PES and Governance Brian Child University of Florida 31 August – 3 September 2009

PES and Governance

Brian ChildUniversity of Florida

31 August – 3 September 2009

• Collective action is a response to the benefits of managing ecosystems at larger scales

• CBNRM requires highly disciplined institutional design– If not, extremely difficult

Putting in place the conditions for the emergence of effective, equitable CBNRM governance

• CBNRM governance can be locked in an unhealthy state for many years.

• We should not assume that good governance will naturally evolve.

• We have theoretical and practical knowledge to design CBNRM organizations that are participatory, transparent, that have low levels of financial misappropriation, and that can manage natural resources well

• However, we may need to impose these conditions in the sense that:– Elites tend to benefit from the status quo (oppose changes)– Ordinary people, once they understand these changes (i.e. the capacity to

aspire), will support them strongly and, over time, may even be able to defend them (though they will usually need help/support to do so)

– Tendency for negative governance to re-assert itself. – Therefore need to protecting the procedural conditions tfor effective function

and evolution of CBNRM. – i.e. protecting the weak against the predation of the strong.

Principles

• ECONOMIC: The first principle, therefore, is to maximize the value of wildlife to landholders/occupiers (i.e. INDIVIDUALS)

• POLITICAL: The second principle is that decision-making power must originate in the people (not the committee). The elected committee (e.g. trust, Conservancy) must be answerable to the people, and not in charge of them

International

National

State/Provincial

District/Municipal

Cooperative/Multi-community

Local/Community

Meso Level

Macro Level

Micro Level

‘Governance’ is the linkagebetween these different levels of public and civil society entities

Property rights push the locus of power towards the local level

Household

Civil SocietyCivil Society

Governance Governance of Local of Local

Collective Collective ActionAction

Governance &Governance &Enabling Enabling

EnvironmentEnvironment

Governance &Governance &Enabling Enabling

EnvironmentEnvironment

Strong, widely Strong, widely applicable applicable conceptual and conceptual and operational operational model/smodel/s

High probability High probability of successof success

Weak conceptual Weak conceptual understanding, understanding, within historically within historically and site specific and site specific circumstances.circumstances.

Biggest challenges Biggest challenges to success:to success:• incompetence / incompetence / disinterestdisinterest• defense of status defense of status quoquo

Quality wildlife

resources

CBNRM in Luangwa: Institutional Lessons

South Luangwa National

Park

Lupande GMA• Six chiefs (4,500km2)• 50,000 people• Six Community Resource Boards• 45 Village Action Groups• Two hunting concessions• Earning USD 230,000 annually

South Luangwa National Park• 9,050km2• 9,000 elephants• Costs USD1m / year• Income USD850,000

CBNRM in Luangwa, CBNRM in Luangwa, Zambia (NORAD Zambia (NORAD Project)Project)

Harsh Climate• Floods• Droughts• Disease

Community Development Programme: Top Down Phase

• Two powerful co-Directors (“integration”)Two powerful co-Directors (“integration”)• 40% of park and GMA revenue returned to community40% of park and GMA revenue returned to community• But returned through six Chiefs for projects selected by But returned through six Chiefs for projects selected by

them and implemented by LIRDP (“followership” was not them and implemented by LIRDP (“followership” was not involved) involved)

• Did 36 different projects in community:Did 36 different projects in community:– Women’s programme (chickens)Women’s programme (chickens)– RoadsRoads– Infrastructure / buildingsInfrastructure / buildings– CullingCulling– Bus serviceBus service– Tourism and hunting managed by projectTourism and hunting managed by project

• Not one project was viable or sustainable despite massive Not one project was viable or sustainable despite massive fundingfunding

When I arrived in 1996:When I arrived in 1996:• People did not understand the ProjectPeople did not understand the Project• Very low perception of benefitVery low perception of benefit• Conflict/suspicion over project Conflict/suspicion over project

implementationimplementation

Agreed to implement “fiscal devolution” to Agreed to implement “fiscal devolution” to village level (80%) of incomevillage level (80%) of income

Resistance to Devolution by “Losers”

Revenue distribution meetings held in Malama

But chief rejects programme

Success in Chivyololo

Innovations: Mechanisms of Constituent Accountability

Recognition that devolution is a RIGOROUS process

“Loose-tight” principles

1. Constitutions

2. Accounts

3. Records of decisions

Constituency Accountability

Ensure that everyone knows what is happening with the finances (quarterly)

Innovations: Self Managed Revenue Distribution

The tight p

art (i.e

. procedural) o

f

The tight p

art (i.e

. procedural) o

f

loose-tight m

anagement (loose =

loose-tight m

anagement (loose =

let people decide fo

r themselves

let people decide fo

r themselves

provided they fo

llow democratic

provided they fo

llow democratic

procedure)

procedure)

Community Projects

Investing in Wildlife Management

Central Government

Local Government

Representational Democracy

Participatory Democracy

First Generation CBNRM

Second Generation CBNRM

Financial Flows in CBNRM

Participation

Benefits

Projects

Accountability

Attitudes to wildlife

Investment in wildlife

Wildlife trends

PERFORMANCE METRICS

75-100,000

20,500 people got cash

230+

0.8%

+90%

18% of income

Stable/up

SECOND GENERATION

Single versus Multiple VillagesSingle versus Multiple Villages

Defining local regimesDefining local regimes

According to Madison/ de Tocqueville:A Democracy – is where every one meets together to represent themselves (Township Government)

A Republic – is where people’s interests are represented by elected persons

According to Madison/ de Tocqueville:A Democracy – is where every one meets together to represent themselves (Township Government)

A Republic – is where people’s interests are represented by elected persons

Multi-Village community Indirect or

representational governance

Multi-Village community Indirect or

representational governance

Single Village Direct/participatory

democracy/ accountability

Single Village Direct/participatory

democracy/ accountability

Real Life Implications Real Life Implications

Preliminary data from CBNRM (next slide) is intriguing.

Suggests Madison’s dichotomy is critical to success

Representational Governance Participatory Governance

Red/Pink – gets to people (projects/cash) public good??


The effects of full face-to-face participationThe effects of full face-to-face participation

Where everyone in the community is involved in financial decision making (with full discretionary choice)•Revenue is allocated to the best combination of uses (i.e. the highest valued uses) including household and community benefits•This locates the origin of power in individuals (Tocqueville)

•Does this gives us a single metric that can measure both poverty reduction at HH level and empowerment (i.e. participation, accountability, democratization)?

CBNRM 2.0 (second generation)• This leads us to CBNRM 2.0, a second

generation model build on the principles of bottom-up accountability.

• There are several critical changes:– Money goes to individuals, and then

flows upwards through collective agreement

– This ensures that committees are downwardly accountable to their constituents

– An important role for government is to protect downward accountability (see conformance criteria below)

– Communities must be small enough to meet face-to-face regularly (i.e. single Village communities)

– This structure is much more likely to be effective than CBNRM 1. However, structure must be accompanied by effective information

• The following slide compares CBNRM 1.0 and CBNRM 2.0 using a wide range of performance metrics

5. Central Government5. Central

Government

4. District Council

4. District Council

3. CommunityCommunity Based Organization 3. CommunityCommunity Based Organization

2. Village (Grass-roots community)

Wildlife/TourismWildlife/Tourism

1. Individuals(Grass-roots community)

Household

Sequencing ScaleGLOBAL

NATIONAL

SUB-NATIONAL

Community

Province/State/Department

District/County/Traditional Area

Village

Scal

ing

Up

REGIONAL

Scale Dow

n (devolve rights)

Scaling process is critical:

• Scale down by devolving rights

• Scale up through upward delegation

• Avoid appropriation of rights

Read Murphree (2000)

Scaling process is critical:

• Scale down by devolving rights

• Scale up through upward delegation

• Avoid appropriation of rights

Read Murphree (2000)

I’ve included more detailed notes and recommendations on CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point

The Enabling Environment:some preliminary lessons

Some early hints at what a CBNRM enabling environment is

• National process work in impersonal states• May need to rely on projects in personalized (neo-

patrimonial states) where scaling up is challenging

• Legislated use rights (benefit, manage, allocate, sell) critical. Can pilot with project agreements (but vulnerable)

• Continuity of champions– Protect conditions for emergence– Inter-disciplinary experience and advice– Innovation requires trust

• Pilots critical (pilots lead policy)

• Learning through communities of practice

Long-term, Long-term, persistent, persistent, consistent consistent facilitationfacilitation

Aborted Aborted devolutiondevolution

More hints for enabling environments

• Donors – variability in outcomes– Design (often flawed; locally envisaged programs worked best)– Tenacity (seldom present)– But financing, political role, can be used positively

• Associations invaluable:– Political (e.g. CAMPFIRE Association)– Technical (e.g. CCG, NACSO)

• Responsible Research adds value (but research often an irritant)

• Need meso-organization (still lots to learn):– Role of local government (district councils) a two-edge sword– Sustainability of NGO support organizations

• Capacity-building– Process often misunderstood and badly designed = wasteful, expensive– Across-scale, experiential learning highly effective

REDD – opportunity or threat?REDD – opportunity or threat?

REDD New resource – limited vested interested allows us to do it

properly

But objectives very unclear, and seems to be driven top down with too little listening to landholders and communities

If done properly, could contribute to environment, development, governance:Land recovery (biodiversity, productivity, carbon) Improve livelihoods in marginal areas Incentivize improved governance (build “hollow states” from

the bottom up)

Forest Tenure: Who ‘owns’ the World’s Forests?

• Gov’t ……………….Owned and Administered by Government• Public-Comm ……Community has usufruct rights (Gov’t owned)• Private-Comm ….Owned by communities and indigenous peoples• Private-Indiv ……..Owned by Individuals or Firms

[Sunderlin, Hatcher and Liddle 2008]

Latin America Africa

African data appears to ignore customary tenure rights?

M hasM hasRights critical

to success but unclear

and disputed

Governance in Countries with 10 largest oil reserves(The Resource Curse)

Oil Reserve Data from: http://internationaltrade.suite101.com/article.cfm/top_ten_oil_countriesGovernance Indicator Data from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp

90% of these countries ranked in the lowest 1/3 in terms of Governance

Money that flows top-down

from a single source

=> governance problems

http://internationaltrade.suite101.com/article.cfm/top_ten_oil_countries

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp

How do we avoid a Tragedy of the Global Carbon Commons?

• Tragedy of the commons occurs in open access situations• Many of the commons situations envisaged by Hardin are

in fact subject to rules – local, communal and national

• What are the rules and structures that exist to govern Carbon?

• Governance = structure and processes that link the macro- with the meso- and micro-levels of NRM

Carbon Governance Mechanisms – Global to LocalUNFCCCKyoto Protocol

International

National

Community

UN Declarations• human rights• civil/political rights• ILO 169• Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP)

ConstitutionSocial Function Doctrine

Case LawHuman Right to Property(Mabo Case)

Regional Inter-American Court of Human RightsInter-American Commission of Human Rights

CBOsCAMPFIREConservancies

Complex – can we start with very

simple and clear goals?

[RRI 2008]

Conclusion• REDD attaches new value to forests

• Threat of elite land speculation

• Governance structures/processes need to be developed for REDD

- transparent, accountable, participatory, legitimate

• Who makes the new rules? Where is the landholder voice?

• Carbon raises all the same concerns and opportunities as CBNRM

Thanks to RRI for their support

Household

GOVERNANCE/SCALE ISSUESGLOBAL

NATIONAL

SUB-NATIONAL

Community

Province/State/Department

District/County/Traditional Area

Village

• Baseline• Additionality• Distribution• Monitoring

Accounting

Scal

ing

Up Issues:

• Size/Pop Density?• tenure security• perverse incentives• capacity building

REGIONAL

• Projects (low national capacity, initial pilot startups)

Summary Results of CBNRM Assessment and Priority

Recommendations

Overall Findings (2)Overall Findings (2)• Single Village CBOs work far better than multi-

village CBOs• CBOs lack procedural guidelines• Large, unsatisfied demand for technical

support / information• Managers, on the whole, working well (need

technical support, socialization in empowering communities, protection)

Critical Areas for ImprovementCritical Areas for Improvement

1. Governance, accountability and participation of people (including finances) is weak especially in multi-village CBOs

2. Benefits at household level far too low (ratio of overhead to benefit is FAR too high)

Overall JudgmentOverall Judgment

Key Recommendations (1)Key Recommendations (1)

A. Institutional DesignA. Institutional Design1. Break multi-villages up into single villages2. Set guidelines for constitutions and for

procedural conformance3. Monitor conformance

Key Recommendations (2)Key Recommendations (2)

B. B. DevolvedDevolved Capacity Capacity

4. Support and oversee marketing (database, facilitation, training)

5. Develop participatory revenue allocation and accountability systems

6. Experiment with participatory quota-setting (and set goals for wildlife monitoring and management responsibilities)

7. Develop stronger national and internal-CBO information systems

Key Recommendations (3)Key Recommendations (3)C. Enabling Environment and Support AgenciesC. Enabling Environment and Support Agencies

8. Develop MET capacity for: Adaptive policy formulation Conformance monitoring

9. Develop producer association/s right to levy communities provided they fulfill key functions:

Political representation Peer-based monitoring (Grameen Bank) Information (capacity-building)

10. Develop capacity for capacity-building. How?? Who ??

1. Independent monitoring and research (adaptive management model?)

Building Capacity through Building Capacity through Procedural ConformanceProcedural Conformance

Government should monitor procedural conformance to ensure

Full participation and democracy, Equity, Transparency and accountability, Protect the weak against the serious

threat of elite capture

Hence Capacity-building should focus on:

1. Sound constitutions and awareness of them

2. Information flow3. Participatory financial allocation

and accountability

Conformance CriteriaConformance Criteria

1. Budget properly discussed, presented and agreed by whole community

2. Proper financial and technical general meetings every quarter, well attended

3. Quarterly financial reports are accurate, follow budget, low variance, no misuse

4. Annual audit presented to community and approved by them (as an activity-based budget)

5. Annual/biannual elections

Only approve quota / payments on receipt of conformance audit (not just a financial one)

Technical Recommendations Technical Recommendations for CBO Managementfor CBO Management

1.1. Improve participation and transparency in financial Improve participation and transparency in financial allocation and controlallocation and control1.1. Participatory financial management (budgeting, control)Participatory financial management (budgeting, control)2.2. Use PRA communication techniques to make financial Use PRA communication techniques to make financial

decisionsdecisions3.3. Quarterly variance analysisQuarterly variance analysis

2.2. Improve information through carefully planned quarterly Improve information through carefully planned quarterly meetingsmeetings

3.3. Organize financial information to reflect benefits, Organize financial information to reflect benefits, overheads, investmentsoverheads, investments

4.4. Define roles and procedures in small manualsDefine roles and procedures in small manuals

Participatory BudgetingParticipatory Budgeting

Steps:

1. Define membership

2. Make list of members (and check it)

3. List animals shot and values

4. Worked out share per person

5. Agree on allocation: HH, projects, wildlife, management

Format for BudgetFormat for Budget

Total Per HouseholdN=55

INCOMEINCOME 3,000,000 54,545

EXPENDITUREEXPENDITURE

1. Cash benefits1. Cash benefits 110,000 2,000

2. Local Projects2. Local Projects 825,000 15,000

3. Wildlife management 275,000 5,000

4. Administrative overheads 550,000 10,000

5. Investments5. Investments 1,100,000 20,000

Making & communicating budgetsMaking & communicating budgets•Community participationCommunity participation•VisualizationVisualization

Making & communicating budgetsMaking & communicating budgets•Community participationCommunity participation•VisualizationVisualization

Making sure people UnderstandMaking sure people Understand

Each Member Gets Each Member Gets Their Full Share in CashTheir Full Share in Cash

Each Person Pays Into Each Person Pays Into Projects (Buckets) As Projects (Buckets) As Agreed by CommunityAgreed by Community

Quarterly Variance AnalysisQuarterly Variance Analysis

Expenditure ItemBudget

agreed at AGM

Actual Expenditure

Variance Planned corrective

Action

1. Cash benefits1. Cash benefits

2. Local Projects2. Local Projects

3. Wildlife management

4. Administrative overheads

5. Investments5. Investments

Ensure that everyone knows Ensure that everyone knows what is happening with the what is happening with the finances (quarterly)finances (quarterly)

Quarterly Report

Agenda• Value of animals• Constitution• Financial report• Project report• Wildlife management report• Report on hunting and tourism• HIV/AIDS• Other issues arising of interest e.g. wildlife policy

Notes on Designing Effective Community Based Organizations

Collective action is a response to the benefits of managing ecosystems at larger scales

• Many high value resources in semi-arid savannas are mobile, or fugitive, in space or time – wildlife, water, grazing, ecological health

• Without institutional mechanisms to manage these ecosystems at scale, the systems tend to be used for those activities that can be owned individually – small scale agriculture, and privately owned livestock

• In other words, because we do not know to manage these ecosystems at the correct scale, the high value resources tend to be replaced by lower value resources

• However, scale is a complex issue because:– Human institutions work better when they are small– Ecological systems work better when they are big(The principles for dealing with this mismatch will be dealt with separately)

• Within the southern African region, and particularly in relation to the wildlife-tourism resource there are large economic benefits associated with scaling up, and new institutions are evolving for this purpose. These include:

– Large, private ranches and conservancies– CBNRM– TFCAs

• There is considerable evidence to showing that scaling up creates significant ecological and economic benefits, including job creation.

• Scaling up is working well on private land (e.g. Conservancies), and TFCAs are still in their infancy and have many issues worked out.

CBNRM requires highly disciplined institutional design

• However, our interest is in the special case of CBNRM which faces is own challenges:

– Even at small scale, large numbers of people need to be involved– There are particular problems of poverty, literacy– People have a long history of political and managerial marginalization (disempowerment)– People have limited or no experience with modern organizational development theory and

practice, and tend to default to models less appropriate to the challenges of being competitive in a global world.

• Consequently, many CBNRM programs face serious problems of financial mismanagement, low levels of participation, and elite capture.

• This reflects badly on policy makers, implementers and communities • We do, in fact, understand both the principles and operational practices of CBNRM

sufficiently that we should be able to implement it with a high probability of success.

• There are many parallels with democratization. In the history of mankind, democratization is a rare process that seems to occur only under a particular and complicated set of circumstances. Gradual evolution should not be assumed – even though there is clear evidence that democratic governance is much better for people (every single country with a per capita GDP of over $20,000 is a democracy, except for a few oil rich nations), societies usually remain in a non-democratic status-quo for decades and even centuries.

Putting in place the conditions for the emergence of effective, equitable CBNRM governance

• This has several lessons for CBNRM:– CBNRM governance can be locked in an unhealthy state for many years. – We should not assume that good governance will naturally evolve.– Fortunately, we now have sufficient theoretical and practical knowledge to

design CBNRM organizations that are participatory, transparent, that have low levels of financial misappropriation, and that can manage natural resources well

– However, we may need to impose these conditions in the sense that:• Elites tend to benefit from the status quo, including dominating Committees and Trusts,

and will strongly oppose such changes, or changes that benefit the majority• Ordinary people, once they understand these changes (i.e. the capacity to aspire), will

support them strongly and, over time, may even be able to defend them (though they will usually need help/support to do so)

• Nevertheless, there will be a tendency for negative governance to re-assert itself. • Therefore supporters of CBNRM, especially government agencies with legal authority,

have an important role to play in protecting the procedural conditions that allow effective function and evolution of CBNRM.

• This can also be seen as protecting the weak against the predation of the strong.

Aligning CBNRM objectives by locating discretionary choice with individual landholders

Effective design of CBNRM institutions brings the following principles and practices into alignment:•It establishes mechanisms for property rights and exchange that allocate scarce resources to the highest valued uses, i.e. the conditions for a neo-liberal democratic economy•It locates the right to make decisions with individual community members (not their representatives), i.e. the conditions for participatory democracy•It uses communications methods that promote positive social change and transformation•It uses performance tracking mechanisms that improve the effectiveness and adaptability of management•It manages natural resources profitably and sustainably to create jobs and reduce poverty and vulnerability

Therefore, if CBNRM is not designed properly, managing CBNRM becomes a complicated trail (and trial)of crisis management.

However, if we follow the single principle that discretionary choice should be located in the individual landholder, and aggregate institutions upwards from this foundation, it is remarkable how well all these principles come together.

In this document we present an institutional design for communities that provides a solid foundation for these objectives. Other designs include fundamental political, economic, or ecological contradictions, and we are skeptical that they will work.

A Practical Sequence for Implementing CBNRM

IF we assume the government has put in place an enabling environment for CBNRM (the subject of another chapter), we can view CBNRM as sequentially addressing the following challenges:1.Earning money – the first step is to generate benefits by, for example, marketing tourism, hunting or timber concessions. This is easily achieved using open, competitive marketing and many communities do this reasonable well (note 1, 2)2.Spending money – much less attention is paid to the use of this money, and it is here that many problems occur. Effective systems will:

1. Allocate revenue to the most effective uses2. Maximize individual benefits and choice (not only collective benefits) as costs are borne by individuals3. Avoid serious challenges of corruption and elite captureHowever, our research in communities in six countries implementing CBNRM in southern Africa suggests that

serious problems are occurring: At best, very few individuals are getting benefits, or participating in the program, or have information about

what is happening At worse, communities face serious problems of financial misappropriation (corruption) and elite capture

3.Effective natural resource management

Note 1: Nevertheless, benefit streams can be greatly improved. We will address this issue separatelyNote 2: While our focus is on high value resources (e.g. wildlife, tourism), which is the fastest and easiest way to develop CBNRM, we acknowledge that CBNRM is entirely appropriate for other natural resource management challenges such as non-financial ecosystem services.

Spending moneyAs noted, earning money from wildlife / tourism is relatively easy. However, effective natural resource management is only likely to occur when this money generates individual and communal incentives.

Therefore the key to CBNRM, and its biggest challenge and opportunity, lies in spending money effectively so that:1.It is allocated effectively, transparently and honestly2.It is used to build high levels of participation, accountability, and benefit, and therefore a commitment to a natural-resource based economyIn other words “spending money” is the key to GOOD GOVERNANCE

However, the serious problems of financial mismanagement and/or elite capture that currently afflict many CBOs are gravely undermining the concept of CBNRM. Consequently, the major threat to CBNRM is governance. This more easily corrected than often supposed but requires that:

Implementing agencies understand and operationalize the principles of CBNRM governance

Policy makers are committed to devolution, and operationalise this by ensuring that communities have strong rights (and responsibilities) for natural resource management

We will describe the essential principles, and operational practice for effective governance below.

Reason 1: Individuals determine land use

• Individual landholders (including community members) are deterministic of land use and conservation outcomes.

• Their decisions are strongly influenced by a personal cost benefit analysis that compares:

– the value of wildlife (including tangible values like cash and intangible values like proprietorship and aesthetics),

– to (1) alternative land uses (2) and costs and opportunity costs associated with wildlife• The first principle, therefore, is to maximize the value of wildlife to

landholders/occupiers (i.e. INDIVIDUALS)• The success of commercial wildlife management in southern Africa has been based

on this principle• However, we tend to ignore the importance of maximizing individual landholder

benefit when dealing with communities by:– Reducing the value of wildlife through bureaucratic constraints, license fees, etc.– Thinking that community benefits are equivalent to individual benefits when clearly they are

not. Even in communities making a lot of money from wildlife, individuals are often excluded from direct benefit. CBNRM will not be sustainable unless this is changed.

Reason 2: Individuals determine land use

• The second principle is that decision-making power must originate in the people (not the committee). The elected committee (e.g. trust, Conservancy) must be answerable to the people, and not in charge of them.

• Many natural resources, like wildlife, are mobile or fugitive (over time and/or space), and therefore need to be managed collectively.

• Collective management is currently problematic, and the source of the financial and governance challenges that we are well aware of.

• Further, in Africa, elite capture is often more pronounced at local than at national level. It is a serious problem that arises from a hollow state, i.e. where leaders are neither controlled by or accountable to the people

• To make CBNRM work, we have to explicitly address this challenge.• The trick to effective CBNRN governance is that individuals (not committees) must

control financial benefits and decision-making• Achieving this requires careful design of community organizations and procedures

to ensure ACCOUNTABILITY and TRANSPARENCY.

Achieving Accountability• Bottom-up accountability is highly effective in rural

communities.• However, it is seldom automatic, and has to be

achieved by careful institutional design and role formulation

• To protect the community, especially women and the poor, the state needs to protect the conditions for bottom-up accountability.

• This is achieved by insisting on transparent, accountable, democratic procedures that are maintained through the conformance criteria outlined below.

6. Illustration of the change from a top-down to a bottom-up,

democratic, transparent and accountable policy



Central Govt.

Chiefs

Community Resource

Board

Wildlife

Village Action Group

Administration and Scale• To design effective local

organizations, it is essential to understand the relationships between difference layers of government, and their respective roles

• In Africa there are often five layers of organization (illustrated). A sixth layer, province is omitted to simply this explanation


Government

4. District Council

4. District Council

3. Community Based Organization





Centralized, colonial administration of wildlife resource

• Following the London Convention of 1933, most Africa countries centralized the control of wildlife outside protected areas (note that centralization often increased in post colonial states)

• All benefits (if there were any) were paid to Treasury, and all decisions were made by the wildlife/game department.

• The system failed:– Landholders (and local governments)

were alienated from wildlife and came to resent its presence

– Wildlife declined rapidly outside protected areas


Government

4. District Council

4. District Council






The lesson of private conservation in southern Africa

Recognizing that wildlife outside of parks was threatened primarily by competition for land, southern Africa adopted a sustainable use strategy. Policy makers:•Encouraged commercial use (rather than banning it)•Devolved ownership of and benefits from wildlife to private landholder•This led to a rapid increase in wildlife on private land in southern Africa.

•Landholders received the following rights:– To benefit from wildlife– To manage wildlife (e.g. set quotas)– To allocate and sell wildlife

•Government retained a regulatory role. This worked most effectively when:

– A light touch approach to regulation was used– Regulatory functions were devolved to communities of

landholders (e.g. Intensive Conservation Areas in Zimbabwe, and more recently Conservancies)

•The success was based on a triad of principles:– Price – maximise the value of wildlife– Proprietorship – devolved rights to wildlife (often usufruct) to

landholders– Subsidiarity – ensure that all functions are conducted at the

lowest possible level. They should only move upward through upward delegation.

•The success of this model from the 1960s, led to CBNRM


Government

4. District Council

4. District Council

3. Community Based Organization (ICA)3. Community Based Organization (ICA)


1. Private Ranchers

CBNRM 1.0 (first generation)• The first CBNRM program was

WINDFALL in Zimbabwe. • Benefits followed the path

illustrated. District Councils were pressured to get benefits to communities producing wildlife, albeit often in the form of schools, clinics and projects.

• WINDFALL only partially modified the original colonial model, and failed because:

– The links between wildlife and benefits were long and unclear to rural people

– People had few rights to manage wildlife themselves – they were more the objects of windfall charity than empowered wildlife producers


Government

4. District Council

4. District Council






CBNRM 1.1 (first generation)• Zimbabwe quickly recognized these problems. This led

to CAMPFIRE• Using the Parks and Wildlife Act, “Appropriate

Authority Status” (the same status enjoyed by private landholders – see above) was devolved to District Councils.

• The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management had wanted to establish “Village Companies” as the appropriate authorities. However, this was resisted by the Ministry of Local Government and a strategic compromised was reached whereby:

– Rights were legally devolved to District Councils, but– There was a gentleman’s agreement, the “CAMPFIRE

Principles/Guidelines” that rights would be further devolved to local communities

• The closer the CAMPFIRE Principles were followed, the better the individual programs worked

• In some communities, benefits were decided on by individuals. Some of this money was retained by households, and some was delegated upwards to the CBO for collective projects (see blue arrows)

• It is probably not a coincidence that these were the high performing CAMPFIRE communities, and that they have proven robust even in the face of current economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe (e.g. Masoka, Mahenye).

• Note that the blue arrow model is actually a prototype second generation CBNRM model


Government

4. District Council

4. District Council






CBNRM 1.2 (first generation)Recognizing these problems, CBNRM practioners improved the model. •Namibia and Botswana, for example, avoided the problems of passing benefits through district councils.•They established communities as legal entities (Conservancies, Trusts). Benefits flowed directly to these CBOs.However, in most cases, CBOs included multiple villages.•Research and anecdotal evidence indicates serious governance problems with this model including:

– Low levels of individual participation and benefit (i.e. high levels of elite capture)

– Financial impropriety•There are some exceptions. These are nearly always single village communities. This suggests what we call a second generation CBNRM approach


Government

4. District Council

4. District Council






Single versus Multiple VillagesSingle versus Multiple Villages

Defining local regimesAccording to Madison/ de Tocqueville:A Democracy – is where every one meets together to represent themselves (Township Government)A Republic – is where people’s interests are represented by elected persons

This correlates to: A single Village with direct or

participatory democracy/ accountability

A multi-Village community with indirect or representational governance

Implications

Preliminary data from CBNRM across the region (see next slide) is intriguing.

This confirms the importance of Madison’s dichotomy

Representational Governance Participatory Governance



The effects of full face-to-face participationThe effects of full face-to-face participation

Where everyone in the community is involved in financial decision making (with full discretionary choice)•Revenue is allocated to the best combination of uses (i.e. the highest valued uses) including household and community benefits•This locates the origin of power in individuals (Tocqueville)

•Does this gives us a single metric that can measure both poverty reduction at HH level and empowerment (i.e. participation, accountability, democratization)?

CBNRM 2.0 (second generation)• This leads us to CBNRM 2.0, a second

generation model build on the principles of bottom-up accountability.

• There are several critical changes:– Money goes to individuals, and then

flows upwards through collective agreement

– This ensures that committees are downwardly accountable to their constituents

– An important role for government is to protect downward accountability (see conformance criteria below)

– Communities must be small enough to meet face-to-face regularly (i.e. single Village communities)

– This structure is much more likely to be effective than CBNRM 1. However, structure must be accompanied by effective information

• The following slide compares CBNRM 1.0 and CBNRM 2.0 using a wide range of performance metrics


Government

4. District Council

4. District Council

3. CommunityCommunity Based Organization 3. CommunityCommunity Based Organization




Central Government

Local Government

Representational Democracy

Participatory Democracy

First Generation CBNRM

Second Generation CBNRM

Real data comparing performance of Real data comparing performance of CBNRM 1 and CBNRM 2CBNRM 1 and CBNRM 2

Participation

Benefits

Projects

Accountability

Attitudes to wildlife

Investment in wildlife

Wildlife trends

PERFORMANCE METRICS

75-100,000

20,500 people got cash

230+

0.8%

+90%

18% of income

Stable/up

SECOND GENERATION

Example Policy Statement: Organizational Structure, Roles and Responsibilities

Recognizing that democratic institutions (e.g. CBOs) that rely on representation (rather than full and direct participation) are structurally predisposed to problems of accountability, weak participation, and non-performance:

1.Single Villages shall be constituted as the building blocks of any CBOs. As the primary level of implementation, they shall:

1. receive the majority of natural resource revenues (>85%), and 2. shall be responsible for day-to-day decisions and management.

This is the DOING level, and all decisions shall ultimately be made by individuals. 2.Village decision processes shall be structured in such a manner that ordinary people (i.e. members) control the all activities and budgets, and are responsible for :

1. instructing committees, including setting budgets and work plans through annual general meetings. (Committees should never make budgets themselves, and should be instructed by (and never instruct) their constituents

2. controlling committee activity through regular (quarterly) feedback on financial and technical performance (variance analysis).

3.All decisions, including budgets and the control of financial and technical performance (variance), shall be fully participatory and exercised through regular (quarterly) meetings of the membership. 4.Communities shall decide on the allocation of funds to alternative uses in a full forum. They shall have the right to allocate benefits from natural resource benefits to best advantage, including:•Community projects (e.g. social infrastructure; revenue generating projects; loan funds; food relief; clubs) •Natural resource and natural resources management •Household cash dividends •Administration.5.However, decisions may be implemented by committees that are democratically elected on an annul basis.

continued

6. Where Multi-Village CBOs are necessary:1. their primary function shall be COORDINATION (not

management). 2. They shall depend on voluntary payments from

Villages, to which they are accountable. These functions shall generally be conduct with no more than 5% -15% of natural resources revenues. Multi-Village CBOs tend to create functions that do not add value if they get too much money

3. Optimally, all revenues should be allocated to Villages. Coordinating CBOs then then obtain their revenues after justifying their plans and performance to the membership of Villages

Conformance Criteria

• Recognising that the devolution of (defined) rights and responsibilities is the basis for institutional evolution and should not be held out as its reward.

• Recognising, further, that institutional evolution always involves experiment, and without authority such experiments are both methodologically and substantively defective.

• Recognising that capacity must be created in both the leadership, but especially the followership, to avoid the problems associated with asymmetric power and knowledge relationships

• Recognising, by implication, that the route towards effective CBNRM programmes requires entrusting communities with rights at the scale of face-to-face participation, and facilitating the followership to learn experientially how to apply these rights;

• Recognising that “experiential learning” is not trial-and-error but a rigorous process than includes

• (1) scrupulous monitoring and adaptive management, plus • (2) insistence on conformance to certain organizational principles (and sometimes • (3) NRM performance criteria), the following conformance principles shall apply:

Institutional Conformance Principles1. Decision-making: The budget (which reflects key allocation decisions) shall be made by the whole

community. Its allocation between cash dividends, projects, natural resource management and administration shall be recorded in detail (using a standard format)

2. Accountability: The variance between financial and technical status (e.g. project implementation) and the instructions embodied in the budget, shall be carefully and competently presented to, and accepted by, a minimum of two thirds of the community quarterly

3. Performance audit: Technical and financial variance analyses shall be audited internally at least twice a year, and at least once a year by an external agency, and this audit report shall be presented to the community

4. Financial management system: Each Village shall have a bank account, and a double-entry cash book systems with clear filing of invoices and receipts.

5. Banking: Income owing to a community shall be paid directly into a community bank account and protected with two panels (signatures) – that of the community, and that of the regulatory agency or a proxy acting on their behalf.

6. Release of benefits: Money shall be released in a timely manner for community benefit provided all conformance criteria and financial problems are resolved. Conformance shall be subject to a standard analysis (see form **)

7. Elections: The committee shall face re-election bi-annually subject to performance ratification by AGM

NR Management Performance Criteria:National authorities may dictate what monitoring takes place (conformance), but the choice of desired outcomes are desired shall rest with the community. The following performance metrics should be monitored:

1.Protection effort: The community shall undertake a number of patrol days each month as agreed with the respective authority

2.Protection effectiveness: Monitoring of patrolling shall ensure that the catch-effort ratio of poaching incidence per patrol days remains below a pre-determined threshold

3.NRM status: The number of animals / fish / trees seen per unit effort (e.g. on patrol, per day, per block covered) shall be monitored

4.Monitoring offtake: The offtake of all natural resources shall be monitored by Village employees. An annual summary shall be prepared and presented to the Annual General Meetings in all Villages. For wildlife this annual summary should list:

all animals hunter, Name of hunter, the price paid, and concessions fees. trophy qualityData provide by the national authority, the hunting outfitter, and community monitors, and shall be reconcile d.

For fish ….For trees ….

5.Zonation Plan: Each community shall make a land use zonation plan and monitor adherence to plan

Useful checklists

The following slides provide:1. Chart summarizing roles of each organization2. Checklist to assess if community has conformed

with CBNRM principles (and to authorize annual payments)

3. Checklist to assess of principles of accountable financial management are being followed

4. Checklist to assess of CBNRM principles are being followed





Central Govt.

Community Trust / Board

Wildlife

Village Action Group

All Wildlife Revenue (100%)

Some of wildlife revenue

Old Policy (failed)

New Policy (Second generation)

Effective CBNRM requires evolution from a First Generation (left) to a truly devolved Second Generation CBNRM programme (right).

In a First Generation:Devolution is only partialPeople and communities are ‘subjects’. They are not trusted to make sensible decisions, and middle-level government officials invariably ratify or ‘guide’ their choices.They invariably evolved into Second Generation projects because they do not really work.Second Generation CBNRM Projects:Generate real grass-roots participation and empowerment by devolving revenues to them.Encompass principles that ensure full participation in a democratic, transparent and account system.Depend heavily on scale since all members of a community institution should be able to meet face-to-face.People become citizens

80-90%

5-10%

Definition of RolesRoles Income

Chiefs 1.Patron; ideally, protect democratic principles in VAGs. 2.Overall advisor, and maintain traditional values;3.Neutral arbitration;4.Guide decisions on broad land-use issues;5.Non-executive, non-administrative role.

Board / Trust Conservancy COMMUNICATION &COORDINATING LEVEL1.Maintain bank account and financial records;2.Monitor and summarize Village performance and financial records;3.Coordinate development plans for area;4.Plan, implement and monitor large multi-VAG projects;5.Monitor and oversee NRM utilization in the area (e.g. wildlife management and safari hunting, fishing).6.Conflict resolution within and between VAGs

Income share: 5-10 % NR/wildlife income Purpose: administration and coordination.

Where CRB undertakes project implementation (e.g. clinic) or activities (e.g. employ game-guards) money must be voted to it from VAGs

Village (VAGs) DOING LEVEL1.Membership shall hold annual, democratic elections, with power to dissolve committees. At any time2.All decision shall be made at general meetings to prepare,, to prioritize and agree all plans and budgets (no imposition of choices); 3.NR/wildlife revenues shall be allocated to (1) projects/activities (2) household cash (3) NRM and (4) administration t general meetings;4.Hold quarterly general meetings to report on financial and technical performance andv ariance from budgets and workplans5.Plan, implement and monitor Village projects and activities6.Maintain bank account and financial records7.Manage NR (wildlife, fish, trees) at the local level (e.g. employ Village Scouts or sanction/prosecute poachers according to by-laws)

Income share: 90+ % NR/wildlife income

Purpose: equivalent to income from crops or livestock except that use must be decided by the community.

May be used for any purposes decided by the community including household needs (cash), projects and activities.

CBNRM Support AgenciesMonitor performance (finances, wildlife/NR, institutional development) of CBNRM;Develop managerial capacity of community institutions (i.e. design systems and provide training);Ensure compliance with conditions by which wildlife revenues are devolved including:

o 80% + of income to communities;o Full community participation in decision-makingo Revenue distribution guidelineso Auditing

Donors or tax

CERTIFICATION OF VAG PERFORMANCE AND APPROVAL OF RELEASE OF FUNDS

We hereby confirm the following:

This VAG held at least four general meetings during the year at which matters were openly and transparently discussed and which were well attended. (If not, and you are convinced that there are legitimate reasons for this, please note these reasons below).That the financial accounts of this VAG are accurate, follow the budget, and that no money has been misused, or if misuse has occurred acceptable corrective action has been taken. (Before approving this, you should be (a) be convinced that adequate and responsible corrective action has been taken and (b) the problem and actions should be summarized below). That the finances and other matters of this VAG were properly presented and approved by the community at the AGM.That a membership list was updated and approved by the general community.That elections were freely and fairly held and that a newly approved committee is now in place to receive the NR/wildlife income.That projects and activities were properly presented for the community to choose. Communities were properly facilitated to choose projects.That the choice of projects and approval of the budget was done by the community in a general meeting and was not forced on them. That the VAG reported on protection, monitoring, zonation metricsThat the VAG has full records of wildlife/NRM offtake and income Certified by authority (or proxy): To be attached following revenue distribution:

AGM minutes…………… ………………….. ………………. VAG AGM Summary Report (Form 2)Approved Name Title…………… ………………….. ……………….Approved Name Title

CERTIFICATION OF VAG PERFORMANCE AND APPROVAL OF RELEASE OF FUNDS

We hereby confirm the following:

This VAG held at least four general meetings during the year at which matters were openly and transparently discussed and which were well attended. (If not, and you are convinced that there are legitimate reasons for this, please note these reasons below).That the financial accounts of this VAG are accurate, follow the budget, and that no money has been misused, or if misuse has occurred acceptable corrective action has been taken. (Before approving this, you should be (a) be convinced that adequate and responsible corrective action has been taken and (b) the problem and actions should be summarized below). That the finances and other matters of this VAG were properly presented and approved by the community at the AGM.That a membership list was updated and approved by the general community.That elections were freely and fairly held and that a newly approved committee is now in place to receive the NR/wildlife income.That projects and activities were properly presented for the community to choose. Communities were properly facilitated to choose projects.That the choice of projects and approval of the budget was done by the community in a general meeting and was not forced on them. That the VAG reported on protection, monitoring, zonation metricsThat the VAG has full records of wildlife/NRM offtake and income Certified by authority (or proxy): To be attached following revenue distribution:

AGM minutes…………… ………………….. ………………. VAG AGM Summary Report (Form 2)Approved Name Title…………… ………………….. ……………….Approved Name Title

Principles for Revenue DistributionConditions Means of verification

1. Decisions regarding use of benefits must be democratic, transparent and participatory.

Decisions must be made at general meetings attended by at least 60% of household heads and confirmed in written minutes.

2. People must have full choice of the use of their money, including household dividends (cash), projects and activities.

Confirmed by minutes and auditing of General Meetings.

3. All finances must be used in the manner agreed at general meetings, and must be fully accounted for by keeping proper financial records.

Full financial records will be compiled and submitted quarterly by Villages and BCOs to general meetings (with copies to support agencies)

4. Each body should report regularly to its constituents (i.e. downwards)

Committees must report regularly on project implementation and finances at general meetings.

5. Villages and CBOs must be properly constituted and democratically elected.

Each Village and CBO must have a constitution, and hold regular (annual) elections.

6. Money should be allocated according to the principle of producer communities.

Revenue should be allocated to the Village which animals are shot or tourism income earned.

7. The link between production and benefit should be immediate and transparent

Revenues should be disbursed no later than May in the year following that in which it is earned, and should be accompanied by a full list (and value) of animals shots and other fees paid.

Analysis of Congruence of Policy Guidelines with CBNRM Principles and Best Practice

Principles of CBNRM How are these fulfilled by Policy Guidelines

1. The unit of production should be the unit of management and benefit.

Are all revenues generated in the area returned to these communities in a bottom-up manner?

Is there good participation in quota-setting and allocation; and law enforcement?

2. Producer communities should be small enough that all households can participate face-to-face.

Are decisions on at least 80-100% of revenues made at VAG-level and by a quorum comprising 60+% of households?

3. Community corporate bodies should be accountable to their constituency.

Do committees report regularly and accurately to general meetings on financial and technical performance?

4. Functions should be conducted at the lowest appropriate level.

Are projects, village scouts, etc. done at VAG-level or lower?

5. The link between production and benefit should be transparent and immediate.

Are wildlife revenues returned to the communities where it was earned at general meetings?

Is this accompanied by good records of wildlife offtake and income?

6. Communities must have full choice in the use of wildlife revenues, including household cash.

Are revenues allocating at general meetings where members have the full choice of cash dividends?

7. All marketing should be open and competitive and should be done by the wildlife producers themselves.

Is marketing open and competitive? Do communities select safari operators themselves? (This

significantly strengthens the important relationship between safari operators and community).

8. The rates of taxation of wildlife should be similar to that of other resources.

Do communities get 100% of wildlife revenues?

9. Activities or investment should not be undertaken unless they can be managed and sustained locally.

Can wildlife activities fund themselves in the near future?

10. Government is the ultimate authority for wildlife. Does a government agency monitor key process such as institutional accountability, finances and community wildlife management?

11. Devolving authority and developing community management capacity is a process.

While enlightened management must accept that there will be mistakes and misappropriations, does this take place within a rigorous framework that monitors progress and takes corrective action?

Documents

PES and Governance Brian Child University of Florida 31 August – 3 September 2009