of the Bar



Francisco Dean Sedfrey Candelaria

Solgen Frank Chavez

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng

mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.

World War II Veterans Legionnaires of

the Philippines, Inc.

Citizen Public right

Sanlakas Social Justice Society Citizen Public right David Alternative Law Groups, Inc. Citizen Public right

North

Cotabato

Sen. Ernesto Maceda

Jejomar Binay

Aquilino Pimentel III

Citizen Public right

North

Cotabato

Sen. Manuel “Mar” Roxas Citizen Public right

Fortun Any citizen Citizen Public right

Sanlakas Sanlakas

Partido ng Manggagawa

People’s

organization

Public right

David Kilusang Mayo Uno People’s

organization

Direct injury

Francisco Jaime Soriano Taxpayer Taxpayer

Sanlakas Social Justice Society Taxpayer Taxpayer

David Sen. Loren Legarda Taxpayer Taxpayer

North

Cotabato

Sen. Ernesto Maceda

Jejomar Binay


Taxpayer Taxpayer

North

Cotabato

Franklin Drilon

Adel Tamano

Taxpayer Taxpayer

Francisco Rep. Salacnib Baterina

Rep. Raul Gonzalez

Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.

Congressman

Senator

Legislator

Sanlakas Rep. Rolex Suplico

Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.

Congressman

Senator

Legislator

David Various congressmen Congressman Legislator David Sen. Loren Legarda Former senator Legislator

North

Cotabato

Sen. Manuel “Mar” Roxas Senator Legislator

North

Cotabato

Sen. Ernesto Maceda

Jejomar Binay


Ruy Elias Lopez

Former senator

Makati mayor

Cagayan de

Oro resident

Former

congressman

Legislator

Mayor

Legislator

Francisco U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc. Representatives

of unborn

Filipinos

Intergenerational

responsibility (Oposa

v. Factoran)

4. In Francisco, the injured party was obviously Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.Explain why the Court proceeded with the case even though the chief justice

himself did not file a suit. Is it possible to pursue a constitutional case even

though one is not the directly injured or the most injured party?

5. In David, distinguish how the standing of a people’s organization was

recognized from how such standing was treated in Sanlakas.

6.

In North Cotabato, distinguish the taxpayer standing claim of Senators

Ernesto Maceda and Franklin Drilon.

7. In Fortun, distinguish the standing of “any citizen” from all other invocationsof citizen standing in all other cases.



8. If a president declares martial law in Maguindanao, does one have to be aresident of Maguindanao to challenge the declaration?

9. Summarize the rule to establish standing in each of the following cases:

• Direct injury

• Lawyer

•

Law professor• Citizen

• People’s organization

• Taxpayer

• Legislator

VI. Raise a constitutional issue at the earliest possible opportunity

“Although this Court has no control over contrary people and naysayers, we reiterate

a word of caution against the filing of baseless petitions which only clog the Court’s

docket. The petition in the instant case belongs to that classification.”

-- Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,

G.R. No. 191618, 635 SCRA 783, Nov. 23, 2010


• Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, 635 SCRA

783, Nov. 23, 2010 (focus on when Atty. Romulo Macalintal raised the

constitutional issue; ignore the other issues)

• CONST. art. XIII, § 4

• Hacienda Luisita Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No.

171101, 653 SCRA 154, Jul. 5, 2011 (focus on when the constitutional issue

was raised; ignore the other issues)

Guide questions1.

Who was Atty. Romulo Macalintal? At what stage of proceedings did he raise

the constitutional issue?

2. Was this issue entertained? Did the Court have a good impression of Atty.

Macalintal?

3. Who were FARM’s members? At what stage of proceedings did they raise the

constitutional issue?

4. Was this issue entertained?

VII. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

“[W]e do not take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se, not becauseof any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that

facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. As a result, we

cannot accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners’ allegation that the Arroyo

government is engaged in “doublespeak” in trying to pass off as a mere training

exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil. The petitions invite us to

speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao, to issue, make factual findings on

matters well beyond our immediate perception, and this we are understandably loath

to do.”-- Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.

151445, 380 SCRA 739, Apr. 11, 2002




• CONST. art. XVIII, § 25

• Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, 380 SCRA 739, Apr. 11, 2002

(read the majority opinion and Justice Kapunan’s dissent; focus on the issue of

whether American troops are involved in active combat operations in thePhilippines; ignore the analysis of the Visiting Forces Agreement)

Guide questions1. How did the Supreme Court resolve the issue of whether or not US special

forces units were involved in active combat operations in the Philippines?2.

According to Justice Santiago Kapunan, what facts should the Court have

been aware of regarding US military operations in the Philippines?

VIII. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction over all matters

“If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where theConstitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction

where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of

jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance.”-- Chief Justice John Marshall, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

• CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 5(1), 5(2)

• Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (focus on whether the US SupremeCourt had jurisdiction over a petition for mandamus)

• R ULES OF COURT, Rule 63, § 1

•

Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, 357 SCRA 757, May 10, 2001 (focus onthe section “G.R. No. 147810”)

Guide questions

1. Did Chief Justice John Marshall find that William Marbury had a right to his

commission? Did he order Secretary of State James Madison to deliver the

commission to Marbury? Why or why not?

2.

In Lacson, did the Liberal Party have standing to raise a constitutional issue?

Was it proper for them to file a suit for declaratory relief in the Supreme

Court? What is declaratory relief?

IX. Transcendental importance doctrine

“We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The

issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than

those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues

immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in

the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive

effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in

pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves

recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushesaside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.”

--Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., Kilosbayan v. Guingona,G.R. No. 113375, 232 SCRA 110, May 5, 1994



“Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are

brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or

by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually

sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have

‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure thatconcrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court

so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’”

--Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, Kilosbayan v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, 250SCRA 130, Nov. 16, 1995, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)



• Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, 232 SCRA 110, May 5, 1994

(read the majority opinion, Justice Feliciano’s concurring opinion and Justice

Puno’s dissent; focus on discussion on standing and transcendental

importance; ignore the discussion about the contract being assailed)

• Kilosbayan v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, 250 SCRA 130, Nov. 16, 1995

(focus on discussion on standing and transcendental importance; ignore the

discussion about the contract being assailed)

• Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 415 SCRA 44, Nov.10, 2003 (focus on discussion on standing and transcendental importance)


(focus on discussion on standing and transcendental importance)

• Oscar Franklin Tan, Guarding the Guardians, Addressing the Post-1987

Imbalance of Presidential Power and Judicial Review, 86 PHIL. L.J. 523, 539-

46 (2012)

Guide questions

1. What is the transcendental importance exception to the rules on standing?

2.

How did Justice Vicente V. Mendoza distinguish the standing requirement in

constitutional cases and the real party in interest requirement in ordinary

cases? In Kilosbayan v. Morato, did Justice Mendoza consider it relevant that

the assailed contract was with a government corporation?

3. Is it possible to draft a rule to govern when the Court grants an exception tostanding based on transcendental importance? How did Justice Florentino

Feliciano approach this question in Kilosbayan v. Guingona?

4.

Was Justice Feliciano’s framework cited in David? In Francisco? Has thisframework been uniformly accepted, based on recent cases?

5. Why did Dean Raul Pangalangan allude to Justice Feliciano’s framework in

Francisco? Why was this case a good demonstration of the framework?

6. What examples did David present of cases where the Court recognized an

issue of transcendental importance and granted standing based on this?

7. How can liberal or strict treatment of standing lead to judicial activism or

restraint?8.

Is standing a constitutional requirement or a procedural requirement that can

be waived by the Court to hear a case?



X. Non self executing provisions

“To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more

specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the

general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine

Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effectiveopportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to

dismiss.”

-- Justice Florentino Feliciano, Oposa v. Factoran, G.R.

No. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, Jul. 30, 1993 (concurring)

“[S]ome constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the

framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different

departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and

inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such

as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of

supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means

of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus aconstitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred

and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can bedetermined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language

indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.”

“This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of

respondents to sell the historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia

— to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever

manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of foreignsilver. … [T]his Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the

duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protectthe sanctity of the Constitution.”

-- Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,

G.R. No. 122156, 267 SCRA 408, 431, Feb. 3, 1997

“[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,

labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchangewith the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection

of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that areunfair. … While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign

goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. Infact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on

foreign competition that is unfair.”

-- Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, Tanada v. Angara,

G.R. No. 118295, 272 SCRA 18, 54, May 2, 1997


•

CONST. art. II, § 16



• Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, Jul. 30, 1993 (Feliciano,

J., concurring ) (focus on the distinction between a policy and a legal right)


• CONST. art. XII, §§ 10, 12

• CONST. art. XII, §§ 1, 13

•

Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No.122156, 267 SCRA 408, 431, Feb. 3, 1997 (read the majority opinion and the

dissents of Justices Puno and Panganiban; focus on the implementation of the

“Filipino First” policy and whether a Filipino bidder was allowed to match a

foreign bidder)

• Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, 272 SCRA 18, 54, May 2, 1997 (focuson the sections “Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing” and “Economic

Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain

Balanced Development of Economy”)

• CONST. art. XII, § 3

•

Duncan Ass’n of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo-Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,G.R. No. 162994, 438 SCRA 343, Sep. 17, 2004 (focus on the discussion of

Glaxo having a right to guard its trade secrets and a right to reasonable returns

on investments; ignore the discussion on the right to marry)


• Hacienda Luisita Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No.

171101, 653 SCRA 154, Jul. 5, 2011 (Corona, C.J., concurring and

dissenting ) (focus on the section “Court’s duty to confront constitutional

question and compare the discussion of whether the constitutional provision

on land reform is self executing with the discussion in the majority opinion)

Guide questions1. A constitutional claim will be entertained only in an actual controversy and if

it claims what kind of right?

2. In Oposa, how did Justice Florentino Feliciano distinguish a constitutional or

statutory policy and a demandable legal right? Which branch of government is

responsible for crafting policy? For enforcing legal rights?

3.

How did he suggest the petitioners improve their petition? Did he agree with

the legal doctrine in the majority opinion?

4. According to Manila Prince Hotel, it is clear that the Constitution affectslaws. Does it affect contracts between private persons?

5. According to Manila Prince Hotel, what is a self executing provision?

6.

According to Manila Prince Hotel and Tanada, what are some provisions ofthe Constitution that have been declared non self executing? Is gambling

textually prohibited by our Constitution?

7.

According to Manila Prince Hotel, what is our national patrimony? Was the

Manila Hotel described as an ordinary building in the Philippines? How did

the Court describe the idea of selling the Manila Hotel to a foreigner?

8. How was a qualified bidder defined in Manila Prince Hotel and how was a

qualified bidder allowed to match the bid of a foreigner? Did Justice Punoagree with the majority opinion on this point? What about Justice Panganiban?

9. Did Manila Prince Hotel and Tanada interpret the same constitutional

provision? Was the result the same?

10.

Explain the balancing approach in Tanada.



11. Did the Court state that Glaxo had relevant constitutional rights in Dunan Assn, and were these rights self executing? Were these rights invoked against

the right to marry, which is a fundamental human right?

12. Is the Constitution’s provision on land reform self executing? Can it be used

as the basis to strike down a law?

Week 5(July 13, 2013)


(continued, 165 minutes)

XI. Intergenerational responsibility

“Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations

yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of

their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. … Needless tosay, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and

harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little

differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, atthe same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that

right for the generations to come.”

-- Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., Oposa v. Factoran,

G.R. No. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, Jul. 30, 1993



• A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 2, §§ 4-5, Apr. 29, 2010 (Supreme Court Rules of

Procedure in Environmental Cases)

• Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, Jul. 30, 1993


Imbalance of Presidential Power and Judicial Review, 86 PHIL. L.J. 523, 541-43 (2012)

Guide questions

1. How did the concept of intergenerational responsibility expand the rule on

standing? To what kind of cases is this rule applicable?

2.

How have later cases applied Oposa?

XII. The rulemaking power

“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to

claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first dutiesof government is to afford that protection.”

-- Chief Justice John Marshall, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

• CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 5 (5)

• Rep. Act. No. 9745, §10 (2009) (Anti-Torture Act of 2009)

•

Reynato Puno, “The View from the Mountaintop”, Keynote Speech deliveredat National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killing and Enforced



Disappearances, Centennial Hall, Manila Hotel, Jul. 16, 20078 (focus on the

legal basis of the amparo rules)

• Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, 568 SCRA 1, Oct. 7, 2008

(focus on the legal basis of the amparo rules)

• Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, 301 SCRA 96, Jan. 19,

1999 (focus on the one paragraph where Justice Puno discusses art. VIII, § 5(5) before he became Chief Justice)



• Dean Raul Pangalangan, Passion for Reason: Judicial activism and its limits,

PHIL. DAILY I NQUIRER , Feb. 1, 2008

• Dean Raul Pangalangan, Passion for Reason: The Chief Justice replies, PHIL. DAILY I NQUIRER , Feb. 7, 2008

Guide questions

1.

What is the legal basis of the rulemaking power? Is there a limit to the rules

that can be promulgated by the court?

2.

What was the understanding of art. VIII, § 5 (5) before 2007?

3. Has Congress recognized the amparo rules?

4. What is the writ of amparo? What did the Court of Appeals and the SupremeCourt order in Manalo? Could these orders have been made under art. VIII, §

1?5.

Did the memo of Chief Justice Reynato Puno on a preference for fines instead

of imprisonment exceed the power of judicial review?

6. Was the memo an exercise of the rulemaking power? Should it be treated as

such?7. How has the rulemaking power been used? Has it been used after the term of

Chief Justice Puno?

XIII. The expansion of judicial power’s scope under the 1987 Constitution

“Our experience under martial law has swung the pendulum of judicial power to the

other extreme where the Supreme Court can now sit as ‘superlegislature’ and‘superpresident.’ If there is such a thing as judicial supremacy, then this is it.”

“Judicial review, like most things in life, is double-edged. In our political life, it can

cut both ways: it can protect human rights, but it can also prevent social reforms. Withits new found strength and its expanded power, the judiciary is no longer the ‘least

dangerous branch of our government’.... [I]t may yet evolve to be the most dangerous

branch.”

-- Dean Pacifico Agabin, The Politics of Judicial Review Over Executive Action: The Supreme Court and Social Change, 64 P HIL. L.J. 189 (1989)

• CONST. art. VIII, §§1, 5 (5)

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• In re Matter of Impeachment of Renato C. Corona, Verified Complaint for

Impeachment, art. VII, Dec. 12, 2011

• Dean Raul Pangalangan, Commentary: Arroyo’s pleas political, not human

rights issue, PHIL. DAILY I NQUIRER , at A1, Nov. 18, 2011



Guide questions1. In November 2011, what was the legal basis to allow former President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo to leave the country? The legal basis to prevent her fromleaving? How was judicial power involved in this issue? Which answer do you

think is more democratic?

2. Did allowing Arroyo to leave constitute an impeachable offense? How would

you arrive at the answer to this question?

3. Explain the expansion of judicial power in the 1987 Constitution, particularly:

a.

The expanded certiorari power

b. The political question doctrine’s restriction and the recognition of “not

truly” political questionsc.

Relaxed standing rules, the transcendental importance doctrine and the

concept of intergenerational responsibilityd.

The sheer length of the 1987 Constitution and a focus on textualism

e. The rulemaking power

f. The entrenched acceptance of judicial supremacy

XIV. After judicial review: Control over implementation of decisions

“[T]he finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor

the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to

amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the courtretains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the

jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modifyor alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for

the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment

becomes final. . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances

may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.”

-- Justice Camilo Quiason, P HILIPPINE C OURTS AND THEIR J URISDICTION (1998)

• Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, 301 SCRA 96, Jan. 19,

1999 (focus on the Court’s control over the execution of a judgment)

• Metro Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay,G.R. No. 171947, Feb. 15, 2011 (focus on the Court’s control over the

execution of a judgment contrasted with encroachment on executive power)

Guide questions

1. In Echegaray, according to the Secretary of Justice, did the Supreme Court

have the authority to restrain its own decision, which became final and

executory? Did the Court agree?

2.

What extreme circumstance prompted the Court to restrain its own decision?What opportunity did it wish to give Congress?



3. How is the power to control the execution of a judgment related to a court’s jurisdiction?

4. In MMDA, what did the Court instruct various agencies to do pursuant to its

decision? Were these actions extensive?

5. Were the Court’s instructions an encroachment on executive power? How did

the Court justify its actions?

XV. After judicial review: Operative fact doctrine

“The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an

unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law

remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair

play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the

unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.”

-- Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, League of Cities of the Philippines

v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 176951, Aug. 24, 2010

• League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

176951, Aug. 24, 2010 (note the date of the decision; focus on the section“Operative Fact Doctrine”)

• Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, Jul. 17, 2012 (focus on

the discussion of the operative fact doctrine at the end of the decision)

Guide questions

1. Why is the League of Cities line of cases famous? What effect did the

unconstitutional (at the time of the above decision) law have on the country?

2.

What practice in the JBC was struck down in Chavez v. JBC? Did the Court

recognize the JBC’s previous actions pursuant to its problematic composition?3.

What is the operative fact doctrine?

4. Does the operative fact doctrine validate an unconstitutional law?

PART 5: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE JUDICIARY

(15 minutes)

I. “One Supreme Court”

“[T]o disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, isnothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established

by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial

power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the

jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation

of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of

the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass

disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but toabandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its

entire membership of Justices.”

-- Chief Justice Reynato Puno, Estrada v. Desierto,

G.R. No. 146710, 356 SCRA 108, Apr. 3, 2001





783, Nov. 23, 2010 (focus on whether the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is

different from the Supreme Court)

• Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, 356 SCRA 108, Apr. 3, 2001 (motion

for reconsideration) (focus on the section “VI. Recusation”) • Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 Phil. 297 (1948) (focus on whether Supreme Court

Justices may be disqualified by the law discussed in the case and other judges

may be designated to the Supreme Court)

Guide questions

1. Judicial power is ultimately placed in the Supreme Court. Can it be placed inany other body? Does the Supreme Court become another body when it

exercises other functions given to it under the Constitution?

2. What would the effect have been in Estrada v. Desierto had the Court granted

President Joseph Estrada’s motion for 12 Justices to inhibit from the case? If

the designations in Vargas were permitted?

Week 6(July 20, 2013)

PART 5: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE JUDICIARY

(180 minutes, continued)

II. Quorum and the logistics of deciding cases

“Any ruling of this Court that a tie-vote on a motion for reconsideration reverses a

prior majority vote on the main decision would wreak havoc on well-settled

jurisprudence of this Court. Such an unprecedented ruling would resurrect contentious

political issues long ago settled, such as the PIRMA initiative in Santiago and the

people's initiative in Lambino. Countless other decisions of this Court would come

back to haunt it, long after such decisions have become final and executory followingthe tie-votes on the motions for reconsideration which resulted in the denial of the

motions. … This Court cannot afford to unleash such a catastrophe on the nation.”

-- Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, League of Cities of the Philippinesv. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 176951, Dec. 21, 2009 (dissenting)

•

CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4, 13, 14, 15• Fortich v. Corona , G.R. No. 131457, Aug. 19, 1999


• League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

176951, Dec. 21, 2009 (note the date of this decision; read the majority

opinion and Justice Carpio’s dissent; focus on what happens to a motion for

reconsideration of the Court’s decision if the voting is tied and ignore the

substantive issues regarding the cities)


• Agoy v. Araneta Center, Inc. G.R. No. 196358, Mar. 21, 2012

• Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Evangelista, et al, G.R. No.88709, Feb. 11, 1992 (focus on the questioned order and whether it met the

constitutional requirement)



• In re Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, A. M. No. 00-8-

05-SC, 370 SCRA 658, Nov. 28, 2001 (focus on the Sandiganbayan’s

compliance with the constitutional period to decide cases)

• People v. Celdran, Crim Case No. 387435-SA (MTC Branch 4, Manila), Dec.

14, 2012 (Judge Juan Bermejo, Jr.)

•

Oscar Franklin Tan, Commentary: Celdran jailed for offending political feelings, PHIL. DAILY I NQUIRER , Jan. 31, 2013

Guide questions1. What is the minimum number of Justices needed to declare a treaty, law or

other act of the President or Congress unconstitutional?2.

When must a case be decided en banc? Give three instances.

3. What must the Chief Justice certify and what basis must be expressed in each

decision?

4. What is the maximum allowable period to decide a case?

5. In the last Fortich case, what distinction was made between a case and a

matter? What is the impact of this distinction?

6. What is the effect of a tie vote in the Supreme Court en banc?

7. Was the rule cited in the motion for reconsideration in the first League ofCities case the rule previously applied by the Supreme Court, according the

Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio?8.

Why is the League of Cities line of cases famous again?

9. Does art. VIII, § 14 apply to executive agencies? To congressional

committees? What kind of decision does this section apply to?

10. What kind of judicial order does art. VIII, § 14 apply to? What is a minute

resolution and does the requirement apply to such a resolution?

11.

Did the order in Nicos meet the requirements of art. VIII, § 14? Why did the petitioners challenge the order under this section?

12. What examples of decisions that did not comply with art. VIII, § 14 did theCourt cite in Nicos?

13. Does art. VIII, § 14 require lengthy, detailed decisions?14.

Summarize what art. VIII, § 14 requires in a decision or final order.

15. What are the maximum time periods for deciding cases? What are the lower

collegiate courts?

16. What is the Sandiganbayan? Describe how many overdue cases the

Sandiganbayan had in 2001? Describe the delays involved.

17.

Did the Sandiganbayan comply with the constitutional period? How did the

Court resolve the situation? What happened to Justice Francis Garchitorena?18. Apply the requirement that a decision must state the facts and law on which it

is based to Carlos Celdran’s conviction for offending religious feelings.

III. Judicial independence, fiscal autonomy and jurisdiction

“One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional

grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent a judge from

discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a court

from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all

jurisdiction from courts, the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or

dispose of their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is



unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on theJudiciary’s fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of

government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it

must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose.”

-- Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, In re COA Opinion on the Computation

of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012

• CONST. art. VIII, §§ 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12


• Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 789 (focus on the characteristics the

judiciary was proposed to have to ensure its independence from politics)

• CONST. art. IX-D, § 2 (1)

• In re COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the

Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme

Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012

• Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 78780, 152 SCRA

284, Jul. 23, 1987 (focus on whether applying income tax to judges violates

judicial independence)

• Diaz v. Court of Appeals, Energy Regulatory Board, et al, G.R. No. 109698,Dec. 5, 1994 (focus on whether the Court’s appellate jurisdiction may be

expanded without its consent)

• CONST. art. VI, § 30

• In re Matter of Impeachment of Renato C. Corona, Verified Complaint forImpeachment, art. VIII, Dec. 12, 2011

• Metro Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay,

G.R. No. 171947, Feb. 15, 2011 (Carpio, J., dissenting ) (focus on theargument that the Court was improperly performing quasi-judicial or

administrative functions)


783, Nov. 23, 2010 (focus on whether the Justices as members of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal were improperly performing quasi-judicial or

administrative functions)

Guide questions

1. How did In re COA Opinion define judicial independence? What two contextsdid it give?

2.

What are the various safeguards protecting judicial independence in the

Constitution?

3. How does fiscal autonomy relate to judicial independence? Describe

meaningful fiscal autonomy.

4. Does the Chief Justice have power to realign the budget given to the judiciary?

5. Does applying income tax to judges violate judicial independence? Was the

rule different before the 1987 Constitution? Why?

6. Under Diaz, may the Court’s appellate jurisdiction be expanded without its

consent? Why does this protect judicial independence? What appellate procedure was imposed on the Court in Diaz?

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7. How was Chief Justice Renato Corona accused of abusing fiscal autonomy?Given the doctrine in In re COA Opinion, what are remedies against such

abuse?

8. Who was Chief Justice when In re COA Opinion was decided?

9. In MMDA, what did the Court instruct various agencies to do pursuant to its

decision? Were these actions extensive?10.

Were the Court’s instructions an encroachment on executive power? How did

the Court justify its actions?

11. Explain Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio’s argument that the Courtwas effectively performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. What

past actions did the Court consider as performing quasi-judicial oradministrative functions?

12. What is a practical reason why Justices may not be designated to

administrative bodies?

13. Following Macalintal, is the Presidential Electoral Tribunal a different body

from the Supreme Court? Assuming it is, are the Justices improperly

performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions as PET members?

IV. Power over procedural rules

“The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress’ subsidiary and

corrective power. This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice that this Court’s power to promulgate judicial rules

‘is no longer shared by this Court with Congress’…. Reaffirming Echegaray’s

construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive power to promulgate

rules on pleading, practice and procedure as ‘one of the safeguards of this Court’s

institutional independence’….”

-- Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, Baguio Market Vendors Multi- Purpose Cooperative v. Cabato-Cortes, G.R. No. 165922, Feb. 26, 2010

• CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (5)

• Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Cabato-Cortes, G.R.

No. 165922, Feb. 26, 2010

• People v. Mateo, G.R. No. 147678, 433 SCRA 640, Jul. 7, 2004 (focus on the

creation of intermediate review only and ignore the facts of the case)

• In Re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954) (focus on the Court’s power over

admission to the practice of law and ignore the lengthy discussion ofAmerican cases; this case is being assigned primarily for comic relief)

Guide questions

1. Recall the previous decisions on what art. VIII, § 5 (5) before 2007 and theamparo rules. How does Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio in Baguio

Market Vendors summarize this subsection in a more general context?

2. Does Congress have any authority over the rules the Court is authorized to

promulgate? Was this true before the 1987 Constitution?

3. Does the Court have the authority to instruct intermediate review for death

penalty cases? Why?

4.

In In re Cunanan, what did bar flunkers lobby for in Congress? Were theysuccessful? Did the Court feel that their efforts promoted good public policy?



5. Does the Court have exclusive power over admission to the practice of law?Was this true before the 1987 Constitution?

6. How does the consolidation of the power to promulgate procedural rules

solely in the judiciary strengthen judicial independence?

V. Appointments to the Supreme Court and the judiciary

“The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's

mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidateswhose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the

discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should onlyrefer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in

the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an

unjustified delay in performing that duty.”

-- De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, Mar. 17, 2010

•

CONST. art. VIII, §§ 7-9

• Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 201 SCRA 210, Sep. 3, 1991

• Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, Jul. 17, 2012 (focus onhow many representatives of Congress may be in the JBC)

• De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, Mar. 17, 2010 (focus

on parts III and IV only)

Guide questions

1. What are the qualifications to be appointed to the judiciary in general?

2. Under Cayetano, how is “practice of law” interpreted? Is this a broad or a

narrow interpretation?3.

What are the qualifications to be appointed to the Supreme Court?

4. Describe the nature of the Judicial and Bar Council. According to Chavez v.

JBC, why was it created under the 1987 Constitution as an alternative toconfirmation by Congress?

5. What is the composition of the JBC?6.

May the JBC be compelled to submit a list to the President? What is its

mandatory time frame for submitting this list?

7. What was the final issue raised at the end of De Castro? How were standing

rules used to deflect this issue? Has this issue now been resolved?

Week 7(July 27, 2013)

PART 6: EXECUTIVE POWER

(180 minutes)

I. The nature and scope of executive power

“[A]lthough the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific

powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within

the scope of ‘executive power.’ Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said

to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In otherwords, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.”



--Justice Irene Cortes, Marcos v. Manglapus,G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668, Sep. 15, 1989

“The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black

and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra

shading gradually from one extreme to the other. …

“It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by

veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative andexecutive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight

compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that itis, or that the Constitution requires.”

--Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Springer v. Government

of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928) (dissenting)

“1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of

Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in hisown right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these

only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty.If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the

Federal Government, as an undivided whole, lacks power. …

“2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of

authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of

twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its

distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence

may sometimes, at least, as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on

independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely

to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables, rather thanon abstract theories of law.

“3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied

will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his

own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the

matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by

disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at

once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at

stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”--Justice Robert Jackson, The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (concurring)


• Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668, Sep. 15, 1989

(majority opinion by Justice Irene Cortes) (focus on executive powerdiscussion)

• Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (a.k.a. The Steel Seizure Case), 343

U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring ) (focus on Justice Robert Jackson’s

three categorizations of presidential power and his famous “zone of twilight”)

Guide questions



1. Did President Corazon Aquino have the power to prohibit the Marcoses fromreturning to the Philippines despite their recognized human right to return?

2. What is executive power? What are some powers explicitly included in

executive power? Is executive power limited to the powers explicitly

enumerated in the Constitution?

3.

In whom is executive power vested? In terms of the number of peopleinvolved, how is executive power different from legislative and judicial

power? What difference does this make, according to Justice and Dean Irene

Cortes?4. What is the delineation of executive and legislative power according to

Springer, Marcos v. Manglapus and Ople? Is this a clear delineation?5.

Discuss Justice Robert Jackson’s three categorizations of presidential power

(including his famous “zone of twilight”) and the rules for gauging the extent

of presidential power within each category.

II. The power of control and the doctrine of qualified political agency

“[T]he President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive

departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The

Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction … but he does not have the same control of

local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his

jurisdiction. … In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or

authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter

fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by

law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power

of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had

done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former forthat of the latter.”

--Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955)


• Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, 293 SCRA 141, Jul. 23, 1998 (ignore

discussion on the right to privacy; focus on whether the President could create

the computerized identification system discussed using his own power)

• Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director General of the National Economic

Development Authority, G.R. No. 167798, 487 SCRA 623, Apr. 19, 2006(ignore discussion on the right to privacy; focus on whether the Presidentcould create the multi-purpose ID system discussed using her own power)

• Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, 637

SCRA 78, Dec. 7, 2010 (focus on the section “Power of the President toCreate the Truth Commission”; ignore discussion of equal protection clause)

• Angeles v. Gaite, G.R. No. 176596, Mar. 23, 2011 (focus on the application of

the doctrine of qualified political agency to the libel case being discussed and

its review by the Department of Justice and the Office of the President; the full

background facts of this case are in the original 2009 decision)

• CONST. art. X, §§ 2, 4

•

CONST. art. II, § 25



• Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, 235 SCRA 135, Aug. 4, 1994 (focus on the

difference between the exercise of supervision versus control with respect to a

local government unit)

Guide questions

1.

Could the President could create the computerized identification system inOple using his own power? In KMU? Why? Distinguish the facts of the two.

2.

Could the President create the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 using his

own power? Is fact finding an executive function?

3. In Angeles, how did the libel case arise? Was its filing reviewed by the Office

of the President? Why or why not? Was the reason valid?

4. What is the doctrine of qualified political agency? What is its extent? Are

there certain acts which the President cannot perform via alter ego?

5. According to the landmark decision Mondano v. Silvosa, what is the

difference between the power of control and the power of supervision? Which

is broader? To what kind of government unit does each power apply to?

6.

Describe the President’s power over local governments.7.

Does the wording of the power of control imply that the political question

doctrine could be applied in the context of this power?

III. The commander-in-chief power

“[The Constitution] grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of

graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power,

the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to

declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court

ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that

‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to

prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ …

“Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him

in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is

considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the

exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under

a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the

greater are the limitations.”

-- David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. 171396, 489 SCRA 161, May 3, 2006


• CONST. art. XVI, § 6

• CONST. art. III, § 13

• Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, 338 SCRA 81,Aug. 15, 2000 (focus on commander-in-chief powers discussion)

• Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, 357 SCRA 757, May 10, 2001 (focus on

commander-in-chief powers discussion)

• Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, 421 SCRA 656, Feb. 3,

2004 (focus on commander-in-chief powers discussion, including the history

of how the power was transplanted from the United States)




(focus on commander-in-chief powers discussion)

• Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 120293, Mar. 20, 2012 (read the

majority decision and Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio’s dissent; focus

on commander-in-chief powers discussion)

•

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the PhilippinesPeace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008 (focus on

commander-in-chief powers discussion and ignore the discussion of the

content of the MOA-AD)

Guide questions1.

Which graduated power of the President as commander-in-chief was exercised

in IBP v. Zamora? What restriction on this power was cited by the Court? In

what instance did the Court say it might strike down the use of this power?

2. Do you think IBP v. Zamora applied the political question doctrine even

though the decision never mentioned the application of this doctrine?

3.

Which graduated power of the President as commander-in-chief was exercised

in Lacson? What restriction on this power was cited by the Court? In what

instance did the Court say it might strike down the use of this power? Was theCourt’s treatment similar to the treatment in IBP v. Zamora?

4. Which graduated power of the President as commander-in-chief was exercisedin Sanlakas? What restriction on this power was cited by the Court? In what

instance did the Court say it might strike down the use of this power? Was the

Court’s treatment similar to the treatment in Lacson?

5. Did Sanlakas involve a declaration of martial law?

6. According to Sanlakas, may the commander-in-chief power be used in

conjunction with the President’s general executive power?7. Which graduated power of the President as commander-in-chief was exercised

in David? What restriction on this power was cited by the Court? In whatinstance did the Court say it might strike down the use of this power? Was the

Court’s treatment similar to the treatment in Sanlakas? 8.

Did David involve a declaration of martial law? According to Justice Vicente

V. Mendoza in David and Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio in Fortun,

what powers would the President seek to exercise if martial law were in fact

declared? Does martial law authorize the issuance of presidential decrees?

Warrantless arrests? The suspension of the Bill of Rights? The suspension of

civilian courts?

9.

Which graduated power of the President as commander-in-chief was exercisedin Fortun? What restriction on this power was cited by the Court? In whatinstance did the Court say it might strike down the use of this power?

10. How is the President’s power to declare martial law and suspend the writ of

habeas corpus limited by Congress? By the Supreme Court? Which branch of

government is intended to exercise the primary responsibility to review the use

of these powers by the President? Did Justice Carpio agree with the majority

regarding a sequential or joint nature of this power of review?

11. According to Justice Carpio, were the requisites for the exercise of various

commander-in-chief powers met in Fortun? What standard of evidence does

Justice Carpio propose to gauge whether such requisites are met?

12.

In the United States, the power over war was originally divided between thePresident and Congress. How did the balance of power over war between them



evolve? What balance was inherited by the Philippines? How was this powertransplanted to the Philippines?

13. In summary, what are the graduated powers of the President as commander-in-

chief? Describe the acts the President may perform under each power and the

restrictions of each power.

14.

Many portions of the 1987 Constitution were introduced in reaction to themartial law regime. Name the various safeguards introduced specifically

against a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

15. What commander-in-chief power was exercised in North Cotabato? Was itappropriate to invoke the commander-in-chief power? Is the invocation of this

power in North Cotabato overly textual to the point of nitpicking?

IV. Emergency powers and the power to take over

“After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of

the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of

government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the comminglingof powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary

government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this

framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, notexcepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United

States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have

specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to

another department – unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative

policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was

fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve

the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times

of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances ‘the various branches, executive,legislative, and judicial,’ given the ability to act, are called upon ‘to perform the

duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively.’”

--Araneta v. Dinglasan (a.k.a. the Emergency Powers Cases), 84 Phil. 368 (1949)

• CONST. art. VI, § 23(2)


• David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. 171396, 489 SCRA 161, May 3, 2006(focus on the section “Third Provision: Power to Take Over ”)

Guide questions1.

What emergency powers did President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo exercise in

David? Were these powers validly exercised?2.

What are the requirements for the President to exercise emergency powers?

3. What are the requirements for the President to exercise the specific power to

take over a public utility or private business? Is this power vested in the

President?

V. Sole organ and authority in foreign affairs

“By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his or her office, the President, as head ofstate and government, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the



country. The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into internationalagreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the required concurrence votes of the

Senate.”

-- Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, 641 SCRA 244, Feb. 1, 2011

“[W]hile Art. VIII, § 1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry... it has notaltogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of

foreign relations.”

--Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, 277 SCRA 268, Aug. 14, 1997

• CONST. art. VII, §§ 20-21

• Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, 641 SCRA 244, Feb. 1, 2011

(focus on the president’s power over foreign affairs and agreements with other

states and the section “No grave abuse of discretion”; focus also on Senior

Associate Justice Antonio Carpio’s argument that the executive agreement

involved could not run counter to law)

Guide questions1.

Describe the President’s power over foreign affairs.

2. Describe the President’s power to enter into agreements with other states. Dothese agreements need to be concurred in by Congress? What is the difference

between an executive agreement and a treaty?

3. What was the executive agreement involved in Bayan Muna? Did the

President have the power to enter into this agreement? Explain the argument

of Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio that the executive agreement could

not run counter to law.

4.

Where in the Constitution is the President’s power over foreign affairsspecified? Does the wording of this power imply that the political questiondoctrine may be applied to it?

Week 8(August 3, 2013)

PART 6: EXECUTIVE POWER


VI. Power to appoint

“It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted,

there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4)

groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:

“First , the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers

and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,

and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

“Second , all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise

provided for by law;

“Third , those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;



“Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in

the President alone.”

--Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, 156 SCRA 549, Dec. 17, 1987

“Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by theofficer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that

the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the

appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified whoshould have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of

wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.”--Luego v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 69137, 143 SCRA 327, Aug. 5, 1986




•

Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, 208 SCRA 254, Apr. 23, 1992 (quotingthe landmark decision Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, 156 SCRA 549,

Dec. 17, 1987)

• Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, 496 SCRA 13, Jul. 21, 2006

• Luego v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 69137, 143 SCRA 327, Aug. 5,1986 (ignore the facts and focus on the doctrine regarding the nature of

appointment as an essentially discretionary power and how the Commission

on Appointments and Civil Service Commission restrict the President’s powerof appointment)


•

De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, Mar. 17, 2010 (focuson the discussion of the restrictions on the President’s power of appointment

and how these restrictions apply to the judiciary)

• Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, 380 SCRA 49, Apr. 2, 2002 (focus on

the validity of the ad interim appointments involved)

• Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, 472 SCRA 587, Oct. 13, 2005

Guide questions

1. What was the Labor Code provision challenged in Calderon? Was thechallenge upheld? Why?

2. What are the classifications of appointees in art. VII, § 16? Which require

confirmation of the Commission on Appointments?3. What is the Commission on Appointments? Who compose it?

4. What was the provision of Presidential Decree No. 15 challenged in Rufino?

Was the challenge upheld under the 1987 Constitution? Why?

5. Does the wording of art. VII, § 16 imply that the political question doctrine

may be applied to it?

6. In 2008, in Province of North Cotabato, one of Senior Associate Justice

Antonio Carpio’s objections to the original MOA-AD was that appointmentsin the Bangsamoro Judicial Entity would no longer be subject to the

president’s power to appoint or, as appropriate, confirmation by the

Commission on Appointments. Is this a valid criticism of the MOA-AD?



7. According to Luego, what is the nature of the power of appointment? How dothe Commission on Appointments and the Civil Service Commission restrict

the President’s power of appointment? Is this power interpreted broadly or

narrowly?

8. Does the wording of the President’s power of appointment imply that the

political question doctrine may be applied to it?9.

In addition to the need for confirmation in certain cases, what are other

restrictions on the President’s power of appointment?

10. What is a midnight appointment? According to the landmark decision Aytonav. Castillo, why are midnight appointments restricted?

11. Were the appointments in Matibag valid? In Pimentel? 12.

What is an ad interim appointment? What is an acting or temporary

appointment? What is the difference?

13. When does an ad interim appointment lapse? An acting or temporary

appointment?

14. Based on Pimentel, how can acting and ad interim appointments evade the

requirement of confirmation for cabinet secretaries?

VII. Power to pardon and to grant amnesty

“Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must

be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no noticethereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence

of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.

Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of

persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or

after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.

Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offenseof which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and

for that reason it does ‘‘nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, orthe right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the

pardon,’ and it ‘in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civilindemnity imposed upon him by the sentence’. While amnesty looks backward and

abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the

offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before

the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.”

-- Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642 (1949)


• Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642 (1949)

• Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, 170 SCRA 190, Feb. 9, 1989 (focus

on the present doctrine regarding the scope and effects of a pardon; note thatsome portions extensively discuss old doctrine)

• In re Petition for Habeas Corpus of Torres, G.R. No. 122338, Dec. 29, 1995

• People v. Salle, G.R. No. 103567, 250 SCRA 581, Dec. 4, 1995 (focus on

whether a pardon may be granted to a person still appealing his conviction)

Guide questions

1.

In Barrioquinto, were the petitioners entitled to the amnesty?2.

Distinguish an amnesty from a pardon. Which has broader effects?



3. What is the restriction on the President’s power to issue an amnesty?4.

What are the restrictions on the President’s power to issue a pardon?

5. What are the effects of a pardon on a person? Does it restore one to a public

office previously held? Does it restore all civil and political rights? Does it

forgive civil penalties that arise from a criminal conviction?

6.

May the President issue conditions to a pardon? Who determines whetherconditions issued by the President have been violated? Must the determination

be made pursuant to the strict requirements of judicial due process?

7. May a pardon validly be granted to someone appealing his conviction? Why?Was the rule different before the 1987 Constitution?

8. Does the wording of the President’s power of pardon imply that the politicalquestion doctrine may be applied to it?

VIII. Power to veto

“[T] he Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she cannot act like

an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or shedislikes. In the exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. However,

when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs themoney to run the machinery of government and it can not veto the entire bill even if it

may contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore, compelled to approveinto law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the

Constitution has wisely provided the ‘item veto power’ to avoid inexpedient riders

being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.”

-- Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642 (1949)


•

Bengzon v. Drilon, Z0=0 [20 ">@KD\I D>J :;=# "@@I #,30 "KI "]]D

• Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals and Manila Golf

& Country Club, Inc., Z0=0 [20 \?\D"I S%V "\I "]]>

Guide questions

1. What is a veto? Describe how the power is exercised. May it be overruled?

2.

Describe the veto in Bengzon. Was it upheld? Why?

3. Describe the veto in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax

Appeals. Was it upheld? Why?4. What is an item veto? When may it be used? Distinguish a provision from an

item.

PART 7: THE PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

(60 minutes)

I. Qualifications, disqualifications and selection

• CONST. art. VII, §§ 2-5, 13

• CONST. art. IX-B, §§ 6-8

• Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, 194 SCRA 317,

Feb. 22, 1991



Guide questions1.

What qualifications must one possess in order to be President and Vice-

President?

2. What restrictions are there on the President and Vice-President holding other

positions or practicing a profession? Do these restrictions apply to private

sector positions?3.

What designation was questioned in Civil Liberties Union? Was it upheld?

4. Explain the rule on the prohibition on an executive officer holidng multiple

positions. What is an ex officio position?

II. Succession

“In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of

resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20,

2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not

petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during

and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous andposterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the

issue.

“Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.”--Chief Justice Reynato Puno, Estrada v. Desierto,

G.R. No. 146710, 356 SCRA 108, Mar. 2, 2001


• Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, 356 SCRA 108, Mar. 2, 2001

Guide questions1.

What happens if the elected President fails to qualify? The Vice-President?

2. What happens if there is a vacancy in the Presidency? The Vice-Presidency?

3. May a Philippine President serve for more than six years?

4. Name all the methods through which a vacancy in the Presidency may arise?

What happens in each case?

5. How did the vacancy in the Presidency arise in Estrada v. Desierto? What

type of vacancy arose and how was it filled?

6.

Did Estrada v. Desierto involve a revolutionary government?

7. Do you think Estrada v. Desierto should have been decided based on the

political question doctrine?

III. Presidential immunity from suit

“We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-

sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character.

They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the

imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be

covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot

cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and

wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to

hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts andomissions. … Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity



will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it

impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. … [The US

Supreme Court] concluded that “when the ground for asserting privilege as to

subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the

generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands

of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.” … [T]he USSupreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages

covers only “official acts.” Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to

reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones where it held that the USPresident’s immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is

inapplicable to unofficial conduct.”--Chief Justice Reynato Puno, Estrada v. Desierto,

G.R. No. 146710, 356 SCRA 108, Mar. 2, 2001

• Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, 356 SCRA 108, Mar. 2, 2001 (focus on

the section “Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit”)

Guide questions

1. What is the textual basis in the Constitution for the President’s immunity from

suit?2. What is the rationale for immunity from suit?

3. How was presidential immunity asserted in Estrada v. Desierto? Was itupheld?

4. What is the duration of immunity from suit?

5. What is the scope of immunity from suit? Does it cover all acts of the

President? All criminal actions? Civil actions and money claims?

Investigations? Discuss the doctrine that evolved based on the cases of US

Presidents Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton.

6. Was the scope of immunity from suit different under the 1973 Constitution,

under Dean Pacific Agabin? (What, according to him, was AIDS?)7. Recall David v. Arroyo. What was my rationale for arguing that the President

could be sued by Professor Randy David in this case? Was this upheld?

IV. Executive privilege versus legislative inquiry

“A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in

the early history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head

of government may keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the publicinterest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a

distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: ‘Decision, activity,

secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in amuch more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in

proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.’

“History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold

information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.”

-- Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, Senate v. Ermita,

G.R. No. 169777, 488 SCRA 1, Apr. 20, 2006

• CONST. art. VI, §§ 21, 22



• Exec. Order No. 464 (2005)

• Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, 488 SCRA 1, Apr. 20, 2006 (ignore the

discussion of the right to information)

• Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, Mar. 25, 2008 (read the majority opinion and

the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato Puno)

Guide questions

1. What was the Northrail controversy and who did the Senate summon toanswer questions in Ermita?

2. What is executive privilege? What are rough categories of this privilege?3.

What is the basis of executive privilege in our Constitution? Is it textual?

4. Based on the experience of US President Richard Nixon, would a US court

favor the President or Congress in an issue of executive privilege? Has the

Philippine Supreme Court taken a similar approach?

5. Who may claim executive privilege? May executive officers subordinate to

the President claim the privilege merely by invoking the fact that they are

executive officers? Does executive privilege attach to specific persons?

6. What is the nature of the power to conduct legislative inquiries? Pursuant tothis power, when may Congress compel attendance under pain of contempt?

7. Distinguish the legislative powers used to conduct an inquiry in aid oflegislation and a question hour. Are there differences in the restrictions

involved? In which case is appearance mandatory and in which case is the

President’s consent required?

8. How is a claim of executive privilege weighed? What are relevant factors?

9. May a private person claim executive privilege?

10.

Was Executive Order No. 464 held to be constitutional in Ermita? 11. What was the National Broadband Network controversy in Neri v. Senate and

who did the Senate summon to answer questions regarding this? What werethe questions that the person concerned refused to answer?

12. According to Neri, are there categories of information that are presumptively privileged? Is this consistent with Ermita? Did the Court state that the facts of

Neri and Ermita were not similar?

13. How did Neri reach a different result compared to Ermita? Was the method

used different?

14. Explain Chief Justice Reynato Puno’s argument in his Neri dissent that

executive privilege may not shield wrongdoing.

15.

Would an invocation of executive privilege be a political question?


PART 8: LAWMAKING

(150 minutes)

I. Legislative procedure and restrictions

“[D]espite the President’s certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the

requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill must always be observedto enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently



respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members of Congress is:(1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them

notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process.”

-- Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, Oct. 18, 2011

“Traditionally, an enrolled bill was ‘a record’ and as such was not subject to attack atcommon law. Likewise, the rule of conclusiveness was similar to the common law

rule of the inviolability of the sheriff’s return. Indeed, they had the same origin, that

is, the sheriff was an officer of the king and likewise the parliamentary act was a regalact and no official might dispute the king’s word. Transposed to our democratic

system of government, courts held that as the legislature was an official branch ofgovernment the court must indulge every presumption that the legislative act was

valid. The doctrine of separation of powers was advanced as a strong reason why the

court should treat the acts of a co-ordinate branch of government with the same

respect as it treats the action of its own officers; indeed, it was thought that it was

entitled to even greater respect, else the court might be in the position of reviewing

the work of a supposedly equal branch of government. When these arguments failed,as they frequently did, the doctrine of convenience was advanced, that is, that it was

not only an undue burden upon the legislature to preserve its records to meet theattack of persons not affected by the procedure of enactment, but also that it

unnecessarily complicated litigation and confused the trial of substantive issues.…

“Persuasive as these arguments are, the tendency today is to avoid reaching results by

artificial presumptions and thus it would seem desirable to insist that the enrolled bill

stand or fall on the basis of the relevant evidence which may be submitted for or

against it.”

--Sutherland Statutory Construction (6th Ed. 2000)

“To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when theyare, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of

the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, toinvade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere

with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Applying these

principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’ charges that an amendment

was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually R.A. No. 7354 and that

copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each

House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was

duly enacted i.e., in accordance with … the Constitution. We are bound by suchofficial assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which weowe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.”

--United State v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729 (1916)

• CONST. art. VI, §§ 16(4), 24, 26, 27

• Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, Oct. 18, 2011 (focus on the section

“The President’s Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153”)

• Abakada Guro Party List v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, 469 SCRA

1, Sep. 1, 2005 (focus on the section “Procedural Issue” in the majority

opinion and the second and third points of Justice Reynato Puno’s separate

opinion regarding the enrolled bill doctrine and bicameral conferencecommittee)



• Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, 277 SCRA 268, Aug. 14, 1997

(focus on discussion of enrolled bill and journal entry doctrines)

Guide questions

1.

What was the procedural objection in Abas Kida? Was it upheld?

2.

What is the procedure in which a bill becomes a law? How many readings arerequired in Congress? Are there restrictions on conducting readings?

3.

Summarize the doctrine regarding vetos from our previous discussions.

4. What was the procedural objection in Abakada Guro Party List v. Executive

Secretary? Was it upheld?

5. What is the enrolled bill doctrine? What is its rationale? Is the remedy of a

party who believes that there were irregularities in the proceedings regarding a

bill to file a case with the judiciary?

6. What does the bicameral conference committee do? What is the scope of its

power?

7. Do amendments by the bicameral conference committee violate the

constitutional “no amendment” rule? What about amendments in one chamberof Congress after the other has already voted on a counterpart bill?

8. Explain Chief Justice Reynato Puno’s criticisms of traditional judicial

deference to the enrolled bill doctrine and the bicameral committee’s role.9. What was the procedural objection in Arroyo v. De Venecia? Was it upheld?

10. What is the journal entry rule? What is its rationale?11.

Which takes precedence, an enrolled bill or the journal?

II. The form and substance of bills (including taxation)

“Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should

not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The

requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a

reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be

comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeksto effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient

for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title neednot be an abstract or index of the Act.”

--De Guzman v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 129118,

336 SCRA 188, Jul. 19, 2000

•

CONST. art. VI, §§ 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29• CONST. art. XIV, § 4(3)

• CONST. art. XIV, § 5(5)

• De Guzman v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 129118, 336 SCRA 188,Jul. 19, 2000 (focus on the discussion of art. VI, § 26 of the Constitution)

• Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. 115455, 235 SCRA 630, Aug. 25,

1994 (focus on the discussion of art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution)

• Lambino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174153, 505 SCRA 160, Oct.

25, 2006 (focus solely on the discussion of logrolling legislation)

• Philippine Constitutional Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, 235SCRA 506, Aug. 19, 1994

•

Guingona v. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, 196 SCRA 221, Apr. 22, 1991



• Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, 433 SCRA

119, Jun. 29, 2004 (focus on the discussion of art. VI, § 28(3) of Constitution)

Guide questions

1.

What was the procedural objection in De Guzman? Was it upheld?

2.

What is the rule regarding the title of a bill? What is its rationale?3. What was the procedural objection in Tolentino in relation to Section 24? Was

it upheld?

4. What is the rule regarding the origination of bills? What is its rationale?

5. What is logrolling legislation? Why is it not allowed?

6. What was the procedural objection in Philconsa? Was it upheld?

7. Is a provision allowing individual legislators to direct the use of a

Countrywide Development Fund unconstitutional? Why?

8. Is a provision allowing individual legislators to realign savings

unconstitutional? Why?

9. What is the rule regarding realignment of budgets?

10.

What was the procedural objection in Guingona v. Carague? Was it upheld?11.

How is the provision regarding the priority for budgetary allotments to

education interpreted?

12. Is an automatic appropriation law for foreign debt constitutional?13. What is the process for passing the annual budget? What is the President’s

participation? What happens if a budget is not passed by Congress?14.

What was the objection regarding taxation in Lung Center? Was it upheld?

15. What is the rule regarding the taxation of property used for religious,

charitable or educational purposes? How is the rule applied? What is the

rationale for this?

III. Congressional oversight, legislative inquiries and the legislative veto

“Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House

of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that itmay exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far

incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power ofinquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the

legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the

absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to

affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite

information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often

unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or

complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.”--Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)

• CONST. art. VI, §§ 21, 22

• Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, 488 SCRA 1, Apr. 20, 2006 (focus on the

discussion of legislative inquiries)


Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, Mar. 25, 2008 (focus on the discussion of

legislative inquiries)



• Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, 562 SCRA 251, Aug.

14, 2008 (focus on discussion of legislative veto and congressional oversight)

Guide questions

1.

What is the nature of the power to conduct legislative inquiries? What are

restrictions on this power?2. Does Congress have the power to compel attendance and punish

nonattendance with contempt in a legislative inquiry? What is the basis? What

are the restrictions? What are the remedies if these restrictions are breached?

3. What is the nature of the power to conduct a question hour? Differentiate this

from the power to conduct legislative inquiries.

4. What was the legislation assailed in Abakada Guro v. Purisima? Was it

upheld?

5. What is a legislative veto? Is it valid in the Philippines?

6.

What is the scope of permissible congressional oversight? What kind of

oversight is out of bounds for Congress?

PART 9: CONGRESS AND ITS STRUCTURE

(30 minutes)

I. Composition

“[T]he definition of ‘Congress’ as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in

government - to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the

distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’

non-legislative powers such as, inter alia, the power of appropriation, the declaration

of an existence of a state of war, canvassing of electoral returns for the President and

Vice-President, and impeachment. In the exercise of these powers, the Constitution

employs precise language in laying down the roles which a particular house plays,

regardless of whether the two houses consummate an official act by voting jointly orseparately. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of

these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount.Verily, each house is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to

its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber;

and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances, to the other branches

of government.”

--Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, Jul. 17, 2012

• CONST. art. VI, §§ 1-8

• Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, Jul. 17, 2012 (focus on

the discussion of Congress’ bicameral structure)

• Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, 570SCRA 411, Nov. 3, 2008 (focus on the Pimentel petition)

• Sema v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177597, 558 SCRA 700, Jul. 16,

2008 (focus on discussion of creation and reapportionment of congressional

districts)

• Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189793, 617 SCRA 623, Apr.

7, 2010 (focus on discussion of creation of congressional districts)

Guide questions



1. How did the Court describe Congress’ bicameral structure in Chavez? Whatwas the issue in Chavez and how was it resolved in this structure’s context?

2. What is the composition and structure of Congress?

3. What are the qualifications of legislators?

4. What was the assailed regulation in Social Justice Society? Was it upheld?

5.

May Congress or the Commission on Elections add qualifications forlegislators?

6. When are elections for Senators held?

7. What was the assailed legislation in Sema? Was it upheld?8. What is the rule regarding the number of House of Representatives districts?

How are new districts created? Which body has authority over such creation?9.

What was the assailed legislation in Aquino? Was it upheld?

10. How is the 250,000 population figure in the Constitution interpreted? What

are the requisites for the creation of a province under the Local Government

Code?


PART 9: CONGRESS AND ITS STRUCTURE


II. The Party List System

“[T]he clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)

and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system

is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.”

-- Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Atong Paglaum, Inc.

v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203766, Apr. 2, 2013

“The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only

by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to

become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the

implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: ‘to enable Filipino citizens belonging

to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to

become members of the House of Representatives.’ Where the language of the law is

clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.”

--Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comm’n on Elections,G.R. No. 147589, 359 SCRA 698, Jun. 26, 2001


• Rep. Act. No. 7941, § 2 (1995)

• Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189466, 612SCRA 375, Feb. 11, 2010 (focus on nature of party list representative and how

his qualification is contested)

• Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179271, Apr. 21 & Jul. 8, 2009 (focus on

the computation of party-list seat allocations)




2013 (focus on discussion of the concept of marginalized and whether the

party-list system is solely for the marginalized)

• Oscar Franklin Tan, The Party-List System Revisited: Uncovering Hidden

Pitfalls in Present Reform Proposals, 82(3) PHIL. L.J. 181, 186-87, 192-96

(2008)• Oscar Franklin Tan, Commentary: Opening up the partylist system, PHIL.

DAILY I NQUIRER , Apr. 7, 201310

• Dean Raul Pangalangan, Passion for Reason: Palparan’s perversion of the

party-list system, PHIL. DAILY I NQUIRER , May 1, 2009

Guide questions1.

What is the party list system?

2. What is the nature of a party list representative? How is he different from a

district representative? How are his qualifications challenged?

3. How many seats are there under the party list system? How are these seats

allocated?

4.

Explain how the party list system is for representatives of the marginalized.

How is this defined and implemented?

5. Must a nominee come from the marginalized sector represented? What aboutthe party itself?

6. Explain the current allegations against the party list group Akbayan, which isconsidered successful and strongly allied with the Aquino administration.

7. Discuss the two conflicting policy goals in the Constitution regarding the party

list system. Which one is currently held to apply? Are there problems

becoming apparent in implementing this policy?

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“Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege

cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English

Parliament, its purpose ‘is to enable and encourage a representative of the public todischarge his public trust with firmness and success’ for ‘it is indispensably necessary

that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected fromthe resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may

occasion offense.’ … It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression

without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or

any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him fromresponsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are

considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United

States Congress.”

--Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960)

“[Any speech or debate] refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made,

or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills

introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts

"> E63*+)3 3)%5&4F- Oscar Franklin Tan, Commentary: Party-list system’s dirty secret, PHIL. DAILY

I NQUIRER , Oct. 18, 2012



performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing itsoffices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of

Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the

time of the performance of the acts in question.”

--Jimenez v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. 15905, 17 SCRA 876, Aug. 3, 1966

• CONST. art. VI, §§ 9, 16(3)

• R EV. PEN. CODE, art. 143-45

• Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 148334, 420 SCRA 438, Jan.21, 2004 (focus on the validity of the special election held)

• Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, 356 SCRA 636, Apr.

18, 2001 (focus on the nature of the power of Congress to suspend a legislatorunder the Constitution and the power to suspend under a law)

• Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960)

• Pobre v. Defensor Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, Aug. 25, 2009 (focus on whether

a legislator may be disbarred for statements on the floor; ignore the legalethics discussions)

• People v. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875, Feb. 3, 2000 (focus on whether a

legislator in custody may be freed to attend sessions of Congress)

Guide questions

1. How is a vacancy in Congress filled?2.

What was the vacancy in Tolentino? How was it resolved?

3. What statutory rules are there for filling a vacancy in Congress?

4. What was the suspension in Defensor Santiago? Was it upheld?

5. What is the nature of the power of Congress to suspend a legislator under the

Constitution? May criminal laws provide for a suspension outside this power?Would this violate the separation of powers?

6. What was the suspension in Osmena? Was it upheld?

7. Is a suspension of a legislator by Congress subject to judicial review?

8.

What are the immunities of a legislator? What is the scope of immunity? What

is the rationale? Are these immunities absolute?

9.

Sen. Tito Sotto offers to decriminalize libel so that he and bloggers can sling

mud at each other. Explain the liability of Sen. Sotto should this happen?

10. What was the disbarment in Santiago? Was it upheld?11.

May a legislator be disbarred for statements made on the floor of Congress?

12. Why was Romeo Jalosjos in custody? Was his request to be freed to attend

sessions of Congress upheld?

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“[Any speech or debate] refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made,



performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its

offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of

Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the

time of the performance of the acts in question.”

--Jimenez v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. 15905, 17 SCRA 876, Aug. 3, 1966



• CONST. art. VI, §§ 10, 12-14, 20

• Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Mathay, G.R. No. 25554, 18

SCRA 300, Oct. 4, 1966 (focus on the length of time before an increase of

legislators’ salaries takes effect)

•

Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, 593 SCRA 68, Jul. 15, 2009 (focus on thedisqualification of a legislator from holding another office)

• Puyat v. de Guzman, Z0=0 [20 K""DDI ""@ :;=# @DI S%30 DKI "]JD

Guide questions

1. What is the restriction on legislators’ increase in salaries? How was this

interpreted in Philconsa v. Mathay?

2. What is the disqualification on a legislator’s holding an additional office?

How was this interpreted in Liban?

3.

Sen. TG Guingona gave the opening remarks for the petitioners against the

Cybercrime Law in 2013. Is this unconstitutional?

4.

What is the disqualification on a legislator’s appearing before anadministrative body? How was this interpreted in Puyat?

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“[Any speech or debate] refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the

performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made,



performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its

offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and ofCongressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the

time of the performance of the acts in question.”--Jimenez v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. 15905, 17 SCRA 876, Aug. 3, 1966


• Defensor Santiago v. Guingona, Z0=0 [20 "@\K??I D]J :;=# ?KAI [2$0 "JI

"]]J PU2167 24 _65&1&%' 3)$&)/ 2U )')1*&24 2U 124F3)77&24%' 2UU&1)37Q

• Pimentel v. Senate Committee of the Whole, G.R. No. 187714, Mar. 8, 2011

(focus on definition of a quorum and when internal rules must be pubished)

• Garcillano v. House Committee on Public Information, G.R. No. 170338, 575,

SCRA 170, Dec. 23, 2008 (focus on requirement for publication of internalrules for legislative inquiries)

Guide questions

1. Is the election of congressional officers subject to judicial review? How wasthis interpreted in Defensor Santiago v. Guingona?

2. What measures may legislators take to compel a quorum?

3. Was there a quorum in Pimentel? Why?

4. Is Congress required to publish internal rules? What is the basis for such a

requirement? What are the exceptions?

5.

May internal rules be waived by Congress?

6.

Is compliance with internal rules subject to judicial review?



7. How did Garcillano summarize the requirements for the publication ofinternal rules and the rights of third parties in a legislative inquiry?

8. May the publication of internal rules via the Internet satisfy requirements?

What is the proper procedure for publication before a law becomes effective?

$"# 8)**(.'* %'/ 9.3(':

“[I]t is the staggering of the terms of the 24 Senators and allowing the terms of officeof a portion of the Senate membership to continue into the succeeding Congress -

whether two-thirds under the 1935 Constitution or one-half under the 1987

Constitution - that provides the stability indispensable to an effective government, and

makes the Senate a continuing body as intended by the framers of both the 1935 (as

amended) and the 1987 Constitutions.”

--Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, Mar. 25, 2008

•

CONST. art. VI, §§ 10, 11, 15, 16

• CONST. art. VI, § 23(1)


• CONST. art. XVII, § 1(1)

• CONST. art. VII, §§ 18, 19


Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, Mar. 25, 2008 (focus on “The Senate is acontinuing body”)

Guide questions

1.

What is a regular session of Congress? When are these held?2. What is a special session of Congress? When are these held?

3.

When does Congress vote as two separate houses outside the normal

legislative process?

4. When does Congress vote jointly outside the normal legislative process?5.

Explain the bicameral nature of Congress.

6. Explain why the Senate is a “continuing body.” Can a Senate committee

continue to function during a recess of Congress?

$""# 8-)&(%1 3.-(&; <%&(%1 &=%11)':)* .> 1%?* >.0 .9)0@0)%/3= %'/ 9%:,)')**

“A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which isoverbroad because of possible ‘chilling effect’ upon protected speech. The theory is

that ‘[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction

suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the

transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to

justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person

making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a

statute drawn with narrow specificity.’ The possible harm to society in permittingsome unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the

protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester

because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.”

--Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v.

Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, Oct. 5, 2010



• Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council,

G.R. No. 178552, Oct. 5, 2010 (focus on the discussion of facial challenge,

overbreadth and void for vagueness)

Guide questions1. What was the assailed law in Southern Hemisphere? What was the basis for

the challenge? Was it upheld?

2. What is a facial challenge? What is an as applied challenge?

3. What is overbreadth?

4. What is void for vagueness?


* * *MIDTERM EXAMINATION HERE * * *


PART 8: IMPEACHMENT

(45 minutes)

“Impeachment, described as “the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of

democracy,” was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or

highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that “the decision will be

regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrationsof innocence or guilt.” Given their concededly political character, the precise role ofthe judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the

effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checksand balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch

or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the

political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave

abuse or arbitrariness.”

-- Corona v. Senate, G.R. No. 200242, Jul. 17, 2012

• CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-3

•

In re Plagiarism, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, Feb. 8, 2011 (Carpio-Morales, J.,dissenting ) (focus on disbarment of impeachable officers)

• Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 415 SCRA 44, Nov.10, 2003 (focus on “Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure” and the

impeachment process)

• Gutierrez v. House Committee on Justice, G.R. No.193459, 643 SCRA 199,

Feb. 15, 2011 (focus on discussion of the impeachment process and the oneyear bar)

• Corona v. Senate, G.R. No. 200242, Jul. 17, 2012 (focus on “impeachment

and judicial revew”)

• Gil Cabacungan, House divided on impeaching 8 justices who blocked

opening of Corona dollar accounts, PHIL. DAILY I NQUIRER , Feb. 10, 2012



• Maila Agar, Senate needs to assert supremacy as impeachment court, PHIL. DAILY I NQUIRER , Feb. 28, 2012

Guide questions

1.

What is the nature of public office?

2.

What is impeachment? Who are impeachable officers?3. What are the grounds for impeachment?4.

Does impeachment preclude other proceedings such as disbarment and

administrative investigation?

5. Describe the impeachment process.

6. Discuss the one-year bar.

7. Is the initiation of impeachment subject to judicial review? What about the

actual impeachment trial? The verdict?

PART 9: INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS AND OTHER OFFICES

"# A.22.' -0.9(*(.'*

• CONST. art. IX-A, §§ 1-8

• CONST. art. IX-B, § 1

• CONST. art. IX-C, § 1

• CONST. art. IX-D, § 1

• Engaño v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156959, 493 SCRA 323, Jun. 27, 2006(focus on whether public office is a vested right)

• Gaminde v. Commission on Audit , G.R. No. 140335, 347 SCRA 655, Dec.

13, 2000 (focus on the rotation in commissioners’ terms)

•

Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, 380 SCRA 49, Apr. 2, 2002 (focus onacting and ad interim appointments in constitutional commissions)

• Funa v. Chairman of the Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 192791, Apr. 24,

2012 (focus on validity of promoting a commissioner to chairman of an

independent commission and the summary rules at the end of the decision)

Guide questions

1. What are the independent constitutional commissions?2. Is there a vested right to public office? Are the constitutional commissions an

exception?3.

Describe the concept of rotation in commissioners’ terms.

4.

May an acting commissioner be appointed? What about an ad interimappointee? An appointee not yet confirmed?

5. Compare the rulemaking power of an independent commission to that of the

Supreme Court.

6.

Compare the period for decisions of an independent commission to that of the

Supreme Court.

7. Describe the composition of each independent commission.8. Describe the appointment process for each independent commissioner.

9. Describe how independent commissioners are removed.

""# A.22(**(.' .' B1)&3(.'*



“All registered parties and bona fide candidates shall be have the right to reply tocharges published against them. The reply shall be given publicity by the newspaper,

television and/or radio station which first printed or aired the charges with the same

prominence or in the same page or section or in the same time slot as the first

statement.”

-- Section 10, Fair Election Act

• CONST. art. IX-C, §§ 2-11

• Bulilis v. Nuez, G.R. No. 195953, Aug. 9, 2011 (focus on certiorari power of

Commission on Elections)

• Jaramilla v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 155717, 414 SCRA 337, Oct.23, 2003 (focus on how Commission on Elections decides quasi-judicial

versus administrative issues; ignore the merits of the case)

• Cayetano v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193846, Apr. 12, 2011


2013 (focus on interpretation of art. IX-C, § 7)

• Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, Z0=0 [20 ""]]?AI D\J :;=#

@>>I :),0 "JI "]]K PL642I G0I $.'$>22&'(Q (focus on interpretation of art. IX-

C, § 10)

• Rep. Act No. 9006, §§ 2, 10 (the Fair Election Act) (2001)

• Commission on Elections Resolution No. 9615, § 14 (Implementing the Fair

Election Act) (2013)

• National Press Club v. Commission on Elections, Z0=0 [20 ">DAK@I S%30 KI

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Guide questions1.

What is the difference between an ordinary appeal and certiorari (this is in

remedial law)?

2. What is the original jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections? Its appellate jurisdiction? Its certiorari jurisdiction?

3. How does the Commission on Elections decide quasi-judicial matters?Administrative matters? How is the Commission structured with respect to

decisionmaking and adjudication?

4. What is the remedy from an adjudicatory decision of the Commission on

Elections?

5. What is the party system envisioned by the Constitition based on Atong

Paglaum? 6. Describe the use of art. IX-C, § 10 by Chief Justice Reynato Puno.

7. What is the authority of the Commission on Elections to impose a right ofreply? What was the right of reply envisioned by the Supreme Court? By

Congress? By the Commission on Elections itself?

"""# A.22(**(.' .' C,/(3

“There is no dispute that the COA’s authority under the second paragraph of Section

2 is exclusive as the language of the Constitution admits of no other meaning. Thus,

the COA has the exclusive authority to decide on disallowances of unnecessarygovernment expenditures.”



-- Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, Development Bank of the Philippinesv. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 88435, Jan. 16, 2002

• CONST. art. IX-C, §§ 2-4

• Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.

88435, Jan. 16, 2002 (focus on “First Issue: Power of COA to Audit under theConstitution”)

• Veloso v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 193677, 656 SCRA 767, Sep. 6,

2011 (focus on Commission on Audit authority over local governments and onwhat basis the Supreme Court strikes down its decisions)

• In re COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the

Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the SupremeCourt, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012

Guide questions

1. Describe the powers of the Commission on Audit. Do these powers extend to

government owned and controlled corporations? To Congress? The judiciary?

2.

What is meant by post-audit?

3. Is the Commission on Audit’s audit authority exclusive? May a government

agency engage private auditors?4. Does the Commission on Audit have authority to audit local governments?

5. On what basis does the Supreme Court strike down Commision on Auditdecisions?

6. How do you reconcile the Commission on Audit’s powers with judicial

independence and fiscal autonomy?

"$# A(9(1 8)09(&) A.22(**(.'

• CONST. art. IX-B, §§ 2-8

• Department of Health v. National Labor Relations Commission, Z0=0 [20

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E)(0 ""I D>"@

Guide questions

1.

What is the scope of the civil service?2.

What is the Civil Service Commission’s authority with respect to validating or

invalidating appointments?

3. What is the general prohibition on holding two positions for public officers?How did Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno allegedly violate this?

$# 8%'/(:%'@%5%' %'/ 3=) D2@,/*2%'

“The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is armed with the power to

prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the

enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that

may be committed by such officers and employees. The legislature has vested him

with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. Recognizing the



importance of this power, the Court cannot derogate the same by limiting it only tocases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. It is apparent from the history and the

language of the present law that the legislature intended such power to apply not only

to cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those within the

jurisdiction of regular courts.”

-- Chief Justice Reynato Puno, Uy v. Sandiganbayan,G.R. No. 105965, Mar. 20, 2001

• CONST. art. XI, §§ 4-18

• Lacson v. Executive Secretary, Z0=0 [20 "DJ>]AI @>" :;=# D]JI G%40 D>I

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• Uy v. Sandiganbayan, Z0=0 [20 ">K]AKI S%30 D>I D>>" PU2167 24 *+) +&7*23V

%45 ,2/)37 2U *+) C8(6578%4Q

Guide questions

1.

What is the Sandiganbayan? What is its jurisdiction?2.

Does the nature of involvement of a public officer in a crime matter in

determining the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction?

3. What is the Ombudsman? What are the origins of this office? What is the

intent of creating an Ombudsman?

4. What are the Ombudsman’s powers?

5. Does the Ombudsman have prosecutorial powers? Investigation powers? Are

these two separate powers?

$"# A.22(**(.' .' E,2%' 6(:=3*

“Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays

of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the

cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger

without dentures but with maimed legs to boot.”

-- Justice Teodoro Padilla, Simon v. Commission on Human Rights,

G.R. No. 100150, 229 SCRA 117, Jan. 5, 1994 (dissenting)

• CONST. art. XIII, §§ 17-19

• Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on

Human Rights, Z0=0 [20 "KK@@AI \]A :;=# DDAI G6'0 D"I D>>A PU2167 24 *+);288&77&24 24 M68%4 =&F+*b7 +&7*23V %45 7*%*67 %7 1247*&*6*&24%' (25VQ

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G%40 KI "]]\

Guide questions

1. What is the Commission on Human Rights? Describe its status relative to the

status of the constitutional commissions.

2. Does the Commission on Human Rights enjoy fiscal autonomy? When does

an independent constitutional body gain the benefit of the fiscal autonomy

contemplated for independent constitutional commissions?

3.

What are the Commission on Human Rights’ powers? Is it a quasi-judicial oradjudicatory body?



4. Why was the Commission on Human Rights created and given constitutionalstatus?

5. What is the nature of the civil and political rights protected by the

Commission on Human Rights?

6. How does the Commission on Human Rights declare someone in contempt?

7.

If you have a human rights issue, how would you work with the Commissionon Human Rights to address it?

$""# E.,*) %'/ 8)'%3) B1)&3.0%1 F0(@,'%1*

• CONST. art. VI, §§ 14, 17, 19

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Guide questions

1. What are the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals? What is their

composition?

2. Is a tribunal judicial or legislative in character?

3.

What was the issue in Abbas? How did the Court rule?

4.

What is the jurisdiction of each tribunal?5. Is a House Electoral Tribunal required to have party-list members?6.

Was the reorganization in Bondoc valid?

7. Describe an electoral tribunal’s independence. Do its members have security

of tenure?

$"""# A.22(**(.' .' C--.('32)'3*

• CONST. art. VI, §§ 18, 19

• CONST. art. VII, §§ 16

• W%T% $0 :&4F724I Z0=0 [20 JA@\\I "J> :;=# \]AI W)10 D"I "]J] PU2167 24

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Guide questions

1. What is the Commision on Appointments? What is its composition?

2. How did Daza resolve the issue discussed? Describe the required

proportionality in the Commission on Appointments.

3. How are the seats on the Commission on Appointment assigned to maintain

the proportionality required in the Constitution?



4. What happens when there are fractions in the computations?

PART 10: CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION

(45 minutes)

"# A.'*3(3,3(.'%1 C2)'/2)'3*

“The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect

and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified

modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.”

“Incantations of ‘people's voice,’ ‘people's sovereign will,’ or ‘let the people decide’

cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the

Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ! the people’s fundamental covenant

that provides enduring stability to our society ! becomes easily susceptible to

manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises.Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.”

-- Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, Lambino v. Commission on Elections,G.R. No. 174153, 505 SCRA 160, Oct. 25, 2006

• CONST. art. XVII, §§ 1-4

• Lambino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174153, 505 SCRA 160, Oct.25, 2006 (please read the case carefully as it outlines the entire topic)

• Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 34150, 41 SCRA 702, Oct.

16, 1971 (focus on whether changes made by a constitutional convention may

be made one at a time)

• CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 27 (date: February 2, 1987)

Guide questions

1.

What is a Constitution again? Should a Constitution be difficult to change?

2. What is a constitutional amendment? A constitutional revision?

3. What are the two modes of changing our constitution? Can an amendment bedone through both modes? A revision?

4. Which modes require approval in a plebiscite? What is a plebiscite?5.

May a plebiscite be held at the same time as a national election?

6. What is a people’s initiative? How is it initiated? How is it conducted?

7.

Describe the people’s initiative in Lambino. Was it defective?8. Did the people’s initiative in Lambino propose an amendment or a revision?

9. Is there currently a law allowing people’s initiative? What is the effect?

10.

What is a constituent assembly? How is it initiated? How is it conducted?

11. How will the voting of Congress in a constituent assembly be conducted?

12. What is a constitutional convention?13. May the changes made by a constitutional convention be ratified one at a

time? Explain what happened in Tolentino. 14.

Is a constitutional convention subject to judicial review?

15. When did the present Constitution take effect?



""# 6)9.1,3(.' %'/ .3=)0 &=%':)* .> &.'*3(3,3(.'%1 0):(2)

“[T]he legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to

the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the

people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President

Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is notmerely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.”

-- Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, Lambino v. Commission on Elections,

G.R. No. 174153, 505 SCRA 160, Oct. 25, 2006

• Proclamation No. 1, s.1986, available at

http://www.gov.ph/1986/02/25/proclamation-no-1-2

• In re Bermudez, G.R. No. 76180, 145 SCRA 160, Oct. 24, 1986 (focus onwhether the legality of the Aquino government is justiciable)

• Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, 356 SCRA 108, Mar. 2, 2001 (focus on

the comparison of the change of administration in Edsa I and Edsa II)

•

Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113 (1945) (focus on the issues in

the questions below and pick out the main ideas from the lengthy discussion in

the case)

Guide questions

1. What was the legal basis of President Corazon Aquino’s assumption of office

in 1986? Under which constitution was this conducted?2. Is the legality of the Aquino administration a justiciable issue?

3. What was the legal basis of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s assumptionof office in 2001? Under which constitution was this conducted?

4.

Is the legality of the Arroyo administration a justiciable issue?5.

What is the nature of a revolutionary government? Is the formation of such a

government subject to judicial review?

6. What is the difference between a de facto and a de jure government, according

to Co Kim Cham? What were de facto governments involved in the case?

What were de jure governments?

7. What was the effect of the successful invasion of the Philippines by theJapanese army on the laws of the Philippines? Did this mean all existing laws

were suspended?8.

What was the assertion in Co Kim Cham regarding judicial proceedings in

relation to the Japanese invasion? Was the assertion correct?

PART 11: PUTTING IT TOGETHER : THE BROADER CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME

(120 minutes)

"# 8)-%0%3(.' .> -.?)0* %'/ &=)&G* %'/ @%1%'&)*

“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be

connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human

nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If

men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,

neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing agovernment which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in



this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary

control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of

auxiliary precautions.”

-- The Federalist No. 51 (1788)

• Alexander Hamilton or James Madison, The Federalist No. 51, I NDEPENDENT

JOURNAL, Feb. 6, 1788 (focus on above excerpt)

• Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 157013, 505 SCRA 160,

Jul. 10, 2003 (Puno, J., concurring and dissenting ) (focus on section“separation of powers and checks and balances”)

Guide questions

1. What is the separation of powers?

2. What is the concept of checks and balances?

3.

How does the political question doctrine maintain the separation of powers?

4.

How can one reconcile the separation of powers and judicial supremacy?

""# H)>('(3(.' .> % *3%3) %'/ 3=) I=(1(--(') 3)00(3.05

“It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it isrequired in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign

community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legallysupreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime

of law. It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an

organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact

obedience to its commands. It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by

common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general

welfare. Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification of

the nation." This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is

on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized,exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it

and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak of it then as aterritorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted

area a supremacy over all other institutions. McIver similarly would point to the

power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a

legal order and to enter into international relations. With the latter requisite satisfied,

international law do not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde didopine.”

-- Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda,

G.R. No. 13250, 42 SCRA 23, Oct. 29, 1971

• CONST. art. I

• CONST. art. XII, § 2(2)

• Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda, G.R. No. 13250, 42 SCRA

23, Oct. 29, 1971 (focus on definition of a state)

• Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the PhilippinesPeace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008 (focus on

“Second Substantive Issue”)



Guide questions1.

In simple terms, what was the tax issue in Campos Rueda? Why was it

important to determine whether Tangier is a state under Philippine law?

2. What is a state? What are its key elements?

3. Does the Constitution define all the elements of a state?

4.

Describe the Philippines’ territory.5.

In North Cotabato, how did the original MOA-AD violate the Philippine

Constitution? State all the provisions that would be violated.

6. Did the contemplated Bangsamoro Juridical Entity possess all thecharacteristics of a state?

"""# 8.9)0)(:' (22,'(35

“A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete

theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as

against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”

-- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907)


• Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, Feb. 23, 2011 (focus

on distinction between governmental and proprietary functions of governmentfor purposes of determining sovereign immunity)

• Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 152318, Apr. 16, 2009 (focus on discussion of sovereignimmunity in relation to a foreign entity)

• Professional Video, Inc. (Provi) v. Technical Education and Skills

Development Authority (Tesda), G.R. No. 155504, Jun. 26, 2009 (focus ondistinction between governmental and proprietary functions of government,

and the immunity of public funds from attachment and garnishment)

• Minucher v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142396, Feb. 11, 2003 (ignore

discussion of diplomatic immunity; focus on sovereign immunity in relation to

a United States government agent performing official functions overseas)

• Republic v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 84607, 220 SCRA 124, Mar. 19, 1993 (focus

on the discussion of how liability should be borne by the individualsconcerned, not the State)

• Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 88537, Apr. 17, 1990 (focus solely on

the issue of whether the State enjoys sovereign immunity against a

counterclaim or against a party seeking no affirmative performance)• Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme, G.R. No. 52179, 195 SCRA 692, Apr.

8, 1991 (focus on sovereign immunity of municipal corporations)

• CIVIL CODE, arts. 2176, 2180(6)

• Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil. 311 (1916) (focus on

discussion on whether a government is liable for quasi-delicts committed by

its officers and agents, particularly the quote from the Spanish Supreme Court)

• Fontanilla v. Maliaman, G.R. No. 55963, Feb. 27, 1991 (read the main opinion

and the separate opinions of Justices Florentino Feliciano and Teodoro

Padilla) (focus on whether the National Irrigation Administration may invoke

sovereign immunity and its liability for torts committed by its employees, and

how this case is distinguished from Merritt )



Guide questions1.

What was the lawsuit in Ramos? Was sovereign immunity recognized?

2. What is sovereign immunity? Does it have textual basis in the Constitution?

What then is its legal basis, according to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes?

3. What is the practical reason for recognizing sovereign immunity?

4.

What is a governmental function? What is a proprietary function? Why is thedistinction important for recognizing sovereign immunity?

5. Is there a difference for purposes of sovereign immunity between an

unincorporated government agency and a government owned corporation?6. What was the lawsuit in GTZ? Was sovereign immunity recognized? What is

the nature of GTZ? What is its relation to the German government?7.

Is sovereign immunity automatically recognized when a foreign government is

involved in a lawsuit in the Philippines? What about other foreign entities?

8. If a government is in fact being sued, what must be determined to establish

whether sovereign immunity should be recognized?

9. May sovereign immunity be waived? How? May this be done simply by

agreeing to such a waiver in a contract?10. Is there a difference for purposes of sovereign immunity between an

unincorporated government agency and an agency with its own charter?11. What is the procedure for a foreign person or entity to assert diplomatic

immunity in a Philippine court proceeding?12.

What is the most important “barometer” to determine whether sovereign

immunity should be applied, according to GTZ?

13. What was the lawsuit in Provi? Was sovereign immunity recognized? What is

the nature of Tesda?

14. Was Provi correct in arguing that Tesda waived any sovereign immunity

because it entered into a contract with for a commercial purpose?

15.

May public funds be attached or garnished?

16. If the State is found not to have sovereign immunity in a case and is foundliable, does the winning party have the right to seek execution of the judgment

against government funds and assets? What must the winning party do?17.

What was the lawsuit in Minucher? Was sovereign immunity recognized even

though Arthur Scalzo’s claim to diplomatic immunity was not found to be

sufficiently established? What is the nature of Scalzo’s actions?

18. When is the agent of one sovereign state deemed immune from suit in the

courts of another sovereign state? What is the underlying reason for this?

19.

Is the consent of the “host” government relevant when determining the

sovereign immunity of a foreign government’s agents? Did the Philippinesconsent to Scalzo’s actions against drug traffickers? Was this explicit?20.

What was the lawsuit in Sandoval? Was sovereign immunity recognized,

considering those accused of the “Mendiola massacre” were military officers?21.

Did the State waive its sovereign immunity in Sandoval? What was the effect

of the fact finding commission? Of the President’s statements?

22. What are three instances cited in Sandoval when a suit is against the State?

23. When is the act of a government officer or agent an official act? When is it a

personal act? Is the difference relevant when determining immunity? What is

the underlying reasoning of this rule?

24. Is a waiver of immunity liberally or strictly interpreted?



25. Were the military officers in question performing official functions when theywere deployed to maintain peace and order in the crowd? When they fired on

the crowd? What is the effect of your conclusion on sovereign immunity?

26. Who should pay for damages if a government agent performing official

functions is deemed liable for an act that gives rise to damages? Is this

relevant when determining sovereign immunity?27.

What was the lawsuit in Republic v. Sandiganbayan? Was sovereign

immunity recognized? Is sovereign immunity applied when a counterclaim or

counter suit is filed against the State? When a party seeks no affirmative performance from the State?

28. What was the lawsuit in Firme? Was sovereign immunity recognized?29.

What is the general rule on the sovereign immunity of municipal corporations?

30. When is a municipal corporation performing governmental functions? How is

its sovereign immunity determined if it is performing these functions?

31. What type of function was the municipality’s driver performing in Firme?

32. What is a municipal corporation’s liability for a quasi-delict of an employee?

33.

What is the difference between suability and liability, according to Firme? 34. What was the lawsuit in Merritt? Why was sovereign immunity an issue even

though the legislature passed a law consenting to be sued by Merritt?35. The government chauffer who caused Merritt’s accident was concluded to

have been negligent. What was the government’s liability for the accident?36.

What is a quasi-delict? Is a government liable for quasi-delicts committed by

its officers and agents? Does a government guarantee the fidelity of everyone

it employees?

37. What is a special agent? How does one determine whether a government agent

is a special agent? Is the determination that a government agent is a special

agent relevant to determining sovereign immunity for quasi-delicts?

38.

What was the lawsuit in Fontanilla? Was sovereign immunity recognized?

39. In Fontanilla, was it relevant that the Court found the National IrrigationAuthority negligent in supervising its driver?

40. According to Justice Florentino Feliciano, how is Fontanilla distinguishedfrom Merritt? How would Teodoro Padilla have decided the case, and would

his result have been the same as Merritt’s?

41. Summarize the rules on sovereign immunity’s application based on the above.

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“In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice,this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give

effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective

offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully

challenge a winning candidate’s qualifications, the petitioner must clearlydemonstrative that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and

legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to theapparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very

democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so

zealously protect and promote.”

-- Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,

G.R. No. 120295, 257 SCRA 727, Jun. 28, 1996



• CONST. art. IV, §§ 1-5

• Secretary of Justice v. Pennisi, G.R. No. 169958, 614 SCRA 292, Mar. 5,

2010 (focus on “Validity of the Cancellation of Respondent’s Certificate of

Recognition and the Issuance of Deportation Order”)

• Ma v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 183133, 625 SCRA 566, Jul. 26, 2010

•

CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 6• CONST. art. VII, § 2


• CONST. art. IX-B, § 1

• CONST. art. IX-C, § 1

• CONST. art. IX-D, § 1

• CONST. art. XI, § 8


• CONST. art. XIII, § 17(2)

• CONST. art. XI, § 18

•

CONST. art. XII, § 8• CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 27 (date: February 2, 1987)

• Commonwealth Act No. 625, § 1 (1941)

• Commonwealth Act No. 473, §§ 2-7, 15 (1939)

• Commonwealth Act No. 63, §§ 1-2 (1941)

• Republic Act No. 8171, § 1 (1995)

• Republic Act No. 9225, §§ 3-5 (2003)

• Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 142840,

357 SCRA 545, May 7, 2001 (focus on “On the issue of citizenship” and Part

4 of Justice Artemio Panganiban’s concurring opinion)

•

Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 92191, 199SCRA 692, Jul. 30, 1991 (focus on “On the issue of citizenship”)

• Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, G.R. No. 83882, 169 SCRA 364, Jan. 24, 1989

(focus on whether renunciation of citizenship needs to be explicit)

• Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, Aug. 10,2012 (focus on “Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for

failure to renounce her Australian citizenship”)

• In re Muneses, B.M. No. 2112, Jul. 24, 2012

• Cordora v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 176947, Feb. 19, 2009 (focuson “Tambunting’s dual citizenship” and “requirements for dual citizens”)

Guide questions1. Who are citizens of the Philippines?

2. Why was Michael Pennisi’s citizenship being questioned? What basketball

team did he play for?

3. What was Pennisi’s citizenship? Why? Please recall the background and

citizenship of his parents.

4. What evidence regarding his citizenship did Pennisi present to the Bureau of

Immigration and Department of Justice? What was the most important?5.

What evidence against Pennisi’s citizenship was presented?

6. Explain how the Court weighed the evidence and determined citizenship.

7. What was the Ma siblings’ citizenship? Why? Please recall the background

and citizenship of their parents.



8. When should the election in article IV, § 1 (3) be made? Is there a deadline?9.

Describe the Ma siblings’ election. Was it defective? Did the Court accept it?

10. Distinguish the Ma siblings’ election from the other elections discussed.

11. Who are natural born citizens? How does being a natural born citizen affect

one’s rights as a citizen? Can you explain the distinction?

12.

What is the citizenship of Teodoro Cruz of Pangasinan? Why?13.

What are the two ways of acquiring citizenship?

14. How is Philippine citizenship lost under Commonwealth Act No. 63? How did

Cruz lose his citizenship?15. How may a Philippine citizen reacquire his citizenship? What did Cruz do?

16. Can you compare the process for repatriation and naturalization?17.

Is it correct to say that a repatriated citizen cannot be considered natural born

because he had to perform an act to obtain or perfect his citizenship?

18. In his Bengson concurring opinion, Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban quoted

part of his landmark 1996 Frivaldo ponencia. Explain his position.

19. What is the citizenship of Jose Ong, Jr. of Northern Samar? Why? Please

recall the background and citizenship of his parents.20. Explain the unequal treatment under the 1935 Constitution of children of

Filipino fathers and alien mothers, and children of Filipino mothers and alienfathers. When was this unequal treatment removed?

21. Is a citizen who elected to take Philippine citizenship under Article IV, § 1(3)natural born? What if the election was before the 1987 Constitution?

22. How is the election under Article IV, § 1(3) made? Is it a formal process?

23. Describe the formal election process under Commonwealth Act No. 625.

24. How did the Supreme Court consider Jose Ong, Jr. to have made the election?

25. May the citizenship of a person be attacked as a collateral matter in court?

26.

Describe the qualifications and process for naturalization under

Commonwealth Act No. 473.

27. What was Willie Yu’s citizenship? How did he lose Philippine citizenship?28.

Describe how citizenship is regained under Commonwealth Act No. 63,

Republic Act No. 8171 and Republic Act No. 9225.29.

What was Teodora Sobajana-Condon’s citizenship? How did she lose

Philippine citizenship? How did she regain it?

30. What is the specific requirement for a former natural born Filipino or a dual

citizen to run for public office in the Philippines? Is it a strict requirement?

31. Is the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a dual citizen still a sufficiently

clear renunciation of a foreign citizenship under Philippine law?

32.

Is citizenship a requirement to practice law in the Philippines?33. Was Atty. Epifanio Muneses able to resume the practice of law in thePhilippines? Did his regaining Philippine citizenship automatically make him

eligible to resume practice of law in the Philippines?34.

What was Gustavo Tambunting’s citizenship? Why?

35. Was Tambunting a naturalized American citizen?

36. What are three situations in which a Filipino may have dual citizenship?

37. What is the principle of jus sanguinis? Of jus soli? Which do we follow?

38. Is the place of one’s birth relevant in determining Philippine citizenship?

39.

Distinguish dual citizenship from dual allegiance. Which applied to

Tambunting? Which concept is discussed by article IV, § 5?

40.

How does Republic Act No. 9225 apply to dual citizens?



PART 12: OTHER PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

• CONST. arts. II, XII, XIII

• Please review the doctrines on self executing / non self executing principles.

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“The majority opinion wreaks havoc on the bedrock principle of our ‘democratic and

republican State’ that all votes are equal. Instead, the majority opinion introduces the

Orwellian concept that some votes are more equal than others. The majority opinion

allows, for the first time under the 1987 Constitution, voters in a legislative districtcreated by Congress to send one representative to Congress even if the district has a

population of only 176,383. In sharp contrast, all other legislative districts created byCongress send one representative each because they all meet the minimum population

requirement of 250,000.”

-- Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, Aquino & Robredo v. Commission

on Elections, G.R. No. 189793, 617 SCRA 623, Apr. 7, 2010 (dissenting)

• CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 4

• Aquino & Robredo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189793, 617 SCRA623, Apr. 7, 2010 (Carpio, J., dissenting ) (focus on first two paragraphs)

• Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, 257 SCRA 727, Jun.

28, 1996 (Puno, J., concurring ) (focus on first three paragraphs)

Guide questions

1. What kind of State is the Philippines?

2.

How does Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio invoke the “democratic”and “republican” character of the Philippine State in the controversial series of

Corona Court decisions regarding the creation of cities and provinces? What

was the context of these decisions?

3. The principle “one man, one vote” is familiar in constitutional law, and was

particularly highlighted in the 1960s by the United States’ Warren Court.

What do you think this principle means?

4. In what context does Chief Justice Reynato Puno present article II, sections 1and 4 in his Frivaldo concurring opinion?

5. Might these state principles justify an invocation of popular constitutionalism?

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“The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited from

engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.”

-- Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, 380 SCRA 739, Apr. 11, 2002

• CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 7, 8

• Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, 380 SCRA 739, Apr. 11, 2002

(focus on brief discussion of assigned constitutional provisions only)

Guide questions

1.

What state principles would prohibit offensive operations by foreign troops inPhilippine territory?



2. Are nuclear weapons allowed in Philippine territory? May the Philippinegovernment initiate a nuclear weapon development program?

3. How did Lim rule on whether United States forces were engaging in

unconstitutional offensive operations in the Philippines under the Visiting

Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States?

4.

As a review, were both of the above instruments ratified by the Senate? If not,under what authority were these instruments entered into?

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;247*&*6*&24 8%45%*)7 *+%* 1&$&'&%4 %6*+23&*V &7I %* %'' *&8)7I 76,3)8) 2$)3 *+)

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“Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative

head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the

power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he

would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military

experts; but the ultimate power is his. As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to

direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command,and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual.

“Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitutionstates that: ‘The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be

national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by anational police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in

their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.’

“A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational

supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day

operations….”

-- Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, Jul. 3, 2012



•

CONST. art. XVIII, § 24• Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, Jul. 3, 2012 (focus on text accompanying

footnotes 39 to 41 and footnotes 49 to 53)

Guide questions

1. Describe the civilian supremacy over the armed forces referred to in the

Constitution. How is this civilian supremacy clause read with the commander-

in-chief powers of the President?

2. Are the police governed by a different constitutional provision from thoserelating to the armed forces?

3. Was the governor’s calling out of the armed forces and the police and his

formation of a “Civilian Emergency Force” in Kulayan valid? Why?4. Which civilian authority exercises control over the armed forces? The police?



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“Social justice is ‘neither communism, nor despositism, nor atomism nor anarchy,’

but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by

the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people,

the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability

of all the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a propereconomic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the

community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or

extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all

governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.”

-- Justice José P. Laurel, Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1936)

• CONST. art. II, §§ 10, 21

•

CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1-2• Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, G.R. No. 78742, 175 SCRA 343, Jul. 14, 1989 (focus on text

accompanying footnotes 1-4, 45-51)

• Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations

Commission, G.R. No. 80609, 164 SCRA 671, Aug. 23, 1988 (focus on text

accompanying footnotes 13-17)

Guide questions1.

What is the famous definition of social justice by Justice José P. Laurel?

2.

How did the constitutional principle of social justice expand from the 1935 tothe 1987 Constitutions? Is agrarian reform a part of this principle?

3. What is expropriation? What is just compensation?

4. What is the revolutionary concept of just compensation in Association of

Small Landowners? Is this constitutional?

5. What does it mean when an employee is dismissed for cause? Was the

payment of separation pay required under the Labor Code in such cases?6. What was the basis of the Supreme Court for granting separation pay in

certain cases despite dismissal for cause? Is it more than abstract equity?7.

Did the Court grant separation pay in PLDT? Why not?

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“With the State's obligation to protect and promote the right to health of the people

and instill health consciousness among them (Article II, Section 15, 1987

Constitution), in order to develop a healthy and alert citizenry (Article XIV, Section

19(1)), it became mandatory for the government to supervise and control the

proliferation of drugs in the market. The constitutional mandate that "the State shall

adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall

endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost" (Article XIII, Section 11) cannot be neglected. This is why

"the State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system

(Article XIII, Section 12). The BFAD is the government agency vested by law tomake a mandatory and authoritative determination of the true therapeutic effect of



drugs because it involves technical skill which is within its special competence. Thehealth of the citizenry should never be compromised. To the layman, medicine is a

cure that may lead to better health.”

-- People v. Presiding Judge Estrada, G.R. No. 124461, Jun. 26, 2000

•

CONST. art. II, § 15• CONST. art. XIII, §§ 11-12

• CONST. art. XIV, § 19(1)

• Roma Drug v. Regional Trial Court of Guagua, G.R. No. 149907, Apr. 16,

2009 (focus on Part III)

Guide questions1.

What are the constitutional provisions regarding the right to health?

2. Why did the Supreme Court say that the first cited law’s provisions against

counterfeit drugs were too broad to the point that they were unconstitutional?

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“Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony

indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,

renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,

wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,

development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as futuregenerations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to

preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthfulecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound

environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation toensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.”

-- Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., Oposa v. Factoran,

G.R. No. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, Jul. 30, 1993


• Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, Jul. 30, 1993 (focus on

answering the guide questions)

Guide questions

1. Is the right to a balanced and healthful ecology self executing?

2.

Explain the concept of intergenerational responsibility and the rule onstanding created by Oposa? What kind of cases does it apply to?

3. What was the alternative proposed by Justice Florentino Feliciano to declaring

the right to a healthful and balanced ecology itself a self executing right?

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“[S]ome constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the

framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the differentdepartments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and

inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, suchas those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a



provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid ofsupplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means

of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a

constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred

and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be

determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no languageindicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.”

“This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts ofrespondents to sell the historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia

— to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever

manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of foreign

silver. … [T]his Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the

duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect

the sanctity of the Constitution.”

-- Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,G.R. No. 122156, 267 SCRA 408, 431, Feb. 3, 1997

“[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,

labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchangewith the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection

of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are

unfair. … While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign

goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In

fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on

foreign competition that is unfair.”

-- Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, Tanada v. Angara,

G.R. No. 118295, 272 SCRA 18, 54, May 2, 1997

• CONST. art. II, §§ 19-20

• CONST. art. XII, §§ 1, 10-13

• Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No.

122156, 267 SCRA 408, 431, Feb. 3, 1997 (read the majority opinion and the

dissents of Justices Puno and Panganiban; focus on the implementation of the

“Filipino First” policy and whether a Filipino bidder was allowed to match a

foreign bidder)

•

Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, 272 SCRA 18, 54, May 2, 1997 (focuson the sections “Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing” and “Economic

Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to AttainBalanced Development of Economy”)

• Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. v. Secretary of Transportation and

Communication, G.R. No. 169914, 549 SCR 44, Apr. 2008 (Corona, J.,dissenting ) (focus on text accompanying footnotes 71-73)

Guide questions

1. What are the constitution’s nationalist economic provisions?

2. Is the provision giving preference to qualified Filipinos in granting economic

rights self executing? Explain how this was applied in Manila Prince Hotel.



3. Is the provision on an independent national economy self executing? Explainhow this was applied in Tanada.

4. Does the constitution embrace a free market economy? How did Chief Justice

Renato Corona frame the Build-Operate-Tranfer Law in a constitutional

context in AEDC .

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“Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring ‘equalaccess to opportunities for public office’ is the claim that there is a constitutional right

to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency.

There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed

by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor

elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain

language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of

the sort.”

-- Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161872,427 SCR 96, Apr. 13, 2004



• Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161872, 427 SCR 96, Apr.13, 2004

Guide questions

1. Does the Constitution grant a right to run for public office?

2. What was the intent of the Constitutional Commission in drafting the

provision on equal access to public office? Does it grant an enforceable right?

3. Does the Commission on Elections have the right to ban nuisance candidates?

4.

Was Bro. Elly Pamatong, Esquire allowed to run for president?

5. Are political dynasties currently prohibited? How is a dynasty defined?

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“The Court, however, distinguished the duty to disclose information from the duty to permit access to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the

Constitution. Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under the

Constitution, the other aspect of the people’s right to know requires a demand orrequest for one to gain access to documents and paper of the particular agency.

Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only transactions involving public interest,

while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information which embraces not

only transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained in official

communications and public documents of the government agency. Such relief must be

granted to the party requesting access to official records, documents and papers

relating to official acts, transactions, and decisions that are relevant to a governmentcontract.”

-- Ideals v. Psalm, G.R. No. 192088, Oct. 9, 2012

•

CONST. art. II, § 28• CONST. art. III, § 7



• Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal

Services, Inc. (Ideals) v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management

Corp. (Psalm), G.R. No. 192088, Oct. 9, 2012 (focus on “Violation of right to

information”)

Guide questions1. Does the Constitution grant a right to information?2.

Distinguish the duty to disclose information on transactions involving public

interest, pursuant to the state principle, from the right to information on

matters of public concern in the Bill of Rights.

3. What is the significance of the fact that it was a Korean company granted

water rights in the transaction in Ideals? Was Psalm required to disclose

information on this company?

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“Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and, assuch, is the general source of all private titles. Thus, pursuant to this principle, all

claims of private title to land, save those acquired from native title, must be traced

from some grant, whether express or implied, from the State. Absent a clear showingthat land had been let into private ownership through the State’s imprimatur, such

land is presumed to belong to the State.”

-- Republic v. Santos, G.R. No. 180027, Jul. 18, 2012

• CONST. art. XII, §§ 1-4, 7-8

• CIVIL CODE, arts. 420, 1117, 1137

•

Republic v. Santos, G.R. No. 180027, Jul. 18, 2012 (focus on the discussion ofthe Regalian Doctrine under the Constitution in “Jura Regalia and the Property

Registration Decree”)

• Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 384 SCRA 152, Jul. 9,

2002 (focus on the constitutional rules in “Dispositions under the 1987

Constitution,” “The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban” and

“Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas” but do not

focus on the specific statutory rules applicable)

• La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, Dec. 1, 2004

(focus on entire section “The Proper Interpretation of the Constitutional

Phrase ‘Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance’”)

Guide questions

1. What is the Regalian Doctrine? From where must all land ownership be

traced? If land is not registered or not categorized as proper for private

ownership, who owns it?

2.

The government claimed that the land in Santos was only reclassified as

proper for private ownership on March 15, 1982, after which it was

unregistered. The Santoses, on the other hand, purchased the land and

attempted to register it to obtain a land title. Who was presumed to own the

unregistered land? What evidence was presented to rebut this presumption ofownership? How did the Supreme Court weigh this evidence?



3. To invoke the extraordinary acquisitive prescription in the Civil Code, theclaimant must establish uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years. Was

this recognized in Santos? When did the period to count prescription begin?

4. Who owned the reclaimed land in Chavez? Why? How should this reclaimed

land be classified?

5.

Generally, agricultural land may be “alienable land of the public domain” orreclassified by the government into “patrimonial” land. What are the

restrictions on the sale or lease of land of the public domain that apply to

agricultural and other types of land?6. According to Chavez, which government agency properly authorizes land

reclamation from Manila Bay? Which government agency properlyreclassifies lands of the public domain into an alienable or disposable status?

7. Given the classification of the reclaimed land in Chavez, could this land be

validly sold to the Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation?

8. What was the mining controversy in La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association?

How did the Supreme Court rule?

9.

What is the proper interpretation of the phrase “agreements involving eithertechnical or financial assistance” and what type of constitutional interpretation

did the Supreme Court apply?

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• Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines

Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008 (Carpio,

J., concurring ) (focus on “Violation of Constitutional Rights of Lumads”)

Guide questions

1.

According to Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, how did the original

MOA-AD violate the rights of lumads in Mindanao? What specific rights were

violated under the Constitution, statutes and international law? How shouldthese violations be remedied?

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“Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, asopposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in

Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, ifthe preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the

term "capital" shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in

the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in

the election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of

the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of

directors.”-- Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, Gamboa v. Teves,

G.R. No. 176579, 652 SCRA 690, Jun. 28, 2011




• Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, 652 SCRA 690, Jun. 28, 2011 (focus on

“Definition of the Term ‘Capital’ in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987

Constitution”)

Guide questions

1.

What is the constitutional restriction on the ownership of public utilities?What is the rationale for this restriction?

2.

What is the definition of “capital” in the context of the above restriction?

3. Describe the ownership of the Philippine Long Distance Company’s common

(and voting) shares? What about its nonvoting preferred shares? How did this

ownership structure come about?

4. Did PLDT’s capital structure violate the Constitution?

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“[T]his constitutional provision does not declare an outright prohibition of

monopolies. It simply allows the State to act ‘when public interest so requires’; eventhen, no outright prohibition is mandated, as the State may choose to regulate rather

than to prohibit.”

-- Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, 583 SCRA 119, Apr. 2, 2009


• Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, 583 SCRA 119, Apr. 2, 2009

(focus on “#1*6%' ;%7) ;24*32$)37V Susceptible of Judicial Determination”)

Guide questions1.

What is the constitutional restriction on monopolies? Is it an absolute

prohibition?

2. What deregulation did Congressman Enrique Garcia attempt to challenge?

How did the Supreme Court rule on his challenge?

Documents

Philippine Constitutional Law I Syllabus of Oscar Franklin Tan (University of the East) (as of June 2013)