6
Payment vehicle as an instrument to elicit economic demand for conservation Déborah Quinderé Carneiro a, * , Adriana Rosa Carvalho b,1 a Post-graduation Program in Development and Environment at Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte/UFRN, Natal, Brazil b Department of Ecology at Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte/UFRN, Natal, Brazil article info Article history: Available online abstract In this study we applied collective/mandatory and individual/voluntary payment vehicles to elicit public claim for governmental investments of urban coastal nature reserves; to verify the efciency of either payment formats to recall protest voters declared under the other and sensitivity of respondents to reveal willingness to pay-WTP for maintenance and conservation of reserves. Results showed higher WTP bids and valuation under collective and mandatory payment format and supplied evidence that in developing countries people nurture expectancy on governmental actions and funding to conserve natural landscapes. The difference between the non-use values estimated under the two payment ve- hicles was USD 3.5 millions. For the purpose of this study, this indicates the amount claimed by local people for governmental investment in the coastal urban nature reserves. Ecological knowledge on the reserves have a positive effect on non-use values, underlining the role of information to increase people understanding on benets supplied by nature reserve and to enable them to declared the utility attributed to these areas in economic terms. Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction In the last four decades a number of actions and public policies has emerged the number and size of protected areas, widening governmental investments to biodiversity protection. Notwith- standing global biodiversity is declining and many other strategies have been applied in an attempted to decrease the biodiversity loss rate (Butchart et al., 2010). Economic valuation of natural capital has been increasingly undertaken to guide decision-making on conservation (TEEB, 2010) and on economic policy (Birdir et al., 2013). Given that there is a stated trend to accept that no price means no value (Jakobsson and Dragun, 2001), natural resources pricing has a role to inform on conservation economic benets and to highlight that protected areas are not worthless. Recently substantial technical innovation has been incorporated to natural resources valuation methods, giving support to the challenge of identify the method to better estimate the economic value of an environmental asset and to the challenge of understand the effect of this valuation to the conservation and management of natural resources (Jakobsson and Dragun, 2001). One of the most widely used methods is contingent valuation which is a stated preference method and the only that estimates non-use values for natural resources without take into account current or futures uses. Contingent valuation method has been widely discussed in the literature, reaching more than 2 000 re- searches published in the rst 35 years of the method development (Carson, 2000). This method is based on the elaboration of hypo- thetical markets that simulate the change on the natural resource provision, aiming to stimulate people to state their preferences under the resource variation scenarios, in a similar way that choices would be done by consumers in real market (Carson, 2000; Hoyos et al., 2009; Whitehead and Rose, 2009). Currently, discussions focusing in the criteria to acquire more consistent results (Bateman and Turner, 1992; Carson, 2000) and in the payment vehicle used in the hypothetical market (Berrens et al., 2002; Champ and Bishop, 2001) have adjusted the technique to the intended objectives and improved the estimates. Concerning on the payment vehicle, a debate has arisen over whether different methodological approaches assess the efciency of either collective and mandatory or individual and voluntary payment to achieve conservation goals (Wiser, 2007) and to avoid bias such as strategic behavior (when interviewee declares false willingness to pay to * Corresponding author. Tel.: þ55 084 87377661. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (D.Q. Carneiro), acarvalho.ufrn@gmail. com (A.R. Carvalho). 1 Tel.: þ55 084 32193525. Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Ocean & Coastal Management journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ocecoaman http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2014.03.002 0964-5691/Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Ocean & Coastal Management 93 (2014) 1e6

Payment vehicle as an instrument to elicit economic demand for conservation

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Payment vehicle as an instrument to elicit economic demand for conservation

lable at ScienceDirect

Ocean & Coastal Management 93 (2014) 1e6

Contents lists avai

Ocean & Coastal Management

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/ocecoaman

Payment vehicle as an instrument to elicit economic demand forconservation

Déborah Quinderé Carneiro a,*, Adriana Rosa Carvalho b,1

a Post-graduation Program in Development and Environment at Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte/UFRN, Natal, BrazilbDepartment of Ecology at Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte/UFRN, Natal, Brazil

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Available online

* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ55 084 87377661.E-mail addresses: [email protected] (D.Q. Car

com (A.R. Carvalho).1 Tel.: þ55 084 32193525.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2014.03.0020964-5691/� 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

a b s t r a c t

In this study we applied collective/mandatory and individual/voluntary payment vehicles to elicit publicclaim for governmental investments of urban coastal nature reserves; to verify the efficiency of eitherpayment formats to recall protest voters declared under the other and sensitivity of respondents toreveal willingness to pay-WTP for maintenance and conservation of reserves. Results showed higherWTP bids and valuation under collective and mandatory payment format and supplied evidence that indeveloping countries people nurture expectancy on governmental actions and funding to conservenatural landscapes. The difference between the non-use values estimated under the two payment ve-hicles was USD 3.5 millions. For the purpose of this study, this indicates the amount claimed by localpeople for governmental investment in the coastal urban nature reserves. Ecological knowledge on thereserves have a positive effect on non-use values, underlining the role of information to increase peopleunderstanding on benefits supplied by nature reserve and to enable them to declared the utilityattributed to these areas in economic terms.

� 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

In the last four decades a number of actions and public policieshas emerged the number and size of protected areas, wideninggovernmental investments to biodiversity protection. Notwith-standing global biodiversity is declining and many other strategieshave been applied in an attempted to decrease the biodiversity lossrate (Butchart et al., 2010).

Economic valuation of natural capital has been increasinglyundertaken to guide decision-making on conservation (TEEB, 2010)and on economic policy (Birdir et al., 2013). Given that there is astated trend to accept that no price means no value (Jakobsson andDragun, 2001), natural resources pricing has a role to inform onconservation economic benefits and to highlight that protectedareas are not worthless.

Recently substantial technical innovation has been incorporatedto natural resources valuation methods, giving support to thechallenge of identify the method to better estimate the economicvalue of an environmental asset and to the challenge of understand

neiro), acarvalho.ufrn@gmail.

the effect of this valuation to the conservation and management ofnatural resources (Jakobsson and Dragun, 2001).

One of the most widely used methods is contingent valuationwhich is a stated preference method and the only that estimatesnon-use values for natural resources without take into accountcurrent or futures uses. Contingent valuation method has beenwidely discussed in the literature, reaching more than 2 000 re-searches published in the first 35 years of the method development(Carson, 2000). This method is based on the elaboration of hypo-thetical markets that simulate the change on the natural resourceprovision, aiming to stimulate people to state their preferencesunder the resource variation scenarios, in a similar way that choiceswould be done by consumers in real market (Carson, 2000; Hoyoset al., 2009; Whitehead and Rose, 2009).

Currently, discussions focusing in the criteria to acquire moreconsistent results (Bateman and Turner, 1992; Carson, 2000) and inthe payment vehicle used in the hypothetical market (Berrens et al.,2002; Champ and Bishop, 2001) have adjusted the technique to theintended objectives and improved the estimates. Concerning on thepayment vehicle, a debate has arisen over whether differentmethodological approaches assess the efficiency of either collectiveand mandatory or individual and voluntary payment to achieveconservation goals (Wiser, 2007) and to avoid bias such as strategicbehavior (when interviewee declares false willingness to pay to

Page 2: Payment vehicle as an instrument to elicit economic demand for conservation

D.Q. Carneiro, A.R. Carvalho / Ocean & Coastal Management 93 (2014) 1e62

skip the payment), protest votes and unwillingness to pay(Ivehammar, 2009; Morrison et al., 2000).

The choice for the payment vehicle may also guide the decision-makers toward efficient and acceptable environmental actions,since each method may provide an overview on citizens demandfor environmental conservation before the statement of any man-agement decision (Morrison et al., 2000). Further, preferencesrevealed can indicate the expectation of citizens concerning to theiruncertainty on conservation programs (Voltaire et al., 2013).

Thus, a number of studies have investigated payment vehicleeffects (Campos et al., 2007; Champ and Bishop, 2001; Ivehammar,2009; Wiser, 2007) but not many studies have investigated on thesensitivity of WTP to whether payments have to be made collec-tively or voluntarily (Stithou and Scarpa, 2012). Further, literaturedoes not provide investigation on how the private or publicperception on these vehicles affects the WTP and none study hasrelated the people’s perception of public taxes paid to the claimedgovernmental investments on conservation.

In this study individual voluntary payment vehicle (as donation)and collective and mandatory payment were applied aiming toverify how these formats can be used to guide conservation de-cisions and investments, having three urban coastal nature reserveas study site. Therefore, the individual contribution has the char-acter of private investment while the collective payment delegatesto the public managers the responsibility in assure conservation inurban natural areas, improving urban well-being.

A literature overview indicates that when both payment choicesare presented, respondents in general state higher WTP in thecollective payment format (see Bateman et al., 1995; Champ et al.,2002; Green et al., 1994; Jakobsson and Dragun, 2001; Wiser,2007). The trends of higher WTP in collective and mandatorypayment vehicles can be explained by ‘free-riding’ concept. Thismechanisms dictates that once many individuals are able tocontribute in voluntary payment scheme, many will skip of paying,since they believe that others will pay for the public good provision(Wiser, 2007). Nonetheless, evidence exists in the literature thatcompulsory and collective payments may produce lower WTP(Stithou and Scarpa, 2012) and other three studies showed nosignificant difference between the individual and voluntary pay-ment and the collective andmandatory payment (Ajzen et al., 1996;Babb and Sherr, 1975; Milon, 1989: all cited in Stithou and Scarpa,2012). Diversely, the lower WTP at collective payment formatmay be attributed to the strategic behavior and incentive compat-ibility. Accordingly, the voluntary payment may not be incentivecompatible, because it provides no incentives for truthful demandrevelation and under a hypothetical context the individual wouldoverstate WTP to ensure actual provision of the potentially desir-able public good in question (Stithou and Scarpa, 2012; Wiser,2007).

Apart from determining WTP for the conservation of coastalurban nature reserves, this paper explores the use of collective andmandatory or individual and voluntary payment vehicle to explorepeople’s demand by public investment in conservation and tostimulate the protest voters to declare their real economic valueattributed to the environmental asset. Further, the paper in-vestigates the difference in bids produced by private and publicpayment vehicles, given that the private format is individual andthe public is collective.

2. Methods and data

2.1. Study site

For the purpose of this investigation interviewees wereenquired on their willingness to pay by urban coastal nature

reserves. We used three coastal nature reserves in Natal city, in RioGrande do Norte State to data sampling. Natal is a touristic spotlocated in the northeastern of Brazil coast. The city has 1 699 km2

and total population of 803 739 in habitants (IBGE, 2013) settled by36 neighborhoods. Less than 30% of urban area is constituted bynatural reserves (SEMURB, 2010). The larger urban coastal naturereserve, the Park of Dunes, is bordering the ocean and has 1172 ha.This was the first state reserve to be created and is also the largesturban natural park over dunes in Brazil (IDEMA, 2013). Recreationalactivities in this reserve include trekking with guides all over thepark, walking or jogging in the administration area and attendanceto the opened concerts on Sunday’s summer. The medium sizereserve, known as Park of Jenipabu has 800 ha and is the only withaccess to the ocean. Jenipabu is the most touristic spot due toavailability of recreational activities as buggy rides, trekking withguides, dromedary or horses rides and sunset watching. The smallreserve, the Park of City, has 64 ha and was established by the CityHall (SEMURB, 2008). This last one has ocean viewand has not beenopened to recreational activities since the reserve creation due tolocal political disputes, despite the pleasant natural landscape andthe logistic structure created. Dunes, patches of Atlantic forest,coastal lakes and sandbank vegetation (restinga) are the naturallandscape in all reserves (SEMURB, 2009; IDEMA, 2013).

2.2. Questionnaire design and the payment vehicles

A questionnaire comprised by open-ended questions was usedto collect information on socioeconomic characteristics of in-terviewees, ecological knowledge on the reserves and questionsaddressing hypothetical market in the willingness to pay method,as follows. The first part consisted of general information on theinterviewee such as age, literacy and local of living. The second partcontained questions that informed the degree of familiarity of in-terviewees with the reserves, hypothetical market was elaboratedusing as elicitation method the open-ended survey, allowing in-terviewees to reveal his/her willingness to pay by the means of freebids (Serôa da Motta, 1998). Before asking on willingness to pay,each respondent was informed on ecological features of the re-serves, their importance in the urban ecosystem and the upcomingthreats due to unplanned urban expansion and to the plannedprojects for urban mobility for FIFA World Cup at 2014 in Brazil.Respondents revealed their willingness to pay for management,conservation and use of these urban coastal natural areas throughtwo payment vehicles: i. a collective mandatory fee e in which theinterviewees were asked to indicate if he/she would be favorable tothe application of part of the monthly Municipal Property Tax paid,hereafter MPT, with the aim of support management, conservationand use of urban natural reserves only. In case of agreement, he/shewas asked to indicate the proportion of MPT should be fairlyinvested to the purpose aforementioned; and ii. by means of amonthly donation to a Non Governmental Agency e NGO thatwould be in charge of manage and conserve the nature reserves.

The Municipal Property Tax is an annual duty stated by FederalConstitution in 1988 to supply urban safety and welfare and like-wise, environmental equilibrium. Despite being considered annual,MPT full value is paid in a monthly basis, turning the effect of thispayment similar to the monthly donation requested to the NGO.The value of this tax is determined by the sale price of each prop-erty multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.6 (poorer neighborhood)to 1.0. Sale price is defined according to the characteristics of theproperty, features of the land where the dwelling is settled andwhether the use is residential, commercial, industrial or essentialservices, like schools and hospitals.

The two alternative payment vehicles were applied to assesscitizens’ claim for public liability in the conservation of the urban

Page 3: Payment vehicle as an instrument to elicit economic demand for conservation

Table 1Variables included in the logistic analysis.

Variable specification Description and code

Binary dependent variable WTP e equal 0 if do not have WTP; andequal 1 if have WTP)

Continuous explanatory Distance in km from the neighborhood tothe nature reserve

Binary explanatory If the respondent is married (1) or single (0)Binary explanatory Sex of respondents (female ¼ 1; male ¼ 0)Continuous explanatory Income of the respondentsContinuous explanatory Family incomeDiscrete explanatory Age of respondent in yearsCategorical explanatory Literacy e described by primary education

incomplete (¼ 1) or complete (¼ 2), secondaryeducation incomplete (¼ 3) or complete (¼ 4),tertiary level incomplete (¼ 5) or complete(¼ 6) and post-graduate (¼ 7)

Continuous explanatory Ecological knowledge e Score of eachrespondent, ranging from 1 to 10 when askedon the ecological knowledge of reserves

D.Q. Carneiro, A.R. Carvalho / Ocean & Coastal Management 93 (2014) 1e6 3

coastal nature reserve and to verify the proportion of protest voteswhen comparing both payment vehicles. Subsequently to haverevealed his/her willingness to pay by the first payment vehicle(NGO donation), each respondent was enquired on his/her contri-bution by the alternative payment vehicle (MPT).

Payment vehicle bias was not explored in this study but also itwas not a concern as both payment vehicles presented are plau-sible, appropriated to the context and are realistic to interviewees.

2.3. Data sampling

Interviews were randomized and nine neighborhoods close toeach coastal nature reserves and nine neighborhoods far from eacharea were picked, likely combining as people that know/visit thereserves as people that may not know/visit the reserves and thathave different levels of knowledge about the areas. Respondentswere enquired on only one reserve, following the criterion of dis-tance aforementioned. Sample size comprised 0.1% of the totalpopulation from 16 neighborhoods in Natal and two in Extremozdistrict and was determined according to the table of Arkin andColton (1995) considering a population over 100 000 inhabitants,at 95% confidence level and 5% error. Following the pilot test, surveywas carried out from October 2012 to April 2013 and only in-dividuals older than 18yo and residents at the neighborhood pickedwere interviewed. An intercept survey was used, thus following thelast interviewee every next person encountered was approached tothe survey. Logistic limitations, characteristic of interviewees andcost limitations dictated the choice for the sample and surveymethods. People were individually and personally interviewed toavoid lack of information and to do not cause embarrassment tothose eventually illiterate people.

2.4. Data analysis

The non-parametric Wilcoxon test was performed to verify thedifference between bids declared by interviewees using both pay-ment vehicles. A contingency table was applied to investigate thedifference in the willingness to pay between the payment vehiclespresented and the values produced were compared by chi-squaretest.

As usually practiced, a logistic regression was adjusted to esti-mate the variables which influence the WTP for the urban naturereserves. Explanatory variables used were distance between inter-view home and the reserve, marital status, sex, income, age, literacyand respondent’s ecological knowledge on the reserve (Table 1). Theprobabilistic function with logistic distribution, Pi ¼ 1/1 þ e(g0 þ gi �xi) was assumed to calculate the probability of significant variables(Pessoa and Ramos, 1998; below). Pi denotes the qualitative depen-dent variable, g0 is the constant of regression, gi is the coefficient ofindependent variables, xi is the vector of independent variable(s),and 3i is a random component arising from omitted variables(Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989; Li and Mattson, 1995).

Respondent’s ecological knowledge on the reserve was measureby the proportion of right answers when individuals were asked toinform the reserve’s Biome, to quote three ecological benefitsprovided by the areas and list as three animals as three vegetalspecies from Atlantic Forest. To the respondent that provided allinformation, was attributed a score equal to 10. Then, if respondentprovided half of information, his/her score was five. Using thestepwise method that includes algorithms and successively in-cludes or remove explanatory variables non significant (Gotelli andEllison, 2011; Whittingham et al., 2006), just variables of p ¼ 0.05were held in the model.

Estimative for economic value of non-use to each coastal reservewas performed multiplying modal values of bids declared by one-

third of total population in the city (803.739 inhabitants; IBGE,2013). Modal values were selected due to the high standard devi-ation of means values.

The difference between non-use value estimated usingMPT bidsand the non-use value estimated by ONG bids represents theannual economic demand of citizens for mandatory public invest-ment to the conservation of the urban coastal nature reserves.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Sample characteristics

The final sample consisted of 445 respondents, mostly singlewomen (60%), ranging in age between 18 and 88 years, with anaverage age of 40.5 years. Respondents have mainly secondaryschool (39%), partial primary school (16%) and university degrees(12%). All people surveyedmentioned their income, which averagesaround monthly USD 753.30 (�809.89) and has as modal value asmedian value equal to USD 583.25.

3.2. Ecological knowledge

Almost all interviewees (75%) know the urban coastal naturalreserves and half of them had visited these areas at least one time.Thus, the values revealed by at least 222 interviewees were actuallynon-use value associated to the reserves since people have nevervisited the areas (Carson, 2000). As a whole, even those that visitedthe reserves seldom or often had poor prior knowledge on thesenatural public areas. Despite majority of respondents (88%) wereaware that the reserves were settled in the Atlantic Forest Biome,most of them were unaware on benefits provided by the reserves(63%) and only 22% were able to mention the vegetation type in thereserves. Besides, few people mentioned at least one animal speciesfrom Atlantic Forest (10%) and one third were able to quote at leastone species of flora. Just tree species were quoted and the mostmentioned were Brazilwood (Caesalpinia echinata; 25%) andcashew tree (Anacardium occidentale; 19%). Brazilwood is the mostknown tree species likely because of the historical importance ofthe species since the country was named after the tree (Bueno,2013). Information on cashew tree were likely driven by the eco-nomic importance of the cashew nuts to exportation that generatedUSD 196 millions in 2008 (Embrapa, 2012) and by the importanceof cashew pseudofruit to the local economy.

Even though the knowledge seems to be narrow and quitegeneral, this was an important issue to the WTP by the reserves.

Page 4: Payment vehicle as an instrument to elicit economic demand for conservation

Table 3Probabilities associated to significant variables estimated to both payment vehicles.

WTP probability Collective mandatory Individual and voluntary

Probability EKnow Age EKnow0.4 a 78e84 a

0.5 a 63e75 a

0.6 0e1 48e62 a

0.7 2 31e47 a

0.8 3e5 18e30 a

0.9 6e7 a 0e71.0 8e10 a 8e10

Under individual voluntary payment: probabilities (P) ¼ 0.8 to women; (P) ¼ 0.9;(P) ¼ 0.8 to post-graduated respondents; and (P) ¼ 0.7 to lower literacy.Eknow ¼ ecological knowledge.

a Probability does not exist or was not estimated by the model to this interval.

D.Q. Carneiro, A.R. Carvalho / Ocean & Coastal Management 93 (2014) 1e64

Ecological knowledge was the most influential variable (Table 2)and showed higher probability to WTP (Table 3) though re-spondents educated to the tertiary level, youngest (raging from 18to 30) and mostly men also had high probabilities of WTP underindividual and voluntary payment vehicle.

Willingness to pay under collective and mandatory paymentvehicle was also (and only) determined by ecological knowledgerevealed by the respondent. Individuals that scored over six weremore likely to haveWTP under collective payment format (Table 3).Other studies have explored the effect of people’s knowledge onWTP and have found that people’s prior knowledge of species canincreaseWTP probabilities (Stithou and Scarpa, 2012) and attitudestoward biodiversity influencing financial support allocated forspecies conservation (Martín-López et al., 2007). These findingsunderline the role of information to increase people understandingon benefits supplied by nature reserve (Birdir et al., 2013; Hoyoset al., 2009). Likewise results showed here offered evidence thatknowledge influence on ecosystem valuation, as to the urbancoastal nature reserves valuated here.

3.3. Willingness to pay and bids under the payment vehiclespresented

Regardless the payment format presented 101 respondentswere not able to inform if they had or not willingness to pay for theurban coastal nature reserves. This uncertainty decreased thesample size to 344 respondents.

Thewillingness to pay declared by interviewees was remarkablyhigher (X2 ¼ 4.38; p ¼ 0.03; N ¼ 344) when considering the col-lective and mandatory payment vehicles (292 respondentsdeclared WTP) than when presenting the individual and voluntarypayment format (199 respondents showed WTP). This finding is inline with the literature that predicts higher WTP stated on collec-tive andmandatory payment format (Champ et al., 2002; Jakobssonand Dragun, 2001). On the contrary, collective payment had lessprotest votes (52 protest votes) than individual voluntary paymentthat generates 145 protest votes. This preference, however, cannotbe explained by the free-riding hypothesis (Wiser, 2007) becauseroughly half people interviewed attributed their lack of WTP tofinancial reasons and not for have considered that others will pay(Table 4).

It should be reminded that the compulsory character for thepayment format likely did not influenced the preference by thepayment vehicle, because respondents could refusal the paymentregardless the payment format presented. Actually, 28 respondentsdeclined to pay when confronted with both payment vehicles. Yetcollective payment was efficient to reintroduce into the bidscounting more than one fourth of respondents that have previouslyrefused to pay. Therefore, the sample design applied here allowedpeople to express their true economic value by the assets(Jorgensen et al., 1999), indicating utility closest to the real (Green

Table 2Logistic regression for the willingness to pay under both payment vehicles.

Coefficient Error p Rho2 LL Payment vehicle

Constant 0.468 0.140 0.001 0.032 �254 289 Collective andmandatoryEknow 3.256 0.872 0.000

Constant 2.257 0.472 0.000 0.052 �286 790 Individual andvoluntaryAge �0.030 0.007 0.000

Sexo �0.527 0.218 0.016Literacy �0.198 0.068 0.003Eknow 1.550 0.730 0.034

Eknow e Ecological knowledge scores from 0 to 10.

and Tunstall, 1991) and increasing the reliability on results (Carsonand Groves, 2007).

Mean values of bids generated by the collective payment format(USD 38.56 � 50.29) were statistically different (W ¼ �33428,p < 0.0001) from mean values produced by individual and volun-tary payment format (USD 10.91 � 10.30). The collective paymentformat produced as the higher as the lower bids, ranging from USD0.32 to USD237.71 while individual voluntary payment producedbids ranging from USD 0.85 to USD 42.45 (Fig. 1).

3.4. Non use values estimated and the demand for publicinvestment in conservation

The difference between the non-use values estimated under thetwo payment vehicles, was USD 3.5 millions (USD3 530 019.73). Forthe purpose of this study, this indicates the amount claimed bylocal people for governmental investment in the coastal urbannature reserves. Yet, the amount estimated reveals the economicexpectation of citizens on conservation programs (Voltaire et al.,2013). While in developed countries conservation funding isincreasingly reliant on nongovernmental funding sources (Bakkeret al., 2010), our outcomes shed light on strong evidence that indeveloping countries people nurture expectancy on governmentalactions and funding to conserve natural landscapes. Besides, thisvalued preference indicates to decision-makers on the acceptabilityand efficiency of environmental conservation actions (Morrisonet al., 2000; Voltaire et al., 2013).

Under the collective and mandatory payment format the non-use value estimated was USD 4.6 million (US$ 4 667 268.22) andunder the individual and voluntary format the non-use valueestimated was USD 1 million (US$ 1 137 248.49).

Economic value estimated to the urban coastal nature reservesranged from 0.09% (under collective and mandatory payment) to0.02% (under individual and voluntary payment) from total GrossDomestic Product e GDP estimated to the province in 2010 (USD

Table 4Reasons to do not have WTP when using individual and voluntary payment vehicle.

Reasons to do not have WTP under individual and voluntary payment %

Financial reasons 49Governmental attribution 12Lack of confidence in NGOs 9Other people will contribute 8Do not know 8Other reasons 7Amount of current taxes 6Did not answer 1

Total 100

Page 5: Payment vehicle as an instrument to elicit economic demand for conservation

Fig. 1. Range of bids revealed by interviewees (a) under collective and mandatory payment vehicle (using municipal property tax) and (b) under individual and voluntary paymentvehicle (NGO donation).

D.Q. Carneiro, A.R. Carvalho / Ocean & Coastal Management 93 (2014) 1e6 5

5 092 707 765.43; IBGE, 2013). Although illustrative given people’slack of information on management costs, this result underlines animportant claim and measure toward conservation, indicating 0.1%of the state GPD as a minimum for governmental commitment toinvestment in nature conservation. By hectare, this represents anestimated value ranging fromUSD 552.89 (under voluntary format)to USD 2 269.06 value (under collective payment). Currently, onlyUSD 1.87 has been invested in management and conservation ofnature reserves countrywide (Medeiros et al., 2011).

When enquired through collective and mandatory paymentformat, interviewees attributed higher value to the medium sizenature reserve, the Park of Jenipabu, which is the area of higherlandscape heterogeneity (USD 336 436.44). Both larger and smallernature reserve were attributed the same value (USD 282 132.48).Individual and voluntary payment resulted in similar non-use valueto all urban coastal nature reserves (USD 1 137 248.49). It isworthful to remind that just dwellers were interviewed and thatvalues declared, are related to the benefits perceived by localpeople. Further, collective payment likely represents the mosttruthful estimate, once this format allowed large proportion ofpeople to reveal the utility of these areas by their WTP. Under thisviewpoint, is interesting to note that non-use value attributed wasthe same as to the larger as to the smaller reserve and that theformer is opened to public use while the latter is not. This can beassumed as a validation of non-use values revealed and a sign that,instead of stating values related just to leisure, people are creditingvalue to benefits and well-being other than recreational.

4. Conclusions

Collective and mandatory payment vehicle seemed to be moreincentive-compatible and produced as more willingness to acceptas higher bids and lower protest votes. Collective format seems tobe more precise to indicate the claim for governmental commit-ment in conservation of natural landscapes and match to culturalscenario of developing countries, in which citizens credit to gov-ernment the liability for preserve nature.

Lastly, ecological knowledge on the reserves have a positiveeffect on non-use values, underlining the importance in increasepeople understanding on benefits supplied by nature reserve andenabling them to declare their utility in economic terms.

Even though general, these results give some insights on pref-erences of citizens when confronted with collective/mandatorypayment vehicles and individual/voluntary format and supply oneclear and simple sample design to investigate on the plea for in-vestment of public taxes in nature conservation. These trends can

guide decision-makers to achieve as conservation goals as popu-lation agreement and may stimulate the investigation of thispattern in other landscapes through developing countries.

Acknowledgments

D.Q. Carneiro is grateful to Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento dePessoal de Nível Superior (Coordination for the Improvement ofHigher Level) for a master degree scholarship.

References

Ajzen, I., Brown, T., Rosenthal, L., 1996. Information bias in contingent valuation:effects of personal relevance, quality of information, and motivational orien-tation. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 30, 43e57.

Arkin, H., Colton, R., 1995. Tables for Statisticians. SEBRAE, Brasília, Brasil.Babb, E., Sherr, B., 1975. Pricing public goods: an experiment with two proposed

pricing systems. Public Choice 23, 25e48.Bakker, V.J., Baum, J.K., Brodie, J.F., Salomon, A.K., Dickson, Brett G., Gibbs, H.K.,

Jensen, O.P., McIntyre, P.B., 2010. The changing landscape of conservation sci-ence funding in the United States. Conserv. Lett. 3, 435e444.

Bateman, I.J., Turner, R.K., 1992. Evaluation of the Environment: the ContingentValuation Method. Cserge GEC, Londres, pp. 92e118 (Working Paper).

Bateman, I.J., Langford, I.H., Turner, R.K., Willis, K.G., Garrod, G.D., 1995. Elicitationand truncation effects in contingent valuation studies. Ecol. Econ. 12, 161e179.

Berrens, R.P., Smith, H.J., Bohara, A.K., Silva, C.L., 2002. Further investigation ofvoluntary contribution contingent valuation: fair share, time of contribution,and respondent uncertainty. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 44, 144e168.

Birdir, S., Ünal, Ö., Birdir, K., Williams, A.T., 2013. Willingness to pay as an economicinstrument for coastal tourism management: cases from Mersin, Turkey. Tour.Manag. 36, 279e283.

Bueno, E., 2013. Brazil: a History. Editora Leya, first ed., p. 480 (in Portuguese).Butchart, S.H.M., Walpole, M., Collen, B., van Strien, A., Scharlemann, J.P.W.,

Almond, R.E.A., Baillie, J.E.M., Bomhard, B., Brown, C., Bruno, J., Carpenter, K.E.,Carr, G.M., Chanson, J., Chenery, A.M., Csirke, J., Davidson, N.C., Dentener, F.,Foster, M., Galli, A., Galloway, Genovesi, J.N.P., Gregory, R.D., Hockings, M.,Kapos, V., Lamarque, J.F., Leverington, F., Loh, J., McGeoch, M.A., McRae, L.,Minasyan, A., Morcillo, M.H., Oldfield, T.E.E., Pauly, D., Quader, S., Revenga, C.,Sauer, J.R., Skolnik, B., Spear, D., Stanwell-Smith, D., Stuart, S.N., Symes, A.,Tierney, M., Tyrrell, T.D., Vie, J.C., Watson, R., 2010. Global biodiversity: in-dicators of recent declines. Science 328, 1164e1168.

Campos, P., Caparrós, A., Oviedo, J.L., 2007. Comparing payment e vehicle effects incontingent valuation studies for recreational use in two protected Spanishforests. J. Leis. Res. 39, 60e85.

Carson, R.T., 2000. Contingent valuation: a user’s guide. Environ. Sci. Technol. 34,1413e1418.

Carson, R.T., Groves, T., 2007. Incentive and informational properties of preferencequestions. Environ. Resour. Econ. 37, 181e210.

Champ, P.A., Bishop, R.C., 2001. Donation payment mechanisms and contingent valua-tion: an empirical study of hypothetical bias. Environ. Resour. Econ. 19, 383e402.

Champ, P.A., Flores, N.E., Brown, T.C., Chivers, J., 2002. Contingent valuation andincentives. Land Econ. 78, 591e604.

Embrapa, 2012. Brazilian Enterprise for Agricultural Research. Available from:http://www.urbanizacao.cnpm.embrapa.br/conteudo/uf/rn.html.

Gotelli, N.J., Ellison, A.M., 2011. Principles of Statistics in Ecology. Artmed, PortoAlegre, Brazil (in Portuguese).

Page 6: Payment vehicle as an instrument to elicit economic demand for conservation

D.Q. Carneiro, A.R. Carvalho / Ocean & Coastal Management 93 (2014) 1e66

Green, C.H., Tunstall, S.M., 1991. Is the economic evaluation of environmental re-sources possible? J. Environ. Manag. 33, 123e141.

Green, D.P., Kahneman, D., Kunreuther, H., 1994. How the scope and method of publicfunding affect willingness-to-pay for public-goods. Public Opin. Q. 58, 49e67.

Hosmer, D.W., Lemeshow, S., 1989. Applied Logistic Regression. Wiley Intersciencepublication, New York, p. 309.

Hoyos, D., Mariel, P., Fernàndez-Macho, J., 2009. The influence of cultural identityon the WTP to protect natural resource: some empirical evidence. Ecol. Econ.68, 2372e2381.

IBGE, 2013. Cidades. Available from: http://www.ibge.gov.br/cidadesat/index.php.IDEMA, 2013. Unidades de Conservação. Available from: http://www.idema.rn.gov.

br/contentproducao/aplicacao/idema/unidades_de_conservacao/gerados/unidades_de_conservacao.asp.

Ivehammar, P., 2009. The payment vehicle used in CV studies of environmentalgoods does matter. J. Agric. Resour. Econ. 34, 450e463.

Jakobsson, K.M., Dragun, A.K., 2001. The worth of a possum: valuing species withthe contingent valuation method. Environ. Resour. Econ. 19, 211e227.

Jorgensen, B.S., Syme, G.J., Bishop, B.J., Nancarrow, B.E., 1999. Protest responses incontingent valuation. Environ. Resour. Econ. 14, 131e150.

Li, C.Z.,Mattson, L.,1995.Discrete choicepreferenceuncertainty: an improvedstructuralmodel for contingent valuation. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 28 (2), 256e269.

Martín-López, B., Montes, C., Benayas, J., 2007. The non-economic motives behindthe willingness to pay for biodiversity conservation. Biol. Conserv. 139, 67e82.

Medeiros, R., Young, C.E.F., Pavese, H.B., Araújo, F.F.S., 2011. Contribution of theBrazilian Protect Areas for the National Economy: Executive Summary. UNEP-WCMC, Brasília, Brazil (in Portuguese).

Milon, J.W., 1989. Contingent valuation experiments for strategic behavior.J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 17, 293e308.

Morrison, M.D., Blamey, R.K., Bennett, J.W., 2000. Minimising payment vehicle biasin contingent valuation studies. Environ. Resour. Econ. 16, 407e422.

Pessoa, R., Ramos, F.S., 1998. Avaliação de ativos ambientais: aplicação do métodode avaliação contingente. Rev. Bras. Econ. 52, 405e426.

SEMURB e Municipal Office of Urbanization, 2009. Dunes: Report of maping andcaracterization of remianing dunes in the city dos remanescentes de dunas domunicípio de Natal-RN. Secretaria Municipal de Meio Ambiente e Urbanismo,Natal, Brazil (in Portuguese).

SEMURB e Municipal Office of Urbanization, 2010. Natal Neighborhoods. SecretariaMunicipal de Meio Ambiente e Urbanismo, Natal, Brazil (in Portuguese).

SEMURB e; Municipal Office of Urbanization, 2008. Parque da Cidade Dom NivaldoMonte (Park of city): An Invitation to Environmental Preservation. SecretariaMunicipal de Meio Ambiente e Urbanismo, Departamento de Informação,Pesquisa e Estatística, Natal, Brasil (in Portuguese).

Serôa da Motta, R., 1998. Manual for Economic Valuation of Environmental Re-sources. Ministério do Meio Ambiente, dos Recursos Hídricos e da AmazôniaLegal. IPEA/MMA/PNUD/CNPq, Brasília, Brasil (in Portuguese).

Stithou, M., Scarpa, R., 2012. Collective versus voluntary payment in contingentvaluation for the conservation of marine biodiversity: an exploratory studyfrom Zakynthos, Greece. Ocean. Coast. Manag. 56, 1e9.

TEEB, 2010. In: Kumar, P. (Ed.), The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity:Ecological and Economic Foundations. Earthscan, London and Washington.

Voltaire, L., Pirrone, C., Bailly, D., 2013. Dealing with preference uncertainty incontingent willingness to pay for a nature protection program: a new approach.Ecol. Econ. 88, 76e85.

Whitehead, J.C., Rose, A.Z., 2009. Estimating environmental benefits of naturalhazard mitigation with data transfer: results from a benefit-cost analysis ofFederal Emergency Management Agency hazard mitigation grants. Mitig. AdaptStrateg. Glob. Change 14, 655e676.

Whittingham, M.J., Stephens, P.A., Bradbury, R.B., Freckleton, R.P., 2006. Why do westill use stepwise modelling in ecology and behaviour? J. Anim. Ecol. 75, 1182e1189.

Wiser, R.H., 2007. Using contingent valuation to explore willingness to pay forrenewable energy: a comparison of collective and voluntary payment vehicles.Ecol. Econ. 62, 419e432.