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FUEL TANK INERTING SYSTEM A-330
El Fuel Tank Inerting system, de operación automática sin intervención de la tripulación,
reduce la cantidad de oxígeno en la atmosfera del tanque central, para minimizar la
posibilidad de ignición del combustible en el tanque, (ver presentación del sistema
suministrada por Airbus)
NOTA
Cuando hay interrupciones de energía eléctrica con duración mayor a un mínimo, el
sistema se bloquea, mostrando mensaje en ECAM. El MEL prevé continuar serie de vuelos
por un tiempo determinado (ver documento Technical Follow -up a continuación de la
presentación.)
Fuel Tank Inerting SystemATA 47 and 21-58
Training session
Presented by
Michel MESNIER (FSM AVABOG)
And
Nicolas KOQUELY (FSR AVABOG)
February 2011
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Contents
• Part 1- Historical – Why this new System?
• Part 2 – System Description
• Part 3 – System Operation/Control
• Part 4 – Documentation
Page 2February 2011
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Historical
Part 1 - Why This New System?
February 2011 Page 3
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Why a new system?
• In 1996, a TWA B747 exploded after take-off due to a suspected spark in the centre tank combined with little amount of fuel in this tank which had been heating on ground, and generating fuel vapours.
• As a result, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) undertook researches into fuel tank flammability
• The FAA and EASA have now released new rules in order to reduce the flammability of aircraft fuel tanks. Flammability Reduction System also called Fuel Tank Inerting System Ignition risks addressed in SFAR88 rules.
February 2011 Page 4
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System Description
Part 2 - SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
February 2011 Page 5
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System Description
The architecture is broken down in two major subsystems:
The Conditioned Service Air System (CSAS) ATA 21-58The Conditioned Service Air System (CSAS) is an air temperature conditioning system. The CSAS cools the hot engine bleed air and supplies the conditioned air to the Inert Gas Generation System (IGGS) . The CSAS controller is the primary computer which controls this system. The controller operates the valves, monitors air temperature and air pressure to supply the necessary flow of conditioned air to the inert gas generation system.
The Inert Gas Generation System (IGGS) ATA 47The IGGS is composed of an Air Separation Module (ASM). ASM’s filter oxygen
molecules, from the air supply provided by the CSAS. The oxygen molecules are vented overboard, as Oxygen Enriched Air, through the ASM OEA port. The ASM output air is composed of NEA, which is supplied to the fuel tank to inert the tank. The IGGS uses hollow permeable membrane fibers, packaged as Air Separation Modules (ASM), to remove oxygen from a compressed air stream, thus creating nitrogen enriched air (NEA).
February 2011 Page 6
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System Description
February 2011 Page 7
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CSAS Part
February 2011 Page 8
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IGGS Part
February 2011 Page 9
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February 2011 Page 10
FTIS location on SA A/C
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FTIS location on LR A/C
February 2011 Page 11
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System Operation
Part 3 – System Operation/Control
February 2011 Page 12
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CSAC Schematic
February 2011 Page 13
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FTIS Operation CSAS Part (ATA 21-58)
• The Conditioned Service Air System (CSAS) operates only during flight conditions and it stops the operation of the system when the aircraft is on ground.
• The CSAS controller is the primary computer which controls this system. The controller operates the valves, monitors air temperature and air pressure to supply the necessary flow of conditioned air to the inert gas generation system.
• The CSAS gets hot compressed air (bleed air) from the pneumatic air distribution system. This hot bleed air comes from the manifold near the high pressure ground connector and flows through the CSAS isolation valve to an ozone converter. The CSAS isolation valve controls the airflow in the system.
• A hot air bypass valve is installed in the bypass duct. The hot air bypass valve adds hot bleed air to the always cold air downstream of the heat exchanger to increase the temperature.
February 2011 Page 14
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FTIS Operation CSAS Part (ATA 21-58)
• A temperature sensor and a pressure sensor, which are installed in the duct to the Inert Gas Generation System (IGGS), monitor the conditioned air and transmit the signals to the CSAS controller.
• The CSAS controller receives the data, compares them to the demand from the IGGS controller and, if necessary, operates the valves.
• In case of pack 1 inoperative, the FTIS will not be operative but will not generate a Maintenance message at the cockpit, so no FTIS MEL entry is required.
February 2011 Page 15
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IGGS Schematic
February 2011 Page 16
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FTIS Operation IGGS part (ATA 47)
• A Gate Valve (GV), Temperature Sensor (T2) and Pressure Sensor (P2) are located on the input to the IGGS, to insure proper air temperature and pressure is maintained to the ASM input.
• Between the GV and T2, a Double Ultra Low Particulate Air (DULPA) is used to remove any particles from the IGGS input air supply, prior to the ASM inlet.
• An Oxygen Sensor samples the ASM output air to measure and insure the correct NEA concentration is being provided to the fuel tank. The O2 Sensor also provides a pressure reading during the health monitoring sequence.
• Downstream of the O2 sensor, the Dual Flow ShutOff Valve (DFSOV) controls the flow of NEA to the fuel tank during Fuel Tank Inert System (FTIS) operation. The DFSOV is open when the FTIS is operating and closed if the FTIS is off. The DFSOV helps prevent backflow of fuel or fuel fumes, whenever the FTIS is not operating.
February 2011 Page 17
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FTIS Operation IGGS part (ATA 47)
• Downstream of the DFSOV, a Dual Flapper Check Valve installed in the NEA duct for additional protection from fuel/vapor ingress into the FTIS. The DFCV is situated in the NEA distribution line and installed above the entrance to the fuel tank and assembled to the In-Tank Housing which is installed inside the fuel tank.
• NEA flow provides the muscle pressure to open both check valves and the DFSOV. Without NEA flow, the two check valves of DFCV and the DFSOV maintain a normally closed position, forming a triple barrier against fuel/vapor backflow into the IGGS.
• The IGGS Controller provide the necessary output signals used to control airflow and shutdown the IGGS, if a failure is detected.
February 2011 Page 18
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FTIS operative conditions
The FTIS will be operative when the following conditions are met:BLEED AIR AVAILABLE = TrueAnd Weight on Wheels (WOW) = falseAnd ECS COMMANDED OFF = falseAnd No digital latch is set (No Volatile Memory latch not
set). And IGGS TOTAL AVERAGE AIR TEMPERATURE <=
47°C.And ENG1_FIRE = no fire
→ At landing, FTIS will be switched off
February 2011 Page 19
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FTIS Control/Indicating
• The FTIS is controlled and monitored by a combination of two communicating controllers with digital monitoring and analog partitioning: one for the CSAS portion of the system and one for the IGGS portion.
• The IGGS Controller Unit (ICU) is the automatic controlling and monitoring unit of the IGGS. The controllers provide automatic control of the FTIS without pilot interaction.
• Primary functions include: monitoring LRU health, provide CSAS temperature control, switch from low to high flow during descent, provide over-temperature protection and provide over-pressure protection.
• The controllers will provide a means of shutting down the FTIS when a critical fault is detected. For each controller, a critical fault detected by either section (digital or analogue) causes a fault to be logged to the other section.
February 2011 Page 20
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FTIS Control/Indicating (continued)
• The digital latched fault can be cleared by a successful maintenance activity conducted by means of the maintenance computer, CMC (Centralized Maintenance Computer).
• The FTIS will not operate during refueling or de-fueling operations in order to protect the aircraft from potential fuel tank over pressurization.
• The FTIS remains on and in the low-flow mode during: takeoff, climb and cruise.
• After cruise the airplane begins descent and the IGGS is switched to the high flow mode. The high-flow mode maximizes the volume of NEA entering the fuel tank, which curbs the amount of vent inflow. During descent the ambient pressure continuously increases, which causes the vent pressure to increase and outside air to enter the fuel tanks. Increasing the NEA flow rate reduces the amount of outside air entering the tank and also increases the NEA oxygen concentration. The goal is to optimize the balance between the NEA oxygen concentration, NEA flow rate, and the amount of outside air entering the tank so that at the end of descent, the average fuel tank oxygen concentration is near or below 11%. Immediately after landing the FTIS is commanded
off.
February 2011 Page 21
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FTIS Bite
• The BITE functionality of the IGGS is hosted in the CSAS controller, except a memorization function and a pre-consolidation of faults.
• Initial Test at Power up and Start Up. During IGGS operation, a Continuous BITE will check IGGS equipment and transmit fault messages to FWC and Maintenance computer.
• Interactive BITE Test with Bleed Pressure for FTIS Health Check: This test would be run
with a bleed source available at the inlet of the CSAS. This bleed source could be APU or a high-pressure ground cart. This test will check: Controllers, CSAS and IGGS applications, Wiring, Sensors, Valves Open/closed functionality, External / internal communication, System Functionality.
• Interactive BITE Test without Bleed will be used to check electrical component connections within the FTIS system. This test will check: Controllers, CSAS and IGGS applications, Wiring, Sensors, Valves position, External / internal communication.
February 2011 Page 22
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Inerting menu in the MCDU
February 2011 Page 23
1. On the MCDU, select the Maintenance Page& select SYSTEM REPORT/TEST
2. Select the second page of the menu
3. Select the INERTING menu
INERTING menu
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Specific data
February 2011 Page 24
In this example Specific data allow to identify failure of P2 IGGS pressure sensor .
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Documentation
February 2011 Page 25
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Documentation
• FCOM: Description in FCOM 1.28.10
On Long Range aircraft, the failure of the Inerting system is covered by the crew awareness: “ FUEL INERTING SYS FAULT” and is already included in the
FCOM 3.02.28 page 5 SEQ 303.
• MEL : FAA 20 days non-renewable / EASA 10 days renewable once No maintenance/Pilot action associated to MEL
• WBM: FTIS has no specific impact on the SA and LR WBMs other than modifying the global aircraft weight and CG.
February 2011 Page 26
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MEL Item
February 2011 Page 27
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MEL Item
February 2011 Page 28
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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential andproprietary document.
This document and all information contained herein is the soleproperty of AIRBUS S.A.S.. No intellectual property rights aregranted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure ofits content. This document shall not be reproduced ordisclosed to a third party without the express written consentof AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not beused for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied.
The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. Theyare based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressedin good faith. Where the supporting grounds for thesestatements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased toexplain the basis thereof.
AIRBUS, its logo, A300, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321,A330, A340, A350, A380, A400M are registered trademarks.
Page 29February 2011
Technical Follow-Up
PAGE 1/2
TFU REF : 21.58.00.001 LR - Fuel Tank Inerting System issues TFU STATUS : OPEN
OWNER/EXT : C.AMSELLEM Tel : +33 567197340 E-Mail : [email protected]
A/C Affected : A330 Engine Affected :
TFU ISSUE DATE : MAR 2011 TFU FIRST ISSUE DATE : FEB 2011 TFU NEXT ISSUE DATE : APR 2011 ISSUE NB : 03
DESCRIPTION : The following issues have been reported from the field: . Case 1 : ECAM message FUEL INERTING SYS FAULT + Class1 fault message FCMC1(5QM1)+FCMC2(5QM2) The message is triggered at A/C power-up or if FCMC1 and 2 are reset, due to a power-up sequence of the ICU compared to the FCMC. The message display is latched even if ICU FCMC communication is recovered at end of power-up sequence. . Case 2: Class1 fault message SDAC1(1WV1)/CSAS CTL UNIT(100HH) with no ECAM message The message is triggered at A/C power-up sequence, and display is latched even if SDAC-CCU communication is recovered at end of power-up sequence. . Case 3 : ECAM message FUEL INERTING SYS FAULT + Class1 fault message CSAS ISOL VLV (111HH) This message is triggered in case of loss of air engine bleed system 1 (AIR ENG1 BLEED FAULT at cockpit). The FTIS is then shutdown and latched. It is to be noted that display of ECAM message FUEL INERTING SYSTEM FAULT is inhibited: - in all phases except for flight phases 1 & 10 - and if DC1 Power is unavailable, or ADIRU1 or 3 is unavailable, or FCMC1&2 are unavailable or SDAC1 is unavailable CONSEQUENCE : . Case 1: The ECAM message is latched until T/S is done, even if FTIS remains operative. TSM 47-11-00-810-815-A refers. . Case 2: No ECAM message is generated and the system remains fully operational. No maintenance action is necessary (neither interactive BITE test) . Case 3: The ECAM message and System shut-down are latched until T/S is performed. TSM 21-58-00-810-802-A should be followed to clear message and recover system operation. Aircraft can be dispatched with no need for immediate maintenance action as per MMEL entry for ATA47 (note: MMEL coverage is 20 days for FAA and 10+10 for EASA) INVESTIGATION STATUS : . Case 1: Root cause is a timing & confirmation time discrepancy at power-up between FCMC and CCU. . Case 2: Root cause is a timing & confirmation time discrepancy at power-up between SDAC and CCU
IMPACTS CLASSIFICATION Impact on flight OPS : None Impact on line maintenance : Low Impact on shop maintenance : None Impact on environment : None Effect on flight : None Category : Impact on PAX comfort : None RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION Airbus OPS documentation Airbus Maintenance documentation Other documentation VENDOR and PN affected SERVICE BULLETIN Airbus Vendor VENDOR and PN solution
Technical Follow-Up
PAGE 2/2
TFU REF : 21.58.00.001 LR - Fuel Tank Inerting System issues TFU STATUS : OPEN
OWNER/EXT : C.AMSELLEM Tel : +33 567197340 E-Mail : [email protected]
A/C Affected : A330 Engine Affected :
TFU ISSUE DATE : MAR 2011 TFU FIRST ISSUE DATE : FEB 2011 TFU NEXT ISSUE DATE : APR 2011 ISSUE NB : 03
. Case 3: In case of AIR ENG1 BLEED FAULT, pilot must select BLEED1 P/B OFF and then X-Bleed valve Open. This is to ensure continued air supply, including to FTIS. During this sequence the confirmation time for no bleed air to FTIS is 3 seconds, with CSAS Isolation Valve closure. This scenario is valid only for RR engine only. On GE & RR engines the level of pressure is high enough to provide time for X-Bleed valve opening before CIV closure. MITIGATION / INTERIM PLAN : . Case 1 : In the case these ECAM Warning & Fault Message are seen during A/C power-up or FCMC reset or FCMC change over, TSM 47-11-00-810-815-A must be followed. This task first requires an iBite of the system without bleed (AMM 47-31-34-740-801), that would then clear the messages. As an alternative solution to the interactive BITE, these ECAM Warning & Fault Message can be cleared by CSAS Control Unit (CCU )reset via C/B 11HH . Case 2 : No maintenance action is necessary (neither interactive BITE test), since no ECAM Warning is latched and system operation is maintained. . Case 3 : as per TSM 21-58-00-810-802-A; perform I-bite with Bleed (AMM 21-58-00-710-803) would correct system fault. In addition AIR ENG1 BLEED FAULT must be corrected as per relevant TSM task depending on associated fault message. Note : If aircraft is dispatched with engine bleed system #1 considered inoperative as per ATA36 MMEL, FTIS operation is not impacted. MAINTENANCE ADVICE : Case 1 : Apply TSM 47-11-00-810-815-A after aircraft power-up if ECAM message is triggered. Case 2 : None Case 3 : Apply TSM 21-58-00-810-802-A after flight if ECAM message is triggered. OPS ADVICE : N/A REPERCUSSION ON A/C DISPATCH : Please refer to Maintenance recommendations for T/S, or MMEL ATA47 for dispatch with FTIS system considered inoperative. PERMANENT OR FINAL SOLUTION : All cases : The final solution will be determined by investigation outcomes.
