Europe’s North: Historical Geopolitics and International Europe’s North: Historical Geopolitics and International Institutional Dynamics, 2-5 ECTSInstitutional Dynamics, 2-5 ECTS

3. 3. European integration in the North: is the EU the leading power?European integration in the North: is the EU the leading power? Autumn 2011Autumn 2011

Pami AaltoPami AaltoJean Monnet Professor/Director, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence on European Jean Monnet Professor/Director, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence on European

Politics and European-Russian Relations, University of Tampere Politics and European-Russian Relations, University of Tampere pami.aalto@uta.fipami.aalto@uta.fi

<http://www.uta.fi/jkk/jmc/index.html><http://www.uta.fi/jkk/jmc/index.html>

Towards a mixed geopolitical/institutionalist Towards a mixed geopolitical/institutionalist approachapproach

The late 1990s underestimation of EU’s power in NE, although:The late 1990s underestimation of EU’s power in NE, although:• EU included the Baltics as part of its CEE enlargement against all oddsEU included the Baltics as part of its CEE enlargement against all odds• EU moved closer to the sphere of influence that Russia more or less EU moved closer to the sphere of influence that Russia more or less

willingly inherited from the Soviet Unionwillingly inherited from the Soviet Union Beyond conventional notions of political agency:Beyond conventional notions of political agency:

• ‘‘No’ to traditional-geopolitical, pure state-centrism; locking of No’ to traditional-geopolitical, pure state-centrism; locking of imagination into the category of imagination into the category of Westphalian nation states/Westphalian-Westphalian nation states/Westphalian-federal states. federal states. In an ideal-typed Westphalian nation-state, the power of In an ideal-typed Westphalian nation-state, the power of the centre is uniformly distributed across all territorial and functional the centre is uniformly distributed across all territorial and functional dimensions. The power of the centre reaches all corners of the state dimensions. The power of the centre reaches all corners of the state equally and is not territorially and functionally differentiated unlike in equally and is not territorially and functionally differentiated unlike in the case of the EU. In Westphalian-federal states (e.g. GER, USA), the the case of the EU. In Westphalian-federal states (e.g. GER, USA), the constituent units maintain more independence, but their ties to the constituent units maintain more independence, but their ties to the centre are identical to each other across both territorial and functional centre are identical to each other across both territorial and functional dimensions dimensions

• ‘‘No’ to regionalist analyses taking the EU as an organization/framework No’ to regionalist analyses taking the EU as an organization/framework for regional co-operation of NE states. International intergovernmental for regional co-operation of NE states. International intergovernmental organizations consist of nation-states, or of federal or other type of organizations consist of nation-states, or of federal or other type of states that are all equally bound by the common rules typically states that are all equally bound by the common rules typically pertaining to a limited sector of policy. IGOs thus have limited pertaining to a limited sector of policy. IGOs thus have limited autonomy from their members. In the EU, member states remain autonomy from their members. In the EU, member states remain variably integrated with the common rules whilst remaining greatly variably integrated with the common rules whilst remaining greatly affected by EU integration practically across all sectors of policy (30-affected by EU integration practically across all sectors of policy (30-70% of national legislation originate in European law)70% of national legislation originate in European law)

The thesis of the EU as the The thesis of the EU as the main geopolitical subjectmain geopolitical subject of northern Europe of northern Europe

The opening up of EU’s wider northern EuropeThe opening up of EU’s wider northern Europe

For the EU, DEN EU membership (1973), GER re-For the EU, DEN EU membership (1973), GER re-unification (1991), and FIN, SWE memberships unification (1991), and FIN, SWE memberships (1995) opened up a new view onto NE. They (1995) opened up a new view onto NE. They gradually engaged the Union into their efforts of gradually engaged the Union into their efforts of overcoming the remaining Cold War era divisions in overcoming the remaining Cold War era divisions in northern Europe by regional co-operationnorthern Europe by regional co-operation

The Baltics, POL sought membership in the mid-The Baltics, POL sought membership in the mid-1990s, joining 20041990s, joining 2004

Russia bound to the EU direction by a ‘strategic Russia bound to the EU direction by a ‘strategic partnership’ with the Unionpartnership’ with the Union

NW-Russia tied to the northern EU and EEA area by NW-Russia tied to the northern EU and EEA area by the 2006 renewed Northern Dimension (ND) based the 2006 renewed Northern Dimension (ND) based on equal partnership (EU, RUS, ICE, NOR)on equal partnership (EU, RUS, ICE, NOR)

USA mostly withdrawn from NE after Soviet troops USA mostly withdrawn from NE after Soviet troops pull-outs from the Baltic states, 1997 NEI, 1998 pull-outs from the Baltic states, 1997 NEI, 1998 Baltic charters, Baltic/POL NATO membershipsBaltic charters, Baltic/POL NATO memberships

In all, a powerful north European opening to the EU In all, a powerful north European opening to the EU due to the pressure for EU accession states and due to the pressure for EU accession states and applicants to converge with EU legislation and policy applicants to converge with EU legislation and policy priorities, whilst a less binding but clearly observable priorities, whilst a less binding but clearly observable pull applies to the EU’s neighbours with market and pull applies to the EU’s neighbours with market and other interests in the EU areaother interests in the EU area

The EU has become the The EU has become the entity towards which the entity towards which the minor, small and great minor, small and great powers in the European powers in the European north, and many north, and many regional agents and regional agents and organizations there tend organizations there tend to look before anything to look before anything else, and towards which else, and towards which regional political and regional political and economic activities economic activities increasingly tend to gearincreasingly tend to gear

But it is not taking the But it is not taking the traditional great power traditional great power place of RUS/GER!place of RUS/GER!

The geo-economy The geo-economy of EU’s North at of EU’s North at the time of the the time of the 2004 enlargement2004 enlargement

• With the exception of Russia, and slightly less so, Norway, the countries of the region have from one half to two thirds of their EU-bound trade with other northerners •Germany occupies a central role in these regional patterns

• North European countries’ extra-EU trade for example to the US and Asian directions •Northern Europe economically a European sub-region. Despite notable degrees of regionality, it is clear that economically northern Europe does not stand alone, and even less does the post-Soviet north with its vulnerable small Baltic economies and export-geared natural resources industries of Russia

•Cohen (1991): CEE from buffer to gateway region; from geopolitics to geoeconomics

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Imports/EU 23.3% 23.9%

66.0%

64.6%

59.2%

67.8%

65.3%

62.6%

56.5%

57.9%

76.5%*

Exports/EU 17.8% 19.0%

54.0%

51.0%

48.5%

66.7%

72.5%

76.5%

69.5%

68.0%

82.4%*

Imports/CIS 21.6% 20.4%

18.8%

17.0%

17.4%

14.2%

17.0%

9.8% 10.0%

9.5% 13.4%

Exports/CIS 30.4% 30.3%

25.1%

25.1%

26.4%

20.8%

13.4%

4.0% 5.1% 5.4% 6.0%

Estonia’s foreign trade with the EU-15 and CIS, 1993-2003 (% of value)

The EU’s wider northern Europe

• Due to strategic reorganisation of northern Europe, EU has been invited into making what can be termed its ‘wider northern Europe’, and has also increasingly exploited the opportunity to this this• How wide such a project can ever be? Even after the breaking of the Cold War era bipolar division of the world, we continue to live in a world of boundaries and frontiers, where ‘wide’ always remains a relative term•Need to conceptualise the EU’s rule in more detail

Away from WestphaliaAway from Westphalia

Traditional European integration theories Traditional European integration theories functionalism/neofunctionalism and functionalism/neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism/liberal intergovernmentalism/liberal intergovernmentalismintergovernmentalism focus on the character of focus on the character of EUEU integration as suchintegration as such and deal with the degree and deal with the degree to which already existing member states decide to which already existing member states decide to co-operate or compete: to co-operate or compete: internalinternal dynamicsn dynamicsn

The Westphalian claims:The Westphalian claims:• lack of a common European identity (Smith, lack of a common European identity (Smith,

Hoffmann) vs. common and consistently Hoffmann) vs. common and consistently pursued values e.g. in enlargement; erasing pursued values e.g. in enlargement; erasing ‘postcommunism’, ‘post-Soviet’ and changing ‘postcommunism’, ‘post-Soviet’ and changing identity political context of northern Europeidentity political context of northern Europe

• member states’ ability to formulate common member states’ ability to formulate common political interestspolitical interests (Duchene: ’civilian power’; (Duchene: ’civilian power’; Medrano: ’economic giant, political dwarf; Medrano: ’economic giant, political dwarf; Rynning: not a ’strategic actor’) vs. new Rynning: not a ’strategic actor’) vs. new treaty, solidarity clause, ESDP, crisis treaty, solidarity clause, ESDP, crisis management troops?management troops?

• Hill’s ‘capability-expectations gap’ thesis Hill’s ‘capability-expectations gap’ thesis (1993) vs. its closing(1993) vs. its closing

Towards a broad view of EU Towards a broad view of EU foreign policy and beyond foreign policy and beyond rigid distinction between rigid distinction between what used to be the EU’s I, II, what used to be the EU’s I, II, III pillars before the Lisbon III pillars before the Lisbon treaty:treaty:• what is said and done to what is said and done to

others under the EU flag, others under the EU flag, either by representatives either by representatives of the Union institutions of the Union institutions or member states, and or member states, and what these ‘others’ take what these ‘others’ take as EU action, can as EU action, can conveniently be conveniently be understood to connote EU understood to connote EU foreign policyforeign policy

Focus on the regional policy Focus on the regional policy impactimpact of various EU of various EU activitiesactivities

In search of new theories: network In search of new theories: network governance and boundaries (I)governance and boundaries (I)

Part of the new Part of the new multi-level governancemulti-level governance approach of European integration approach of European integration studies, comes from comparative politics, not IRstudies, comes from comparative politics, not IR

Conceptualizes the EU’s system of rule as mixing elements of foreign and Conceptualizes the EU’s system of rule as mixing elements of foreign and domestic policy, and relying on partnerships, networks and interactive domestic policy, and relying on partnerships, networks and interactive dependencies; the application of the principle of dependencies; the application of the principle of subsidiaritysubsidiarity

The EU’s system of rule argued to represent a more complex form of The EU’s system of rule argued to represent a more complex form of political agency than in Westphalian entities. This leads to portraying the political agency than in Westphalian entities. This leads to portraying the EU’s policy activities as prone to incoherence due to the various levels and EU’s policy activities as prone to incoherence due to the various levels and actors involved, which often makes the policies difficult to grasp to their actors involved, which often makes the policies difficult to grasp to their target groupstarget groups

The EU’s system of rule is not very often unidirectional, but rather a non-The EU’s system of rule is not very often unidirectional, but rather a non-hierarchical, fragmented one that uses a mixture of levels and actorshierarchical, fragmented one that uses a mixture of levels and actors

Complex network governance odten makes it unclear for outsiders to Complex network governance odten makes it unclear for outsiders to figure out who is doing what within the EU, and where do the EU’s figure out who is doing what within the EU, and where do the EU’s boundaries eventually reachboundaries eventually reach

EU’s network: e.g. NOR, ICE, NATO, CBSS, NCM, BEAC, OSCEEU’s network: e.g. NOR, ICE, NATO, CBSS, NCM, BEAC, OSCE EU’s policy-export to its network partners, receiving states and regions, is EU’s policy-export to its network partners, receiving states and regions, is

the subsequent construction of fuzzy, differentially constituted, partly the subsequent construction of fuzzy, differentially constituted, partly overlapping and partly separate boundaries around the Union along overlapping and partly separate boundaries around the Union along geopoliticalgeopolitical, , institutional/legalinstitutional/legal, , transactionaltransactional and and cultural divisionscultural divisions

In search of new theories: network In search of new theories: network governance and boundaries (II)governance and boundaries (II)

Geopolitical boundary:Geopolitical boundary: avoidance of ‘fortress Europe’ scenario in NE. The avoidance of ‘fortress Europe’ scenario in NE. The EU’s multi-level and multi-agent, regionalist engagement of the Baltics and EU’s multi-level and multi-agent, regionalist engagement of the Baltics and NW-RUS has supported webs of de-centralized cross-border co-op which NW-RUS has supported webs of de-centralized cross-border co-op which has helped to reduce a little some of the previous tensionshas helped to reduce a little some of the previous tensions

Institutional/legal boundaryInstitutional/legal boundary: soft security challenges from the Baltics/RUS : soft security challenges from the Baltics/RUS in the form of organized crime, money-laundering, and trafficking of arms, in the form of organized crime, money-laundering, and trafficking of arms, drugs and human beings, create a need for a considerable alignment of drugs and human beings, create a need for a considerable alignment of legal frameworks between the EU and its network partnerslegal frameworks between the EU and its network partners

Transactional boundary:Transactional boundary: efforts to reduce trade barriers among north efforts to reduce trade barriers among north European countries. Notable advances regardless of Russia’s rather European countries. Notable advances regardless of Russia’s rather complex economic transition problems; some signs of voluntary, though complex economic transition problems; some signs of voluntary, though yet partial adaptation to EU market and trade principles in Russiayet partial adaptation to EU market and trade principles in Russia

Cultural boundary:Cultural boundary: youth and student exchange, and town twinning youth and student exchange, and town twinning programmes to spread European social and institutional culturesprogrammes to spread European social and institutional cultures

This literature challenges the Westphalian notion of sovereignty, and This literature challenges the Westphalian notion of sovereignty, and envisions a multi-perspectival/postmodern European polityenvisions a multi-perspectival/postmodern European polity

Fuzziness and messiness in the Union’s geopolitical form; several ‘grey Fuzziness and messiness in the Union’s geopolitical form; several ‘grey zones’ such as the post-Soviet north, where EU, its members, and its zones’ such as the post-Soviet north, where EU, its members, and its network members and target territories meet and mingle with each othernetwork members and target territories meet and mingle with each other

Yet, the result is a model that eludes goal-oriented action and Yet, the result is a model that eludes goal-oriented action and responsibility into the multiple layers of EU governance; could ‘incremental responsibility into the multiple layers of EU governance; could ‘incremental progress’progress’ in fact account for identity and interest building? in fact account for identity and interest building?

In search of new theories: In search of new theories: geopolitics, ES and ’empire’geopolitics, ES and ’empire’

Empire literature relates to critical geopolitics and the English SchoolEmpire literature relates to critical geopolitics and the English School Introduces Introduces powerpower and and responsibilityresponsibility much more explicitly into the analysis much more explicitly into the analysis Suggests historical analogies for the contemporary European order by Suggests historical analogies for the contemporary European order by

looking at pre-Westphalian world systems; ‘neo-medievalism’, ‘neo-looking at pre-Westphalian world systems; ‘neo-medievalism’, ‘neo-sumerianism’ (Wsumerianism’ (Wæver 1998)æver 1998)

Imperial centredness is about complexity, overlapping authority, and a Imperial centredness is about complexity, overlapping authority, and a diffused nature of the distribution and exercise of power from the EU-diffused nature of the distribution and exercise of power from the EU-centre. This means that the power of the loosely defined EU-centre centre. This means that the power of the loosely defined EU-centre gradually fades when one moves away from it, first towards the inner gradually fades when one moves away from it, first towards the inner circles, and then towards the outer circles and the fringes of the circles, and then towards the outer circles and the fringes of the metaphorically understood EU-empire. We end up with a gradated or metaphorically understood EU-empire. We end up with a gradated or concentric model of European integrationconcentric model of European integration

Christiansen et al.: EU’s own ‘near ‘abroad’ in the BSR regionChristiansen et al.: EU’s own ‘near ‘abroad’ in the BSR region Compared to many other historical empires, the EU-empire commands a Compared to many other historical empires, the EU-empire commands a

striking amount of legitimacy among the Balts, Poles, and others, as they striking amount of legitimacy among the Balts, Poles, and others, as they voluntarily approach the Union as a means of taking distance from Russia voluntarily approach the Union as a means of taking distance from Russia + the support of Baltic Russophone populations towards the EU accession + the support of Baltic Russophone populations towards the EU accession of their countries of residence of their countries of residence

Tunander: the fuzziness of borders that is implicated in the EU’s and Tunander: the fuzziness of borders that is implicated in the EU’s and Russia’s efforts in the 1990s of creating a greater space for themselves Russia’s efforts in the 1990s of creating a greater space for themselves within the Baltics, in fact connotes the prospect of dialogue, which did not within the Baltics, in fact connotes the prospect of dialogue, which did not exist in a similar sense in the sharply bordered Cold War era Europe exist in a similar sense in the sharply bordered Cold War era Europe

Concentric EU order (‘EU empire’) with a focus on northern Europe

centre

insiders

semi-insiders

semi-outsiders/close outsiders‘wider Europe’

BSR

(northwest) Russia

northernEurope

• The circles of the concentric model are best understood as a theoretical organizing device.• In practice there is movement and tension between the circles when member-states take the lead or strive towards the centre along some policy sectors whilst expressing reservations along some other sectors• ‘Magnetism’• Continuous strengthening and expansion of the EU empire until it found its limits in the case of Russia in the early 2000s

EU’s northern policies: universalising trends EU’s northern policies: universalising trends (vs. the more regional approach of the ND)(vs. the more regional approach of the ND)

Enlargement policy and the Enlargement policy and the Union’s 1993 Copenhagen criteria:Union’s 1993 Copenhagen criteria:• Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,

human rights, and respect for and the protection of minoritieshuman rights, and respect for and the protection of minorities• Functioning market economy capable of coping with competitive Functioning market economy capable of coping with competitive

pressures and market forces within the Unionpressures and market forces within the Union• Candidates must take on the Union’s Candidates must take on the Union’s acquisacquis (80,000-odd pages), and (80,000-odd pages), and

the goals of political, economic, and monetary Unionthe goals of political, economic, and monetary Union Extension of the Union’s Schengen borders regime eastwards: lifts internal Extension of the Union’s Schengen borders regime eastwards: lifts internal

border controls, but introduces tighter visa and other control procedures in border controls, but introduces tighter visa and other control procedures in the external borders in order to tame the ‘soft’ security threats seen as the external borders in order to tame the ‘soft’ security threats seen as emanating into the Union from the post-Soviet spaceemanating into the Union from the post-Soviet space• Accession states required to start applying Schengen practices on their Accession states required to start applying Schengen practices on their

eastern borders already before their EU accessioneastern borders already before their EU accession• In practice, EU required unilateral abolishment of the 1990s simplified In practice, EU required unilateral abolishment of the 1990s simplified

border crossing practices from the EST—RUS and LIT—KAL bordersborder crossing practices from the EST—RUS and LIT—KAL borders The 1999 Common Strategy on Russia (CSR) and the 1994/1998 EU—The 1999 Common Strategy on Russia (CSR) and the 1994/1998 EU—

Russian Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) proceeded from Russian Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) proceeded from ‘common values’, since then more pragmatic approach ‘common values’, since then more pragmatic approach • The EU-Russia 2003 ‘common spaces’ and the roadmaps of 2004: The EU-Russia 2003 ‘common spaces’ and the roadmaps of 2004:

common EU—Russian socio-economic space and a free market area common EU—Russian socio-economic space and a free market area still a goal in addition to international/external security co-opstill a goal in addition to international/external security co-op

• PCA still gives institutional framework for EU-RUS co-operation: PCA still gives institutional framework for EU-RUS co-operation: summits, Cooperation Council and Committee (officials level) summits, Cooperation Council and Committee (officials level)