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Payments Fraud & Prevention Results of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 2010 Payments Fraud Survey April 2011 Payments Information & Outreach Office

Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

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Page 1: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Payments Fraud & PreventionResults of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

2010 Payments Fraud Survey

April 2011

Payments Information & Outreach Office

Page 2: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Agenda

• Introduction

• 2010 Payments Fraud Survey Results

– Payment types most vulnerable to fraud attacks & losses

– Fraud schemes most prevalent today

– Fraud mitigation methods use & effectiveness

– Barriers & opportunities to reducing payments fraud

• Conclusions

2©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Page 3: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Introduction

• Federal Reserve roles relevant to payments fraud: – FR Board promulgates regulations that govern

payments

– FR Board & FR Banks regulate & supervise aspects of U.S. Banking system & financial markets

– FR Banks provide payment & settlement services to financial institutions & U. S. government

– FR Board & FR Banks conduct research & education

3©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Page 4: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Payments Fraud Defined

4©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Payments Fraud Definition:

Fraud that occurs when someone gains financial or material advantage by using a payment instrument or information from a payment instrument to complete a transaction that is not authorized by the legitimate account holder.

Page 5: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Payments Fraud Data

5©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Accurate Data on Payment Fraud is Limited

Why It Matters

• No definitive data on total number of payment fraud attacks or amount of losses in the U.S.

• Practices of FIs, companies & industries to monitor fraud are inconsistent

• Fraud data collected is often not shared publically; data that is shared is not comparable

• Fraud “facts” reported are subject to hype

• Unable to make accurate business case to base investment in fraud mitigation

• Unable to make best choices among mitigation strategies

• Unable to price fraud risk accurately, skewing incentives

• Unable to aggregate societal impacts & allocate public resources appropriately

Page 6: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

2010 Payments Fraud Survey

• Conducted by FRB Minneapolis Payments Information & Outreach Office• Focus on payments-related fraud experience of area organizations• 206 survey respondents are members from several regional organizations:

– 57% under $100 million in annual revenue– 71% financial service organizations; mostly financial institutions (FI)– 29% representing 15+ industries

6©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

20%

14% 12%8% 8% 7% 5% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%

10%

0%5%

10%15%20%25%

Mix of Non-Financial Service Respondents

Page 7: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

4/28/2011 77

Fraud Attacks & Losses

©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Page 8: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Payments Most Vulnerable to Attacks

Payment Types with the Highest Number of Fraud Attempts % of Respondents

8©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

76%

44%

18%

28%

16%

6%1% 0% 1% 2%

6%

63%

46%

4%6%

4%6% 6%

2% 0%0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Debit Signature

Checks Credit Cards

Debit Pin

ACH Credits

Wire ACH Debits

Prepaid Cards

Cash Other

FI, N=132

Other Org., N=48

Page 9: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Payments Most Vulnerable to Losses

Payment Types with the Highest Dollar Losses Due to Fraud % of Respondents

9©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

70%

27%

18%

10% 9% 7%2% 0% 0% 2%3%

57%

3%

33%

3%7%

10%3% 3%

0%0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

DebitSignature

Checks Debit Pin

Credit Cards

Wire ACH Credits

ACH Debits

Prepaid Cards

Cash Other

FI, N=126

Other Org., N=30

Page 10: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Payments Fraud Losses & Trends• 17% of all respondents reported no fraud losses

– 6% of FIs & 45% of Other Organizations • 80% of all respondents that incurred payment fraud losses

estimated a financial-loss rate as < 0.3% of revenues• Majority said losses stayed the same or declined

10©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Changes in Payments Fraud Losses

in Last 12 Months

% of FIs % of Other Org.

2010

N=131

2009

N=137

2010

N=53

2009

N=38

Increased 45% 50% 11% 27%

Stayed

the same42% 41% 79% 50%

Decreased 13% 9% 9% 23%

Loss Range as a

Percent of Annual Revenue

Range

% of FIs

N=120

% of Other Org.

N=28

> 0% to .3% 82% 75%

.3% - .5% 11% 11%

.6% - 1 % 3% 4%

1% - 5% 3% 7%

Over 5% 2% 4%

Page 11: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Increased Losses & Key Factors

Financial Institutions• Over half of FIs with increased fraud

loss rates cited increases of 1% to 5%; nearly 20% estimated an increase of over 10%

• Despite increases, total losses estimated as a % of revenue remain relatively small for most FIs

• Top 3 factors reported by FIs:

– Stolen or counterfeit cards (70%)

– Use of internet enabling fraud (56%)

– Data breach at an external organization (46%)

11©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

58%

5%

19%

18%

49%

10%

8%

33%

1 - 5%

6% - 10%

More than 10%

Unsure

2010 2009 N=57

Increase in Loss Rate% of FIs

Page 12: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

33%

0%

33%

33%

33%

8%

17%

42%

1 - 5%

6% - 10%

More than 10%

Unsure

Increased Losses & Key Factors

Other Organizations• Only 11% of Other Organizations

reported increases in fraud loss rates

• 33% reported an increased rate of more than 10%

• Top 4 factors reported by Other Organizations:

– Stolen or counterfeit cards (50%)

– Criminal activity increased due to low likelihood of prosecution & light penalties (50%)

– State of economy (33%)

– Data breach at an external organization (33%)

12©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

N=6

Increase in Loss Rate% of Other Organizations

58%

5%

19%

18%

49%

10%

8%

33%

1 - 5%

6% - 10%

More than 10%

Unsure

2010 2009

Page 13: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Decreased Losses & Key Factors

Financial Institutions• 13% of FIs reported decreases in fraud

loss rates; most were FIs w/ revenue under $100 million

• Over half of FIs were unsure about decrease size; 24% estimated reduction of 1% to 5%

• Top 3 factors reported by FIs:

– Staff training & education (82%)

– Enhanced fraud monitoring system (65%)

– Enhanced internal controls (59%)

13©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

N=17

Decrease in Loss Rate% of FIs

24%

6%

12%

59%

8%

8%

17%

67%

1 - 5%

6% - 10%

More than 10%

Unsure

2010 2009

Page 14: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

20%

20%

0%

60%

27%

0%

9%

64%

1 - 5%

6% - 10%

More than 10%

Unsure

2010 2009

Decreased Losses & Key Factors

Other Organizations• 9% of Other Organizations reported

decreases in fraud loss rates

• 60% were unsure about decrease size; 20% estimated reduction of 1% to 5% & 6% to 10%

• Top 2 factors reported by Other Organizations:

– Staff training & education (80%)

– Enhanced internal controls (80%)

• ACH controls remained important in 2010, but were not a top factor, i.e., ACH filters, ACH positive pay & payee positive pay

14©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

N=5

Decrease in Loss Rate% of Other Organizations

Page 15: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Fraudsters

Portion of Successful Payments Fraud by Perpetrators Involved

Perpetrators 1-25% 26 - 50% 51-75% 76-99% 100%

Internal Only 4% 1% 1% 1% 2%

Internal w/External 4% 1% 1% 1% 0%

External Only 4% 4% 3% 7% 64%

Could Not Determine 8% 3% 1% 2% 13%

15©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

21% attributed a portion of successful fraud to

more than one perpetrator category

79% attributed all successful fraud to a

single perpetrator category

• Respondents reported external parties as most often responsible for successful fraud attempts; 64% attributed all successful fraud to external parties

Page 16: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

4/28/2011 1616

Fraud Schemes

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Page 17: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Fraud Schemes

Top Schemes Involving Payments Accepted % of FIs

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59%

52%

51%

39%

24%

12%

8%

8%

4%

1%

1%

0%

68%

58%

51%

31%

23%

14%

4%

3%

5%

1%

2%

1%

Counterfeit or stolen cards used at POS

Counterfeit checks

Counterfeit or stolen cards used online

Altered or forged checks

Other Internet initiated payments, e.g., UAR WEB

Telephone initiated payments, e.g., UAR TEL or RCC

Use of fraudulent credentials/data

Counterfeit currency

Fraudulent checks converted to ACH

Wireless initiated payments

Other

Cash register frauds

2010

2009

N=119

Page 18: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Fraud Schemes

Top Schemes Involving Payments Accepted % of Other Organizations

18©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

34%

34%

31%

19%

16%

16%

16%

13%

13%

9%

9%

0%

51%

60%

17%

9%

17%

14%

11%

3%

6%

6%

9%

0%

Counterfeit checks

Altered or forged checks

Counterfeit or stolen cards used at POS

Cash register frauds

Counterfeit or stolen cards used online

Other Internet initiated payments, e.g., UAR WEB

Use of fraudulent credentials/data

Counterfeit currency

Fraudulent checks converted to ACH

Telephone initiated payments, e.g., UAR TEL or RCC

Other

Wireless initiated payments

2010

2009

N=32

Page 19: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Fraud Schemes

Top Schemes Involving Own Accounts

19©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

51%

48%

45%

24%

7%

1%

0%

55%

45%

57%

22%

7%

6%

4%

Counterfeit checks

Altered or forged checks

Fraudulent or unauthorized ACH debits

Fraudulent or unauthorized card transactions

Breach of organizations access or security controls

Other

Internal fraud scheme

% of FIs % of Other Organizations

52%

48%

38%

31%

3%

3%

0%

76%

70%

8%

46%

0%

5%

0%

Counterfeit checks

Altered or forged checks

Fraudulent or unauthorized card transactions

Fraudulent or unauthorized ACH debits

Breach of organizations access or security controls

Other

Internal fraud scheme

51%

48%

45%

24%

7%

1%

0%

55%

45%

57%

22%

7%

6%

4%

Counterfeit checks

Altered or forged checks

Fraudulent or unauthorized ACH debits

Fraudulent or unauthorized card transactions

Breach of organizations access or security controls

Other

Internal fraud scheme 2010

2009N=67 N=29

Page 20: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Source of Information Used

20©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Information Sources Used in Fraud Schemes FI

(N=107)

Other

Org.

(N=30)

All

(N=137)

“Sensitive” information obtained from lost or stolen card, check, or

other physical document or device while in consumer’s control54% 30% 49%

Phishing, spoofing, pharming or other “cyber attacks” used to

obtain “sensitive” customer information49% 17% 42%

Skimming of card magnetic stripe information 41% 3% 33%

Organization’s information obtained from a legitimate check issued

by your organization22% 53% 29%

Information about customer obtained by family or friend 19% 20% 19%

Data breaches due to lost or stolen physical documentation or

electronic PC/device while in control of the organization8% 0% 7%

Employee with legitimate access to organization or customer

information1% 23% 6%

Data breaches due to cyber attacks against organization’s

information e.g., computer hacking6% 3% 5%

Page 21: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

False or Fraudulent Consumer Claims

• FIs estimated fraud involving consumer’s claim that an ACH made to their bank account was unauthorized

• Majority estimated some number of claims as fraudulent

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*WSUD = Written Statement of Unauthorized Debit

Estimated Percent of False or Fraudulent Consumer Claims Made by WSUD*

0% 1-5% 6-10% 11-15% 15-20% 21-30% 31-50% Over 50%

% of Financial Institutions

in 2010 (N=104)25% 46% 6% 4% 3% 3% 5% 9%

% of Financial Institutions

in 2009 (N=109)22% 51% 5% 3% 5% 3% 5% 5%

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Fraud Mitigation Methods

©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Page 23: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Fraud Mitigation Methods

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44% Use47% Use52% Use65% Use70% Use78% Use84% Use86% Use88% Use89% Use89% Use90% Use91% Use93% Use95% Use

Employee hotline to report potential fraudSeparate banking accounts by payment type

Dedicated computer to conduct trxs w/FI or fin. serv. providerSeparate banking accounts by purpose

Transaction limits for corporate card purchasesRestrict/limit employee Internet use from org.’s networkPhysical access controls to payment processing functions

Review card related reports dailyTransaction limits for payment disbursements

Authentication/authorization controls to payment processes Dual controls/separation of duties w/in payment processes

Logical access controls to network/payment applications Verify controls applied via audit or management review

Reconcile bank accounts dailyAddress exception items timely

Use & very effective Use & somewhat effectiveUse & somewhat ineffective Use & very ineffectiveDon’t use but plan to w/in 12 to 24 months

80 % Using

Internal Controls & Procedures Use & Effectiveness% of FIs

(N=103)

Page 24: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Fraud Mitigation MethodsInternal Controls & Procedures Use & Effectiveness

% of Other Organizations

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19% Use24% Use43% Use49% Use53% Use59% Use59% Use65% Use66% Use66% Use66% Use69% Use76% Use78% Use81% Use

Employee hotline to report potential fraudDedicated computer to conduct trxs w/ FI or fin. serv. provider

Separate banking accounts by payment type Review card related reports daily

Restrict/limit employee Internet use from org.’s networkTransaction limits for corporate card purchases

Separate banking accounts by purpose Transaction limits for payment disbursements

Address exception items timelyVerify controls applied via audit or management review

Reconcile bank accounts dailyLogical access controls to network/payment applications

Dual controls/separation of duties w/in payment processesPhysical access controls to payment processing functions

Authentication/authorization controls to payment processes

Use & very effective Use & somewhat effectiveUse & somewhat ineffective Use & very ineffectiveDon’t use but plan to w/in 12 to 24 months

(N=40)

60% Use

Page 25: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

12% Use

14% Use

32% Use

34% Use

36% Use

48% Use

63% Use

65% Use

68% Use

73% Use

73% Use

77% Use

Biometrics authentication

Verify customer state ID card is authentic

Magnetic stripe or card chip authentication

Centralized fraud info database - multiple pymnt types

Centralized risk management department

Centralized fraud info database - one payment type

Positive ID/valid account for in-store/in-person trxs

Fraud detection software w/ pattern matching

Human review of payment transactions

Customer authentication for online transactions

Participate in fraudster databases & receive alerts

Fraud detection pen for currency

Use & very effective Use & somewhat effectiveUse & somewhat ineffective Use & very ineffectiveDon’t use but plan to w/in 12 to 24 months

Fraud Mitigation Methods

25©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Authentication, Trx Screening & Risk Management % of FIs

(N=106)

60% Use

Page 26: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Fraud Mitigation Methods

26©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Authentication, Trx Screening & Risk Management% of Other Organizations

(N=38)

40% Use

8%

8%

8%

11%

16% Use

18% Use

22% Use

32% Use

37% Use

44% Use

57% Use

65% Use

Magnetic stripe or card chip authentication

Biometrics authentication

Participate in fraudster databases & receive alerts

Centralized fraud info database - multiple pymnt types

Centralized fraud info database - one payment type

Verify customer state ID card is authentic

Fraud detection software w/ pattern matching

Fraud detection pen for currency

Positive ID/valid account for in-store/in-person trxs

Centralized risk management department

Customer authentication for online transactions

Human review of payment transactions

Use & very effective Use & somewhat effectiveUse & somewhat ineffective Use & very ineffectiveDon’t use but plan to w/in 12 to 24 months

Page 27: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

23% Use12% Offer28% Use13% Offer42% Use17% Offer22% Use19% Offer49% Use26% Offer51% Use27% Offer29% Use40% Offer16% Use44% Offer57% Use46% Offer36% Use56% Offer49% Use82% Offer71% Use86% Offer

ACH payee positive pay

ACH positive pay

Check payee positive pay

Post no check services

ACH debit filters

Check positive pay/reverse positive pay

Card alert services for commercial/corporate cards

Account masking services

ACH debit blocks

Account alert services

Multi-factor authentication to initiate payments

Online information services, e.g., statements

Fraud Mitigation Methods

27©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

FI Risk Mitigation Services Offered & Used by % of Respondents

50% Offer or Use

FIs Offering Service (N=100)

Very Effective to Very Ineffective % Offering Service

% Plan to Offer w/in 12 to 24 months

Other Orgs Using Service (N=37)

Very Effective to Very Ineffective % Using Service

% Plan to Use w/in 12 to 24 months

Page 28: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

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Barriers & Opportunities to Reduce Payments Fraud

©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Page 29: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Barriers to Reduce Fraud

• Costs are main barriers

29©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Main Barriers to Payments Fraud Mitigation% of FI (N=92)

% of Other Org. (N=34)

2010 2009 2010 2009

Lack of staff resources 54% 56% 53% 52%

Cost of implementing in-house fraud detection

tool/method52% 62% 38% 48%

Cost of implementing commercially available

fraud detection tool/service48% 57% 41% 52%

Lack of compelling business case (cost versus

benefit) to adopt new or change existing

methods

47% 36% 35% 55%

Consumer data privacy issues/concerns 38% 37% 41% 34%

Page 30: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Opportunities to Reduce Fraud

30©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

New Methods Needed by Organizations FI

(N=95)Other Org.

(N=31)

Controls over Internet payments 67% 65%

Information sharing on emerging fraud tactics

being conducted by criminal rings62% 74%

Restrict access to customer DDA accounts 23% 26%

Industry Considerations FI

(N=95)Other Org.

(N=38)

Industry specific education on fraud prevention best practices

73% 74%

Industry alert services 66% 61%

Industry sponsored fraudster databases 55% 66%

Page 31: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Opportunities to Reduce Fraud

31©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Legal & Regulatory Considerations FI

(N=104)

Other Org.

(N=39)

Increase penalties for fraud & attempted fraud 70% 67%

Place more responsibility on consumers & customers to

reconcile & protect their payments data79% 26%

Strengthen disincentives to committing fraud through stiffer

penalties & more likely prosecution59% 72%

Place responsibility to mitigate fraud & shift liability for

fraudulent card payments to the entity that initially accepts the

card payment

79% 18%

Improve law enforcement cooperation on domestic &

international payments fraud & fraud rings38% 69%

Align Regulation E & Regulation CC to reflect changes in check

collection systems’ use of check images & conversion of checks

to ACH

52% 26%

Page 32: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Conclusions• Payments related fraud remains a significant concern of FIs & other

corporations in the region, including very small organizations that responded to the Minneapolis Fed’s 2010 payments fraud survey.

• Most problematic is fraud that affects checks & debit cards, as these are the payment types that were most often attacked by fraud schemes & that sustained the highest losses as a result.

• Most FIs & other corporations report total fraud losses that represent less than 0.3% of their annual revenues.

• Various types of internal controls & procedures are the main methods used by most organizations to mitigate payments fraud risk.

• Cost is the main barrier to organizations adopting more defenses against payments fraud.

• At the industry level, respondents believe that sharing fraud related information among organizations would help to mitigate fraud.

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Questions

©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Page 34: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Resources

• Industry Links– American Bankers Association www.aba.com– Association for Financial Professionals www.afponline.org– Bank Administration Institute www.bai.org– BITS www.bitsinfo.org– Credit Union National Association www.cuna.org– Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

www.federalreserve.gov– Electronic Check Clearing House Organization www.eccho.com– Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council's www.ffiec.gov– Federal Reserve Financial Services www.frbservices.org– Independent Community Bankers of America www.icba.org– National Automated Clearing House Association www.nacha.org– X9, Financial Industry Standards www.x9.org

34©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent

Page 35: Payments Fraud & Prevention - Minneapolis Fed

Contact Information

Federal Reserve Bank of MinneapolisPayments Information & Outreach Office

Claudia Swendseid, Senior Vice PresidentPhone: 612-204-5448Email: [email protected]

Amanda Dorphy, Senior Payments Information ConsultantPhone: 612-204-5894Email: [email protected]

Web Site: www.minneapolisfed.org

35©2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Materials are not to be used without consent