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PH400 INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2015/16 Course Guide DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD

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PH400 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD Teacher Responsible: Professor Roman Frigg Contact Details: Room LAK1.01, Lakatos Building Tel: 020 7955 7182 Email: r.p.frigg@lse.ac.uk Lecturer: Professor Roman Frigg Seminar Leaders: Professor Roman Frigg

Timetable: Details can be found on the LSE

website at www.lse.ac.uk/admin/timetables

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Introduction Overview

This course will present core subject areas of analytical philosophy of science. No in-depth knowledge of any science is presupposed for this course, nor is mathematics beyond basic algebra. The bulk of the course is concerned with ‘general’ philosophy of science rather than with the philosophies of specific sciences (such as the philosophy of quantum mechanics or Darwinian evolution). There will, however, be one lecture on the philosophy of space and time at the end of the course in order to convey the main idea of what a philosophy of a special science amounts to. Aims and Objectives

This course is an introduction some of the main problems and issues that have been discussed within analytical philosophy of science in the 20th century. By the end of the course, students should be familiar with most of the core problems along with the attempts to solve them, and be able to discuss them critically. Mastering the course provides a basis for further studies in philosophy of science at the graduate level. Coursework

Attendance of all lectures and classes is compulsory. Lectures for this course double as lectures for PH201, the undergraduate course in philosophy of science. The backup seminars therefore play a crucial role in deepening the understanding of the issues at stake and should not be skipped. At the same time, lectures cover more material than can be discussed in the seminars, so skipping lectures is not recommended either.

Philosophy is about engaging actively with ideas. Participating in lectures and seminars is an essential way to experience it. In addition to attending the meetings, students will be expected to:

• Answer the 3 Short Answer Questions posted weekly on Moodle, and submit them through Moodle before the start of the weekly discussion seminar. These answers are not marked, but serious submission is required.

• Participate in discussion during the scheduled seminars. • Submit 4 formative essays of 1,500 words each, two in Michaelmas Term and

two in Lent Term. The essays have to be handed in by the end weeks 5 and 9. The essays can either be written on a topic from the essay list (which will be distributed in the seminar) or on a topic discussed with, and approved by, the seminar leader.

Short Answer Questions. Solutions to short answer questions will typically be 3-5 sentences. A good short answer solution has the following qualities. 1. It is focused on the question. Don’t write down everything you know on the topic! Only include material that is relevant to the question set. 2. It is clear and precise. Obfuscation will only harm you. 3. It shows you are familiar with the material, for instance through discussion of the main argument(s) of philosopher(s) relevant to the question, through expression of these ideas in your own words, through illustration with your own examples, and through your own critical evaluation.

Students are expected to submit solutions to 3 short answer questions each week, and discuss them during your seminar discussions. So, when the time comes to prepare for

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the exam, students should already have built up solutions to 60 questions to study.

Essay Questions. The essay questions will be based on the topic studied in each week. Answers should be given in the form of a philosophical essay. In particular, it should have above all:

• A clear thesis that provides an answer to the essay question. • An argument for that thesis, which is both valid and which is supported

through evidence and argument. • Discussion of the background for the thesis. In order to understand the thesis,

there is always some context that must be explained.

Students will also receive credit for your grasp of the material, organisation, originality, and general clarity of writing.

Students with no prior training in analytical philosophy may find the following helpful when planning and writing essays:

Weston, Anthony (2000): A Rulebook for Arguments. 3rd ed., Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett.

Teachers will mark essays and give critical feedback only for essays turned in on time. Marks given are for orientation only and do not count towards the final mark. Assessment

The final mark of the course will determined solely by a three-hour written examination in the summer term. The exam will consist in the following:

• 10 Short Answer Questions. The exam will state 10 short answer questions chosen word-for-word from the list of 60 Short Answer Questions provided throughout the year. 5 questions will be chosen from Michaelmas Term and 5 questions from Lent Term. Students must answer all 10 of these questions; it is therefore advisable to study answers to all 60 questions.

• 2 essay questions. The exam will state a list of 5 essay questions from Michaelmas Term and 5 essay questions from Lent Term, one for each week of lecture. Students must answer one essay question from each of the two lists. It is therefore advisable to study 2-3 essay topics from each term.

The two essay questions and the group of 10 short answer questions bear equal weight. That is: 1/3 of the mark is based the first essay question; 1/3 of the mark is based on the second essay question; and 1/3 of the mark is based on the 10 short answer questions. Note: The above only concerns LSE examinations. Students from other colleges attending this course have to take intercollegiate examinations; they do not take the LSE examination. These students will be told by their own colleges when their examination will take place and on what materials they will be assessed. Neither the lecturer of this course nor the LSE are involved in the organisation of these examinations at any point. Internet Access

By enrolling in this course, students agree that they will have regular access to the

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internet that will allow them to submit coursework online before the due date. In particular, they are responsible for making sure that they have enough to time learn how to submit coursework online, and to troubleshoot any potential problems before the due date. To avoid such problems, please don’t to wait until the last minute! Academic Integrity

LSE seeks to maintain an optimal learning environment. General principles of academic honesty include the concept of respect for the intellectual property of others, the expectation that individual work will be submitted unless otherwise allowed by an instructor, and the obligations both to protect ones own academic work from misuse by others as well as to avoid using anothers work as ones own. All students are expected to understand and abide by these principles. If you are not sure what constitutes plagiarism, visit the Harvard Guide to Using Sources at http://goo.gl/hFa7EF.

The School's policy and procedures regarding plagiarism are available online at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/calendar/ academicregulations/regulationsOnAssessmentOffences-Plagiarism.htm. Accessibility Needs

Your success at LSE is important to us. Every student is entitled to the opportunity to have a meaningful learning experience. You are warmly encouraged to discuss your particular learning styles and requirements with me personally during Office Hours. Students with special needs or disabilities are also encouraged to avail themselves of the services of LSE's Disability and Well-Being O_ce, located in Old Building room G23, open Monday through Thursday from 10am-12pm and from 2pm-4pm. They may be contacted by email at disability-dyslexia@lse.ac.uk or by phone at (0)20 7955 7767. If you plan to make a request, please remember to make an appointment for an Individual Student Support Agreement (ISSA) and contact their lecturers about your requests as early in the semester as possible, so we can make sure that you are accommodated. Texts

Main Texts (students should buy these)

Curd, Martin and J. A. Cover (1998): Philosophy of Science. The Central Issues. New York and London: W. W. Norton. [Henceforth abbreviated to ‘C&C’]

Salmon, Marrilee et al. (1992): Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett.

Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy of Science

Bird, Alexander (1998): Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge. Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2003): Theory and Reality. An Introduction to the Philosophy

of Science. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Hitchcock, Christopher (ed.) (2004): Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science.

Oxford: Blackwell. Kosso, Peter (1992): Reading the Book of Nature. An Introduction to the Philosophy

of Science. Cambridge: CUP. Ladyman, James (2002): Understanding Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge.

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Lambert, Karel and Gordon G. Brittan Jr. (1992): An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Atascadero/CA: Ridgeview. 4th ed.

Losee, John (1992): A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford UP. 4th ed.

Rosenberg, Alexander (2000): Philosophy of Science. A Contemporary Introduction. London: Routledge.

Classical Textbooks

Braithwaite, Richard B. (1953): Scientific Explanation. Cambridge: CUP. Carnap, Rudolph (1966): An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. New York:

Dover 1995 (Reprint of: Philosophical Foundations of Physics: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. New York 1966).

Hempel, Carl G. (1966): Philosophy of Natural Science. Princeton: Princeton UP. Nagel, Ernest (1961): The Structure of Science. Problems in the Logic of Scientific

Explanation. New York 1961; repr. Indianapolis/Cambridge 1979: Hackett. Pap, Arthur (1963): An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. London: Eyre and

Spottiswoode.

Some Classical Texts

Cartwright, Nancy (1983): How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: OUP. Duhem, Pierre (1906): La Théorie Physique, son Objet et sa Structure. 1st ed. Paris

1906. Engl. trans. by Philip P. Wiener: The aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton: Princeton UP 1954.

Goodman, Nelson (1954): Fact, Fact, and Forecast. 4th ed., Cambridge/Ma and London: Harvard UP1983.

Hempel, Carl G. (1965): Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York.

Howson, Colin and Peter Urbach (1989): Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach. Illinois: Open Court (second edition 1993).

Hacking, Ian (1983): Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: CUP. Kuhn, Thomas (1962):The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago and London:

Chicago UP (second edition 1969). Lakatos, Imre (1970): ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research

Programmes’, in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.): Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: CUP, pp. 91-196.

Popper, Karl R. (1932): The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Routledge 2003. – (1989) Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge. van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980): The Scientific Image. Oxford.

Companions and Encyclopaedias

Newton-Smith, W. H. (ed.) (2000): A Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Malden/MA and Oxford: Blackwell.

Machamer, Peter and Michael Silberstein (2002): The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Blackwell.

Web Resources

Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy [Link in LSE e-library] Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu Epistme Link Page: www.epistemelinks.com The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu/

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Topics It is recommended that students read the required readings in the order in which they are listed. Additional readings are listed in alphabetical order. Disclaimer: The outline below is for orientation only and the compulsory readings can be changed at any time in order to respond to the needs of course participants. The definitive list of compulsory readings will be posted on Moodle every week. Michaelmas Term Unit 1: Scientific Realism versus Antirealism

Week 1: Scientific realism

Required Reading

1. Psillos, Stathis (1999): Scientific Realism. How Science Tracks Truth. London: Routledge, Introduction.

2. Harman, Gilbert (1965): ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’, Philosophical Review 74, 88-95, pp. 88-91.

3. Alison Wylie (1986): ‘Arguments for Scientific Realism: The Ascending Spiral’, American Philosophical Quarterly 23(3), pp. 287-297

4. Mizrahi, Moti (2012): ‘Why the ultimate argument for scientific realism ultimately fails’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 132–138.

Additional reading

Boyd, Richard (1981): ‘Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology’, Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980 Vol. 2, 613-662.

– (1983): ‘On the Current Status of Scientific Realism’, Erkenntnis 19, pp. 45-90. Glymour, Clark (1992): ‘Realism and the Nature of Theories’, in Salmon et al.

(1992), Ch. 3. Leplin, Jarrett (ed.) (1984): Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California

Press. – (1997): A Novel Defence of Scientific Realism. New York and Oxford: OUP. Lipton, Peter (2004): Inference to the Best Explanation. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. Harman, Gilbert (1965): ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’, Philosophical

Review 74, pp. 88-95. Psillos, Stathis (1999): Scientific Realism. How Science Tracks Truth. London:

Routledge. – (2000): ‘The Present State of the Scientific Realism Debate’, British Journal for the

Philosophy of Science 51, 705-28. Week 2: Scientific antirealism

Required Reading

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1. Maxwell, Grover (1962): ‘The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities’, C&C pp. 1052-1062.

2. Tulodziecki, Dana (2013): ‘Underdetermination, Methodological Practices, and Realism’, Synthese 190, pp. 3731–3750.

3. van Fraassen, Bas (1980): ‘Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism’, C&C pp. 1064-1087.

Additional reading

Brown, James R. (1985): ‘Explaining the Success of Science’, C&C pp. 1136-1152. Carnap, Rudolph (1966): An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. New York

1995 (Repr. of: Philosophical Foundations of Physics: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. New York 1966).

Churchland, Paul (1982): ‘The Ontological Status of Observables: In Praise of the Superempirical Virtues’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63, pp. 226-236.

Churchland, Paul and Clifford A. Hooker (1985): Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. Chicago: ChicagoUP.

Duhem, Pierre (1906): La Théorie Physique, son Objet et sa Structure. 1st ed. Paris 1906. Engl. trans. by Philip P. Wiener: The aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton: Princeton UP 1954.

Laudan, Larry (1990): ‘Demystifying Underdetermination’, C&C pp. 320-353. Musgrave, Alan (1985): ‘Realism versus Constructive Empiricism’, C&C pp. 1088-

1113. Psillos, Stathis (1999): Scientific Realism. How Science Tracks Truth. London:

Routledge, Ch. 1. Quine, Willard Van Orman (1953): ‘Two dogmas of Empiricism’, C&C pp. 280-301. Week 3: The growth of scientific knowledge and the pessimistic meta-induction

Required Reading

1. Laudan, Larry (1981): ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’, C&C pp. 1114-1135.

2. Kuhn, Thomas (1962): ‘The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions’, C&C pp.86-101.

3. Kuhn, Thomas (1977): ‘Objectivity, Value Judgement, and Theory Choice’, C&C pp. 102-118.

Additional reading

Bird, Alexander (2001): Thomas Kuhn. Princeton: Princeton UP. Hoyningen-Huene, Paul (1993): Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S.

Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science. Chicago: Chicago UP. Kuhn, Thomas (1962). Lakatos, Imre (1970): ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research

Programmes’, in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.): Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: CUP, pp. 91-196.

Laudan, Larry (1984): ‘Dissecting the Holist Picture of Scientific Change’, C&C pp. 139-169.

McGuire, J. E. (1992): ‘Realism and the Nature of Theories’, in Salmon et al. (1992), Ch. 4.

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McMullin, Ernan (1993): ‘Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science’, C&C pp. 119-138.

Psillos, Stathis (1999): Scientific Realism. How Science Tracks Truth. London: Routledge, Ch. 5.

Week 4: Selective Realism: entity realism and structural realism,

Required Reading

1. Hacking, Ian (1982): ‘Experimentation and Scientific Realism’, C&C pp. 1153-1168.

2. Worrall, John (1989): ‘Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?’ Dialectica 43, 99-124.

3. Harker, David (2012): ‘How to Split a Theory: Defending Selective Realism and Convergence without Proximity’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64(1), pp. 79-106.

Additional reading

Campbell, Keith (1994): ‘Selective Realism in the Philosophy of Physics’, The Monist 77(1), pp. 27-46

Cartwright, Nancy (1983): How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: OUP, Ch. 5. Curd, Martin and J. A. Cover (1998): ‘Commentary’, C&C pp. 1226-1289. Fine, Arthur (1984): ‘The Natural Ontological Attitude’, C&C pp. 1186-1208. – (1986): ‘Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Instrumentalist Attachments to Science’,

Mind 95, pp. 149-79. Frigg, Roman and Ioannis Votsis (2011): ‘Everything You Always Wanted to Know

About Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask.’ European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1, 227–276.

Hacking, Ian (1983): Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: CUP, Chs. 1 and 16. Musgrave, Alan (1989): ‘NOA’s Ark – Fine for Realism’, C&C pp. 1209-1225. Poincaré, Henri (1902): La Science et l’ Hypothèse. Paris. Translation: Science and

Hypothesis. New York 1905. Redhead, Michael (2001): ‘The Intelligibility of the Universe’, in: Anthony O’Hear

(ed.): Philosophy of the New Millennium. Supplement to ‘Philosophy’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 48, pp. 73-90.

Resnik, David D. (1994): ‘Hacking’s Experimental Realism’, C&C pp. 1169-1185. Russell, Bertrand (1927): The Analysis of Matter. London 1992. Worrall, John (1994): ‘How to Remain (Reasonably) Optimistic: Scinetific Realism

and the “Luminiferous Ether”’, Proceedings of the Biennial Meetings of the Philoophy of Science Association 1994, Vol. 1, 334-42.

Zahar, Elie (2001) Poincaré’s Philosophy. From Conventionalism to Phenomenology. Chicago and La Salle.

Unit 2: Theory and Observation

Week 5: The problem of induction

Required Reading

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1. Hume, David (1748): Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Oxford UP 1997, Secs, 2-7.

2. Goodman, Nelson (1954): Fact, Fact, and Forecast. 4th ed., Cambridge/Ma and London: Harvard UP1983, Ch. 3.

Additional reading

Howson, Colin (2000): Hume’s Problem. Induction and the Justification of Belief. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Week 6: Underdetermination and the confirmation of hypotheses

Required Reading

1. Salmon, Wesley and John Earman (1992): ‘The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses’, in Salmon et al. (1992) Ch. 2, Parts I and II.

2. Popper, Karl (1932): ‘The Problem of Induction’, C&C pp. 426-432. 3. Duhem, Pierre (1906): ‘Physical Theory and Experiment’, C&C pp. 257-279.

Additional reading

Feyerabend, Paul (1975): Against Method. London and New York: Verso. Earman, John (ed.) (1983): Testing Scientific Theories. Minnesota Studies in the

Philosophy of Science: University of Minnesota Press, Vol. 10. Gillies, Donald (1993): ‘The Quine Thesis and the Duhem Thesis’, C&C pp. 302-319. Glymour, Clark (1980): Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton UP, Ch. 2. Hempel, Carl G. (1966): ‘Criteria of Confirmation and Acceptability’, C&C pp. 445-

459. Laudan, Larry (1990): ‘Demystifying Underdetermination’, C&C pp. 320-353. Miller, David (1994): Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence. Chicago:

Open Court. Putnam, Hilary (1974), ‘The Corroboration’ of Theories, in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.),

The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Book I, La Salle/Ill; Open Court, pp. 221-240. Repr. in: Hilary Putnam (1975), Mathematics, Matter and Method, Phil. Papers, Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma.:Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 250-269.

Quine, W. V. O. (1951): ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, C&C pp. 280-301. Strawson, Peter F. (1952): Introduction to Logical Theory. London: Methuen, Ch. 9. Worrall, John (1989): ‘Why Both Popper and Watkins Fail to Solve the Problem of

Induction’, in: Ian C. Jarvie and Fred D’Agostino (eds.): Freedom and Rationality: Essays in Honor of John Watkins. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 257-296.

Week 7: Bayesianism and probabilities

Required Reading

1. Salmon, Wesley and John Earman (1992): ‘The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses’, in Salmon et al. (1992) Ch. 2, Parts III and IV.

2. Curd, Martin and J. A. Cover (1998): ‘Bayes for Beginners’, C&C pp. 627-638.

Additional reading

Probabilities

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Galavotti, Maria Carla (2005): Philosophical Introduction to Probability. CSLI Publications, Lecture Notes N0 167, Stanford.

Gillies, Donald (2000): Philosophical Theories of Probability. London; Routledge. Horwich, Paul (1993): ‘Wittgensteinian Bayesianism’, C&C pp. 607-624. Howson, Colin (1995): ‘Theories of Probability’, British Journal for The Philosophy

of Science 46, pp. 1-32. Lewis, David (1981): ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’, in: David Lewis:

Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Oxford: OUP, pp. 83-132. – (1994): ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’, Mind 103: 473-390. Mellor, D. Hugh (2005): Probability. A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge:

London and New York. von Plato, Jan (1994): Creating Modern Probability. Cambridge: CUP.

Bayesianism

Bovens, Luc and Stephan Hartmann: Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: OUP. Earman, John (1992): Bayes or Bust? Boston: MIT Press Howson, Colin (2000): Hume’s Problem. Induction and the Justification of Belief.

Oxford: Oxford UP. – and Peter Urbach (1989): Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach. Illinois:

Open Court (second edition 1993). Joyce, James: ‘Bayes’s Theorem’, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online,

see above). Week 8: Bayesianism continued

Required Reading

1. Glymour, Clark (1980): ‘Why I am not a Bayesian’, C&C pp. 584-606. 2. Curd, Martin and J. A. Cover (1998): ‘Commentary’, C&C pp. 646-74. Unit 3: Laws of Nature

Week 9: Laws of nature I: the statement and the universals view

Required Reading

1. Ayer, Alfred J. (1956): ‘What is a Law of Nature?’, C&C pp. 808-825. 2. Rescher, Nicolas (1969): Lawfulness as Mind-Dependent. In: Rescher (ed.):

Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. A Tribute on the Occasion of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 178-197.

3. Dretske, Fred (1977): ‘Laws of Nature’, C&C pp. 826-845.

Additional reading

Armstrong, David M. (1983): What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Beauchamp, Tom L. (ed.) (1974): Philosophical Problems of Causation. Encino and Belmont: Dickenson.

Carroll, John W.: Laws of Nature. Stanford Encyclopaedia. Goodman, Nelson (1954): Fact, Fact, and Forecast. 4th ed., Cambridge/Ma and

London: Harvard UP1983, Ch.1. Kneale, William 1949: Probability and Induction. Oxford (repr. 1966). Part II.

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Molnar, George (1969): Kneale’s Argument Revisited. Philosophical Review 78, pp. 79-89.

Tooley, Michael 1977: ‘The Nature of Laws’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, pp. 67-98.

Week 10: Laws of nature II: antirealism and the systems view

Required Reading

1. Cartwright, Nancy (1983): ‘Do the Laws of Physics State Facts?’, C&C pp. 865-877.

2. Earman, John (1984): ‘Laws of Nature: The Empiricist Challenge’, in: R. Bogdan (ed.): D. M. Armstrong. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 191-223.

Additional reading

Cartwright, Nancy (1999): The Dappled World. A Study in the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge: CUP, Chs. 2 and 3.

Chalmers, Alan (1993): ‘So the Laws of Physics Needn’t Lie’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71, pp. 196-205.

Giere, Ronald N. (1995): ‘The Sceptical Perspective: Science without Laws of Nature’, in: Friedel Weinert (ed.): Laws of Nature: Essays on the Philosophical, Scientific, and Historical Dimensions. New York: De Gruyter.

Lewis, David (1973): Counterfactuals. Cambridge/Ma: Harvard UP. Loewer, Barry (1996): ‘Humean Supervenience’, Philosophical Topics 24, pp. 101-

126. Ramsey, Frank P. (1978): Foundations, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, therein:

‘Theories’. van Fraassen, Bas C. (1989): Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: OUP.

******* Christmas Break ******* Lent Term Unit 4: Scientific Explanation

Week 11: The deductive-nomological model of explanation

Required Reading

1. Salmon, Wesley (1992): ‘Scientific Explanation’, in Salmon et al. (1992), Ch. 1, pp. 7-23.

2. Carnap, Rudolph (1966): ‘The Value of Laws: Explanation and Prediction’, C&C pp. 678-684.

3. Hempel, Carl G. (1965): ‘The Thesis of Structural Identity’, C&C pp. 695-705. 4. Salmon, Marrilee (1989): ‘Explanation in the Social Sciences’, Philip Kitcher

& Wesley C. Salmon (eds.): Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, Volume 13, 384-409.

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Additional reading

Hempel, Carl and Paul Oppenheim (1948): ‘Studies in the Logic of Explanation. Philosophy of Science 15, pp. 135-75.

Kitcher, Philip and Wesley Salmon (eds.) (1989): Scientific Explanation. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. XIII. Minneapolis.

Pitt, Joseph (ed.) (1988): Theories of Explanation. Oxford and New York. Salmon, Wesley (1989): ‘Four Decades of Scientific Explanation’, in: Philip

Kitcher and Wesley Salmon (1989), pp. 3-219; repr. independently by the Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneaoplis 1990.

– (1998): Causality and Explanation. Oxford: Oxford UP. Ruben, David-Hillel (ed.) (1993): Explanation. Oxford: OUP. van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980): The Scientific Image. Oxford, Ch. 5. Week 12: Statistical explanation

Required Reading

1. Hempel, Carl G. (1965): ‘Inductive Statistical Explanation’, C&C pp. 706-719. 2. Salmon, Wesley (1992): ‘Scientific Explanation’, in Salmon et al. (1992) Ch. 1,

pp. 23- 41. 3. Railton, Peter (1978): ‘A Deductive Nomological model of Probabilistic

Explanation’, C&C pp. 746-765.

Additional reading

Fetzer, James (1972): Statistical Explanations, in: Kenneth Schaffner and Robert S. Cohen (eds.): PSA, Dordrecht 1972, pp. 337-47.

Hempel, Carl G. (1962): ‘Two Basic Types of Explanation’, C&C pp. 685-594. Hitchcock, Christopher R. (1993): ‘A Generalized Probabilistic Theory of Causal

Relevance’, Synthese 97, pp. 335-64. Howson, Colin (1988): ‘On a Recent Argument for the Impossibility of a Statistical

Explanation of Single Events, and a Defence of a Modified Form of Hempel’s Theory of Statistical Explanation’, Erkenntnis 29, pp. 113-24.

Salmon, Wesley C. (1965): ‘The Status of Prior Probabilities in Statistical Explanation’, Philosophy of Science 32, 137-46.

– (1970): Statistical Explanation. In: R. Colodny (ed.): The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories. Pittsburgh, 173-231.

– (1977): ‘Hempel’s Conception of Inductive Inference in Inductive-Statistical Explanation’, Philosophy of Science 44, 180-85.

–, Richard Jeffrey and James Greeno (1971): Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance. Pittsburgh.

Week 13: Causal explanation and unification

Required Reading

1. Kitcher, Philip (1981): ‘Explanatory Unification’, Philosophy of Science 48, 507-31.

2. Weber, Erik (1996): ‘Some Problems for Kitcher’s Unification Account of Explanation’, Communication and Cognition: Monographies 29, pp. 441-456

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3. Salmon, Wesley (1984): Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton: Princeton UP, Ch. 5.

Additional reading

Unification

Friedman, Michael (1974): ‘Explanation and Scientific Understanding’, Journal of Philosophy 71, pp. 5-19.

Kitcher, Philip (1976): ‘Explanation, Conjunction, and Unification’, Journal of Philosophy 73, pp. 207-12.

– (1989): ‘Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World’, in: Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon (eds.): Scientific Explanation. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. XIII. Minneapolis, pp. 410-505.

Morrison, Margaret (2000): Unifying Scientific Theories. Physical Concepts and Mathematical Structures. Cambridge: CUP.

Causal Explanation

Dowe, Phil (1992a): ‘An Empiricist Defence of the Causal Account of Explanation’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6, 123-8.

– (1992b): ‘Process Causality and Asymmetry’, Erkenntnis 37, 179-96. – (1995): ‘Causality and Conserved Quantities: A reply to Salmon’, Philosophy of

Science 62, 321-33. – (1999): ‘The Conserved Quantity Theory of Causation and Chance Raising’,

Philosophy of Science 66, supp. 486-501. Hitchcock, Christopher R. (1992): ‘Causal Explanation and Scientific Realism’,

Erkenntnis 37, 151-78. – (1995): ‘Discussion: Salmon on Explanatory Relevance’, Philosophy of Science

62, 304-20. Lewis, David (1986): ‘Causal Explanation’, in: David Lewis: Philosophical Papers.

New York and Oxford: OUP, pp. 214-40. Woodward, James (1984): ‘A Theory of Singular Causal Explanation’, Erkenntnis 21,

223-62. Unit 5: Miscellaneous Contemporary Topics

Week 14: Reductionism

Required Reading

1. Nagel, Ernest (1974): ‘Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations’, C&C pp. 905-921.

2. Dizadji-Bahmani, Foad , Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann (2010): ‘Who’s Afraid of Nagelian Reduction’, Erkenntnis 73, pp. 393-412.

3. Cartwright, Nancy (1999): The Dappled World. A Study in the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge: CUP, Introduction and Chapter 1.

Additional reading

Anderson, Philipp W. (1972): ‘More is Different’, Science, New Series, Vol. 177, No. 4047, 393-396.

Batterman, Robert: ‘Intertheory Relations in Physics’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.

Butterfield, Jeremy (2011): ‘Emergence, Reduction and Supervenience: A Varied

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Landscape’, Foundations of Physics 41, pp. 920-959. Butterfield, Jeremy (2011): ‘Less Is Different: Emergence and Reduction

Reconciled’, Foundations of Physics 41, pp. 1065-1135. Dupré, John (1993): The Disorder of Things. Metaphysical Foundations of the

Disunity of Science. Cambridge/Ma and London: Harvard UP, introduction and other chapters.

Feyerabend, Paul (1963): ‘How to Be a Good Empiricist – A Plea for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological’, repr. in: C&C), pp. 922-949.

– (1981): ‘Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism’, in Paul Feyerabend (1981): Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method. Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, Ch. 4.

Fodor, Jerry (1974): ‘Special Sciences’, repr. in Richard Boyd et al. (eds.) (1991): The Philosophy of Science. Cambridge/Ma: MIT Press, pp. 429-41.

Garfinkel, Alan (1981): ‘Reductionism’, repr. in Richard Boyd et al. (eds.) (1991): The Philosophy of Science. Cambridge/Ma: MIT Press, pp. 443-59.

Kim, Jaegwon (1993): Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge UP

Kitcher, Philip (1984): ‘1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences’, C&C pp. 971-1003.

Nagel, Ernest (1961): The Structure of Science. Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. New York 1961; repr. Indianapolis/Cambridge 1979, Ch. 11.

Nickles, Thomas (1975): ‘Two Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction’, repr. in: C&C pp. 950-970.

Oppenheim, Paul and Hilary Putnam (1958): ‘Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis’, repr. in Richard Boyd et al. (eds.) (1991): The Philosophy of Science. Cambridge/Ma: MIT Press, pp. 405-27.

Sklar, Lawrece (1967): ‘Types of inter-theoretic reduction’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18, 109-124.

Weinberg, Stephen (1993): Dreams of a Final Theory. The Search for the Fundamental Laws of Nature. London and Sydney: Vintage.

Week 15: Causation

Required Reading

1. Hitchcock, Christopher (2008): ‘Causation’, in: Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd (eds.): The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: 317-326.

2. Norton, John (2003): ‘Causation as Folk Science’, Philosophers’ Imprint 3 (4), 3. Cartwright, Nancy (2004): ‘Causation: One Word, Many Things’, Philosophy of

Science 71(5), pp. 805-819.

Additional reading

Beauchamp, Tom L. and Alexander Rosenberg (1981): Hume and the Problem of Causation. New York and Oxford: Clarendon.

Cartwright, Nancy (1979): ‘Causal Laws and Effective Strategies’, Noûs 13; repr. in Cartwright (1983): How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: OUP, pp. 21-43.

– (2001): ‘What’s wrong with Bayes’ Nets’, Monist 82, pp. 242-64. – (2002): ‘Against Modularity, the Causal Markov Condition, and Any Link between

the Two: Comments on Hausman and Woodward’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53, pp. 411-53.

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Dowe, Phil (1992): ‘Wesley Salmon’s Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory’, Philosophy of Science 59, pp. 195-216.

– (1995): ‘Causality and Conserved Quantities: A Reply to Salmon’, Philosophy of Science 62, pp. 321-333

Hall, Ned and Laurie Paul (2003): ‘Causation and Pre-emption’, in: Peter Clark and Katherine Hawley (eds.): Philosophy of Science Today. Oxford: OUP, pp. 100-130.

Hausman, Daniel and James Woodward (1999): ‘Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50, pp. 521-584.

Hitchcock, Chris (1995): ‘Discussion: Salmon on Explanatory Relevance’, Philosophy of Science 62, pp. 304-20.

– (2003): ‘Of Humean Bondage’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54, pp. 1-25.

Hume, David (1739): A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed by L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon, Book I, Parts I-III.

Hume, David (1748): Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Oxford UP 1997, Secs, 2-7, First Enquiry, Sections I-VII.

Lewis, David (1993/1973): ‘Causation’, in: Ernest Sosa and Michael Tooley (eds.), Causation, Oxford: OUP, pp. 193-204.

– (1979): ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’, Noûs 13, pp. 455-476. – (1986): ‘Postscripts to ‘Causation’’, in: Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, Oxford:

OUP, pp. 172-213. – (2000): ‘Causation as Influence’, Journal of Philosophy 97, pp. 182-97. Mackie, John L. (1965): ‘Causes and Conditions’, American Philosophical Quarterly

2, 245-64; repr. in Ernest Sosa and Michael Tooley (eds.): Causation. Oxford 1993, 33-55.

Mackie, John (1974): The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation, Oxford: Clarendon.

Mill, John Stuart (1874): A System of Logic, New York: Harper, Book III. Psillos, Stathis (2002): Causation and Explanation, Chesham: Acumen. Russell, Bertrand (1913): ‘On the Notion of Cause’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society 13, pp. 1-26. Salmon, Wesley (1984): Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the

World, Princeton: Princeton University Press. – (1994): ‘Causality Without Counterfactuals’, Philosophy of Science 61, pp. 297-

312. Schaffer, Jonathan (2000): ‘Trumping Preemption”, Journal of Philosophy 97, pp.

165-81. Scheines, Richard (1997): ‘An Introduction to Causal Inference’, in Vaughn McKim

and Stephen Turner (eds.): Causality in Crisis? Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 185-200.

Urbach, Peter (1987), Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science, LaSalle: Open Court Woodward, James (2003): Making Things Happen, Oxford: OUP. Week 16: Scientific Modelling

Required Reading

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1. Carnap, Rudolf (1953): ‘The Interpretation of Physics’, in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (eds.), Readings in The Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts ), pp. 309-18.

2. Hesse, Mary (1967): ‘Models and Analogy in Science’, in Paul Edwards (ed.): Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York: Macmillan, pp. 354-359.

3. Morgan, Mary, and Margaret Morrison (1999): ‘Models as Mediating Instruments’, in Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, edited by Mary Morgan and Margaret Morrison, 10-37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

4. Cartwright, Nancy (1999): Cartwright, Nancy. The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Chapter 2.

Additional reading

Models

Achinstein, Peter (1965): ‘Theoretical Models’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (62), pp. 102-20.

Bailer-Jones, Daniela M. (2009): Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.

Cartwright, Nancy (1983): How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, Alan F. (1986): ‘The heuristic role of Maxwell's mechanical model of electromagnetic phenomena’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 17(4), pp. 415-27.

Cushing, James T. (1982): ‘Models and Methodologies in Current Theoretical High-Energy Physics’, Synthese 50(1), pp. 5-101.

French, Steven (2010): ‘Keeping Quiet on the Ontology of Models’, Synthese 172 (231–249).

French, Steven and Ladyman, James (1997): ‘Superconductivity and Structures: Revisiting the London Account’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28(3), pp. 363-93.

Harré, Rom (2004): Modeling: Gateway to the Unknown., ed. Daniel Rothbarth. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Hartmann, Stephan (1995), 'Models as a Tool for Theory Construction: Some Strategies of Preliminary Physics', in William E. Herfel, et al. (eds.), Theories and Models in Scientific Processes. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Science and the Humanities 44. Amsterdam and Atlanta/GA: Rodopi, pp. 49-67.

– (1999): ‘Models and Stories in Hadron Physics', in Mary Morgan and Margaret Morrison (eds.), Models as Mediators. Perspectives on natural and social science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 326-46.

Leplin, Jarrett (1980): ‘The Role of Models in Theory Construction’, in T. Nickles (ed.), Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 267-83.

Morton, Adam (1993): ‘Mathematical Models: Questions of Trustworthiness’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44(4), pp. 659-74.

Nersessian, Nancy (1984): ‘Aether/Or: The Creation of Scientific Concepts’, Studies in History and Philosphy of Science 15 (3), pp. 175-212.

Psillos, Stathis (1995): ‘The Cognitive Interplay between Theories and Models: The Case of 19th Century Physics’, in William E. Herfel, et al. (eds.), Theories and

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Models in Scientific Processes. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Science and the Humanities 44. Amsterdam and Atlanta/GA: Rodopi, pp. 105-33.

Redhead, Michael (1980): ‘Models in Physics’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31(2), pp. 145-63.

– (2001): ‘The Intelligibility of the Universe’, in Anthony O'Hear (ed.): Philosophy at the New Millennium. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weisberg, Michael (2007): ‘Who Is a Modeler?’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58(2), pp. 207-33.

Wimsatt, William (1987): ‘False Models as Means to Truer Theories’, in Matthew H. Nitecki and Antoni Hoffman (eds.), Neutral Models in Biology (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press), 23-55.

The relation between models and theories

Carnap, Rudolph (1939): ‘The interpretation of Physics’, repr. in: Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck: Readings in The Philosophy of Science. New York 1953, pp. 309-318.

Carnap, Rudolf (1956): ‘The Methodological Status of Theoretical Concepts’, in: Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (eds.): Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 1, pp. 38-77.

Giere, Ronald N. (1988): Explaining Science. A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: Chicago UP, Ch. 3.

Hempel, Carl G. (1966): Philosophy of Natural Science. Princeton:Princeton UP, Ch. 6.

Lloyd, Elisabeth (1984): ‘A Semantic Approach to the Structure of Population Genetics’, Philosophy of Science 51, pp. 242-64.

Nagel, Ernest (1961): The Structure of Science. Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. New York 1961; repr. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett 1979, Chs. 5 and 6.

Putnam, Hilary (1962): ‘What Theories are Not’, in: Ernest Nagel, Alfred Tarski and Patrick Suppes (eds.): Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Reprinted in: Hilary Putnam: Mathematics, Matter, and Method. Philosophical Papers, Volume I. Cambridge 1975, pp. 215-227.

Suppe, Frederick (1972): ‘What’s Wrong with the Received view of the structure of Scientific Theories’, Philosophy of Science 39, pp. 1-19.

– (ed.) (1977): The Structure of Scientific Theories. Chicago: Chicago UP. – (1989): The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism. Chicago: Chicago UP. Suppe, Frederick (2000), 'Understanding Scientific Theories: An Assessment of

Developments, 1969-1998', Philosophy of Science, 67 (Supplement), 102-15. Suppes, Patrick (1960a): ‘A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in

Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences’, in: Patrick Suppes: Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science. Selected Papers from 1951 to 1969. Dordrecht: Reidel 1969, pp. 10-23.

– (1967): ‘What is a Scientific Theory’, in: Sidney Morgenbesser (ed.): Philosophy of Science Today. New York: Basic Books, pp. 55-67.

Week 17: Scientific Representation

Required Reading

1. Giere, Ronald N. (2004): ‘How models are used to represent reality’, Philosophy of

19

Science 71(4), p. 742–52. 2. Frigg, Roman (2006), ‘Scientific Representation and the Semantic View of

Theories’, Theoria, 55 (1), 49-65. 3. Brading, Katherine and Landry, Elaine (2006), 'Scientific structuralism:

presentation and representation', Philosophy of Science 73(5), 571-81. 4. Elgin, Catherine Z. (2010): ‘Telling instances’, in Roman Frigg and Matthew C.

Hunter (eds.), Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science. Berlin and New York: Springer, pp. 1-18.

Additional reading

Frigg, Roman and James Nguyen (2016): ‘Models and Representation’, forthcoming in Lorenzo Magnani and Tommaso Bertolotti (eds.): Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science, with James Nguyen. [This is a survey piece that contains a large number of references. Those interested in the topic can find further references here. The paper will be made available on Moodle.]

Unit 6: Sociological Approaches to Science Week 18: Social factors in science and social constructivism

Required Reading

Barnes, Barry and David Bloor (1982): ‘Relativism, Rationalism, and the Sociology of Knowledge’, in M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds.): Rationality and Relativism. Boston: MIT Press 1982, 21-47. Reprinted in Daniel Rothbart (ed.): Science, Reason, and Reality. Issues in the Philosophy of Science. Forth Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers 1998, 325-343.

Latour, Bruno (1987): ‘Selections from Science in Action’, in Daniel Rothbart (ed.): Science, Reason, and Reality. Issues in the Philosophy of Science. Forth Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers 1998, 344-366.

Additional reading

Collins, Harry (1985): Changing Order. Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice. Chicago: Chicago UP.

Feyerabend, Paul (1987): Farewell to Reason. London: Verso. [In particular Ch. 1] Goodman, Nelson (1978): Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis: Hackett. Hacking, Ian (1999): The Social Construction of What? Cambridge/Ma: Harvard UP. Hanson, Norwood Russell (1957): Patterns of Discovery. New York: Cambridge UP. Koertge, Noretta (2000): ‘“New Age” Philosophies of Science: Constructivism,

Feminism and Postmodernism’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51, 667-683.

– (ed.) (1998): A House built on Sand. Exposing Postmodernist Myths About Science. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Lakatos, Imre (1971): ‘History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions’, in: Philosophical Papers Vol. I, ed. By John Worrall and Gregory Currie, Cambridge: CUP 1977, 102-138.

Laudan, Larry (1990): Science and Relativism. Chicago: Chicago UP. Longino, Helen (1990): Science as Social Knowledge. Values and Objectivity in

Scientific Inquiry. Princeton: Princeton UP. – (2002): The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton UP. Mannheim, Karl (1929): Ideology and utopia. London: Routledge, 1960.

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Miller, Richard (1987): Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation, and Reality in the Natural and the Social Sciences. Princeton: Princeton UP.

Searle, John (1995): The Construction of Social Reality. London: Penguin. Week 19: Feminist approaches to science

Required Reading

Fox Keller, Evelyn (1978): ‘Gender and Science’, repr. in: Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.): Discovering Reality. Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Reidel 1983, 187-205.

Haack, Susan (1998): ‘Science as Social? – Yes and No’, in: Susan Haack: Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate. Chicago: Chicago UP, 104-22.

Harding, Sandra (1993): ‘Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is “Strong Objectivity”?’ In: Keller, E. Fox and Longino, H. (1996): Feminism and Science. Oxford: OUP. p. 235-248.

Additional reading

Many of the above references (e.g. Koertge 2000) also contain material on feminism.

Alcoff, Linda and Elizabeth Potter (eds.) (1993): Feminist Epistemologies. New York and London: Routledge.

Andermahr, Sonya, Lovell, Terry and Wolkowitz, Carol (1997): A Concise Glossary of Feminist Theory. London: Arnold.

Fausto-Sterling, Anne (1992): Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men. London and New York: Routledge.

Fox Keller, Evelyn and Helen E. Longino (eds.) (1996). Feminism and Science. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Haack, Susan (1998): Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate. Chicago: Chicago UP. Harding, Sandra (1991): Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women’s

Lives. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. – and Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.) (1983): Discovering Reality. Feminist Perspectives

on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Hartsock, Nancy (1983): ‘The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism’, in Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.): Discovering Reality. Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Reidel 1983, pp. 283-310.

McErlean, Jennifer (ed.) (2000): Philosophies of Science. From Foundations to Contemporary Issues. Belmot: Wadsworth. [Chapter 6 provides a collection of essays on the feminist approach to science.]

Nussbaum, Martha (2001): Sex and Social Justice. New York and Oxford: OUP. Wright, Elizabeth (ed.) (1992): Feminism and Psychoanalysis. A Critical Dictionary.

Oxford: Blackwell. Tanesini, A. (1999): An Introduction to Feminist Epistemologies. Oxford: Blackwell. Unit 7: Philosophy a Special Science: Space-Time Theories

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Week 20: The philosophy of Newtonian space and time

Required Reading

Huggett, Nick (ed.) (1999): Space from Zeno to Einstein. Classic Readings with a Contemporary Commentary. Cambridge/Ma: MIT Press, pp. 107-168.

Additional reading

Alexander, H. G. (ed.) (1956): The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. Together with Extracts from Newton’s Principia and Optiks, Manchester and New York: Machester UP.

Earman, John (1989): World Enough and Space-Time: Absolute Versus Relational Theories of Space and Time. Cambridge/Ma: MIT Press.

Friedman, Michael (1983): Foundations of Space-Time Theories. Relativistic Physics and Philosophy of Science. Princeton: Princetion UP.

Hoefer Carl (1996): ‘The Metaphysics of Spacetime Substantivalism’, The Journal of Philosophy 93, 5-27.

– (1998): ‘Absolute vs Relational Spacetime; For Better or Worse, the Debate Goes On’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49, 451-467.

– and Craig Callender (2002) ‘Philosophy of Space-time Physics’, in Peter Machamer and Michael Silberstein (eds.): The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 173-198.

Huggett, Nick (ed.) (1999): Space from Zeno to Einstein. Classic Readings with a Contemporary Commentary. Cambridge/Ma: MIT Press, all other chapters.

Le Poidevin, Robin and Murray MacBeath (eds.) (1993): The Philosophy of Time. Oxford: OUP

Norton, John (1992): ‘Philosophy of Space and Time’, in Salmon et al. (1992): Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, pp. 179-231.

Sklar, Lawrence (1974): Space, Time, and Spacetime. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stein, Howard (1967): ‘Newtonian Space-Time’, The Texas Quarterly 10, 174-200.