Perception Technology Life-worlds

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Perception, Technology, and Life-Worlds


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C O L L E C T I O N U T C P

P E R C E P T I O N ,

T E C H N O L O G Y , a n d

L I F E - W O R L D S

Junichi Murata


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Contents

Preface 7 Acknowledgements 9

I. Perception, Color, and the Mind-Body Problem

1. Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem 13

2. Perception and Action 313. Colors in the Life-World 514. Space and Color 655. The Multi-Dimensionality of Colors 856. The Indeterminacy of Images 103

II. Technology, Modernity, and Ethics

7. Why is Technology a Fundamental Problem of Philosophy? 1218. Technology and Life-Worlds 1339. Creativity of Technology 15110. Pragmatism and the Ethics of Technology 17911. From Challenger to Columbia 197

References 217Note about the author 225

Copyright © 2007 by Junichi Murata

Sponsored and published by UTCP (The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy).

Correspondence concerning this book should be addressed to:

UTCP

3-8-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8902, Japan

Edited by: Koichi Maeda, Yuko Yabuki, and UTCP

Book Design: Kei Hirakura

Printing: DIG Inc., 2-8-7 Minato, Chuo-ku Tokyo104-0043, Japan

ISSN 1881-7637

Printed in Japan


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Preface

This book consists of papers I have written during the last ten years.During these years my main interests lay in two problem areas: one is

related to the philosophy of perception and the mind-body problem;and, the other is related to the philosophy and ethics of technology.Papers in the first part of this book concern the former problem area and

those in the second part deal with the latter problem area.These papers were written on various occasions, but my philosophi-cal stance to various problems is not as different as it perhaps seems. My stance could be called phenomenological in the widest sense of the word.

When I use the word phenomenology here, I do not mean a specific phe-nomenology, for example, the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, orMerleau-Ponty. Rather, I mean the common methodological stance thesephilosophers took when considering various problems. This stance can

be expressed using the well-known expression “Back to the things them-selves” (“ Zu den Sachen selbst ”). When phenomenologists use the concept“things themselves,” they understand them above all as concrete phe-nomena we experience in our everyday lives. Not objective phenomena dealt with by scientific theories, and not the subjective phenomena nor-mally interpreted to belong to our inner consciousness, but phenomena belonging to the world in which we live are to be considered the basis of philosophical investigation. Objects belonging to this world appear first

as colorful things we perceive and meaningful tools we use. These phe-nomena we encounter in our Life-World are the basis of philosophicalanalysis, as well as the basis of our every experience. I would like to pre-sent this kind of philosophical stance as taking the point of view of theLife-World, which I think belongs to the core of the phenomenologicalmethod in the widest sense of the term. Thus, the term Life-Worlds usedin the title of the book suggests not only the theme of the book, but alsothe methodology I take throughout the book.

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Acknowledgements:

1. “Consciousness and the mind-body problem,” in Cognition, Computation, Consciousness , ed.

by M. Ito, Y. Miyashita and E. Rolls, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 31-43.

2. “Perception and Action—unity and disunity of our perceptual experiences,” in Proceedings

of the 2nd PEACE (Phenomenology for East-Asian Circle) conference in Tokyo, 2006, pp. 122-

135.

3. “Colors in the life-world,” in Continental Philosophy Review 31, 1998, pp. 293-305.

4. “Space and color: Toward an ecological phenomenology,” in Continental Philosophy Review ,Vol. 38, 2006, pp. 1-17, (translated from German version by Corey McCall).

5. “The multi-dimensionality of colors,” in the forthcoming Proceedings of the 1st PEACE con-

ference .

6. “The Indeterminacy of Images: An Approach to a Phenomenology of the Imagination,” in

Phenomenology: Japanese and American Perspectives , ed. by Burt Hopkins, Kluwer Academic

Publishers, 1999, pp. 169-183.

7. “Philosophy of Technology, and/or, Redefining philosophy,” in UTCP Bulletin, Vol. 1, 2003,

pp. 5-14.

8. “Technology and Life-Worlds—Towards a Hermeneutics of Technologies,” in Interkulturelle

Philosophie und Phaenomenologie in Japan, eds. by T. Ogawa, M. Lazarin and G. Rappe, indi-

cium, 1998, pp. 153-166.

9. “Creativity of Technology: An Origin of Modernity?” in Modernity and Technology , eds. by

Thomas Misa, Philip Brey, and Andrew Feenberg, The MIT Press, 2003, pp. 227-253.

10.“Technology and Ethics—Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Technology,” in Proceedings

of the COE Symposium: Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Technology , Vol. 2, 2003, pp. 60-70.

11.“From Challenger to Columbi a,” in UTCP Bulletin, Vol. 4, 2005, pp. 36-47.

9

Many people helped me to write the papers contained to this book on various occasions. Some have invited me to conferences to present a paper, others have invited me to publish a paper in a journal or in a book.People who heard my presentations made friendly and critical comments.

I cannot estimate how much I owed them. I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to all of them on this occasion.

December, 2006

Junichi Murata

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I. Perception, Color, and the Mind-Body Problem


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1

Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem

Introduction

After the long ascendancy of philosophical treatments of behavior andlanguage, the problem of consciousness has once again become one of the predominant themes in philosophy. At least so it seems in analyticphilosophy. Over the last ten years, hundreds of papers and books relat-ed to the problems of consciousness have been published, and it seemsthat the philosophy of mind has now created a huge philosophical indus-try. Here I cannot and have no desire to survey all the literature onconsciousness in the philosophy of mind. Instead, in the following I

would like to concentrate on and describe the problems about phenom-enal consciousness or the so-called qualia or subjective aspects of sensations and perceptions, which are now considered to constitute thecore of the problems of consciousness. Because I think that the qualia

consciousness cannot be treated separately from other features of con-sciousness, such as intentionality and self-consciousness. I will also touchon these phenomena as necessary.

1. Consciousness and qualia

1) The Ignorabimus-thesis

In 1872 at the 45th Assembly of Natural and Medical Scientists inGermany, Emil Du Bois-Reymond, one of the most famous physiolo-

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3

Colors in the Life-World

Introduction

Do things look red, because they are red? Or are things red, becausethey look red? Naive realists would answer positively to the first ques-tion, and idealists positively to the second. But since Galileo naturalscientists have provided a more radical answer: If there were no humanbeings, there would be no colors on the earth. To be exact, there are nocolors in the objective world, and things in the world have no color. Col-ors are only subjective phenomena, like “hallucinations.”

Husserl has taken a very clear stance against this “scientific realism” con-cerning so called “secondary” qualities or “qualia,” such as colors, sounds,and so on. Colors are “sensory qualities”: they are not to be confused with“sense data,” but are to be taken as “properties of the bodies which are actu-ally perceived through these properties” (Husserl 1970, p. 30). Therefore,according to Husserl, there are colors in the world, at least in the life-

world. But how do they exist? This is the question that I would like totake up in this paper.

1. Mixed color

There is a famous phenomenon in which two things seem to have thesame color, although they reflect totally different spectral components of light. It is called “metamerism.” Metamerism is a phenomenon that colorscientists and philosophers use in order to “demonstrate” that colors are

subjective phenomena. But is this a necessary consequence?

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4. Coexistence of lifeworlds

The above consideration of color perception was made mostly froma static point of view. But the constitution of colors occurs factually inthe course of a long evolutionary history in which various perceivers of colors and various colors of things emerge and develop together. To theextent that we have embodied and adapted ourselves to a certain rangeof electromagnetic waves, it has become possible for us to see corre-sponding colors. In order to realize this, we have also had to develop andembody a certain structure of the retina, the nervous system, and thebrain. The situation is not fundamentally different in the case of otherliving creatures. Animals and insects have developed their perceptual

organs with which various colors can be identified. On the other hand,plants have developed colorful flowers and trees in order to be identifiedby and “use” the animals and insects. The colorful world, which we now perceive, is the result of a long process of the co-evolution between var-ious living creatures and their lifeworlds.

It is well-known that bees perceive ultraviolet colors. What it mightbe like to experience such colors for bees is beyond our ability to under-stand. The colors of other living creatures are in principle incommensurable

with “our” colors. In this sense the colors of the other living animals are inprinciple invisible, and these colors cannot be considered to be other“aspects” of our visible colors in the sense of this concept we have consid-ered up to this point. Nevertheless this does not mean that we can revivethe view that the colors of the other animals are subjective sensations anddo not exist in the world. Rather the same thing can be said in the case of the colors of other animals as in the case of “our” colors. The ultraviolet“color” that bees perceive is constituted by the whole system of factors and

lies in the lifeworld of the bees. Besides we can see and enjoy the colors of flowers, which have coevolved with perceptual organs of bees, “from ourpoint of view” and in “our” lifeworld. In this sense although the colors of other animals are impossible to see, we could say that we see the other“aspects” of that invisible color. The colors which we see are other “aspects”of the invisible colors of the other animals, and how we perceive colorsshows the form of coexistence between “our” lifeworld and the lifeworldsof other animals.

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4

Space and Color:Toward an Ecological Phenomenology

1. Color, adumbration, and space

Current color science accepts as a basic presupposition Newton’s the-sis that light rays are not colored. Supplementing this presupposition isthe corollary that color is a subjective impression resulting from a causalprocess that begins when colorless rays of light impact the retina elicit-ing a stimulus. After various information exchanges in the nervoussystem, this causal process ends somewhere in the brain. According tothis interpretation, all color, be it the green of the trees, the red of wine,

or the blue of the sky encountered in everyday life is but illusion. Variousfacts were presented in the textbooks of color science to support variouskinds of “argument from illusion,” for example, that light rays of differ-ent wavelengths cause the same color and that light rays of the same

wavelength cause different colors.In opposition to this “common sense” of current color science, phe-

nomenology presents the theory that colors adumbrate themselves. Thatthe same object appears differently in various situations or that different

things viewed from a single vantage point appear the same is not anunusual but is rather a common fact of our everyday perceptual experi-ence. This fact is reinterpreted by Husserlian phenomenology such thatthe being of a thing is “constituted” by its various adumbrations. This isone of the most important insights of Husserlian phenomenology, andit provides a sort of immunity from the “argument from illusion” in orderto “save” the phenomena of the perceptual world. Husserl shows that thisconcept of adumbration applies not only to spatial form but to sensible

phenomena such as sound or color as well, and he thereby erects a kind


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The Multi-Dimensionality of Colors

Color has been a popular theme of philosophy for a long time, espe-cially in the field of the philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind. When it comes to the notorious difference between primary andsecondary qualities, for example, since the time of John Locke color hasbeen dealt with as a typical example of secondary qualities. In spite of these circumstances, there have been very few philosophical investiga-tions in which color itself is discussed as a central theme. Only recently have philosophical discussions concerning the nature of color and colorvision been held, mainly within the work of analytical philosophers.These discussions have partly been motivated by the development of color sciences, which have produced various interesting results; and part-ly influenced by the naturalizing tendency of philosophy, in which it is

widely recognized that conceptual analyses alone, without empiricalknowledge about concrete phenomena, are insufficient even within thefield of philosophy (cf. Byrne and Hilbert 1997).

In this sense, color and color vision now seem to have become recog-nized as important subjects of philosophical discussions. Nevertheless,

the problems dealt with in these discussions mostly remain within a tra-ditional conceptual scheme. For example, what is most widely discussedis the question of the ontological status of color; i.e., the question of

whether color can be considered an objective property of things (objec-tivism or physicalism), whether it must be considered a subjective state of the perceivers (subjectivism or physiological eliminativism), or whether itis a kind of dispositional state of an object, which causes a subjective sen-sation in perceivers (dispositionalism).

With regard to this situation in the philosophy of color, what kind of


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logical studies and also in various examples of our experiences describedi i h l i l i ti ti

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in various phenomenological investigations. Wittgenstein left the following statement in his last manuscript: “The

logic of the concept of color is just as much more complicated as it mightseem (III-106)” (Wittgenstein 1977, p. 29). Although this statement

sounds simple, it must be taken seriously, as the complexity and multi-dimensionality of colors and color visions reflect the complexity andmultidimensionality of the realities of our life world, in which we live

with other species.

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The Indeterminacy of Images: An Approach to a Phenomenology of the Imagination

1. Is the Lockean concept of “abstraction” to be saved?

J. Locke’s thesis, that the meaning of a word is an idea in the mind,is now quite unpopular. In particular, his thesis about general or abstractideas has been very strongly criticized. But let’s take a look at the famouspassage where he talks about the process by which general ideas are appro-priated.

The use of words then being to stand as outward marks of our internal

ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every par-

ticular idea that we take in should have a distinct name, names must be

endless. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas received

from particular objects to become general; which is done by considering

them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from all other

existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any

other concomitant ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby ideas

taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the

same kind; and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists

conformable to such abstract ideas. Such precise, naked appearances in

the mind, without considering how, whence, or with what others they

came there, the understanding lays up (with names commonly annexed

to them) as the standards to rank real existences into sorts, as they agree

with these patterns, and to denominate them accordingly. (Locke 1959,Book II, Chap. XI, p. 9.)

Locke names here the process of the separation and isolation of ideas


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arisen. (James 1950, p.255f.)

In n n rti t kn th bj t f th ir pr d ti n r ll f r

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In one sense artists know the subject of their production very well, forexample, what life is like, but in another sense, they don’t know it at all.They must find out by bringing the image into reality. The process of

producing a work of art is as much a process of finding an image as of producing it, in the sense that the indeterminate image is made explicitand “determinate” through this process, though not in the same sense of determinacy of normal perception. And the process of understanding a

work of art moves in the opposite direction. We can say that we under-stand the subject of a work, for example, what life is like, only when wemake the “determinate” image, in this case, the “material image” which

we perceive, once more indeterminate, that is schematic and embodied in

ourselves. What life is like comes to be understood “through our ownbodies” (cf. Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 30). The circular movement betweenthe determinacy and the indeterminacy of images plays an importantrole in various fields of our life, from everyday perception and imagina-tion to artistic production and understanding.


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II. Technology, Modernity, and Ethics

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Why is Technology a Fundamental Problem of

Philosophy?

At around 9:00 A.M. on February 1, 2003, the space shuttleColumbia disintegrated in flames over Texas a few minutes before itsscheduled landing in Florida, after having completed a 16-day missionin space. While the main cause of the destruction of Columbia was clar-ified later, the scene of its disintegration was shocking enough to makeus rethink the meaning of technology in our modern world. While thetechnologies that make space shuttles possible belong to the advanced

technologies applied in space exploration, their essential characteristicsare no different from those of technologies that constitute the world in

which we live. In this sense, even for laymen who are not directly relat-ed to space exploration, the Columbia accident is not an event that existsonly in TV programs, but also represents symbolically the characteristicsof our modern lives. Our lives proceed with many kinds of risk, which arenot fundamentally different from the risks that led to the disintegrationof Columbia.

In this paper, I would like to focus on problems concerning technol-ogy in our world. I shall maintain that technology poses a fundamentaland challenging problem for us as philosophers, and it enables us to rede-fine traditional conceptual schemes if we take the philosophical problemof technology seriously.


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Creativity of Technology: An Origin of Modernity?

Introduction

Technology studies are currently dominated by social constructivistapproaches of many kinds: sociotechnical systems, social shaping,sociotechnical alignments, or actor-network approaches (see Grint and

Woolgar 1997, chap. 1). Despite their differences, these approaches sharea common stance against essentialist tendencies in one way or other. Thischaracteristic can be found very clearly in the so-called social construc-tion of technology (SCOT) approach (see Pinch and Bijker 1987 andBijker 1995), as well as in the actor-network approach of Bruno Latour

(1987, 1999) and Michel Callon (1995). Advocates of these approachesalso argue against any determinism, whether it is a technological or a social determinism. That is, they do not presuppose a naive distinctionbetween the “technical” and the “social.” They maintain that technolog-ical development is not determined by technical or social factors. Theseapproaches emphasize the unique, contingent situation in which a sociotechnical network is developed and in which technological artifactsare correspondingly interpreted. Technological artifacts and their ways

of working are considered to have no inherent and essential attributesand are subject to “interpretative flexibility.”

While this nonessentialism makes discussions in technology studiesintriguing, it also makes them at times very complicated and difficult,especially when the relationship between modernity and technology isunder analysis. It is difficult to retain a nonessentialist view of technology

when we consider technology to be one of the essential factors of moder-nity; it seems that we cannot but assume that there is an essential


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Pragmatism and

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Pragmatism and

the Ethics of Technology

One of the conspicuous characteristics of the pragmatic concept of

knowledge and technology is the emphasis on their creative character.However, when it comes to ethical issues related to the development of knowledge and technology, this character seems to pose a fundamentalproblem. As a creative process, the development of knowledge and tech-nology necessarily shows the characteristics of unpredictability anduncertainty, so it seems to be difficult to attribute the concept of respon-sibility to such a process.

Taking their creative character seriously, how are ethics of knowledge

and technology possible? This is the question I would like to address inthe following.

1. Philosophy as applied ethics; the Deweyan approach towards the ethics of technology

1) Dewey’s definition of philosophy

In 1919, John Dewey delivered a lecture entitled Reconstruction in Phi-losophy at the University of Tokyo. In the first part of this lecture heformulated the origin and the role of philosophy, describing and analyz-ing the initial phase of western philosophy. According to Dewey, ashuman beings, we have two points of view with which to respond to thevarious problems in our lives. One is a traditional point of view, which isdeeply rooted in social habits and loyalties. It is also surcharged with themoral aims for which human beings live and the moral rules by which


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stability and certainty can be realized.

19510. Pragmatism and the Ethics of Technology

its change belongs to scales associated with natural history, not the his-tory of human beings. It is entirely beyond the sight of human actionsin the usual sense. In the case of genetic engineering and gene therapy,the technological actions concerning the transformation of genes belong not only to the level of normal actions of human beings but also belong to the level of the evolution of life, whose scale is beyond the scale of the

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, ynormal actions of human beings.

Because of these circumstances in which different ontological levelsintersect each other, the results of contemporary technological actionsare so difficult to evaluate, and become fundamentally ambiguous.

According to Jonas, it is exactly in these circumstances that new prob-lems of ethics emerge. In this way, we can again find here the reverse of Dewey’s perspective.

According to Dewey, because we have too little power to control the world, we are in an unstable and dangerous situation, and must makeand use technological tools to get out of it. However, the contrary is thecase in the contemporary situation. Because we have too much power,

we are in an unstable and dangerous situation, and from this point of view we need new ethics.

We live now in a world of fundamental unpredictability and funda-mental uncertainty from which we can never escape. In these

circumstances, the principal question related to technology changes fromthe question of how to control and conquer uncertainty to one of how tolive with inevitable uncertainty. How can we continue to live in a fun-damentally unstable and dangerous world? This is the basic question inthe background, on the basis of which we must always deal with variousproblems of the ethics of technology in the contemporary world. And,I think only from this perspective can we understand the true meaning of the “R and D role” of philosophers and the heuristics we have seen above.

Now, through these discussions, we seem to have come to a rather dif-ferent view of technology and ethics from that of Dewey. However, asfor the spirit of Dewey’s pragmatism, I think we are not so far away. It

was precisely Dewey who radically criticized the quest for certainty, andemphasized the necessity for patience and strength of nerve to remain inthe real experiential world, in which dangers and uncertainties never dis-appear, and not to fly to a metaphysical world, in which alone perfect

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From Challenger to Columbia:What lessons can we learn from the report of the Columbia

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accident investigation board for engineering ethics?

Introduction

One of the most important characteristics of technology is that wecan use it to produce certain instruments that can then be used to light-en our work loads, and/or produce safer working conditions for ourselves.It is also well known that the meaning of technology cannot be reducedto the role of instrumentality (Tenner 1996). For example, during theprocess of production, and while using technology, unintended situa-tions sometimes arise which can be considered a source of creativity but

can also lead to technology failures and accidents. How can we interpretthis unpredictable and unmanageable aspect of technology? I think thisproblem is pivotal to the philosophy of technology.

In the view of technological determinism, the processes of technolog-ical development and the introduction of a technology to a society areseen in hindsight. This hindsight allows us to interpret them as the pro-cesses dominated by technological rationality and efficiency and theunpredictable and unmanageable aspect of technology remains out of

focus. In contrast to this deterministic view, the social constructivistapproach focuses on technological unpredictability and unmanageability and finds that these aspects provide interpretative flexibility and a chancefor users of a technology to take the initiative to develop the technology in a new direction. Thus, our perspective on the philosophy of technolo-gy depends on how we characterize these aspects of technology, or on whichfacet of these aspects we focus (Murata 2003a; 2003b [Chapter 9 andChapter 7, this volume]).


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Science of Color , MIT Press.

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son, J., and Pinch, T. eds., Handbook of Science and Technology Studies , Sage, pp. 29-63.

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Technik, Sprache , Felix Meiner, pp. 39-91.

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Note about the author:

Junichi Murata (born in 1948) studied at the University of Tokyo, Department of History d Phil h f S i h f ll (DAAD) h U i i f C l G

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Wittgenstein, L. 1977. Remarks on Color, Anscombe , G. E. M. ed., Basil Blackwell.

Zimler, J., and Kenan, J. M. 1983. “Imagery in the Congenitally Blind: How Visual are Visual

Images?” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9 : 269-282.

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and Philosophy of Science, was a research fellow (DAAD) at the University of Cologne, Ger-

many (1977-1979). A Lecturer and then Associate Professor at Toyo University (Tokyo)

(1981-1991). He conducted research at the Ruhr-University of Bochum, Germany as Hum-

boldt Stipendiat (1988-89). He is presently Professor at the University of Tokyo, Department

of History and Philosophy of Science.

His important publications in Japanese include Perception and the Life-World [CHIKAKU

TO SEIKATSUSEKAI ] (The University of Tokyo Press, 1995), Philosophy of Color [SHIKISAI

NO TETSUGAKU ] (Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 2002), The Ethics of Technology [GIJUTSU NO

RINRIGAKU ] (Maruzen Publisher, Tokyo, 2006).

Documents

Perception Technology Life-worlds