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Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System Venugopalan Ramasubramanian Emin Gün Sirer Cornell University

Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

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Venugopalan Ramasubramanian Emin G ü n Sirer Cornell University. Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System. Venugopalan Ramasubramanian Emin G ü n Sirer Cornell University. How to 0wn the Internet in Your Spare Time? Part 2. Introduction. DNS is critical to the Internet - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Venugopalan Ramasubramanian

Emin Gün Sirer

Cornell University

Page 2: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

How to 0wn the Internet in Your Spare Time? Part 2

Venugopalan Ramasubramanian

Emin Gün Sirer

Cornell University

Page 3: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Introduction• DNS is critical to the Internet

• DNS architecture is based on delegations– control for names is delegated to name

servers designated by the name owner

• delegations facilitate high scalability and decentralized administration– what about security?

Page 4: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

sprintlink.nettelemail.net

sprintip.com

Dependencies for www.fbi.gov

vericenter.com

gov.zoneedit.comzoneedit.com

dns[,2].sprintip.com ns[3,4,5,6].vericenter.com

fbi.gov

gov

comgtld-servers.net

nstld.comnet

zoneedit.comroot

www.fbi.gov

Page 5: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Subtle Dependencies in DNS

• www.fbi.gov86 servers, 17 domains

• www.cs.cornell.educs.rochester.edu cs.wisc.edu itd.umich.edu48 nameservers, 20 domains

• DNS dependencies are subtle and complex• are administrators aware of what they depend on?• increases risk of domain hijacks

Page 6: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Servers with Security Loopholes

www.cs.cornell.edu [slate,cayuga].cs.rochester.edu

source: internet systems consortium (www.isc.org)

dns[,2].sprintip.com ns[3,4,5,6].vericenter.com

fbi.gov

ns[1,2,3]-auth.sprintlink.netreston-ns[1,3].telemail.netreston-ns[2].telemail.net

sprintip.comwww.fbi.gov

Page 7: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Survey Goals

1. Which domain names have large dependencies and entail high risk?

2. Which domains are affected by servers with known security holes and can be easily taken over?

3. Which servers control the largest portion of the namespace and are thus likely to be attacked?

Page 8: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Survey Methodology

• 593160 domain names (Yahoo and Dmoz.org)• 166771 name servers• 535036 domains, 196 top-level-domain

Page 9: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Most Vulnerable Names

Number of Dependencies

2226Median

342604Max

6846Mean

Top 500All

Page 10: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Most Vulnerable Names 307 306

46 46 44 44 43 37 33 320

100

200

300

400

aero int mil info edu biz gov org net com466

390 366 353 349

15 15 15 8 50

100200300400500

ua by sm mt my mx hm jp bh tk

Page 11: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Vulnerability to Security Flaws

• survey of BIND version numbers

• 17% of servers have known loopholes [ISC]

• 45% of names are not totally safe

• security through obscurity!

– more than 40% of servers hide version numbers– 19/46 reports for cs.cornell.edu and 18/86 for fbi.gov

Page 12: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Vulnerability

Page 13: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Vulnerability to Security Flaws

Page 14: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Critical Assets

Page 15: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Most Valuable Nameservers

arizona.edu

ucla.edu

uoregon.edu

nyu.edu

berkeley.edu

Top 5 Domains

Page 16: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Conclusions

• Domain names have subtle dependencies– name-based delegations

• High risk of domain hijacks– well-known software loopholes– leading to more effective phishing attacks

http://www.cs.cornell.edu/people/egs/beehive/codons.php

Page 17: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System
Page 18: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

DNS-SEC

• Security Standard for DNS based on public-key cryptography and digitally signed certificates

• Not widely used currently

– security at delegation points

– authenticated denials

– islands of security

• Does not eliminate name-based delegations

Page 19: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

DNS Bottlenecks

Page 20: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Safe Bottlenecks

Page 21: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Safety

Page 22: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Dependencies

Page 23: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Critical Assets 2

Page 24: Perils of Transitive Trust in the Domain Name System

Dependencies for www.fbi.govwww.fbi.gov

fbi.edgesuite.neta33.g.akamai.net

ns[1-6].vericenter.com

vericenter.com

govgov.zoneedit.com

zoneedit.com

zoneedit.comcom

gtld-servers.netnstld.comnet

edgesuite.netakam.net

g.akamai.netakamai.net

akamaitech.net

dns[,2].sprintip.com ns[3,4,5,6].vericenter.com

fbi.gov

ns[1,2,3]-auth.sprintlink.netreston-ns[1,2,3].telemail.net

sprintip.com