91

The year 2012 closed with an escalatingcrisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC). The fragile political environment inthe wake of the November 2011 presidentialand legislative elections and the subsequentoutbreak of violence in eastern DRC stem-ming from the mutiny of the March 23 move-ment in April 2012 are only the most recentmanifestation of chronic problems in the re-gion, including the authoritarian drift of thestate and a mix of domestic and regional con-flict drivers unresolved since the SecondCongo War formally ended in 1999. Whilethe international community suffers from asevere case of “Congo fatigue” and is frus-trated at the slow pace of political reform,donors continue to support programs in theface of recurrent setbacks to stability and development in the country rather than risk atotal breakdown. The UN Security Council hasstruggled to map out the position of the UNOrganization Stabilization Mission in theDem ocratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO),which was unable to stop rebel groups fromcapturing the strategic city of Goma in easternCongo in late November.

Background

The UN Security Council first authorized thedeployment of a UN peacekeeping mission,the UN Organization Mission in the Demo-cratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), in 1999in response to a regional request followingtwo wars in the DRC that engulfed much ofthe region, and the subsequent signing of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement. While theagreement formally ended hostilities, it left

unresolved many of the underlying causes ofthe conflict. MONUC was eventually author-ized at a strength of 22,016 uniformed mili-tary and police personnel, making it the largestUN peacekeeping mission. In its eleven yearsof existence, the mission developed its focusaccording to the changing circumstances onthe ground, from supporting implementationof the cease-fire agreement to assisting thepolitical transition process.

In 2009, in keeping with its reinforcedmandate, MONUC focused largely on the un-finished business of the stabilization of east-ern DRC. A series of joint military operationswith the Congolese national armed forcesagainst armed groups in the east, while yield-ing important results, also came under heavy

4.5

Democratic Republic of Congo

KigaliKigaliBujumburaBujumbura

RWARWA

BURUNDIBURUNDIBrazzavilleBrazzaville

KampalaKampala

UGANDAUGANDA

LibrevilleLibreville

BANDUNDUBANDUNDU

KATANGAKATANGA

BAS-CONGOBAS-CONGO

KinshasaKinshasa

BukavuBukavu

GomaGoma

BuniaBunia

KinduKindu

MbandakaMbandaka

KanangaKananga

KisanganiKisangani

Mbuji-MayiMbuji-Mayi

BandunduBandundu

LubumbashiLubumbashi

0

0 200 mi

300 km

* In addition to its Kinshasa headquarters, MONUSCO maintainsliaison offices in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Bujumbura (Burundi),Harare (Zimbabwe), Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda),Lusaka (Zambia), and Windhoek (Namibia).

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92 • MISSION NOTES

criticism for lapses in protecting civilians.These operations, conducted with the nationalarmy, known for human rights abuses, ex-posed the operational tensions in the mis-sion’s mandated activities.

On 28 May 2010, the UN Security Counciladopted Resolution 1925, substantially recon-figuring the mission, reframing it as a stabiliza-tion mission, and renaming it MONUSCO.Resolution 1925, which came on the heels ofefforts by the Congolese government to see asubstantial reduction in the UN’s presence,authorized the withdrawal of up to 2,000 troopsfrom the country while maintaining the previ-ously authorized ceiling, further concentratedthe mission’s attention on civilian protectionand military operations in the east, and estab-lished a reserve force that can react, in princi-ple, to incidents throughout the country.

Elections in 2011On 20 December 2011, President Joseph Ka-bila was sworn in for a second five-year termin office, following elections in November thatwere widely denounced by international ob-servers as lacking credibility and that spurredviolent incidents in some parts of the country.Attempts to protest election results publicly

were met with quick and overwhelming forceby state security forces, while Etienne Tshise -kedi, the leader of the opposition, was keptunder house arrest by state authorities andpressured by the international community notto take to the streets in order to avoid whatmany feared would be widespread violence.

The fragmented nature of the Congoleseopposition and the lack of persistent, coordi-nated pressure from the international com -munity to address the many irregularities ofthe elections—due partly to an ambivalenceamong international diplomats toward Tshise -kedi as a viable alternative to Kabila—allowedthe Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle(AMP), President Kabila’s fraying majority,to weather the immediate unrest. However,the crisis deepened throughout 2012, and thepresident’s legitimacy eroded in the eyes ofthe Congolese people.

Key Developments

Escalating Violence and Calls for a Regional ForceThe political crisis spurred by the 2011 elec-tions coincided with a dramatic deteriorationof security in eastern DRC in early 2012 asformer members of the Congrès National pourla Défense du Peuple (CNDP) defected fromthe Forces Armées de la République Démocra-tique du Congo (FARDC) and began launch-ing coordinated attacks on national forces.

Since 2009, CNDP rebels, formerly sup-ported by the government of Rwanda, whowere integrated into the national army as partof the 2002 Kinshasa-Kigali peace deal, havedominated local economies in North Kivu.Their integration greatly benefited the CNDPas it solidified and legitimized its controlover the “petit nord” area of North Kivu.These former CNDP contingents refused todeploy outside of North Kivu, and maintaineda parallel chain of command that continued tocontrol economic networks tied to Rwandabased on illicit mineral extraction.

During the 2011 elections, these formerCNDP elements allied themselves with Kabila

• Authorization Date 28 May 2010 (UNSC Res. 1925 [asMONUSCO succeeding MONUC])

• Start Date 1 July 2010• SRSG Roger Meece (United States)• Force Commander Lieutenant-General Chander Prakash

(India)• Police Commissioner Abdallah Wafy (Niger)• Budget $1,347.5 million (1 July 2012–

30 June 2013)• Strength as of Troops: 16,96631 October 2012 Military Observers: 688

Police: 1,401International Civilian Staff: 977National Civilian Staff: 2,895UN Volunteers: 543

For detailed mission information see p. 270

UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)

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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO • 93

and carried out a campaign of intimidation toforce voters in North Kivu to cast their votesfor the incumbent president. This dominanceand intimidation was so deeply resented byKivutian populations that it cost Kabila hispopularity and the vote in North Kivu, de-spite this having been his power base in the2006 elections. Efforts by Kabila followingthe November 2011 elections to regain somecontrol over the Kivus by threatening CNDPcommander Bosco Ntanganda with arrest andby trying to dismantle CNDP networks, led tothe mutiny and the emergence of a new rebel-lion in eastern DRC. In May 2012 the defectedsoldiers named themselves the March 23movement (M23)1 and rapidly gained ground.

The M23 does not pose the only securityproblem in the Kivus. Several smaller armedgroups are being mobilized as a reaction to theM23, some of them composed of ex–ForcesDémocratiques de Libération du Rwanda(FDLR) fighters, motivated by anti-Tutsi, anti-Rwanda, and nationalistic sentiments. TheseMayi-Mayi groups, although weakly organ-ized and difficult to track, are growing innumbers. Intimidation and fear-mongering bythe M23 and its CNDP predecessor are alsofueling ethnically charged self-protection ac-tivities among local populations. These vari-ous smaller groups are believed to be follow-ing the same pattern of abuse and repressionof local populations that has been carried outby the M23, and have the potential to controlparts of the territory of North and South Kivu,thus posing a growing security threat.

Regional confidence in the capacity ofMONUSCO to quell the activities of armedgroups was low during 2012. On 15 July theAfrican Union announced that it was “pre-pared to contribute to the establishment of aregional force to put an end to the activitiesof armed groups” in the DRC.2 The neutralforce initiative of the International Confer-ence on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR),while initially a welcome expression of re-gional interest to end the violence, has sincestalled. Zimbabwe has offered troops, Tanza-nia has also offered troops as well as a forcecommander, and South Africa has offered

some logistical support, but financing andfurther logistics support remain unaddressed.There are also questions about the modalitiesof how this so-called neutral force would re-late to MONUSCO, including whether thiswould be a hybrid force, a regional force sup-ported by the UN, or a troop enhancement ofthe existing UN operation.

Amid discussions about military action,the deteriorating security situation in theKivus underscored the urgency for a revived,sustained political process in the region.There is growing recognition that withoutsustained international pressure on the M23and its supporters and a comprehensive polit-ical process to accompany any military re-sponse, the security and humanitarian situa-tion in the region risks further deterioration,as military power-sharing, the dominant para-digm of past attempts to end the violence inthe DRC, has repeatedly failed to yield sus-tainable results.

A high-level UN meeting on easternDRC, convened by UN Secretary-General Ban

An Indian UN peacekeeper walks past trucks of Congolese M23 rebels as they withdraw from the city of Goma in the east of the Democratic

Republic of Congo, 1 December 2012. Hundreds of Congolese M23 rebelsbegan the withdrawal from Goma as promised under a regionally

brokered deal, after a twelve-day occupation of the city. Around 300rebels, army mutineers who seized Goma on 20 November in a lightning

advance, were seen by an AFP reporter driving in a convoy of lootedtrucks north of the main town in DRC’s mineral-rich east.

AFP

photo

/Phil

Moore

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Ki-moon in New York on 27 September 2012in the margins of the UN General Assembly,suggested that the deployment of a high-leveleffort could provide the impetus to launch apolitical process to end the violence. How-ever, while there are calls for a high-level UNenvoy to the region, negotiations between theKinshasa government and the M23 rebelshave been driven by the ICGLR. This has beencalled into question, as the ICGLR is chairedby Uganda, an alleged source of support forM23.

The Fall of GomaThe rapidly escalating violence in the Kivusbetween the FARDC and the M23 throughoutthe year further destabilized the already frag-ile, war-torn region. On 16 November, sol-diers from the FARDC and the M23 engaged

in heavy clashes near the town of Kibumba.The town eventually fell to the rebel move-ment, which soon advanced to the edge ofGoma. The M23 gave the government atwenty-four-hour ultimatum for peace talks, aproposal rejected by Kinshasa, before advanc-ing on the regional capital. On 20 November,M23 forces occupied the city of Goma, meet-ing limited resistance from the FARDC, whofled in advance of the attack, and MONUSCOpeacekeepers. While the M23 withdrew fromGoma eleven days later following an agree-ment with the ICGLR that set the stage for ne-gotiations, the group has maintained positionsnearby, posing a continuing threat to the city.

MONUSCO came under heavy criticismfor its inability to stop the fall of the moststrategic city in the east, despite the deploy-ment of attack helicopters to slow the rebels’

Recognizing for the first time the devas-tating impact that the HIV/AIDS pan-demic can have on global security, theSecurity Council in July 2000 passedlandmark Resolution 1308. The resolu-tion mandated the Secretary-General andthe Department of Peacekeeping Opera-tions to take relevant steps to curb therisks posed by the unchecked spread ofthe HIV/AIDS pandemic, noting espe-cially the disproportionate effect that ithas on women and children.

In June 2011, building on the gainsin mitigating the risks posed by HIV/AIDS over the past decade, the SecurityCouncil adopted Resolution 1983, rec-ognizing the important role that peace-keepers play in awareness and preven-tion in missions abroad and in theirhome countries. The resolution furtherrequested that the Secretary-General en-sure the implementation of HIV/AIDSawareness and prevention programs forall UN missions.

Following these resolutions, the UNnow has integrated HIV/AIDS programs

in all peacekeeping operations. The UNhas eight HIV/AIDS units and nine focalpoints in its sixteen peacekeeping mis-sions, ensuring the implementation ofprograms to reduce the risk of missionpersonnel contracting and transmittingHIV. HIV/AIDS officers also provide ad-vice to heads of missions on HIV/AIDS–related issues in the context of mission-specific mandates, and coordinate withrelevant local partners.

On an operational level, peacekeepingmissions strive to incorporate HIV/AIDSawareness in their work, including in post-conflict demobilization, disarmament, andreintegration pro cesses and in security sector reform. The UN Organiza tion Sta-bilization Mission in the Democratic Re-public of Congo (MONUSCO), for ex -ample, integrated HIV/AIDS sensitivity intraining national military personnel, whilethe UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) assisted national authoritiesto address HIV/AIDS in Haiti’s prisons.

Increasing budgetary constraints,however, severely impede the efforts of

peace operations in fulfilling the SecurityCouncil’s mandates. Financial, logistic,and other constraints, such as limitedhuman resources, affect the ability ofHIV/AIDS units and focal points to mo-bilize full HIV/AIDS training, ser vices,and programs. The lack of HIV/AIDSresources is particularly pressing for UNpolitical missions, which could benefitfrom support for staff in the form ofawareness and prevention programs andservices. As of November 2012, only twopolitical missions, the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) and the UN AssistanceMission for Iraq (UNAMI), had focalpoints deployed to provide HIV/AIDS–related assistance. None of the fifteenfield-based political missions maintainHIV/AIDS officers or dedicated HIVfocal points. Plans to extend HIV/AIDSawareness to the other political missionsmay further strain already limited resources.

HIV/AIDS and UN Peace Operations

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advance. The mission evacuated out of Gomaa number of senior Congolese officials, in-cluding nearly two dozen magistrates whowere targeted by M23. The rebels used advanced weapons and more sophisticatedoperations than expected. The UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, HervéLadsous, argued that the mission was man-dated to assist the FARDC in protecting civil-ians in the area rather than engage directlywith the rebels, an impossible task after na-tional forces fled.3 In December, Ladsouspresented several options to the SecurityCouncil in response to the fall of Goma, in-cluding deploying a regional force as pro-posed by the ICGLR, providing additionalforce enablers for MONUSCO, and support-ing an expanded version of the joint verifica-tion mechanism of the ICGLR,4 which waslaunched in September in an effort to addressthe continued conflict in eastern DRC.

The UN Group of Experts on the DRC, inits final report, issued on 21 November 2012,documented evidence of Rwandan and, to alesser extent, Ugandan logistical, financial,and recruitment support for M23, highlightingthe total breakdown of the earlier rapproche-ment between the DRC and Rwanda.5 Thefindings of the final report were similar tothose of the group’s interim report, released inJune 2012. The November final report alsorecommended placing several M23 leaders onthe UN sanctions list. Following this recom-mendation, in December the Security Councilimposed an arms embargo on M23 as well astravel and asset sanctions on the M23’s presi-dent and one of its top commanders.

While the Group of Experts’ report andthe experts themselves have been loudly de-nounced by Kigali, Western donors, includingthe United States and United Kingdom, havesince suspended aid to Rwanda in reaction to its support of the M23 rebellion. Ugandaalso denounced the charges of the Group ofEx perts and briefly threatened to pull its troopsout of all peacekeeping missions, includingthe AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), forwhich Uganda is the top troop-contributingcountry.

Security Sector Reform and Stabilization: Stalled ProcessesThe stabilization and peace consolidation ef-forts under the DRC government’s Stabiliza-tion and Reconstruction (STAREC) programhave stalled, though one can point to somemodest successes. For example, the successfulconduct of a census of the army; recent im-provements in the justice sector such as thenew mobile courts systems, widely considereda success at making justice more accessiblein rural areas; progress in police training andsensitization through MONUSCO and the EUPolice Mission in the Democratic Republic ofCongo (EUPOL RD Congo) training; and thereopening of the military academy. However,the absence of a political pro cess and strategyfor security sector reform by Kin shasa hasmade those efforts piecemeal and unsustain-able. Other institutional reforms, like the de-centralization project, are either stagnant orprogressing extremely slowly, as the crisis inthe east and the tensions with Rwanda domi-nate international attention in the region.

On 7 November 2012 the EU Advisoryand Assistance Mission for Security Reform inthe Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSECRD Congo) signed a new action program withthe Congolese authorities to continue with itsmandate to help develop a FARDC reformplan that will reinforce administrative capaci-ties in the human resource and budget do-mains, support and continue to engage in train-ing, and revitalize the logistical component of

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO • 95

• Authorization Date 12 June 2007 (EU Council Joint Action2007/405/CFSP)

• Start Date July 2007• Head of Mission Commissioner Jean Paul Rikir (Belgium)• Budget $9.27 million (1 October 2011–

30 September 2012)• Strength as of Civilian Police: 1630 September 2012 International Civilian Staff: 21

National Civilian Staff: 19

EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD Congo)

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96 • MISSION NOTES

the FARDC. Throughout the year, EUSECconducted several workshops with civil soci-ety and military leaders in order to enhancecivil-military cooperation, conducted trainingworkshops on sexual violence and the protec-tion of children, and piloted a biometric sys-tem of payments for a regiment in NorthKivu. In July 2012 the mission recommendeda yearlong extension of the EUSEC mandate,to be followed by a twelve-month final tran-sition phase.

Conclusion

On 28 December 2012, two MONUSCO util-ity helicopters came under fire by M23 ele-ments, the second time that month that themission’s helicopters had been targeted.These events underscore calls for the UN toregain the initiative on the political front inthe DRC, as there is growing awareness thatthe UN and MONUSCO cannot play a purelytechnical support role and that there is a needfor a political process to streamline and focusefforts to resolve both the short-term crisis inthe east and the long-term challenge of therole of neighboring countries and national re-form. Toward this end, the UN is conductinga strategic review on MONUSCO, and in De-cember the Secretary-General engaged in dis-cussions with regional powers on developinga political framework for addressing the cri-sis. This objective is likely to become evenmore complicated once Rwanda takes itstwo-year seat on the UN Security Council inJanuary 2013.

Notes

1. The movement is named after a 23 March 2009 peace deal with the government under which therebel group was to change into a political party, but that the rebels say has not been implemented.

2. “AU Ready to Send Peacekeepers to DR Congo,” Agence France-Presse, 15 July 2012.3. “UN Defends Failed Attempt to Halt Capture of Congo’s Goma,” Reuters, 21 November 2012.4. “DR Congo: UN Peacekeeping Chief Presents Security Council with Options After M23 With-

drawal from Goma,” UN News Service, 7 December 2012.5. For the report and its addenda, see http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml.

• Authorization Date 2 May 2005 (EU Council Joint Action2005/355/CFSP)

• Start Date June 2005• Head of Mission Antonio Martins (Portugal)• Budget $17.65 million (1 October 2011–

30 June 2012)• Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 50.5a

30 September 2012 National Civilian Staff: 41Note: a. EUSEC RD Congo has 50 full-time and 1 part-time internationalcivilian staff.

EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo)

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