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2010 16: 69 originally published online 3 August 2009Party PoliticsGünes Murat Tezcür

The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors

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THE MODERATION THEORY REVISITED

The Case of Islamic Political Actors

Günes Murat Tezcür

A B S T R A C T

An influential political science literature argues that integration of radicalpolitical parties within the political system leads to their moderation.These parties trade off their ideological platforms for electoral viabilityand political legality. Radicals become moderates through strategicinterests. In this article, I revisit this thesis and apply it to the Islamicpolitical actors in Iran and Turkey by employing the comparative methodof agreement. Three conclusions are reached. First, moderation helpsexplain the evolution of Islamists into Muslim reformers. Second, mod-eration is a double-edged sword, especially in regimes with strong un-democratic characteristics. Moderation of radicals may result in theirdomestication – a situation that does not contribute to democratic tran-sition or consolidation. Finally, change in the ideologies of political elitesis central in our understanding behavioural change. The data sourcesinclude ethnography, primary language sources and historical narratives.

KEY WORDS � democratization � Iran � Islam � moderation � Turkey

Introduction

An influential body of scholarship argues that parties espousing ‘radical’ posi-tions have a strong incentive to moderate their positions once they operateas vote-seeking electoral parties with centrist and accommodative platforms.This process facilitates sustainable democratic transition and contributes todemocratic consolidation. Historical examples include the socialist partiesof Western Europe in the twentieth century. The moderation theory is alsorelevant in evaluating the prospects of democracy in many Muslim majoritycountries where Islamist opposition groups have broad appeal.

In the 1990s, Islamic groups with strong democratic credentials becamemore visible in the Muslim world (Baker, 2003; Brumberg, 2001; Fuller,

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2003; Hefner, 2004; Yavuz, 2003). Muslim reformers can be defined aspolitical groups with salient Islamic identities that accept the inviolabilityof political pluralism, competitive elections and human rights at base level(Nasr, 2005). However, they represent diverse positions on issues such asgender equality, the application of Islamic law, the socio-political status ofminorities, including non-Muslims, and relations with Western countries(Brown et al., 2006).

The strongest Muslim reformers in the Middle East in the 1990s emergedin the Islamist Iranian republic and the secularist Turkish republics, thuspresenting a historical puzzle. In Iran, Mohammad Khatami was electedpresident in June 1997 on a platform of civil society, rule of law and repub-licanism, and again in 2001. Candidates aligned with the Reform Front(Jebhe-ye Eslahat or Jebhe-ye Dovom Khordad – RF) won the 2000 parlia-mentary elections. In Turkey, a group split from the Islamist movement andin 2001 established the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve KalkınmaPartisi – JDP). The JDP swept to victory in the 2002 and 2007 parliamen-tary elections and has been in government since 2002. These were primarilyelectoral parties seeking a popular mandate for change rather than funda-mentalist parties aiming fundamentally to reorganize social and politicalrelations (Gunther and Diamond, 2003). The RF and JDP both faced stiffopposition after coming to power. The RF could not translate its popularmandate into governmental power and, consequently, authoritarian rule inIran remained unadulterated. The JDP had significantly more effective powercompared to the RF and external dynamics favoured the JDP. While theparty continued major political and economic reforms inaugurated by theprevious government, it wavered in its determination to achieve progress onissues critical to the consolidation of the Turkish democracy. The irony wasthat the rise of groups demonstrating the compatibility of Islamic values anddemocratic commitments did not necessarily generate democratic transitionin Iran or consolidation in Turkey.

In this article, I suggest an analytical understanding of the evolution ofMuslim reformers in Iran and Turkey by revisiting the moderation theory.I argue that moderation of these groups is not necessarily conducive to democ-ratization, especially in consolidating democracies and semi-competitive autoc-racies. Primarily, I address three questions: (1) What does moderation entail?(2) How are beliefs of political elites relevant to evolution of party beha-viour? (3) What factors explain the similar evolution of Islamic oppositionin Iran and Turkey ruled by ideologically opposing regimes? The data sourcesinclude historical narratives, ethnography and primary language sources.

Revisiting the Moderation Theory

Radical or anti-system parties can be defined as organizations that opposethe regime on principle and consider several aspects of the ruling regime as

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illegitimate (Sartori, 1976: 132–3). While they usually tend to have weakdemocratic credentials, they may be staunch advocates of democratizationin authoritarian regimes. Robert Michels, who conducted one of the earlieststudies of how radical parties behave in elections, and best known for the‘iron law of oligarchy’, argues that socialist parties, despite their ideologicalcommitments to working class democracy, are controlled by a small groupof leaders who develop strategies with minimum input from the masses.‘The objective . . . of the mass based elite is to replace the power of oneminority with that of another, themselves’ (Michels, 1915/1962: 18).

A second and hitherto obscure aspect of his theoretical framework pro-vides valuable insights into radical party behaviour in elections. Michelssuggests that conservative tendencies that characterize the inner workingsof political parties also shape their behaviour. He identifies two causal mech-anisms by which revolutionary socialist parties lose their radical orientationsand are domesticated: (a) pursuit of votes, and (b) organizational survival(pp. 333–41). When party elites decide to participate in an electoral contest,they quickly realize that the espousal of ideological policies alienates largesegments of the electorate. Consequently, socialist parties transform into prag-matic, vote-maximizing electoral parties in order to remain politically viable.This causal process is based on the assumption that vote-maximization entailsdeveloping ‘centrist’ political platforms rather than radical platforms thathave little public appeal.

Party elites’ concern with organizational survival tames their ideologicalcommitments. Participation in elections exposes a party’s formerly clandes-tine networks to state authorities and renders the party vulnerable. As aresult, the higher the party’s electoral organizational capacity, the more timidare its policies. ‘The party doctrines are whenever requisite, attenuated anddeformed in accordance with the external needs of the organization’ (p. 336).Party organization acquires a life of its own at the expense of revolution-ary principles. Under the dynamics of electoral competition and the constantthreat of state repression, revolutionary parties modify their original ideo-logical commitments and affirm their revolutionary credentials only in theoryand on paper, i.e. ‘not on lines which interest the police’ (p. 336).

Note that Michels’ theory is based on a single case study, and his conclu-sions are not necessarily applicable in other institutional and historical settings(Hallas, 1971). His theory of moderation should not be taken as a conse-quence of some unalterable characteristics of human nature or political com-petition. Under a different set of circumstances, political elites can achievemoderation without necessarily losing their reformist orientation.

Other prominent scholars share Michels’ insights. Schumpeter observesthat socialist parties abandoned Marxist internationalism when they realizedthat adherence to its maxims would be costly in elections (1950/1975: 283,352–2). Parties that hoped to attain electoral majorities had to eschewexclusivist platforms and organizational strategies that deterred potentialvoters (Kirchheimer, 1966/1990; Lipset, 1959; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967;

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Neumann, 1956/1990). The unintended consequence of socialist participa-tion in democratic politics was their transformation from radical move-ments into parties that represented the interests of working classes within theestablished political system (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986: 18, 24, 182–3).A similar argument was made with regard to Catholic parties (Kalyvas,1996: 264).

This vast and rich literature on how ‘radical’ parties evolved in Europe hasa common thread: the inclusion of these parties in a parliamentary systembrought their moderation. The trade-off between participation and radical-ism also applies in the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991: 169;for an opposite view, see Bermeo, 1997). As a result, democracies may emergeeven in the absence of committed democrats (Waterbury, 1997). Oppositionleaders become moderates not as a result of ideological metamorphosis orcivic learning, but because of strategic interests (Kalyvas, 2000; 2003).

Moderation is a double-edged sword that may or may not be conduciveto sustainable democratization. Under certain conditions, moderation ofradical parties implies that they lose their capacity to reform the authoritar-ian characteristics of the regimes. Factors that define the nature of modera-tion include characteristics of the ruling regime and organizational capacitiesof the radical party. A regime holding regular and competitive elections forthe chief executive office may still have strong undemocratic aspects. It mayimpose restrictions on political pluralism, violate minority rights and exacer-bate the prevailing socio-economic inequalities. Conversely, a radical partyin opposition may espouse reformist platforms that aim at rectifying thesepolicies. The German Social Democratic Party (SDP) in Imperial Germanyat the turn of the twentieth century exemplifies this situation. Michels arguesthat electoral concerns and the constant threat of state repression under-mined the reformist impulse of the SDP; he uses the term domestication whendescribing the evolution of the SDP.

The moderation theory mainly focuses on how institutional and organiza-tional factors shape the behaviour of radical parties. Behavioural moderationis thought to precede and beget ideological moderation. While this focusrenders the theory applicable in a variety of historical and cultural contextswith similar institutional frameworks, the exclusive focus on elite interestsas the primary causal factor may leave party behaviour unexplained in somecontexts. Political elites may respond differently to similar institutional con-straints and opportunities. A full understanding of why radical parties behavedifferently under similar organizational resources and institutional conditionsrequires better specification of the linkages between elite behaviour andbelief systems (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2004). After all, political leaders are morelikely to be guided in their actions by their beliefs than are ordinary people(Dahl, 1971: 125–32). Elite behaviour may change as a result of politicallearning, even in the absence of institutional incentives and constraints.Studies of Islamist parties demonstrate that these parties may develop demo-cratic credentials even in authoritarian Arabic regimes (Schwedler, 2006;

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Wickham, 2004). Consequently, the process of ideological change deservescareful conceptualization.

Conceptualizing Ideological Change

Beliefs and ideas often do not directly influence action by determining its ends.Rather, they predispose actors to behave in certain ways and discourage themfrom acting in others (Elkins and Simeon, 1979; Swidler, 1986). As a result,actors are unlikely to behave in ways that cannot be justified by institution-ally and culturally established norms (March and Olsen, 1984). The responseof actors in novel situations ‘depends on how novel they are and on thecultural heritage of the actors. Their cultural heritage will, in many instances,determine the success or lack of success of the actors to adapt their behaviorto changing circumstances’ (North, 2005: 18).

Beliefs and ideas change due to a variety of reasons, including new lifeexperiences and exposure to new ideas (Axelrod, 1986). Similarly, beliefsand ideas evolve as actors engage in ‘meaning-making practices’ that createa dynamic relationship between social reality and culture (Weeden, 2002).Actors may deliberately reject cultural resources that are at odds with theirlife experiences in favour of beliefs and norms that are more relevant totheir experiences and interests. In this regard, great religious traditions ‘maysanction different maxims of conduct in different situations, and which isthus elastic and susceptible of accommodation’ (Weber, 1922/1993: 209).

The conceptualization of how beliefs and ideas set the boundaries of beha-viour is a fruitful way of thinking about radical party behaviour. Their inte-gration into the political system will not result in moderation unless partyleaders have enough intellectual resources to reorient their ideological worldviews. In this sense, ideological evolution remains a precondition for beha-vioural change. The existence of these intellectual resources ultimatelydepends on party leaders’ life experiences and exposure to new ideas, or therise of a newer generation of activists who challenge the party hierarchy.

Comparing Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey

The theoretical framework developed in this article provides valuable insightsinto the transformation of Islamic politics in Iran and Turkey since the early1990s. Comparing between Muslim reformers in these two countries followsthe logic of the method of agreement (Lijphart, 1971; Skocpol and Somers,1980). The comparative approach adapted in this study overcomes severalproblems of causal inference. There is variation in the dependent variableas the focus of inquiry, the behaviour of Muslim reformers, varies over time(King et al., 1994). Besides, the theory is tested with independent observa-tions that are not used in its construction (Muck and Snyder, 2007). The


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comparison also aims to clarify causal mechanisms connecting the beliefs,interests and behaviour of Muslim reformers by relying on primary data(Goldthorpe, 2001; Tilly, 2001).

Finally, the method of agreement is particularly useful in identifying orruling out the necessary causal factors (Collier et al., 2004: 213–21; Dion,1998; Mahoney, 2007). Neither of Iran nor of Turkey can specific factorsbe considered necessary for the rise of Muslim reformers. First, Islam beingSunni in Turkey and historically lacking an autonomous clerical establish-ment does not automatically make religious movements in this country anyless or any more democratic than in Iran, where Shi’i Islam is the predom-inant religious denomination, with its powerful clerical establishment. Next,neither the secularist nature of politics in Turkey, nor the theocratic rule inIran, has prevented the rise of discourses that synthesize Islamic values withdemocratic commitments. Furthermore, Turkey has been much more exposedto the West, with more extensive linkages to the West than Iran (Levitskyand Way, 2006). The Iranian economy was highly regulated, oil-based andcharacterized by heavy state involvement in all aspects of production. Incontrast, Turkey had an open and diverse economy beset by erratic growthrates. Business interests advocated democratic reforms as necessary to limitarbitrary state intervention.

This comparative study is based on four hypotheses. First, behaviouralmoderation is accompanied by ideological change. Politicians who contin-ued to adhere to rigid Islamist world views remained unresponsive to insti-tutional incentives. A typical example of ideological ossification was theIslamist Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi – FP) in Turkey. The leaders of boththe RF and the JDP were products of post-ideological thinking amongIslamic cadres (Bayat, 2007). Disillusion with the authoritarian practices ofthe Islamic Republic in Iran and with the performance of the Islamist lead-ership in Turkey generated extensive soul-searching among younger gener-ations of Islamist politicians and intellectuals. They reinterpreted Islamictraditions and abandoned ideology-driven utopian goals in favour of a prag-matic, pluralistic and moderate discourse. At the same time, their discoursesreflected the boundaries drawn by the ruling regimes. The RF had to appearmore Islamist than it actually was – the JDP, more secular.

Second, participation in relatively competitive and pluralistic politics rein-forces moderate tendencies at the expense of radical voices. In this regard,the relatively competitive nature of politics in Iran and Turkey, in contrastto Arab countries, had decisive influence on the rise of Muslim reformers.The RF and the JDP chose the electoral way to power over confrontationaland violent strategies, and defeated Islamists at the ballot box. Once the pathof electoral politics had been taken, that of subversive or contentious politicsbecame increasingly remote (for the notion of path dependency, see Pierson,2000; Thelen, 2003). Yet, not all electoral Islamist groups are faced witha trade-off between organizational survival and pursuit of revolutionarygoals. Some states lack the capacity to dismantle their grassroots and militias.

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Examples include Hamas in the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah in Lebanon,the Sadr Movement and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution(SCIRI) in post-Saddam Iraq. Consequently, the moderation theory does notpredict that these organizations will eventually be domesticated and evolvein a similar manner to the RF and the JDP.

The third hypothesis concerns the impacts of state repression on the beha-viour of radicals-turned-reformers in relatively pluralistic political environ-ments. The greater the threat of state repression, the more cautious andrisk-averse are the reformers. The threat of state repression was a recurrentconcern for both the RF and the JDP. The Islamic Republic of Iran and thesecularist Turkish republic were characterized by guardianship that restrictedthe power of parliamentarians and elected governments (Tezcür, 2007). InIran, the Guardian Council (Shura-ye Negahban – GC) repeatedly vetoedbills and legislation enacted by the reformist president and parliament. Italso disqualified many RF members from running in the 2004 parliamen-tary elections. In Turkey, the military had enormous leverage over govern-ments and had veto power in issues including state regulation of Islam andKurdish discontent. The Constitution Court banned Islamic parties in 1998and 2001. While the RF and the JDP occasionally challenged the guardians’interference in politics, they generally preferred non-confrontational policiesthat accommodated the priorities of the guardians.

Finally, as Michels argues, reformers are prisoners of their organizationalresources. Once they commit to an electoral strategy, it becomes very hardto pursue alternative and complementary strategies. The RF lacked strongorganizational capacities and robust vertical links with citizens. The Iranianparty system was underdeveloped and the RF could not build extensive grass-roots. When the electoral strategy failed, the RF could not uniformly act andlacked the organizational capacity for mass mobilization. The JDP had amore developed organizational basis. Yet, power distribution was personal-ized and asymmetrical, and fostered patron–client relations despite the partyleadership’s declared goal of fostering democratic practices. The internalmechanisms that make the leader accountable to grassroots were absentand the party structure was built on ‘charismatic linkages’ (Kitschelt, 2000).The lack of internal party democracy eroded the reformist agenda of the JDPand sustained a culture of corruption similar to that of previous mainstreamTurkish parties.

The Rise and Fall of the RF

By 1982, after the Marxist and liberal forces had been eliminated, politicsin the Islamic Republic of Iran gradually took the form of conflict betweentwo elite factions (Akhavi, 1987; Baktiari, 1996: 100–8; Moslem, 2002:47–82; Vakili-Zad, 1994). After the death of Khomeini and selection ofKhamenei as the new faqih, the tensions between factions erupted into open


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conflict, and by the early 1990s this had resulted in total marginalizationof the leftist faction. The leftist resistance to the alliance between Presidentand the rightist faction was effectively broken by the 1992 parliamentaryelections (Baktiari, 1996: 214–24). When the GC disqualified about one-third of all applicants from running in the elections, the rightists and thefollowers of Rafsanjani gained control of parliament (Sarabi, 1994).

Political defeat led to a deal of soul-searching among the leftists. Mean-while, many intellectuals and clerics who had been ardent supporters of therevolution became disillusioned with the increasing gap between revolution-ary ideals and the reality of the Islamic republic. The democratic revolutionsin the East European countries, the collapse of the Soviet Union and theglobal prestige of the liberal democracy in the early 1990s contributed tothe rise of a discourse of pluralism, civil society, human rights and popularrule in Iran. Deprived of any real possibility of challenging the rightist dom-inance of the existing political institutions, the leftists joined disillusionedrevolutionaries at various think-tanks, newspapers and magazines and articu-lated platforms that called for greater political pluralism and competitionin society (Brumberg, 2001: 185–230). The leftists came to appreciate theimportance of personal liberties and protections against arbitrary politicalpower. Consequently, revolutionaries of the 1980s transformed into democ-rats throughout the 1990s. In line with the expectations of the moderationtheory, their pluralistic discourse resonated well with the public who bothresented governmental economic policies and demanded greater social andcultural freedoms. The ex-leftists capitalized on widespread public discon-tent with the government by taking advantage of the opportunities offeredby the electoral contestation.

The reform candidate Khatami won the June 1997 presidential electionsby a landslide, which opened up a new era in Iranian politics. The IslamicIran Participation Front (Jebhe-ye Moshakerat-e Iran-e Eslami – IIPF), estab-lished in 1998, became the main organization representing the reformistagenda. IIPF and 17 other reform-oriented organizations formed an electoralcoalition under the rubric of Dovom Khordad. This coalition was victoriousin the 2000 elections and gained control of parliament.

The central idea of the RF was recovery of the democratic spirit of the re-volution.1 The RF accused the current power-holders of betraying the repub-lican promises of the revolution and Khomeini’s legacy (Vaqa-ye Ettefaqieh,2004). In a manifesto before the 2000 elections, IIPF declared that they werefollowing Khomeini’s path and would recapture the democratic promise ofthe 1979 revolution (Reuters, 2000). In general, RF politicians made a sys-tematic effort to redefine the revolution as a process toward democracy andto recreate Khomeini as a democratic leader (Brumberg, 2001).2 Mean-while, they deliberately preferred a legal strategy to grassroots mobilizationand agitation toward achieving their goals.

Shortly after Khatami assumed the post of the presidency, he found himselfconfronted by well-entrenched forces. These hardliners had no qualms about

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denouncing the supporters of the RF as ‘the champions of American-stylereforms’3 and ‘trampling upon the blood of martyrs’.4 Elements within thesecurity forces murdered a number of dissident intellectuals in 1998, studentdemonstrations were brutally suppressed in 1999, the judiciary constantlyharassed leading figures of the RF and reformist publications were repeatedlybanned (Tabari, 2003). The GC used its veto power to strike down parlia-mentary legislation and presidential bills (Samii, 2001). Hardline activitiesreached their climax with the GC’s disqualification of many RF candidatesfrom running in the 2003 local council and 2004 parliamentary elections.The ratio of disqualified candidates rose from 8 per cent in 2000 to 29 percent in 2004 (Samii, 2004). Accusations of fraud overshadowed the 2005presidential elections won by the hardline candidate Mahmood Ahmedinejad(Iran, 2005).

Through its electoral mandate, the RF pursued a moderate and accommo-dative strategy to overcome institutional obstacles and to undermine vestedinterests blocking Iran’s democratization.5 This strategy entailed the em-powerment of publicly elected and accountable politicians over the guardianscontrolling the GC, the judiciary and parastatal institutions such as para-military forces6 and bonyads (Buchta, 2000: 73–8; Esfehani and Taheripour,2002). The most critical moment of the reform strategy was Khatami’s twobills that would end the GC’s supervisory role in the electoral process andenhance the authority of the president vis-à-vis the other organs of govern-ment. Not surprisingly, the GC rejected these bills in 2003, and Khatamihad no choice but to withdraw them in March 2004.

The loose organizational structure of the RF seriously restricted the avail-ability of alternative strategies. When the GC disqualified reformist candi-dates from running in the 2004 elections, the RF could not pursue a unifiedstrategy. A large group of parliamentarians affiliated to the RF protested theGC’s decision by staging a sit-in in parliament. When that strategy failed toproduce results, the IIPF announced that the elections would be illegitimateand called for a boycott. In a rare act of public defiance, RF parliamentar-ians sent an open letter to Khatami. However, the other main reform-orientedparty, led by the speaker of the parliament, decided to take part in the elec-tions (AFP, 2004). President Khatami publicly encouraged citizens to votein order to prevent an extremist takeover of parliament (BBC, 2004). Theirony was that reformists were prevented from fielding candidates in almosthalf of the races (Reuters, 2004). At their post-electoral meeting, the IIPFleaders grudgingly accepted their inability to muster public support andopted for a more grassroots-oriented strategy (Iran, 2004). In the 2005 elec-tions, the RF failed to mobilize behind a single candidate and no reformcandidate made it to the run-offs.

Although the RF failed to trigger democratization, it made Iranian politicsmore pluralistic and open. It fundamentally changed the parameters of theIranian political discourse and left a lasting legacy. For instance, all presi-dential candidates in the 2005 presidential elections, with the exception of


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Ahmedinejad, adopted the themes and promises of the Khatami era. Therise of Khatami also galvanized women and youth political participation,and ethnic minorities strongly supported his movement. In particular, theKhatami government increased the political visibility of the Kurds and easedrestrictions on the Kurdish language and culture. Nonetheless, the RF failedto provide lasting leadership to nascent forces of democracy in Iran. Fourfactors brought the eventual collapse of the RF. First, most of the reformerswere former revolutionaries who matured into democrats in the seconddecade of the Islamic republic. Despite their dislike of the hardliners, thereformers were generally loyal to the Islamic revolution and the constitution.Hence, they were reluctant to formulate confrontational and potentiallyviolent strategies. Next, while elections introduced a degree of uncertaintyand pluralism, ultimate power lay in the hands of the unaccountable andnon-elected forces and their allies controlling vast institutional resources(Chehabi, 2001). Electoral success did not put reformers in control of thestate in such a rigid political system. In this regard, the RF was in a moredisadvantageous position compared to the Turkish JDP. The Iranian re-formers continued to be the subject of periodic harassment. In addition toheavy state repression, the RF’s organizational structure made non-electoralstrategies infeasible. The RF lacked the organizational capacity to buildsustainable links with the public. This partially reflected the rudimentarynature of the Iranian political system. Iranian parties were a loose collec-tion of influential individuals pursuing factional goals with little grassrootsparticipation (Fairbanks, 1998). Voters lacked strong party identifications.As a result of its organizational weakness, the RF’s ability to capitalize onpublic discontent was at best tenuous. Finally, the RF became the victim ofits very own electoral success. The RF was in control of both the presidencyand the parliament from 2000 to 2004 and received the lion’s share of thepublic blame for economic problems and pervasive corruption, albeit lackingeffective authority. Public enthusiasm for the reformist movement graduallywaned and was eventually replaced by widespread apathy and disenchant-ment. According to a random sample survey conducted in Tehran in August2003, more than half of the respondents evaluated the political system asnot being responsive to their demands. Forty-five per cent argued that thestate had completely failed in achieving the goals deemed important bycitizens.7 Yet, only around one-third perceived the reformers as capable ofsolving Iran’s problems. In the 2005 elections, a hardliner, Ahmedinejad, wonon a populist platform and by promising to rekindle the equalitarian spiritof the revolution.

Hence, the RF exhibited the same disadvantages characterizing the ‘legaloppositions’ in competitive authoritarian countries (Levitsky and Way, 2002).The RF participated in the regime-controlled elections and won victoriesdespite its inferior resources. However, it was incapable of an alternativestrategy when the hardliners effectively blocked the possibility of reformthrough legal means by taking advantage of their huge institutional and

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organizational means (Gheissari and Nasr, 2006: 136–42). The non-electoralstrategies of mass disobedience that brought down the authoritarian regimesin Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine were simply not available to the RF (Bunceand Wolchik, 2006; McFaul, 2005). Furthermore, competitive politics was notthe indicator of incumbent weakness in Iran that it was in post-communistauthoritarian regimes (Way, 2005). Consequently, electoral competition inIran created cycles of political change that affected factional balance but didnot trigger democratic breakthroughs. In essence, this resembled regimecycles in post-Soviet Eurasia, where patrimonial presidentialism createdfairly regular cycles of elite defection (Hale, 2005).

Maturation of the JDP

Unlike the situation in most of the Middle Eastern countries, conspiracy andmass agitation were not central to the strategies of Turkish Islamic politi-cal parties. The first political party to openly espouse Islamism in Turkeywas established in 1970, but Islamists remained on the margins of elec-toral competition throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Their understanding ofdemocracy reflected a belief in majoritarianism rather than a commitment topluralism and basic freedoms. However, as the moderation theory wouldexpect, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi–WP), established in 1983, graduallydeveloped policies with broader public appeal under the dynamics of elec-toral competition. The party gained parliamentary representation and madea strong showing in urban peripheries for the first time in the 1991 elections.In the early 1990s, the WP abandoned its espousal of the state-led economicdevelopment programme in favour of policies that promoted private invest-ment and entrepreneurship; put forward a bold critique of the Turkish state’srepressive treatment of its Kurdish citizens; and developed a programme ofsocial justice (Sen, 1995). All these changes signified the growing importanceof a younger generation of politicians and intellectuals within the party whowould later form the JDP (Göle, 1997; Yavuz, 2003: 225–7). Meanwhile,membership in the party grew, women actively took part in the party’s well-organized vote canvassing (White, 2002) and the WP went beyond religiousmobilization (Gülalp, 1999). The party significantly increased its appealamong citizens who were disillusioned with the incompetent leadership ofthe centrist parties. The WP formed a coalition government in summer 1996.

The WP successfully capitalized on the opportunities presented by thehighly fragmented and volatile Turkish elections. It proved to be ideologi-cally and organizationally more innovative and adaptive than its predeces-sors. However, the party’s rise triggered a strong reaction from the armedforces, the judiciary, the media and civil society organizations. The NationalSecurity Council, an institution that represented the influence of armed forcesover elected governments, declared political Islam (irtica) as the existentialthreat to the Turkish republic in February 1997. The Constitution Court


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banned the WP and in 1998 forbade its chairman, Necmettin Erbakan, fromtaking part in political activity. In the same year, the popular mayor ofIstanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was also barred from political activity andspent four months in prison in 1999.

Similar to the experience of the Iranian reformers, state persecution hada lasting impression on the WP cadres. As Michels might have predicted,organizational survival became the main priority of the Virtue Party (FaziletPartisi–VP), which was established in 1997 instead of the WP. The VPadopted a pro-European Union (EU) stance, hoping that the EU processwould make Turkey more democratic (Önis, 2006; Tanıyıcı, 2003). Althoughit may be more moderate, the VP could not sustain the WP’s popularity andreceived around 15 per cent of the vote in the 1999 elections. Electoral defeatintensified the discontent of the younger generation (yenilikçiler), who werealready disillusioned with Erbakan and his coterie.

By that time, the younger generation had realized the ideologically drivenplatforms had both limited public appeal and rendered their parties vulner-able to state repression. They therefore pursued a dual strategy of movingto the centre of Turkish politics and of accommodating the secularist forces.First, they were convinced that victory at the ballot box required developingcentrist platforms with cross-cutting appeals. Second, they realized that theyhad to give unambiguous and clear signals to the military, the judiciary,secular civil society and the media to neutralize their hostility. The dualstrategy pursued by the younger generation was similar to the dual gameplayed by the Christian Democratic party in Peru after 1980 (Mainwaring,2003). However, in Turkey, vote-maximization and political survival rein-forced one another. After the Constitution Court banned the VP in June2001, the old guard established the Felicity Party in July, and the youngergeneration the JDP in August 2001.8

From the beginning, the party leadership emphasized that their partywould pursue centrist and conciliatory politics (Yakıs, 2002). Hüseyin Çelik,the minister of education in the Erdogan government (personal communi-cation, 6 July 2002), explained that he joined the JDP because of its broadappeal, which went beyond the ‘mosque crowd’. Gül (personal communica-tion, 28 June 2002) articulated: ‘We believe that modernity and being Muslimcomplement each other. We accept the modern values of liberalism, humanrights and market economy.’ Abdüllatif Sener, who later became one of thevice-prime ministers, argued along similar lines: ‘There are now no moredemands for Shari’a from people. Political Islam is now discredited. . . . Nowpeople come for jobs and bread but not with Shari’a demands’ (personal com-munication, 4 July 2002). The JDP chairman, Erdogan, described his partyas a continuation of the centre–right Democrat Party which ruled Turkeyfrom 1950 to 1960, and rejected any affiliation with Erbakan’s agenda(Milliyet, 2003; Radikal, 2004).

Erdogan utilized vernacular Islamic idiom to make his conciliatory stanceaccessible and meaningful to the crowds who listened to him. Whereas, for

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Erbakan, Islam was a holistic ideology that was in an inevitable strugglewith the West, it has become a source of moderation and conciliation inthe discourse of Erdogan. For the latter, Islam has been a cultural sourcethrough which he could justify his ideological moderation and communi-cate it to the voters. Like Khatami, Erdogan articulated Islam as a languageof peace and political pluralism.

The early elections of November 2002 provided a golden opportunity forthe JDP. The party system remained highly fragmentary, i.e. reflecting deep-seated differences in voter preferences (Baslevent et al., 2004). Yet, almost allthe major parties were discredited mainly because the country was experi-encing its worst economic crisis of the post-World War II period in 2001.The JDP emerged triumphant from the elections in capturing a plurality ofthe votes. Vote-maximization entailed centrist moderate platforms as wouldbe predicted by the moderation theory. The JDP came to power at a timewhen EU–Turkey relations had reached a critical threshold. In contrast toIran, where tensions with the United States translated into intolerance foropposition, external dynamics was highly conducive to the JDP’s reformagenda. The party oversaw one of the most ambitious reform periods inmodern Turkish history (Tepe, 2005). Political reforms included broaderrights to non-Muslim minorities and the Kurds, increasing the scope of indi-vidual liberties, abolishing the state security courts and reducing the role ofarmed forces in policy-making through institutional changes. Consequently,the EU decided to initiate accession negotiations with Turkey in December2004. The government was also successful in achieving high and sustainablegrowth rates and in reducing inflation. Meanwhile, the JDP back-pedalledon issues related to Islamic education and identity when confronted withthe secularist opposition (Radikal, 2003).

Two of the most salient obstacles to democratic consolidation in Turkeyinvolve the undemocratic nature of the political parties and political repre-sentation of the Kurds. The JDP’s approach to these two issues was inconsis-tent and timid. Major Turkish political parties exhibited strong authoritariantendencies (Çarkoglu et al., 2000). Closed-list proportional representation,used since the 1991 elections, reinforced hierarchical power structure withinparties. Patronage distribution was central to party organizational struc-tures. At its inception, the JDP declared that the party would eschew author-itarian practices that characterized the WP and VP. However, they quicklyfailed to fulfil these promises. In May 2002, any public criticism of theparty leadership and members was made a reason for permanent expul-sion (Radikal, 2002). Two parliamentarians were expelled on this basis(Hürriyet, 2006). The party leadership had complete control over candi-dates running under the party ticket in the 2002 and 2007 elections. In2006, popularly elected provincial branch chairpersons who defeated thecandidates favoured by the party leadership were summarily dismissed andprovincial congresses were annulled (Milliyet, 2006). Changes in party by-laws consolidated the power of the chairperson over delegates and made


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it practically impossible to challenge the chairperson in party congresses(Sabah, 2006).

The struggle against corruption was a major theme of the JDP platform.9

However, the JDP government soon succumbed to corrupt practices andfavouritism in bureaucratic appointments and in the allocation of public bids.The JDP-controlled municipalities were hit by corruption scandals,10 whichthe party leadership preferred to cover up (Radikal, 2006c). The JDP rapidlymatured into a patronage distributing leader party with very limited plural-ism and deliberation within its ranks. Once organized as a vote-maximizingparty replicating hierarchical tendencies in other centre–right parties, theleadership lost the opportunity to build more democratic forms of repre-sentation. As a result, the party could not provide an alternative avenue formore deliberative, autonomous and broader public participation in politics.

Another crucial issue that confronted the JDP government was the Kurdishproblem and the illegal activities of the security forces. The origins of thesegroups went back to the extra-legal tactics that had been employed by theTurkish state since the early 1990s in its struggle against the Kurdish insur-gency (Kalkan, 2006). While many of these groups were exposed in the late1990s, they continued to operate with impunity, because they enjoyed pro-tection at high levels of the state bureaucracy and from the armed forces(Savas, 1998). Their elimination became a precondition for the establishmentof the rule of law and public accountability of politicians and the securityforces. The JDP had only limited progress in eliminating these groups. In2005, members of the Turkish armed forces engaged in a bombing campaignto intimidate and pacify the civilian population in the southeastern provinceof Hakkari. The government promise to thoroughly investigate the forcesbehind the attacks11 turned out to be hollow. A public prosecutor whoaccused the chief of the land forces of protecting one of the assailants wasexpelled from the profession. The report of the parliamentary investigatorycommission produced no tangible results (TBMM, 2006).

Integration of the JDP into the political system also brought its domes-tication, because this failed to generate a consistent and substantial Kurdishpolicy. The party hoped that the EU-related reforms would meet Kurdishdemands for greater cultural rights and political representation, and recog-nized Kurdishness as a sub-identity of Turkish citizenship but categoricallyrejected ethnic, regional and religious nationalism.12 Erdogan and his partygarnered the overwhelming support of the Kurds in the 2007 elections. Inthis sense, both Iran’s and Turkey’s Kurds saw in Khatami and Erdogan thepotential to alleviate their plight and end discriminatory state policies. How-ever, the legal and administrative reforms did not necessarily translate intopractical improvements. The JDP categorically rejected calls for decreasingthe 10 per cent threshold, which would have given more substantial parlia-mentary representation to the Kurds. By the summer 2005, the party hadlost the initiative to push through a peaceful solution and armed conflictrestarted. The JDP was too insecure to assert civilian control over the armed

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forces and interfere in security affairs that were historically considered therealm of the army. Moreover, the continuing conflict between the Turkisharmy and Kurdish militants and developments in Northern Iraq polarizedthe political atmosphere and severely restricted the options available to theJDP government in the autumn of 2007. Consequently, the JDP achievedlittle in terms of increasing Kurdish political rights and improving securityconditions in the Kurdish populated areas.

Conclusions

This article has demonstrated that moderation of the Islamists can take placein diverse settings, i.e. in Islamist Iran and secularist Turkey. A similar processthrough which Islamists develop democratic credentials can also be seen insuch very different contexts as Egypt and Indonesia. Ideological transforma-tions are accompanied by behavioural change guided by strategic interests.The RF dramatically broadened the scope of Iranian political discourseand the JDP undertook substantial reforms. Meanwhile, moderation thatintegrates Islamists is not necessarily conducive to democratization. OnceIslamists are integrated to the competitive political system, they developelectoral strategies and pursue conciliatory policies. Electoral calculations,fear of state repression and organizational constraints all make them politi-cally risk-averse. Consequently, they seek accommodation with authoritar-ian aspects of the regimes.

The process of moderation is not deterministic. Political movements areproducts of particular historical, cultural and institutional conditions. Poli-tical leaders make strategic choices under these conditions. While modera-tion of Iranian and Turkish Muslim reformers led to their domestication, thisshould not be taken as a result of an unavoidable and universal process. TheRF would probably have been more successful if the leadership had devel-oped a more grassroots-oriented strategy and built organic links with society.The groups that formed the core of the RF continued to act as factionsstriving for little power under the dynamics of highly restrictive Iranian elec-tions. They could not mature into mass parties. A fundamental factor thatcurtailed the reformist impulses of the JDP was the way in which the partywas organized. A more democratic and participatory organizational designwould have made the party more representative of and more responsive tosocial demands. The JDP crystallized into a leader party. In this sense, itreplicated the chronic problem of mainstream Turkish political parties. Asidentified by Michels more than a century ago, organizational strategies andresources remain central to the success of parties and movements that strivefor political change. Muslim reformers’ failures primarily stemmed from theirorganizational weaknesses rather than ideological deficits.

These findings also imply that the crucial variable affecting prospects forsustainable democratization in hybrid or authoritarian regimes in the Muslim


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world is the institutional characteristics of the ruling regimes rather thanideological commitments of the opposition (also see Bellin, 2004; Lust-Okarand Jamal, 2002). The transformation of Islamist opposition groups intoelectoral parties is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratictransition and consolidation.

Notes

1 For instance, see the interviews Khatami gave to the Iranian daily, Entekhab(1999), and his speeches broadcast by the Vision of the Islamic Republic of IranNetwork 1, on 28 May and 14 June 2001 and 27 May 2004.

2 For example, see the speech of Mohammed Reza Khatami at the fifth conferenceof the IIPF; IRNA, 17 October 2003.

3 The statement issued by the Revolutionary Guards, reported by AFP on 1 July2000.

4 Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi quoted by Reuters (2000).5 For example, see the interview with the general-secretary of Moshakaret, Reza

Khatami, in the Iranian daily, Sharq (2004). Also, see the interviews with leadingreformers in the Iranian daily, Aftab-e Yazd (2004).

6 See the interview with the commander of Basij in the Iranian daily, Kayhan (2002).7 For more information on the survey, see Tezcür et al. (2006).8 For the official presentation of the JDP’s ideology, see Akdogan (2004).9 Erdogan’s speech at the party’s first congress on 12 October 2003.

10 See, for example, Radikal (2006a, b, d).11 Erdogan’s address to the JDP parliamentary group, 22 November 2005.12 Erdogan’s speech in Diyarbakır reported by Milliyet (2005).

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