Parsing Ollie: How Conservatives and the Military Viewed Honor, Loyalty and Duty in the Prism of Lt. Col. Oliver North’s Role in Iran-Contra

7/31/2019 Parsing Ollie: How Conservatives and the Military Viewed Honor, Loyalty and Duty in the Prism of Lt. Col. Oliver N

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Parsing Ollie:

How Conservatives and the Military Viewed Honor, Loyalty and Duty in

the Prism of Lt. Col. Oliver Norths !ole in "ran#Contra

I want to make it clear beyond any question that absolute integrity of anofficers word, deed and signature is a matter that permits no compromise.

-- Gen. illiam !. estmoreland"

#he greatest dangers to liberty lurk as insidious encroachments by men of$eal, well-meaning but without understanding.

-- %ustice &ouis 'randeis

(e presumed to sa)e his country without the consent of the emperor.-- *dward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of theRoman Empire, !hapter +&

By Martin Edwin Andersen

#he boyish, ramrod straight arine !orps officer emerged in %uly "/0 in full dress uniform to

face a 1oint !ongressional committee in)estigating the Iran-!ontra scandal, in a 2enate !aucus

3oom where prior inquiries into the sinking of the #itanic, #eapot 4ome, %oseph c!arthys

libels against the 5rmy, and atergate had been held. 5s he later recalled it, he had first entered

the 2enate chamber thinking, ho are these people and what am I doing here67 5 lieutenant

colonel who had operated out of the basement of the 8ld *9ecuti)e 8ffice building as a sort of

underground 2ecretary of 2tate:and who was about to become a media sensation-cum-5merican

icon, 8li)er &. ;orth was stepping out front and center in the middle of a constitutional crisis thatwas arguably largely of his own making. ith a stern and, at first, insolent

demeanor, for the ne9t se)eral days ;orth parried the queries of solons and committee lawyers,

ducking into the ?ifth 5mendment when counseled by his lawyers to do so. (e was, he told his

accusers and the rest of the country ri)eted by tele)ised co)erage of the e)ent, a soldier who

would take a spear for God, country and @resident 3onald 3eagan.

#oday, nearly two decades after ;orths appearance before !ongress, the role he played in the

Iran-!ontra affair, one of the most important political scandals in the Anited 2tates in the latter

half of the 7Bth!entury, offers critical insights into contemporary debates about foreign policy

"3ichard (alloran, ashington #alkC #he 5rmed 2er)icesD 8fficers and Gentlemen and 2ituational &ying, The New

York Times, 5ugust E, "/0, p. 57>.7 8li)er ;orth, Under Fire An American !tory,p. :F".:#he description of ;orth in @hilip eiss, 8li)er ;orths ;e9t ar, The New York Times, %uly >, ":, p. 5. "7.> ;orth, op. cit,p. :E7.


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mechanisms and the role of the military. ;orths responsibility as an indi)idual, combined with

certain institutional enablers that flourished within the 3eagan 5dministrations conduct of

foreign policy, resulted in an ine9orable bifurcation between the traditional ethos of the A.2.

armed forcesincluding such )alues as leadership, discipline and integrity that remain the

bedrock training for the arine !orpsHand the foreign policy aims and practices of a

conser)ati)e administration, despite their sometimes conflation in the popular mind. (ow ;orth

interpreted and applied the !orps official motto, !emper Fidelis,


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ideological conser)atism is particularly appropriate in the conte9t of the 3eagan 5dministrations

willingness to up the ante in the !old ar against the 2o)iet empireD its particular brand of anti-

communism synonymous not with the managing of the status quo of his predecessors, but

rather winning the twilight struggle against the 2o)iets.0

5lthough sharing 3eagans tough anti-communism, the militarys institutional conser)atism,

especially during the "/Bs, was more akin to what uller calls orthodo9y, whose defense of

institutions depends on belief in their correspondence to some ultimate truth. K #he positi)e

)alue ascribed to institutions by conser)atism contributes to its natural affinity for the stat#s *#o,

in contrast to liberalisms innate hostility towards authority and establishments. In this way, the

military can been seen as a bulwark of unbending )alues. / 8r, as an institution that shares the

assumption, as 3ussell Lirk posed it, that there e9ists a transcendent moral order, to which we

ought to try to conform the ways of society.

4uring the period under study, howe)er, therewere also indications that the militarys orthodo9 conser)atism was itself in the process of

morphing into a more ideological brand. 5s one defense commentator noted, the military

appeared to be both more conser)ati)e than their predecessors, and more politically acti)e. #he

e)idence is skimpy, and the definitions of Mconser)ati)e are unstated but almost certainly

shifting. K #he military increasingly appears to lean toward partisan conser)atism."B

#he centrality of the role played in Iran-!ontra by ;orth, who had limited foreign affairs or

intelligence e9perience, is without question, as was his meteoric ascent within the national

security bureaucracy.


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officer and the country likely spared the trauma of Iran-!ontra. ?or make no mistake, without

8li)er ;orth the Iran initiati)e would certainly ha)e de)eloped differently and the profits from

the arms sales to Iran most probably would not ha)e been di)erted to support the !ontra

resistance in ;icaragua."7

hile the unorthodo9, off-the-books actions taken by ;orth and his superiors ha)e been 1udged

by often partisan and leftwing critics to be illegal and setting a dangerous precedent, others might

contend that they were only an e9treme byproduct of the shifting sands of responsibility for

national security and defense between the *9ecuti)e and &egislati)e branches, where bureaucratic

maneu)ering outside public scrutiny allowed for both questionable inno)ation and unbridled

personal protagonism. 2uch an e9amination is particularly useful gi)en the preference of another

conser)ati)e 5dministrationthat of @resident George . 'ushfor an operational ;2! to deal

with an e)en larger issue, the conduct of the war in Iraq, despite the cautions a)ailable from thee9ample of the 3eagan presidency.": It is within that conte9t that this paper will e9plore the

tensions between institutional )ersus political conser)atismas well as those institutional

practicesthat facilitated ;orths shift away from the instincts and training of the military sphere

to a lone wolf conser)ati)e acti)ism, at the same time becoming, in the words of one obser)er,

the most powerful lieutenant colonel in the world.">

;83#( 2*3*4 52 4*@A#J 4I3*!#83 of political-military affairs at the ;2! under two

;ational 2ecurity 5d)isors, 3obert 'ud c?arlane and 5dm. %ohn @oinde9ter. 4uring that

time, they and se)eral other members of the 5dministration of 3onald 3eagan helped sell arms to

a)owed enemy IranD implausibly reaching out to Iranian moderates, and using the proceeds to

fund, against !ongressional prohibitions for doing so


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to be largely at cross purposes. ?or e9ample, ;orths delight in o)ercharging the Iranians for

arms and spare parts, generating more funds for the !entral 5mericans, ended up alienating a

#ehran already sensiti)e to being cheated by the Anited 2tates. 5fter the partial deli)ery of

(5L missiles from Israel it was ;orth himself who relayed to @oinde9ter his feeling that the

Iranians were unlikely to liberate all of the hostages in a single transaction because they felt

that had been scammed."0

hile ;orths role in the arms sales to Iran was important, it was his role in the !ontra operation

that made the lieutenant colonel a big time operator, becoming the person who kept the Panti-

2andinistaQ !ontra resistance ali)e though financing, political support, and his own in)enti)e

determination."/ In an article whose title, Is the mysterious colonel a saint or a sinner6

captured the debate about ;orth in the aftermath of the public disclosure of Iran-!ontra

machinations,Newsweek noted that ;orth was hardly the M1ust- following-orders political naRfhe sometimes appears to be. In addition to the co)ert foreign policy he was running out of the

hite (ouse basement, ;orth was deeply in)ol)ed in domestic policy to win financial and

political support for the contras from wealthy conser)ati)es."@art of that effort was establishing

a non-go)ernmental co)ert entity known as #he *nterprise to run the !entral 5merican war

effort. In that endea)or ;orths helpmates included far-right acti)ists and, according to sources

not unsympathetic to larger administration goals, conni)ance with known criminals.7B

;orth was also a central figure in the 3eagan 5dministrations e9tensi)e subterfuge for keeping

!ongress in the dark about the A.2. role in !entral 5mericas pro9y wars. ?or e9ample, although

3eagan assured !ongress in %une "/F that his 5dministration was committed to political, not

military solutions in !entral 5merica and that we do not seek the military o)erthrow of the

2andinista P;icaraguanQ go)ernment, that 4ecember he reported to his boss at the ;2! that,

following his directions, ;orth had assured allies in !entral 5merica that the Anited 2tates

former ;2! chief c?arlane, who said that the negotiations in #ehran amounted to a hostage ba$aar. I think ;orthknew when we went there that they hadnt agreed to release the hostages. p. EF"."0!annon, op. cit., p. EF0."/(artle, op. cit."

Newsweek, 4ecember 77, "/E, p. 7E.7B?ebruary "B, "/E memo from 3ob 8wen, ;orths !entral 5merican point person, to ;orth noted that a !ontra

supply plane used at one time to run drugs, and part of the crew had criminal records. ;ice group the 'oys


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intendPedQ to pursue )ictory so that these would not be forced to seek a political

accommodation with the 2andinistas.7"

hen the arms sales to Iran were re)ealed in ;o)ember "/E, 3eagan at first appeared on

national tele)ision to deny that they had occurred. 5 week later, howe)er, he again took to theairwa)es to admit that weapons had been sent to Iran, but still denied that they were part of a

hostage e9change.77 In the meantime, ;orth and @oinde9ter began hectically shredding

documents to keep them from reaching the public, after the former had applied do not log

procedures to those which ended up being destroyed.

#he dealings with Iran stripped 3eagan of his public stance as being a resolute foe of

international terrorism.7: #he secret parleys did not achie)e their intended purpose of releasing

A.2. hostages held in &ebanon. 3ather a)ailable e)idence suggests that once ashington was

seen as willing to betray its own public policy on non-negotiation with hostage takers, pro-Iranian

militants kidnapped additional A.2. citi$ens, which allowed the Iranians to e9tort more arms and

intelligence from the 5mericans. ;ews of the botched deal also created a political firestorm in the

Anited 2tates while embarrassing the country internationally. hen the affair e9ploded in the

fall of "/E, one former senior 3eagan ad)isor noted, the administration effecti)ely came to a

dead halt. ?or o)er a year, time stood still for 3eagan as he fought a scandal that nearly felled

him.7>

@ublic demands for a full accounting of what happened led 3eagan to appoint a 2pecial 3e)iew

'oard, popularly known as the #ower !ommission after its chairman, 2en. %ohn #ower


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others. In part due to the confusing testimony that was gi)en by 3eagan himself, who claimed

faulty memory of key e)ents, the presidential commission did not determine the e9tent of the

presidents knowledge of the program.7E It found, howe)er, that 3eagan should ha)e e9ercised

better control of the ;2! staff and, instead, had only weakly super)ised his subordinates and

their actions.70

In arch "//, ;orth and @oinde9ter were indicted on multiple charges. 8f the "7 counts with

which he was charged, ;orth was found guilty of three lesser felony countsobstructing

!ongress, destroying documents and accepting an illegal gratuity. (e was acquitted of nine other

countsincluding lying to !ongressafter con)incing the 1ury that he carried out policies he

belie)ed had been appro)ed by 3eagan. ;orths con)iction was later o)erturned on appeal on the

grounds that the former ;2! aides ?ifth 5mendment rights may ha)e been )iolated by indirect

use of his !ongressional testimony, for which he had been gi)en use immunity, not because hewas wrongly con)icted on the facts of the case.7/

Joure here now because of your own conduct when the truth was coming out, %udge Gerhard

Gesell told ;orth at his sentencing hearing. 5pparently you could not face disclosure and

decided to protect yourself and others. Jou destroyed e)idence, altered and remo)ed official

documents, created false papers after the e)ents to keep !ongress and others from finding out

what was happening. K I belie)e that you knew this was morally wrong. K It was against all

your training. Ander the stress of the moment it was easier to choose the role of a martyr but that

wasnt a heroic, patriotic act nor was it in the public interest.7

5 G354A5#* 8? #(* A.2. ;55& 5!54*J, ;orth was a decorated combat )eteran of

ietnam known for his gritty determination, fierce loyalty and personal charisma. 3eagan

biographer &ou !annon called ;orth a $ealot and an ad)enturer, someone who was fond of

7E5lthough key aides reported that 3eagan had a literal, photographic memory


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assigning himself such code names as M'lood and Guts and M2teelhammer. :B5s one military

obser)er noted of ;orthC 5s he frequently said with pride, 8li)er ;orth made things happen.:"

In his autobiography, Under Fire, An American !tory,;orth says that the criminal proceedings

against him boiled down to two fundamental issues. #he first was that e)erything I had done was

known about and appro)ed by those I had worked for. K #he other K was that I hadnt acted

with criminal intent. In other words, I had no intention of breaking any laws. In fact, those of us

in)ol)ed in helping the P;icaraguanQ resistance went to great lengths to a)oid )iolating the

'oland 5mendment or any other statute.:7

;orths legal defense operated on theory that his superiors knew almost e)erything that he had

done, and that 3eaganwho did not always know what he knew but was aware of e)erything

concerning the scandalhad sought to shield himself through plausible deniability.

::

ostobser)ers agree that ;orths goals of freeing the hostages and helping the contras were also the

presidents ob1ecti)es.:>

5lthough 3eagan was apparently ne)er briefed about the di)ersion of the Iran monies to the

!ontras before the operation was about to implode, ;orths ad)ocacy of the idea met with

appro)al from his ;2! boss, @oinde9ter, and !I5 director illiam !asey, who at times seemed

to treat ;orth K as a son.:F;orth reported that !asey greeted the proposal with enthusiasm,

calling it the ultimate irony, the ultimate co)ert operation.:E 5nd contemporaries clearly

remember ;orth regaling in what he thought was the presidents direction. ?or e9ample, a !I5

official who ser)ed as a liaison between the !ontra supply operation and the go)ernment of *l

2al)ador recalled sitting in ;orths office in "/E, as the tele)ision showed !ongress debating

:B!annon, op. cit., p. EFED:"(artle, op. cit.D ;orths self-propagated image of derring-do, together with his cloak of clandestinity, lent itself, ready

made, in the )ernacular press to )ariants of accusations of a 4r. 2trangelo)e kind, that ;orth himself was a memberin good standing of a pathological and lunatic fringe. 8r as conser)ati)e essayist 3. *mmett #yrell, %r., wrote, amember of one of two distinct species of true belie)ers at large in ashington, the first, about whom all learnedsociologists warn, to witC the anticommunist military goon, the straight-arrow right-winger, the propounder of old-fashioned )irtues. #yrrell, 'orne 5loft on (ot 5ir, The "ashin(ton )ost, %uly 7", "/0, p. 57". In fact, ;orth didrisk being stereotyped in the redoubtable fashion of A.2. academia and the 5merican &eft, which cast anti-communismin its more e9treme and disreputable form, stereotyping all as c!arthyites and militarists. In Not "itho#t $onor,@owers noted that during the %uly "/0 congressional hearings, #hose alarmed by 3eagans anti-communist rhetorichad been appalled by the spectacle of the bemedaled K ;orth facing down congressmen with attacks on their

patriotism ...


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renewing official aid to the ;icaraguan insurgents. #hose people want me, but they cant touch

me, ;orth said, pointing to the tele)ision, because he was in fa)or with the old man. :0

In the ;orth trial, Independent !ounsel &awrence *. alsh noted, the arines defense centered

on his claims that all of his actions were known to and appro)ed by his superiors, that although heknew certain of his actions were wrong, they were 1ustifiable in light of the need for co)ert action

in a dangerous world, and that he ne)er belie)ed that any of his actions were unlawful. ?or

e9ample, ;orth admitted to helping the !ontras while the 'oland 5mendment was in effect,

saying that in "/> he was instructed by !I5 4irector !asey and ;ational 2ecurity 5d)isor

c?arlane )ery clearly K that I would be the one to replace the !I5 for each of these acti)ities.

K I was told not to tell other people, not to talk about it, keep my operational role )ery, )ery

secret, that it should not be something that others came to know about. :/ In response to a

question from the prosecutor during the !ongressional Iran-!ontra hearings about whether thego)ernment kept secrets from the 5merican people, ;orth respondedC 'y their )ery nature,

co)ert operations, or special acti)ities are a lie. #here is great deceit-deception practiced in the

conduct of co)ert operations. #hey are at essence, a lie.:

2imilarly, concerning the charge that he had lied to !ongress, alsh noted that ;orth

characteri$ed those actions as part of a political dispute that had nothing to do with

lawbreaking.>BIn his autobiography, ;orth claimed that there was enormous contro)ersy as to

the meaning and scope of the )arious 'oland 5mendments K common sense tells me that if a

!ongress that was known to be deeply di)ided on this issue ne)ertheless )oted for 'oland 8ne >"

/y a mar(in of 233 to 4ero, theres no way on earth that this amendment could ha)e been

understood as forbidding all aid to the !ontras.>7

5lthough comedians would later lampoon 3eagans difficulty in recalling key aspects of the Iran-

!ontra affaire by the questionhat did he know, and when did he forget it;orth also

found members of !ongress striking a disingenuous pose, one that could ha)e similarly been

framed asC hat did theyknow and when did theyforget it. 2ometimes a matter of looking the

:0?o9 'utterfield, !olonel 3ecounts (ow ;orth 3an !ontra 8peration, The New York Times, ay 7/, "/0D see also

;orth, Under Fire,p. :F:.:/alsh IranT!ontra 3eport, !hapter 7C Anited 2tates ). 8li)er ;orth, pp. "B, "7.:Suoted in ichael &ynch and 4a)id 'ogen, The !pectacle of $istory !peech, Te5t and Memory at the 0ran6&ontra

$earin(s, 4urham, ;.!.C 4uke Ani)ersity @ress, "E, p. ""F.>Balsh IranT!ontra 3eport, !hapter 7, op. cit, p. "7.>" In the period "/7 and "/E, fi)e separate 'oland 5mendments, named for the chair of the (ouse intelligence

committee, passed the (ouse of 3epresentati)es.>7;orth, Under Fire, p. 7:/.


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other way, on other occasions legislators appeared to play dumbto look stricken upon

supposedly hearing about contro)ersial information for the first time, while in truth, they or their

staffs had known about it beforehand. In the contro)ersial case of the sowing of ;icaraguan

harbors with loud but )irtually non-lethal firecracker mines, ;orth said, !ongressional

opponents roared their outrage at the clandestine effort, e)en though 2enate and (ouse

intelligence committees had been briefed about the operation. ;ot all the members of the

intelligence committees knew all the facts, ;orth wrote of his own in)ol)ement in !entral

5merica, but there werent many people in ashington with an interest in the ;icaraguan

situation who didnt know, at least in general, that 8li)er ;orth was up to his ears in aiding the

!ontras. 5t the same time, ;orth admitted that, he has misled members of the (ouse

Intelligence !ommittee when, in ;o)ember "/E, he denied a role in supporting the !ontras. I

look back on that meeting today knowing that what I did was wrong. I didnt gi)e straight

answers to the questions that I was asked.>:

#(* I35;-!8;#35 5??5I3 JI*&4*4 a unique look at conser)ati)e national security

practice and responsibility. (istory, custom, laws, constitutional intent, and the intentions of the

framers ha)e long shaped and informed A.2. national security policies, within a framework of

constitutionally mandated checks and balances, and shared powers. 5nalysts who speak of

foreign policy as the product of the e9ecuti)e branch alone ignore the shifting balance of power

built into the 5merican system by the ?ramers, noted political scientist %ames . 2cott. #he

document itself is ambiguous on the di)ision of their powers, so the precise role and

responsibility of each branch is also unclear, creating an in)itation to struggle.>>

5s the !old ar raged, howe)er, there emerged in ashington a foreign policy bias for a non-

elected bureaucratic elite to control decision-making, in which a marked predisposition for

*9ecuti)e 'ranch pre-eminence emerged.>F5t the core of this shift, and a necessary emphasis on

secrecy, was what one obser)er called the colossal bluff in)ol)ed in the policy of nuclear

deterrence, in which, as 2ecretary of 2tate %ohn ?oster 4ulles admitted to ice @resident 3ichard

;i9onC one cannot e9plain e)erything to our own people, as it also e9plains things to the

enemy.>E

>:;orth, Under Fire,pp. 7:F-7:E, :77, :0B.>>2cott, op. cit. p. 7:/.>F2ee, for e9ample, (arold (ong1u Loh, The National !ec#rity &onstit#tion !harin( )ower After the 0ran6&ontra

Affair,;ew (a)enC Jale Ani)ersity @ress, "B.>E?rank ;inko)itch, The "ilsonian &ent#ry, !hicagoC Ani)ersity of !hicago @ress, ", pp. 7BB, :BE..

"B


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In addition, the Iran-!ontra affair represented one of the first times a sustained clandestine war-

making operation>0was conducted since ietnam, atergate and the congressional hearings in

the mid-"0Bs that e9posed plots to assassinate !uban dictator ?idel !astro and other foreign

leaders, as well as the A.2. role in the o)erthrow of democratically elected ar9ist president

2al)ador 5llende Gossens in !hile. ith the media and the public less tolerant of such

acti)ities, wrote one )eteran 5merican foreign correspondent, the hearings made it more

difficult for ashington to 1ustify and wage secret wars.>/ #he subsequent lack of elite

consensus about the boundaries for the legitimate e9ercise of 5merican force o)erseas resulted in

the actions of ;orth et. al, being denounced, post facto, by many

3epublicansTconser)ati)es, while at the same time heralded by others who chaffed at

!ongressional restrictions in what they saw a undue interference in a twilight struggle with 2o)iet

communism a stoneUs throw from 5mericaUs borders.

Ley to understanding Iran-!ontra in the conte9t of related co)ert operations that were carried out

simultaneously on two continents comes from the le9icon of intelligence tradecraft. 5s the

!hurch !ommittee, otherwise known as the Anited 2tates 2enate 2elect !ommittee to 2tudyGo)ernmental 8perations with 3espect to Intelligence 5cti)ities, chaired by 2enator ?rank

!hurch


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shredded by ;orth and an assistant and 3eagans own faulty memory about key e)ents make

conclusi)e statements about how plausible denial worked in the case of Iran-!ontra difficult.

#his is particularly true concerning the problems of assessing intent and ensuring control and

accountability and it is that gray area that ser)ed as the background to the role encumbered by

;orth, both as a military man and as a conser)ati)e acti)ist.

Ironically, the acti)ist role of ;ational 2ecurity !ounciloriginally created by !ongress to ser)e

as the presidents primary forum for resolution of military and foreign policy issuesand the

place military officers might play within the ;2! in a conser)ati)e administration were not

articles of consensus at the beginnings of the 3eagan 5dministration. 3ichard 5llen, a foreign

affairs scholar who became 3eagans first ;ational 2ecurity 5d)isor in "/", had written a line

into a 3eagan speech in 8ctober "/B that signaled the cutting back of the post from the

operational, policymaking role its occupant had en1oyed since the Lissinger eraC hen@resident, I will reduce the conflict between the ;ational 2ecurity 5d)isor and the 2ecretary of

2tate, and the ;ational 2ecurity 5d)isor once again will become a staff person. !oncerning

;orth, 5llen told an inter)iewer in 7BB7, If I hadnt left, he would ha)e been gone. I would

ne)er keep a military man more than si9 or eight months. ;e)er. K #he military always has its

own agenda. #heyre the guys you want to fight the war, theyre terrific people, but I dont want

them anywhere near the hite (ouse for more than a year at a time.FB

Apon taking office in %anuary, "/0, @oinde9ters replacement, ?rank !arlucci, immediately

abolished the political-military affairs unit that had ser)ed as ;orths launching pad within the

;2! staff. !arlucci was quoted as sayingC I could ne)er figure out what it did. K It made not

sense to me because almost e)erything we do in)ol)es political and military affairs. #he way it

was set up simply in)ited trouble, and, of course, trouble came along. 'y taking the ;2! out of

operations, and gi)ing it back its honest broker role, he said, e set out to restore the

credibility of the institution, to restore it to its proper role as an interagency body. F"

#he compulsion for secrecy and compartimentali$ation of information that characteri$ed Iran-

!ontra also predated the affair and were not, when 3onald ilson 3eagan was inaugurated

president for the first time, necessarily a preordained policy preference for the conser)ati)e

administration. 3eagans first secretary of state and former Lissinger trusted ad)isor, 5le9ander

(aig, whose 5chilles heel pro)ed to be his own tenuous standing among 3eagans confidants,

FBRonald Rea(an -ral $istory )ro.ect,5llen inter)iew, op. cit., pp. >0->/, E:F"&ou !annon, op. cit.,p. 0:7.

"7


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ran his own initiati)es with little hite (ouse input or clearance in the first months of the

administration.F7 (aigs 2tate 4epartment counselor was 3obert c?arlane, who later at the

head of the ;2! used ;orth as a prime conduit for back-channel intrigue, and enough protVgVs of

(aigforced out of office in mid-"/7were so closely identified with Iran-!ontra that one

;2! colleague referred to them as (aigs re)enge.F: 5ccording to one authoritati)e account,

internal critics inside the 5dministration charged that long before the Iran-!ontra affair,

senior ;2! staff officials often o)errode or refused to consult their own e9perts inside the

go)ernment and took action outside con)entional channels. 5 small clique of ;2! staff,

including ;orth, was used to accomplish co)ertly what they could not do through regular policy-

making channels. F>ost of the ;2!s statutory members knew little, if anything, about ;orths

role. 5nd ;orth often lied to colleagues from ;2!, 2tate, etc.FF

Ironically, despite the operational role assumed by the ;2!, the body lacked a strong leader ineither c?arlane 'abcock and 8berdorfer, op. cit.FF!annon, op. cit.,p. E7". ?or e9ample, he lied to the 2tate 4epartment director of counterterrorism, 3obert 8akley,

about the pro)enance of (5L missiles that were to be shipped to Iran,FE'abcock and 8berdorfer, op. cit. (aig protVgVs in)ol)ed in Iran-!ontra also included 4onald ?ortier, (oward 3.

#eicher and consultant ichael 5. &edeen.

":


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hostages and running a secret army alongside skilled profiteers.F0 c?arlane, who like ;orth

ser)ed in the arine !orps in ietnam and made him a protVgV, turned ;orth loose in a big

way, and @oinde9ter had neither the skill nor the sense to rein him in. F/ ?or his part, ;orth

understood the e9tent to which the hite (ouse had become hostage to the hostages,Fa point

that not only underscored their rescue as a presidential priority, but also allowed him to le)erage

his action-oriented ideas, howe)er implausible and un-)etted, into a principal role for himself.

;or was there any doubt about 3eagans commitment to the ;icaraguan rebels, who he lioni$ed

as freedom fighters and about whose pro9y battle against the 2o)iet-backed ar9ist regime,

(aig had assured the president, #his is one you can win.EB

#(* A.2. I&I#53J I* of ;orths role in Iran-!ontra reflected its own traditions and

codes of conduct, and brought to the fore questions about both the lieutenant colonels personal

ethics and his internali$ation of institutional )alues. ;orths truthfulness and discipline becamekey standards upon which he was 1udged, as was the in)ersion of military discipline that occurred

when ;orth claimed to ha)e a better, more comprehensi)e )iew of matters of state than his

superiors because he was closer to them on the ground. #he way ;orth pushed generals around

during meeting by walking in and saying that he spoke for the president became the stuff of

legend, his personal foible nonetheless underscoring how often senior military officers could be

intimidated by political power. (e was, recalled an 5ir ?orce colonel who worked with him on

&atin 5merica policy from the %oint 2taff at the @entagon, a brash, upstart lieutenant colonel

who ignored military protocol and called general officers by their first nameE"

#he armed forces strict subordination to elected authority and respect for the rule of law are

cornerstones of 5merican democracy. #hroughout its history, the A.2. military has been a non-

deliberati)e institution of distinctly conser)ati)e culture, maintaining and stri)ing to impro)e

)alues such as leadership, high moral standards and )alues, and discipline, a standard far higher

F0&arry 'ensky, 8llie ;orthC 5 2oldier for MGods 5merica,os An(eles Times,;o). :, "".F/ !annon, op. cit.,p. E70. @oinde9ter lacked ties to 3eagan, political e9perience and knowledge of international

relations. 3arely has such an intelligent and unassuming man been so poorly suited for the high position he inherited

as @oinde9ter was as 3eagans national security ad)iser, 3eagan biographer &ou !annon wrote. Intro)erted andreclusi)e in his habits K @oinde9ter was a remote figure e)en within the ;2! K hen I mentioned K during aninter)iew that e)en some 3epublican congressmen had complained about his inaccessibility, he told me that he had noresponsibility for dealing with !ongress and ga)e the impression he also had no interest. ore ad)erse to political

process than other of his military peers, #his a)ersion would enable @oinde9ter to carry out what he belie)ed to be thewishes of his commander in chief without troubling himself about the legality of his conduct. (is reticence wouldenable the )enturesome and temperamentally opposite 8li)er ;orth to gain lock-stock-and-barrel control o)er themany-sided Iran initiati)e. !annon, pp. E7F-E7E.F!annon, op. cit.,pp. E70-E7/.EB@owers, op. cit, p. :E.E"5uthor inter)iew, name withheld by request.

">


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than that of mere citi$enship e9pected of all 5mericans. #he )alues necessary to defend the

society are often at odds with the )alues of society itself, noted General &oyalty, fairness, accountability

thats what makes the military work, noted former 3eagan 2ecretary of the ;a)y %ames ebb,

;orths bo9ing ri)al in the 5nnapolis class of E/.EF

#he integrity of an officers word, deed and signature were considered paramount and rested on a

pragmatic understandingC that if senior officers were allowed to lie to their men about the dangers

they faced, )ital missions might fail and the men could be condemned to pointless death. 2ome

obser)ers point to a deterioration of these ethical )alues occurring during the war in ietnam,

when pressure to inflate statistics on enemy dead and false reports meant to win decorations and

promotions caused, in the words of a former officer, the erosion of trust upon which professional

relationships, lifelong friendships and loyalties of comrades in arms and the honorable perception

of military ser)ice ha)e been based.EE

E7 Suoted in %ohn eroney, Is the ;a)al 5cademy 8ff !ourse6 #he 5merican *nterprise 8nline W

httpCTTwww.taemag.comTissuesTarticeid."0B7/TarticleXdetail.asp E:Lrista *. eigand and 4a)id &. @alet$, #he *lite edia and the ilitary-!i)ilian !ulture Gap, Armed Forces 9

!ociety, ol. 70, ;o. 7, inter 7BB", pp. ":, "E.E>8ne critical cadet in the "0Bs obser)ed thatC #he central, ironic parado9 of 5cademy life is that the institution

attempts to build leaders by denying them room for indi)idual choice, through and initiati)e. Suoted in 'illLauffman, #he est @oint 2tory, #he 5merican *nterprise 8nline WhttpCTTwww.taemag.comTissuesTartcileid."0B70TarticleXdetail.aspEFY#radition in the ilitary, #he 5merican *nterprise 8nline W

httpCTTwww.taemag.comTissuesTarticleid."E7"BTarticleXdetail.asp EE (alloran, The New York Times, op. cit. #he officer quoted was &ewis 2. 2orley III, a "FE graduate of the A.2.

ilitary 5cademy at est @oint.

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http://www.taemag.com/issues/articeid.17028/article_detail.asphttp://www.taemag.com/issues/artcileeid.17027/article_detail.asphttp://www.taemag.com/issues/articleid.16210/article_detail.asphttp://www.taemag.com/issues/articleid.16210/article_detail.asphttp://www.taemag.com/issues/articeid.17028/article_detail.asphttp://www.taemag.com/issues/artcileeid.17027/article_detail.asphttp://www.taemag.com/issues/articleid.16210/article_detail.asp


16/23

#he testimony of ;orth and @oinde9ter at the Iran-!ontra hearings, long-time New York Times

@entagon correspondent 3ichard (alloran noted, raised a fundamental question of military

ethicsC ay an officer lie6

Is it permissible for a military officer to lie6 If so, under what circumstances,to whom and about what6 If not, why not6 5fter considerable deliberation,the nations top military officers declined to reply to the query, thusunderscoring the ambi)alence that runs through the officer corps of allser)ices on a critical issue of military ethics and integrity. K in recentyears, the practice of what military officers refer to as Msituational ethicshas become per)asi)e. #hat )iew K says that a higher end, such as nationalsecurity, 1ustifies such means as lying and deception.E0

(alloran obser)ed that the importance of trust as a military )alue was underscored by the feeling

thatC an officer lying through the press to the people he has sworn to defend soils his uniform

and )iolates the time-honored code dictating that officers do not lie, cheat, or steal. *)en

deception, (alloran said, a basic principle of war used to decei)e the enemy, is not

permissible when it K decei)es 5merican citi$ens. #he lie would not only be dishonorable but

would erode the credibility of the military ser)ice once the lie has been disco)ered.E/

5s ;orth catapulted into national headlines, the head of the arine !orps, Gen. @aul +. Lelly,

whose many detractors critici$ed his leadership style and the type of role model he himself

offered, a)oided commenting directly on the case. Lelly was asked whether he considered ;orth

a hero or a bum, or if he ob1ected to the lieutenant colonel wearing his uniform while taking the

?ifth 5mendment. (e noted that ;orth had an outstanding combat record before he left the

!orps for duty at the hite (ouse in "/", after which he hasnt belonged to me and therefore

could not 1udge his performance. It was ;orths call, he said, whether to wear his uniform

while testifying before !ongress.E


17/23

and for the public. In his study of the arine !orps, Makin( the &orps, military 1ournalist

#homas *. 3icks obser)ed that the ser)ices orientation on the front line combatant and its small

si$e seems to ha)e encouraged both a sense of brotherhood and a culture of candor within the

!orps that the other ser)ices lack. #o which he addedC #o be sure, there are liars, kna)es, and

cheats within the !orps, as there are anywhereand the !orps liars can be whoppers, as &t. !ol.

8li)er ;orth demonstrated.0" &t. Gen. ictor (. Lrulak, the legendary paramarineN during

orld ar II, challenged the )eracity of ;orths tales about his derring-do in ietnam, sayingC

(is combat e9ploits in ietnam are romantici$ed, like the 2unday-supplement tale of his )aliant

single-handed midnight forays into the 3ichard 2ecord,$onored and Betrayed,;ew JorkC %ohn iley and 2ons, "7, p. :>".

"0


18/23

standard such an e9change may be for an espionage agent, it may be questionable for a arine

officer, whose professional ethic places great emphasis on honesty and truth-telling to lie

purposefully and substanti)ely to officials of a friendly nation. ;orths efforts to backdate

checks and to hide the fact that a third party paid for an e9pensi)e security system installed at his

irginia home were )iewed by (artle as suggesting that ;orth might ha)e set aside the moral

discrimination between truth and falsehood that ser)ed him well as a midshipman at the ;a)al

5cademy and as a young arine officer. hile it is not unethical for an officer to mislead the

enemy, he wrote, ;orths treatment of !ongress, ?'I and ;2! security staff agents, and those

directed by 3eagan to in)estigate the scandal, all suggested that they could be decei)ed in the

name of a greater good known only to ;orth and other members of the co)ert operations group.

K hen the inefficiency and lack of responsi)eness of democratic procedures become to great a

lu9ury or danger, and persons other than the peoples elected representati)es conclude that,

because they understand the real priorities, democratic procedures must be set aside, then the

republic is perhaps most endangered.0F

#he arine !orps adage about no man being left behind is a point of pride. (owe)er, in Iran-

!ontra one palpable casuality was ;orths secretary ?awn (all, the sometimes model who was

pilloried in the press for her role and her continuing loyalty to ;orth. Ander oath, (all testified

that ;orth was an inspirational boss, who was ne)er la$y or self-ser)ing.0E?or years after the

scandal broke, howe)er, ;orth did not bother to e)en contact her. 8llie used me, (all later

complained. I was like a piece of Lleene9 to him.00;oted ;2! consultant ichael &edeen, one

of ;orths key allies in Iran-!ontra. &oyalty means not 1ust loyalty up, but loyalty down. (e did

not show it to her.0/

In assaying ;orths conduct as a military officer in the Iran-!ontra scandal, it is important to note

what may ha)e been institutional enablers within the arines itself, ideas and practices that help

e9plain, although not e9cuse, his beha)ior. In the arine !orps, military writer #homas 3icks

tells us, culture, that is, the )alues and assumptions that shape its membersis all the arines

ha)e. K #heirs is the richest cultureD formalistic, insular, elitist, with a deep anchor in their own

history and mythology. uch more than the other branches, they place pride and responsibility at

the lowest le)els of the organi$ation. In addition, a sense of being different and better than the

0F(artle, op. cit.0E(all, ;orth #rial #estimony, arch 77, "/, p. F>".00Suoted in 3o9anne 3oberts, 8llie ;orth, 5ction (eroD "B Jears 5fter Iran-!ontra, ?reedom 5lliance (onors Its

r. 3ight, The "ashin(ton )ost, %uly , "0.0/eiss, op. cit.

"/


19/23

ci)ilian society it is sworn to defend is deeply engrained within the arines, and makes ;orths

distain for ci)ilian rules and procedures only an e9treme case noteworthy for the power and

influence he came to hold. In the past three decades, 3icks wrote, as 5merican culture has

grown more fragmented, indi)idualistic, and consumerist, the arines ha)e become more

withdrawnD they feel that they simply cannot afford to reflect the broader society. #odays

arines gi)e off a strong sense of disdain for the )ery society they protect. 0;orths hubris, and

thus much of the Iran-!ontra action, may ha)e been midwifed by that disdain.

!8;2*35#I*2 *3* 2@&I# 5&8;G 2**35& lines in the aftermath of the disclosure

of the Iran-!ontra affair. #he first fault line di)ided those who sought to isolate 3eagan and the

hite (ouse from embarrassment, political eclipse and e)en impeachment, against those who

rallied to defend ;orth from attack. #he second di)ided ;orth supporters into those who 1ustified

his actions and those who chose not to address his deeds but rather sought to deflect blame bypointing out the alleged perfidity or callowness of ;orths critics. ?urther nuances in the

conser)ati)e camp drew distinctions between conser)ati)es and anti-communists, those who

wanted to protect 3eagan and those who sought to protect the presidency, and proponents of

limited go)ernment


20/23

2ome conser)ati)es, e)en within the 5dministration, refused to go along. hite (ouse

!ommunications 4irector @atrick 'uchanan, who in arch "/E, wrote that with the !ontra

)ote, the 4emocratic @arty will re)eal whether it stands with 3onald 3eagan and the resistance

or


21/23

uncanny resemblance to the Grinch that stole !hristmas. alsh was someone who has

indicted and intimidated a score of former 3eagan officials on the basis of Mcrimes that no other

prosecutor would e)er ha)e recogni$ed. K #he ;orth and @oinde9ter dismissals were

particularly tough on alsh, lea)ing him with no stolen presents to show for his ZFB million

e9pense account. (a)ing failed to come up with anything substanti)e, cGurn complained,

does not that effecti)ely call into question the wisdom of his own employment6 #he ?ounding

?athers, after all, thought e9ecuti)e malfeasance would best be corrected by either the

impeachment power granted !ongress or by the )oters at the election booth. #he e9tra-

constitutional office held by alsh, has now become a weapon with which a 4emocratic-

controlled !ongress can embarrass 3epublican 5dministrations by criminali$ing policy with

which they disagree./E

#he implications of the national security state 1ustification that ends 1ustified means clearlybothered some conser)ati)e thinkers. artin 5nderson, 3eagans domestic policy guru, saw in

Iran-!ontra the mischie)ous philosophy that the ends sometimes 1ustify the means, the idea that

it is 8L to bend and stretch the law, to slyly circum)ent it and, if really necessary, to )iolate the

law, to break it if your cause is 1ust and grand enough. In this )iew, although 3eagan ne)er

broke the law, he made his frustration with the 'oland 5mendment plain and clear but failed

to ha)e the law changed. 5nd when he failed, some of his aides took it upon themsel)es to

achie)e what they thought he wanted. In the process they bent the law, they twisted it, they went

under it and around it and, e)ery now and then, they 1ust said the hell with it and broke the law./0

In Iran-!ontra, ideological conser)atism, represented by the 3eagan 5dministrations foreign

policy agenda, had trumped conser)ati)e orthodo9y, represented by the armed forces, as ends

were held up as 1ustification for means. #he elite bureaucratic decision-making that characteri$ed

the !old arD the imperati)es of sustained clandestine war-making in the post-ietnam, post-

atergate eraD the e9aggerated secrecy and compartimentali$ation of ;2! acti)ities and the

operational cast that body was gi)en by acolytes of former 2ecretary of 2tate (aig, all these

played contributing roles as institutional enablers to the affair. eak super)ision and ;orths

own personal ideological agenda also contributed to the sub)erting of not only the established

foreign policy chain of command, but also of those military )alues the lieutenant colonel seemed,

at a distance, to embody.

/EcGurn, r. alshs ;orth 2tar,CNational Re'iew, %an. 7B, "7./05nderson, op.cit, pp. :F-:E, >77->7:. 'oth 5nderson and 3ichard 5llen, 3eagans first ;ational 2ecurity 5d)isor,

noted that ;orths history of hospitali$ation for emotional problems in the mid-"0Bs, had they not been co)ered up bythe military brass, would ha)e pre)ented him from 1oining the ;2! staff.

7"


22/23

#he issue is rele)ant today as the question is being asked, ho lost Iraq6 5gain the ;2!s role

as an operational bureaucratic actor is once more at center stage and under criticism. #his time,

@resident George . 'ushs national security ad)isor, !ondolee$$a 3ice, is cast as a true belie)er

in a war who found herself unable to play the traditional role of ;2! chief, that is, to be animpartial broker in the rough-and-tumble of interagency go)ernment. Instead, the ;2! once

again became )ery operational, micromanaging Iraqi reconstruction efforts, while senior

military officials put a big spin on their briefings, reporting the numbers but downplayFB of his admirers

held an anni)ersary party in celebration of ;icaraguan freedom and ultimate )ictory in the !old

ar at the (yatt 3egency hotel in ashington, 4.!. 2en. %esse (elms


23/23

;orths 3epublican opponents that he was getting pretty steamed about the statements coming

from 8li)er ;orth. 3eagan, mindful of his legacy, remembered why he was getting so angry. I

ne)er instructed him or anyone in my 5dministration to mislead !ongress on Iran-!ontra matters

or anything else. I certainly did not know anything about the Iran-!ontra di)ersion. 5nd the

pri)ate meetings he said he had with me 1ust didnt happen."

"3eagan Getting M2teamed at ;orth 8)er 3eported Iran-!ontra 3emarks, The os An(eles Times, arch "/, ">.

Documents

Parsing Ollie: How Conservatives and the Military Viewed Honor, Loyalty and Duty in the Prism of Lt. Col. Oliver North’s Role in Iran-Contra