Panslavism in Practice. Cherniaev in Serbia (1876)

Panslavism in Practice: Cherniaev in Serbia (1876)Author(s): David MacKenzieSource: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 1964), pp. 279-297Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1874289 .Accessed: 08/03/2014 15:30

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to TheJournal of Modern History.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 139.179.80.88 on Sat, 8 Mar 2014 15:30:47 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

PANSLAVISM IN PRACTICE: CHERNIAEV IN SERBIA (1876)* DAVID MACKENZIE

FROM July to November 1876 Gen- eral Mikhail Grigorevich Cherniaev was unquestionably the most pop-

ular man in Russia. Leading his Serbo- Russian army against the Turks, Cher- niaev to millions of Russians embodied the Panslav ideal of selfless service to Slav Christians groaning under the Otto- man yoke. In a manner reminiscent of medieval chivalry, he sought to realize the shadowy programs of such Panslav theorists as N. Ia. Danilevskii and R. A. Fadeev. But when the smoke of battle settled at Djunis, the Serbian army was in panicky retreat and General Cher- niaev fled ignominiously to Belgrade. The Slav cause seemed lost, and much of the Russian press made Cherniaev the scapegoat for disaster. His star eclipsed, General Cherniaev returned to Russia saddened and discredited. Never again did Panslavism inspire such gen- uine enthusiasm in Russia.'

* The author is indebted to the Ford Founda- tion, the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants, and Wells College for assistance in making possible the original research for this study.

1 For an excellent general treatment of the theory of Russian Panslavism see H. Kohn, Pan- Slavism: Its history and Ideology (Notre Dame, 1953), pp. 103-79. The transition from Slavophil- ism to Panslavism is treated thoroughly in M. Petrovich, The emergence of Russian Panslav- ism, 1856-1870 (New York, 1956). The best sum- mary in English on the ideology of Russian Panslavism is still B. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880 (Oxford, 1937). The weight- iest theoretical exposition of Russian Panslavism is N. Danilevskii, Rossiia i Evropa (St. Peters- burg, 1871). A briefer, more popular exposition of Panslav aims, first published in Russia in 1869, is R. A. Fadeev's Opinion on the Eastern Question (London, 1876). Ivan S. Aksakov's articles on the Slav question, comprising Volume I of his Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (Moscow, 1886),

Cherniaev's experiences in Serbia in 1876 provide many clues to the nature of Russian Panslavism during the East- ern Crisis. Tsarist and Soviet historians have commented negatively upon the general's checkered career,2 but they have not sought to analyze fully his role in the Serbo-Turkish War or his relationship with the Serbian and Russian governments and public opinion. This article will attempt such an assessment.

I Cherniaev's adventures in Serbia must

be viewed against the background of his Russian career. Mikhail Grigorevich sprang from a Russian noble family of moderate means. His father, Grigorii N. Cherniaev, married the daughter of a French burgher during the Russian oc- cupation of France, then alternated between state service and retirement at Tubyshki, his estate in Mogilev province. Like his more famous son, Grigorii N. found that a hot temper and an independent cast of mind involved him in

represent another significant contribution to Panslav ideology.

2 There is no complete published biography of General Cherniaev. Many of his personal papers and letters, collected by A. A. Cherniaeva, are now held by the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. These include a brief autobio- graphical sketch and a lengthy draft of a biography by his daughter, A. A. Cherniaeva. For critical contemporary commentary on Cherniaev see A. Khvostov, Russkie i serby v voinu 1876 g. za nezavisimost' slavian (St. Petersburg, 1877), pp. 47-52. A recent Soviet work, S. Nikitin's Slavianskie komitety v Rossii v 1858-1876 godakh (Moscow, 1960), pp. 273-339, contains a critical but judicious general treatment of Cherniaev's activities.

279


280 DAVID MACKENZIE

frequent trouble with the authorities.3 After a seminomadic early youth, Mik- hail Grigorevich, his second son, at- tended the cadet corps of a Guards regi- ment in St. Petersburg. Then he studied at the Military Academy, where D. A. Miliutin, later minister of war, taught military geography "in the dullest fash- ion."4

"By nature I was strongly inclined toward war," wrote Mikhail Grigorevich subsequently. As a subordinate general staff officer, Cherniaev fought bravely in defense of Sevastopol during the Cri- mean war. Afterwards, under the command of Prince A. I. Bariatinskii, a re- actionary he greatly admired, Cherniaev helped subdue rebellious chieftains in the Caucasus. Still in search of action, he then obtained a transfer to the steppes of central Asia where sporadic fighting was proceeding against the na- tive khanates. In June 1865, leading two thousand poorly equipped Russian troops, Cherniaev approached the walls of Tashkent. Although receiving an order to retreat from War Minister Miliu- tin, he boldly "put the telegram in my pocket and I took Tashkent."5 For this feat he was promoted to major general and intrusted with the military administration of Turkestan. But Miliutin, angry at Cherniaev's cavalier disregard for orders, soon engineered his recall to St. Petersburg. He was rebuked by Alex- ander II for his bad relationship with his superiors.

While serving in the Caucasus, Cher- niaev had read Ivan S. Aksakov's articles in Den' (1861) and had become inter-

3 A. Cherniaeva, "Letopis' sem'i Cherniaevikh," Russkii Arkhiv, I (1909), 204.

4"Avtobiografiia Cherniaeva," pp. 2-3, Inter- nationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam (hereafter cited as "I.I. Amsterdam").

5"Lettres du general Tchernaieff," I.I. Am- sterdam.

ested in the plight of the Balkan Slavs. In March 1867, with war apparently imminent between them and the Turks, he secretly offered his services to Prince Michael of Serbia. The prince's reply was intercepted, opened in the foreign ministry, and communicated to the emperor. Alexander II instructed Miliutin to rebuke Cherniaev. The war minister accused the general of treason for offer- ing to serve a foreign government; a violent scene ensued. Cherniaev's military career in Russia appeared to be over.6

With his accustomed vigor the former general prepared himself for a career as a notary public. In Moscow he passed the state examination, rented an office, and made connections with commercial firms. Then Count P. A. Shuvalov, head of the Third Section, wrote him that the emperor, learning of Cherniaev's plans from Moskovskie Vedomosti, con- sidered the position of notary to be improper for a former major-general. Shu- valov's attempt to arrange a suitable post in the ministry of interior for Cher- niaev was likewise blocked by the emperor. Finally, he was urged to re-enter military service. Restored to his old rank, Cherniaev was attached to the staff of the Warsaw military district in a capacity which provided no outlet for his restless energy.

During the early 1870's he spent much time in St. Petersburg discussing the issues of the day with other Panslavs. His close associates included General R. A. Fadeev, author of Opinion on the Eastern Question, V. V. Komarov, a conservative editor, M. A. Khludov, a wealthy merchant, and V. A. Kokor'ev, founder of the Volga-Kama Bank. He

6 "Avtobiografiia Cherniaeva," I.I. Amsterdam, p. 15; A. Cherniaeva, "K perepiske M. G. Cher- niaeva," Russkii Arkhiv, LII (1914, No. 1), 29.


PANSLAVISM IN PRACTICE 281

developed a close friendship with I. S. Aksakov, leader of the Moscow Slav Committee.7 Common to this group was strong opposition to liberal domestic re- form and support for a dynamic, ex- pansionist foreign policy.

Encouraged by his Panslav friends, Cherniaev at the end of 1874 resigned again from military service and resur- rected Russkii Mir, a small nationalist newspaper in St. Petersburg. In his edi- torials he criticized Miliutin's army reforms and General K. P. Kaufman's administration of Turkestan.8

The Christian revolt in Hercegovina (July 1875) reawakened Cherniaev's in- terest in the South Slavs. Russkii Mir, one of the first Russian newspapers to report the insurrection, supported the rebels wholeheartedly. Cherniaev urged generous contributions in behalf of the suffering Christians of Hercegovina, but most of the money was sent to the larger newspapers. If the rebels were assisted by Serbia, Montenegro, and the Russian public, argued Cherniaev, they could begin the liberation of all Turkish Chris- tians.9 Although he had opposed the emancipation of the Russian serfs, Cher- niaev now favored freeing Balkan Slavs: "Our clear duty . . . is to seek without any ulterior motives the liberation of the South Slav peoples from the Moslem

7 Cherniaeva, "K perepiske M. G. Cherniaeva," pp. 30-31; "Biografiia M. G. Cherniaeva," I.I. Amsterdam, p. 210.

8 On February 11, 1875 Cherniaev in an editorial defended his administration of Turkestan and accused Kaufman of extravagance and incompetence. The latter retaliated by having his officials demand payment by Cherniaev of a "debt" of 3,931 rubles, 9 kopecks which he had supposedly contracted during his service in Cen- tral Asia. Before this matter was finally settled in Cherniaev's favor in 1878, it had caused him much embarrassment (see "Pravda o nachete na M. G. Cherniaeva," Russkii Arkhiv, XLIX [1911, No. 1], 443-62).

9 Russkii Mir, July 27 and Aug. 13, 1875 (all dates are given in the new style); Nikitin, p. 273.

yoke." In Russkii Mir Cherniaev cru- saded in their behalf and opposed the efforts of Russian and European diplo- mats to find a peaceful solution to the Eastern Crisis. When the "action ministry" of J. Ristic' and J. Grujic assumed power in Serbia in September 1875, he predicted that war between the Porte and the principalities of Serbia and Montenegro was inevitable. Calling upon Russia to dissociate itself from its part- nership with Austria-Hungary, Russkii Mir proclaimed that it was Russia's mission to promote the unification of the South Slav peoples, although it failed to explain how this was to be achieved.'0

A crusade of the pen did not satisfy Cherniaev. Yearning to be at the scene of action, in September 1875 he sought to organize a military expedition to Herzegovina. Aksakov seconded his efforts to raise 70,000 rubles to equip a sixty-man Russian detachment and pur- chase arms for the insurgents. When the Moscow merchants refused to donate the money, Cherniaev was forced to abandon this scheme." Alarmed by the general's plans, which conflicted with the official Russian policy of neutrality, Alexander II instructed the Third Sec- tion to obtain Cherniaev's promise not to travel to "those bandits" in Herce- govina and to place him under surveil- lance.'2

Cherniaev promised A. L. Potapov he would not go to Hercegovina, but he had already decided to proceed to Serbia which loomed as the main base for a Slav war on the Porte. In February 1876 he went to Moscow and obtained the support of its Slav Committee. Aksakov

10 Russkii Mir, Sept. 10, Oct. 6, and Oct. 12, 1875, and Jan. 4, 1876.

11Nikitin, pp. 273-75. '12"Avtobiografiia Cherniaeva," I.I. Amster-

dam, p. 83; Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii ot turets- kogo iga (Moscow, 1961), I, No. 85, 182-83.


282 DAVID MACKENZIE hoped that Cherniaev's appearance in Serbia would frustrate St. Petersburg's efforts to solve the Eastern Crisis peace- fully. The Moscow Committee therefore instructed N. Durnovo to sound out Belgrade about the general's acceptabil- ity. Although disappointed at the un- availability of the more famous General Fadeev, the Serbian government replied that Cherniaev would be welcomed warmly. Aksakov was able to provide only 6,000 rubles out of Slav Committee funds for the undertaking, but Cher- niaev's resolve to make the trip remained unshaken.13

Since Alexander II was opposed to his departure, Cherniaev left Russia surrep- titiously. Listing his destination as Pales- tine, he obtained a passport from Prince V. A. Dolgorukov, the governor-general of Moscow. On April 21 the Russian press reported that Cherniaev would soon leave for St. Petersburg, but he had already departed by train and that very day crossed the Rumanian frontier.14 After conferring briefly with I. Ivanov about the Bulgarian insurrection, Cher- niaev crossed without trouble into Ser- bia and arrived in Belgrade on April 28.15 Greeted warmly by Prince Milan, the general was persuaded to carry out an inspection of the Serbian army. Be- fore the end of May he had accepted command of the army of the Morava and Serbian citizenship.'6

13 N. Durnovo, "K istorii serbsko-turetskoi voiny 1876 g.," Istoricheskii Vestnik, LXXV (1899), 533-35; I. Aksakov, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii L. S. Aksakova (Moscow, 1886), I, 220-21.

14 Nikitin, pp. 292-93. D. Miliutin asserts that Cherniaev had been forbidden to depart for Serbia (Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina [Moscow, 1947- 50], II, 53).

15 I. Ivanov, "Bolgarskoe opolchenie i ego sformirovanie," Russkaia Starina, CLXII (1910), 136-37.

loeWrede to Andrassy, May 25, 1876, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter cited as "St.A."), No. 70.

Why had the general decided to travel to Serbia? In an open letter to Russkii Mir Cherniaev asserted he had come to discover and report the true situation there, then had yielded to Milan's insistence that he inspect the Serbian forces.

Upon my return to Belgrade, they [the Serbian authorities] requested me to enter the Serbian army. It is understandable that any hesitation on my part would have been misplaced: a refusal would have been tanta- mount to a desire to avoid obvious danger. . . . My departure from Serbia, after having examined the front lines, could have been interpreted by the enemies of Slavdom as demonstrating I was convinced of the im- possibility of the Serbs' forthcoming struggle.17 Cherniaev was more honest in a sub- sequent letter to his brother-in-law, G. A. Wul'fert: "Having decided in 1876 to go to Serbia to fight for its political independence, I was convinced that the Principality with its dynasty must become the Piedmont of the entire Serbian nation."18 Assertions by his enemies that Cherniaev went to Serbia for adventure and to rehabilitate his military career contain some truth,19 but he believed sincerely that it was his, and Russia's, mission to lead the way to Slav unity.20 Obsessed by this cause, Mikhail Grigore- vich was much more than a military adventurer.

Cherniaev hoped to provide leadership for a Slav crusade against Turkey. Reports of extensive revolts in Bulgaria and his conversations with Bulgarian exiles in Rumania had filled him with optimism. He wrote Aksakov: "The

17 Russkii Mir, No. 142, June 6, 1876. 18 Cherniaev to G. A. Vul'fert [1879?], Cher-

niaev papers, Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Mu- zei, Moscow (hereafter cited as "G.I.M.").

19 See Golos, No. 148, June 11, 1876. 20 Cherniaeva, "K. M. G. Cherniaevu," Russkii

Arkhiv, LII (1914, No. 1), 25.


PANSLAVISM IN PRACTICE 283

[Bulgarian] population merely awaits a signal from Serbia to begin guerrilla warfare."21 Despite disappointment at the unpreparedness of the Serbian army and the pacific attitude of the Serbian people, Cherniaev intended to give that signal.22

Prince Milan and the bellicose Ser- bian intelligentsia, encouraged by Cher- niaev's arrival, completed plans for an attack on Turkey. Less than a week after the general's arrival, Ristic's "action ministry" returned to power. Serbian war plans, drawn up primarily by Sava Gruji6, had already been approved by a large majority of the War Council; Cherniaev merely confirmed the decision to strike southeast toward Ni's and Sofia.23 Cherniaev's arrival was interpreted by Serbian leaders as indirect Russian encouragement to their aggres- sion against the Porte.

II Of greatest concern here is Cherniaev's

political role during the Serbo-Turkish War, but his generalship cannot be ex- cluded from consideration. Inheriting the strategy of an eastward offensive, Cherniaev should not be blamed for confirming this Serbian decision and seeking to implement it. Both he and the Serbian command anticipated important assistance from Bulgarian insurgents.24

21 Cherniaev to Aksakov, May 11, 1876, Os- vobozhdenie, I, No. 99, p. 208.

22 "Avtobiografiia Cherniaeva," G.I.M., p. 9. 23 S. Grujic convincingly scotches the legend,

fostered by Khvostov among others, that Cher- niaev was responsible for the eastward offensive by taking the responsibility himself (see Grujic, Operacije timocko-moravske voiske: beleTke i uspomene [Belgrade, 1901-2], I, 55, and Khvos- tov, p. 24).

24The extreme optimism among Serbian officers about a Bulgarian uprising is cited by Gruji6. An offensive westward into Bosnia, he claims, would have led to even earlier defeat (Gruji6, I, 51, 55, 65).

Thus an eastward offensive was the logi- cal course to follow. Since Austria-Hun- gary opposed Serbian conquest of Bosnia, the westward offensive advocated by a minority of the Serbian War Council was not a true alternative strategy. The Serbs' fundamental error was to launch an aggressive war with inadequate forces, but Cherniaev bore little responsibility for that move.

Cherniaev is more vulnerable to sharp criticisms of his tactics by his Serbian and Russian contemporaries. Given command of the Morava army in May, he failed to conduct training exercises or to get well acquainted with his inex- perienced troops in the weeks before war began. Instead he harbored the de- lusion he could reach Sofia in three days.25 When the war started, Cherniaev advanced and occupied the heights at Babina Glava, but he failed to exploit this initial success. After the failure of the opening Serbian offensive, Colonel Mileta Despotovic, a retired Russian officer of Serbian origin, asserted in the presence of Cherniaev's entire staff that the general's hesitancy and inactivity had demonstrated his incompetence to command the Morava army. On behalf of the Serbian officers of its staff, Despo- tovic urged Cherniaev to return to Rus- sia. Sava Grujic recommended that the general be retained merely in an ad- visory capacity by the Serbian government.26

Cherniaev's use of Russian-style frontal assaults in Serbia was severely criticized, especially by War Minister Nikolic:

25 S. Grujhc, Bugarski dobrovolici u srpsko- turskom ratu 1876 godine (Belgrade, 1892), pp. 10-11.

26 Ibid., p. 12. Cherniaev, however, persuaded Milan to name him commander-in-chief of all Serbo-Russian forces on the eastern front. Des- potovic was reassigned to the inactive Drina army.


284 DAVID MACKENZIE "The general [Cherniaev] does not spare men. It is possible to conduct war this way with Russian troops, whose losses can be replaced, but not with Serbian militia, since the entire country would soon go into mourning."27 Cherniaev's insistence on continuing attacks on Turkish fortified positions after the failure of his opening offensive undermined the morale of the Serbian militia and was a contributory cause of defeat.28

The general's faulty tactics were illus- trated during the crucial Battle of Djunis (October 29). Cherniaev's failure to utilize the Timok army, improper deploy- ment of his own troops, and lack of leadership contributed to a disastrous Serbian defeat. Afterward, when Cher- niaev ordered Russian volunteers to abandon their units, the demoralization of the Serbian army became complete.29

The defenders of Cherniaev, the military leader, were a few extreme Russian conservatives who shared his political views. Prince V. P. Meshcherskii, em- phasizing his personal courage and devotion to the Slav cause, described him as a hero with bound hands. Without a proper army or staff, continued the prince, Cherniaev prolonged ungrateful Serbia's resistance to overwhelming Turkish forces.30 But the general's own statements undermined Meshcherskii's

27 Khvostov, p. 56. 28 N. Maksimov, Dve voiny, 1876-1878 gg. (St.

Petersburg, 1879), pp. 46-47; Ivanov, pp. 141-43 (see also the biased but useful account by J. Stefanovik, "Cernjajev kao vojskovodja i poli- ticar," Otadjbina, VIII [1931], 513-42, esp. 515- 16).

29 Grujic, Operacije, III, 244-46, and IV, 174; Dnevnik F. V. Chizhova, Rukopisnyi Otdel, Bib- lioteka imeni V. I. Lenina, Moscow (hereafter cited as "R.O.Bib. Len."), VII, 4.

30 V. P. Meshcherskii, Pravda o Serbii (St. Petersburg, 1887), p. 377; Moi vospominaniia (St. Petersburg, 1898), II, 296-98, The reaction- ary editor of Grazhdanin, Prince Meshcherskii, gathered materials in Serbia, but his Pravda o Serbii is polemical and unconvincing.

unfounded assertions. He described his Russian volunteers as "an ideal army." "They fought like lions. . . . If I command again, I should like volunteers, volunteers, and more volunteers." 31 After Djunis, Cherniaev also defended the rep- utation of the Serbian militia before his officers: "Gentlemen, you criticize un- fairly the Serbian army in whose ranks you fought. . . . Go home and tell your brethren that you fought in the ranks of an army which has all the military virtues."32

Cherniaev was also a failure as a military administrator. Never before had he commanded more than a few thousand men; now he proved unable to co-ordi- nate and discipline a large army of militia. His unwillingness or inability to select a competent staff multiplied his troubles. Contemporaries agreed that his Russian subordinates were mostly trivial, incompetent adventurers.33 A. L. Izmai- lov, one of Cherniaev's aides, was forci- bly restrained from fleeing the battlefield during the opening offensive; then he joined the dregs of the Russian volunteer movement in the cafes of Belgrade.34 An incompetent staff in its chief army contributed to Serbia's defeat.

To the dismay of his subordinates, Cherniaev collapsed under the strain of defeat. Returning Russian volunteers reported that when the general learned of the Djunis disaster, he "cried like a baby" and tore his hair.35 Abandoning the army, he returned to Belgrade so

31 Cherniaev to Aksakov, Mar. 29, 1877, G.I.M. 32 Zastava (Novi Sad), No. 166, Nov. 12, 1876. 33 Even Prince Meshcherskii agrees with this

verdict (see Pravda o Serbii, pp. 260-61; Khvos- tov, p. 44; Maksimov, pp. 65-66). Elevated to chief of staff was V. V. Komarov, a fussy, cau- tious, and incompetent individual.

34 Cherniaev to Aksakov, Sept. 14, G.I.M.; Maksimov, p. 9.

35 Dnevnik A. A. Kireeva, R.O.Bib.Len., VII, 17, 22.


PANSLAVISM IN PRACTICE 285 "mentally deranged" he was unable to maintain discipline among his volunteers.36 Much as one may admire Chern- iaev's personal bravery and devotion to the Slav cause, his incompetence as a field commander and administrator has- tened, rather than delayed, the defeat of Serbia in 1876.

Cherniaev's political role was the most significant aspect of his activities in Serbia during 1876. His objectives apparently included Panslavism, Pan- Russianism, and personal glory. The general's proclamation of July 2 to the Bal- kan Slavs, as his troops crossed into Bulgaria, reflected his messianic fervor: "We are fighting ... for the holy cause of Slavdom, . . . for freedom, . . . for the Orthodox cross. . . Long live the unity of the Balkan peoples!"37 He sought to provoke a general Balkan insurrection which would achieve the total liberation of its peoples, thus solving that aspect of the Eastern Question. Cherniaev's Pan- Russianism is suggested by his statement to Aksakov in January 1877: "If I had had [1,000,000 rubles] at the beginning of the war, I could have made out of Serbia an extremely useful tool in the hands of the Russian government."38 That he sought personal glory is indi- cated by his declaration to A. N. Khvos- tov during the campaign: "If the [Slav] cause wins, I shall go down in history as a Slav Washington."39 Cherniaev also

36 Dnevnik Chizhova, R.O.Bib.Len., VII, 4; V. N. Teplov to Aksakov, Sept. 18, Osvobozh- denie, I, No. 258, 384-85; P. S. Tolstoi to Aksakov, Feb. 13, 1877, ibid., No. 407, pp. 583-84.

37 H. Schulthess, Europdischer Geschichtska- lender, 1876 (Nordlingen, 1877), p. 510.

38 Cherniaev to Aksakov, Jan. 4, 1877, Aksakov papers, Rukopisnyi Otdel, Biblioteka imeni Saltykov-Shchedrina, Leningrad (hereafter cited as "R.O.Bib.S.S.").

39 Khvostov, p. 27. "For his own personal reasons," added Khvostov, "he decided to put at stake the existence of little Arcadia."

hoped his successes in Serbia would ad- vance the cause of political reaction in Russia.40 After the campaign, he de- nounced Alexander II's regime in a letter to Aksakov: "The Petersburg government cannot stand on Slav ground and remain what it is today. It would have to renounce its Germanic traditions and become popular [narodnym,] and for that the first step would be to gather up its things and transfer to Moscow.... Long before the Serbo-Turkish War I had reached the conclusion that we could not get away from our present trivialities without an external push and that this would have to come from the Slav lands."14'

To implement these objectives, Cher- niaev sought to become military dictator of Serbia and reshape its political insti- tutions. His aims and methods involved him in constant trouble with the Serbian and Russian governments and his rivals in the Panslav movement. To achieve his objectives in Serbia Cherniaev relied heavily upon his close relationship with Prince Milan, an immature youth of twenty-two who had great faith in him. Their intimacy is reflected in an extensive correspondence during the Serbo- Turkish war.42

Cherniaev exercised a dominant influence in Serbian military affairs throughout the war. Milan allowed him to make the principal military decisions, as is demonstrated by the history of the short- lived Serbo-Turkish truce. In mid-Au- gust, before committing themselves to foreign consuls who had offered to medi- ate a truce, Serbian leaders sought Cherniaev's estimate of the military situ-

40 Vpered (London), Sept. 27, 1876, Osvobozh- denie, I, No. 268, 399-409.

41 Cherniaev to Aksakov, Mar. 29, 1877, G.I.M. 42 See "Pis'ma vlastitelei Serbii k M. G. Cher-

niaevu," Russkii Arkhiv, LII (1914, No. 1), 25- 65, 182-96.


286 DAVID MACKENZIE ation.43 On August 23 he replied to Prince Milan that his exhausted army probably could not repel the Turks for long. His pessimistic view induced Bel- grade to accept the powers' offer of medi- ation.44 But Cherniaev telegraphed Bel- grade two days later that the situation had been transformed by a "victory" at Alexinac and urged the negotiations for a truce be delayed.45 Obediently, Milan wrote the general on August 30: "Upon your answer depend my further actions [on a truce].' '46 When the Turks captured Adrovac (September 2), Cherniaev again shifted his ground: he instructed Milan to seek an immediate armistice.47 A truce did take effect on September 15, but Cherniaev undermined it by proclaiming a Serbian kingdom and persuaded Milan the war should be resumed.48 The prince permitted Cher- niaev's assessments of the military pic- ture to prevail over the warnings and advice of his government.

But Cherniaev's attempts to exploit Milan's friendship to oust the Ristic- Grujic cabinet failed. The general's ab-

43 Ristic to Cherniaev, Aug. 19, Arhiv J. Ris- tica, XVIII/2/58, Istoriski Institut, Belgrade (hereafter cited as "Arhiv Ristica"); Milan to Lj. Ivanovic, enclosing a telegram to Cherniaev (Arhiv Ristica, XVIII/2/262).

44 Cherniaev to Milan, Aug. 23, Arhiv Ristica, XVIII/2/262; Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, Zapisi Jevrema Grujica (Belgrade, 1923), III, 211.

45 Drzavna Arhiva, Belgrade, Poklon i otkupa (hereafter cited as "D.A., P.&O."), 29/98-VII; Cherniaev to Ristic, Aug. 24, Aug. 25, Arhiv Ristica, XVIII/2/80.

46 Russkii Arkhiv, LII (1914, No. 1), 42. 47J. Ristic, Diplomatska istorija Srbije za

vreme srpskih ratova za oslobodjenje i nezavis- nost, 1875-1878 (Belgrade, 1896-98), I, 135.

48 Ibid., pp. 144-45; Grujic, Zapisi, III, 225. Cherniaev complained to Milan on September 20 that the truce benefited only the Turks and was making his position untenable. Deeply split as to the wisdom of continuing the war, the Serbian government finally bowed to Cherniaev's insistence that it be resumed when Milan sided with the war faction in the cabinet.

horrence of Serbian parliamentarism was expressed by Russkii Mir prior to his arrival in Serbia: "As if not realizing the importance of her mission, Serbia has entertained Europe with endless 'ministerial' and parliamentary spectacles in miniature, not realizing that cabinet crises are only comic in such a small country.... It is time for them to reach the conclusion that it is not at all fitting now to play parliamentary games."49 In Serbia Cherniaev and his entourage awaited an opportunity to take full political control by coup d'etat.50 To Aksakov the general described how Ser- bia would benefit from such a coup: "The influence of Russia upon Serbia would be real and rest on firm founda- tions. The chief of state and the entire people sympathize with Russia. The ministers gradually could be named from Russians. Hostile parties would disap- pear, and one of the Slav states would become de facto a Russian province."'51 A more blatant statement of Pan-Rus- sianism is difficult to find!

Cherniaev sought to smooth the way for a coup d'etat by suddenly proclaiming Milan king of Serbia on September 15 just as the Serbo-Turkish truce was taking effect. Without consulting prince or government, the general instructed his subordinates to organize among their troops a "spontaneous" movement in favor of a Serbian kingdom. Then he telegraphed Milan that the agitation in his army for the kingdom was irresistible: "To restrain the movement is no longer

49 Russkii Mir, No. 72, Apr. 7, 1876. 50 M. Protik to Ristic, Aug. 7, Arhiv Ristika,

XXVI/12/717. 51 Undated war telegram, Papers of the Mos-

cow Slav Committee, Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstven- nyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov, No. 90, p. 235, cited in S. Nikitin, "Russkoe obshchestvo i voprosy balkanskoi politiki Rossii, 1853-1876 gg." (doc- toral dissertation, University of Moscow, 1946), p. 1025.


PANSLAVISM IN PRACTICE 287 in my power. Any attempt to do so would destroy all authority in the army." Cherniaev gave the prince his word of honor that the proclamation reflected the feelings of his militia troops. But Milan refused the proffered title. "I feel it would be very sad," he wrote Cher- niaev, "if movements in the army should dictate my internal and foreign policies. "52

How little Cherniaev's word of honor was worth is shown by his confidential explanations of the proclamation to Dr. Vladan Djordjevic and Ivan Aksakov. He told Djordjevic he had arranged the kingship affair to forestall a Serbo-Turk- ish peace and to compel the Russian government to enter the war.53 To Aksakov he admitted responsibility for the movement and explained: "In Bel- grade . . . the view prevailed that the war should not be continued. The ministers were disturbed by the fact that power had passed out of their hands and into those of Cherniaev and they joined the general chorus for peace. This general pressure on Milan for peace made him hesitate.... It was essential to indi- cate a goal which would flatter everyone, unite all parties and force them to desire continuation of the struggle."54 Cher- niaev evidently feared that conclusion of peace would undermine his power and make his continued presence in Serbia superfluous.

Counting upon the militia's support, Cherniaev sought Milan's acquiescence to his high-handed proclamation. On September 17 he requested the prince's permission to send to Belgrade a "dele-

52 Cherniaev to Milan and Milan to Cher- niaev, telegrams of Sept. 15, Arhiv Ristica, XVIII/2/129; Cherniaev to Milan, Sept. 16, G.I.M.

53 V. Djordjevic, Srpsko-turski rat (Belgrade, 1907), I, 409-11.

54 Cherniaev to Aksakov, Oct. 14, G.I.M.

gation" of four battalions under General K. Protic to "lay at the feet of Your Majesty the feelings of fidelity and devotion of their constituents." This force, claims Ristic, had instructions to over- throw government and constitution.55 Convinced that Cherniaev had changed from a Serbian general into a Russian dictator, Ristic told the Austrian consul: "Some time ago I remarked to my col- leagues that we had been bypassed [deborde]; this last event [the proclamation] proves how right I was."56

But Milan, proving much less docile than Cherniaev expected, supported his cabinet instead of the general. His reply to Cherniaev, drafted at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, disavowed the proclamation and forbade the departure of the army "delegation." With Milan's support, the cabinet rejected the petition of a skupstina committee in behalf of the kingship; the movement was not permitted to spread outside Cherniaev's command.57 The general reacted with surprising mildness to Milan's veto, re- vealing his lack of political daring. He merely insisted the proclamation remain in effect until Russian reactions could be ascertained. Milan agreed to this and avoided an open breach with Cher- niaev.58 In the face of Belgrade's veto and strong Russian and Austrian dis- approval of the proclamation, the kingship movement, and with it Cherniaev's aspirations to rule Serbia, fizzled out ingloriously.

55 Cherniaev to Milan, Sept. 17, D.A., P.&O., 29/100-XI; Ristic, I, 140-41.

56Wrede to Andrassy, Sept. 19, No. 151, St.A. 57 Wrede to Andrassy, Sept. 23, No. 154, and

Sept. 29, No. 157, St.A.; Grujic, Zapisi, III, 223. 58 Writing Cherniaev on October 4, Milan con-

sented to leave matters in Deligrad as they stood and renounced his idea of publishing an order of the day to the army repudiating the title (Russkii Arkhiv, LII [1914, No. 1], 56, 62; Grujic, Zapisi, III, 227-28).


288 DAVID MACKENZIE Cherniaev's attitude toward the Ristic

government was also revealed by his feud with War Minister T. Nikolic, the Ser- bian official with whom he dealt most frequently. Since September 1875 Niko- lie, with a meager budget and a minute staff, had labored to prepare Serbia for war. Although his defensive strategy was disregarded by his government, Nikolic nevertheless co-operated fully with Cher- niaev and during the war sought to ad- minister the Serbian army.59 But Niko- lic's critique of Cherniaev's opening offensive and of the Correspondence Bureau aroused the general's anger. Cherniaev wrote him: "It is easy to sit in Belgrade and criticize actions at the war front."60 The rift deepened after Cherniaev usurped functions of the war ministry, such as issuing promotions, and imposed punishments prohibited by Serbian law. Prince Milan rebuffed Nikolic"s repeated protests and attempts to resign.61

After the kingship debacle Cherniaev sought revenge upon the RistiM cabinet by resuming his assault upon the war minister. On September 30 he telegraphed the Serbian chief of staff accus- ing Nikolic during his recent visit to Deligrad of seeking "in every way to re- duce my authority," and of conferring with officers hostile to Cherniaev. The general asserted: "Such an individual [Nikolic] in any other country would not rise by ability above the rank of bat- talion commander." Determined to by- pass the war minister, he informed the chief of staff he would deal directly with the prince.62

59 Khvostov, pp. 54 ff. 60 Cherniaev to Nikolic, Aug. 22, Arhiv Ristica,

XVIII/2/63. 61 Golos, Nov. 28, No. 317, report from Bel-

grade of November 21. 62 Cherniaev to Ivanovic, telegram, Sept. 30,

Arhiv Ristica, XVIII/2/165.

In mid-October the Cherniaev-Nikolic quarrel reached the boiling point. Cher- niaev received a letter, signed by the war minister, complaining about the bad be- havior of Russian volunteers. "From all sides . . . come complaints against the Russian volunteers who overindulge in spirits . . . and commit scandalous acts in hotels, cafes, and the streets." The Serbs, intimated the letter, would use force if necessary to curb such misbe- havior.63 In an indignant letter to Ristic, Cherniaev demanded full apologies for himself and the volunteers; otherwise he would leave Serbia. He warned: "Take into consideration that once the Russian officers and I have left and the [Nikolic- Becker] letter has been communicated to the Slav Committees, you will not be able to expect any more moral or ma- terial assistance from the Russian people."64 In response to Cherniaev's demand, the letter was discussed in the Council of Ministers. Ristic was instructed to express the government's re- gret. He wrote Cherniaev that Becker, the subordinate responsible for the letter, had been dismissed.65 But despite Milan's urgings, Nikolic refused to apol- ogize to the general and accused him of usurping powers belonging to the government. The prince finally informed Cherniaev that, although he was deeply dissatisfied with his war minister's be- havior, he could not risk a ministerial crisis by demanding his resignation. Only the Ristic cabinet, Milan noted, pos- sessed sufficient determination and abil-

63 [Nikolic?] to Cherniaev, Oct. 13, Arhiv Ris- tica, XVIII/5/363. Prince Milan was informed that this letter had actually been written by a certain Becker and signed by Nikolic (Catargi to Milan, Oct. 18, D.A., P.&O. 29/101-V).

64 Cherniaev to Risti, Oct. 18, Arhiv Ristica, XVIII/5/363.

65 Ristic to Cherniaev, Oct. 23, Arhiv Ristica, XVIII/5/363.


PANSLAVISM IN PRACTICE 289 ity to continue the war.66 TI he other ministers' support of Nikolic confirmed the wisdom of Milan's course.67 Once again Cherniaev had failed to unseat the Ristic cabinet.

Thus Cherniaev's political influence had been undermined prior to his military defeat at Djunis. Returning to Bel- grade after that battle, the general managed to obtain Serbian approval for a mission to Russia, but he could not persuade Milan to attempt a coup d'etat. Unable to maintain his position any longer, Cherniaev left Serbia at the end of November.68 His Panslav political plans had been checkmated by the prince and his government.

How did the Serbian public and press regard Cherniaev? Initially, he and his volunteers were welcomed enthusiasti- cally by Serbian crowds.69 The bad be- havior of some Russian volunteers eroded this popularity. An anonymous Serb told Prince V. P. Meshcherskii: "It was nice of Cherniaev to come to Serbia; he is a fine fellow and an able military man, but we did not think he would arrive with such an assortment of Russians to con- quer our country. Look what surrounds him: uncivilized elements, drunkards, and not a single Serb on his staff."70 Anta Bogicevic, a Serbian major, wrote a harsh critique of Cherniaev late in the campaign and coupled it with a warning, apparently directed to Jovan Ristic': 'Certainly you have seen that the man

in Deligrad is the biggest fool of the second half of the nineteenth century. . ..

66 Milan to Cherniaev, Oct. 24, Russkii Arkhiv, No. 1 (1914), pp. 184-88; Wrede to Andrassy, Nov. 7, No. 172, St.A.

67 Grujhk, Zapisi, III, 233. 68sWrede to Andrassy, Nov. 12, No. 174, St.A. 69 Maksimov, p. iv; Khvostov, p. 5. 70 Meshcherskii, Odin iz nashikh Molt'ke (St.

Petersburg, 1890), pp. 343-44. Actually, there were Serbs on Cherniaev's staff, e.g., Sava Grujic, chief of artillery.

He is an enemy who will make difficulties for you on every occasion.... I can tell you that you will see black days and great humiliation with this Russian mad- man."71

But individual critics of Cherniaev, like Nikolic and Bogicevic, were drowned out by the chorus of support from newspapers and the public. Istok, Ristic's semiofficial organ, backed Cherniaev loyally throughout the campaign and afterward. The only important newspaper permitted in Serbia during the war, Istok featured Cherniaev's open letter to Russkii Mir and reports from his Correspondence Bureau. Istok carefully denied that Pan-Russianism found support in individualistic Serbia;72 it omitted all mention of Cherniaev's royal proclamation. But immediately after the campaign, Istok declared: "Serbs will always remember thankfully General Cherniaev and the other Russian volunteers."73 In March 1877 Istok still called Cherniaev "our commander-in-chief"; in June it praised him as a hero of the great ideal of Slavdom. Defending him against his Russian critics, Istok wrote: "We glimpsed his heroism and composure; we were amazed by his skilful operations and plans.... We wish him. . . much success in the Caucasus and that he cast shame upon his enemies."74 Despite his shabby treatment of the Ristic government, Istok persisted in representing Cherniaev to the Serbian public as a paragon of Slav virtue and courage, as a Russian knight who had fought valiantly in defense of Serbdom.

Zastava, the liberal organ of Dr. Svet- ozar Miletic and the leading Serbian

71 Oct. 13, Arhiv Ristica, XXVI/12/734. 72 Istok (Belgrade), No. 77, July 28, 1876. 73 Ibid., No. 115, Nov. 5; No. 1, Jan. 13, 1877. 74 Ibid., No. 23, Mar. 11, 1877; No. 57, June 6,

1877; No. 65, July 1, 1877.


290 DAVID MACKENZIE newspaper outside the principality, not only credited Cherniaev's overblown claims of victory, but beat the drums in behalf of his royal proclamation. Assert- ing that the general's move was supported by the entire Serbian people, it urged Prince Milan to accept the crown he offered.75 Well into 1877 Zastava continued to eulogize Cherniaev. After Djunis it declared: "His name will always be the object of the greatest respect by all Serbs who are real friends of the Serbian people and its freedom."76

Paradoxically, despite military defeat and abortive attempts to dominate Serbia politically, Cherniaev retained the loyal support of Prince Milan and the Serbian press. Zastava's account of Cherniaev's return to Belgrade in November 187677 indicates that he still enjoyed the respect and even devotion of thousands of ordiiiary Serbs. Charmed by his adop- tion of the idea of Greater Serbia, the Serbs forgave his shortcomings. For the Serbian people Cherniaev was transformed into a legendary figure representing the Russian people and its supposedly unselfish aid to the cause of Serbian liberation and unity.

III Cherniaev's relationships during 1876

with leaders of official and unofficial Rus- sia helped determine his role in Serbia. Alexander II and the foreign ministry were antagonized by Cherniaev's edi- torials in Russkii Mir favoring Russian intervention in behalf of the insurgents in Herzegovina; War Minister Miliutin had long been hostile to Cherniaev. His secret trip to Serbia and unauthorized acceptance of a Serbian army command

75 Zastava, No. 142, Sept. 29; No. 142, Oct. 1; No. 151, Oct. 15.

761Ibid., No. 165, Nov. 10, 1876; No. 19, Feb. 16, 1877.

77 -bid., No. 166, Nov. 12, 1876.

endangered the official Russian policy of replatrage in the Balkans. The tsar was furious. His first impulse was to recall Cherniaev and strip him of his military decorations. In Ems late in May, A. N. Kartsov, Russian consul in Belgrade, and Chancellor Gorchakov dissuaded Alex- ander from drastic action against Cher- niaev. But the tsar insisted that Kartsov sever all relations with the disobedient general.78 A secret order of the Third Section urged Cherniaev to return to Russia,79 but no effort was made to in- sure compliance.

Although incensed at Cherniaev's encouragement to Serbia to make war con- trary to St. Petersburg's advice, the tsar's attitude changed gradually. Soon after he had telegraphed Alexander to an- nounce "glorious victories" over the Turks,80 Cherniaev proudly displayed a dispatch confirming that privately the tsar had drunk to his success.81 A. A. Kireev, a well-informed Panslav, asserted Alexander had abandoned his hostility toward Cherniaev.82 But the general's vanity kept him from seeking forgive- ness, as Aksakov advised. Instead, just

78 Iu. Kartsov, "Za kulisami diplomatii," Rus- skaia Starina, CXXXIV, 70-71.

79 Early in July Kartsov showed Wrede a docu- ment bearing the signature of A. L. Potapov, chief of the Third Section (Wrede to Andrassy, July 10, No. 107, St.A.). On June 5 Potapov had informed A. E. Timashev, minister of interior, of the emperor's wish that Cherniaev be recalled from Serbia (Osvobozhdenie, I, No. 113, p. 231).

Grujic recalled that Cherniaev had received orders from the tsar not to accept command of the Morava army or Serbian citizenship. "He was extremely agitated, but seeing how far he and others had committed themselves toward war, he took courage in the hope that after the first military successes, the tsar would approve and even send him a decoration" (Grujic, Bugarski dobrovoljci, p. 10).

s8Cherniaev to Alexander II, Sept. 11, Arhiv Ristic'a, XVIII/2/158.

81 Djordjevic, I, 410. 82 Dnevnik Kireeva, Oct. 9, R.O.Bib.Len., VII,

2.


PANSLAVISM IN PRACTICE 291 before leaving Belgrade, Cherniaev wrote Alexander a pompous letter to justify his actions in Serbia and signed himself: "Your faithful servant." Bridling at the letter, Alexander commented: "Whose faithful servant? The King of Serbia's?" Miliutin queried: "What right does Cherniaev have to speak in the name of the Serbian people?"83 In April 1877, receiving Cherniaev in Kishinev, the tsar said reproachfully: "You deceived me. You gave me your word not to travel to Serbia, and you did not keep your word." But after reprimanding the general for proclaiming Milan king of Serbia, Alex- ander forgave him completely.84

Cherniaev regarded the tsar with con- tempt. He told Milan Alexander was weak and would accept a fait accompli; he relied instead upon the heir. The future Alexander III displayed consistent sympathy toward Cherniaev and the Panslav cause. Corresponding with V. V. Zinov'ev, head of the heir's court, the general sought massive aid for his armies and assurances that he be allowed to return to Russia after the campaign. The heir reacted sympathetically on both issues, and Zinov'ev appended to his reply: "Wishing you, with all Russia, the fullest success in the holy cause you have undertaken, . . . I remain at your service.' 85

The court at St. Petersburg reacted

83 Cherniaev to Alexander II, Nov. 29, Osobye pribavleniia k opisaniiu russko-turetskoi voiny 1877-78 gg. na Balkanskom polustrove (St. Peters- burg, 1899-1903), No. 1, pp. 70-72. Cherniaev claimed that Belgrade's decision to go to war had induced him "to dedicate myself entirely to this Christian and humanitarian cause. ... My modest task was merely to hold back the Moslem pressure on a country which had intrusted its defense to me until Your majestic word was spoken."

84"Avtobiografiia Cherniaeva," G.I.M., pp. 9- 10.

85 V. V. Zinov'ev to Cherniaev, Sept. 25, Osvo- bozhdenie, I, No. 263, 395-96.

joyfully to Cherniaev's military successes and gloomily to his defeats,86 but official Russia unanimously censured his royal proclamation. Foreign Minister Gorcha- kov wrote: "We have energetically condemned the crazy escapade [folle e'quipe'e] of Cherniaev."87 War Minister Miliutin complained this "stupid undertaking" was undermining the powers' efforts to secure peace for Serbia and "greatly com- plicates our diplomacy."88 Russia could not afford to quarrel with Austria-Hun- gary, Kartsov warned Ristic. Should Milan accept the kingship, Austria might be allowed to occupy Serbia.89 Official Russia's sharp reaction helped persuade Prince Milan to refuse a crown,90 and contributed to the failure of Cherniaev's political plans.

Cherniaev's jealous concern to preserve and extend his power in Serbia made his relations with Russian diplo- mats and military leaders uniformly bad. He and Kartsov had disliked each other from the start. Rivals for the favor of Prince Milan, their relations were exacer- bated by persistent criticism of each other's activities. After the royal proclamation Kartsov joined Austrian Consul Wrede in urging Milan to repudiate Cherniaev altogether.9' "Such a coup de

86 Baron Langenau, the Austrian ambassador in Russia, reported that when exaggerated accounts of Cherniaev's "victory" at Alexinac were received, "quelle joie immense cette nouvelle avait produite partout 'a Zarskoe [Selo]" (Lan- genau to Andrassy, Aug. 30, No. 49A-F, St.A.).

Miliutin agreed that this was for days almost the sole topic of conversation at court (Dnevnik Miliutina, II, 70).

87 Gorchakov to Shuvalov, Sept. 17, in R. W Seton-Watson, "Russo-British relations during the Eastern Crisis," Slavonic review, June 1925, p. 185.

88 Miliutin, II, 79, Sept. 18. 89 Gruji6, Zapisi, III, 227-28. 90 Milan to Cherniaev, Sept. 18, Russkii Ar-

khiv, LII (1914, No. 1), 46, 48. 91 Kartsov, pp. 70-71; Teplov to Aksakov,

Sept. 18, Osvobozhdenie, I, No. 258, 384.


292 DAVID MACKENZIE theatre," commented Kartsov, "is the work not of a victorious army but fol- lows defeat."92 After complaining re- peatedly of Kartsov's intrigues against him, Cherniaev in October urged Aksa- kov to exert influence and have him recalled: "If at the present time there were a competent Russian consul, he could simplify matters considerably, but Mr. Kartsov is even worse than the Serbian ministers [sic!] and does not know how to behave decently. He is completely under the thumb of the Austrian and British consuls and along with them he rejoices at Turkish victories."93 In September, General S. K. Novoselov, an elderly un- assuming retired Russian officer, arrived to command the Ibar army. He aroused Cherniaev's anger by establishing friendly relations with Kartsov and Nikoli6 and attracting some Russian volunteers into his army.94

Unable to win the support of St. Petersburg, Cherniaev had to rely upon unofficial Russia. The Moscow Slav Com- mittee had arranged and sponsored the general's trip to Serbia.95 Its chief, Ivan Aksakov, later explained why. "By sending you to Serbia and later sending the volunteers, I had it in mind to cause the official participation of Russia and never believed in the possibility of having the Slav Committees alone solve the matter." Opposing Cherniaev's grandiose dream of liberating the Slavs with the Serbian army, Aksakov reminded the general:

92 Kartsov, p. 311. 93 Cherniaev to Aksakov, Oct. 14, G.I.M. 94 Cherniaev demanded that all arriving Rus-

sians be sent to him in Deligrad and that Novoselov be subordinated to him. Milan refused this latter request (Cherniaev to Milan, Oct. 16, D.A., P.&O. 29/101-III).

95 Cherniaev wrote Aksakov: "I cannot forget that you sent me here at my own risk. Who then understands the significance of my arrival in Serbia other than you?" (Oct. 6, Aksakov papers, No. 387, R.O.Bib.S.S.).

"The program which I contemplated for you was to take Old Serbia and per- haps Bosnia for Serbia, and most important, defeat the Turks thoroughly in two or three battles."96

The Slav Committees were committed to Cherniaev and generally supported him loyally throughout the campaign. Shortly after the start of the Serbo- Turkish war Aksakov wrote: "Everything now depends upon the successes of Cher- niaev."97 In September, A. A. Kireev, a leader of the St. Petersburg Committee, confirmed this. "Cherniaev must be supported per fas et ne fas-all our efforts must be directed toward him, since if the Turks defeat him the whole cause will be compromised."98 But Aksakov, who was most directly concerned, grew more critical of Cherniaev as the campaign proceeded. In mid-September he chided the general for failure to thank the Moscow Committee for the money and volunteers it had sent. "Do not forget that you are now the most popular man in Russia. . . . Do not forget that you stand before the face of the Russian people and Russian public opinion, which makes you a gift of so much love. The Slav Committee is seeking in every way to support this feeling among the people. It would not hurt you some- times, after a special success, to send the committee an informative telegram." Aksakov went on to describe mounting dissatisfaction in Russia at Cherniaev's choice of V. V. Komarov as chief of staff and at reports that unworthy volunteers had been decorated. He castigated the general's apparent conversion to a nar- row Serbian viewpoint on the Bulgar- ians: "You are a Russian, and we Rus-

96 Aksakov to Cherniaev, Nov. 13, G.I.M. 97 Aksakov to V. A. Cherkasskii, July 6, Sla-

vianskii sbornik (Moscow, 1948), pp. 148-49. 98Dnevnik Kireeva, R.O.Bib.Len., VI, 132.


PANSLAVISM IN PRACTICE 293 sians must stand above Bulgarians and Serbs and take a broader view. For Russia the Bulgarians and their independence is no less dear than the Serbs and their independence. . . . The in- terests of Russia stand above all else, since what is beneficial for Russia also benefits the Serb, the Bulgarian and all of Slavdom." Aksakov criticized Cher- niaev's poorly concealed attempts to ob- struct formation of Bulgarian volunteer detachments in Serbia.99 While finding fault with Cherniaev's methods, Aksakov nevertheless continued to support him against his rivals.

It was after the campaign that Aksa- kov made a thorough critique of Cher- niaev's views and actions in Serbia. The general's belief that Serbia and Russian society could solve the Eastern Question was rejected completely: "In no case can Serbia stand at the head of Russian society.... Only Russia can solve the Slav question, not even Russian society . Russia as a whole, as a state organism, with the government at its head."'00 He condemned the flight of Cherniaev and his staff after Djunis and criticized his failure to preserve discipline among the defeated volunteers. Dismayed at reports that Cherniaev had organized a detachment of bodyguards preceded by a ban- ner bearing the general's coat of arms, Aksakov wrote sadly: "All this is not exactly in Suvorov's tradition . . . , and not in your style at the start of the war."101 Despite the blunt criticism, the Moscow chairman remained Cherniaev's friend. They were fully reconciled when

99 Aksakov to Cherniaev, Sept. 19, G.I.M. Cherniaev's jealous antipathy toward the formation of Bulgarian volunteer detachments in Ser- bia was described by Col. I. K. Kishel'skii (see Kishel'skii to Miliutin, Oct. 20, Osvobozhdenie, I, No. 308, 444-48).

100 Aksakov to Cherniaev, Nov. 13, G.I.M. 101 Same to same, Jan. 16, 1877, G.I.M.

the general returned to Russia just before the Russo-Turkish war. Aksakov then urged Cherniaev to join in the struggle against liberalism and foreign influences in Russia.102

Other Slav Committee leaders were much less charitable toward Cherniaev. Typical was the merciless verdict of Ki- reev: "Either one should return in tri- umph or die sword in hand. But Cher- niaev tore his hair and cried at Djunis. ... He is not of the stuff of which states- men or even great warriors are made." 103 V. A. Cherkasskii and F. V. Chizhov, prominent supporters of the Slav Com- mittees, were equally critical of the general.104 As far as most committee leaders were concerned, Cherniaev's usefulness had ended at Djunis.

Cherniaev's truculent optimism and constant demands upon the Slav Com- mittees during the campaign help to explain their disillusionment with him. Deluging the committees with complaints, he had demanded more of them than they could possibly provide. He went so far as to ask the Moscow Com- mittee for a portable church and a choir, "since there is no proper singing at vespers here."'105 In September, begging Aksakov to supply his troops with winter clothing, Cherniaev asserted that if the Turks were held one more month, "victory will be ours."106 Aksakov had managed to arrange, at Cherniaev's request, a large private Russian loan to Serbia.107 But just prior to the final Turkish offen-

102 Same to same, Apr. 24, 1877, G.I.M. 103 Dnevnik Kireeva, VII, May 26, 1877, R.O.

Bib.Len. 104 Dnevnik Chizhova, VII, Jan. 19, 1877, R.O.

Bib.Len.; Cherkasskii to Aksakov, May 2, Sla- vianskii Sbornik.

105 Cherniaev to Aksakov, Aug. 11, 25, telegrams, Aksakov papers, No. 387, R.O.Bib.S.S.

106'Ibid., Sept. 14, 15. 107 Nikitin, Russkoe obshchestvo, pp. 977-78;

Cherniaev to Aksakov, May 11, R.O.Bib.S.S.


294 DAVID MACKENZIE sive, the general demanded redoubled efforts from the committees, reiterating his foolish optimism:

The Serbs have already gained a three- quarters victory over Turkey, but in this struggle they have exhausted their last penny and put forward their last man. Now has come the decisive time to aid them funda- mentally, all at once. . . . If the number of volunteers rises to 10,000 and 1500 Cossacks, I guarantee that few from the army of Abdul Kerim will return home, and I will be in Sofia this winter and consequently Bulgaria will be free. . . . Official participation of Russia in my opinion is now unnecessary and would merely lead to diplomatic compli- cations. Against whom would vast Russia fight when the entire Turkish strength has been broken against little Serbia? Comparing the 10 million rubles he re- quired to prosecute the war with the 800 million rubles he claimed it would cost official Russia to conduct a campaign, Cherniaev trumpeted: "Turkey is at her last gasp!l"108 Two weeks later his forces were overwhelmed by these same Turks.

Writing Aksakov after the campaign, Cherniaev defended himself vigorously against the charges made by his enemies and former friends. He emphasized Turkish numerical superiority at Dju- nis. Denying there had been luxury at his headquarters, Cherniaev provided statistics on how Slav Committee funds had been spent, on the number of volunteers who had served under him.109 But he failed to explain away the dis- parity between his boastful statements and the disaster of Djunis.

The press, after contributing during the Serbo-Turkish war to Cherniaev's great popularity in Russia, also became disillusioned with the general. Its favor- able reaction to Cherniaev's trip to Ser-

108 Cherniaev to Aksakov, Oct. 16, R.O.Bib.S.S. 109 Cherniaev to Aksakov, Mar. 29, 1877

G.I.M.

bia contrasted sharply with official dis- approval. His open letter in Russkii Mir roused the public's hopes for Slav liberation. Novoe Vremia, a leading liberal organ, regarded Cherniaev's trip as pro- foundly significant for the Slav cause; it favored a Russian volunteer movement to assist South Slav liberation.110 In a concession to the pro-Slav tide in public sentiment, even semiofficial Golos wished the general success, but it warned against independent action by Panslav generals. Golos declared: "One thing Russian society will not be sympathetic with: that is the appearance on Russian soil of those condottieri to whom it matters very little for what they fight, who are ready to change their homeland every day for even the shadow of authority, for the momentary satisfaction of ambition."1'' To obtain Russian public support, Cherniaev resorted to rigid press censorship and outright falsehood during the Serbo-Turkish war. At his Deligrad headquarters Cherniaev estab- lished a Correspondence Bureau, run by V. V. Komarov, his crony from Russkii Mir. Throughout the campaign this bureau enforced strict controls upon news- papermen, favoring those representing pro-Cherniaev organs such as Russkii Mir and Moskovskie Vedomosti. Only with the greatest difficulty did the Inter- national Telegraphic Agency obtain un- censored reports from correspondents who managed to reach Semlin in Austria- Hungary. A. A. Kraevskii, editor of Golos, noted that only one of eleven reports by his correspondent, P. A. Vis- kovatov, was cleared by the bureau. Viskovatov himself was even more em- phatic: "Not a single honest line could

110 Nikitin, Russkoe obshchestvo, p. 973. I"1 Golos, No. 148, June 11, 1876. Below this

editorial appeared a poem satirizing the adventures of Cherniaev and Fadeev.


PANSLAVISM IN PRACTICE 295 reach the Russian press from the battlefield."112

Systematically deceiving the Serbian and Russian public, the Correspondence Bureau' s correspondents continually "improved" the war news. Typical was Novoe Vremia's review of the first week's military operations: "Within a short time, in the whole area where there is even hope of quick aid from the Serbs, the entire [Bulgarian] male population will rise. To arm it General Cherniaev is bringing with him 100,000 rifles . . . and at the end of last week, when the army stood in Pirot, the distribution of weapons was carried out.... It is anticipated that here [near Sofia] General Cherniaev will give battle next week unless the Turks retreat sensibly towards Adrianople."113 Actually, few Bulgarians would accept rifles from Cherniaev and Pirot was not captured. On July 15 sev- eral St. Petersburg newspapers, on the basis of the bureau's reports, placed Cherniaev's army "on the road to Con- stantinople,"114 whereas it was already retreating into Serbia! Early overopti- mism, fed by fanciful accounts, turned subsequently into bitter disillusionment with Cherniaev and the Serbs when it proved unfounded. To explain the failure of Cherniaev's initial offensive, the bureau claimed that large numbers of Austrian troops, disguised in Turkish uniforms, were serving with the enemy.115 "Victories" were described from areas where no fighting had occurred. The Turks' destruction of a Morava River bridge was transformed into a heroic feat by a Russian officer. Just be-

112 Ibid., No. 308, Nov. 19; No. 327, Dec. 8; No. 339, Dec. 20.

113Novoe Vremia, July 9. 114 Golos, No. 183, July 16. 115 Langenau to Andrassy, July 13, telegram

No. 48, St.A.

fore Djunis Novoe Vremia published a report that Russian officer prisoners had been burned alive by the Turks.116 After the campaign Golos correctly described the purpose of these fabrications: "The bureau was really a weapon of political blackmail of the most criminal kind. By means of lies and deception it hoped to involve Russia in a war with Turkey.'"117

The bureau's efforts, seconded by the Slav Committees, made Cherniaev a hero to millions of ordinary Russians. During July and August the general's popularity reached its peak. Golos reported that Russian schoolchildren were playing a new game called "the Eastern Question" and they all wanted to be Cherniaev.118 In Moscow portraits of Cherniaev and Serbian leaders hung from almost every wall.119 A police report from St. Peters- burg confirmed the astounding prestige of the general among uneducated Rus- sians: "They consider Cherniaev as sent by God to defend the cross and their belief in him is great that he will drive the Turks from Europe and re-establish Orthodoxy in the entire Balkan Penin- sula." The merchantry, added the report, shared their attitude.120

After Djunis the Russian press was divided in its assessment of Cherniaev's role in Serbia. Leading the defense, Rus- skii Mir asserted he had accomplished the objectives for which Serbia had gone to war. "The Eastern Question has been raised in its full scope. . . . Having brought matters to this decisive stage, the Serbs and their leaders can consider

116 Golos, No. 327, Dec. 8; Cherniaev to Risti6, Oct. 3, Arhiv Ristica, XVIII/5/348.

117 Golos, No. 308, Nov. 19. 118 Ibid., No. 190, July 23. 119 A. Golubev, Kniaz' A. I. Vasil'chikov (St.

Petersburg, 1882), pp. 115-16. 120 Report of N. S. Birin, chief of gendarmes

in St. Petersburg, of Nov. 6, Osvobozhdenie, I, No. 325, 464.


296 DAVID MACKENZIE

their task fully achieved. . . . The Ser- bian armies and commanders resisted longer than one could have supposed."121 Condemning those who sought to sow distrust between Serbs and Russians, the paper called for complete unity of purpose.122 Russkii Mir called reports of Russian volunteers' dissatisfaction with Cherniaev "vile inventions." But while it defended the military showing of the Serbian army and Russian volunteers, Russkii Mir made no attempt to refute Golos' revelations concerning the Corre- spondence Bureau.123

The assault against Cherniaev, begun by Birzhevye Vedomosti, was pressed most vigorously by Golos, which during November and December exposed the bureau and unworthy actions by Cher- niaev and defended his principal rivals, Nikolic and Novoselov. Golos accused Cherniaev of betraying the Slav cause for selfish reasons. "We are told that Cherniaev 'made history' and it is up to history to judge him. . . . History pun- ishes those who put their personal in- terests above their people, utilize the blood of others, and worry more about externals than the heart of the matter even in the face of the enemy."124 Other newspapers, including Sankt Peterbur- gskie Vedomosti which earlier had praised the general, joined in attacks upon him.

But Cherniaev's popularity among the Russian people largely survived this hostile barrage. Having discovered a knightly hero, Russians were loath to part with him. A memorandum of the Third Section reported that most Rus- sians, while believing that both sides in the newspaper controversy about Cher-

121 Russkii Mir, No. 260, Nov. 4. 122 Ibid., No. 263, Nov. 7. 123 Ibid., No. 270, Nov. 14; No. 278, Nov. 22. 124 Golos, No. 319, Nov. 30. See also Nos. 305,

308, 312, 318, and 327.

niaev were partly correct, regarded this polemic as inopportune because it endangered the Slav movement.125 Crowds of people continued to applaud Cher- niaev heartily whenever he appeared in public.126

IV Cherniaev's role in Serbia reflected the

goals and methods of Russian Panslav- ism in the 1870's. His slogan of South Slav liberation camouflaged the Panslav aim of expanding Russian influence by making Serbia a political tool and an economic appendage of Russia. Cher- niaev sought to achieve this by a coup d'etat against the Ristic government. He fostered the Panslav concept of a uni- lateral solution of the Eastern Question by Russia which involved abandoning Russia's ties with the "German powers." Thus, he advocated an aggressive Rus- sian foreign policy and counted upon successes abroad to contribute to the defeat of liberal reforms at home. Like Fadeev and Ignat'ev, Cherniaev also sought personal glory and adventure.

But the means which Cherniaev em- ployed led to failure and defeat. Royal proclamations and fantastic predictions of victory could not compensate for the weakness of his instrument: the Serbian militia army. Torn between the desire to play an independent role as a "Slav Washington" and the need to obtain the support of official Russia Cherniaev vac- illated and antagonized St. Petersburg. The general's relations with the emperor and the foreign ministry demonstrated the refusal of the Russian government to adopt Panslavism as official policy

125 Report of the Third Section, Nov. 22, Osvobozhdenie, I, No. 349, 505-6.

126 Dnevnik Kireeva, R.O.Bib.Len., VII, 52; A. Cherniaeva, "Stranitsy iz semeinoi letopisi Cher- niavikh," Russkii Arkhiv, XLVII (1909, No. 2), 693.


PANSLAVISM IN PRACTICE 297 however much prominent individuals might sympathize with some of its goals. Cherniaev's program for solving the East- ern Question disregarded the realities of Russia's diplomatic and financial position which dictated good relations with the "German powers." His abhorrence of parliamentarism and west European influences, shared by Aksakov and Ig- nat'ev, induced him to attempt to re- direct Serbian political life along Rus- sian lines, a tactic which was bound to fail.

Cherniaev's military and diplomatic failure in Serbia revealed the futility and bankruptcy of the Panslav movement in action. His power as virtual military dictator of Serbia was based not on sub- stantial support there for Panslavism but

on the belief of Serbian leaders that official Russia stood behind him. After the royal proclamation, when St. Peters- burg repudiated him, the Serbian leadership discerned the truth and his influence faded. Cherniaev's military incompetence, boastfulness, and unscru- pulous political methods helped to dis- credit the Panslav movement in the Balkans; but his heroic poses and support of Greater Serbian nationalism en- deared him to the Serbian public. Cher- niaev's popularity among lower-class Russians in 1876, however, reflects the widespread appeal of certain Panslav aims, such as Slav liberation, and a dissatisfaction with domestic Russian conditions. WELLS COLLEGE


Article Contentsp. 279p. 280p. 281p. 282p. 283p. 284p. 285p. 286p. 287p. 288p. 289p. 290p. 291p. 292p. 293p. 294p. 295p. 296p. 297

Issue Table of ContentsThe Journal of Modern History, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 1964), pp. 245-371Front MatterBelgian "Autonomy" under the Archdukes, 1598-1621 [pp. 245 - 259]The "Prometheus" and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty [pp. 260 - 278]Panslavism in Practice: Cherniaev in Serbia (1876) [pp. 279 - 297]The Vatican, French Catholics, and the Associations Cultuelles [pp. 298 - 317]Review ArticleNew Sources for Countervailing a Legend: Personal and Political History in South Africa and India [pp. 318 - 323]

Book Reviewsuntitled [p. 324]untitled [pp. 324 - 325]untitled [pp. 325 - 326]untitled [pp. 326 - 327]untitled [p. 327]untitled [pp. 327 - 328]untitled [p. 328]untitled [pp. 328 - 329]untitled [pp. 329 - 330]untitled [pp. 330 - 331]untitled [pp. 331 - 332]untitled [pp. 332 - 333]untitled [p. 333]untitled [pp. 333 - 334]untitled [pp. 334 - 335]untitled [pp. 335 - 336]untitled [pp. 336 - 337]untitled [pp. 337 - 338]untitled [pp. 338 - 339]untitled [pp. 339 - 340]untitled [pp. 340 - 341]untitled [p. 341]untitled [pp. 341 - 342]untitled [pp. 342 - 343]untitled [pp. 343 - 344]untitled [pp. 344 - 345]untitled [pp. 345 - 346]untitled [pp. 346 - 347]untitled [pp. 347 - 348]untitled [p. 348]untitled [p. 349]untitled [pp. 349 - 350]untitled [pp. 350 - 351]untitled [pp. 351 - 352]untitled [p. 352]untitled [pp. 352 - 353]untitled [pp. 353 - 354]untitled [p. 354]untitled [pp. 354 - 355]untitled [pp. 355 - 356]untitled [pp. 356 - 357]untitled [pp. 357 - 358]untitled [p. 358]untitled [pp. 358 - 359]untitled [pp. 359 - 360]untitled [p. 360]untitled [p. 361]untitled [pp. 361 - 362]untitled [pp. 362 - 363]untitled [p. 363]untitled [pp. 363 - 364]untitled [pp. 364 - 365]untitled [pp. 365 - 366]untitled [p. 366]untitled [pp. 366 - 367]untitled [pp. 367 - 368]untitled [p. 368]untitled [pp. 368 - 369]untitled [pp. 369 - 370]untitled [pp. 370 - 371]

Back Matter

Documents

Panslavism in Practice. Cherniaev in Serbia (1876)