Peter Rietmann, Global Product Management SAS, 2015 · PDF filePeter Rietmann, Global Product Management SAS, 2015-02-19. Content ... NSD570 Rel. 3.3 / GOOSE LAN Interface G3LS Proxy

Seminario ABB, 2015-02-19Desarrollo Nueva Normativa

Peter Rietmann, Global Product Management SAS, 2015-02-19

Content

February 19, 2015 | Slide 2© ABB

§ IEC 61850 Edition 2

§ IEC61850 process bus

§ Cyber security

IEC 61850 Edition 2

February 19, 2015© ABB

| Slide 3

Trends and technologies of control systemsFrom traditional to future grids

1975 1995 20102005 2015

FutureSA Systems

NCITsMerging unitsIEEE1588Cyber security

What else?

IEC 61850Edition 1

IEC 61850Edition 2

IEC 61850development


IEC 61850 Edition 2Scope mapped to system architecture


Communication networks and systemsfor substations

IEC 61850Edition 1

1995-2004

3 workinggroups

14 docs

1400pages

IEC 61850 Edition 2Scope mapped to system architecture

February 19, 2015 | Slide 6

Communication networks and systemsfor power utility automation

IEC 61850Edition 1

1995-2004

3 workinggroups

14 docs

1400pages

IEC 61850Edition 2

2005-??

5 workinggroups

30+ docs

2500+pages

© ABB

IEC 61850 Edition 2Solidify existing parts, extension for new applications


§ Error corrections§ Compatibility of Edition 1

and Edition 2§ IED and system tools

conformance statement

Improve interoperability

§ Top down ,Bottom up,modifications

§ Multiple projects§ Substation to substation

More flexible engineering process

Substation 1 Substation 2

Control Center

§ Substation to substation§ Substation to control

center (not released yet)

Communication beyond substation

§ Bumpless link redundancyfor end devices

§ No single point of failure

Increase system availability

© ABB

IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureData model extension


§ New Logical Nodes (LN) à functions

§ Edition 1: Approx. 90

§ Edition 2: More than 150

§ Example of new LNs

§ FCNT: Counter

§ LCCH: Communication channel

§ LBRI: Bridge

§ Advantages

§ Reduce anonymous information to aminimum – no generic IOs (GGIO)

§ Integrate more information via IEC61850 – e.g. Ethernet switches

GroupIndicator

Logical Nodes Group

A Automatic control

C Control

D Distributed Energy Resources (DER)

F Functional Blocks

G Generic

H Hydro

I Interfacing and archiving

K Mechanical and non-electrical primary equipment

L System LN

M Metering and measurement

P Protection

Q PQ events detection related

R Protection related

S Sensor and monitoring

T Instrument transformers

X Switchgear

Y Power transformers

Z Further power system equipment

© ABB

§ Data model accordingIEC/TR 61850-90-4 whichcovers all aspects ofnetwork components

§ Unified approach tosupervise communication,protection and controldevices using standardizedlogical nodes

§ No separate tools andprotols for supervision andintegration

IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureSupervision of communication infrastructure


| Slide 9

§ New SCL extensions

§ IID: Instantiated IED Description –Describes the instantiated data modelof an IED

§ SED: System Exchange Description –Describes interface data exchangebetween different projects

§ More flexible System engineering

§ Top Down (already supported in Ed1)

§ Bottom up

§ Use of IID file for modifications

§ Multiple projects

§ Substation to substation

IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureSystem Configuration description Language Extension

IEC 61850-6


IED ModificationIID


§ Defines configuration of one IED for aproject

§ Data exchange format from the IEDconfigurator to the system configurator

§ Contains only data for IED beingconfigured:

§ one IED section

§ communication section with the IED'scommunication parameters

§ IED's data type templates

§ optionally, a substation section with thebinding of functions (LNodes) to thesingle line diagram

§ SCL implementation conformancestatement (SICS)

§ IED configurator conformancestatements

§ System configuration conformancestatements

§ Stating mandatory and optionalfeatures of IED tools and systemtools

§ Improved interoperability

§ Allows judging the degree ofinteroperability between differentengineering tools, system tools aswell as IED tools.

IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureSCL implementation conformance statement (SICS)


PICS Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement:Which Communication services are supported ...

PIXIT Protocol Implementation ConformanceExtra Information for Testing:Restrictions and Limitations found in a device ...

MICS Model Implementation Conformance Statement:Models supported ...

TICS Tissue Implementation Conformance Statement:Which tissues have beenimplemented: www.tissue.iec61850.com

SICS SCL Implementation Conformance Statement:Which aspects of SCL have been implemented in aTool

§ System configurator conformancestatements

§ .icd and .iid import and usage

§ Communication engineering

§ Data flow engineering

§ .scd substation section handling

§ .scd modification, export, import

§ .sed handling

IEC 61850 Edition 2 – System Tool RequirementsEdition 2 ready


IEC 61850-6

§ System configuration tool according IEC61850-6 Ed.2 SICS (SCL ImplementationConformance Statement).

§ Unlike for the IEDs, currently there are noUCA conformance tests for tools to verifythe IEC 61850-6 Ed.2 SICS

IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureCommunication – Beyond the substation


§ Two Guidelines (Technical Reports)

§ Substation to substation

§ Substation to control center(not released yet)

§ Customer Benefits

§ Homogeneous communication

§ Reduce engineering & training effort

Proxy Gateway

Transparent Tunnel

© ABB

NSD570 Rel. 3.3 / GOOSE LAN Interface G3LSProxy gateway solution – mixed operation

Max. 4 commandsvia analog channels,max 8 commandsvia all others

Commands arrangedin pairs of two, e.g.2x contact I/O and

6x GOOSE

PLCPower Line

Optical Fibre

Copper Wires

Optical Fibre

Radio Link MUX

MUX

PLC

MUX

MUX

analoganalog

anal

ogan

alog

digi

tal

anal

ogdi

gita

lop

tical analog

digital

optical

analog

digital

analog

EthernetEthernet

IP based network

ProtectionCommands of

Contact I/OType

ProtectionCommands of

Contact I/OType

Stationbus according IEC 61850-8-1

ProtectionCommands in

GOOSEmessages

ProtectionCommands in

GOOSEmessages

Stationbus according IEC 61850-8-1


IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureLink Redundancy

§ Redundancy within the network§ RSTP, IEEE 802.1D§ (n-1) criteria§ With recovery time upon failure

§ Redundancy in the end nodes§ PRP, IEC 62439-3

Parallel Redundancy Protocol§ HSR, IEC 62439-3

High-available SeamlessRedundancy

§ (n-1) criteria§ Zero recovery time upon failure

© ABB

§ Operation principle

Link Redundancy – IEC 62439-3 PRPParallel Redundancy Protocol

sender

receiver

§ DANP (Double Attached Nodeimplementing PRP) are attached to2 independent LANs

§ Source DANP sends same frameover both LANs

§ Destination DANP receives framefrom both LANs, consumes 1stframe, discards the duplicated


Redundant network with IEC 62439-3 PRPAdvantages and disadvantages§ Any topology supported§ Network is autonomous, independent of IEDs§ Standard Ethernet components§ Flexible network speed and media

ì § 0 ms failure revovery time§ No frame loss

ì

§ Failure or power-off of 2 or more IEDshas no impact to the network

ì

§ High costs for switches and network cabling î

§ Connect single port IEDs to one network§ Fully interoperable with non redundant IEDs

ì


| Slide 18

§ Operation principle

§ DANH (Double Attached Nodeimplementing HSR) has 2 portsoperated in parallel

§ Source DANH sends a frame overeach port (“A”-frame and “B”-frame)

§ Destination DANH receives framefrom each port, consumes 1st frame,discards the duplicated

§ DANH support bridge functionalityand forward frames from one port tothe other (not frames that it injected)

Link Redundancy – IEC 62439-3 HSRHigh-availability Seamless Redundancy


| Slide 19

Redundant network with IEC 62439-3 HSRAdvantages and disadvantages

endnode

endnode

endnode

endnode

endnode

endnode

endnode

A B A B

B A B A B A B A B A

BA

switch

RedBox

singly attached nodes

interlink

§ 0 ms failure revovery time§ No frame loss

ì

§ No direct connection of single port IEDspossible (only via RedBox)

§ Not interoperable with non redundant IEDs

î§ Only ring or ring of ring topologies§ IEDs are integral part of network§ Standard Ethernet components cannot be used§ Fix network speed (100MBit/s)

î

§ Failure or power-off of more than 2 IEDshas impact to the network

î

§ Low cost (no switches andfew network cables)

ì


| Slide 20

IEC 61850 Edition 2Increased availability through PRP und HSR

© ABB

HSR

615 & 620 Series

HSR: High availabilitycombined with optimal

installation effort

670 und 650 Series, REB500

PRP

PRP: Highest availability andperformance

MicroSCADA Pro

RTU500

LAN A

LAN BPRP

AFS Serie

§ Interoperable seamlesslink redundancyaccording IEC 62439-3

§ Available in Relionseries, MicroSCADAPro und RTU500 series

§ New logical node LCCHto supervise linkredundancy standard inIEC 61850 Ed2 IEDs

NOTE: PRP / HSR is also available in Ed1 devicesFebruary 19, 2015 | Slide 21

IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureRecord critical process using service tracking


§ Critical infrastructure requires tokeep logs (records) of allimportant information changes

§ Record the “manipulation” of theprocess by tracking all services,even those with negativeresponses

§ Control block related services

§ Command related services

§ Other services

§ Use client to log these additionalinformations for audit trail

IED(IEC61850 Server)

IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureSupervision Logical Nodes – LTRK


Description

ApcFTrk CTSAnalogueValueCtlF Control service tracking for controllableanalogue setpoint data with float command.

ApcIntTrk CTSAnalogueValueCtlInt Control service tracking for controllableanalogue setpoint data with integer command.

BacTrk CTSBsControlKind Control service tracking for binary controlledanalogue data.

BrcbTrk BTS Access service tracking for buffered reportcontrol blocks.

BscTrk CTSBsControlKind Control service tracking for binary controlledstep position data.

DpcTrk CTSBOOLEAN Control service tracking for controllable doublepoint status data.

GenTrk CST Common service tracking for all services forwhich no specific tracking data exists.

GocbTrk GTS Access service tracking for GOOSE controlblocks.

IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureSupervision Logical Nodes – LTRK


Description

IncTrk CTSINT32 Control service tracking for controllable integerstatus data.

IscTrk CTSINT8 Control service tracking for integer controlledstep position data.

LocbTrk LTS Access service tracking for log control blocks.

SgcbTrk STS Access service tracking for setting groupcontrol blocks.

SpcTrk CTSBOOLEAN Control service tracking for controllable singlepoint status data.

UrcbTrk UTS Access service tracking for unbuffered reportcontrol blocks.

EncTrk1 CTSEnum Control service tracking for enumerated ncontrollable status data.

EncTrk2 CTSEnum Control service tracking for enumerated ncontrollable status data.

IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureMechanism for testing, simulation, maintenance


§ Mod and Behavior is now preciselydescribed

§ Ed1: It was up to the vendor todecide on how an IED behaves

§ Defines how IED behave in case a LNor LD is set into a certain Mod

§ Switching between modes only as anoperator command to the data objectMod

§ Improves testing capabilities in IEC61850 systems

IEC 61850 Edition 2 – New featureMod / Beh – 670 2.0

© ABB

§ LD0/LLN0 (Root LD) accepts the values

§ On, Blocked, Test and Test/Blocked

§ but not Off for Mod.

§ Only values ON and Off are accepted by the individual LNsfor Mod.February 19, 2015 | Slide 26

Test mode of a functionNormal command – test flag FALSE

© ABB

§ LN or LD can be put in test mode

§ data object Mod of the LN or ofLLN0

§ Command to operate initiated by

§ Control operation or

§ GOOSE

§ Behavior

§ Only executed if LN or LD Mod ON

§ LN or LD in test mode no commandexecution

Input Mod Process Output

Test=FALSE ON Yes Yes

Test No No

Test/blocked

No No


Test mode of a functionTest command – test flag TRUE

© ABB

§ Not executed if function is "ON"

§ If function "TEST", command will beexecuted

§ If function "TEST-BLOCKED",command will be processed

§ all reactions (e.g. sending acommand confirmation) will beproduced

§ but no wired output to the processwill be activated

Input Mod Process Output

Test=TRUE ON No No

Test Yes Yes

Test/blocked

Yes No


Simulation of messages


§ Subscribe to GOOSE or SV from simulationor test equipment.

§ Flag indicate if message is original orsimulated

§ Data object in LPHD defining if IED shallreceive original or simulated message

§ Data object Sim set to TRUE

§ IED receive for all GOOSE messages itis subscribing the ones with thesimulation flag set to TRUE.

§ If for a specific GOOSE message nosimulated message exists, it willcontinue to receive the originalmessage

GOOSE

Simulation=FALSE

Simulation=TRUE

LPHD

Sim= FALSE

Sim= TRUE

Combining TEST mode and SimulationA future scenario


§ Protection device receivessimulated sampled valuesfrom a test device

§ Protection IED will initiate atrip

§ Trip is sent as GOOSE withq.test=TRUE to XCBR

§ XCBR will receive GOOSE butnot trip as it is in TEST-BLOCKED mode

§ Output can be verified throughOpOk and tOpOk attributes

Pxxx

LPHD

TCTR

TVTR

Merging Unit

XCBR

Breaker

Testequipment

Mod=Test Sim=TRUE

Mod=Test/blocked

SV (Sim=FALSE) SV (Sim=TRUE)

XCBR.Pos.opOkXCBR.Pos.tOpOk

GOOSE (q.test=TRUE)

IEC 61850 Edition 2

§ Edition 2 starts with initialportfolio

§ Markets whereMicroSCADA Pro andRelion 670 isestablished

§ Tools PCM/IET/ITT 600are ready

Available ABB products

© ABB

670 series

MicroSCADA ProSYS600/SYS600C

SDM 600

LAN ALAN B

IED Configuration

SystemConfiguration

AFS 600 series

Testing Tools

Product Version

MicroSCADA Pro 9.4

SDM 600 1.1

Relion 670 2.0

PCM 600 2.6

IET 600 5.3

ITT 600 2.0

NSD570 3.5

NSD570


IEC61850 Edition 2


| Slide 32

Client

GOOSE

§ Latest IEDs like 670 seriessupport IEC 61850 Edition 1 andEdition 2

§ Most easy way to replace IEDs inan existing system or to extend anexisting system

§ Full system functionality can bemaintained

§ Well proven with minimalconfiguration and testing effort

IEC 61850 Edition 2System extension – using only Edition1 IEDs

SCD Ed1

IED

Ed 1 Ed 1

IED New IED

Ed 1GOOSE


| Slide 33

§ Clients need to support both IEC61850 Editions

§ Edition 1 and Edition 2 IEDsneed to be configured inseparate projects / subnets

§ GOOSE cannot be appliedbetween Edition 1 and Edition 2IEDs

§ Well suited solution for verticalintegration of IEDs

IEC 61850 Edition 2System extension – mixing Edition1 and Edition2 IEDs

SCD Ed2

GOOSE

IED

Ed 1 Ed 1

IED New IED

Ed 2GOOSE

New IED

Ed 2

Client

SCD Ed1


| Slide 34

§ Edition 1 and Edition 2 devices canwork together with limitation

§ Today standard does not provideclear rules how to handle Ed1 andEd2 in respect of SCL/engineering

§ No round trip engineering

§ No SCD file reimport in Ed1 IEDtools from Ed2

§ Consequence: No GOOSE betweenEd1 and Ed2 devices

IEC 61850 Edition 2New system – mixing Edition1 and Edition2 IEDs

SCD Ed2

GOOSE

IED

Ed 1 Ed 2

IED IED

Ed 2GOOSE

IED

Ed 2

Client


| Slide 35

IEC 61850 – Process bus


| Slide 36

Digital Substation and IEC61850Today

IEC 61850 Station BusReplace wiring and legacyprotocols between baysby digital communication

Interface to fieldHardwired point to pointconnections betweenprimary and all secondaryequipment

IEC 61850-8-1

REB500 650 series670 series

© ABB

Digital Substation and IEC61850Tomorrow

IEC 61850-8-1

REB500 650 series670 series

SAM600NCITNCIT

SAM600SAM600

IEC 61850-8-1IEC 61850-9-2

Digital substation1) All signals digital, station and process2) Analog, status and commands3) Acquire once, distribute on a bus

NCIT Non-conventional instrument transformers© ABB

Benefits of a digital substationMotivations for EPCs and Utilities


EPCsEPCsFaster project deliveryReduce material (cabling)Reduced risk on cableengineering

High degree ofstandardizationpre-engineered buildingblocks, e.g. panels, kiosks

Easier handling of latechangesas all communication isdigital IEC61850

IET600

UtilitiesUtilitiesIncreased safety bydigitizing all signals right attheir source reduces the riskof electrical hazards

Integration of NCITs byadherence to standards andby that further increase safety& availability

Outage time reductionfaster installation due tothrough pre-tested processbus systems

Cost effective maintenancemore supervision anddiagnostics, reduced spareparts

Lower requirements onCTs/VTs by reducing burdenfrom cabling and minimizingNo of circuits

Conventional vs. digital substationQualitative assessment of cost items


MK MK

IEC 61850 Station Bus

Process level

Bay level

Station level

MK = Marshalling Kiosk

MU MUMU MU

§ Project Management§ Base/Concept Design

§ SA Engineering

§ Protection, control IEDs

§ Panel mfg + testing

§ Fiber mat., laying, connecting

§ Copper mat., laying, connecting

§ Commissioning

IEC 61850Process Bus

Same Less More

§ Kiosk mfg + testing

à

à

æ

æ

æ

æ

Primary

ä

Conventional Digital substation

§ Panel and cable eng. æ

ä

§ MU devices ä

§ Retrofit outage time æ

§ Total costs æ

100m+

5-30m+

§ Signal test

§ Maintenance

æ

æ

Introduction to process bus

§ The station bus connects IEDs andsubstation automation system

§ It transmits information between thestation level and the bay level aswell as between IEDs (GOOSE)

IEC 61850 on station and process level


§ The process bus connects the processto the bay level

§ Binary data as GOOSE messagesbetween merging units and IEDs

§ Sampled analog values aretransferred via Ethernet accordingIEC 61850-9-2

§ Implemented according to UCAIugimplementation guideline“IEC 61850-9-2LE”

NCIT

MU

IEC 61850-9-2process bus

Process level

Bay level

MU

IEC 61850station bus

Station level

MU = merging unitNCIT = non-conventional instrument transformer

MU

Standardization and interoperability

§ The smallest part of afunction thatexchanges data iscalled logical node(LN) in IEC 61850

§ Logical nodes areallocated to logical andphysical devices

IEC 61850 logical nodes

© ABB

Primary Technology (Switchgear)

SecondaryTechnology(SubstationAutomation)

PTOCXSWI

XSWI

SIMG

XCBR

SIMG

PTRC

CSWI

CSWI

CSWISIMG

TVTR

TCTR


Standardization and interoperabilityAllocation of logical nodes

Station Bus

XCBRTVTR TCTR

PTRC

PTOC PDISPDISPDIS

ProtectionIED

hardwiredXCBRTVTR

PTRC

PTOC PDISPDISPDIS

TCTR

ProtectionIED

with Process Bus

BreakerIED

MergingUnit IED


| Slide 43

© ABB

Standardization and interoperabilityIEC 61850-9-2 standard and implementation guideline

The standard: IEC 61850-9-2

§ Standard for communication networks and systems insubstations, part 9-2: “Specific Communication ServiceMapping (SCSM) - Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3”

§ The standard is very broad, leaving wide room forinterpretation, which complicates interoperability

Implementation Guideline for digital Interface toinstrument transformers using IEC 61850-9-2

§ To facilitate implementation and enable interoperability,the UCA International Users Group created a guidelinethat defines an application profile of IEC 61850-9-2

§ Commonly referred to as IEC 61850-9-2LE for “lightedition”

© ABB

Standardization and interoperabilityStandard IEC 61850 and implementation guideline

Area StandardIEC 61850-9-2

Implementation guidelineIEC 61850-9-2LE

Sampling rate ofanalog values

Free parameter 80 samples per period forprotection and metering256 samples per period forpower quality

Content of dataset Configurable 3 phases current + neutralcurrent values and quality3 phases voltage + neutralvoltage values and quality

Timesynchronization

Not defined Optical pulse per second(1PPS)

Standardization and interoperabilityTwo distinct types of merging unit for analog values


Merging unitfor conventional CTs/VTs§ With interfaces to conventional

CTs/VTs (SAMU*)§ Allow connection of any

conventional current/ voltagetransformer

§ Dynamic behavior at the 9-2output is not yet defined

SAMU

Merging unitfor a specific NCIT§ With interface to NCIT

§ The MU is developed for, andverified with, a specific NCIT

§ Dynamic behavior at the 9-2output is known

IEC 61850-9-2

*SAMU: stand-alone merging unit (will be defined in IEC 61869)

NCIT MU

IEC 61850-9-2

Standardization and interoperabilityDynamic behavior


Current transformer

Principle:magnetic

Protection device

SamplingA/D conversionFiltering

Protectionalgorithm

Internaldata exchange

Transient / dynamicbehavior is notstandardized

ClassesTPX, TPY, TPZ

IEC60044/IEC61869

Standard IEC 61869-13under preparation by IECtechnical committee TC38

Current transformer

Principle:magnetic, optical,etc.

Merging unit


Protectionalgorithm

Protection deviceTransmissionof values:

IEC61850-9-2

Current transformer

Principle:magnetic

Stand alone MU


Protectionalgorithm

Protection deviceTransmissionof values:

IEC61850-9-2

Conventional

Independent transformer and merging unit

NCIT with related merging unit

Standardization and interoperabilityNew standard for instrument transformers

IEC 61850Communication networksand systems in substations

Part 9-2Sampled values overEthernet

IEC 61850-9-2LEImplementation Guidelinefrom UCAIug

IEC 61869Instrument transformers

Part 9 *Digital interface forinstrument transformers

Part 13 *Stand-alone merging unit

Communication in substations Instrument transformers

Standard

Application Standard* Under preparation by IEC TC38 WG37


| Slide 48

MaintainabilityWorkforce challenges

© ABB

§ IEC 61850 at working level

§ Cross skilling of workforce

§ New design considerations

§ Change to the test equipmentand testing methods

§ Fault finding techniques

§ System design, functions andtools need to support efficientmaintenance


“Wiring” test

§ Done automatically through self-supervisionfeatures of NCITs, MUs and IEDs

Protection and control testing

§ “Non-conventional” secondary injection

§ Simulation of IEC 61850-9-2 LE trafficinstead of secondary injection

§ Test modes to simulate U/I, by

§ NCIT

§ Merging unit

§ Primary injection

§ Primary injection for stability anddirectional tests

Commissioing and maintenanceImpact on protection and control testing

NCIT

MU

Protection

IEC 61850-9-2LE

9-2simulator

Control

Primaryinjection

SAMU

Secondaryinjection


| Slide 50

Testing tool for IEC 61850ITT600 SA Explorer - Overview


IED ConfigurationTools

SystemConfiguration

Tool

Station bus

Process bus

StationComputer

IED IED IED IED

Process Interface Process Interface

SCLConfigure testingenvironment

.SCD

ConfigureSA System

ITT600 SA Explorer

ITT600 SA ExplorerComprehensive testing of GOOSE messaging


Hardwired signal exchange§ Testing wire per wire with volt meter

IEC 61850 GOOSE signal exchange§ Comprehensive overview of goose messages

in state diagrams

ITT600 SA ExplorerSimple testing of sampled values


Conventional Process bus

SAM600SAM600

IEC 61850-9-2Software replaces multimeter§ Intelligent software for the collection,

display and evaluation of sampled-valuestreams§ Oscilloscope display of U/I values§ Phasor diagram§ Quality information of all values§ Online and offline analysis

Complete system supervisionTaking advantage of modern IEC 61850 based SA

§ For efficient operation andmaintenance:Permanent system supervision ofall intelligent electronic devices.From communication gatewaysto MUs and NCIT electronics

§ Supervision diagrams for fastoverview of the substation health

§ System overview with allsubstation automation,protection and controlequipment as well asmerging units

§ Process bus overview withdetailed information aboutmerging units and NCITs

© ABB

ABB‘s portfolio for process bus applications

Station level§ SAS600 series of substation automation solutions

with IEC 61850 station busBay level§ 670 series control and protection IEDs§ REB500 Busbar protection system§ IEC 61850 system engineering: IET600

IEC 61850 testing: ITT600 SA Explorer§ UnigearDigital with 615 series IEDS, 9-2 and GOOSEProcess level – NCIT§ ABB NCITs for GIS, CP-MU merging unit for

ELK-CP14 and ELK-CP3 (current and voltage)§ Fiber Optic Current Sensor FOCS-MU (current only).

Freestanding or integrated in DCBProcess level – stand-alone merging units§ SAM600 modular process bus IO system

Overview


IEC 61850 station bus

IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus

Remote control

Product portfolio670 series protection and control IEDs


§ 670 series high-end protection and controlIEDs with IEC 61850-9-2LE:

§ Bay control IED REC670

§ Line distance protection REL670

§ Line differential RED670

§ Transformer protection RET670

§ Generator protection REG670

§ All IEDs can have a 1PPS input forsynchronized sampling

§ All devices support mixed mode withconventional CT and VT interfaceseg, transformer low-voltage side fortransformer differential protection

§ Line differential protection runs withconventional and 9-2 remote-end substations

IEC 61850-9-2LE

Product portfolioREB500 busbar and breaker failure protection


§ REB500 decentralized busbar protectionsystem is fully compliant withIEC 61850-9-2LE

§ Busbar protection

§ Breaker failure protection

§ End-fault protection

§ Seamless combination of bay units withIEC 61850-9-2LE and conventional bay unitsin one system

§ This allows flexible extension ofconventional substations

IEC 61850-9-2LE

ABB’s process bus product portfolioNCIT for metal-clad switchgear

§ Fully redundant, combined currentand voltage sensor(Rogowski coils, capacitivedividers)

§ Redundant secondary converter(sensor electronics) can bereplaced during operation, nocalibration necessary

§ Configurable current ratingsenable future adaptation of CTratios without the need to replaceCT cores or to open gascompartments

§ Covers metering, protection andcontrol accuracy in a single device

2/19/2015© ABB Group

| Slide 58

Nominal values:100 … 4000A175 … 550 kV/Ö3

© ABB

ABB’s process bus product portfolioMerging unit to integrate NCIT

The world’s first UCA-certifiedmerging unit

§ IEC 61850-9-2LE-compliant

§ Merges the U and I valuesfrom the individual phasesinto aIEC 61850-9-2LE stream

§ Multiple Ethernet ports andconnections to NCITs offerhigh flexibility to systemdesign

§ Reducing the need forEthernet switches inprotection circuits

The UCA International Users Group is a not-for-profit corporation focused on assisting users and vendors inthe deployment of standards for real-time applications for several industries with related requirements.


| Slide 59© ABB

Product portfolioFully redundant and independent system design


System 1 System 2

PPL PPL

IEC 61850-9-2LE IEC 61850-9-2LE

System 1 System 2

Protection Metering Protection and controlMetering

Product portfolioFOCS-FS, Free-standing optical CT

§ Free-standing optical CT

§ 245 to to 800kV

§ IEC 61850 9-2LE

§ Redundancy as option

§ Meets modern performance requirements(0.2S; 5TPE) in terms of accuracy

§ Being filled with N2 at <0.5 rel bar, it isintrinsically safe and environmentally friendly

§ It does not require modification in substationlayout, where conventional CTs are installed

© ABB

Product portfolio

ABB’s functionally modular AISplatform is fully flexible to customerneeds

§ DCB

§ Integration of disconnecting functioninto circuit breaker (=disconnectingcircuit breaker, DCB)

§ FOCS

§ Integration of redundant opticalcurrent sensors to LTB with IEC61850-9-2LE process bus interface

DCB with integrated FOCS


SAM600 process bus IO system


SAM600 process bus IO system enables digital substationsby integrating conventional switchgear equipment into IEC61850 process bus.

SAM600 – ABB’s process bus IO system

Modular IO system for interfacing§ One hardware module per primary object philosophy§ Conventional current or voltage transformers§ Time synchronization§ Modules can be chained in order to adapt to different application

types

Optimized form factor§ Indoor - bay cubicles for retrofit applications§ Outdoor - marshalling kiosks, VT terminal boxes for new or retrofit

installations§ DIN-rail mountable for fast installation and replacement

Termination of primary cabling on SAM600 module§ One hardware module per primary object terminating all signals,

including supervision (e.g., fuse failure)§ Process interface terminals are part of SAM600 and can be

customized§ Usage of standard cabling

Digitizing primary signals made easy


SAM600-CT

SAM600-VT

SAM600-TS

SAM600 – the digital substation enablerFlexible placement, scalable communication

© ABB

IEC 61850-9-2LE

SAM600 modulesper primary object Protection and control IEDs

Control

Feeder protection

Busbar protection

IEC 61850-9-2LEprocess bus

SAM600 modules are allocated per primary object.(In version 1 for CT and VT)

With increasing SAM600 system size the amount ofcommunication port increases, allowing lean systemswith minimum Ethernet switches.

1PPS


SAM600 – the digital substation enablerEfficient upgrade for conventional substations

© ABB

IEC 61850-9-2LE

SAM600 modules inoutdoor cubicle

Relion Series IEDs andREB500 with process

and station bus

Application example with SAM600 modulesmounted in outdoor marshalling kiosk.


© ABB

Service experiencePilot installation Laufenburg

§ Pilot installation at a 380kV feeder inLaufenburg, Switzerland

§ ELK-CP3 non conventionalinstrument transformer (NCIT)installed in addition to conventionalCT/ VT

§ IEC61850-9-2 protectionequipment REL670 and REB500

§ Pilot installation withoutconnections to trip circuits

§ Direct comparison to conventionalinstallation

§ Analysis of performance of pilotequipment

Ø Commissioned 2009-12-04

© ABB

Service experiencePilot installation Laufenburg

§ Conventional current transformer

§ ELK-CP3 NCIT

§ Earthing switch

§ Disconnector and conventionalvoltage transformer

§ Circuit breaker

Service experienceFOCS in 420kV disconnecting circuit breaker

§ Fibre optic current sensor(redundant)

§ Merging units(redundant)

§ Protection panel with670 series IEDs


| Slide 69

Service experience

§ Between 1998 and 2001, ABBand Powerlink Queensland,AU commissioned substationsequipped with NCITs andIEDs with proprietary processbus

§ The systems, with over 300NCITs, have been incontinuous operation for morethan 14 years

§ Refurbish the substations toIEC 61850 compliant systemswith process bus

Complete process bus and NCIT systems


Service experience

§ Secondary system upgrade atLoganlea 275kV SS

§ Upgrade to IEC 61850-9-2LEcompliant system by keepingprimary equipment

§ Main functions:

§ Control

§ Line distance protection

§ Line differential protection

§ Transformer differentialprotection

§ Breaker failure protection

Ø Commissioned December 2011

Complete process bus and NCIT systems


Service experienceLoganlea site pictures (1/2)


| Slide 72© ABB

Service experienceLoganlea site pictures (2/2)


| Slide 73© ABB

Service experienceComplete process bus and NCIT systems


A10-T2

A10-T1 A30-T2

A30-T1

A20-T2

A20-T1

A40-T1

A40-T2

PDIFMain X

Control

BFP

PDIFMain X

Control

BFP

PDISMain X

Control

BFP

PDIFMain X

Control

BFP

The picture showssimplified one of twofully redundantprotection systems

Cyber security


| Slide 75

© ABB

Cyber Security for Substation AutomationWhy is Cyber Security an issue?

Cyber security has become an issue by introducing Ethernet(TCP/IP) based communication protocols to industrialautomation and control systems. e.g. IEC60870-5-104, DNP3.0 via TCP/IP or IEC61850

Connections to and from external networks (e.g. officeintranet) to industrial automation and control systems haveopened systems and can be misused for cyber attacks.

Cyber attacks on industrial automation and control systemsare real and increasing, leading to large financial losses

Utilities need to avoid liability due to non-compliance withregulatory directives or industry best practices;

Cyber security for substation automationWhat are the threats?

Hacking Malicious software Mistakes

Personal computer Control System

Threats

Targets


| Slide 77

© ABB

Cyber Security Standards / Guidelines / RegulationsOverview

IEC 62443

Substation

Network control Center

Substation

NERC CIP IEEE 1686

IEC 60870-5-101, IEC 60870-5-104 ….

IEC62351

Cyber Security Standards / Guidelines / RegulationsStandards and their scope

EnergyIndustrial AutomationIT

Design Details

Completeness

IEC62443

NIST 800-53

IEC 62351

NER

CC

IP

Operator Manufacturer

ISO 27K

Technicalaspects

Relevance

for Utilities

(operations)

Relevance

for Manufacturers

IEEE P 1686

Source: IEC 62351 Part 10: Security architecture guidelinesFebruary 19, 2015© ABB

| Slide 79

© ABB

Cyber Security Standards / Guidelines / RegulationsKey Cyber-Security initiatives

Standard Main Focus StatusNERC CIP NERC CIP Cyber Security regulation for North

American power utilitiesReleased

IEC 62351 Data and Communications Security Partly released,On-going *

IEEE 1686 IEEE Standard for Substation Intelligent ElectronicDevices (IEDs) Cyber Security Capabilities

Finalized

IEC 62443(ISO 99)

Industrial Automation and Control System Security Partly released,On-going *

Joint WorkingGroup B5-D2.46

Application and Management of Cyber SecurityMeasures for Protection and Control Systems

Draft

BDEW WhitePaper

White Paper Requirements for Secure Control andTelecommunication Systems

Released

* On-going: major changes will affect the final solution

Mai

nst

anda

rds

for

subs

tatio

nau

tom

atio

n

© ABB

time

Rea

ctD

etec

tP

rote

ct

Ver

ifyR

ealiz

ePr

epar

e

Developer securitytraining

Securitytesting

Secure codeSecuredesign

Plantsecurity

assessment

Plantsecurity

architecture

Secureconfiguration

Securitypolicy

Securitytesting

Security architecturemaintenance

Incident handling

Monitoring & audits

Threat modeling

Platform patchmanagement

CustomerSecuritytraining

Development Installation / migration Operations

Cyber Security for Substation AutomationCyber Security in the system lifecycle

© ABB

Cyber Security for Substation AutomationCyber security and robustness threats

Physical Security Perimeter

Electronic Security Perimeter

Network disturbance,malware, Cyber attacks

��

� Electronicperimeter protection

UnauthorizedPerson

�

Security measures

� Physical perimeterprotection

InfectedMobile

datastorage

InfectedNotebook

Data storm by aFaulty Device

UnauthorizedPerson

�

��

� Defense in depth

© ABB

SAS 600 seriesElectronic perimeter protection and defense in depth

Monitorsecurity and health activitiesin real-time

Reporting,Auditing

Managecritical activities, such asconfigurations, changes

and patches

PatchManagement

Accounts,Authenti-

cation

Protectagainst threats to substationautomation systems

PerimeterProtection

Manage

Monitor

Protect

§ Customer Needs§ Robust and reliable products and

solutions

§ ABB’s Solution§ Centralized security testing center

guarantees a common and bestpractice robustness testing of allproducts

§ Regular regression tests on ABBproducts and systems ensure a highlevel of robustness against cybersecurity attacks

§ Security deployment guidelines forproducts

Cyber security for SA – RobustnessHardened devices out of the box

© ABBFebruary 19, 2015 | Slide 84

§ The most named advanced securitymarket requirements

§ Central user account management

§ Central user activity logging

§ Open solution based on internationalstandards (IEC 62351)

§ ABBs answer: System Data ManagerSDM600

§ Complement existing ABB SAproducts

§ Add to existing solutions or part ofnew SA system

Cyber security for substation automationManage cyber security from a central point

Gateway

Serial Protocols

IEC 61850 and otherEthernet based protocols

IEC 60870-5-101/104 or DNP3

SDM600

SDM600


SDM600 system data managerProduct Overview

Data Management

DisturbanceRecorder DataManagement

DisturbanceRecorder Data

Evaluation

Cyber SecurityManagement

Central UserAcount

Management

Central UserActivity Logging

Service andMaintenance

IED SoftwareVersions

IED ConfigurationRevisions

Collect , store and provideevaluation support for DR filesincluding short reports

Provide centralized UserAccount Management andActivity logging for cybersecurity related events

Documentation of Firmwareand configuration revisions ofthe supervised IEC 61850IEDs


| Slide 86

Cyber Security in SA – MonitorReal-time monitoring security and health activities

Legend:

Local event logging

Central eventcollection

Service Data

Disturbance RecorderData

SDM600

SDM600

Proof securitycompliance andcreate efficientlyincident reports


Cyber Security in SA – ManageEfficient data and security management

Central User Accounts

Authentication to SDM600

Legend:

SDM600

SDM600

Add / remove auser withinseconds on

entire system


SDM600 system data managerBring data to valuable information

When did it happen

Correlations

DR Eventrepresentation

User activity andconfigurationchanges

Where did it happen


© ABB

SAS 600 SeriesStandard Security Architecture

Disabled ports / services

Removable media access

Individual User Accounts

Malware protection

Firewall

Legend:

© ABB

SAS 600 SeriesEnhanced Security Architecture




Malware protection

Firewall

Router

Encryptet communication

Legend:

© ABB

SAS 600 SeriesAdvanced Security Architecture




Malware protection

Firewall

Router

Encryptet communication

Local security event loggingCentral security event logging

Legend:

SDM600

SDM600

SDM600

Summary


| Slide 93

Summary

§ Non-conventionalinstrument transformers,among other advantages,increase availability andsafety of substations

§ IEC 61850 process busreduces field cablingsimplifies engineering andenables slim and smartsubstation retrofit


| Slide 94

Summary

§ ABBs NCITs, merging unitsand IEDs with IEC 61850process bus are incommercial operation sinceseveral years

§ Designing products andsystems fully compliant toIEC 61850 (and futureIEC 61869) is the key tofuture proof andinteroperable systems


| Slide 95

§ Ready to start with Edition 2 systems

§ Ensure future sustainability

§ Full support by tools initialrequirements

§ Handling of mixed Ed1 and Ed2needs special considerations

§ Cyber Security is integral part ofsubstation automation

§ Standards still ongoing

§ New needs for central management

Summary

SDM600

670 series

MicroSCADA Pro SYS600/SYS600C

LAN ALAN B

IED Configuration

SystemConfiguratio

n

Testing Tools


Documents

Peter Rietmann, Global Product Management SAS, 2015 · PDF filePeter Rietmann, Global Product Management SAS, 2015-02-19. Content ... NSD570 Rel. 3.3 / GOOSE LAN Interface G3LS Proxy