42

..A SAVAGE AI\[D ROMANTIC WAR"SPAIN 1833-1840

Part 4: The Cadtst Army of the CentreText by Conrad Caims. Illustrations by Ralph Weaver

The Army of the Centre was, like the Army of the North, inlarge part the work of one man, and the differences between thecharactets and training of Remon Cabren and Tom6s Zumala-cdrregui go a long way to explain the differences between theamies- Bom in 1806, and so much younger than the Basquechampion, Cabrera was the son of a prcminent citizen ofTortosa, near the mouth ofthe EbroRiver, had studied for thepriesthood and was in minor orders. h r$3 he joined tleCarlist forces which had sprung up in the Maestrazgo, a desolateand largely inaccessible region which was the heartland ofAragonese Ca ism. Cabrera rose ftom private (voluntaio inCarlist teminology) to colonel by the end of 1834, during aperiod lvhen the Carlist forces were under the conmand ofManuel Camicer, who kept the bands in existence but did notleadthem to major successes.In early 1835 Cabrera traveled toroyal headquarters, where he made a good impression onCarlos. On 6 April Camicer was shot by the Cristinos afterbeing captured, and the Pretender appointed Cabrera com-andanE generul olhis forces in lower Aragon.

The change of command tumed Carlist fortunes around.Cabrera was a murderous opponent, although he cannot beentirely blamed for the ferocity with which the war in Aragonwas waged. He was also an excellent cdrdtlo who undoubtedlyinspied his men to feats of arms and loyalty to the caus€,although for many the cause was as much a resistance to centralgovemment and a dislike of liberalism as the bringing to powerof Carlos. Cabrera had seen the formidable discipline of theArmy of the North, and perhaps for this reason he realised thatthe Carlists of Aragon had been held back by a la€k of propermilitary organisation. He therefore set out to remedy thisshortcoming and had considerable success. Yet for whateverreason - perhaps because he had never been a regular soldier,let alone a colonel of infantry like Zumalac6rregui the Arnyof the Centre grew more slowly than that of the North and didnot achieve the same standards of disciplin€.

The Army of the Centre was never able to capture a majorcity to use as a base, its ability at siege-craft being even less thanthat of Zumalac6negui's. But the harshness ofthe Aragoneselandscape and the distance of the Maestrazgo from the centresof government made it hard for the Cristiros to root out theCarlists; on the other hand, as long as Cabrera restricted hisactivities to Aragon he was a regional and not a national povrer.For these reasons the pdme objective of the queen's govem-ment was alwa)B the crushing or at Ieast containment of theArmy of the North, and it therefore tended to send the besttroops to the northern theatre. It also used national militia to agreaier degree in Aragon rhan in lhe nonhem provinces.Instead of serving only in tbe defenc€ of forts and towns, inAragon the militia could form part of field columns - for whichuse, how€ver, their lack of training and essentially territorialoqanisarion did not really suit them. As was genemlly the casein the north, p€rereror (volunteers - see part 2 of this serietwere employed by the Cristinos on a large scale, but for longetthan in the Basque prcvioces and Navarre. By the last two orthree yean o{ the war, however, the tirela/es realised thatCabrera's army had become professional to the degree that onlyregulars were staunch enough to duel with the Carlists.

Cabrera met G6mezon the latter's celebrated march around

Spain in the second half of 1836, but the two generals did notseem to get along well. He also joined the royal exPedition thenext year with a powertul corps which proved to be capable ofstanding in battle beside units of the main army. Cabrera wasone of those who urged Carlos to attack Madrid; when the latterdid not follow his advice he retumed to Aragon while the mainarmy was being pursued to its home by Espartero's formidablearay.

This retreat caused the Army of the No(h to enter a slowdecline which was marked by a loss of self-confidence,war-wearifless, and, worst ofall, quarelsin the high command,and which ended in the "Treason ofMaroto". the Commander-in-Chief who in August 1839 agreed to terms. But a goldenperiod was beginning Ior Cabrera's men, for it was duringAugust 1838 that his "state" attained its greatest power and hisforces achieved thei greatest triumphs. In January he had talenthe spectacular and isolated fortress-city of Morella by thetreachery of a Cristino gunner and the daring of a small pany ofhis injantry. Although Morella's fortifications wele medieval,Cabrera strengtbened its defences and made it the headquartersof his military and civil administration. In the late summer ofthat year the Carlists defeated Orea's major attack on Morella,during which the castle and town were left with a small ganisonwhile the main army harassed the besiegers from the rear. As aresult the court nam€d Cabrera Count ofMorella.

Although Cabrera had always, and probably sincerely,proclaimed his loyalty to "Carlos V", he was in no real sens€under the control of the Carlist govemment and he acted like arobber baron in many ways, lhe bash for his administrationbeing his army. The existence of the Army of the Centledepended, however, on that of the Army of the No(h. AJterthe "Embrace of Vergara", which Cabreraroundlycondemned,Espanerowas able to move againstthe Aragonese Carlistsin aleisurely fashion. w})en added 1o forces already in that part ofSpain, his large, battle-hardened amy outnumberedthat oftheCarlists several times. Morella fell in May 184{ after a weakresistance, and the last battle ofthe war, Berjaon4July, was arout. Large numbers ofCarlist soldiers, including Cabrela, fledto France, an end to the campaign very different from that afterVergara, when some Carlists joined the government army andonly a few die'hads crossed the Aontier with their leader.Espartero was left as a vifiual liberal dictator. Cabrera retu.nedto Spain for a Carlist uprising in 1848-49, but after its failure helived out his years asan English country gendeman. Hedied in1877 and is buried in Virsiniawater, nearLondon.

ORGANISATION AND EQT]IPMENT OF TIIEARMY OF TIIE CENTRE

Table A gives the organisation and strength of the army inDecember 1836. The data in Pirala, on rvhich it is based, showthat there were enough muskets and bayonets for its foot unitsand a couple of4-pounders for the anillery, but that the cavalrywas deficient in horses and saddlery, only a fifth of the menhaving swords and over a quarter being without lances. A yearlater the army numbered on paper 11,418 infantry, 1,511cavalry and337 arti ery; there were 26 adllery pieces includingmortars and caEonades, but the horse was still very short of

swords. In early 1838 the clerical gaelr,ll/ero Jefijnimo Merinoled a Castilian division of rhree weat battalions to join the

Table B shows the army at its greatest extent, and it is reducedfrom a much larger chart which shows ah€ numbers of men andthe items of uniform and equipment in each division. TheTortosa division seems to have be€n the most consistent inmatters of dress, with every man outfitted in a frock coat; in th€other divisions some wore jackets and some even lackeduniforms. Most men had a musket and bayonet, although somehad to make do with carbines or escore&r (blunderbusses orshotguns). Berets, linen trousers and packs were universal, andalmost everyone had a belly box. The cavalry had plenty ofhamesses but only 1,574 horses, 387 carbines, 1,?88 lances and1,064 swords. Most of its men dressed in jackets but some hadfrock coats. Almost all the gunnen had carbines. There were125 pieces in all, including 19 3,poundels and 4-poundermountain guns and 29 mortars. Each division had two mountainguns and twomountam mortars,

It would be unwise to rely absolutely on lists such as this forthis fairly ramshackle almy, since they omit units such as theO enanza: del Generul ar,d the Carlist narry. Cabrera'sstepfather, a fisherman, oryanised the Compaitias de la Maina,which qewed small, lightly armed coastal boats and included amounted detachment to serve as the escon of their commander,The existance of these additional units reinforces the opinion ofmodem authorities that in 1837, the year in which Cabrera'sforces became really formidable, the expansion of the army washeld up more by a Iack of equipment than by a lack of recruits(Albi and Stampa,312-13), and the equipping o{ the army wasalways a problem. Although Cabrera's army had a corps ofarmourels by 1839 and an arms factory by 1837 (the soldiers inwhich continued to smoke while wrapping cartridges!).

Cabrera took most of his weapons, saddlery, horces andartillery from the enemy. Uniforms were introduced only in1837, and although the Carlists were capable of making somefor themselves they lacked rhe supply route fron Francewhichdid its best to keep the Army of the North stocked. It is probablysignificant that the predominant colours of uniforms were blue,from captured Cdstino uniforms, ard perhaps dark brown, acommon colour for civilian clothes, rather than the grey whichwas official dress for most oI the Army of the North.

The infantry appears to have been trained to an adequatedegree at least by 1837 or 1838, as is shown by the arrny's abilityat that time to defeat first-class opponents. The most famousvictory during this period was perhaps that ofMaella, in August1838. Cabrera led the best units of his army, .he lst and 2ndTortosa battalions, the lst and 2nd Mora battalions. the GtrtasdeA g6n, a sqta&on of the Lancercs de To osa, one ol thelst Lancercs de Arcg6n, ard the O enanzas against a $ackCristino division of roughly the same size (the Cadists claimedthat they were outnumbered). Of the 5,000 Ziberalei only athousand escaped, and a thousand died. As it did so often, theArmy of the Centre disgaced itself by shooting or knifing

The plains of Aragon are better cavalry country rhan much ofahe Basque provinces, and the Aragonese Carlists had to lookafter themselves in this rcspect, especially after the Cristinohorse improved in quality. Sometimes they failed. The newlyorganised cavalry could not withstand the Cazadorcs de IaGua ia Real afi the Hfisarcs de la Pincesa at Arzrzleqtre on19 September 1837. Three days later, eight companies ofToftosa cazadorcs covering the Ca ist retreat were takenprisoner by squadrons of the lst and 2nd Line and 6th LightCavalry. It seems that the Crisrinos forced the Carlists into somesort of closed formation and then charged; the Carlist fue wasnot enough to stop them. Perhaps th€ Carlists had beenweakened by having had nothing but grapes to ear for three days

GuladeAragonGuiasdelConde

de ilorella

To o€a lancer

Turi6Intanlry

liliiones Traditional Valencla dress

and demoralised by the failure of the royal expedition, whichthey had j ust left.

The foot was trained to fom square. Wlen all but one of agroup of battalioN retreating at the end oI the Batde of Cheste(1 December 1838) were caught before they could do so, theysuffercd.

Mobility was as imponant to the AImy ofthe Centrc asitwasto the northerntroops. Because ofits lack ofcavalry, especiallyearly in its career, the army relied heavily on infanEy forscouting and outpost *ork. On one occasion captured horseswere used to mount flank companies. One ofthe most famouscorps was the Mrioie.t, a body ol gendnrmerie d pied wh;'chcarried despatches, guarded generals ard made good use of itsknowledge of the tenain. These tireless warrion appear to havebeen able to keep up with mounted generals; the Prussiancavalryman Lichnowsky met a group of 60 detailed to theheadquarters of the Conde de Espana, chief of the CastilianCarlists.

Unlike the cavalry of the Army ofthe North, that of the Armyof the Centre was organised into five regiments, although thesquadron was the normal tactical unit. As Table B shows, astange system of numbering prevailed with the "1st Regim-ents". There were also independent squadrons. The mostfamous of these were the O enanzas del General, a gefieftls'escort which aced as a shock troop , ̂ nd the Husares de Ontaia,an excellent corDs which ioined Cabrera in 1839 after service inthe Army of the North. The lllrdles raised a second squadronand were later incorporated into theToftosa lancer.

As noted, the cavalry was always short ofweapons, and at theexclusively mounted a€tion of La Hoz on 11 June 1839 thedrddorer of both sides fought on horseback with carbine buttsbecause of a dearth of lances. Cavalry failed to break twobattalions of the Cristino Srrola rcgiment in square at thebloody and hard-fought combat of Friginals on 17 June 1836,which was only to be expected, as was the destruction andsubsequent massacre of four companies of militia whichaccompanied the regulars but lackedtheir firnness. The Carlistcavatry could employ ruses, such as the wearing of capturedhelmetsto disguise theirsilhouettes, orthestanpedingof a herdofmares to disorganise the cristinos.

The artillery of the Army ofthe Centre appears to have beenefficient, but was used in very small quantities. As noted above,in 1839 there were over a hundred pieces, but only 16 wereattached to the divisions. A large proportion ofthe rernainderhad no doubt been left in strongholds; when Espartero tookMorella he captured 32 pieces, in€luding 18 small-bore mortanfor throwing grenades.

UNIFORMS OF THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE

Guerille,osoI La lilancha

berettassels, shoulder "wings" and collarparches, whereas forthe cazadores th€se items werc green and for the &ri/€/os,yellow. Drums were black with coloured rims and a white skulland crossbones emblem. The Mora battalions nay have had redcuff flaps and sardinetas for ganadercs .

Only the fiIst four Aragon battalions initialy wore uniforms,although all are listed as unifonned in the original source forTable B, and perhaps matters had improved by the end ofthewar. The jacket or ftock coat was dark brown with red edging tocollar and cuffs, and the beret was blue with a yellow centre andred tassel. Tbe four Turia battalions. also known as Balallor,€rdsl Cid, had a blue shell jacket with red collar, cuffs, piping tothe front, and edging to the pockets, and a blue beret with ayellow centre but no tassel. The first four Valencia battalionshad similar berets and blue frock coats, but the other three atleast commenced their careerc without uniforms. Some worethe white za'ogt€l (kilt) of the Valencian peasant-

Cavalry usually had a tailed jacket or a tailless shell jacket."fhe Onienanzas had a black sheepskin saddle, but most othershad a white sheepskin saddle, eith€r plain or edged red. Beltsalso lended to be white. Both Aragonese regiments had greenjackets faced red, red berets with white tassels, and rcd overwhite lance pennons. Trumpeters may have had red jacketsfaced green- The Lanceros de Toftosd were some of thebest-equipped cavalry units. Most men wore a sky blue jacketwith red piping, tails and collar patches, brass shoulder scales,pale grey overalls wi$ a yellow stripe, and white berets with ayellow centre and a red and yellow tassel. Pennons may havebeen red-yellow-red; trumpeters may have had reversed-colourjackets and even red cloaks. The lilddol company,66 strong,had a very different unifonn. The jacket was replaced by ayellow hussar-style dolman, faced green with green and redbraiding. The beret was sky blue and lacked a tassel; theoveralls were also sky blue. The men carried carbines instead oflances and therefore should have had a doubled shoulder belt.

The Lancercs de valencia had a blue jacket faced red and arcd beret;those of the Cid werevery poorly equipped and maynot have had a uniform- One picture shows an unidentifiedlancer with a red jacket and beret. The Ordenarzar had a redpelisse with black furand green braid, a green beret with a redtassel, and sky blue overalls with a red stripe. Unlike mostCarlist cavalry, whose round valises, when they had any, wereof the jacket colour tdmmed with the facing colour, the valisesof this unit were green ed ged red. The Hbarcs de Ontuna worefull hussal uniform, although all troopers save those of thetbarlor comp^Ay curied ^ lance with a black pennon bearing askull and crossbones. Thepelisse, braid and fur were black,thedolman white faced deep blue with red and geen braid.Overalls were red, the beret blue with a yellow centre. Valiseswere blue edged red.

The uniforms and equipment of Cabrera's army followed thesame sMe as those of the Army of the North, with belly boxes,white linen packs, greatcoats, frock coats or jackets, andsandals. The only unit not to wear the beret was the Miiones (inwhich th€ officers had boinrr), where the headgear was a tall,black round hat, edged white and bearing a red cockade. Thetrousers and jacket or frock coat of this unit were blue, withwhite rardinerar and pointed button loops; jackets and coatswere \rom open and over a red waistcoat (Lichnowsky, II, 98,descibes a similar but morc elaborate uniform). The Gtl,-ar delConde de Motella h^d a sky blue frock coat with red collar andwhite rardrneror, a black waistcoat, a red beret, ornamented asabove, red breeches and leathergaiters.

The "line" infantry should have wom white linen trousers,but no doubt many other coloun were seen. The Tortosa andMora battalions had blue frock coats, and white berets with ayellor{ centre. They are the only Carlist units for which detailsofcompany distinctions exist. The Tortosa g/araderos had red

47

One body of cavalry was not part of any army, being no morethan a group of bandits semi-detached from the Carlist causebut making ample use of the civil war to further their own ends.These were the Bueililleros of L^ Mancha, who sometimescooperated rvith Cabrera's forces, andtheyare too famous andpr€turesque to omit- If the gue illercs had a leader it wasVincente Rugieros, who was created a brigadier and a Carlistcommander in La Mancha. His for€es were said tototal800. allmounted, divided into bands of30 or40. They took advantageoftheflatness ofLa Mancha to keepwatchofl pursuing columnsfrom the church towers of villages and were very difficult tosurprise. They had no uniform, organisation or discipline andwere very heavily armed with a sabre, dagger, about sir pistolsin sashes, pockets and saddle holsters, and one or twoblunderbusses. Their costume was ahigh, black velvet hat withmany ornaments! a jacket with five tows of silver buttons,breeches ofblack velvet and leather gaiters.

The artillery had an elabomte full dress, a btuejacket facedblackandpipedred, with red epaulettes. Mountain artillery hada grey frock coat with the same distinctions. Berets were redwith yellow centres and white tassels, trousers could be rcd witha black stripe. Engineerswore a blue j acket faced red with whiteepauletres and sardrneras. and a red berel. The marine corpshad a long-tailed blue coatee with yellow safd,rerar, collarpatches, chest lace, turnbacks and pocket ornaments on thetails. The beretwasredwith a yellowcentre, the trousers greedwith a y€llow stripe.

Cabrera himself was described by Lichnowsky as wearing awhite beret with a gold tassel, a sho( green jacket and redtrousers with a silver stripe. He never wore a sabre but kept it onhi: saddle along wrrh his pisrols. shich were beneath wotf-skrncovers. He is also shown wearing a wolf,skin pelisse withastrakhan collar and cuffs, red sash, and a yellowish-whitehorseman's cloak lined in scarlet. In case anyone was able tomiss him, he aho had a habit of riding a white hone(Lichnowsky, I, 168;Barado, 232).

Descriptions survive of two flags ofthe Army ofthe Centre.One was black, with a skull and crossbones berw€cn a sworoand an olive bmnch, all devices being in white; it may havebelonged to a battalion ofTortosa infantry. The other was whitewith the "small" coat of allns of Spain, the words DIOSPATRIA Y REY and a laurelwrearh, bothingold.

TABLE A: THE ROYAL ARMY OF ARAGON,DECEMBER 1836

(Fron Pirala, III, 652 53)

Tortosa Division: lst Tortosa Barallion - 784; 2nd TortosaBatlalion - 647; lst Mora Batralion 902t 2nd Ca.ratryRegiment Lancercs de Tortosa 402.Valencia Division: lst Battalion - 813; 2nd Bartation 753.Aragon Diviaion: 4rh Batralion - 683; 5th Batralion - 559;Cadre of 6th Batralion 396; Cadre of 3rd Cavalry Regnnent -131.

Turia Divisior lst talar{tn del Cid-848; lst Cavalry RegimenrLancercs del Cid - 194.

Artillery Company: 63.

ntsilercs de Valencia: 60.

The total was 7,236 men and 659 holses. To these should beadded the lst, 2nd and 3rd Aragonese Bartalions (2,158) andrhe lst Lancercs de ArcB6n (4$). on detached service withG6Inez's expedition.

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TAILE B: TIIE ARMY OF TIIE CENTRX. 1839Frorn Pirala, Vl, 557-63)

Tortosa Division: lst Bdgade (1st, 2nd and 3rd To(osaBattalions) 2,369; 2nd Brigade (lst, 2nd and 3rd MoraBattaliont 2.255.

Aragon Division: lst Brigade (Guias de Arcgdn,sth AragoteseBztralion, Tnadores de Arcgtn) - 2,A A;zndBrigade (4rh,6th,7th and 8th Aragonese Bal]�aliofls, Batall'n de Tiladores deArugin) - 2,537; 3rd B.igade (1st, 2nd and 3rd AragoneseBattaliotts, Batalltin de Tbadores de Arag6n) - 2,U)A.

Valencia Divisionr lst Brigade (lst, 2nd and 3rd ValencianBatral ions) - 2,338; 2nd Bdgade (4th,5th,6th and 7thValencian Battalions) -2,492.

Murcia Division: 1st Brig ade (7st andznd BataU6nes det Cid) -1,840; 2nd Brigade (3rd Aatull6n del Cid, Guias del Conde deMore a\ - 1 ,653 .

Cavalry: Regiments - lst a anceros de Arag6n,2nd Lancercs deTo4osa,3ft Lancercs de Arag6n , lst Lanceros de Valencia, tstLancercs del Cidt squadrons from La Mancha and Toledo -2,115.

Artillery: 1,026.

The invalid corps has been omitted in this distillation ofPirala'sfigures. The total infantry force was 19,558;rhe cavalryhad 1,576 horses.

Several oth€runitshave not been includedin the above. TheMifiones and rhe Fusilercs de Valencia n\\mbercd 229 in rot^land were attached to the Murcia Division. Three cavalry units,the Compafi{a de la Leqitimitad, rhe Hrtsarcs de Ontaia and theO enanzas haye also been omittedi the last two wereincorporated into the ldncercs de To4osa. Therc \Me ^lso astaff corps of sorts and a bodyofarmouryworkers. Lastly, therewerelocal corpsat Morella and Cantavieja.

Four bands are included in the totals, one ea€h for theTortosan and Valencian diyisions, rhe Lancercs de Tortosa andthe artillery.