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    VULNERABILITY ELIMINATI

    FORCE OF NEW MOBYU

    THE 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR INTERNET TECHNOLOGY AND SECURED

    TR

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    THE SECURITY IS THE CORNERSTONE

    A POWERFUL HIGH LEVEL INTEGRATION

    IMs, SOCIAL NETWORKS

    FINANCIAL DATA AND ETC.

    THE BLACKBERRY WAS BUILT

    FREE OF MALWARE & HARMFUL ACTIONS WITH NATIVE SECURITY SOLUTIONS

    MAINLY FOCUSED ON ENTERPRISE

    WIDE RANGE IT POLICY SET

    UP TO 500 UNITS

    A FEW THIRD PARTY SECURITY SOLUTIONS

    A SIMPLIFICATION OF THE SECURI

    POOR INTERGRATION (ONLY BLAC

    NO BUILT IMs, HTML5 &

    NO WALLETS OR ELSE BU

    PLAYBOOK MIGHT

    PRODUCE FEW VALUE DA NOT MORE THAN LARGE

    TOTALLY FOCUSED ON ENTERPRIS

    IT POLICY EXTRA REDUCE

    UP TO 10 UNITS

    ENTERTAINMENT APPLIC

    BLACKBERRY SECURITY ENVIRONM

    BL CKBERRY SM RTPHONE W S SECURE PLAYBOOK HAS COME WITH A POO

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    A LOT OF TYPES

    BOOTKITS

    FIRMWARE

    USER-MODE

    KERNEL

    HYPERVISOR

    SIMILAR TO THE SPYWARE

    BUNDLING WITH DESIRABLE SOFTWARE

    WIDESPREADING, EASY DITRIBUTION AND QUITE

    RELEVANT FOR HACKERS

    BASED ON:

    VENDOR-SUPPLIED EXTE

    THIRD PARTY PLUGINS

    PUBLIC INTERFACES

    INTERCEPTION OF SYSTE

    EXPLOITATION OF SECUR

    VULNERABILITIES

    HOOKING AND PATCHING

    METHODS

    USER MODE ROOTKIT AND SPYWA

    M LW RE BOUNDS BECOME UNCLE R HACKERS ARE INTERESTED IN CHEA

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    VIA THE BUILT (INTERNAL) EXPLORER

    AFTER ENTERING THE PASSWORD BUT STILLTHE INTERNAL EXPLORER

    FOR EXECUTING MALWARE FROM THE DEVICE

    BY CLICKING FILE (.JAR/.JAD + .COD)

    TO ALLOW COPYING THE MALWARE TO THEDEVICE AS AN EXTERNAL DRIVE (LIKE A WORM)

    AFTER MOUNTING AS AN EXT

    AFTER ENTERING THE PASSWONOT NECESSARY TO USE INTER

    TO PREVENT FROM EXECUTIN

    OUTSIDE APPWORLD (.BAR)

    MALWARE IS A PERSONAL APSUBTYPE IN TERMS OF RIMs S

    THE FILE SYSTEM ISSUES

    BB OS v45 WAS ACCESSIBLE BB OS V67 PLUS PLAYBOOK ARE AC

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    THE UPGRADE FEATURE MEANS

    THE INSTALL & REMOVE ACTIONS AT LEAST

    AN APPLICATION ID REQUIREMENT

    AN ACCESSIBLE RUNNING APPLICATION LIST

    HANDLING ANOTHER APPs SILENTLY VIA API

    HANDLING ANOTHER APPLICATION SILENTLY VIAPC TOOLS

    MAY NEED A PASSWORD

    DEBUG MODE IS FOR TRACING &

    DEBUGING ONLY

    EASY TRACKING THE NEWCOMING .COD

    MODULES FOR THE MALWARE PAYLOAD

    THE UPGRADE MEANS AN USE

    WITH APPWORLD

    WITH HOME SCREEN

    THERE ARE SOME APIs BUT DIS

    THERE IS NO API FOR SUCH ACT

    HANDLING ANOTHER APPLICATIPC TOOLS

    MAY NEED A PASSWORD

    STRONGLY NEED ACTIVAT

    MODE

    LOOKS LIKE MORE SECURE THAN

    DIFFICULT TO REMOVE DISTRIBU

    THE APPLICATION MANAGEMENT IS

    BLACKBERRY SMARTPHONE (LESS THAN BB 10) BLACKBERRY PLAYBOOK (PROBABLY

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    HOW TO REVEAL THE DATA IN REAL TIME

    GETCLIPBOARD()

    ANY PROTECTION

    NATIVE WALLETS RESTRICT THE CLIPBOARD

    ACCESS BY RETURNING NULL WHILE THE APPLICATION IS ACTIVE (ON

    TOP OF SCREEN STACK) ONLY

    DOES NOT WORK IN MINIMIZED STATE

    HOW TO REVEAL THE DATA IN R

    GETDATA()

    ANY PROTECTION

    NO NATIVE WALLET APPL

    MANAGING THE LAST CLSHARED FOLDER

    PLAIN TEXT

    HTML

    ETC.

    THE CLIPBOARD ISSUES

    BLACKBERRY SMARTPHONE BLACKBERRY PLAYBOOK

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    SCREEN PROTECTION VIA SWITCHING

    PERMIT

    RESTRICT

    ADDITIONALLY PER APPLICATION.

    BUT DOES NOT HANDLE WINDOWs

    HANDLE WITH THE KEY PREVIEW DUE THEVIRTUAL KEYBOARD

    MAY BE IMPROVED BY XORing TWO

    PHOTOSCREENS TO GET THE DIFFERENCE

    MASKING THE ASTERISKS TAKES A DELAY

    ENOUGH TO STEAL THE TEXT

    MAY BE PART OF OCR ENGINES

    ONLINE OR DESKTOP

    RECOGNIZE TYPED DATA

    WAS TESTED ON ABBYY O

    SUBSTITUTE FOR HARDWARE KE

    RUNNING DOWN THE BATTERRYTHAN PHOTO/VIDEO CAMERA

    EASY ACCESS TO ANY APPLICATI

    NO RESTRICTION LIKE THE CLIPB

    SCREENSHOTS OFTEN STORE IN

    THE SAME A FILE ACCESS

    THE PHOTOSCREEN ISSUES

    ARE AVAILABLE FOR ALL BLACKBERRY DEVICES BUT DISABLED FOR PLAYBOOK AND BLACK

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    USING AUTHORIZED API TO INTERCEPT

    MESSAGES (BBM, EMAIL, PIN-TO-PIN)

    CREATE THE MESSAGE

    READ THE MESSAGE

    DELETE THE MESSAGE

    SET THE MESSAGE STATUS (UNREAD,SENT, ANY ERROR STATE, ETC.)

    THE BUTTON EVENTS (THE SAME TYPES)

    OPENING THE MESSAGE

    FORWARDING THE MESSAGE

    SENDING THE MESSAGE

    INTERCEPTING THE SMS (BASICA

    RECEIVING AND SENDING

    DELETING THE SENT & R

    ENOUGH TO HANDLE SO

    OUTCOMING SMS (ADVANCED)

    BLOCKING (DROPPING) T A NOTIFICATION IN THE M

    SPOOFING

    THE RECEPIENT

    THE BODY

    TRANSMISSION RE

    SUCH MESSAGE W

    THE MESSAGES ISSUES

    AVAILABLE ON THE BB DEVICES PROBABLY ON THE BLACKBERRY 10 NO 3G, NO AP

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    THE PASSWORD PROTECTION COVERS

    DEVICE LOCKING & ENCRYPTION FEATURE

    APPWORLD REQUEST

    LIMITED BY 5/10 ATTEMPTS & WIPE THEN

    WIPING THE INTERNAL STORAGE ONLY

    EXTRACTING THE PASSWORD TRHOUGHT ELCOMSOFT PRODUCT (CUSTOM CASE)

    GUI VULNERABILITY

    CREATING THE FAKE WINDOW ON

    DESKTOP SYNCHRONIZATION

    BREAKING INTO BB DESKTOP SOFTWARE

    HANDLING MS WINDOWS VULN

    UNMASKING THE FIELD

    GRABBING THE PASSWO

    MASKING THE FIELD

    THIS DELAY TAKES 10-20

    AFFECTED PASSWORD TYPES THE DEVICE PASSWORD

    THE BACKUP PASSWORD

    AFFECTED DEVICES

    BLACKBERRY 4-7 (BB 10

    BLACKBERRY PLAYBOOK

    THE DEVICE PASSWORD ISSUES

    FOR THE BLACKBERRY 47 DUE THE INTERNAL CASE FOR ALL DEVICES DUE IN THE DESK

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    INITIALLY BASED ON AUTHORIZED API COVERED

    ALL PHYSICAL & NAVIGATION BUTTONS

    TYPING THE TEXTUAL DATA

    AFFECT ALL NATIVE & THIRD PARTY APPs

    SECONDARY BASED ON ADDING THE MENU ITEMS

    INTO THE GLOBAL MENU INTO THE SEND VIA MENU

    AFFECT ALL NATIVE APPLICATIONS

    NATIVE APPLICATIONS ARE DEVELOPED BY RIM

    BLACKBERRY WALLETS, MESSAGES,

    SETTINGS, FACEBOOK, TWITTER,

    BBM/GTALK/YAHOO/WINDOWS IMs,

    GUI EXPLOITATION HANDLES WI

    REDRAWING THE SCREEN

    ADDING NEW GUI OBJEC

    CHANGING THEIR PROPE

    GRABBING THE TEXT FRO

    ANY FIELDs (INCL.

    UNLOCK THE DEVI

    SETTING UP THE P

    ADDING, REMOVING THE

    ORIGINAL DATA IS INACCESSIBL

    AFFECTED

    GUI OBJECTS SHUFFLING IS NOT

    THE GUI EXPLOITATION

    CONSEQUENCE OF WIDE INTERGRATION FEATURES OFFERED FOR DEVELOPERS (BLACKBE

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    KASPERSKY MOBILE SECURITY PROVIDES

    FIREWALL, WIPE, BLOCK, INFO FEATURES

    NO PROTECTION FROM REMOVING.CODs

    NO PROTECTION UNDER SIMULATOR

    EXAMING THE TRAFFIC, BEHAVIOUR

    SHOULD CHECK API IS SIMULATOR SMS MANAGEMENT (QUITE SECRET SMS)

    PASSWORD IS FOUR SIXTEEN DIGITS SET

    AND CAN BE MODIFIED IN REAL-TIME

    SMS IS A HALF A HASH VALUE OF GOST R

    34.11-94

    IMPLEMENTATION USES TEST CRYPTO

    VALUES AND NO SALT

    TABLES (VALUEHASH

    OUTCOMING SMS CAN B

    WITHOUT ANY NOTIFICA

    OUTCOMING SMS CAN B

    THE SAME DEVICE OR AN

    McAfee MOBILE SECURITY PROV

    FIREWALL, WIPE, BLOCK NO PROTECTION FROM R

    NO PROTECTION UNDER

    EXAMING THE TRA

    SHOULD CHECK AP

    WEB MANAGEMENT CO

    DIFFICULT TO BREAK SM

    THE THIRD PARTY EXPLOITATIO

    THERE ARE A FEW OF THEM THEY MIGHT HAVE AN EXPLOIT BUT RUIN NA

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    DENIAL OF SERVICE

    REPLACING/REMOVING EXEC FILES

    DOSing EVENTs, NOISING FIELDS

    GUI INTERCEPT

    INFORMATION DISCLOSURE

    CLIPBOARD, SCREEN CAPTURE

    GUI INTERCEPT

    DUMPING .COD FILES, SHARED FILES

    MITM (INTERCEPTION / SPOOFING)

    MESSAGES

    GUI INTERCEPT, THIRD PARTY APPs

    FAKE WINDOW/CLICKJACKING

    GENERAL PERMISSIONS

    INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC SUB-PE

    A FEW NOTIFICATION/EVENT

    BUILT PER APPLICATION INST

    CONCRETE PERMISSIONS

    BUT COMBINED INTO GENER

    A SCREENSHOT PERMISSIONCAMERA

    GENERAL PERMISSIONS

    INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC SUB-P

    A FEW NOTIFICATION/EVENT

    BUILT PER APPLICATION INST

    THE PERMISSIONS

    PRIVILEGED GENERAL PERMISSIONS OWN APPs, NATIVE 3RD PARTY APP

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    SIMPLIFICATION AND REDUCING SECURITY CONTROLS

    MANY GENERAL PERMISSIONS AND COMBINED INTO EACH OTHER

    NO LOGs ACTIVITY FOR SUB-PERMISSIONS TO PROVE THE TRANSPARENCY

    ANY SECURITY VULNERABILITY ARE ONLY FIXED BY ENTIRELY NEW AND DIFFERENT OS / KER

    A FEW PERMISSIONs ARE CLOSED TO THE USER ACTIONS

    THE SANDBOX PROTECT ONLY APPLICATION DATA

    USERS HAVE TO STORE THEIR DATA INTO SHARED FOLDERS OR EXTERNAL STORAGE APPLICATIONS CONTINUE STORE DATA IN PUBLIC FOLDERs BECAUSE GOVERNED BY CHANC

    MITM / INTERCEPTION ACTIONS ARE OFTEN SILENTLY

    THE NATIVE SPOOFING AND INTERCEPTION FEATURES

    BLACKBERRY ENTERPRISE SOLUTION / BLACKBERRY MOBILE FUSION IS NOT EFFECTIVE MUC

    THE BEST SECURITY (PERMISSIONS) RULED BY AMAZON WEB SERVICES

    PERMISSIONS SHOULD RELY ON THE DIFFERENT USEFUL CASES SET INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC PE

    CONCLUSION

    THE VENDOR SECURITY VISION HAS NOTHING WITH REALITY AGGRAVATED BY

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    THAN

    YU