PDF Vol 12 No 02 693-728 Positivism Special Bust Am Ante FINAL

8/7/2019 PDF Vol 12 No 02 693-728 Positivism Special Bust Am Ante FINAL

1/36

SpecialIssue

TheManyFatesofLegalPositivism

CommentonPetroskiOnMacCormicksPostPositivismByThomasBustamante

*

A. Introduction

In her thoughtprovoking paper Is PostPositivism Possible?, Karen Petroski argues thattherearecertaininstitutionalconditionsinthemodernsettingofscholarlyactivitythatmakepositivismtheinevitable(ornearlyinevitable)formoftheoreticalthinkingaboutthelaw. Furthermore, she also claims that there is nothing in Neil MacCormicks post

positivismthatshouldleadustobelievethathislegaltheoryisqualitativelydifferentfrompositivism,whichaccording toPetroskiconstitutesthemainstreamAngloAmerican legalphilosophy. Herargument isthatthere isaparallelbetweenthecharacteristicsof lawand thecharacteristicsof the theoreticaldiscourseabout law.

1 Law,as theobjectof

legal theory,shareswith legaltheoretical inquiry (or,morebroadly,withmostacademicdiscoursesinthemodernsociety)someinstitutionalconditionsthatmakelegalpositivismnot merely a defensible mode of theorizing about the law, but an irresistible orinescapableone.

2

Even though thereareother interesting topics inPetroskispaper, Iwill concentrateondiscussingthesetwoclaims. Although Iamwell impressedbysomeofthearguments inPetroskispaper,Icannotshareherthesisthatlegaltheoryisconstrainedbysomesortof

institutionalcontext,

which

rules

out

the

possibility

of

post

positivism

(Petroskis

first

thesis),andIalsodoubtherclaimthatNeilMacCormickfailstoprovidearealalternativeto the current versions of legal positivism (Petroskis second thesis). In the followingsections Iarguethatthe firstthesisderivesbothfromtoostrictanunderstandingoftheroles of philosophy and legal scholarship and from a questionable description of thenecessary features of law. Moreover, I attempt to highlight some of the features ofMacCormicks latest legal theory that demonstrate that he moves beyond the limitedhorizonsofpositivism.

*AdjunctProfessor,FederalUniversityofMinasGerais,Brazil.Email: [email protected]. Theauthorwouldlike to thankMtys Bdig, Tams Gyrfi, Scott Styles, Zenon Bakowski, Andrs Jakab, Karen Petroski, and

AntonioCavalcantiMaiafortheirvaluablecommentsonpreviousdraftsofthispaper.

1KarenPetroski,IsPostpositivismPossible?,12GERM.L.J.670(2011).

2Id.at673.


2/36

[Vol.12No.02694 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lMyanalysisisstructuredinthefollowingway. Inthefirstpartofthepaper,dividedintwo

sections, I summarize Petroskis main arguments for the alleged predominance ofpositivism in theAngloAmericancontextand for theclaim thatpostpositivism isnotarealalternativetothecontemporaryeffortsinthefieldoflegaltheory. InsectionB.I,Itryto determine the best interpretation of Petroskis argument to explain the connectionbetweenthefeaturesoflegaltheoryandthefeaturesoflegalpractice,whichaccordingtoherexplanationmakepositivismthemostattractivetypeoflegaltheory. InsectionB.II,Icriticizethisviewandattempttoelucidatethenatureoftheargumentsthatwecanfindinlegalphilosophy,aswellastherelationshipbetweensuchargumentsandthepracticeoflaw. InPartC, in turn, I focuson the specific criticisms thatPetroski addresses toNeilMacCormickspostpositivism. ThefirstsubsectionrestatesPetroskispointsagainstthelateversionofMacCormicksinstitutionaltheoryoflaw,andtheremainingofthepaperisdedicated to showing what answers in MacCormicks legal theory we could find to

Petroskis

criticisms.

B. LegalScholarshipandLegalDiscourse

I. PetroskisArgumentforthePredominanceofPositivism

Petroski starts her argument for the first thesis by referring to an emerging literaturewhichargues that, sinceearlymoderndays, theacademicdomainhasbeenmoreandmore characterized by the policing of membership through extensive discursiveindoctrinationandtheevaluationofvariousformsofdiscursiveperformance.

3 Sheclaims

thatthemodernuniversityhassomedistinctivematerialandformalfeaturesthatimposeasetofconstraintsintheformsofknowledgeproducedwithinitsboundaries. Thoseactingwithin the institution of the modern university are depicted as depending on some

externalsupportwhichcanonlybeachievedbytherecognitionofaspecialexpertisethatjustifies their activities to social actors outside the institutions. At the same time, theinstitutionalstructureisdescribedaslargelyselfreproducing,andsuchselfreproductionoccursprimarilythroughaspecialtypeofdiscourse.

4 Thesefeaturesmakethestructure

a competitive arena, and the resulting competition encourages academics to drawdistinctionsbetween theirpositionsand thoseof their forebearsandcontemporaries.

5

Thetypicalstrategyofacademicsinthesocialsciences,andinlawinparticular,wouldbetomakefractaldistinctionswhichencouragerhetoricalinnovationevenwhenatheoristisnottrulymakinganovelpoint.

6

3Id.at677.

4Id.at678.

5Id.at678.

6Id.at678.


3/36

2011] 695CommentonPetroski

Inasimilarway,thepracticallegaldiscourseismarkedbythesametypeofindoctrination.

Liketheacademy,theargumentgoes,thesetoflegalinstitutionsisbothmateriallyandconceptually selfperpetuating. Materially,lawyersexpertise in thediscourseused tonavigatetheinstitutionsregulatingstatepowersensurestheircontinuedsupportbynonlawyers.

7 On the formal level, in turn, lawyers adopt a theoretical perspectivewhich

helpsthemtoexcludecertainreasonsforactionfromthesetofmaterialsavailableinlegalreasoning. Asintheacademicdomain,thisselfreferentialcharacteroflawtakesafractalform and creates a status hierarchy for the experts that master the nuances of legallanguage.

Inmy reading Petroski argues that both the academic discourse and themodern legaldomain are selfreferential; dependant on some sort of indoctrination and fractaldistinctions;inneedofmasteringaspecialdiscoursewhichjustifytheiractivitiestoactors

outside

their

realm;

exclusive

or

certain

reasons;

and

self

perpetuating.

But

why

are

these

common features relevant for the debate over postpositivism? How do these parallelfeaturesofeachoftheseintellectualdomainsinfluencetheother?

Ifweacceptthatthereismorethanasimplehistoricalcoincidencebetweenthecharacterof legal theoretical inquiry and the features of legal discourse, then there are twoalternative interpretationsavailableforthisparallelbetween legalpracticeandacademicscholarship.

Thefirst interpretationexplainsthedominanceofpositivismonthebasisofthefeaturesthat Petroski attributes to the legal practice. At first sight, the author appears to befollowingthisroute inthebeginningofthesecondsectionofherpaper. Nevertheless,ifwe look closely enoughwe can see that any attempt to explain the features of legal

theorysacademicdiscourseon thebasisof the features thatPetroski attributes to thelegalpracticewillbeveryfragile. This lineofargumentpresupposesfromtheoutsetthecorrectionofpositivism,whichispreciselywhatitintendstodemonstrate. Theargumentwouldbecircular,sincethedescriptionofthe legaldomainasnecessarilyselfreferentialandexclusiveofanynonlegalreasonsalreadycoincideswiththekeyassumptionsoflegalpositivism. If we define positivism as the theory according to which the law is selfreferential(inthesensethatitregulatestheprocessofitsowncreationandsetsatestforclearly distinguishing between legal and nonlegal rules) and exclusionary of certainreasons (whether this feature is interpreted in a strict sense according to which thesources of law are to be found in social facts alone or in a broader sense thatwouldexcludeonlythesetofreasonswhicharenotincorporatedbytheruleofrecognition),thenit becomes obvious that this interpretation of the relationship between law and legal

scholarship

simply

begs

the

question,

for

the

features

that

are

attributed

to

law

or

legal

practice coincide with some of the theoretical theses about the law held by most

7Id.at679.


4/36

[Vol.12No.02696 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lcontemporarypositivists. To follow this strategywouldbe saying something like legal

theory defines the law as selfreferential and exclusionary because the law is selfreferentialandexclusionary,which seems like a tautology. It isquestionable, thus, toclaimthatlegaltheoriststendtobepositivistsbecauseofanyempiricalfeatureofthelegalsystems.

Nevertheless,torefutethisfirstinterpretationisnotenoughtodismantlePetroskispoint.OnecanseefromhertextthatPetroskiisawareofthisproblemwhenshesaysthatsheisnotactuallyadvocatingthatlegaltheoryislogicallyconstrainedtobepositivistduetotheempiricalfeaturessheattributestolegaldiscourse:

My point is not that legal theory inevitably adoptsthese features because it is impelled to take on the

features

of

the

subject

matter

it

is

explaining

(either

becausethisisnecessaryforthecompleteexplanationorbecause it isakindof irresistibletemptation). It is,rather,thatbecauseoftheparallelsocialfunctionsandhistorical paths of these two practiceslegal practiceand theoretical inquirythey in fact share certainfeatures, at least when they are regarded from acertainperspective.

8

Thisquotation shows that thebestway to read the thesisof theparallelbetween legalpracticeandacademicdiscourseisbyacceptingnotthatthefeaturesoflawinfluencethetheoretical understanding of legal theorists, but rather that the features of academicdiscourseareprojected in thewayscholarsdescribethe law. Therewouldstillbesome

sortofirresistible temptation forpositivism,but itscausewouldnotbeany featureoftheobjectofinquiryoflegaltheorists(thelaw),butratherasetoffeaturesoftheinquiryitself. This is the second interpretation of the connection between the character ofpractical legaldiscourseand thatof legaltheoretical inquiry. Ican find support for thissecond reading in Petroskis own words, when she holds that the institutional andconceptualdynamicswithineachdomainprovide strong incentives for thoseworking ineachtofixateonjustthesefeatures.

9 Thesamephenomenonwouldthusoccurinboth

institutionalcontexts: On theonehand, lawyers tend to interpretthe law ina legalisticwaybecauselegalreasoningisembeddedinanexclusivistdiscursivepattern;ontheotherhand, theorists tend todescribe thenatureof law inapositivisticwaybecauseof someinstitutional restraints over the sphere in which they operate. Does this secondinterpretationoftheparallelconnectionsbetweenlegaldiscourseandlegalpracticemake

Petroskis

thesis

more

acceptable

than

the

first

one?

8Id.at680.

9Id.at680(emphasisadded).


5/36


Anargumentforthesecondinterpretationcouldbeplausibleifpositivismweretheonlyortheoverwhelminglydominantwayofthinkingaboutthenatureoflaw. Nonetheless,theimpactofsuchinstitutionalandconceptualdynamicsincontemporarylegaltheoryisnotthatevident. Nonaturallawyer,pragmatistornonpositivist ingeneralwoulddefinethelawasentirelyselfreferentialandexclusionaryofallnonlegalreasonsinastrictsense.

10

Nocompellinginstitutionalfactorinthestructureofthemodernuniversitiesseemstoberequiringsuch theoriststodoso. Furthermore, Ibelieve thatPetroskis ideasabout thesocial functions of law and legal theory are unconvincing, for at least two correlatedreasons. Ontheonehand,theonlysocialfunctiononecanidentifyforlegalpracticeinherparadigmistoexerciseanaristocraticdominationoverthemassofnonlawyersbymeansofanobscurediscoursewhich isclosedwithinitself. Thisseemstobemoreapathologythanagenuinesocialfunction. Ontheotherhand,ifthisdescriptionoflegaltheorywere

correct,

then

the

theoretical

inquiry

about

law

would

suffer

from

self

imposed

limitations

whichwouldkeepitawayfromanyinterestingreallifeproblem. Legaltheorywouldnotbeable toachievewhat itpurports todo, since itwouldneitherbeable toexplain thenormativityoflawnorcontributetojustifyrelevantdecisionsaboutthenatureoflaw. Aswe will see in the next section, legal philosophy itself would lose one of its centralfunctions.

II. TheCriticalDimensionofLegalTheory

Although Petroski intends to explain positivism in sociological terms, I believe that thedebatebetweenpositivistsandnonpositivistsisaphilosophicalone,andthatitcannotberesolvedwithoutaproperunderstandingofthenatureof legalphilosophy. WecanseefromPetroskisdescriptionof thecharacterof legaltheoreticaldiscourses that she sees

legal theorists as (at least in part) strategic actors who operate within a competitiveenvironmentthatisclosedwithinitselfandexcludesallthereasonsthatfalloutsideofthescopeofitsowndiscursivepattern. Insteadofactingcriticallyagainstthisframework,legaltheoristscultivateitandreproduceitbecausetheycanonlyachievestatus,authorityandexpertisebystickingtosuchdiscourseanddifferentiatingitfromthecompetingdiscoursesbymeansoffractaldistinctions. Tomoveoutofthiscontextwouldbeagainsttheinterestsofthetheoristherself.

10Anatural lawyerwouldhavetosaythatthenormativityof lawis justifiedbysomeobjectivemoralprinciples

which cannotbeentirelyexcluded frompractical legal reasoning. Seegenerally JOHN FINNIS,NATURAL LAW ANDNATURALRIGHTS (1979). Apragmatistwouldneverdeny that reasonsofpolicyandarguments fromothernonstrictly institutionalizedmaterialsplayanimportantpart in legalargumentation,althoughshewouldtendtobe

skeptical about the role ofmoral principles in legal practice. See generally RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF

JURISPRUDENCE (1993). A nonpositivist like Dworkin or Alexy, finally, would argue that the key principles ofpoliticalmoralityare inanycasepartofthematerialsthat lawyersuse intheirpracticalactivity. SeegenerallyROBERT ALEXY, THE ARGUMENT FROM INJUSTICE: A REPLY TO LEGAL POSITIVISM (2002); RONALDDWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE(1986).


6/36

[Vol.12No.02698 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lIfPetroskisanalysisoflawandoftheoreticalthinkingiscorrect,boththelegalsystemand

legal philosophy could be described in the sameway that Jrgen Habermas describedNiklasLuhmannssociologyoflaw.

Assodescribed,thelegalsystemisarecursivelyclosedcircuitofcommunicationthatselfreferentiallydelimitsitself from itsenvironment,withwhich ithas contactonly through observations....[T]he system describesits own components in legal categories and employsthese selfthematizations for the purposes ofconstituting and reproducing legal acts by its ownmeans.

11

The

problem

of

Luhmanns

12

autopoietic

theory

of

law,

Habermas

argues,

is

that

its

empiricist interpretationofthe legalsystemassumesthat it isdetached fromall internalrelations tomorality and politics. The law is reduced to the special function of theadministrationof law,and the interpreteror the theorist loses sightof theconnectionbetween law and the constitutional organization of the origin, acquisition, and use ofpoliticalpower.

13 If the law isunderstoodasanautopoietic socialsystem,onecannot

account for its social normativity and its proper social functions in the context of apluralisticand secularsocietywhichcanno longer relyonmetaphysicalarguments fromnaturallaw. Stripedofitsnormativeconnotationsthatoncewerebackedbymetaphysicalnatural law,butwhichcanno longer findany roomwhen the law isobserved from theoutside and characterized as an entirely autonomous social system, the law becomesnarcissisticallymarginalizedandcanonlyreactto itsownproblems. Inshort,amutualindifferencebetweenthelawandallothersocialsystemsisassumedbytheinterpreter.

14

Thismutual indifference,Habermaswouldsay,hastheconsequencethatthe lawcannolongerfindaproperjustification,foritsnormativityisheavilycompromised.

Whoeverisrightinthispoint,HabermasorLuhmann,itmustbestressedthatthisdebateismorefruitfulasadebateaboutthelawthanasoneaboutthecharacteroftheoreticalinquiryover itsnature. In fact,onecanmakeverygoodarguments to support,againstHabermas, the claim that the law is a closed and selfreferential systemwhich can beidentifiedbymeansofa strictlyempiricalanalysis,withoutanyconsiderationabout theroleplayedbypoliticsormorality in itscreationandadministration. This is, infact,how

11 JRGENHABERMAS,BETWEEN FACTS ANDNORMSCONTRIBUTIONS TO ADISCOURSE THEORYOF LAW ANDDEMOCRACY49

(1996).

12SeegenerallyNIKLASLUHMANN,LAWASASOCIALSYSTEM(2008).

13HABERMAS,supranote11,at50.

14Id.at51.


7/36


one of the most powerful legal theories of our time explains the validity of a law.

AccordingtoJosephRaz,thevalidlawshouldnecessarilybeidentifiedinawaythatisfreefromanypoliticalormoralconnotations,sinceitssourcescomefromsocialfactsalone. Toincludemoralprinciplesoranytypeofnonauthoritativeconsiderations inthetestsusedto distinguish legal rules from other social norms would undermine the authoritativecharacteroflegalnorms,whichisitsdistinctivefeature. Whenlegalofficialsaresetouttoapplythelaw,theyareguidedbypositiveauthoritativeconsiderationswhoseexistenceand content can be assertedwithout resort tomoral judgment.

15 Law, in this theory,

consistsonlyof suchpositive authoritative considerations. When stateofficials identifyand apply the law, their personal action is situated not on the deliberative stage ofpracticalreasoning,butratherontheexecutivestage,inwhichthequestionwhatoughttobedone isansweredwithout resort toany typeofmoralorpoliticalargument.

16 As in

Luhmann,wecannoticeinRazastressonanintrinsicformofrationalityinlegalreasoning,

which

is

conducted

in

an

entirely

autonomous

practical

context.

If

that

is

the

case,

one

mightaskwhetherthisautonomyappliesalsotothetheoreticalinquiryaboutthenatureof law,asPetroski suggests. Canweconceiveof legal theoryas strictly separated fromother fieldsof inquiry suchaspoliticsandmorality? Do legal theoristsneed toconfinethemselvestoanyparticulartypeofreason?

Myviewisthatbothofthesequestionsshouldbeansweredinthenegative. Evenwithintherealmoflegalpositivism,fewarethetheoristswhounequivocallyagreewithPetroskionthispoint. Austin,Kelsen,andHartarepossiblythebestexamplesofthisapproach,butthey seem to be in a minority (even though they are prominent thinkers within thepositivisttradition),andIdonotthinkthattheyarerightinthis. Theyseemtobelievethattheoretical inquiry shouldbeentirelyneutral. Nomoral,ethicalorpragmaticargumentshould be used to back up a particular theoretical conception of law. In Kelsens

perspective, for instance, science is theonly formof knowledgeworth pursuing, and itmust proceed either by means of empirical observation or by strict logical andmathematical analysis. The theorist ismotivated solelybyher faith in science and thepursuit of the truth. She has no ideological ambitions and is determined to free heranalysisfromtheprejudicesandpreconceptionsthatareusuallyfoundinethics,morality,politics,psychology,biology,andreligion. AsKelsenwritesintheopeningpageofthePureTheoryofLaw,legaltheoryisatheoryofpositivelaw,andassuchitaimssolelyatthecognitionof its subjectmatter; that is to say: Legal theory is legal science,not legalpolicy.

17 Bythesametoken,Austins imperativetheoryof law isstronglycommittedto

anempiricistapproach,asisvisibleinoneofhismostfamouspassages,whereheargues

15JOSEPHRAZ,ETHICSINTHEPUBLICDOMAIN: ESSAYSINMORALITYOFLAWANDPOLITICS189(1994).

16Id.at190.

17HANSKELSEN,INTRODUCTIONTOTHEPROBLEMSOFLEGALTHEORY7(1992).


8/36

[Vol.12No.02700 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lthatthematterof jurisprudence ispositive law,simplyandstrictlysocalled.

18 Finally,

Harts view of jurisprudence as a form of descriptive sociology19 is even morecharacteristicofthisneutralmethodologicalpointofview.

Inmyview,Petroskiseemstobelievethatit isfeasibletoanalyzethe legalphenomenonwith the kind of neutrality that is advocated by the strand of descriptive positivismmentioned justabove. If thatwere the case, itwouldappear reasonable toargue thatlegaltheoryisboundtobepositivistbecauseofthemethodologicalattitudeofthemajorlegal theorists,whoby large excludepolitical, pragmatic, andmoral reasons from theirtheoretical inquiry about the nature of law. This is, in fact, the root of my deepestdisagreementwithPetroski. Iamnotconvincedthatanyserioustheoreticalaccountofthelegalphenomenoncanfreeitselffromthekindofreasonsthatarefoundinpolitics,ethicsor morality. As a matter of fact, I can think of no AngloAmerican positivist whose

arguments

in

support

of

his

or

her

own

theory

are

neither

moral

nor

political

in

nature.

In

these matters, I think that Dworkin is right when he claims that any theory of law,includingpositivism,isbased intheendonsomeparticularnormativepoliticaltheory.

20

Lawisacontestedpoliticalconceptwhichtakesitssensefromitsuse,fromthecontextsof debates aboutwhat the law is, and fromwhat turns onwhich view is accepted.

21

According to Dworkin, positivists who claim that their theories are merely a sort oflinguistic study or descriptive sociology potentially do not understand their ownarguments.

22 Everythesisaboutthenatureof law ispartlygrounded inanargumentof

politicalmorality.

IfonelooksatthefiveauthorsthatPetroskiquotesinsupportofherargumentthatlegaltheoryisboundtoremainpositivistbecauseofthekeyfeaturesofjurisprudentialinquiry,one should be able to see that none of them excludedmoral and political reasons in

supportofhistheory. Inmyopinion,neitherHobbesnorBentham,Austin,Hart,orRazhasproduced a legal theorywith all the features pointed out by Petrosky. None of thesetheoriesisselfreferentialorexclusiveofallmoralandpoliticalconsiderations.

Hobbes,forinstance,isasmuchanaturallawyerasheisoneofthefoundersofpositivism.Thelawsofnaturearedescried in theLeviathanasimmutableandeternal,and thescienceofthese laws isthetrueandonlymoralphilosophy.

23 Althoughheisskeptical

18JOHNAUSTIN,THEPROVINCEOFJURISPRUDENCEDETERMINED1(1832).

19H.L.A.HART,THECONCEPTOFLAW(2ded.1994).

20RonaldDworkin,AReply,inRONALDDWORKINANDCONTEMPORARYJURISPRUDENCE254(MarshallCohened.,1984).

21Id.at256.

22Id.at255.

23THOMASHOBBES,LEVIATHANpara.,I.15(1651).


9/36


aboutanynatural inclinationofmankindtowardsthese laws,for inthestateofnature

the laws of nature cannot determine human action, he shareswith classical naturallawyerstheviewthatpeopleareabletodiscoverwhattheselawsofnaturearebyusingtheirpractical reason. Whenhumansdo that,Hobbesargues, theyare likely to formacommonwealthinwhichmenarenolongerapttoactonthesocalledrightofnatureorthelibertyeachmanhathtousehisownpowerashewillhimselfforthepreservationofhis own nature...or his own life.

24 These views are more than enough to classify

Hobbesasanaturallawyer,forheadmitsboththatthereisanaturallawtheexistenceofwhich does not depend on any positive or institutional act and that the positive lawscreatedbythecivilsocietyfindtheirjustificationinsuchnaturallaws. Hence,Hobbescanonlybereadasapositivist ifoneunderstandsthis labelasnotnecessarilyantagonisttowhat natural lawyers have to say. Moreover, Petroskis belief thatHobbeswas undersome sortofconstraintbecauseof thebasicconceptualvocabulary thatheusesdoes

not

seem

to

me

entirely

accurate

from

a

historical

point

of

view,

since

it

misses

the

point

aboutHobbespoliticalmotivations for the kindof theoryhe advocated. Hobbes livedthroughoneofthemostvolatilemomentsinBritishhistory,andhewrotewithaviewtoprovide a practical and political justification for absolute Monarchy, which was in hisopiniontheonlywayoutoftheEnglishCivilWar. Hence,althoughPetroskiisrightwhenshe argues that Hobbes and other positivists described the legal system as onewhichsuspends the operation of certain reasons for action and that has selfreferentialfeatures,

25thesamecannotbesaidabouttheinquiryortheresearchthatthesetheorists

undertook. Despite the initial appearances, the actual inquiry of Hobbes and hissuccessorsisneitherselfreferentialnorexclusive.

Toillustratethatpoint,onecanthinkofthecaseofBentham. Eventhoughsomescholarsas important as Hart interpret his theory as a predominantly descriptive or neutral

theoreticalenterprise,26thebest readingofhis ideas istheonethat recognizesthattherole of his analytical jurisprudence is subservient to what he called the art oflegislation.

27 Benthamspositivismhasmoralroots. Hedefinesalawinapositivisticway

becausehebelievesthat indoingsohe isfollowingtheprincipleofutility. Asaformofutilitarianpositivism,Benthamsconceptualtheoryisbasedonaparticularviewabouttheproperfunctionoflaw,afunctionwhichcannotbeunderstoodinpurelylegalterms.

28

24Id.,para.,I.14.

25Petroski,supranote1,at682.

26H.L.A.HART,ESSAYSONBENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCEANDPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY2139(1982).

27PhilipSchofield,JeremyBenthamandnineteenthcenturyEnglishjurisprudence12J.LEGALHIST.58,60(1991).

28ThebestdefenseofthisinterpretationofBenthamcanbefoundinGERALDPOSTEMA,BENTHAMANDTHECOMMON

LAWTRADITION(1986).


10/36

[Vol.12No.02702 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lEven Austin, who concentrated his legal theory on the socalled expository

jurisprudence,asopposedtothecensorial jurisprudence,mayhavehiddenmoralandpolitical reasons for his allegedly descriptive positivism. Benthams reformativeutilitarianism can be contrasted with Austins conservative use of the same principle.Whilst Bentham sees the principle of utility as a device for criticizing government andchanging the law into something better, Austin adopted a theological utilitarianismwhich presumed that itwas thewill ofGod that his creatures should be happy, andthereforethetheoryofutilityandthewillofGod...coincided.

29 UnlikeBentham,Austin

seemed to assume that the principle of utility had in practice commonly guided thelegislator. AsSchofieldnotices, whereasBenthams scientificversionofutilitarianismsubjectedexistingpracticesand institutions to thescrutinyof theprincipleofutility...,Austins theologicalutilitarianism tended tosee those samepracticesand institutionsas[already] embodying utility.

30 We can see, thus, that despite Austins claim that his

theory

was

neutral

and

purely

descriptive,

his

jurisprudence

could

not

be

separated

from

theconservativemoralpoliticalcontextinwhichitwasinitiallyproposed.

Hart,likewise,regardlessofhisfirmconvictionthathisaccountisdescriptiveinthatitismorallyneutralandhasno justificatoryaims,

31hasnotmanagedto freehis theoretical

inquiry from arguments of political morality. I can think of two of his most centralargumentsasgenuineexamplesof themoralpoliticalcommitmentsofhistheory,whichwillbeanalyzedinthefollowingparagraphs.

The first argumentwhichexemplifiesHartsmoralpolitical commitments appears in hisreply toRadbruchs postwar papers against positivism. In one of hismost celebratedessays, Hart heavily criticizes Radbruch and the German Constitutional Court for thedecisionsthatappliedthesocalledRadbruchsFormulaandthusdeniedlegalcharacter

toasetofNaziLawswhichimposedracistmeasuresonpeopleoftheJewishreligion. Inparticular,HartwasnotsatisfiedwiththereasoningprovidedbytheConstitutionalCourtto justify, ina setofcriminalcases, theconclusion that somestatutesare toounjust todeserveany formofobedience. Insteadof saying that the lawswhich legalizedmurderagainsttheJews lacked legalvaliditybecauseoftheirextreme injustice,Hartargues,thecourtshouldhaveadmittedthatthesestatuteshad indeed legalcharacter,althoughthelawinthatcasewastoowickedtobeobeyed. Inordertocorrectlyjustifyitsdecisions,thecourtshouldhaverecognizedthelegalcharacteroftheoldstatuteswhilecreatinganewlegalrulewithretrospectiveeffects. InHartsownwords:

29Schofield,supranote27,at63.

30Id.

31HART,THECONCEPTOFLAW,supranote19,at240(emphasisinoriginal).


11/36


Odious as retrospective criminal legislation and

punishmentmaybe, tohavepursued itopenly in thiscase would at least have the merits of candour. Itwouldhavemadeplainthatinpunishingthewomanachoice had to be made between two evils, that ofleaving her unpunished and that of sacrificing a verypreciousprincipleofmoralityendorsedbymost legalsystems. Surely ifwehave learnedanything fromthehistoryofmoralsitisthatthethingtodowithamoralquandaryisnottohideit.

32

Itisclear,therefore,thatoneofHartsmostfamousargumentsinreplytononpositivismisagenuinelymoralargument,whichhasverylittleneutralityinit. Apositivistdefinition

of

law

should

be

preferred

to

a

non

positivist

one

because

it

would

make

plain

the

sacrificesandthechoicesthatonehastomake inorderto impose legalobligationswithretrospectiveeffect.

Thesecondargument,ontheotherhand,isevenmoreexpressiveofthemoralorpoliticalpreferences of the author, for it clearly demonstrates that the allegedly descriptivetheoretical accountproposed inTheConceptof Lawhas importantnormativeelementsbuiltintoit. Hartscentralargumentinsupportoftheideathatalegalsystemmusthavenotonlyprimary rulesaccording towhichhumansare required todoorabstain fromcertain actions, but also secondary ruleswhich are concernedwith the primary rulesthemselves, isgroundedona reductioadabsurdum thatexposes the inadequaciesofapoliticalorganizationwhichusesonlytheformertypeofrules. Animaginarysocietywherethereareonlyprimaryrulesofobligationwouldsufferfromtheproblemsofuncertainty,

for therewouldbenoprocedure for settling any doubt about the validityof a rule; ofhavinga static character, for therewouldbenomeans, in such society, fordeliberatelyadaptingtheserulestonovelcircumstances;andof inefficiency,sincetherewouldbenoprocedure to keep the diffused social pressure by which rules are enforced andmaintained.

33 Itisbecauseofthisthatweneedsecondaryrulestoprovidearemedyfor

these three serious problems for any legal society. Nevertheless, asDworkin correctlyargues,suchconstructionisfarfrombeingneutralorpurelydescriptive,asHartclaimsittobe. Dworkinswordsaboutthispointareparticularlyilluminating:

He [Hart] develops his own account of the mainelements of law by showing how the device of asecondary rule of recognition responds to these

32H.L.A.Hart,PositivismandtheSeparationofLawandMorals,inTHEPHILOSOPHYOFLAW33(RonaldDworkined.,

1977).

33HART,supranote19,at9293.


12/36

[Vol.12No.02704 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lparticulardefectsbymakingpossibleanewsetofrules

thatare flexible,efficient,andcertain. This, Ibelieve,doessupportmysuggestionaboutthepoliticalbasisofpositivism.

34

If Dworkin is right about this, then Harts advocacy of neutrality in jurisprudence isinconsistent with his own theory, for the choice of his theoretical position is entirelydeterminedbypoliticalconsiderations. AsithappenswithHobbes,BenthamandAustin,Hartstheoreticalinquiryisfarfromexcludingallmoralandpoliticalreasons.

Lastbutnotleast,Razsphilosophyoflawappearstomeasanythingbutneutral. Firstofall,hehasneverattemptedtoavoidmoralreasonsinhistheoreticalproject. Althoughheholdsthatthelawconsistsonlyofpositiveauthoritativeconsiderations,whichimpliesthat

one

cannot

appeal

to

moral

or

political

arguments

in

order

to

answer

questions

about

the

validity of a particular rule, he does not deny that there is some sort of connectionbetweenlawandmoralityandthatthenormativityofalegalsystemshouldbeexplainedbymeansofmoral reasons. TheSeparabilityThesis, for instance, isexpresslydeniedbyRaz: [I]tisverylikelythatthereissomenecessaryconnectionbetweenlawandmorality,thateverylegalsysteminforcehassomemoralmeritordoessomemoralgoodevenifitisalsothecauseofagreatdealofmoralevil.

35 PerhapsoneofthekeystounderstandRazs

theory that the law is a system of authoritative rules is to look at the example ofarbitration,whichisoneofhismostfamous. Inthatscenario,eachofthepartieshasherownfirstorderreasonstodeterminehercourseofaction,butthesereasonsmayconflict.Whentwopersonshaveconflictingviewsaboutaparticulardecision,theymayagreetorefer the dispute to an arbitrator. If they do that, two features stand out: (1) Thearbitratorsdecisionisinitselfareasonforaction;and(2)Thearbitratorsdecisionmustbe

based on a set of firstorder reasons which apply to the disputants (or, in Razsterminology,dependentreasons). InRazsperspective,thearbitratorhasauthorityoverthedisputantsbecausehis judgmentover the reasons thatapply to them replaces theirown balancing of reasons. In agreeing to obey the decision [of the arbitrator], thedisputants agreed to follow his judgment of the balance of reasons rather than theirown.

36 Thisiswhathappensinthecaseoflegalsystems. Whenpeoplejointogetherto

formalegalcommunity,theyagreetoacceptanauthoritywhosejudgmentreplacesthatofthe individualactorsthemselves. Atthisstage,wecanseeclearlythepoliticalrootofRazsphilosophyoflaw. Peopleaccepttheauthorityoflawforprudentialreasons. Oneofthe central ideas to explain the normativity of law is what Raz calls the normaljustificationthesis,whichcanbestatedinthefollowingterms:

34Dworkin,supranote20,at255.

35RAZ,supranote15,at211.

36Id.at196.


13/36


[T]he normal way to establish that a person hasauthority over another person involves showing thatthe alleged subject is likely better to comply withreasons which apply to him...if he accepts thedirectives of the alleged authority as authoritativelybinding,andtriestofollowthem,ratherthanbytryingtofollowthereasonswhichapplytohimdirectly.

37

Lawsvalidityandbindingness canonlybe justifiedbymeansofprudential,political,ormoralreasons. Theauthorityoflawisjustifiedwhenpeoplearebetteroffwiththelawsjudgmentratherthanwiththeirown. Thewholeargument,thus,isconductedbypracticalreasons. Furthermore,oneofRazsbasicideasisthatthelawclaimslegitimateauthority,

and

such

legitimacy

means

that

the

authority

of

every

legal

agent

must

seek

for

a

kind

of

moraljustification. ToeliminateanydoubtsabouttheuseofpoliticalandmoralreasonsinRazstheoryoflegalauthority,wecanquotehisownwordsaboutit. Whentalkingabouthisownwritings,Razhasrecentlysaid: Imaintainthatnecessarilythelawclaimstohavelegitimateauthority,andthatthatclaimisamoralclaim.

38 Wecansee,thus,thatRazs

philosophyoflawalsodiffersfromPetroskischaracterizationoflegaltheoreticalinquiryasanentirelyneutralenterprise. This isenoughtoclaim,contrarytowhatPetroskithinks,that jurisprudence as a philosophical discipline neither is selfreferential nor excludesmoralandpoliticalconsiderations. Eveninthecaseofthosewhothinkthatthelawisanautonomous social system, theoretical inquiryover the law is hardly ever autonomous.Jurisprudence is philosophy applied to the law, and it plays a similar role to that ofphilosophyingeneral.

Oneofthemostinterestingquestionsaboutlegalphilosophyistounderstandthekindofstatements we find in it. Although one can think of many different methodologicalapproaches to legalphilosophy,whichcannotbeanalyzedhere, thatwhich seemsmostinteresting tome is theoneadvocatedbyRobertAlexy. Forhim, [l]egalphilosophy isargumentation about the nature of law, and any reflection about legal philosophy is,therefore,areflectionaboutthenatureofargumentsaboutthenatureoflaw.

39 Before

weunderstandthenatureofsuchreflection,however,weneedsomeclarificationaboutphilosophy itself. Howcanwedefinephilosophy? Again,this isoneofthemostdifficulttasks of philosophical discourse. Alexys answer is this: Philosophy is general andsystematic reflectionaboutwhat there is [ontology],whatought tobedoneor isgood

37JosephRAZ,THEMORALITYOFFREEDOM53(1986)(emphasisremoved).

38JOSEPHRAZ,THEAUTHORITYOFLAW: ESSAYSONLAWANDMORALITY315(2ded.2009).

39RobertAlexy,Thenatureof theargumentsabout thenatureof law, inRIGHTS,CULTUREANDTHELAWTHEMES

FROMTHELEGALANDPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYOFJOSEPHRAZ4(L.H.Meyeretal.eds.,2003).


14/36

[Vol.12No.02706 Ge rman L aw J ou rna l[ethics], and how knowledge about both is possible [epistemology].

40 This definition,

according to Alexy, has three corollaries of capital importance: Firstly, the fact thatphilosophy is a reflection presupposes a critical aspect that constitutes a normativedimension for philosophical inquiry; Philosophy as a necessarily reflective enterprisethereforenecessarilyhasanormativedimension.

41 Secondly,thegeneralandsystematic

characterofphilosophicalreflectionleadstoananalyticaldimension(whichisdefinedbytheattempttoidentifyandtomakeexplicitthefundamentalstructuresofthenaturalandsocialworld inwhichwe liveand the fundamentalconceptsandprinciplesbymeansofwhich we can grasp both worlds)

42 and, thirdly, to a synthetic dimension (which is

definedbytheattempttouniteallofthisintoacoherentwhole).43

We are now in a position to define legal philosophy. Legal philosophical inquiry is aphilosophical inquiry about the nature of law. Its differentia specifica consists in its

subject.

It

is,

thus,

a

general

and

systematic

reflection

about

what

there

is,

what

ought

to

be,andwhatcanbeknown,butwithspecificreferencetolaw.

Of course this conceptof legalphilosophy isdifferent from thatof some legal theoristswho might restrict its scope to what Alexy has called the analytical dimension.Nevertheless, this is not how most contemporary philosophers (as opposed to legalphilosophers)understandtheirowndiscipline,andthefactthattheconceptsandtheoriesdevelopedby legalphilosophyarequiteoftenused inpractice,at leastwhenitcomestopivotalcases, isan indicatorthatthe legaltheoreticalaccountsthatrestrictthescopeoflegalphilosophytoanalyticalorempiricalproblemstendtomisrepresentthefunctionofthetheoreticalinquiryaboutthelaw.

44

MymainreasonsfordisagreementwithPetroskiarethatifherdescriptionoflegaltheory

is correct, then jurisprudence lacks what I consider to be one of its crucial functions

40RobertAlexy,TheNatureofLegalPhilosophy17RATIOJURIS156,157(2004).

41Id.at158. ThesameargumentisfoundinALEXY,supranote39,at3.

42Alexy,supranote40,at158.

43Id.

44ThisispreciselywhatDworkinmeans,forinstance,whenheholdsthatinanylegaldisputethereisalwaysthe

possibilityofatheoreticaldisagreementaboutthe law. Inhardcases, judgesand lawyersmaydisagreenotonly about whether or not a particular act falls within the scope of a master rule such as Harts rule ofrecognition,butratheraboutthecontentofthemasterruleitself. Thecriteriononwhichonereliestoidentifythe law in a given casemaydependon the theory oneupholds to develop his conception of law. See,e.g.,

DWORKIN,supra

note10,at45. Topickupanexample, inadditiontothecasesquotedbyDworkin inthefirsttwochaptersofhisLAWSEMPIRE,wecanmentionthedecisionoftheHouseofLordsinJacksonv.HerMajestysAttorneyGeneral[2005]UKHL56. Inthiscase,theLawLordsdisagreednotonlyaboutthevalidityofaparticularrule,butabouttheruleofrecognitionitself. Fortheparticularsofthiscase,seeMichaelPlaxton,Theconceptoflegislation: JacksonandOthersvHerMajesty'sAttorneyGeneral,69MOD.L.REV.249,24961(2006).


15/36


accordingtoAlexysaccount,whichisthenormativeorcriticalone. WhateverdefectsNeil

MacCormicks legal theorymay have, the lack of a critical or normative standpoint forjurisprudential inquiry is not one of them. Inmy reading, his conception of law as aninstitutionalnormativeorderincludestheideathattheproperpurposeofsuchanorderistherealizationofjustice,andoneoftheconsequencesofthisconceptionisthatitjustifiesacriticalattitudetowardsactualinstitutionsoflawandstate.

45

C. MacCormicksPostPositivismandtheNatureofLegalArgumentation

I. PetroskisCriticismonMacCormicksPostPositivism

AccordingtoPetroski,NeilMacCormickistheonlylegaltheoristtohaveappliedtohimselfthelabelpostpositivistortohaveexplainedwhatthislabelactuallymeans. Sheclaims

that

the

use

of

the

prefix

post

implies

that

the

root

tradition

is

no

longer

viable

in

its

original form, and that this is the sense inwhichMacCormick uses the term.46 After

saying that, she explainswhy she thinks that a legal theoristmight conclude that thetraditionof legalpositivism isno longer viable. She claims that there are two typesofreasonsonecanadduceforapostpositivistposition: conceptualandprudentialreasons.On the one hand, the former could include either (1) a dissatisfaction with theincreasingly narrow questions addressed by positivists and their apparently increasinglytrivialconclusionsor (2)aconclusion thatoneormoreofthepremisesormethodsoflegalpositivismhavebeendiscreditedorareirreconcilable. Thelatter,ontheotherhand,could include (3) adesire to free the theoristswork from thepejorative connotationsassociatedwithpositivism; (4)exhaustionwiththevolumeofmaterialproducedunderthepositivist rubric;or (5)adesire tomark the theoristsworkasoriginal rather thanderivative.

47 With this classification in mind, she claims that MacCormicks chief

motivationsforhispostpositivistpositioncanonlybeprudentialinnature.

Petroskiargues,firstly,thatMacCormickdoesnottakethepositionthatthepremisesoflegalpositivismhavebeendiscredited,

48 and attempts to show thisbymentioninghis

assertion that lawandmoralityare conceptuallydistinct.49 Secondly, she claims that

neitherisMacCormicktroubledbythenitpickingdetailsoflegalpositivistcontroversies,sinceheengages inandacknowledges the relevanceofmanyof thesequarrels.

50 And

45NEILMACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONSOFLAW:ANESSAYINLEGALTHEORY264(2007).


47Id.at6723.

48Id.at674.

49Id.,at674,note47.

50Id.at674.


16/36

[Vol.12No.02708 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lthirdly, she says that although MacCormick claims to be a postpositivist because he

believesthatthelaw isnecessarilygearedtosomeconceptionofjustice,heconcedesthat it isonly the more austereand rigorous formsof legalpositivism that absolutelyexcludethepossibilitythatthereisanymoralminimumthatisnecessarytotheexistenceoflawassuch.

51

TheconclusionsPetroskidrawsarethat(1)noneofthedetailsofMacCormickspositionin Institutionsof Law,his final summationofhis theoreticalcommitments, distinguishesthosecommitmentsfromthecore legalpositivistcommitments,and(2)thattheauthorcan only be using the postpositivist label for some of the prudential purposes sheidentifies, that is, as a device for avoiding unwanted negative connotations or forassertingthathisintellectualpositionisdistinguishablefromothers.

52

In

the

following

I

am

going

to

attempt

to

defend

MacCormick

against

these

criticisms.

My

reasonsare twofold. Firstly,my readingdiffers fromPetroskiswhen she suggests thatMacCormick does not hold that the premises of legal positivism are discredited orincorrect,andwhenshestatesthattheMacCormicksbeliefthatlawandmoralityareconceptuallydistinctimpliesanyagreementwithpositivism. Someofthecentralthesesofpositivismarethat(1)thereisnonecessaryconnectionbetweenlawandmoralityand(2)itispossiblethatvalidlawscanbeidentifiedwithoutresorttomoraljudgments.

53 Asa

postpositivist,MacCormick accepts neither of these claims. This fact does not entail,however, that law andmorality should be confused or are not conceptually distinct.Evenanorthodoxnaturallawyeroranenthusiasticnonpositivistwillhavetoconcedethatlaw and morality are not conceptually equivalent, no matter how many necessaryconnections she finds between these two normative orders. Secondly, MacCormicksassertionthatthe law isnecessarilygearedto justiceseemstometobeverydifferent

fromtheclaimthatthereisamoralminimumwhichisnecessaryfortheexistenceoflawassuch. Whiletheformerimpliesthatthereisanargumentativeconnectionbetweenlawand morality, so that moral arguments are embedded in any legal discourse andnecessarilyplayapart inthe interpretationandapplicationof law,the lattermeansonlythatalegalsystemwhichdoesnotcomplywithsomeminimummoralstandardscannotbelegallyvalid. EvenifPetroskiisrightwhenshesaysthattheformerthesiscanbeacceptedbynonorthodoxpositivists,thisfactalonedoesnotmakeNeilMacCormickoneofthem.We can see, thus, that even thoughMacCormick retains some ideas derived from the

51Id.at675.

52Id.at676.

53

Acontemporarypositivistmightreplythatpositivismno longeradvocatesthe firstthesis (Separability). Thiskind of argument ispartof a general attempt tonarrowdownpositivism inorder toescape fromobjectionsraisedbyDworkinandotherpostpositivistssuchasMacCormick. Nonetheless,Ibelievethisdoesnotaffectmyargumenthere,foritsufficestoprovethatMacCormickrejectsthesocalledSourcesThesisinordertoclaimthathistheoryisverydifferentfrompositivism.


17/36


positivist tradition, he departs from the most distinctive theses of such tradition.

DifferentlyfromPetroski,IthinkthatMacCormickstheorygenuinelytranscendstheframeof thoughtwhich is common to legal positivists. In the following section,my job is toprovideafewexamplestodemonstratethispoint.

II. Law,MoralityandArgumentation: TheNatureofMacCormicksPostPositivism

AlthoughMacCormickhadnotadoptedforhimselfthe labelpostpositivistuntil late inhis career, his relationshipwith positivism has never been unproblematic. Even in hisearliestworkshewasnotentirelysatisfiedwiththemainstreampositivistpositionaboutthenatureof law. In spiteof the great influenceofHerbertHart, therewere relevantdisagreementswiththesupposedneutralityofHartianandKelsenianpositivisms. Perhapsthe most expressive of these disagreements concerns the issue of the justification of

decisions

about

the

validity

of

a

norm,

considered

from

theinternal

point

of

view.

As

MacCormickhasstressedseveraltimes, legaltheoristsshouldpressHarts insightsaboutthe internal point of view further than he did in his own theoretical project.

54 Once

theorists take into consideration all the implications of the internal point of view, theproblemofthejustificationoflegaldecisionsbecomesacentralone,aswecanseeinthefollowingexcerptfromMacCormicksLegalReasoningandLegalTheory:

[A]positivisticdescriptionofthesystemas itoperatescannotansweraparticularkindofquestionwhichmayberaisedinternallytoalegalsystem: thequestionasitmightberaisedforajudgeinahardcase: Whyoughtwe to treat every decision in accordancewith a rulevalid by our criteria of validity as being sufficiently

justified? and that is a question which can be, andfrom time to time is, raised. Nor can it answer thequestionyetmorefrequentlyraised for judges: Howought we to justify decisions concerning theinterpretation and application of our criteria ofvalidity?

55

54Toillustratethispoint,wecanquotethefollowingexcerptfromaninterviewthatMacCormickgavetoManuel

AtienzaontheoccasionofthepublicationofhisInstitutionsofLaw: ThemostilluminatingandlastingaspectofHartswritingshastodowiththeneedtounderstandanyconductregulatedbyrulesfromtheinternalpointofview. Thisisessentiallytodevelopaclearandconvincingtheoryofnorms. Butrulesarejustonetypeofnorm.

The analysis of Law as a system of primary and secondary rules, although a valuable intuition, is at the endincomplete and unsatisfactory. A fresh start is needed. Manuel Atienza, Entrevista aNeilMacCormick 29DOXACUADERNOSDEFILOSOFADELDERECHO479,482(2006)(trans.unknown).

55NEILMACCORMICK,LEGALREASONINGANDLEGALTHEORY63(1978).


18/36

[Vol.12No.02710 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lThispassageshowsthatMacCormickisworriedaboutsomethingthatisusuallyneglected

by contemporary positivists: the problem of the justification of legal decisions. He isespeciallyconcernedwith the justificationof legaldecisionsbecausehe isawareof thesubjectiveelement that isalwayspresent, ingreateror lesserextent, in theactivitiesofinterpretationandapplicationof law. Furthermore,heassumesthepointofviewofthenormuserwhenhe takesup the taskofconstructinga theoreticalexplanationof thenatureoflaw.

Although the institutional theory of law,which isMacCormicks legal theory in a strictsense, presupposes some sort of detachment from the part of the theorist, suchtheoreticalinquiryremain[s]neverthelessvalueorientedinthedescriptionsitmakesofthe legal institutions.

56 According toMacCormick,acoherentaccountof thenatureof

law,andacoherentaccountof thecharacterofanymodern legal system,have to take

seriously

the

very

general

values

that

are

inherent

in

the

character

of

the

legal

enterprise.

Theconceptsthatalegaltheoristusestoexplainthenatureoflawarethusinterpretativeconcepts in the sense of Ronald Dworkin, for the theoristmust adopt a hermeneuticapproachwhichseek[s]tounderstandthepracticesand institutionsofhumanbeings intermsofwhatmakesthemintelligibleandworthwhile...totheirhumanparticipants.

57

Although the theorist has a certain degree of detachment when contrasted with thefrontlineactorsofthelegalpractice,shemusthave,asasecondlineactor,arelativelyhighdegreeofengagementbycontrastwithpurelyexternalobservers.

58 Inspiteofthe

fact that MacCormick claims that his jurisprudence is not aimed at the solution ofparticular current practical problems,

59 the understanding which it provides for the

practicalcategoryoflawpresupposesarationalreconstructionofthe legal institutionsthatyieldsacriticalaccountofthegoverningrulesinthelightoftheprinciplesandvalues

whichunderpinthem. Suchacriticalaccount,MacCormickproceeds,may indicatethescopeforfutureinterpretationsoflawthatwillrectifyanomaliesincurrentunderstanding,includingcurrentjudicialpractice.

60

Theunderstandingof legal theoretical inquiryaspredominantlycriticalandvalueladen,adoptedbyMacCormick, iscoupledwithaviewofthepracticeoflegalargumentationas

56MACCORMICK,supranote45,at301.

57Id.at295.

58Id.at6.

59Id.at302.

60Id.at292. LikeAlexy,MacCormickclaimsthatlegaldoctrinehasnotonlyempiricalandanalyticaldimensions,

butalsoanormativeone.


19/36


alsoanecessarilyconstructiveorhermeneuticprocess,whichseemstobeatoddswiththe

empiricalessentialismthatpermeatesmostofthecontemporarypositivists.

Formanypositivists the law is some kindof real entity that is there to be knownordiscovered by the theorist. Theorists very rarely engage in an interpretative orhermeneutic activitywhen they attempt to identify the law. The law has a factualessencewhichcanbeobservedordescribed fromtheoutside. Thetheorist looksatthelaw fromanexternalpointofview,andsheseesastaticsystemofnormswhichcanbetheorizedinasortofPlatonicway,sinceitscontentsarealreadyfixedandtheirmeaningdoesnotdependonthesubjectivitiesoftheinterpreter. Thistypeofpositivism,whichiswidely spread in AngloAmerican jurisprudence, holds that there is a clear separationbetween the creation and the applicationof law. One can identifyquiteeasily thevalidlawinanygivensociety,althoughalegalofficialmayeventuallycreatenewlaws

when

she

is

not

satisfied

with

the

solution

provided

by

the

legal

order

or,

more

frequently,

whensheisdealingwithacasenotyetresolvedbythesetofvalidlaws. Forthisstrandofpositivism,itispossibletoapplythelawwithoutanybalancingofreasons. Thesocalledapplicationoflawismerelytheexecutivestageofpracticalreasoning. Allofthelawcanbefoundinitssocialsources,andthemajortaskofthejurististoidentifythesesources,sincetheygiveheranorientationaboutwhatone is legallyrequiredtodo inaparticularcase.

Suchcleardistinctionbetweenthecreationandtheapplicationoflawleadstoanotherdistinctionwhich is typical of contemporaryAngloAmerican positivism: the distinctionbetweentheoriesof lawandtheoriesofadjudication. Theoriesof lawaregenerallyconcernedwiththeidentificationoflaw. Theyanswertothequestionofwhatthelawis,notwhat itought tobe. Theremustbeasingle test fordifferentiating legal rules from

other type of social norms, and such testnormally has to dowith the pedigree or theprocessbymeansofwhichtherulesarecreated(inotherwords,withitssources). Inthisperspective,thelawisselfreferentialbecauseitregulatestheprocessthroughwhichlegalnorms are created. This distinction between theories of law and theories ofadjudicationpresupposessomegrainofpositivism. Infact,itishardlypossibletofindanonpositivistwhowouldbewillingtoacceptthisseparation.

Thedifferentiationbetweenatheoryoflawandatheoryofadjudicationiscrucialforthedebate about contemporary positivism, since it illustrates how this kind of theorycharacterizesthefunctionofjurisprudenceasatheoreticaldiscipline. Oncejurisprudenceisclassifiedasatheoryoflaw,asopposedtoatheoryofadjudication,onecannoticeanincreasing gap between theory and practice, which are conceived as autonomous

discursive

contexts

which

very

rarely

communicate

with

each

other.

It

is

not

the

task

of

a

theorist to justifyanypracticeorparticulardecisionor toprovide anyguidance for theproperinterpretationandapplicationoflaw. Thepropertaskoflegaltheoryismerelytoexplainthelaw,ratherthantodeveloporreviseit. Agoodlegaltheoristmust,therefore,


20/36

[Vol.12No.02712 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lleave theobjectofher inquiryuntouched. Legal theoryand legalpracticeare separate

domains,whichshouldremainseparateiftheyaretocomplywiththeirsocialfunctions.

IhavenodoubtthatthisishowPetroskiconceivesthetaskoflegaltheory: Legaltheoristsandjudgesoperatewithindifferentinstitutionalcontexts. Hence,itseemspuzzlingtocallapractitionerpositivistor toapply tohim theconceptsandpositionsadvanced in thejurisprudentialdiscourse. ForPetroski,whenoneclassifiesa judgeasapositivist, thiscan onlymean one of these two things: (1) that the judge speaks from an academicdomaindespitehisorherroleasajudge,or(2)thatthejudgeadoptstherhetoricoftheacademicdomain.

61 Inbothcases,however,theuseofthevocabularyoflegaltheoryby

judges or other members of the legal profession is perceived as unnatural, if notillegitimate. Forexample,whenanallegedlypositivist judge like JusticeScalia classifieshimself as a positivist, Petroski thinks thatwhat he is doing ismerely deploying some

interactive

expertise

in

order

to

adopt

a

rhetoric

which

would

allow

him

to

stress

on

statutoryandconstitutionaltextandprecedentastheonly legitimatereasonstooffer insupport of a judicial decision and to disavow any reliance on policy or moralconsiderations.

62 This interactive expertise, however, is considered to be anomalous

and interstitial, since the speaker is actually master[ing] the language of a specialistdomainintheabsenceofpracticalcompetencefordoingit.

63 Whenwefindarguments

from jurisprudence in a particular judicial opinion, this is explained not as somethingnatural and immanent to the activityofadjudication,asDworkin claimedwhenhe saidthatjurisprudenceisthegeneralpartofadjudication,

64butratherasanintrusionintoa

differentdomain.

Thisway of conceiving the spheres of jurisprudence and legal practice, however, onlybecomes plausible if one presupposes a positivistic conception of legal theory. Hence,

Petroski is perhaps giving way to certain positivist prejudices when analysing a nonpositivist theory such as that ofNeilMacCormick. She assumes that the functions ofMacCormickstheoryof lawandthemotivesthathehastoundertakehis jurisprudentialinquiryarethesameasthoseoftheparticulartypeofpositivismwithwhichsheimpliedlyidentifiesherself. WeshouldalsobearinmindthatMacCormickisattemptingtoconstructalegaltheorywhichmakessensetotheparticipantsinthelegalpractice,evenifitisnotprimarilyaimeddirectlyatsolvingindividualproblems. Whenwesetoutforourselvesthetaskofunderstandingalegalsystem,thisinvolvesbothadescriptionandareconstructionofthelegalpracticeandtheprincipleswhichunderlieit,andthisisnotsimplyamatterof


62Id.at6867.

63Id.at687.

64DWORKIN,supranote10,at90.


21/36


detachedunderstandingfromanobserversviewpoint. Itisalsoapracticalunderstanding

fromaparticipantsviewpoint.65

IfonetakesadifferentviewofMacCormicksrecenttheoryoflaw,withoutpresupposingthepositivistseparationbetweentheoriesoflawandtheoriesofadjudication,oneislikelytoseemanypointswherehedefinitivelybreaksdownwithpositivism. ThiswouldbemyreadingofMacCormick,whichIshallconsiderinthefollowingtopics.

1. TheArguableCharacterofLaw

The first point about Neil MacCormicks institutional theory of law is that the lawcomprisesmore than just a set of institutional factswhich do not require any furtherinterpretation. Asanormativeorder,andasapracticalone,the law isincontinuous

need

of

adaptation

to

current

practical

problems.

66

In

this

particular,

MacCormick

acceptsKelsens idea that the lawpresentsahierarchical structure inwhich thehigherlevelnormsarespecifiedorconcretizedintheprocessesoflegislationandadjudication. InEuropeanLaw,forinstance,thetranspositionprocessfromthelevelofsupranationallawtothemunicipallegalordersisapartoftheStufenbau,thatis,thestepbystepprocessfrom abstract general enactment to particular decisions in concrete cases.

67 As

MacCormick puts it with particular clarity, he sees the law as an argumentativediscipline,ratherthananexactscience. Hisfirstcommonplaceaboutthelawisthatitisalwaysarguable innature.

68 Unlike thepositivistswhoplace legalcertaintyas theonly

value secured by the Rule of Law, MacCormick believes that the proclaimedargumentativecharacteroflawissomethingtobecelebratedindemocraticsocieties,foritisdeeplyentrenchedintheidealoftheRuleofLaw. TherecognitionoftheRuleofLawas a political ideal implies the recognition of laws domain as the locus of

argumentation.69 AlthoughtheprincipleoftheRuleofLawisorientedtowardsthevalueoflegalcertainty,thisvalueisnottheonlyone. RationalityandjusticealsofigureamongstthebasicvalueswhichformthebasicidealoftheRuleofLaw.

65NEILMACCORMICK,RHETORIC AND THERULEOF LAW: ATHEORYOF LEGALREASONING6 (2005). It isnot a surprise,

therefore, that MacCormick has recently confessed that his interest in legal philosophy developed from anattempttoreconcilephilosophyand legalpractice. WhenaskedbyManuelAtienzaabouttherootsofhis legalphilosophy,MacCormick answered in the followingway: M. A.: Why have you become interested in legalphilosophy? N.M.: BecauseIwasfascinatedaboutphilosophy,butwantedtodedicatemyselftothepracticeoflaw. Atienza,supranote54,at480.


67Id.at10.

68Id.at1415.

69Id.at13(emphasisadded).


22/36

[Vol.12No.02714 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lInthisinterpretation,theindeterminacyoflawisnotalwayssomethingtobedeplored. It

hastodowiththeidealoftheRuleofLawandwiththeproceduralrulesofargumentationthat are presupposed in the institutional structure that it provides. The ideals ofimpartialityandequalitybetweenthepartiesinalegaldispute,aswellasthefundamentalprincipleaudiaturetalterapars,arenecessarilyconnectedtothebasicideaoftheRuleofLawandtothearguablecharacterofthelegalsystem. Inthissense,itisworthreferringtoMacCormicks words in the introductory chapter to his updated theory of legalargumentation:

I do believe in the argumentative quality of law, andfinditadmirableinanopensociety. Weshouldlookateverysideofeveryimportantquestion,notcomedownatonceonthesideofprejudiceorapparentcertainty.

We

must

listen

to

every

argument,

and

celebrate,

not

deplore, the arguable quality that seems built in tolaw.

70

TheRuleofLawitself,MacCormickwouldsay,impliesacertaindegreeofindeterminacyinthelegalsystem. Suchindeterminacy,accordingtotheauthor,isnotmerelyaresultofthefactthatstatescommunicatetheirlegalmaterialsinnatural(official)language,andthat these are afflictedwith ambiguity, vagueness and open texture, like Hartwouldsay.

71 Italso results fromthedue recognitionof the rightsof thedefense inevery

settingofcriminalprosecutionandcivillitigation.72 Inshort,theRuleofLawimpliesand

inawaymagnifiesthearguablecharacteroflaw.

IfthisinterpretationofthepoliticalidealoftheRuleofLawiscorrect,thentraditionallegal

theoristsarewrongwhentheypresentthevalueoflegalcertaintyastheonlysubstanceoftheRuleofLaw. Moreover,theoristsarealsomistaken iftheyclaim, likeRazdoes inhispositivist legal theory, that the law is to be found in apreviouslydeterminate set ofsocialsources,bymeansofanentirelyempiricalreasoning. Thevalidityofalawcannotbemerelyaquestionoffact,butratherneedstobeatleastinasignificantpartamatterofargument. In MacCormicks view, the law is hardly ever settled and its rules arenecessarilydefeasible, for they are inevitably subjected to a constructive interpretationthat might lead to revisions, reinterpretations, and even exceptions to their operativeconditions. Legal rules are regarded as stating only ordinarily necessary andpresumptively sufficient conditions for the arrangements they regulate, since theunderlyingprinciplesthatprovideageneraljustificationforthelegalsysteminteractswith

70Id.at16.

71Id.at26.

72Id.


23/36


themorespecificprovisions thatare found instatutes,precedentsand inthesecondary

legislation.73 Such interaction may activate some background factor covered by thejustifyingprinciple,which islikelytoamounttotherecognitionofunstatedexceptionstothe rule initially considered by the interpreter. To put it inMacCormicks ownwords,[t]hepresenceofunstatedelementsappearstobeageneralfeatureoflaw.

74

2. TheInterpretativeReadingoftheSourcesofLaw

At this stage, one can see why MacCormicks interpretative theory of law and legaladjudication,whichisinanimportantmeasureinfluencedbyDworkinsconceptionoflawas integrity, is one step aheadof thepositivistic formulationof the socalled SourcesThesis,whichseemstobetheonlycommonpointtoallpositivists.

It

is

a

common

assumption

of

positivists

that

the

decisive

criterion

to

determine

the

validityofalegalnorm,andthereforeitsdistinctivelegalcharacter,isthepedigreeorthesourceofthatparticularlegalnorm. Whenarulecanbetracedbacktoasourcewhichislegallyrecognized, juristscan identify itwithareasonabledegreeofcertainty. EventhenonorthodoxformsofpositivismsuchastheinclusivetheoriesofColeman,Waluchow,andthelateHerbertHarthavetoagreethatwhatevercomesoutofavalidsourceoflawhas a proper legal character, provided that it satisfies themaster rule established in aparticularlegalsystemasatestforthevalidityofitsnorms.

75

MacCormicksrecognitionoftheimmanentlyarguablecharacteroflaw, inturn,seemstoimplyacompletelydifferentdoctrineof the sourcesof law. Thematerials found in thesourcesoflaw,suchasstatutes,precedents,treaties,andadministrativeactsarenotselfinterpreting and selfapplying.

76 Properly considered, they are law only in a pre

interpretative sense.77 PerhapsMacCormicksviewson the theoriesofprecedentareagoodexampleto illustratethispoint. MacCormickarguesthatthetheoriesofprecedentbased on natural law and on positivism have contributed not only to alternative

73Id.at241.

74Id.at244.

75Inthisparticular,aninclusiveorsoftpositivistwouldhavetoconcedethatitisatleasttheoreticallypossible

toconceiveaperfectlyvalidlegalsystemthatdoesnotincorporateanymoralprinciplestoitsruleofrecognition.Whateverconnectionsonecanfindbetweenlawandmoralitywillbecontingent,asopposedtonecessary. Seegenerally JulesColeman,NegativeandPositive Positivism, inRONALDDWORKINANDCONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE(MarshallCohened.,1984);WILLWALUCHOW,INCLUSIVELEGALPOSITIVISM(1994).

76

MACCORMICK,supranote65,at23.

77NeilMacCormick,PrecedentasaSourceofLaw, inSOURCESOF LAWAND LEGISLATION: PROCEEDINGSOFTHE17TH

WORLDCONGRESSOFPHILOSOPHYOFLAWANDSOCIALPHILOSOPHY,BOLOGNA, JUNE16211995,ARSPBEIHEFT177,183(1998).


24/36

[Vol.12No.02716 Ge rman L aw J ou rna linterpretationsofthedoctrineofstaredecisisintheUnitedKingdom,butalsotodifferent

practical uses and applications of the case law. On the one hand, the socalleddeclaratory theoryofadjudicationwhichpresents itselfas compatiblewithanaturallawviewpointanddominatedtheBritishsceneuntilearly inthe18

thCenturysupports

hostility to any doctrine of absolutely binding precedent, and tends towards a view ofprecedents as atmost defeasibly binding, on the grounds thatmistakes about law arelogicallypossible,andprecedentsonlydeclaratoryorevidentiary,notstrictlyconstitutiveof law.

78 On the other hand, positivism,which stresses the human character of law,

necessarilydeniesthepremisesofthedeclaratorytheory:79

There isnoessenceof lawbeyondorbehindwhat isdecided as law by some competent decision maker.From this it follows obviously that, if precedents are

evidence

of

the

law,

they

can

be

so

only

because

judges

explicitlyor implicitlyaccordedauthority tomake lawthrough their decisions. Conversely, the veryrecognition of precedent as evidence of the lawamounts to recognitionof thepowerof thecourts tomakelaw.

80

Wecansee,thus,thatthesetheoriesproduceseriousnormativeconsequencesinthewaya judicial precedent is received and applied in legal practice. It is because of suchconsequences thatMacCormick, in his approach to precedents, holds that we need atheory that canovercome thedichotomy natural lawversuspositivism, for this is theonlywaytotranscendthelimitsofthedeclaratorytheoryanditspositivistcounterpart:

Itisnolongerpossible...torestcontentwithasimplecontrastofnaturallawandpositivisminthetreatmentofprecedent. Forthis,particulartribute isduetothework of Ronald Dworkin, which has subverted thesimple dichotomy of positivism versus natural lawtheory. Inplaceofamodeloflawasasystemofrulesderived from predetermined sources, Dworkin invitesus to reconceive law as an essentially interpretiveconcept. Thewhole body of decisions by legislatureand judges and others that positivism hasconceptualizedasmakingupa legalsystemDworkin

78Id.at182.

79Id.at182.

80Id.at183.


25/36


tells us to acknowledge as law only in a pre

interpretiveway.81

AsMacCormickexplains,accordingtothisconceptiontheverynotionofsourcesoflawneedstoberevised: ForafollowerofDworkinsview, ifwetreatprecedent,or indeedParliamentaryorExecutiveenactment,asa sourceof law,theconceptionof source inplaymust be radicallydifferent from that assumed in the positivisticmodel....

82 By

followingthereasoningofDworkin,MacCormickendsupwithatheoryofthesourcesoflaw according towhich statutory provisions, precedents, case reports, and other legalmaterialsarenotreallythemselves law,butratheraresourcematerials fromwhichthelawmaking taskof themomentmustwork. The specificationof themeaningofa lawdependsonaninterpretiveprocessguidedbytheideaofintegrity,inDworkinssense,

83

ornormativecoherence,whichisthesameideainMacCormicksvocabulary.84 Insuch

constructive

interpretation,

the

interpreter

makes

the

law

operative

by

applying

these

legalmaterialsaccordingtothemoralprinciplesimplicitinthelaw,andthishermeneuticprocess isalwaysguidedbythe idea toachieve thebestpossible interpretationofthesepreinterpretivematerials. We can see, thus, thatMacCormick advocates a theory ofsourcesoflawandatheoryofprecedentsthatareincompatiblewithlegalpositivismandwiththeviewthattheauthorityofasourceistheonlyfactorthatisrelevanttodeterminethe validity of the rulewhich can be extracted from a judicial precedent. The normsderivedfromprecedentwillbefixedinaninterpretativediscoursewhereargumentsbasedonauthorityandargumentsbasedonpracticalreasonarebalancedinaproperway.

3. MacCormicksTheoryofLegalArgumentation

Thearguablecharacterof lawandtheconceptionofsourcesof lawaspreinterpretive

materialsratherthandefinitiveanswerstothequestionofthevalidityofarulearedeeplyconsistentwithMacCormicksambitionstoprovideanormativetheoryoflegalreasoning.If the law necessarily refers to some conception of justice and if its ultimate contentsdepend on constructive interpretations in the context of disputable validity claims tosupport the individual norms produced in the process of application of law, then it isreasonable toargue thatoneof the tasksof legal theory shouldbe toprovidea setofdirectivestohelp lawyersdiscriminatebetweenbetterandworsearguments,moreandlessrationallypersuasiveones.

85 Inthissense,partofMacCormicksstrategytoreconcile

81Id.

82Id.

83DWORKIN,supranote10,at9596.

84SeegenerallyMACCORMICK,supranote55;MACCORMICK,supranote65.

85MACCORMICK,supranote65,atvi.


26/36

[Vol.12No.02718 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lthe argumentative dimension of law with the value of certaintywhich are both

presupposedandimpliedbythepoliticalideaoftheRuleofLawistoelaborateatheoryof legal argumentation that claims to be capable of acknowledging the best criteria ofrationality for legal decisions and the fundamental constraints on the process of legalreasoning.

AlthoughmuchcouldbesaidaboutMacCormickspenetratingtheoryoflegalreasoning,itis enough for our purposes to make reference to the Kantian universalism which isaccepted in the latest version of his theoretical project. For MacCormick, any legaldecisioncannotbe justifiedunless itpassesatestofuniversalizability. Thisfollowsfromtheveryideaofjustification: Tojustifyistoshowthatitisright,andtoshowthatitisright istoshowthat,uponanyobjectiveviewofthematter,theactoughttohavebeendone, or even had to be done, given the characteristics and the circumstances of the

case.

86

There

is

no

justification

without

universalization

in

MacCormicks

theory

of

legal

reasoning: Forparticularfactsorparticularmotivestobejustifyingreasonstheyhaveto be subsumable under a relevant principle of action universally stated, even if theuniversal is acknowledged to be defeasible. This applies to practical reasoning quitegenerally, and to legal reasoning as one department of practical reasoning.

87 This is

enough to show us that MacCormicks theory of argumentation strives towards someuniversalitytestinthespiritofKantscategoricalimperative,evenifthistestisadaptedtotheformofPerelmansidealoftheuniversalaudience

88orHabermasregulativeideaof

theidealspeechsituation.89

In any case,MacCormick is very clear about the importance of themoral principle ofuniversalizabilitywhenheexpresslyrecognizesthatthelatestversionofhistheoryoflegalreasoninghasdepartedfromtheHumeannoncognitivismfoundinhisearliestwritingsin

favor of a Kantian universalistic moral philosophy.90 In this particular, MacCormickstheoryoflegalargumentationhastoincorporatetwothesesputforwardbyRobertAlexyin order to vindicate his claim that the principles of Kantian universalisticmorality arerelevantforlegalreasoning: thethesisoftheclaimtocorrectnessandthespecialcasethesis. If the law isa specialcaseofpracticaldiscourseand,as such, raisesaclaim tocorrectness,thenthebasicrulesofargumentationwhichapplytopracticaldiscoursesare

86Id.at98.

87Id.at99.

88 Seee.g.,CHAIMPERELMAN and LUCIEOLBRECHTSTYTECA,THENEWRHETORIC: ATREATISEONARGUMENTATION3135

(1969).

89

JrgenHabermas,Teorasde laVerdad, inTEORADELAACCINCOMUNICATIVA: COMPLEMENTOSYESTUDIOSPREVIOS11358 (1997). For a comprehensive analysisofHabermasdiscourse theory in English, see generally THOMASMCCARTHY,THECRITICALTHEORYOFJRGENHABERMAS(1978).



27/36


alsovalidforlegaldiscourse. ThesameprinciplesofdiscoursethatonecanfindinKantian

moralphilosophyarealsovalidforlegaldiscourse,sincethelatterisnothingbutacaseoftheformerwithasetofinstitutionalconstraints.

91 Withoutthesetwotheses,MacCormick

wouldnotbeabletovindicatehisclaim,whichiscommontoAlexy,thattheprinciplesofmoralargumentationproposedbythinkerslikeKantandHabermasareapplicabletolegalreasoning. Hence, it is not difficult to notice that MacCormicks theory of legalargumentationat least in its latest formpresupposesabreakdownwith thepositivisttradition. AsIintendtodemonstrateinthefinalsectionsofthispaper,thethesesofthespecial case thesis and of the claim to correctness, in the form that MacCormickinterpretsthem,cannotbereconciledwithanyformofpositivism.

4. TheThesisoftheClaimtoCorrectness

One

of

the

points

in

which

MacCormick

departs

from

positivism

is

when

he

claims

that

the

lawraisesanimplicitpretensiontojustice. Infact,MacCormickholdsthatlegaldiscourseischaracterizedbythepresenceofcertainimplicitclaimswhicharenecessarilyboundupwith theperformanceof the interactive rolesof the lawmaking, judicial,andexecutiveinstitutionsoragenciesofthestate.

92 Everyspeechactwhichintroducesalegalnormor

exercisessomesortof legalauthority isconnectedwiththe illocutionaryactofassertingthecorrectnessofthegeneralorindividualnormwhichisproducedthereby. Anyspeechact performed in the context of legal argumentation involves certain backgroundassumptionsor implicitclaims,and inparticularaclaimto legalandmoralcorrectness.

93

Consideredasan institutionalnormativeorder, the lawstrives to justiceandnecessarilypurportstoresolvepracticalconflictsinamorallyacceptableway: [A]certainpretensiontojustice,thatis,apurportedaspirationtobeachievingjustice(evenifthisbethemaskofamorepartisanorsinister intent) isnecessarilyevinced intheveryactof lawmaking in

thecontextofalawstate.94

The claim to correctness includes, although it is not satisfied with, a claim to moralcorrectness,andnotonlyaclaimtocorrectnessaccordingtothepositive lawsofagivenstate. Suchaclaim,whichplaysacentralroleinAlexystheoryoflegalargumentationandnowseemstoperformananalogousfunctionwithregardstoMacCormickslatestversionofhistheoryoflegalreasoning,isintimatelyconnectedwiththeideathatthelawhasan

91 This obviously does notmean, however, that law andmorality are notdistinguishable. The fact that legal

discourseoperateswithinasetofinstitutionalconstraintsimpliesthatlegaldecisionsarelimitedbytheexigencytorespectthestatutes,precedents,andotherauthoritativematerialsfoundinalegalsystem. Itisthisconstraintinpracticallegalreasoningthatmakesitaspecialcaseofpracticalgeneraldiscourse.


93Id.at275.

94Id.at276.


28/36

[Vol.12No.02720 Ge rman L aw J ou rna largumentative character. The foundations of this thesis can be found in Habermas

philosophyof language. Inhis famousessayTheoriesofTruth,originallypublished inGerman in theearly1970s,Habermascriticizes thephilosophical theorieswhichdefinethetruthofanassertionasthecorrespondencewithacertainthingorstateofaffairsthat is proved to be existent in theworld of physical objects.

95 In contrast to these

theories,Habermasadvocatesaconceptionoftruthasrationalconsensus,whichcanbesummarizedinthefollowingexcerpt:

Icanpredicatesomethingtoanobjectif,andonlyif,alltheindividualsthatcouldenterinadiscoursewithmewould predicate the same thing to the same object.Hence, to distinguish the truth from the falsity of anassertion I make reference to the judgment of the

othersin

fact,

to

the

judgment

of

all

of

those

with

whom Icouldeventuallyenter inadiscussion (amongwhich I counterfactually include all the hearers that Icouldmeet ifmy lifetimewere coextensivewith thehistory of mankind). The truthcondition of astatement is the potential consensus of all theparticipantsinthediscourse.

96

Withthisidealdiscourse,Habermasseeksforthecriterionoftruthwhichheclaimstobeabsent intheepistemologicaltheoriesthat identifythetruthofanassertionwithamerecorrespondence,mediatedbysensorialexperience,toacertainstateofaffairs. Sinceweallhavedifferentexperiences,aconceptionoftruthbasedsolelyonsensorialperceptionwouldprovetobemistakenbecauseitcannotguaranteetheobjectivityoftheknowledge

itprovides. Sincethereisnorealityobjectivelyaccessibletooursenses,therationalityofthe expressions used by A or B can only be assessed in terms of the discursiveredeemability of the validity claims contained in the speech acts performed by eachspeaker. Inotherwords,byunderstandingthediscourseasanargumentativeprocedure,HabermasisclaimingthatinthelinguisticinteractionsbetweenAandBbothraiseclaimswith their symbolic expressions, claims that can be criticized and argued for, that is,grounded.

97 A judgmentabout the truth, in the caseof constatative speech acts, or

aboutthecorrectness,inregulativespeechacts,wherewhatisatstakeisnottheassertionofafact,butratherthevalidityofanorm

98canonlybeobjectiveifitisundertakenon

thebasisofatranssubjectivevalidityclaim, insuchawaythattheassertionsandgoal

95Habermas,supranote89.

96Id.at171.

97JRGENHABERMAS,1THETHEORYOFCOMMUNICATIVEACTION: REASONANDTHERATIONALIZATIONOFSOCIETY9(1984).

98Habermas,supranote89,at130.


29/36


directedactionsarethemorerationalthebettertheclaimthatisconnectedwiththemcan

be defended against criticism.99 Hence, Habermas needs to adopt a concept ofcommunicative rationality which is based on a discourse whose formal properties arecapableofgeneratinganunconstrainedandunifyingconsensus.

100

Like assertions about facts, normatively regulated actions also contain signifyingexpressionswhichareconnectedtocriticizablevalidityclaims. Thenormstowhichtheseactionsreferalsocanbeintersubjectivelyrecognized,andthediscursiveredeemabilityofthevalidityclaims raised for thesenorms iswhatconstitutes their rationality.

101 In the

field of ethics, Habermas adopts a cognitivist position according to which practical ornormative questions can be resolved bymeans of an argumentation put forward in apractical discourse where the correctness of the norm is scrutinized.

102 This type of

discourse is a communicative process that can only be rational if it approaches the

following

ideal

conditions:

(1)

the

speakers

must

be

in

an

ideal

speech

situation

which

isbasicallycharacterizedbythegeneralsymmetryofconditions,sothateachparticipantinthediscoursecanstructurehisspeechactsinawaythatthereisnocoercionotherthatthe rational force of the better arguments;

103 (2) the argumentation, as a process of

communication, must be understood as a a form of interaction subjected to specialrules;and (3) theargumentationhasas itsaim toproducecogentarguments thatareconvincing in virtue of their intrinsic properties andwith which validity claims can beredeemedorrejected.

104

SinceIcannotmoveanydeeperintothistheoryofrationaldiscourse,Iwilllimitmyselftostressoneof thepointswhichappear tobecentral toAlexyandMacCormick: the ideathatregulativespeechactsalwaysraiseaclaimtonormativecorrectness. ItisonthebasisofthispremisethatAlexyarguesthatineveryactofcreationandapplicationoflawaclaim

thatsuchactiscorrectisimplicitlyraised. Inthecoreofthisclaimtherewouldbe: (1)Theassertionthatthe legalact issubstantiallyandprocedurallycorrect;(2)Theclaim (whichgenerates a guarantee) of justifiability of this assertion; and (3) The expectation ofacceptanceofcorrectnessbyalladdresseesofthelegalnorm.

105 ButhowcanAlexyjustify

this thesis? Heanswers thisquestion in the followingway: [A]n implicitclaim canbe

99HABERMAS,supranote97,at9.

100Id.at10.

101Id.at1516.

102Id.at19.

103Id.at25.

104Id.at25.

105RobertAlexy,LawandCorrectness,51CURRENTLEGALPROBLEMS205,208(1998).


30/36

[Vol.12No.02722 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lmade explicit by showing that its express negation is absurd.

106 He follows, thus, a

formalpragmaticstrategyofshowingthattheexplicitnegationoftheclaimtocorrectnessentails a contradiction between the content of the legal act (be it a statute, a judicialdecisionetc.)andthecontentoftheclaimimplicitinitsenactment. Alexycallsthiskindofcontradictionaperformativecontradiction.

107 Everyparticipant in legaldiscoursewho

expresslydeniestheclaimtocorrectnesscommitsacontradictionofthiskind. Itwouldbeaperformativecontradiction, for instance, if in theenactmentofaconstitution the firstarticleexpresslyassertedthatX isanunjustState. Thesamewouldhappen ifa judgepronouncedasentencestatingsomethinglikeXisherebyconvictedtolifeimprisonment,although this isan incorrect interpretationofvalid law. This judgesdecision couldbeclassifiedasabsurdbecauseitwouldcontainbothanimplicitassertionthatitisacorrectdecisionandanexplicitassertionwhichcontradictstheimplicitpart.

Alexy

argues,

in

one

of

the

main

points

of

his

argument

to

justify

his

definition

of

law,

that

theclaimtocorrectnesshasthefunctionofestablishinganecessaryconnectionbetweenlawandmorality,whichisdescribedasacomplexconnectionthathasatthesametimeaqualifying and a conceptually necessary character: It is a necessary character becauseeverylegalsystemnecessarilyraisesaclaimtocorrectness(andthustherecanbenolegalsystemthatdoesnotraisetheclaim),but it isaqualifyingcharacter (unlikeaclassifyingcharacter)becausethe legalsystemsand legalnormsthatdonot fulfilltheexigenciesofthe claim to correctnessmay remain valid in a legal sense, despite being conceptuallyflawed.

108 Theclaimtocorrectnessgeneratesaweakdutytodojusticeaccordingtothe

law,notanabsoluteone.

Butapositivistjuristcouldstillask: Whatistherelevanceofaclaimtocorrectness,ifithasonly a qualifying character? Alexy contests this question by arguing that the claim to

correctness is not only a moral claim, but also a legal claim. And this legal claimcorrespondswithalegalobligationnecessarilyconnectedwithjudicialjudgmentstohanddown correct decisions.

109 It attributes to law an ideal character that is especially

relevantforthosewhoanalyzelawfromthepointofviewoftheparticipants. Thus,whenapplication of the law results in an injustice (and thereforedoes not fulfill the state ofaffairsrequiredbytheclaimtocorrectness),wearefacingnotonlyamoralfault,butalsoalegalfault. InAlexysownwords,[t]heclaimtocorrectnesstransformsmoralfaultinessinto legalfaultiness. Andthis isbynomeanstrivial. It istheconversionofpositivismto

106RobertAlexy,DerechoyMoral,inLAINSTITUCIONALIZACINDELAJUSTICIA21(2005).


108SeegenerallyALEXY,supranote10.



31/36


nonpositivism. Laws claim to correctness isonno account identicalwith the claim to

moralcorrectness,butitincludesaclaimtomoralcorrectness.110

Theclaimtocorrectnessattributesto lawan idealcharacterthatwasnotpresent inthepositivisticaccounts thatdefined the legal system asmere facticityor the resultof theexerciseofauthority. Thisidealdimensionoflawsupportsageneralprincipleofmoralitywhich isvalidasa legalnorm implicit inevery legalsystem. Alongwiththisclaim,Alexyrecognizesanormpragmaticallypresupposedthatcontainsadutyofcorrectlyinterpretingandapplyingthelegalnorms. Asaconsequenceoftheclaimtocorrectness,onecanarguethat there is amethodological argumentative connection between law andmorality

111

which impliesthat legalofficialshaveaprimafacie legaldutytodojusticeaccordingtothe law. This is precisely what MacCormick means when he holds that the law isnecessarily geared to justice, and such claim is obviously at odds with any form of

positivism.

To

say

the

least,

it

attaches

to

law

an

aspirational

character

and

introduces

a

distinctionbetweentheactualpositive lawandtheidealpositive law,112

aswellasadiscursive obligation for legal agents to attempt to reconcile the two of them in theirconstructiveinterpretations.

5. TheSpecialCaseThesis

Furthermore,afewwordscanbesaidaboutthethesisthatthelegalreasoningisaspecialcase ofpractical discourse. The special case thesis is relevant for the theories of legalargumentationbecause itmakes iteasiertoseethe formalpragmaticpresuppositionsoflegaldiscourse. Whenwesaythatlegaldiscourse isaspecialcaseofpracticaldiscourse,we commit ourselves to the view that there are some discursive obligations for theparticipants in this type of discourse. Whatever constraints are applicable to general

practicaldiscoursesarealsovalid for legaldiscourse,albeitwiththeadditionalconditionthat the speakers have to complywith the positive lawswithwhich they operate. AsMacCormickwrites toexpresshisagreementwithRobertAlexysoriginal formulationofthethesis,legalargumentationmustbeacknowledgedtobeonespecialcaseofgeneralpracticalreasoning,andmustthusconformtoconditionsofrationalityandreasonablenessthatapplytoallsortsofpracticalreasoning.

113

110RobertAlexy,OntheNecessaryConnectionbetweenLawandMorality: BulyginsCritique,13RATIOJURIS138,

Documents

PDF Vol 12 No 02 693-728 Positivism Special Bust Am Ante FINAL