‘Peacebuilding’ in Afghanistan: A Bridge Too Far?

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Peacebuilding inAfghanistan: A Bridge TooFar?Isaac Kfir aa Schusterman Visiting Scholar, Maxwell Schoolof Citizenship / Institute for National Securityand Counterterrorism (INSCT), College of Law,Syracuse University , NY , USAPublished online: 03 Sep 2012.

To cite this article: Isaac Kfir (2012) Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: A Bridge TooFar? , Defence Studies, 12:2, 149-178, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2012.699721

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ARTICLE

Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: ABridge Too Far?1

I S AAC KF IR

The 9/11 attacks organized, led and sponsored by Al-Qaeda irrevocablyaltered human history as states and international organizations had tore-examine their approach to transnational terrorism. Consequently, theUnited Nations (UN) Security Council adopted resolutions condemn-ing the attack as well as permitting sovereign states to apply self-defensein fighting non-state actors.2 The North Atlantic Council reacted byinvoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty authorizing the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to support US efforts againstAl-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, an area far removed from theEuro-Atlantic Zone.3 Beyond altering perceptions, 9/11 had atremendous impact on Afghanistan, as not only was the internationalcommunity determined to forcefully deal with those responsible for theattacks, it was going to turn Afghanistan into a stable state that couldprovide basic human services security, education, health.4 This com-mitment was a product of a long discourse whereby the internationalcommunity held that when the state failed to provide basic services toits inhabitants, the international community may intervene - assume theresponsibility - to prevent a humanitarian disaster.

The definition of sovereignty should be broadened to includeresponsibility: a state can claim the prerogatives of sovereignty onlyso long as it carries out its internationally recognized responsibilitiesto provide protection and assistance to its citizens. Failure to do soshould legitimize the involvement of the international community.

Isaac Kfir, Visiting Professor, College of Law, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public

Affairs, Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT), Syracuse University,

NY, USA. Email: [email protected]

Defence Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, (June 2012), pp. 149178ISSN 1470-2436http://www.tandfonline.comhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2012.699721 2012 Taylor & Francis

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States that refuse access to populations at risk could expect calibratedactions ranging from diplomacy to political pressure, sanctions, and,as a last resort, military intervention.5

Between September 2001 and January 2002, the international commu-nity had two objectives concerning Afghanistan: first, capture and/or killthe Al-Qaeda members responsible for the 9/11 atrocities. Second,engage in the rebuilding of Afghanistan to ensure that Afghans wouldnot support the Taliban who had come to power promising security,order and peace.6 An added reason for the willingness to support theintervention was a tacit admission that the international communitybore some responsibility for the crisis as once the Soviets withdrew sodid the international community, leading the different mujahidin groups arguably Western creations to wreak havoc as they fought forsupremacy.7

Two key international meetings laid down the foundation of howthe international community intended to help Afghan reconstruction.The first held in Bonn in 2001, emphasized that the reconstruction pro-gram was to be Afghan-driven. The second meeting, which took place amonth later in Tokyo, outlined the financial commitment of donorcountries. Since those two seminal meetings, the international commu-nity has continued to meet to ensure that the reconstruction commit-ment remains multinational and relevant; at each meeting new targetsare outlined.8 The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan(UNAMA) has the responsibility for supervising, overseeing and coordi-nating the reconstruction process,9 though every year UNAMAs man-date changes, with more duties and responsibilities falling on itsshoulders.10 However, despite a huge commitment, peace, security andstability continues to evade Afghanistan, leading to disillusionmentamong Afghans and the international community.

The paper examines the peacebuilding efforts of the internationalcommunity in Afghanistan, raising the question of whether the opera-tion should continue, as the reconstruction effort appears to be floun-dering, despite if not because of UN involvement in the country. Inaddition, the paper raises the question of whether rebuildingAfghanistan is simply beyond the capabilities of the international com-munity by challenging the UN methodology of peacebuilding. Theanalysis opens with a review of how the international community wentfrom a philosophy that embraced the notion of keeping the peace toone in which it seeks to build the peace. The second section analyzeshow the international community approaches peacebuilding in

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Afghanistan. The focus is on security, reconstruction and reconciliation:the three pillars of the Bonn agreement. The third section explores thereasons why peacebuilding has failed in Afghanistan by looking at whatmakes Afghanistan a poor candidate for UN-type peacebuilding. Thepaper concludes with some preliminary suggestions on how to revampthe peacebuilding process in Afghanistan.

A Review of Peacebuilding

Before peacebuilding emerged, the international community operatingthrough the United Nations engaged in peacekeeping a form of inter-national intervention developed by Secretary-General Dag Hammar-skjld and Canadian diplomat Lester B. Pearson, often described astraditional peacekeeping, as it called for the deployment with theauthority of the Security Council and the consent of at least one of theparties accepting neutral peacekeepers to help ensure the maintenanceof peace following a the cessation of violence.11 Once deployed, theCouncil continues to monitor the situation and if it determines thatthere is a threat to international peace and security, it may expand themandate to undertake peace-enforcement operations, which meansimposing the peace.12

When the cold war ended, the United Nations embraced the notionof a New World Order as a way of maintaining international peaceand security.13 An important element in the way the UN approachedthe question of intervention is by focusing on humanitarian assistancebeyond providing emergency relief to man-made and natural disasters.The new approach to intervention encapsulates the promotion ofhuman rights, political reform and economic and social development.14

These operations allowed the UN as an organization and UN peace-keeping to expand their mandates and area of operations.15 ProfessorEdward Newmann has argued:

the role of the United Nations in post-conflict societies has gonebeyond peacekeeping, as a natural extension of the UN becomingmore involved in societal structure, moving away from the idea ofimpartiality/neutrality, and recognizing that there is an ethical dimen-sion to peace. The UN is now a conduit for the application of inter-national norms and standards of accountability in countries such asGuatemala, El Salvador, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone,and Cambodia.16

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The new approach to peacekeeping stemmed from the dominance ofthe liberal peace thesis,17 leading to the adoption of such UNdocuments as An Agenda for Peace, which Secretary-General BoutrosBoutros-Ghali published in 199218 recognizing the new challenge thatthe organization faced in lieu of its expanding mandate. Put simply, theUNs position in the post-Cold War period was that countries emergingfrom conflict posed a threat to international peace and security as con-flict could spill over, which would undermine peace and security.19 Inaddition, there was also a humanist duty to help people suffering fromthe violence.20 Thus, the UN approached complex peacekeeping opera-tion as involving sustained efforts to identify and support structures toconsolidate peace and create greater trust and well-being among peo-ples, without which no peace agreement is likely to endure for long.In 1993, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali declared:

U.N. operations now may involve nothing less than the reconstruc-tion of an entire society and state. This requires a comprehensiveapproach, over an extended period. Security is increasingly under-stood to involve social, economic, political, and cultural aspects farbeyond its traditional military dimension.21

Thus, as the world celebrated the end of history, the UN took the leadin engaging in complex peacekeeping operations that involved state-building (Mozambique and Cambodia), as well as in reconciliation andpeacemaking (the Chapultepec Accords in El Salvador).22 The chaos inSomalia, Cambodias descent into authoritarianism, Guatemalas deci-sion to adopt an amnesty program, not to mention prevarication overPresident Slobodan Milosevics ethnic cleansing campaign in the Bal-kans and the escalating costs of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations,reduced states willingness to support the new generation of peacekeep-ing, which allowed new actors to assume the lead in complex peaceoperations.23 Discussions as to how to expand the role of the UnitedNations in international relations continued, leading to major philo-sophical changes in thinking about international relations24 culminatingin the 2000 International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-eignty (ICISS), report, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which chal-lenged thw traditional interpretation of state sovereignty.25 R2Ppromoted the principle that the international community had the right if not the duty to intervene in the domestic affairs in cases of geno-cide and other international crimes (war crimes, ethnic cleansing andcrimes against humanity).26

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In sum, international intervention in the twentieth-century beganwith the development of the concept of UN peacekeeping, whichmeant that foreign forces could be placed on the territory of a sovereignstate, as long as the state permitted it. During this period (1950s to thelate 1980s) peacekeeping was a tool in helping maintain internationalpeace and security, as long as the conflict did not affect the greaterinternational community or affect the great powers. If the conflictbecame a major threat, the Council could choose to become more inti-mately involved threatening the belligerents with the use of force,which often compelled negotiations.27 If the threat worked, the Councilcould authorize the deployment of foreign troops operating as peace-keepers to prevent the conflict from reoccurring.28 Ultimately, the endof the Cold War led to an epistemological debate about the duty andresponsibility of states towards people, which over time translated to theadoption of a set of guidelines, ideals and declarations that reinterpretedstate sovereignty causing a major shift in peacekeeping. R2P embodiedthe approach through such documents as In Larger Freedoms and A MoreSecure World: Our Shared Responsibilities that held that states had funda-mental duties and obligations towards people, and should the state failthe international community could assume them until the state was ableto again take charge of these duties.29 From a peacekeeping perspective,there was also an added buoyancy and urgency in respect to the use andapplication of forcer.30 Consequently, the United Nations, through theDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations managed complex peace opera-tions in East Timor and Kosovo, with the purpose of making these ter-ritories into states that abide by international norms.31 In East Timorand Kosovo, the UN appointed Transitional Administrators that man-aged the UN operation (keeping the peace and building the peace) untilit felt that East Timor and Kosovo had the institutional capacity toassume responsibility.32

The UN and Afghanistan: Applying the Peacebuilding Paradigm

Having been involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-enforc-ing operations in the 1990s,33 the UN felt that peacebuilding, could takeplace in Afghanistan. The UNs approach was based on its previousexperiences in conflict and post-conflict environments where first thebelligerents stopped fighting (peacemaking) in respect to Afghanistan,this arguably occurred in Bonn, as various Afghan groups met andsigned an accord, leading to the adoption of a progressive constitution; ademocratic political system designed on liberal values and economic


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reforms. The Accords encouraged the international community to dis-patch, with the permission of Afghans, an international force to helpmaintain the peace in Afghanistan (peacekeeping). NATO was entrustedto lead the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which hadpeacekeeping but also having the power to impose the peace should vio-lence arise (peace-enforcing).34 The peacebuilding program was shapedat the Bonn meeting which Lakhdar Brahimi, an experienced UN dip-lomat, helped manage. He believed that the international communityhad to play a central role in the rebuilding process, but he also acknowl-edged that Afghans were ultimately responsible for what was to occur intheir country. He stated:

Neither the UN nor anyone else, no matter how sincere, may substi-tute themselves for the Afghans and solve the problems of Afghani-stan for them . . . If the Afghan authorities and their internationalpartners set realistic objectives; if the international community hasthe determination and patience to do what it takes to really help thesituation; if, at the same time, we have the humility to realize thatwe are no wiser than Afghans about what is better for Afghanistan,then there is every reason for optimism.35

The Security Pillar: What was Intended?

The international community recognized that insecurity in Afghanistanstemmed from the presence of provincial warlords, local powerbrokers,dissonance between Kabul and the countryside, and many other factorsthat had more to do with the nature of Afghanistan and its history thanexternal actors or the legacy of Afghanistans many wars. The focus wastherefore with human security, which meant that attention was withbuilding institutions: military, police and justice.36 The security sectorprogram37 is based on a three-pillar system involving US forces dedi-cated to capturing or killing senior Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders (Oper-ation Enduring Freedom); an ISAF force that works at promotingsecurity which has led to ISAF adapting some of the tactics used by theBritish in the Malay insurgency: running defensive, offensive and stabil-ization operations.38 The third pillar deals with helping Afghans developtheir own security institutions by developing a national army to replacethe local militias.39 This demands a strong focus on dismantling themilitias, demobilizing the fighters and reintegrating them into societythrough such programs as Partnership for Peace: Afghanistans NewBeginnings Program40).Ultimately, the security sector program was

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supposed to establish peace and security, both of which are seen as vitalwhen it comes to reconstruction, as without these two pillars, it isimpossible to build infrastructure, providing the conditions for a stableeconomy as well as basic services.

Reconstruction: Designing a Political, Economic and Social Program

Recognizing the importance of physical reconstruction the internationalcommunity has spent and continues to spend vast sums on programs tohelp Afghanistan move from being in a state of conflict to a post-con-flict state. This involves addressing what are seen as the root causes ofconflict: poverty, inequality, and lack of political and civil rights.41 Thus,Afghan reconstruction began by fixing the Afghan political system:making it more democratic, as well as establishing a neoliberal, capital-ist-oriented economy.42

The 2001 Bonn Accords signed by the four non-Taliban groups setout a timetable for the political reconstruction process. It began withthe formation of an Afghan Interim Authority (AIA, December 2001 toJune 2002), whose function was to choose a Loya Jirga (Grand Jirga, orAssembly) to draft the Afghan constitution that led to the establishmentof an Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA, June 2002 to December2003).43 The approach had two outcomes: first, Afghanistan adopted in2004 a neoliberal political structure that included a multiparty system, aNational Assembly comprising 351 members, 249 belong to the WolesiJirga (House of the People) and 102 to the Meshrano Jirga (House of theElders), as well as a constitution. Second, as the international commu-nity found the reforms acceptable, it ensured more aid for reconstruc-tion projects, especially as Afghans appeared supportive of the processby turning out to vote in 2004.44 This feeds into the neoliberal model,which sees multiparty elections and a liberal democratic system of gov-ernance as paramount in any reconstruction process.

An important element in the physical reconstruction program is theISAF-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which are composedof soldiers, diplomats and civilian experts (the military element is gener-ally dominant in the Afghan PRT45). The Afghan PRT model has athree-fold agenda: improve security to allow social and economic recon-struction programs to develop, extend the reach of the Kabul-basedAfghan government, and facilitate reconstruction in the provinces.46

Linked to the PRTs and their peacebuilding philosophy is the AfghanNational Development Strategy (ANDS), which reinforces the UN-style peacebuilding ideology.47 ANDS was officially launched in 2008, at


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Paris (Paris Declaration), with three pillars: security (achieve nationwidestabilization, law enforcement, and the personal security of Afghans);political (strengthening the democratic process and democratic institu-tions, human rights, the rule of law, delivery of public services andgovernment accountability); and social and economic (reduce poverty,promote sustainable development through private enterprise, make pro-gress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals).48 Thus,just as PRTs identify the need for civil-military relations, the NationalStrategy recognized the connection between the three pillars forexample, building a road will have the triple effect of helping establish alink between Kabul and the provinces; enhancing economic develop-ment and integration; and ending the isolation of a community, leadingto substantial investment in road construction.49

Reconciliation: Dealing with the Past

At the Bonn meeting the reconciliation process was the most difficultissue to discuss, as it raised many thorny problems for the participantsand the international community. Since 1978, Afghanistan has existed ina state of severe conflict during which time the laws of armed conflictwere widely ignored. By 2001, a common theme in post-conflict peace-building was to demand societies emerging from conflict to engage inreconciliation, which included prosecuting those accused of interna-tional crimes war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.50 InBonn, the problem was that the individuals responsible for many inter-national crimes were the ones deemed essential for the reconstructionand security of Afghanistan, leading Professor Barnett R. Rubin, one ofLakhdar Brahimis advisers, to observe, the voices calling for account-ability for past abuses have been relatively weak and few.51 ProfessorThomas Barfield explains the lack of interest in reconciliation by stating,Compassion in a country of blood feuds is not exactly well developed,particularly in a society where it is what you did to somebody, not thereason that you did it that is most important.52 In addition, the donorstates were disinclined to demand reconciliation as they did not wantknowledge of their own activities in Afghanistan, as well as being con-cerned that such a process would derail the Bonn arrangements as indi-viduals accused of human rights violations, if threatened withprosecution, would revert to warlordism or simply opt out of workingwith the government. This would undermine the campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as reconstruction.53 Consequently, Bonnonly made vague references to the need for reconciliation.

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In summary, when looking at security, reconstruction and reconcilia-tion, the aim of the international community was clear, end Afghanistansinsecurity by working with Afghans on establishing security, physicalreconstruction and ignore reconciliation.

Understanding the Reasons behind the Peacebuilding FailuresFailure of the Security Pillar Identity and Islam

Establishing security without addressing the underlying causes ofAfghan insecurity meant that ISAF faced a huge challenge even before itbegan its operations. There are many issues affecting this pillar, but thesection will only focus on Islam and ethnic identification, which lie atthe epicenter of Afghan society.54 It is important to note that Afghani-stan was experiencing major changes prior to the Soviet invasion. KingZahir Shahs economic reform designed to modernize Afghanistanplaced the younger generations at odds with their elders with thereforms undermining the traditional Afghan family unit. Young menbecame more independent while the older generation became almostsuperfluous and in danger of losing their honored position in the familyas they could no longer contribute economically. Professor LouisDupree identified this change, pointing out that when a three-genera-tion family moved to the city in search of a better future, the traditionalfabric of the family was challenged as the grandparent usually findsitself with no role.55

The actors involved in post-Taliban Afghanistan sought to respectAfghan religious and ethnic sensibilities but also strengthen Afghannational and Islamic identity. However, these two pillars of Afghan soci-ety had irrevocably changed during Afghanistans numerous wars, withIslam and identity becoming more dogmatic and prominent. From anAfghan perspective, the war against the Soviets ensured that the assaulton Afghan traditional society continued, as the war enabled a new classof maliks - white beards (maliks were village elders that manger theirrespective community) to emerge. One type of malik was the self-mademalik individuals that returned whether to the refugee camps or toAfghanistan from Iran or the Gulf States with knowledge of how towork with government and government officials. These maliks hadmoney enabling them to assume positions of power in Afghan society,even if unmerited. The mujahidin were the second new maliks as theywere seen as great warriors and defenders of the Afghan people, whilethe traditional maliks lived in the refugee camps.56


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A second important consequence of the war against the Soviets wasthat it altered the way Afghans practised Islam and their approach toIslam. Sir Martin Ewands, a former British diplomat with experience inthe region has noted that in 1980, Pakistan recognized seven mujahed-een groups, all of which embraced Sunni Islam: four were Islamist andthree traditionalists, with the Islamists being more radical in theiroutlook and usage of Islamic principles in defining their agenda (the tra-ditionalists saw the war against the Soviets as a war of national libera-tion). The groups had an ethnic element, as seen with GulbuddinHekmatyars Hezb-i-Islami, which was a Ghilzai Pashtun movementwhereas Burhanuddin Rabbanis Jamiat-i-Islami was mainly Tajik.57 Thedevelopment of the mujahidin groups was closely linked to the refugeecamps in Pakistan,58 to which millions of Afghans escaped. Thesebecame a hotbed for Islamic radicalism as the Pakistani governmentencouraged Islamist movements from across the world to penetrate thecamps and preach a militarized version of Islam, which encouragedAfghans to abandon the Hanafi School fors the Hanbali School (specifi-cally the Wahhabi and Deobandi traditions).59 Put simply, the youngmen, many of whom were Pashtuns, were fed a diet of poverty, hard-ship, dogmatic Islam and Afghan nationalism that encouraged them tomove away from a conservative and pragmatic Islam characterized bycooperation to religious zealotry that viewed the world through the twolenses of Dar ul-Harb (House of War) and Dar ul-Islam (House ofIslam).60 This afforded them only two options: jihad, or living in anun-Islamic society, seen by many as worse than death. With these twoelements in mind, these young fighters became a powerful force that inthe post-Soviet period tore the country apart and created conditionssuch that Afghanis saw the Taliban as saviors. Graeme Smith saw thelegacy of the Afghan Jihad and civil war when he conducted a survey inKandahar in 2007, for which Taliban commanders were interviewed.When a young Taliban fighter was asked whether it was the killing ofthree of his family members by an air strike that propelled him to jointhe movement, the young man replied, I would never fight to takerevenge for my family or something else. I am fighting only to removethe non-Muslims from my country because they are here to destroyour religion.61 Such a statement illustrates the change in outlook asprior to the Afghan Jihad the killing of family members62 would haverequired vengeance, but in the post-Afghan Jihad period the commit-ment of the young is to religion.63

A second reason for ISAFs failure to establish security stems fromits mandate, which emphasizes how little understanding there was of

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Afghan identity and society and how they clash with the neoliberal ide-als of peacebuilding.64 This began at Bonn when the international com-munity helped polarize Afghans by empowering ethnic groups at theexpense of others, as seen by the decision to work with the Pashtunsthrough Hamid Karzai even though the real power players on theground were members of the Northern Alliance (especially the Tajikelement) and members of the Shura-i-Naza.65 A second mistake madeby the international community was to allow the integration of thewarlords into the security mechanism, which has ensured that thesecurity sector would be rife with discord and tension. In 2001, Afghan-istan had no effective government or legitimate opposition beyond thenefarious Northern Alliance, which is why money and support weregiven to people seen to be able to influence policy.66 Thus, in Novem-ber 2001 the US provided Pacha Khan Zardran, a local militia com-mander in Patkia province, with $400,000 to train and equip fighters topatrol the border. However, when Kabul installed a governor that wasmore to its liking, Padsha Khan Zadran moved to the mountains andbegan shelling the civilian areas to destabilize the new governor. JasonBurke and Peter Beaumont write that due to this policy

Many Afghans in Khost blame the rising tension on the US. Payingthe warlords for their services has triggered clashes among groupseager to win patronage from the Americans. In some areas com-manders have been told they will receive a top-of-the-range $40,000pick-up truck a local status symbol if they can prove they havekilled Taliban or al-Qaeda elements.67

The case of Mohammad Qasim Fahim, the Afghan Defense Minister in2002 is a good example in emphasizing how ethnicity controls govern-ment bureaucracy, as Fahim when he was minister made variousappointments based on ethnicity. He appointed Bismillah KhanMohammadi, a Tajik and member of the Panjshir militia Shura-i-Nezar(Coordination Council) as deputy defense minister. By 2004, Fahimwas out of the Ministry, but he was still able to exert influence withinthe Ministry because his appointees blocked many of the decisions takenby the new minister, Rahim Wardak, a Pashtun.68 What is even moreworrying is that, according to an unofficial survey carried out in cooper-ation with ANA generals, Bismillah Khan when he served as Chief ofStaff of the Army could rely on the loyalty of only about six out of 11brigade commanders and 12 out of 46 battalion commanders. Giustozziwrites:


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There is still a tendency perhaps even a growing one among offi-cers to distrust colleagues who come from a different ethnic back-ground. Although few would admit to the existence of an ethnicbias, political alignments are usually determined along those lines.This is the result of the existence of rival patronage networks insidethe army, who tend to recruit on ethnic or regional bases.69

The clearest manifestation of identity politics and its centrality inAfghan society appeared in the 2009 presidential and provincial elec-tions as well as the 2010 parliamentary elections, in which ethnicidentities were crucial. In 2009, Hamid Karzai chose as his vice-presi-dent Mohammad Qasim Fahim, a Tajik, despite tremendous domesticand foreign opposition due to Fahims role during the Afghan Jihadand afterward. Brad Adams, Asia Director of Human Rights Watch,claimed that:

To see Fahim in government would be a terrible step backwards forAfghanistan ... He is one of the most notorious warlords in the coun-try, with the blood of many Afghans on his hands from the civil war.He is widely believed by many Afghans to be still involved in manyillegal activities, including running armed militias, as well as givingcover to criminal gangs and drug traffickers. The people of Afghani-stan deserve better leadership. The president is insulting the countrywith this choice.70

Ultimately, when looking at Islam and ethnic identity, the moderniza-tion period and the Afghan Jihad empowered the younger generationsat the expense of the older ones. Currently, the program of the interna-tional community seems designed to provoke a re-emergence of tradi-tional types of leadership and organization, as seen with theproliferation of jirgas (Pashtun) and shuras (non-Pashtun). These aredeemed to be effective tools in administering local communities, resolv-ing conflicts and easing tensions, without really appreciating that theindividuals that run them are individuals that rose during Afghanistansworse years and had rejected the traditional norms as many had adoptedradical views on ethnicity and Islam. Thus, the appearance of the arbakai(the term refers to militia forces, but the correct translation is messen-ger71) is a case in point. The arbakai are local and reflect local identitiesand interests but relying on them means working against the campaignto establish a national police and military force, as they compete withthe security services military and police.72 The arbakai are a

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consequence of the increasing ethnicization of Afghanistan and the fail-ure of DDR, encouraging young Afghan men to join local militias someof which are no better than criminal gangs.

Reconstruction: Nurturing a Defunct Political System and its Consequences

The reconstruction effort political, economic and social has beenunsuccessful for many reasons, some endogenous and some exogenous.In determining why, a bit of selectivity is called for, as one cannotaddress all of the issues. Looking at the domestic front, a core aspect ofBonn and the succeeding meetings was the determination to placeAfghans at the center of the reconstruction process, so that it would notappear as if the international community was imposing its ideals on awar-torn community as well as holding to the belief that Afghans knowwhat their country needed. These two elements are sound epistemologi-cally, as effective reconstruction is not possible when those engaging init are perceived as enemies. Realistically, however, the approach hadmany shortcomings, which became clear as the reconstruction processdeveloped.

The Shortcomings of the Afghan Constitution and the Electoral System

A major problem that emerged during the reconstruction was theAfghan constitution. The international community failed to realize thatby 2001 Afghanistan was more fragmented than it had ever been, andyet the constitution and the political system that had been designedfor the country, as well as the aid that was going to be funneled intoit, was very Kabul-centric. The international community instead ofdesigning a political system that acknowledged a strong periphery anda weak centre, the international community opted for a system thatgreatly empowered the centre at the expense of the periphery.73 Theinternational community appeared to address the centre-prepihery ten-sion by creating the illiusion that power from Kabul is devolved, asArticle 137 of the Constitution requires the Afghan central govern-ment to transfer necessary powers . . . to local administrations in orderto accelerate and improve economic, social as well as cultural mat-ters. . . However, because the President has the authority to appointgovernors, rarely do the governors work against him,74 particularly assome of them are his relatives and/or his political allies. Put simply,the 2004 constitution ensured that post-Taliban Afghanistan has a cen-tralized, Kabul-centric system even though Afghanistan is a country


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where most of the people live in the countryside and feel nothing butantipathy and loathing toward Kabul, which they see as corrupt anddecadent.75 Declan Walsh the foreign correspondent for Pakistan andAfghanistan for The Guardian, points to Ghulam Hazrat, a typicalfarmer in Kamah, Nangarhar Province. Hazrat decided to return togrowing poppies because of the lack of support from Kabul. Walshquotes Hazrat as saying, When Karzai helps me then I will go for hisjihad. What does he know about my problems?76

The parliamentary electoral system, as opposed to the one used toelect the president (according to Article 61 of the constitution, thepresident is elected by absolute majority vote in a two-round process),is the rarely used Single Non-transferable Vote (SNTV). The SNTVis only used in Jordan, Vanuatu and the Pitcairn Islands. Under thissystem to which the constitution makes no explicit reference77 Afghans vote for individual candidates rather than political parties,with each province electing a set number of members, some of whommust be women (Articles 82109). This means that in a district thathas been allotted four seats, the four candidates with the most voteswill go to the Wolesi Jirga. However, this also means that should onecandidate carry 90 per cent of the vote and three others share 3 percent of the vote between them, all four will be elected because theyhad more votes than other candidates.78 Thus, Afghanistan has apoorly constructed electoral system that does not cater for the needsof the Afghan people nor takes into consideration the nature of theAfghan state, leading Andrew Reynolds to write that in September2004, he and Andrew Wilder, the Director of the Kabul-based AfghanResearch and Evaluation Unit (AREU), identified the following disad-vantages with SNTV: (1) The system will not improve relationsbetween voters and their representatives, especially in large districts;(2) It does not strengthen political parties, which arguably are impor-tant in establishing a stable political system; (3) It is not very clear,encouraging a plurality of candidates, especially in large districts; (4) Itgives an advantage to those already in power and does not encouragenew candidates, who will lack political capital in the assembly.79 Inshort, the electoral system has helped to promote fragmentation aswell as disillusionment, not to mention rampant corruption. AndrewReynolds declares:

By and large, the SNTV electoral system based on large districts didjust what experts had predicted that it would do: It decreased turnoutby confusing voters, it created a fragmented legislature largely

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unrepresentative of the votes cast, and it diminished the prospects forlegislative-executive cooperation.80

The Effect of International Assistance and its Impact on the Population

In terms of reconstruction aid, there has been a substantial disparitybetween what had been promised and what has been given, as well as in theways the aid has been used,81 with those connected to the powerbrokersable to obtain huge benefits. A common occurrence is the consistentinflation of the cost of projects, leading to corruption and lack of trust inthe state as government officials often abuse their positions. According toan Afghan official, projects are budgeted through a four-stage process dur-ing which money is skimmed off at each level, beginning with the contrac-tors that bid for the project, followed by the granting of permits, theconstruction project itself, and ending with the ribbon-cutting ceremony.82

In this respect, the international community is culpable, as it provided aidand assistance with little accountability. US Special Inspector-GeneralArnold Field declared that his offices examination of US reconstructionaid to Afghanistan found that between 2007 and 2009, the US providedapproximately $18 billion in reconstruction aid to 7,000 contractors. Yet,despite this vast sum, Arnold said, we dont even know who were givingmoney to.83 Braithwaite, a former British ambassador in Moscow from1988-1992, writes after a visit to Afghanistan in September 2008 that inter-national efforts are not reaching the ordinary people or because the pro-grams are more symbolic than useful. He cites the decision of the Britishgovernment to deliver a 200-ton turbine to Kajaki Dam, Helmand Prov-ince, involving 5,000 troops as a pointless exercise, since they [British]now have to bring up the cement on which to build the base for the tur-bines, and if that succeeds they [British] have to build and protect powerlines through Taliban territory.84

Third, the reconstruction effort is severely undermined by the lackof an effective centralized taxation system,85 making Afghanistan heavilyreliant on the international community or on various agreements withlocal powerbrokers, whether legitimate or not, to provide it with funds.An Afghan central government that is either dependent on foreignmoney or on state-owned minerals will never feel the need to beaccountable to its people.86 In 2007, for example, 70 per cent of theAfghan revenue system came from customs duties, fixed taxes onimports/exports and administrative fees while domestic taxes accountedfor only 13 per cent.87 The World Bank has been working towardsimproving Afghan revenue collection, but the embryonic tax system is


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undermined by a lack of identification with the Afghan state, seen bymany as corrupt, which discourages Afghans from paying taxes (at leastthose who could, as most Afghans live in poverty).

Reconciliation: Failing to Achieve Respect for Basic Human Rights

The reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan have failed mainly because ofthe contradiction that lay at the heart of the Bonn process. WhileBrahimi on the one hand recognized the horrors that Afghans had suf-fered, mainly at the hands of their brethren, he also argued the chancesfor peace will only increase with the inclusion of a wider cross-sectionof Afghan political leadership than was present at Bonn or present inthe process now.88 Gross human rights violators have been able to con-tinue to hold positions of power in Kabul and in the provinces becausethe Afghan government lacks the ability to effectively control the coun-try making it reliant on such individuals for its survival. Realpolitikrules the day in Afghanistan, which is why in 2004 an immunity billprotecting members of parliament from prosecution for wrongdoingthey may have committed prior to 2004 was passed.89 This was despitethe fact that in a study conducted by the Afghan Independent HumanRights Commission (AIHRC), a common theme expressed by manyAfghans was that Afghanistan needs reconciliation as well as the prose-cution of individuals responsible for crimes committed during Afghani-stans decades of violence. What is even more surprising about theAIHRC study is the support that many people seem to express forreconciliation and prosecution in a country not known for suchmeasures.90

A second issue hindering the development of reconciliation inAfghanistan, whether in the shape of restorative or retributive justice, isthe dilapidated and corrupt judicial system, which increasingly assumesmany of the features corruption, politicization, financially poor, a leg-acy of manipulation that undermined the branch in the pre-Sovietdays.91 Frank Ledwidge, a barrister and a Justice Advisor to the BritishPRT in Helmand, argues that one of the reasons why people at timesrevert to customary/tribal and/or sharia law to resolve their differencesis because justice is provided quickly and at less cost.92 As the judicialsystem was being designed it came under Italian leadership, with theaim being that the criminal justice system would project neoliberalideals. Unfortunately, there was little recognition of the existence ofcompeting legal systems Islamic and customary/tribal as well as thelack of trained lawyers and judges not to mention a weak investigatory

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system. This made it next to impossible to task the system with moreduties and obligations, which reconciliation would demand. Comment-ing on shortcomings of the system, Astri Sukrke and Kaja Borchgrevinkwrite, The Italian expert, who drafted a law closely patterned on theItalian code, failed to consult with Afghan officials, who stronglyresented the exclusion; they asked President Hamid Karzai not to signthe draft. The Italian government nevertheless stood by its expert andthreatened to withdraw funding for related projects unless the draft wasapproved.93 Thus, the problems with the system become clear whenone looks at the criminal procedure, which reflects the Italian modelrather than an Afghan one, which is why one commentator with first-hand knowledge of Helmand Province notes that:

the formal system in Helmand is what might be termed a legal fic-tion. Throughout huge swathes of this province it simply does notapply at all. Over a period of four years, the Provincial Court con-victed only 75 persons for serious crimes. Several of these werereleased in any event on the payment of bribes for recommenda-tions. For a population of nearly a million either this represents anextraordinarily low rate of commission of serious crimes or the for-mal system is missing something.94

A third fundamental reason for the failure of a reconciliation programstems from the inconsistency of the international community which,while preaching about human rights and the need to abide by those val-ues, has also chosen to work with the same perpetrators of internationalcrimes. Afghans scorn this hypocrisy, making them more suspicious ofthe international community and its initiatives. Afghans realize that ifthe international community recognizes the importance of these men,ordinary Afghans are not in a position to challenge them; this ensuresthat those who have committed international crimes remain free to runAfghanistan. Thomas Barfield emphasizes this point very clearly:

one great fear I have is with international NGOs coming in; they willwant to see the government make public political statements aboutcontroversial issues to please their audiences in the West. They wantto see all international norms recognized and implemented withoutdelay. This might be a very hard sell in some areas that theinternational community is unaware of. So thats where my concernis in terms of the consequences of assuming that Western orinternational values provide the basis for government policy in


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Afghanistan without appreciating how these policies are likely to bereceived by the people there. Why should this cause a problem?Because the agendas of the people giving the advice are probably dif-ferent from those of the Afghans.95

Moving Forward Sometimes Means Stepping Back

Fixing Afghanistan in the immediate or even the medium term maybe a bridge too far for the international community, especially at a timewhen the world is experiencing its greatest economic and politicalupheaval in decades. When looking back at previous peacebuilding ini-tiatives, clearly the international community suffers from attention defi-cit disorder, as with every passing year states commitment toAfghanistan diminishes, as they realize the magnitude of the problem,which is why the mantra appears to be local ownership turning mat-ters to Afghan hands whether they are ready or not.96 Conversely, asstates disengage, the UNs responsibility increases, with UNAMAreceiving more duties and responsibilities, though the resolutions con-tinue to be vague as to what exactly the Council wants achieved beyond Afghan reconstruction and stability. The shift in attitude alsoexplains why donor countries appear willing to talk with moderateTaliban, a polysemous term at best in 2011. Consequently, there aremany different approaches with respect to fixing Afghanistan, rangingfrom the utopian (the redrafting of Afghanistans borders to fit with itsethnic composition) to more practical ones such as recognizing theshortcomings of Bonn and the subsequent meetings, which would leadto changing the peacebuilding agenda.

The first necessary change is an epistemological one, by abandoningthe idea that the international community can rebuild the country usingthe neoliberal template. Peacebuilding in Afghanistan has to follow amodel more attuned to Afghanistans history, culture and religious sys-tems and evolution.97 This means that instead of working through thecenter which was what occurred in Cambodia, Kosovo and EastTimor more attention must be with the villages, towns and provinces.The international community instead of strengthening local communi-ties has allowed Hamid Karzai to devise ways to expand presidentialcontrol over local communities,98 which alienated them even furtherespecially as it is at the local level that the real effects of corruption andmalfeasance are felt. A good example of the failure to appreciate thenegative effect of the Kabul government on local communities was the

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formation in 2007 of an Independent Directorate of Local Governance(IDLG), designed to ensure the selection of capable provincial anddistrict governors, as well as local police chiefs and other local officials.The IDLG in effect has taken power from the Ministry of the Interiorand given it to the President, as the presidency now has a say in choos-ing local officials.99 This also emphasizes the oddity of Afghanistanwhereby a Directorate can undermine a Ministry. In addition, the chairof the IDLG is Jelani Popal, a member of Karzais Popolzai clan.100

Focusing on a bottom-up approach that strives to encourage localempowerment is an established principle in the field of reconstructionand is very important in Afghanistan, especially as Afghans habituallyharbor animosity towards their government. Ambassador Braithwaiterecalls a conversation with a young man who was discreetly dismissiveof Karzai, seeing the president as a puppet of the foreigners.101 In thisregard, the National Solidarity Program (NSP) has potential because itseeks to strengthen local government by empowering it through locallyelected councils as well as establishing the conditions for communitymanaged sub-projects.102 NSP is undermined by corruption as well aslack of funds, which prevents it from fulfilling its goals, which meansthat in time it will either foster resentment or it will be disbanded.

A desperately needed second reform is for the international com-munity to change its philosophical outlook on identity and ethnicitywhen engaging in peacebuilding. In the liberal West, multiculturalismmay be lauded and encouraged, but it has come after centuries ofintolerance and violence. It is important to understand that these con-cepts mean different things in Afghanistan, which is heterogeneous.Although there appears to be little desire to break up the Afghan state,the groups work with one another when it serves their purpose. Thequandary is how to enable a strong emphasis on localism and regional-ism within the framework of a national Afghan state.103 Recognizingthis paradox is the first step in developing a comprehensive peace-building program that appreciates Afghanistans inherent contradictions,which may mean that programs could be acceptable in one region butnot in another. Although it is impossible to confederate Afghanistan,what is possible is a moderate and uneven approach to peacebuilding,which, for example, has a strong focus on broad education in oneregion, while in another the education policy will need to be morelimited and designed to work with conservative clerics. This may upsetforeign human rights and gender NGOs, yet is reflective of Afghanrealities, but changing perception based on a generation of ideas takesa long time.


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A third reform with respect to peacebuilding in Afghanistan is toreduce the international military presence in Afghanistan to help fostersecurity. This commitment towards troop reduction must remain evenif the security situation deteriorates, as although the Afghan Army andthe Afghan police force are far from ready to assume their respectiveresponsibilities, they must learn to shoulder that duty. Waiting until2014 is simply dangerous, as with every passing day the internationalforce in Afghanistan is seen more and more as an occupying force, andinstead of fostering security, it accomplishes the exact opposite it feedsthe insurgency.104 In addition to the troop withdrawal, it would be pru-dent to have a debate on redeployment with a return to the light foot-print approach in which there is a greater reliance on Special Forces.105

This demands a rethink with respect to the drone campaign as eventhough some argue that Al-Qaeda continues to pose a threat, the use ofdrones has proven to be counterproductive owing to the heavy casualtiesamong Afghan civilians. This does not mean an end to their use, butthe Obama administration must adopt a strategy that calls for drones tobe the very, very last option and only against very senior targets. Thisreassessment must also include the drone policy in Pakistan, as reducingcasualty levels in one country will have no effect if they are not reducedin the other because of the cross border family relations.

A fourth issue is the ability of the Afghan government and theAfghan people to become self-sufficient, as until Afghanistan develops aviable tax system and brings to an end the rampant corruption thatundermines the process, the country will not progress. What is more,taxation is not only about financing the state and its security; it is also ameasure of the trust that people have in their state, as people are morewilling to part with their money if they believe that the state will pro-vide them with services. Scandals such as the Kabul Bank,106 not tomention the presidential and parliamentary elections, only emphasizethat Afghanistans ruling elite are not accountable. Moreover, eventhough President Karzai is repeatedly threatened by donors over corrup-tion, nothing of substance ever comes of the threat.107 The internationalcommunity has made the situation worse by supporting such policies asthe Social Outreach Program that aim at developing and enhancing rela-tions between the tribes and Kabul through the payment of a small sum(approximately $200 per month) to tribal leaders as a way of persuadingthem to inform on Taliban movements. The ramifications of this pro-gram could be extensive in that it could contribute to the polarizationof Afghan society for short-term gains (i.e. to the perception thatsecurity has improved when in reality the system does not focus on the

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conditions that caused the insecurity). The Iraqi experience of theAwakening movement has shown that paying Iraqis to fight an insur-gency rarely works, and in fact leaves a legacy of bitterness andhatred.108 The only way to defeat an insurgency and help Afghanistandevelop is for the international community to rely more on local sup-port rather than on the central government in Kabul.109 To put it sim-ply: Until Afghans themselves decide to get rid of the insurgents, noamount of money will be enough. Security, reconstruction and recon-ciliation must lie in the hands of Afghans, as no matter how much goodwill the international community has towards Afghanistan, the reality isthat whereas in 2001 the international community could have been thesolution to Afghanistans many woes, by 2010 it had become part of theproblem.

Undoubtedly the international peacebuilding campaign in Afghani-stan was motivated by self-interest (making Afghanistan secure andstable was essential to international security110), as well as a desire tohelp Afghans progress beyond the incessant insecurity, violence andconflict that has cost the lives of over a million Afghans and leftcountless others traumatized. However, despite its good intentions, theinternational community has made some gigantic mistakes that haveprevented Afghans from moving forward. If it is to put Afghanistan onthe path towards successful post-conflict reconstruction, the interna-tional community must first begin by acknowledging its culpability forAfghanistans current woes, and re-engage in political reconstruction todevise a system more suitable for Afghans and Afghanistan. For theirpart, Afghans must appreciate that the international community musthave the right to pursue those seeking to undermine peace and security,even if they are within Afghanistans national borders. It is only by pro-gressing slowly and appreciating the limitations of peacebuilding thatAfghanistan can hope to experience real peace.

NOTES

1 I wish to thank Professor William Banks, director of the Institute for National Securityand Counterterrorism (INSCT), Syracuse University, Ms. Shani Ross, Research Fellowat INSCT and Ms Bonnie Nusser for all of their useful comments, advice and observa-tions.

2 Security Council resolution 1368, 12 Sept. 2001. See also the NAC press statement theday after 9/11. Statement by the North Atlantic Council, NATO Press Release (2001)124, 12 Sept. 2001 .

3 NATO was created to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the WarsawPact. It was designed to be a defensive alliance for the Euro-Atlantic zone.


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4 On human security see for example United Nations Development Program, NewDimensions of Human Security (New York: OUP 1994); Gary King and ChristopherL. Murray, Rethinking Human Security, Political Science Quarterly 116/4 (20012002)pp.585610.

5 Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, Exodus within Borders: The Uprooted WhoNever Left Home, Foreign Affairs 77/4 (1998) p.14; Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sov-ereignty, The Economist, 18 Sept. 1999; Ronald Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits ofLiberal Internationalism, International Security 22/ 2 (1997) pp.5489.

6 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishmentof Permanent Government Institutions The 2006 Afghanistan Compact makes clear thispoint, as in the Preamble the Compact states that Afghanistan and the international com-munity are determined to strengthen their partnership not only because it wouldimprove the lives of ordinary Afghans but also because it would contribute to national,regional and global peace and security. The Afghanistan Compact, The London Confer-ence on Afghanistan, 31 Jan. 31 1 Feb., 2006. .

7 Nick B. Mills, Karzai: The Failing American Intervention and the Struggle for Afghanistan(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 2007); Stephen M. Walt, Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping USForeign Policy, International Security 26/3 (20012002) p.62. Thomas Barfield recountsbeing in Peshawar in the early 1990s where he met the Afghan shadow minister for agri-culture. The man gave Barfield a card that stated Jihad Engineering We Specialize inReconstruction. Barfield claims that these mujahidin fighters believed that with theSoviet exit, the Najibullah regime would collapse and the US and the West would helpAfghans rebuild their state. Thomas J. Barfield, On Local Justice and Culture in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, Connecticut Journal of International Law 17/3 (2002) p.438.

8 This becomes very clear when reading Annex I to the Afghan Compact. The Afghani-stan Compact, The London Conference on Afghanistan (note 6)

9 Security Council resolution 1401 Calls upon all Afghan parties to cooperate withUNAMA in the implementation of its mandate and to ensure the security and freedomof movement of its staff throughout the country. The Council also requested the Inter-national Security Assistance Force, in implementing its mandate in accordance with reso-lution 1386 (2001), to continue to work in close consultation with the Secretary-Generaland his Special Representative. Security Council resolution 1401, 28 March 2002.

10 Since 2001, the Security Council has expanded UNAMAs authority so that it acts as themeeting point for the international assistance program, as well as working to strengthencooperation between the ISAF and the Afghan government (Security Council resolution1806 (2008)). UNAMA also supported the election processes (Security Council resolu-tion 1910 (2010)). For more on UNAMA duties see, Security Council resolution 1386,20Dec. 2001; Security Council resolution 1413, 23 May 2002; Security Council resolu-tion 1444, 27 Nov. 2002; Security Council resolution 1510, 13 Oct. 2003; SecurityCouncil resolution 1563, 17 Sept. 2004; Security Council resolution 1623, 13 Sept. 2005;Security Council resolution 1707, 12 Sept. 2006; Security Council resolution 1776, 19Sept. 2007; Security Council resolution 1833, 22 Sept. 2008; Security Council resolution1890, 8 Oct. 2009; Security Council resolution 1917, 22 March 2010; Security Councilresolution 1943, 10 Oct. 2010.

11 The Summary Study concludes that as the arrangements for the establishment, imple-mentation and deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) do not fallunder Chapter VII it follows from international law and the Charter that the UnitedNations cannot undertake to implement them by stationing units on the territory of aMember State without the consent of the Government concerned. Summary study ofthe experience derived from the establishment and operation of UNEF, Report of theSecretary-General, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 155, Doc. A/3943.

12 In the 1990s as the Balkans were imploding the Council controversially authorized mili-tary action peace enforcement against Serbia due to its inhuman actions in Kosovo.

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Christopher Greenwood, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49/4 (2000) pp.926934; Javier Solana, NATOs Success in Kosovo, Foreign Affairs 78/6 (1999) pp.114120; Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, TheAmerican Journal of International Law 93/4 (1999) pp.8248; Marrack Goulding, TheEvolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, International Affairs 69/ 3 (1993) pp.45164.

13 On how the US interpreted the concept of a new world order see George H. W. BushAddress before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 29 Jan.1991.

14 Professor Antonio Donini, the former Director of the UN Office for the Coordinationof Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (19992002), sums up the change in the fieldof humanitarianism as follows: In the past, humanitarian action was at the margins ofinternational action: it occupied a small, narrow place in conflict situations providingsecurity and protection to civilians in extremis, mostly in refugee situations outside areasof conflict. Now, humanitarian action and personnel are at the centre of the internationalcommunitys response to crisis and attract high media visibility. Antonio Donini, LocalPerceptions of Assistance in Afghanistan, International Peacekeeping 14/1 (2007) p.160;Michael Barnett, Humanitarianism Transformed, Perspective on Politics 3/4 (2005)p.723; David Chandler, The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the HumanRights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda, Human Rights Quarterly 23/3(2001) pp.678700.

15 Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism (note 5); Ronald Paris, AtWars End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: CUP 2004).

16 Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping(note 12).17 Edward Newman, Transitional Justice: The Impact of Transnational Norms and the

UN, International Peacekeeping 9/2 (2002) p.31.18 Roger Mac Ginty describes the liberal peace thesis as internationally-sponsored peace-

support and reconstruction interventions . . . marked by its increasingly formulaic, topdown and ethnocentric nature. Roger Mac Ginty, Reconstructing Post-War Lebanon: aChallenge to the Liberal Peace? Conflict, Security & Development 7/3 (Oct. 2007) p.457.

19 Law 25/1 (1993) pp.11322; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York:United Nations Publication 1995); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Democracy: A Newly Rec-ognized Imperative, Global Governance 1/1 (1995) pp.311; Boutros Boutros-Ghali,Global Leadership after the Cold War, Foreign Affairs 75/2 (1996); Jeffrey Haynes,Democracy in the Developing World: Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East (Cam-bridge: Polity Press, 2001); Jeffrey Haynes, Third World Politics: A Concise Introduction(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1996); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democrati-zation in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma 1991); Francis Fukuy-ama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books 1992).

20 Boutros-Ghali stated that the goal of the UN in this situation was to forestall a re-emer-gence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities. Boutros-Ghali, Beyond Peacekeeping(note 19) p. 120.

21 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (note 19); Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, MadaleneODonnell and Laura Sitea, Peacebuilding: What is in a Name? Global Governance 13/1(Jan.March (2007) pp.3558; Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Pre-vent, Foreign Affairs 83/1 (2004) pp.13650.

22 Boutros-Ghali, Beyond Peacekeeping (note 19)p.115 (italics in text).23 The Economic Community of West African States took the lead in peacekeeping in

Liberia and Sierra Leone; Haiti became an Organization of American States operation;and Australia took charge of the International Force for East Timor until the arrival ofUN peacekeepers. Clement E. Adibe, The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UNPartnership, Third World Quarterly18/3 (1997) pp.47188; David Curran and Tom Wood-house, Cosmopolitan peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: what can Africacontribute? International Affairs Vol. 83/6 (2007) pp.105570; Nicholas J. Wheeler andTim Dunne, East Timor and the New Humanitarian Intervention, International


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Affairs77/ 4 (2001) pp.80527; James Cotton, Peacekeeping in East Timor: An AustralianPolicy Departure, Australian Journal of International Affairs53/3 (1999) pp.23746.

24 Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty(note 5); Francis M. Deng et. al., Sovereignty as aResponsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1996).

25 Besides the report Responsibility to Protect, there was also the Brahimi Report thatreformed the UNs approach to peacekeeping. Report of the Panel on United NationsPeacekeeping, Doc. A/55/305S/2000/809, 21 Aug. 2009; Sorpong Peou, The UN, Peace-keeping, and Collective Human Security: From An Agenda for Peace to the BrahimiReport, International Peacekeeping 9/ 2 (Summer 2002) pp.5168; Nigel D. White, Com-mentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, (The BrahimiReport), Journal of Conflict and Security Law 6/ 1 (2001) pp.12746; Gareth Evans, TheResponsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come. . . and Gone? International Rela-tions22 3 (2008) pp.28398; Feinstein and Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent(note 21).

26 The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention andState Sovereignty, Dec. 2001 .

27 The Council threatened Israel and the Arab states with such action in 1948 unless theystopped fighting. Looking at the various Security Council resolutions adopted throughout1948, the Council increasingly became more determined to end the conflict in Israel-Pales-tine. Thus, in Security Council resolution 42 (5 March 1948) the there is an appeal to thevarious governments to take all action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are nowoccurring in Palestine. SecurityCouncil resolution 50 (28 May 1948) calls upon the gov-ernments and authorities to cease all acts of armed force for a month. In resolution 54 (15July 1948), the Council orders the parties, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter, to desistfrom any further military action. Moreover, the Council stated that parties that will notcease fighting will be in breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39, which maylead the Council to initiate action under Chapter VII against the offending party.

28 The 1973 Yom Kippur War offer a good example of this. With the war launched by theArab states on 6 Oct. 1973, the Security Council adopted resolution 338 (22 Oct. 22,1973) calling for a ceasefire, by which point the Israelis had moved from defense tooffense, with Gen. Sharon cutting off the Egyptian Third Army and placing the IDFapproximately 100 kilometers from Cairo. The resolution gave the belligerents 12 hoursto terminate all military activity (Israel and Egypt signed a ceasefire on 24 Oct. 1973).Three days later the Council authorized the formation of the United Nations Emer-gency Force to monitor the ceasefire Security Council resolution 340 (25 Oct. 1973).

29 In Larger Freedoms: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights to all, Reportof the Secretary-General, 25 March 2005, UN Doc. A/59/2005; A More Secure World: OurShared Responsibilities: Report of the Secretary-Generals High-level Panel on Threats, Challengesand Change (New York: United Nations 2004); Cohen and Deng, Exodus within Bor-ders(note 5)pp.1216.

30 Boutros-Ghali argued, when the established rules of engagement for peacekeeping oper-ations are no longer sufficient, UN forces may need authorization to demonstrate aresolve to use force. If this is not effective, the situation may call for wider rules ofengagement so that UN peacekeepers may react to force and, in some cases, use force toforestall an escalation in violence. Boutros-Ghali, Beyond Peacekeeping(note 19)p.120.

31 Security Council resolution 1272 dealing with East Timor declares that the Council, inview of what had transpired since the referendum on 30 Aug. 1999, decided to act underChapter VII of the Charter and establish a United Nations Transitional Administrationin East Timor (UNTAET), endowed with overall responsibility for the administration ofEast Timor and empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, includingthe administration of justice. Security Council resolution 1272, 25 Oct. 1999. SecurityCouncil resolution 1244, which deals with Kosovo, declares that the Council decided onthe deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil andsecurity presences. . . The Council authorized the Secretary-General to establish aninternational civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for

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Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration whileestablishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governinginstitutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants ofKosovo. Security Council resolution 1244, 10 June 1999.

32 Alexandros Yanis, Kosovo Under International Administration Survival43/ 2 (Summer2001) pp.3148; Marc Weller, Kosovo s Final Status, International Affairs84/ 6 (2008)pp.122343; Katsumi Ishizuka, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Experience ofUNMISET, International Peacekeeping, 10/ 3 (Autumn 2003) pp.4459; Oliver P. Rich-mond and Jason Franks, Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor Leste: The Emperors NewClothes, International Peacekeeping 15 2 (April 2008) pp.185200; Alan Ryan, The StrongLead-nation Model in an ad hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation Stabilise in EastTimor, International Peacekeeping9/ 1 (Spring 2002) pp.2344; Michael J. Matheson, Uni-ted Nations Governance in Postconflict Societies, The American Journal of InternationalLaw 95/ 1 (Jan. 2001) pp.7685.

33 The typology is developed from Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, UnderstandingPeacekeeping (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press 2010); Boutros-Ghali, Beyond Peacekeep-ing(note 19), pp.11322; Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Wars andBuilding Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies, International Studies Per-spectives, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2008), pp. 1-21; Alex J. Bellamy, The Next Stage in Peace Oper-ations Theory? International Peacekeeping 11/ 1 (Spring 2004) pp.1738; Barnett et al.,Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?(note 21), pp.3558; Andrew Cottey, BeyondHumanitarian Intervention: the New Politics of Peacekeeping and Intervention, Contem-porary Politics14/ 4 (Dec. 2008) pp.42946; Yasushi Akashi, The Use of Force in a UnitedNations Peace-Keeping Operation: Lessons Learnt from the Safe Areas Mandate, Ford-ham International Law Journal. 19/ 2 (1995) pp.31223.

34 Security Council resolution 1386 encapsulated the peacekeeping and peace-enforcing ele-ments of ISAF, which were empowered to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in themaintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan InterimAuthority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure envi-ronment. Security Council resolution 1386, 20 Dec. 2001.

35 Lakhdar Brahimi, Afghanistan: Prospects for the Future, Georgetown Journal of Interna-tional Affairs. 4/ 2 (SummerFall 2003) p.81.

36 Ellen Laipson, the former Vice-Chairman of the US National Intelligence Council,claims that security sector reform is for states that aspire to move along the continuumto democracy; it should not be confused with military modernisation intended toimprove combat effectiveness only. Ellen Laipson, Prospects for Middle East SecuritySector Reform, Survival49/ 2 (2007) p.100.

37 Owing to the lack of security in Afghanistan, there is a continuous need to redefine andreshape the security pillar, as seen at the NATO meeting in Lisbon (2010) where somemembers of the alliance wanted a definite date for the withdrawal of NATO forces fromAfghanistan while others wanted the withdrawal to be dependent on conditions.

38 Peter Dahl Thruelsen, The Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: A Localised Insurgencywith a Local Objective, Small Wars & Insurgencies21/ 2 (June 2010) p.261.

39 The 2002 Military Technical Agreement signed between the Afghan Interim Authorityand ISAF states that ISAFs responsibility in the area of security, law and order meansproviding Afghans with protection from insurgents, criminal enterprises and otherthreats. ISAF has helped establish an Afghan National Army (ANA) as well as playing acentral role in the development of an Afghan National Police (ANP). InternationalSecurity Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan(Interim Administration): Military Technical Agreement, International Legal Materials41/5 (Sept. 2002) pp.10327.

40 These programs were to work in conjunction with the construction of the national army,in addition to the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program, whichinvolved UNDP working with the Afghan government and UNAMA to deal with


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threats posed by illegal armed groups. The objectives of the program in 2005 were: (1)To improve security through disarming and disbanding illegal armed groups; and (2) Toprovide basic development support to communities freed from threats posed by illegalarmed groups. Accomplishing these objectives will permit social and economic develop-ment. Disbandment of illegal armed groups: project document, Government of Afghan-istan, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, United Nations DevelopmentProgram, 31 July 2005 .

41 This is a principal philosophy behind the DIAG program. ibid.42 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment

of Permanent Government Institutions [The Bonn Accords] 5 Dec. 2001.

43 Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistans Long Reconstruction, Journal of Democracy. 14/ 1 (Jan.2003) pp.8299; Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan in 2004: Electoral Progress and anOpium Boom, Asian Survey45/ 1 (Jan.Feb. 2004) pp.8897.

44 Larry Goodson, who spent time in Afghanistan in 2004, recognizes that there was much todo, but his review emphasizes the level of optimism that many people felt about the coun-try, especially around the time of the elections. Goodson, Afghanistan in 2004 (note 43).

45 MajorGeneral Roger Lane, former Deputy Commander Operations ISAF VIII (20052006) and Emma Sky, a former advisor to the ISAF Commander (20052006), have sta-ted that a PRT is essentially a military structure but, owing to the complexity of stabil-ity operations, a civilian element has been added. Roger Lane and Emma Sky, The Roleof Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Stabilization, The RUSI Journal151/ 3 (June/July2006) p. 48.

46 Touko Piiparinen, A Clash of Mindsets? An Insiders Account of Provincial Reconstruc-tion Teams, International Peacekeeping 14/ 1 (2007) pp.14357; Matthew Jackson and Stu-art Gordon, Rewiring Interventions? UK Provincial Reconstruction Teams andStabilization, International Peacekeeping14/ 5 (2007) pp.64761; Nik Hynek and Jan Eich-ler, The Czech Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan: Context, Experiencesand Politics, Defence Studies10/ 3 (Sept. 2010) pp.40530; Kenneth Holland, The Cana-dian Provincial Reconstruction Team: The Arm of Development in Kandahar Province,American Review of Canadian Studies. 40/ 2 (June 2010) p.278; George Dimitriu and Bea-trice de Graaf, The Dutch COIN Approach: Three Years in Uruzgan, 20062009, SmallWars & Insurgency21/ 3 (Sept. 2010) pp.42958.

47 ANDS is closely linked to UNAMA. United Nations Development Assistance Frame-work: In Support of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 20102013.,Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 20082013: A Strategy for Security, Gover-nance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, [.

48 Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 20082013, ibid.49 Andrew C. Kuchins, Thomas M. Sanderson and David A. Gordon argue that building a

modern Silk Road the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) in which Afghanistanwill be a linchpin due to its geography, could promote security, prosperity, and connectiv-ity within some of the most volatile, impoverished, and isolated nations on the planet.Andrew C. Kuchins, Thomas M. Sanderson and David A. Gordon, Afghanistan: Buildingthe Missing Link in the Modern Silk Road,Washington Quarterly 33/ 2 (2010) p.39.

50 Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions 19741994: A Comparative Study,Human Rights Quarterly16/4 (Nov. 1994) pp.597655; Priscilla B. Hayner, UnspeakableTruths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge2010).

51 Barnett Rubin recounts he overheard a telephone conversation between MuhammadYunus Qanuni, head of the Northern Alliance delegation in Bonn, and leaders of theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan who insisted that the paragraph dealing with the prohi-bition of amnesty be removed from the agreement. Barnett R. Rubin, Transitional Jus-

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tice and Human Rights in Afghanistan, International Affairs79/ 3 (2003) pp.5701. On theimportance of Brahimi in the Bonn negotiation, see Simon Chesterman, Walking Softlyin Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-Building, Survival44/ 3 (2002) pp. 3745.

52 Thomas J. Barfield, On Local Justice and Culture in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, Connect-icut Journal of International Law17/ 3 (Summer 2002) p.442.

53 As Bonn was taking place, CIA units and US Special Forces were operating with Afghanwarlords to track down, capture and kill senior Al-Qaeda activists and Taliban leaders.Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, The Attack on bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: APersonal Account by the CIAs Key Field Officer (New York: Three Rivers Press 2005);George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: The CIA during Americas Time of Crisis (NewYork: Harper Perennial 2008); Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger(New York: Random House 2003).

54 Thomas Barfield notes an ethnographic cliche in the region: It is me against my broth-ers; it is my brothers and me against our cousins; and it is our cousins, my brothers andme against the world. Thomas J. Barfield, Problems in Establishing Legitimacy inAfghanistan, Iranian Studies. 37/ 2 (2004) p.266.

55 Louis Dupree, Settlement and Migration Patterns in Afghanistan: A Tentative State-ment, Modern Asian Studies. 9/ 3 (1975) p.411.

56 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan in 1983: And Still No Solution, Asian Survey24/ 2 (Feb.1983) p.233.

57 Oher examples are Yunis Khans Hezb-i-Islami Khalis (Party of Islam), which was Sunnias well as Ghilzai Pashtun; Addal-Rab al-Rasul Sayyaf led Ittihad-i-Islami Bara-i-AzadiAfghanistan (Islamic Unity), a Sunni Pashtun based movement. Martin Ewans, Afghani-stan: A New History (London: Perennial 2002) pp.213216.

58 There is less evidence of what occurred in the Afghan refugee camps in Iran, which iswhy the issue is not addressed in this paper.

59 Eden Naby, Islam within the Afghan Resistance, Third World Quarterly10/ 2 (April1988), pp. 787805; Dupree, Afghanistan in 1983 (note 56)pp.22939; Marvin G. Wein-baum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder, CO: Westview Press1994); Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York:Farrar, Straus, and Giroux 2003).

60 Ashraf Ghani, Islam and State-Building in a Tribal Society: Afghanistan: 18801901,Modern Asian Studies12/2 (1978) pp.26984; Michael Bhatia, The Future of the Mujahed-een: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Afghanistan, InternationalPeacekeeping. 14/ 1 (Jan. 2007) pp.90107; Ahmed Rashid, Afghanistan: Progress Sincethe Taliban, Asian Affairs37/ 1 (March 2006) pp.315.

61 Graeme Smith, What Kandahars Taliban Say, in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding theNew Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia UP2009) p.199; RodricBraithwaite, Afghan Diary. Survival51/ 1 (Feb.March 2009) pp.99118.

62 Gen. Stanley McChrystal when he was the commander of ISAF accepted this concept.See Aryn Baker, TIMEs Interview with General Stanley McChrystal, TIME Magazine,8 July 2009.

63 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, The Taliban troop with an East London cab driver in its ranks,The Guardian, 25 Nov. 2010; Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, Five days inside a Taliban jail, TheGuardian, 26 Nov. 2010; Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, Talking to the Taliban about life afteroccupation, The Guardian, 27 Nov. 2010.

64 Thomas Barfield, writing about justice in Afghanistan, notes that a common assumptionin modern states is that when a crime occurs it is for the state to try the alleged criminalsand punish them if they are found guilty. This, however, is not the case in Afghanistan,where local and community loyalties are more important than loyalty to the state. Bar-field, On Local Justice and Culture in Post-Taliban Afghanistan(note 52) pp.43841.

65 Barnett Rubin notes that Lakhdar Brahimi, who chaired the Bonn talks as Secretary-General Kofi Annans Special Representative was more intent on the outcome and lesson the representative aspect, as Brahimi maintained that history would ignore whetherthe meeting was unrepresentative and focus on the fact that it fashioned a process that


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led to a legitimate and representative government. Barnett R. Rubin, Crafting a Consti-tution for Afghanistan, Journal of Democracy15/ 3 (July 2004) p.7.

66 Gary Berntsens book on the role that the CIA played in the initial invasion of Afghani-stan makes this clear as Berntsen and his team worked with some groups and not others.Berntsen and Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, The Attack on bin Laden and Al-Qaeda (note 53). SethG. Jones, The Rise of Afghanistans Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad, InternationalSecurity32/ 4 (2008) pp.740.

67 Jason Burke and Peter Beaumont, West pays warlords to stay in line, The Observer, 21 July2002, .Anotherexample of a local powerbroker rising to prominence following the invasion is Gul AghaShirzai, the former Governor of Kandahar Province who had also served as Governor ofNangarhar Province. During the DDR program, Shirzai integrated his militia into theAfghan National Police, though in reality Shirzai was and remains a local powerbrokerwhose interests lie in protecting his own interests. Declan Walsh, Strange victories inpoppy province, The Guardian, 5 Oct. 2006, ; Jason Burke, Even as the Afghan war rages, the talking starts,The Guardian, 22 March 2009; Jason Burke, The future of Afghanistan, The Guardian, 14Aug. 2009, .

68 Antonio Giustozzi, Shadow Ownership and SSR in Afghanistan, in Timothy Donais(ed.), Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform (Zurich: Lit 2008) pp.21620; AntonioGiustozzi, Bureaucratic Facade and Political Realities of Disarmament and Demobilisa-tion in Afghanistan, Conflict, Security & Development8/ 2 (2008) pp.16992.

69 Antonio Giustozzi, The Afghan National Army, The RUSI Journal154/ 6 (Nov./Dec.2009) p. 39.

70 Jon Boone, Afghan President Hamid Karzai picks ex-warlord as election running mateThe Guardian.co.uk, 4 May 2009, .

71 The duties of the arbakai are three-fold: implement decisions of the Jirga; maintain lawand order; and protect and defend the borders and boundaries of the tribe and the com-munity. Mohammad Osman Tariq, Community-based Security and Justice: Arbakai inAfghanistan, IDS Bulletin40/ 2 (2009) pp.207.

72 Richard Norton-Taylor, Leaked Afghanistan files reveal corruption and drug-dealing,The Guardian, 27 July 2010; Police Perception Survey, 2009: The Afghan Perspective,Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) Surveys, Kabul,UNDP (Kabul 2009),

73 Article 16 of the Afghan Constitution recognizes Dari and Pashtu as the official lan-guages of Afghanistan, though it also recognizes the Uzbeki, Turkmani, Pachaie, Nuri-stani, Baluchi or Pamiri languages in areas where these ethnic communities form amajority. Government of Afghanistan, The Constitution of Afghanistan 2004, [.

74 Developed from Government of Afghanistan, The Constitution of Afghanistan 2004,ibid.]; Michael Schoiswohl, Linking the International Leg

Documents

‘Peacebuilding’ in Afghanistan: A Bridge Too Far?