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People on the move: impact and integration of migrants in
the European UnionUuriintuya Batsaikhan, Zsolt Darvas and Inês Gonçalves Raposo
Bruegel workshop:
Better policies for people on the move
13th December 2017
Dramatic changes in EU demographics
2Note: Net immigration (non-adjusted) indicates the data as included in the population
statistics. Net immigration (asylum-adjusted) also considers pending asylum seekers.
• Immigration: more
important source of
population change
than natural
change since 1990s
• Scale of
immigration in
2015-16: not
unprecedented
-0.2%
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
Natural change
Net immigration (non-adjusted)
Net immigration (asylum-adjusted)
Components of population change in the EU28,
1960-2016 (percent of population)
Purpose of our report
•Assess the migration challenge that Europe faces, by analysing:
1. Public perception
2. The scale of immigration
3. The economic impact of immigration
4. Integration of migrants• With a special focus on financial integration
5. Policy implications
3
Public perception
4
Immigration and terrorism top the list of public concerns
5
Source: Eurobarometer. Question QA5 “What do you think are the two most important
issues facing the EU at the moment?” Maximum of two answers possible.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90% Terrorism
Immigration
Economic situation
Member States' public finances
Unemployment
Most important issues facing the European
Union, share of respondents
Attitudes towards immigration globally, share of respondents
6
Source: Gallup and IOM (2015) How the world views migration, Figure 1.2 and Table 5.1.
Note: The question "In your view, should immigration in this country be kept at present
level, increased or decreased?". Groups are weighted by population size.
• EU: more
negative
views on
immigration
than
elsewhere in
the world
34
26
39
39
40
29
48
22
41
34
30
21
18
36
21
28
23
18
26
24
8
22
5
4
13
12
29
8
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Global
Oceania
North America
Latin America and Caribbean
Africa
Asia
European Union
Decreased Present level Increased Don't know/refused to answer
Perceptions vs reality: perceived and actual stock of immigrants, 2014 (percent of population)
7
Sources: IPSOS. The question asked: “What percentage of the [Country] population do
you think are immigrants to this country (i.e. not born in [Country])?”
• Citizens
overestimate
the actual
number of
immigrants
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Perceived
Actual: foreign population by nationality
Actual: foreign-born population
Perceptions on handling the refugee crisis & common asylum policy & border control
• EU citizens generally disapprove of the way the refugee crisis was handled in Europe.
• Nevertheless, a large majority of Europeans is in favour of:
• a common European asylum policy and
• increased EU efforts to fight illegal immigration.
8
Support for intra-EU immigration is on the rise
9
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Very positive Fairly positive Fairlynegative
Very negative Do not know
May-15 Nov-15 May-16 Nov-16 May-17
Support for immigration from inside the EU, percent or
responses, EU average
Source: Eurobarometer surveys, The question asked: “Please tell me whether each of the following statements
evokes a positive or negative feeling for you – Immigration of people from other EU Member States
Support for migration from inside the EU vs. from outside the EU, percent of respondents
10
Source: Eurobarometer, May 2017
• Lower support
for extra-EU
immigration
• Yet is also
relatively high
in some
countries,
including the
United
Kingdom
No negative relationship between the share of immigrants and the support for immigration across EU countries
11
Intra-EU immigration Extra-EU immigration
Immigration support vs the share of immigrants
in resident population, 2016
Mapping migration in the European Union
12
Annual dynamics of immigration and emigration: home and foreign citizens, 2009-2015 (percent of population per year)
13Source: Eurostat. EU27 does not include Bulgaria.
• Immigration
from outside
the EU
increased in
2015
• Recall our 1st
chart: current
level not
unprecedented
• Unchanged
return
migration and
emigration
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EU 27
Emigration: home citizens
Immigration: home citizens
Emigration: foreign citizens
Immigration: foreign citizens
Annual dynamics of immigration and emigration: home and foreign citizens, 2009-2015 (percent of population per year)
14
Source: Eurostat. North-West 11: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom. CEE 10: Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. South 4: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
• Most immigration to North-West 11
• Central Eastern Europe (CEE): higher emigration than elsewhere
• South 4: recent increase in emigration, but below EU average
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%North-West 11
Emigration: home citizens
Immigration: home citizens
Emigration: foreign citizens
Immigration: foreign citizens
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%CEE 10
Emigration: home citizens
Immigration: home citizens
Emigration: foreign citizens
Immigration: foreign citizens
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%South 4
Emigration: home citizens
Immigration: home citizens
Emigration: foreign citizens
Immigration: foreign citizens
Intra-EU mobility
• Intra-EU mobility has not reached high levels
• E.g. population of 11 north-west EU countries include:
• 1.88% residents from Central and Eastern Europe
• 0.15% posted workers from Central and Eastern Europe
• 1.18% residents from southern Europe
• 0.02% posted workers from southern Europe
• 1.13% residents from other north-west countries
• 0.04% posted workers from other north-west countries
• Altogether, other EU citizens (both residents and posted workers) account for 4.4% of total population of 11 north-west EU countries
• Non-EU citizens: additional 4.31% 15
Key concern in brain drain and labour shortages
16
Labour shortages as a factor impeding business
Industry
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
199
6-Q
1
199
8-Q
1
200
0-Q
1
200
2-Q
1
200
4-Q
1
200
6-Q
1
200
8-Q
1
201
0-Q
1
201
2-Q
1
201
4-Q
1
201
6-Q
1
CEE-10 NW-11 SE-4
Services
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
200
3-Q
3
200
4-Q
3
200
5-Q
3
20
06
-Q3
200
7-Q
3
200
8-Q
3
200
9-Q
3
201
0-Q
3
201
1-Q
3
201
2-Q
3
201
3-Q
3
201
4-Q
3
201
5-Q
3
201
6-Q
3
201
7-Q
3
CEE-10 NW-11 SE-4
Source: European Commission, European Business and Consumer Surveys.
Question: ‘Factors limiting the business: labour force’
Changing source countries and reasons for immigration from outside the EU
17
EU residence permits by main sending countries and
reason for issuance, 2016, thousands
3-11 months
0
100
200
300
400
500
Employment Other Education Family
-
50
100
150
200
250
300
Employment Other Education Family
One year or longer
Source: Eurostat ‘First permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship’ dataset, code: migr_resfirst.
First time asylum applications in the EU by place of application, Jan 2008 - Sep 2017
18
Source: Eurostat.
• Average 2008-11:
265 thousands/year
• 2015: 1.26 million
• 2016: 1.21 million
• 2017 (expected):
640 thousands 0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
8M
01
200
9M
01
201
0M
01
201
1M
01
20
12
M0
1
201
3M
01
201
4M
01
201
5M
01
201
6M
01
20
17
M0
1Germany Sweden Austria
Hungary Italy Greece
France United Kingdom Rest of the EU
Huge differences in asylum decisionsLikely reason: different implementation of EU asylum rules
19
Source: Eurostat.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
EU
28
Austr
ia
Belg
ium
Bulg
aria
Cro
atia
Cypru
s
Czech R
ep
.
Den
mark
Esto
nia
Fin
land
Fra
nce
Germ
any
Gre
ece
Hun
gary
Ire
lan
d
2015 2016 2017
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Italy
Latv
ia
Lithuan
ia
Lu
xe
mb
ou
rg
Malta
Neth
erland
s
Pola
nd
Port
ugal
Rom
ania
Slo
va
kia
Slo
ve
nia
Sp
ain
Sw
ed
en
UK
2015 2016 2017
Positive first instance decisions on asylum applications,
% of applications, 2015-17
Uneven distribution of 1) first time applications, 2) accepted asylum, 3) GDP
20
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
2017
First time applications Positive decision GDP
Economic Impact of Immigration
21
Labour market impact
• Immigrants take jobs from and depress wages for natives?
• There is a lack of conclusive evidence. Impact on the host country depends on migrant characteristics and the host country’s economic and institutional factors.
• There are studies finding evidence of negative, neutral and positive impact of immigration on native wages
• UK – Rowthorn (2015): competition from immigrants may result in lower wages for low skilled local workers, including previous immigrants.
• Italy – Brücker, Fachin and Venturini (2011): presence of foreign workers discourages internal labour mobility
• Overall European experience: small wage and employment impact on native workers (Peri, 2014)
• Wage and employment assimilation: recognition of educational degrees, language skills, poor networks, etc.
22
Fiscal impact
• The fiscal impact of migrants as assessed in the literature depends on what is included in the analysis
• Are migrants net contributors or net beneficiaries?
- Welfare dependency depends on age, employment status and duration of stay
- OECD countries: fewer contributions to taxes and not by higher dependence on benefits (Liebig and Mo, 2013)
• Migrants make a greater fiscal contribution the younger and better integrated into the labour market they are.
23
Impact on output
• Immigration has a large effect on income per capita and productivity (Ortega and Peri 2014, Alesina et al. 2016)
• Portes et. al (2016) estimates a fall in UK GDP ranging from 0.63 to 1.19 percent as a result of Brexit-related reductions in immigration
• Advanced economies: Jaumotte et al. (2016) find a positive effect in per capita income levels in host economies – one p.p increase in share of migrants in the adult population can raise GDP per capita by up to 2% in the long run.
• The economic impact on receiving countries is largely influenced by the composition of migrant flows. Migrants who come for work reasons or for the short-term are associated with better economic outcomes for receiving countries.
24
The case of refugees
• The IMF estimates the fiscal cost of asylum seekers in 2014-2016 to be around 0.19% of total EU GDP
• OECD: National fiscal costs 0.5% of GDP in Germany annually from 2016-2017, 0.3% in Austria and 0.9% in Sweden for 2016
• Impact of the labour markets: cumulative impact of asylum seekers inflow by end-2016 accounts for 0.4% of EEA labour force
• Germany: less than 1% of total labour force
• Role of national institutions in integrating migrants
25
Integration of immigrants
26
Sweden & UK: good labour market integration record; Belgium & Italy: bad
Country Native-born
Second
generation of
migrants
First
generation of
migrants
Sweden 83% 78% 76%
United
Kingdom79% 76% 75%
Belgium 68% 59% 65%
Italy 63% 48% 70%27
Labour market participation by migrant status,
selected countries, 2014 - total population
Labour market integration: Much better outcomes for tertiary educated people
Country Native-born
Second
generation of
migrants
First
generation of
migrants
Sweden 93% 90% 87%
United
Kingdom88% 89% 83%
Belgium 87% 83% 79%
Italy 82% 72% 78%28
Labour market participation by migrant status,
selected countries, 2014 - tertiary educated population
More low-qualified among non-EU born
29
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Less thanprimary, primary
and lowersecondaryeducation
Upper secondaryand post-
secondary non-tertiary education
Tertiary education
Native-born
Other EU-born
Non-EU-born
Population (15-64) by educational attainment level
and country of birth, 2016
Migrants feel to be over-qualified relative to natives
30
• … especially in Italy,
Greece, Austria,
Germany, Belgium,
Malta
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
ES
SK
CY
PO
PT
UK
MT
FR
CZ
SE FI
LT IT SI
EE
GR
LV
AT
HR
LU
BE
HU
DE
Natives First and second generation of migrants
Self-declared over-qualified employees
as a share of total employees, 2014,
Tertiary educated workers
School drop out rates are much higher for migrants than for natives, with the exception of the UK
31
Share of early leavers from education
or training aged 18-24
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
ES UK BE FR DE NL GR
Reporting country
EU-28 countries except reporting country
Non-EU countries
Student performance by family origin, 2015
32
• Even 2nd
generation
migrants tend to
underperform
relative to natives,
with the exception
of the UK, Portugal,
Hungary, Canada
• Especially poor
results: Belgium,
Austria, Iceland,
Slovakia
• Denmark and
France not good
either
350
400
450
500
550
Fin
lan
dC
an
ad
aG
erm
any
Ire
lan
dE
sto
nia
No
rwa
yN
ew
Ze
ala
nd
Sw
ed
en
Be
lgiu
mS
love
nia
Ne
the
rla
nd
sF
ran
ce
Sw
itze
rla
nd
De
nm
ark
US
UK
Austr
alia
Lu
xe
mb
ou
rgS
pain
Po
rtu
ga
lO
EC
D a
ve
rag
eA
ustr
iaIta
lyC
zech
R.
La
tvia
Ice
lan
dIs
rae
lG
ree
ce
Hu
ng
ary
Ch
ileS
lova
kia
Native
Second-Generation with an immigrant background
First-Generation students with an immigrant background
Reading literacy
Financial Inclusion of Refugees
33
From arrival to integration, refugees have very different financial needs
• Arrival: survival cash for immediate food and housing needs;
• Initial displacement: savings, remittances and paying for immediate service needs such as school fees or furniture;
• Stable/protracted displacement: broader options for savings beyond a bank deposit, micro-consumer credit, small business loans, health insurance, etc.;
• Permanent settlement: financial services needs start to resemble those of the host population, such as access to credit, pension schemes, business loans, remittance and payment accounts, etc.
34
Contradictory forces at work in relation to financial regulation and financial inclusion
• The continuing tightening of financial regulation and oversight of the financial sector (which is important in the fight against money-laundering and terrorist financing) works against the economic integration of refugees.
• Know your customer regulations (KYC): customer due diligence process that financial institutions have to do before they provide financial services
35
Bruegel survey on banks’ attitudes towards financial integration of refugees
• 14 responses from 9 countries: Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden.
1. Regulatory environment
2. Refugees as clients
3. New initiatives to foster financial inclusion
36
Has your national regulatory/supervisory authority issued guidelines regarding the offering of financial services to refugees in recent years?
37
Country Guideline issued
Austria Yes
Cyprus Yes
Estonia No
Germany Yes
Greece Yes/No
Italy No
Luxembourg Yes
Spain No
Sweden No
Note: the two Greek banks surveyed by us gave opposite answers.
• Only about half
of the countries
issued
guidelines to
help banks
accommodate
refugees
Restrictiveness of the ‘know your customer’ (KYC) regulations (percent of responses)
38
% responses
In your opinion, or that of your institution, do the ‘know your customer’ (KYC) regulations of your
country strike the right balance between the need for offering financial services to refugees and the
anti-money-laundering (AML) / counter-terrorist financing (CFT) goals?
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
All banks
Banks withrefugee clients
Banks withoutrefugee clients
• No bank assess
rules too loose
• Banks with
refugee clients
assess rule
more restrictive
than banks
without refugee
clients
Refugees as potential clients for financial instituions (percent of responses)
39
% responses
On a scale from 1 to 5, how interesting is the offering of financial services to refugees as a business
prospect for your institution?
• Moderate
business
interest in
offering
financial
services to
refugees
• Somewhat
larger by banks
that actually
have refugee
clients
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
All banks
Banks withrefugee clients
Banks withoutrefugee clients
Does your institution have specific financial products for refugees?
40
% responses
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Yes No
All banks
Banks withrefugeeclients
Bankswithoutrefugeeclients
Did your institution make active steps to approach refugee clients (for instance, visiting refugee settlement centres, printing flyers and brochures)?
41
% responses
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Yes No
All banks
Banks withrefugee clients
Banks withoutrefugee clients
New initiatives to foster financial inclusion 1
42
• Private sector initiatives
• Offer micro-credit and other specific products that refugees need to be able to get started, to support self-employed persons, to contribute job creation and to facilitate social integration
• Employ refugees short-term, thereby helping them to obtain their first work experience in the host country. Financial institutions could take the lead.
• Access to communications (mobile phone and internet access)
• Foster the private sector’s commitment to prevent the risk of exploitation at work
New initiatives to foster financial inclusion 2
43
• Public sector initiatives• Set-up of a national central registry of refugees
• Create a pan-European registry linked to national registries
• European ID issued to each refugee
• Public-private partnerships• Hold consultations between banks and regulators on how to tackle the
challenges faced by refugees and foster their financial inclusion.
• Common regulation on how to address refugee clients
• Provide trainings by private/public schools or professional training organisations, including language schools and financial literacy education
• Promote social inclusion via working activities, vocational training and cultural exchange by public-private partnerships, with the help of social cooperatives, social enterprises and associations
Policy recommendations
44
Policy recommendations, 1-3
1. Address anti-immigrant attitudes: public understanding of immigration is often far from reality, making it important to disseminate accurate information about various aspects of immigration.
2. Protect the EU’s borders and fight illegal immigration: while various measures have been introduced, 85-90 percent of the EU population would like to see additional measures.
3. Continue to build partnerships with neighbourhood countries, which can help to contain refugee and immigration inflows into the EU, facilitate the successful and safe return of ineligible migrants and provide information about eligible migrants.
45
Policy recommendations, 4-6
4. Provide additional funding for border protection, neighbourhood partnerships and immigrant integration: a small percent of the EU budget is spent on these areas, which we find insufficient given that immigration is a priority concern of citizens.
5. Ensure the consistent implementation of the EU’s asylum rules: the widely different rates of acceptance of asylum seekers in different EU countries suggest different implementation of the EU’s asylum rules. Clear guidelines are needed for the evaluation of asylum applications and their consistent implementation.
6. Address the very uneven distribution of refugees among EU countries: relocation of refugees from, and financial support to, heavily impacted countries is essential. Countries that resist accepting refugees for political and ideological reasons should make large enough financial contributions instead of being forced to accept refugees.
46
Policy recommendations, 7-9
7. Improve identification of refugees by issuing a European ID to each refugee and creating of a pan-European registry of refugees, linked to national central registries: such instruments, established with European financing, would greatly facilitate the identification and integration of refugees.
8. Learn from the best integration practices: only a few European countries can be regarded as successful in terms of integration of immigrants. Cooperation with the private sector and social partners should also play a role in improving integration systems.
9. Combat educational and spatial segregation: early childhood education, language and professional training for recently arrived immigrants, and better access to higher education for young and second-generation migrants, are essential for their integration and to limit spatial segregation.
47
Policy recommendations, 10-12
10. Ensure the EU strategy for integration is well articulated with national governments and other institutions: the EU’s 2016 action plan on the integration of third country nationals includes several useful initiatives which should be better implemented by member states;
11. Review financial regulation to promote the financial inclusion of refugees: regulation should strike a balance between the fight against money-laundering/financing of terrorism and the economic integration of refugees. At the minimum, all supervisory authorities should issue guidelines on financial inclusion of refugees.
12. Address labour shortages in EU member states by fostering labour force participation, increasing the pool of labour for the private sector through reduced public-sector employment, education and specific training programmes and overhauling the tax/social security contribution system to promote higher net wages, while keeping gross wage costs and fiscal revenues unchanged.
48