Panchayat Raj Act Without Substance

8/16/2019 Panchayat Raj Act Without Substance

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Panchayat Raj Act: Without Substance

Author(s): K. R. Sastry

Source: Economic and Political Weekly , Vol. 30, No. 30 (Jul. 29, 1995), pp. 1909-1910Published by: Economic and Political Weekly

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KERALA

Panchayat Raj Act

Wiffiout Substance

K R Sastry

The Kerala Panchayat Raj Act negates the very concept of

decentralisation by providing for interference from above.

THE Kerala Panchayat Raj Act (KPRA),

was passed by the state Legislature on

May 22, 1994, as a sequel to the 73rd

constitutional amendment, incorporating

numerous amendments, but rejecting much

of what was suggested by the members in

the assembly. In the process, it deviated

drastically from the original version of the

bill that was introduced in the assembly on

March 16, 1994.

The people of Kerala witnessed a series

of acrimonious debates, all round protest

and even an unprecedented public dharna by

intellectuals like K N Raj, I S Gulati, etc,

staged in front of the secretariat on some

vital issues concerning the bill, while the bill

was being discussed in the assembly. A

former speaker, and now a sitting member

of the assembly, well-versed in various

aspects of the bill, had a 90 minute deposition

before the 27-member select committee of

the bill and explained how the bill was

strategically tailored to concentrate power

in the hands of government and officials

under the pretext of decentralisation of

power. Social activists like V R Krishna

Iyer, M P Narayanan Nambiar, and others,

organised a People s Assembly (Janakiya

Sabha) at about the same time to reflect the

mood of the common man on Kerala

Panchayat Raj Bill and to create public

awareness on the government s move to

include certain undesirable provisions in the

act. In spite of all the protests, KPRA as

passed by the legislature is an instrument

aimed at maintaining centralised powers with

the state government. All the same, it can

be said that the framework provided by the

73rd amendment was fully retained.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS IN KPRA

The KPRA broadly incorporates almost

all the essential features envisaged by the

Constitution. It provides for a three-tier

system with the village, block and district

panchayats as institutions of local self-

governance. The formation of grama sabha -

comprising all the voters in each constituency

of grama panchayat (GP) - has been made

the lowest rung in the ladder entrusted with

the responsibility to supervise and accelerate

local planning and development. The grama

sabha will have to meet twice a year, at a

venue decided by the GP, on being convened

by the member of that panchayat constituency

and the meeting would be presided over by

the president/vice-president of the GP. The

grama sabha is empowered to suggest, plan

or help developmental activities, to discuss

administrative affairs, to approve the

accounts of the past year, etc, among other

things. The president of grama sabha will

have to explain the reason for non-compliance

of any decision taken by it earlier. The

KPRA has delineated the role of grama

sabha in clear-cut terms.

The act also provides for constitution of

a ward committee comprised of members of

GP and villagers for suggesting

developmental activities of that village,

besides encouraging public participation in

local governance. The rationale behind the

creation of a smaller grama sabha comprising

approximately 1,000 members belonging to

each constituency rather than the whole

grama panchayat is reflective of practical

reasons to conduct the meeting conveniently

and effectively, considering the Kerala

situation rightly. The detailed provision

regarding grama sabha contained in the act

is a welcome step but the functioning of it

will have to be carried forward further to

make it a basic unit of grass roots level

governance.

The head of the panchayat is designed as

the president and the executive officer, the

'secretary', irrespective of the tier to which

he belongs. The presidents, at all levels, are

elected indirectly. If the state legislature

had exercised its discretion in favour of

direct election from among the people in

the case of a GP, it would have got a

president deriving authority from the people

rather than from the political parties,

although it may possibly lead to friction,

in case where he belongs to a particular

faction in the GP.

The block panchayat (BP) at the

intermediate level is a new democratic body

in the scheme of PR in Kerala. Most of the

non-officials and officials at the panchayat

and district levels opine that the BP is an

undesirable tier thrust upon the people by

the constitutional amendment. This new tier

can be entrusted more with the task of

monitoring the development schemes rather

than planning. That said, one cannot

underestimate its importance in the planning

phase for those schemes which are of trans-

village in character. It may be surmised that

due to dense population, the geographical

area coming under the district panchayat

(DP) is not so vast; and, thus it could be

easily managed without the middle tier. It

remains to be seen whether the new tier, i e,

the BP, can emerge as a fulcrum of activity

and consequently dilute the importance of

upper and lower tiers.

The inclusion of MLAs and MPs in the

BPs and DPs has not been received

favourably since this may lead to over-

centralisation in the democratic decision

making process. It is apprehended that such

an incursion into PR theatre would be

detrimental to the emergence of a vibrant

local leadership. The debate, though

inconclusive, over the nature and desirability

of involvement of MPs in the local bodies

takes a new turn with the allotment of rupees

one crore foreach MP to take up development

activities in his constituency. It may not

cause any surprise if MLAs demand a similar

largesse from the state. In such an eventuality,

the exclusion of these elected representatives

is not a feasible proposition. How this elite-

elite conflict could be avoided is a moot

question; and, the KPRA is more or less

silent on this aspect. Thus, one may get a

feeling that the act is not a sincere exercise

of decentralisation and at the most may be

construed as a step toward 'deconcentration'.

Similarly, presidents of all GPs and BPs

have been included as ex-officio members

at the respective upper tier of the panchayat

and this is intended for establishing an organic

link between various levels. The presidents,

thus, included in the upper tier panchayat

have all rights of a member, including voting

power, except for electing/removing the

office bearers.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND

FINANCIAL CENTRALISATION

The KPRA ensures reservation in

proportion of their population in the case of

SCs/STs and one-third for women at all

levels. Even in the reserved seats earmarked

for SCs/STs, one-third are reserved for

women. In case, the population of SCs/STs

is insufficient for reserving one seat, the

act ensures that one seat is reserved to the

category of SCs/STs, whichever is more

in population in that given area. Under the

act, the state government, or an officer

authorised by it, can exercise power to fix

the number of reserved seats and determine

the constituencies which are reserved for

each category without resorting to any

predetermined norm. It is feared that this

provision is liable to be misused for political

gains.

Economc and Political WekyJuy29 1995 1909



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The act, in accordance with the stipulation

of the 1th Schedule of the Constitution,

provides powers and functions enlisted in

Schedules III, IV and V to GP, BP and DP,

respectively. There are 32 obligatory

functions of GP, eight for BP and 21 for

DP uwider the act. But the government can

meddle with the elected bodies by

formulating rules and procedures, in

accordance with thiis act which allows it to

formulate rule.s ;*d procedures in about 140

instances. The aict, as well, provides for the

transfer of all grants pertaining to the

mandatory items to the panchayats. The act

also approves of transfer of all buildings,

institutions, etc, to the grama panchayats as

soon as possible.

The act does not make any earnest effort

for ensuring adequate financial resources to

panchayat raj institutions (PRIs) to perform

self-governing functions effectively. The

devolution of resources, other than the above

mentioned grants pertaining to mandatory

functions, is conditioned by the words,

subject to availability and this provision

is liable to be misused to make PRIs run

short of funds. In the present set up, the

government can dilute the process of

decentralisation of power by avoiding

adequate devolution of financial resources

and by not extending technical support to

the PRIs.

The act provides for constitution of a

three-man State Finance Commission (SFC)

with one memberexperienced in economics/

financial matters and other two with

experience in public/local administration.

However, the government soon after enacting

the law, constituted the commission with all

the three members coming from the

bureaucratic stream. Similarly, the act

provides for having a State Election

Commission (SEC) to conduct regular

elections quinquennially. But the

commission is not endowed with adequate

autonomy and power to decide on all matters

pertaining to elections without relying on

the state government. The de-limitation of

wards, determination of reserved seats, etc,

are not entrusted to SEC, and this raises

doubt in the public on the intention of the

state government. Even though, the

constitutional provision for creating an

independent SEC notwithstanding, the

KPRA has made the SEC dependent on the

state government for getting many things

done before setting the election process on.

Furth.er, the act does not contain any

clear provision that ensures the availability

of existing technical manpower through

re-deployment from the state government

departments for carrying out and co-

ordinating developmental activities at the

panchayat level. It would have been better

if the power to pool the sectoral officers

at each level by the PRls had been

incorporated in the act itself. This is a

major task ahead for all panchayats to

accomplish.

The act contains many provisions that

allow the state government s interference in

the form of inspection and supervision on

the working of panchayats. This power,

retained by the government, will pose a

threat to the autonomy and freedom of the

panchayats and the whole scheme of

panchayati raj will deteriorate to a

subordinate position vis-a-vis the state. What

is more, the provision for dissolution of

panchayats by government on the ground of

abuse of powers can be a perpetual threat.

The authority of the state government to

remove a member/president/vice-president

standing committee chairman and to debar

them for misuse of power, dereliction of

duties, etc, is liable to be misused forpolitical

gains, particularly, because the terms misuse

of power , dereliction of duty , etc, are not

clearly defined in the act. The act empowers

the government to exercise control,

discipline, etc, on the staff including the

secretary. The GP is empowered to have

only nominal control on the staff and this

can be construed as a tilt towards the

officialdom in the scheme of local

governance.

In order to enhance people s participation

in local development, the act provides for

constitution of ward committees, working

committees, and sub-committees, consisting

of members of panchayat and citizens for

speedier execution of developmental

activities. These provisions can be used as

an effective means to bring power to the

people and torinvolvingthem in local affairs.

The act provides for constitution of standing

committees at all levels, consisting of

members of panchayat. It would have been

better if the provision for inclusion of experts,

at times, from outside is provided for in the

formation of stainding committees lor

discussing and dealing with specialised

subjects in depth.

The KPRA doesi not uplhold the cardinal

principle that what can he done at a given

level should be entrusted to that level itself

and not to the higlher level for distributinlg

poweris and functions at each level. While

formulating the Kerala Panchayat Raj Bill,

it seems that no serious effort was made to

delineate various functions that can

etfectively be performed at each level of

panchayat in the context ot Kerala. If true

democratic decentralisation is the real goal,

it is imperative that the centralised powers

so tar held by central and state governments

be decentralised from the centre down to the

panchayats. For effective decentralisation

three types of shifts in power become

imperative in the panchaya raj context - viz,

vertical, horizontal and diagonal. The

'vertical' implies powershirt from thecentral

to the state, from the state to the district level

and from the district level further downward;

the horizontal connotes a shift in p(iwer

from appointed (officials) to elected people

(non-officials); whereas, the diagonal

implies power shift from the MLAs and MPs

to the panchayati raj functionaries. Unless

such power shifts are effected, creation of

a decentralised polity remainis a utopia.

The act allows the state government to

interfere in the working of the panchayats

by invalidating the action orresolution passed

by the panchayat or any of its committees.

Thus, it negates the very concept of

decentralisation by interference from above.

In short, the purpose of the ruling UDF

government in enacting the KPRA is more

to meet the constitutional requirement rather

than to implement panchayat raj in letter and

spirit. If one takes a dispassionate look at

the legislative process behind the enactment

of KPRA and the follow-up action so far

taken by the state government. it would be

clear that it does not like to have a meaning-

ful decentralised system of governance in

the state.

The 73rd constitutional amendment

contains many discretionary provisions

allowing the state government to enact a

meaningful panchayat raj legislation that

brings power to the people . However, the

Kerala statL government seemed more

interested in extending the bureaucratic

control over the elected panchayat raj

bodies. But in the final analysis, it was

torced to compromise on many provisions

in the bill due to the evcr-vigilant public

protest and have enaicted the law which can

be better described as a car-icature of

Gandhian idea of grama swaraj or Rajiv

Gandhi s dream of delegation of powers

to the grass roots. The KPRA should have

taken care to incorlporate the wisdom of

various committees, reviews and evaluation

studies on panchayat raj, whose main thrust

has consistently been how to make the grass

roots institutions more eftective.

It cani however he considered a blessing

that we have a panchayat raj act in Kerala

at last, having constitutional buttress to start

with. Basing on the recent pronouncemnents,

the elections to PRIs may he delayed till

April 1995. This is due to the tact that the

73rd Constitutional Amendment was silent

on the minimrium periodl by which state

governments should condluct elections a'lter

giving statutory recognition to PRIs. It must

be adde(d that the KPRA appears to be

skeleton legislation as it bestows maximlum

discretion and initiative in the hands of the

state government through subordinate

legislation. It is left to the politically articulate

elite groups in Kerala to carry forward the

idea of democratic decentralisation by

invoking the positive provisions to strengthen

PRIs and thereby discouraging the

centralising forces which have a debilitating

etflect on the growth and development ol the

panchayat raj.

1910 Economc and Political WekyJuy29 1995


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Panchayat Raj Act Without Substance