OrganizationScienceVol. 20, No. 3, May 2009, pp. 676–678issn 1047-7039 �eissn 1526-5455 �09 �2003 �0676

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doi 10.1287/orsc.1090.0433©2009 INFORMS

Performativity of Theory, Arbitrary Conventions, andPossible Worlds: A Reality Check

Teppo FelinMarriott School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84602, teppo.felin@byu.edu

Nicolai J. FossCenter for Strategic Management and Globalization, Copenhagen Business School, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark, and

Department of Strategy and Management, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration,N-5045 Bergen, Norway, njf.smg@cbs.dk

We argue that Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton build on a scientifically problematic conception of the relationship betweentheory and social reality. Specifically, the performativity perspective that they build on makes tenuous assumptions

about the role that theories, whether true or not, play in strongly constructing social reality, but the perspective fundamentallyignores central matters related to human nature and the boundaries of possibility. We argue for a more realistic approach totheory building and social science, one that recognizes the role that true theories play in helping us understand and explainreality, but also in turn shaping that reality given this better theoretical understanding.

Key words : performativity; economics; philosophy of social scienceHistory : Published online in Articles in Advance April 27, 2009.

We appreciate the opportunity to briefly addressFerraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton’s (2009) response (hence-forth “FPS”). Given space constraints, we will largelyfocus on the merits and implicit assumptions of the “per-formativity perspective” that FPS build on heavily (Cal-lon 1998, 2007).As FPS emphasize in their response, their arguments

build on a much wider literature in the philosophyand sociology of science, the performativity perspective.The performativity literature argues that theories (pre-dictions, assumptions, explanations, and expectations),independent of ex ante correspondence with truth andreality, fulfill themselves due to social, political, andtechnical reasons, and create the very realities that thetheories predict. According to the performativity per-spective, then, we cannot even meaningfully speak ofthe ex ante “truth” or “reality” of theories, because theo-ries themselves participate in defining and creating whatis truthful and what is real. Theories, as argued by oneof the founders of this perspective, are “arbitrary con-ventions” (Callon 2007, p. 322) that are self-fulfilling(MacKenzie 2006)—arbitrary conventions that are nottrue ex ante but they “perform” themselves and thusbecome true ex post.The problem, however, is that if one holds that the

content of theories indeed is arbitrary ex ante, how isone then somehow able to assess the falsity or truthof other’s theories? Logically, one cannot—any asser-tions of the falsity or truth of theories would be self-

refuting. But FPS nonetheless reduce other’s theoreticalefforts, particularly in mainstream economics, not justto arbitrariness but false ideology. Logically, the perfor-mativity perspective must also reduce its own theoreticalefforts to historical, ex post story telling and labeling(MacKenzie 2006), or worse, politics and ideology.If not truth, what then should be the basis for choosing

a particular theory over others? On this front, the perfor-mativity perspective develops an agenda that radicallychanges the very purposes of science, specifically, wheresocial scientists “no longer have to choose between inter-preting the world and transforming it” (Callon 1998, p.352). Competition, self-interest, incentives, and markets(or any other factor for that matter) may just be arbitrary,cultural or theoretical constructions; in line with thisagenda, the “point [of the performativity perspective] isto question the very naturalness of markets” (Fourcade2007, p. 1025; cf. MacKenzie 2009). Indeed, if the con-tent of our theories is arbitrary, then why not create thebest of all possible worlds?But, even if we reduce theoretical efforts to ideology,

an immediate question then is which of many competingideologies ought to be adopted and why? Thus, ironi-cally, we come back to the need to judge the ex antecontent of the theory itself, along with associated evi-dence. The problem is that the performativity perspectivedoes not allow for any form of ex ante judgment aboutthe potential correctness of given theories because “thereare no context-free or supercultural norms of rationality”

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(Barnes and Bloor 1982, p. 27) by which to judge truth.An additional problem is that the performativity perspec-tive only focuses on selective, ex post evidence for itsarguments, and thus the approach amounts to the stalk-ing of various historical models and all-too opportunisti-cally pointing out how (some of) these models changedor constructed the world. In other words, the performa-tivity perspective—as a recent incarnation of the sciencestudies program, which failed (Mirowski and Nik-Khah2007, cf. Latour and Woolgar 1979)—never addressesthe range of possible, other (ex ante “arbitrary,” “false,”or “true”), competing theories that may potentially alsohave been realized nor the possibility of meaningfulprogress. Might, for example, the Black-Sholes modelhave worked better than other ex ante approaches tounderstanding option value? Undoubtedly so, which ispartly why it was used; thus, one can scarcely label themodel as arbitrary. Did prices come to reflect the model?Yes. Was the model the perfect tool? No, in fact, nomodel is (science indeed progresses over time), but themodel provided an approximation and one that was laterchecked by “reality” and modified accordingly.Overall, then, the range of “possible worlds” that social

scientists might create are bounded by ex ante realities,realities that one cannot transform by simply theorizingand hoping, and thus making them come true (cf. Austin1962, Bloor 1991, Butler 1997). For example, scarcityand costs are a reality. No amount of theorizing willchange this. Human universals and nature are an ex antereality (Brown 1991): some people are self-interested,others are selfless; some people are motivated by extrin-sic factors, others perhaps not; some are talented in par-ticular areas, others are not. Understanding these ex anterealities is fundamental to theorizing, and these reali-ties cannot be labeled arbitrary (Felin and Foss 2009).Might, then, for example, market institutions actuallyprotect from opportunistic behavior rather than create it(Williamson 1985)?The bulk of evidence in Ferraro et al. (2005) for

the self-fulfilling nature of theories comes from theirextension of the performativity argument into the lit-erature on how people’s expectations or stereotypes ofothers fulfill themselves, even when false. But, to saythat people blindly follow inaccurate stereotypes is todeny rationality, free will, and individuating information.That is, review studies persuasively show that individ-uating information and accurate informational updatingdrives stereotypes rather than stereotypes falsely fulfill-ing themselves (see Funder 1995, Jussim et al. 2009,Jussim and Harber 2005). We might also add that theFerraro et al. (2005) language “mechanism” builds on anantiquated conception of the supposedly strong influencethat language has on behavior, perceptions, and the con-struction of reality. Specifically, the thesis of linguisticdeterminism (Sapir 1911), relativism, and performativityhas been refuted by studies in linguistics and psychology

(for an overview, see Pinker 2007) as well as philosophy(Searle 1989).A final concern with FPS’s arguments is that they

have, perhaps inadvertently, taken a rather definitivestand with the strongly social constructionist side inthe so-called “science wars” (Boghossian 2006, Brown2001, Goldman 1999) by heavily anchoring their argu-ments on the performativity perspective. But, if orga-nizational scholars want to be taken seriously, then wecannot simply reduce science to arbitrary convention,rhetoric, and ideology. Thus, our hope is that a modicumof reality is infused into interdisciplinary discussions,and that the arguments and evidence rather than rhetoricand ideology drive the joint effort to create the best ofall possible worlds.

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