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[email protected] Paper 16 571-272-7822 Entered: December 19, 2013 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC., Petitioner, v. JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC., Patent Owner. ____________ Case IPR2013-00369 Patent 7,107,612 B1 ____________ Before MICHAEL R. ZECHER, JAMES A. TARTAL, and MIRIAM L. QUINN, Administrative Patent Judges. TARTAL, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION Institution of Inter Partes Review 37 C.F.R. § 42.108

Palo Alto IPR Decision re 612 patent

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[email protected] Paper 16

571-272-7822 Entered: December 19, 2013

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

____________

PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC.,

Patent Owner.

____________

Case IPR2013-00369

Patent 7,107,612 B1

____________

Before MICHAEL R. ZECHER, JAMES A. TARTAL, and

MIRIAM L. QUINN, Administrative Patent Judges.

TARTAL, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION

Institution of Inter Partes Review

37 C.F.R. § 42.108

Case IPR2013-00369

Patent 7,107,612 B1

2

Palo Alto Networks, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 3,

“Pet.”) requesting inter partes review of claims 1-13 and 22-27 of U.S.

Patent No. 7,107,612 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’612 patent”). Juniper Networks,

Inc. (“Patent Owner”) timely filed a Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response

(Paper 14, “Prelim. Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314.

I. INTRODUCTION

The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35

U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides:

THRESHOLD.—The Director may not authorize an inter

partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines

that the information presented in the petition filed under section

311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there

is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with

respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the information

presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that

Petitioner will prevail in challenging as unpatentable claims 1-13 and 22-27

of the ’612 patent. Accordingly, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we authorize

inter partes review to be instituted as to claims 1-13 and 22-27 of the ’612

patent.

A. Related Matters

Petitioner states that the ’612 patent was asserted against it in a

complaint served on September 25, 2012, in Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Palo

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Alto Networks, Inc., No. 11-1258-SLR (D. Del.) (the “Concurrent

Litigation”). Pet. 10.

B. The ’612 Patent

The application for the ’612 patent, filed July 19, 2004, was a

continuation of an application, filed March 15, 2000, that issued as U.S.

Patent No. 6,772,347 (“the ’347 patent”). The application that issued as the

’347 patent was a continuation-in-part of an application, filed April 1, 1999,

that issued as U.S. Patent No. 6,701,432 (“the ’432 patent”). Petitioner

asserts that because claims of the ’612 patent are directed to new matter

added to the continuation-in-part application for the ’347 patent, the earliest

priority date for the ’612 patent is March 15, 2000. Pet. 1. Patent Owner

has not contended that the ’612 patent is entitled to an earlier priority date.

Prelim. Resp. 4.

The ’612 patent, titled “Method, Apparatus and Computer Program

Product for a Network Firewall,” relates to methods and network devices for

providing network security, and describes an improved firewall that includes

both conventional fixed rules and dynamic rule generation. Ex. 1001,

Abstract, 1:16-19.

The ’612 patent states “a firewall is a device that can be coupled in-

line between a public network and a private network for screening packets

received from the public network.” Id. at 1:59-61. A packet is the

fundamental unit of transfer in a packet switch communication system. Id.

at 1:25-26. “A packet switch communication system includes a network of

one or more routers connecting a plurality of users.” Id. at 1:23-24. In a

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conventional system, a firewall engine processes the packets to enforce an

access control policy by screening the packets in accordance with one or

more sets of rules. Id. at 2:16-19. As explained in the ’612 patent:

As known in the art, a rule is a control policy for filtering

incoming and outgoing packets. Rules specify actions to be

applied as against certain packets. When a packet is received

for processing through a rule search, the packet’s IP header,

TCP header, or UDP header may require inspecting. A rule

will generally include, at a minimum, source/destination IP

addresses, UDP/TCP source/destination ports and transport

layer protocol. Additional criteria may be used by the rules as

well.

Id. at 2:38-46.

The firewall of the ’612 patent includes a first engine using a fixed set

of rules for initially sorting incoming packets into packets that are allowed

and denied. Id. at 3:19-21. The initially denied packets then are sorted

further by a second engine into allowed packets and denied packets using

dynamically generated rules. Id. at 3:21-25. This second engine is a

dynamic filter that generates rules using criteria, such as port number and IP

address, which are extracted from incoming packets for applications, such as

RealAudio, Netmeeting (which uses the H3232 protocol), and network file

system (“NFS”). Id. at 6:6-11.

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C. Illustrative Claims

Claims 1, 13, 22, and 27 are independent claims. Claims 2-12

depend, directly or indirectly, from independent claim 1. Claims 23-26

depend directly from independent claim 22.

Claims 1 and 13 are illustrative of the method and the network device

claims at issue, and are reproduced below:

1. A method, comprising:

establishing a set of rules for controlling access to and

from a network device for incoming and outgoing data units;

receiving, at the network device, a first sequence of data

units; and

adding one or more first rules to the set of rules based on

data extracted from the received first sequence of data units.

13. A network device, comprising:

an access control engine configured to establish a set of

rules for controlling access to and from the network device for

incoming and outgoing data units; and

a dynamic filter configured to add one or more first rules

to the set of rules based on data extracted from a first sequence

of data units received at the network device.

D. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability

Petitioner challenges claims 1-13 and 22-27 of the ’612 patent based

on the alleged grounds of unpatentability set forth in the table below, as

further supported by the Declaration of Dr. John Mitchell (Ex. 1004).

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Reference(s) Basis Claims Challenged

Julkunen1 § 102 1-3, 8-13, and 22-27

Schneider2 § 102 1-4, 6, 8-13, and 22-27

Brenton3 § 102 1-4, 6, 10, 12, 13, 22-24, and 26

Julkunen and Brenton § 103 4 and 6

Julkunen, Brenton, and

IETF NAT4

§ 103 5 and 7

Schneider and Brenton or

IETF NAT

§ 103 4-7

II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

As a step in our analysis for determining whether to institute trial, we

determine the meaning of the claims. Consistent with the statute and

legislative history of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L.

112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011), claims of unexpired patents are construed

by applying the broadest reasonable interpretation, in light of the

specification. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Office Patent Trial Practice

Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,766 (Aug. 14, 2012). Under the broadest

reasonable construction standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and

1 Heikki Julkunen and C. Edward Chow, Enhanced Network Security with

Dynamic Packet Filter (Department of Computer Science, University of

Colorado at Colorado Springs) (April 1997) (Ex. 1006, “Julkunen”). 2 U.S. Patent No. 6,178,505 B1, issued Jan. 23, 2001 (Ex. 1007,

“Schneider”). 3 Brenton, Chris, “Mastering™ Network Security,” (1998) (Ex. 1008,

“Brenton”). 4 Holdrege, Matt, and Srisuresh, Pyda, “Protocol Complications with the IP

Network Address Translator (NAT),” (Feb. 1999) (Ex. 1010, “IETF NAT”).

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customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the

art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech. Inc., 504

F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a claim term

must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re

Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

A. “rules”

Each of the challenged claims recites “a set of rules.” As noted by

Petitioner, the specification of the ’612 patent states “a rule is a control

policy for filtering incoming and outgoing packets.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex.

1001, 2:38-39). Petitioner offers no specific construction of the term

“rules.” Instead, Petitioner asserts both that a “lookup table” is not a “rule,”

and that, in the Concurrent Litigation, Patent Owner appears to contend that

“rules” include “application-specific rules.” Pet. 15-16. Petitioner and

Patent Owner agree that “rules” must exist across multiple sessions. Pet. 16;

Prelim. Resp. 4. Patent Owner contends that further construction is not

needed for the term “rules.” Prelim. Resp. 4-5.

The construction of the term “rules” does not turn on whether a

particular thing, like a “lookup table,” is, or is not, a set of “rules,” but rather

on what the term, itself, means. Moreover, notwithstanding their agreement,

the parties have identified no support in the specification for defining “rules”

to include a requirement that they exist across “multiple sessions.” Indeed,

the specification makes no reference to “multiple sessions.” Consequently,

the term “rules,” in light of the express definition provided by the

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specification, means “control policies for filtering incoming and outgoing

packets.” Ex. 1001, 2:38-39.

B. “access control engine”

Claims 13 and 27 recite an “access control engine configured to

establish a set of rules for controlling access to and from the network device

for incoming and outgoing data units.” The specification does not use the

term “access control engine” apart from the claims. Petitioner contends that

“access control engine” should be interpreted as “firewall engine” or “ACL

engine.” Pet. 17-18. Petitioner’s asserted rationale for such a construction,

which we find insufficient, is that “‘firewall engine’ or ‘ACL engine’ is an

admitted element of a prior art firewall.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:7-19,

59-61, Fig. 2a). Patent Owner offers no construction of “access control

engine.”

An ordinary and customary definition, to one of ordinary skill in the

relevant art, of the term “access control” is the “prevention of unauthorized

use of a resource, including the prevention of use of a resource in an

unauthorized manner.” THE IEEE STANDARD DICTIONARY OF ELECTRICAL

AND ELECTRONICS TERMS 5 (6th ed. 1996). An ordinary and customary

definition in the relevant art of the term “engine” is a “dedicated processor,

architecture, or system component that is used for a single and special

purpose.” Id. at 360. Consequently, the term “access control engine” means

“a dedicated processor, architecture, or system component that is used for

the prevention of unauthorized use of a resource, including the prevention of

use of a resource in an unauthorized manner.” For purposes of this decision,

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we adopt the aforementioned claim construction, because it is consistent

with the ordinary and customary meaning of “access control engine,” as

would be understood by one with ordinary skill in the art in light of the ’612

patent.

C. “dynamic filter”

Claim 13 requires “a dynamic filter configured to add one or more

first rules to the set of rules based on data extracted from a first sequence of

data units received at the network device.” Claim 27 requires, in relevant

part, a “dynamic filter” configured to “modify the set of rules,” “filter

second data units,” “modify the first modified set of rules,” and “filter third

data units.” Petitioner does not offer a specific construction of the term

“dynamic filter.” Instead, Petitioner contends that in the Concurrent

Litigation, Patent Owner construes implicitly “dynamic filter” to mean

“software that performs the function recited in the claim.” Pet. 19. Patent

Owner offers no construction of “dynamic filter.”

Although the specification does not define expressly the term

“dynamic filter,” it states that a “dynamic filter” processes packets, conducts

a search through a set of dynamically generated rules, generates rules, and

controls the passage of packets through the firewall to allow entry to a

private network. Ex. 1001, 6:1-27. The specification further states that use

of the dynamic filter “advantageously allows the use of dynamically-

generated rules, without increasing the processing time for those IP packets,

which are initially allowed [] by the ACL engine [] based on the fixed rule

set.” Id. at 6:32-38.

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The specification does not use the terms “dynamic” or “filter”

contrary to their ordinary and customary meanings. An ordinary and

customary definition, to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art, of the term

“dynamic” is “[p]ertaining to an event or process that occurs during

computer program execution.” THE IEEE STANDARD DICTIONARY OF

ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS TERMS 325 (6th ed. 1996). An ordinary and

customary definition, to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art, of the term

“filter” is a “device or program that separates data, signals, or material in

accordance with specified criteria.” Id. at 408.

Consequently, the term “dynamic filter” means “a device or program

that separates data in accordance with specified criteria through a process

that occurs during computer program execution.” For purposes of this

decision, we adopt the aforementioned claim construction because it is

consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of “dynamic filter,” as

would be understood by one with ordinary skill in the art in light of the

’612 patent.

D. Remaining Claim Terms or Phrases

For purposes of this decision, all remaining claim terms or phrases

recited in claims 1-13 and 22-27 of the ’612 patent are given their ordinary

and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in

the art.

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Petitioner is Not Precluded from Requesting Inter Partes Review

As a threshold issue, Patent Owner argues that the Petition should be

denied because it “violates the doctrine of assignor estoppel” and

“contradicts the oath that [Palo Alto Networks, Inc.] co-Founder Yuming

Mao submitted to the PTO attesting to the validity of the ’612 patent.” See

Prelim. Resp. 45. Mr. Yuming Mao is one of three inventors named on the

face of the ’612 patent.

The Board has determined previously, and we agree, that assignor

estoppel is not a basis for denying a petition requesting inter partes review:

Under the AIA, “a person who is not the owner of a

patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter

partes review of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (emphasis

added). Consequently, under the statute, an assignor of a

patent, who is no longer an owner of the patent at the time of

filing, may file a petition requesting inter partes review. This

statute presents a clear expression of Congress’s broad grant of

the ability to challenge the patentability of patents through inter

partes review.

Athena Automation Ltd. v. Husky Injection Molding Systems Ltd.,

IPR2013-00290, slip op. at 12-13 (PTAB Oct. 25, 2013), Paper No.

18.

Patent Owner’s reliance on 37 C.F.R. § 42.101(c), which provides in

relevant part that a person may not file a petition if the petitioner “or a privy

of the petitioner is estopped from challenging the claims on the grounds

identified in the petition,” is misplaced. See Prelim. Resp. 47. The grounds

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for estoppel, as referenced in § 42.101(c), are discussed expressly in 37

C.F.R. § 42.73(d), which states:

Estoppel. (1) Petitioner other than in derivation proceeding. A

petitioner, or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner,

is estopped in the Office from requesting or maintaining a

proceeding with respect to a claim for which it has obtained a

final written decision on patentability in an inter partes review,

post-grant review, or a covered business method patent review,

on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could

have raised during the trial, except that estoppel shall not apply

to a petitioner, or to the real party in interest or privy of the

petitioner who has settled under 35 U.S.C. 317 or 327.

Patent Owner does not contend that Petitioner, or the real party in

interest or privy of the Petitioner, “has obtained a final written decision on

patentability in an inter partes review, post-grant review, or a covered

business method patent review, on any ground that the petitioner raised or

reasonably could have raised during the trial,” as is required for Petitioner to

be estopped under 37 C.F.R. § 42.101(c). Patent Owner, therefore, has

failed to show that estoppel applies pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.73 and

42.101(c). Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the equitable doctrine of

assignor estoppel provides an exception to the statutory mandate that any

person who is not the owner of a patent may file a petition for inter partes

review. Accordingly, we decline to deny the Petition based on Patent

Owner’s estoppel arguments.

Patent Owner further asserts that even if Petitioner is not barred from

requesting inter partes review, the Board should exercise its discretion to

deny institution of trial because of the relationship between Mr. Mao and

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Petitioner.5 See Prelim. Resp. 48-49. Patent Owner argues that the Board’s

discretion provides an alternative ground for applying the principles of

equitable estoppel. Id. Patent Owner further argues, more generally, that

equitable considerations weigh against granting the Petition, including that

Patent Owner is denied the opportunity to submit “inventor declarations

under 37 C.F.R. [§] 1.131 to identify the circumstances of conception and

reduction to practice so as to ‘swear behind’ what might otherwise constitute

prior art,” because Mr. Mao is adverse to Patent Owner. Prelim. Resp. at 48-

49.

To the extent the Board has discretion to consider equitable

considerations in determining whether to institute trial, in this case, Patent

Owner has not made a showing that warrants exercise of that discretion. For

the same reasons discussed above, Patent Owner has not shown that the

Board should exercise discretion to apply principles of assignor estoppel to

circumvent the express statutory language that permits any person “who is

not the owner of a patent” to request inter partes review. With regard to

other equitable considerations, Patent Owner’s arguments are, at best,

speculative. Patent Owner does not identify any specific prior art it seeks to

“swear behind,” and makes no showing that it is unable to do so merely

because one of a multiple number of inventors on the face of the patent may

5 This case does not require us to reach the issue of whether Mr. Mao is in

privity with Petitioner, as asserted by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 52-58),

because we conclude that even if Patent Owner established such a

relationship, Patent Owner has not shown a sufficient basis to preclude

Petitioner from requesting inter partes review.

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have a relationship with Petitioner. Accordingly, we conclude that Patent

Owner has not shown that Petitioner is barred or estopped, or otherwise

should be precluded, from petitioning to institute inter partes review of the

’612 patent.

B. Anticipation Based on Julkunen

Petitioner contends that Julkunen is prior art to the ’612 patent and

anticipates claims 1-3, 8-13, and 22-27 under 35 U.S.C. § 102. Pet. 21.

Petitioner relies upon claim charts, as well as the Declaration of Dr. John

Mitchell (Ex. 1004), to explain how Julkunen anticipates these claims of the

’612 patent. Pet. 21-30.

Julkunen is a report that “presents the study, design and

implementation of a firewall, in particular a major component of a firewall:

the dynamic packet filter.” Ex. 1006, p. 1 (Abstract).6 According to

Petitioner, Julkunen discloses the modification of a standard Linux firewall

that uses administrator-programmed rules with what Julkunen calls a

dynamic packet filter (“DPF”). Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1006, 3-4; 12-14).

Julkunen explains that a “dynamic packet filter checks on the fly the

outgoing IP packets from a computer and then allows incoming packets to

get through the packet filter if the packets are from the same computer as the

outgoing packets were sent to.” Ex. 1006, p. 1 (Abstract). Petitioner also

asserts that Julkunen describes dynamically generating rules based on

6 In this decision, citations to Julkunen refer to the page numbers as they

appear on the original document, not to the page numbers labeled by

Petitioner for Exhibit 1006.

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information extracted from the Network File System (“NFS”) data packets,

and that dynamically generated rules operate across multiple sessions. Pet.

22 (citing Ex. 1006, 39-43).

1. Whether Julkunen is Prior Art

Petitioner states that Julkunen was published in April, 1997. Pet. 21.

Patent Owner contests the prior art status of Julkunen and contends that

Petitioner “has failed to present any evidence that Julkunen qualifies as a

‘printed publication’ that was publicly available before the critical date.”

Prelim. Resp. 7-11.

Patent Owner cites Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., for the

proposition that absent evidence of publication or public accessibility of a

reference, a petition for inter partes review, with respect to grounds based

on that reference, should be denied. Prelim. Resp. 10-11 (citing IPR2012-

00042, slip op. at 35-36 (PTAB Feb. 22, 2013), Paper No. 16). Indeed, the

determination of whether a given reference qualifies as a prior art “printed

publication” involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances

surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public. In re

Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

Unlike the reference at issue in Synopsys, which was a company’s

product brochure that lacked any date on its face, Julkunen is a dated report

with a Bibliographic Data Sheet, a “Performing Organization Rept. No.,”

and a “Performing Organization Name” listed as the Department of

Computer Science at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs. Ex.

1006, 73. The Bibliographic Data Sheet also identifies the “Report Date” as

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“April, 1997.” Id. We are not convinced that institution of inter partes

review based on Julkunen should be denied in this instance based on Patent

Owner’s assertions that Julkunen “merely includes the words ‘April 1997’

on its first page,” and that a space labeled “Availability Statement” on the

“Bibliographic Data Sheet” page of Julkunen is blank. See Prelim. Resp. 9-

10; see also Ex. 1006, cover page and 73. On this record, we are persuaded

that Petitioner has made a threshold showing that Julkunen is a “printed

publication” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 102. As a consequence, for

purposes of this decision, Julkunen is available as prior art for Petitioner to

demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims are

unpatentable.

2. Whether Petitioner Has Shown a Reasonable Likelihood that

Claims 1-3, 8-13, and 22-27 are Anticipated by Julkunen

Patent Owner contends that review should not be instituted based on

the alleged anticipation by Julkunen. In addition to disputing the status of

Julkunen as prior art, Patent Owner argues that Julkunen does not disclose

“‘rules’ that exist ‘across multiple sessions,’ as required in all independent

claims.” Prelim. Resp. 7. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, none of the

challenged claims recites “across multiple sessions.” As discussed above,

even though Petitioner and Patent Owner agree that “rules” must exist across

multiple sessions, neither party has offered support for the contention that

such a requirement, which does not appear on the face of the claims and is

not discussed in the specification, should be read into the claims. Therefore,

we find Patent Owner’s argument not persuasive, because it is not

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commensurate with the scope of the claims, as they are construed for

purposes of this decision.

Patent Owner also contends that Petitioner fails to allege that “the

purported ‘rules’ in Julkunen are based on a ‘sequence of data units’ or

multiple ‘data units.’” Prelim. Resp. 15-16. Again, Patent Owner’s

argument is not persuasive, because it is not commensurate with the scope of

the claims. The claims recite either adding or modifying rules “based on

data extracted” from either “the received first sequence of data units” (claim

1), “a first sequence of data units” (claim 13), or “first data units” (claims 22

and 27). Thus, based on the record before us, the ’612 patent requires that

rules must be based on “data” extracted from “data units,” not that rules

must be based on a ‘sequence of data units’ or multiple ‘data units,’ as

Patent Owner contends.

With respect to claims 8, 21, and 27, Patent Owner contends that

Petitioner fails to support the assertion that Julkunen discloses further action

upon “second data units,” because Petitioner supports that assertion by citing

to the same disclosure relied upon for the “first sequence of data units.”

Prelim. Resp. 16-17. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument.

Claim 21 is not challenged in the Petition. Claims 8 and 27 require

modifying rules based on data extracted from a “second sequence of data

units,” or from “second data units,” respectively. There is no indication that

the disclosure of Julkunen relied upon by Petitioner suggests that the

disclosed dynamic packet filter acts only on a set of first data units. To the

contrary, Petitioner references Julkunen’s disclosure of adding rules to a set

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of packet filtering rules, and modifying that set of rules based on data

received from another set of NFS packets. See Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1006, 35

and 42-43). Based on the record before us, Petitioner’s citation to Julkunen

amounts to sufficient evidence showing a reasonable likelihood that claims 8

and 27 are anticipated by Julkunen.

With respect to claims 12 and 26, Patent Owner contends that

Petitioner fails to identify any disclosure in Julkunen that satisfies the

requirement that “the data extracted from the received first sequence of data

units comprises a port number and a network address associated with a

source of the data units.” Prelim. Resp. 16-17. In discussing claim 12,

Petitioner references citations to Julkunen that disclose modifying added

rules using source and destination network address and port information

extracted from received FTP and NFS packets. Pet. 28 (citing to Ex. 1006,

35 and 43, and referring to the support provided for claim 1 at pages 24-25).

Based on the record before us, Petitioner’s citation to Julkunen amounts to

sufficient evidence showing a reasonable likelihood that claims 12 and 26

are anticipated by Julkunen.

With respect to claim 13, Patent Owner contends that because

Petitioner offered no construction of the terms “access control engine” or

“dynamic filter,” Petitioner “offers no explanation for how Julkunen

discloses these claim limitations under any construction.” Prelim. Resp. 17.

We disagree, as Petitioner need not propose an express construction for a

claim term to identify how a related claim limitation is disclosed by a

particular reference. In this case, we interpret “access control engine” to

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mean “a dedicated processor, architecture, or system component that is used

for the prevention of unauthorized use of a resource, including the

prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorized manner.” We are

persuaded that, with respect to claim 13, Petitioner identifies the disclosure

in Julkunen of a firewall, which constitutes an “access control engine”

consistent with our construction of that term. Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1006, 3 and

13). Similarly, we interpret “dynamic filter” to mean “a device or program

that separates data in accordance with specified criteria through a process

that occurs during computer program execution.” We are further persuaded

that, with respect to claim 13, Petitioner identifies the disclosure in Julkunen

of a “dynamic packet filter” consistent with our construction of a “dynamic

filter.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1006, p. 16). Based on the record before us,

Petitioner’s citation to Julkunen provides sufficient evidence to show a

reasonable likelihood that claim 13 is anticipated by Julkunen.

In summary, having considered all of the information Petitioner has

presented based on Julkunen with respect to claims 1-3, 8-13, and 22-27, we

conclude that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that these claims

are anticipated by Julkunen.

C. Anticipation Based on Brenton

Petitioner contends that Brenton is prior art to the ’612 patent and

anticipates claims 1-4, 6, 10, 12, 13, 22-24, and 26 under 35 U.S.C. §§

102(a) and (b). In particular, Petitioner relies upon claim charts, as well as

the Declaration of Dr. John Mitchell (Ex. 1004), to explain how Brenton

anticipates these claims of the ’612 patent. Pet. 43-52.

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According to Petitioner, Brenton, a 672-page book describing a wide

range of computer network security technologies, discloses a dynamic

packet filter that extends the capabilities of a static packet filter by

maintaining a connection table or state table. Pet. 43 (citing Ex. 1008, 141-

182). 7 According to Petitioner, “the dynamic filter creates a state table to

store information” regarding a connection allowed by the static filter. Pet.

43-44. Petitioner appears to equate the “state table” to “additional rules of

the dynamic filter” that enable filtering beyond the capabilities of the static

filter, for example, by selectively filtering UDP packets that may have been

denied initially by a static filter. Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1008, 163).

1. Whether Brenton is Prior Art

Petitioner states that Brenton was published in 1998. Pet. 43. Patent

Owner contends that Petitioner has failed to present “any competent

evidence” that Brenton qualifies “as a ‘printed publication’ that was publicly

available before the critical date.” Prelim. Resp. 25-28.

Exhibit 1008 includes a title page indicating a copyright of 1999 and a

Library of Congress Card Number 98-87201. Ex. 1008. Petitioner also

provided an undated copy of the corresponding Library of Congress Catalog

of Record, which indicates a “Published/Created” date of 1998. Ex. 1009.

Patent Owner suggests that the copyright date of 1999 draws into question

the asserted publication date of 1998. Prelim. Resp. 27. Patent Owner also

7 In this decision, citations to Brenton refer to the page numbers as they

appear on the original document, not to the page numbers labeled by

Petitioner for Exhibit 1008.

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maintains that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

found evidence similar to that offered by Petitioner to be insufficient for

purposes of establishing public accessibility of a paper in a database.

Prelim. Resp. 26 (citing In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir.

2009)). The case cited by Patent Owner, however, addressed a paper

submitted by a patent applicant to the Copyright Office, not a published

book with a Library of Congress Card Number such as Brenton. See In re

Lister, 583 F.3d at 1309-10.

On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has made a threshold

showing that Brenton is a “printed publication” within the meaning of

35 U.S.C. § 102. As a consequence, for purposes of this decision, Brenton is

available as prior art for Petitioner to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood

that the challenged claims are unpatentable.

2. Whether Petitioner Has Shown a Reasonable Likelihood that

Brenton Anticipates Claims 1-4, 6, 10, 12, 13, 22-24, and 26

Petitioner has not provided a complete copy of “Mastering™ Network

Security,” a book by Chris Brenton. Instead, as set forth as Exhibit 1008,

the reference identified as “Brenton” consists of the book cover, a title page,

pages of the third chapter titled “Understanding How Network Systems

Communicate,” and pages of the fifth chapter titled “Firewalls.” Ex. 1008.

Patent Owner contends that by failing to submit a complete copy, Petitioner

“has rendered impossible any full and complete consideration of the

reference itself.” Prelim. Resp. 29. Patent Owner does not suggest that it

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was unable to obtain a complete copy of the reference or further explain how

its preliminary response was hindered by an incomplete copy.

We conclude that on the record before us, material omitted by

Petitioner from Exhibit 1008 is not relevant to our determination of whether

Petitioner has presented information that establishes a reasonable likelihood

that it would prevail with respect to the claims challenged in the petition. To

the extent Patent Owner contends it has an objection to the evidence

presented as Exhibit 1008 based on the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Board

rules provide the specific manner and timing of properly making an

objection to evidence during trial.

Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s arguments based on

Brenton are improper because they rely on unrelated portions of the

reference, rather than the disclosure of one complete system. Prelim. Resp.

28-29. In particular, Patent Owner identifies citations by Petitioner to seven

specific pages from a span of 33 pages of Brenton. Prelim. Resp. 28 n.7.

Patent Owner is correct in recognizing that, to anticipate a claim, a reference

“must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of

the document, but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the

claim.” Prelim. Resp. 29 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Net MoneyIn, Inc. v.

VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).

Patent Owner, however, has not shown, by merely identifying the

applicable law and the number of pages cited, that Petitioner has cobbled

together improperly “something allegedly resembling the ’612 patent

claims.” See Prelim. Resp. 28. For example, Patent Owner contends

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Petitioner has cited to “unrelated portions” of Brenton, yet all of the citations

identified by Patent Owner are from the fifth chapter of Brenton and relate

directly to firewalls. See Prelim. Resp. 28 n.7. Patent Owner also does not

articulate how the disclosure of Brenton fails to represent adequately the

arrangement of the claimed elements, as required by each challenged claim.

Accordingly, on this record, we are not convinced that review based on

Brenton should be denied on the premise that Petitioner relied on unrelated

portions of Brenton.

Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner has not demonstrated that

Brenton discloses adding rules to the set of rules, or modifying the set of

rules, as required by all of the challenged claims. Prelim. Resp. 32-33. In

particular, Patent Owner suggests that “adding and modifying must be

performed not on any set of rules, but on the antecedent set of rules

identified earlier in the claim.” Prelim. Resp. 32. Patent Owner’s argument

is premised on its interpretation of Brenton that “the set of rules” is limited

to the access control policy enforced by a static packet filter. Prelim. Resp.

32. Such an interpretation is not consistent with the ’612 patent, which

makes clear that a step involving dynamically generated rules, i.e., added or

modified rules, may be included after processing by the static filter to further

sort packets. Ex. 1001, 3:17-27. Therefore, we are persuaded that the

information presented by Petitioner amounts to sufficient evidence showing

a reasonable likelihood that Brenton discloses adding or modifying the set of

rules, as claimed. See Pet. 46 (citing to Ex. 1008, 150, 157, 160, 163).

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Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner has not shown that Brenton

discloses rules that exist across multiple sessions, or that rules are added or

modified based on multiple data units. Prelim. Resp. 29-32, 33-34. Patent

Owner’s arguments are not persuasive for the same reasons discussed above

with respect to Patent Owner’s assertion of the same arguments with respect

to Julkunen—Patent Owner’s arguments are not commensurate with the

scope of the claims, as they are construed for purposes of this decision. See

III.B.2, above.

Patent Owner further argues that Brenton does not disclose specific

limitations of other challenged claims, without identifying these claims.

Prelim. Resp. 34. Instead, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s analysis is

deficient for the same reasons Patent Owner asserted with respect to

Julkunen. The claims challenged as anticipated by Brenton, however, do not

mirror the claims challenged as anticipated by Julkunen. Patent Owner has

not adequately set forth its argument, and we will not speculate as to what

Patent Owner intends by vague statements purporting to incorporate

arguments against grounds of unpatentability based on a different reference

for different claims.

In summary, having considered all of the information Petitioner has

presented based on Brenton with respect to claims 1-4, 6, 10, 12, 13, 22-24,

and 26, we conclude that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that

these claims are anticipated by Brenton.

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D. Obviousness Based on: (1) Julkunen and Brenton; and (2) Julkunen,

Brenton, and IETF NAT

Petitioner contends that claims 4-7 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.

§ 103(a) over “Julkunen in combination with IETF NAT, Brenton, or the

knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Pet. 52-57. Petitioner

relies upon claim charts, as well as the Declaration of Dr. John Mitchell (Ex.

1004), to explain how these cited prior art references teach claims 4-7 of the

’612 patent. Id.

Claims 4-7 depend, directly or indirectly, on claim 1 and are generally

further directed to adding network address translation (“NAT”) to the

method of claim 1. Petitioner admits that Julkunen does not disclose NAT,

and instead, asserts that Brenton discloses address translation as a standard

feature implemented in most firewall products. Pet. 53 (citing Ex. 1008,

174). Petitioner alleges that with NAT, “the firewall described in Julkunen

would have replaced the network addresses and port numbers in the packet

headers associated with a location within a private network with a network

address and a port number associated with the firewall.” Pet. 48-49, 53

(citing Ex. 1008, 174). IETF NAT is an internet-draft memo, titled

“Protocol Complications with the IP Network Address Translator (NAT),”

posted by the Internet Engineering Task Force. Ex. 1010. Petitioner asserts

that IETF NAT discloses how to apply NAT to packets with address

information embedded in their payload as claimed. Pet. 54-55 (citing Ex.

1010, 2).

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Patent Owner contends that Petitioner has failed to sufficiently

identify the precise grounds of unpatentability upon which Petitioner

challenges claims 4-7, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). Prelim. Resp.

34-36. We disagree. The claim charts provided by Petitioner make clear the

combination of references asserted by Petitioner. See Pet. 52-57. We

understand Petitioner to argue that Claims 4 and 6 are unpatentable as

obvious over the combination of Julkunen and Brenton, and that claims 5

and 7 are unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Julkunen,

Brenton, and IETF NAT. See Pet. 52-57.

Patent Owner also argues that the asserted combination based on

Julkunen fails for the same reasons Patent Owner raised with respect to the

asserted anticipation by Julkunen of claim 1. Prelim. Resp. 36-37. As we

concluded Patent Owner’s arguments were not persuasive with respect to

claim 1, on the record before us, the same arguments are likewise

unpersuasive with respect to the obviousness grounds based on Julkunen.

We also have considered Patent Owner’s arguments against the

asserted combination based on Julkunen, including the contention that

Petitioner offered no rationale for the asserted combination. See Prelim.

Resp. 37-40. To the contrary, for the obviousness grounds based on

Julkunen with respect to claims 4-7 (see Pet. 52-57), we understand

Petitioner to contend that those claims require only the combination of

familiar elements according to known methods to yield predictable results.

See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).

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In addition, Patent Owner argues that “to the extent Julkunen suggests

the use of ‘proxying’ for address hiding, it actually ‘teaches away’ from the

use of NAT for that purpose.” Prelim. Resp. 38-39. Patent Owner also

contends that one skilled in the art would not have sought to combine

Brenton with Julkunen because Brenton suggests that a dynamic packet filter

cannot make filtering decisions based on payload. Id. at 38. We are not

persuaded by Patent Owner’s teaching away arguments, based on the record

before us, because Patent Owner has not sufficiently addressed the

combination of prior art references as a whole. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d

413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for obviousness is not . . . that the claimed

invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references.

Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have

suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”). Moreover, Patent Owner

does not direct us to an explicit disclosure in Julkunen that criticizes,

discredits, or otherwise discourages using a NAT with the firewall disclosed

in Julkunen, namely, as a substitute for the proxying services. See In re

Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere

disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away

from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize,

discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed in the . . .

application.”).

Patent Owner also asserts that review of claims 4-7 on obviousness

grounds should be denied because Petitioner did not address objective

indicia of non-obviousness. Prelim. Resp. 40-41. In particular, Patent

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Owner asserts that in the Concurrent Litigation it has presented “substantial

evidence of objective indicia of non-obviousness.” Id. at 40. We are not

persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. Patent Owner does not argue here

that the previously presented evidence of secondary considerations rebuts or

outweighs the evidence presented by Petitioner supporting the

unpatentability of claims 4-7 over Julkunen, Brenton, and IETF NAT.

Moreover, the existence of previously presented evidence of secondary

considerations, evidence not before us at this juncture, neither bars the

institution of a trial nor constitutes an additional burden that the Petitioner

must overcome in demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that it would

prevail in demonstrating the unpatentability of claims 4-7 of the ’612 patent.

Cf. In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052 (CCPA 1976) (“Facts established by

rebuttal evidence must be evaluated along with the facts on which the earlier

conclusion was reached, not against the conclusion itself.”).

In summary, having considered all of the information Petitioner has

presented based on a combination of Julkunen, Brenton, and IETF NAT with

respect to claims 4-7, we conclude that Petitioner has shown a reasonable

likelihood that claims 4 and 6 would have been obvious over Julkunen and

Brenton, and that claims 5 and 7 would have been obvious over Julkunen,

Brenton, and IETF NAT.

E. Anticipation and Obviousness Based on Schneider

Petitioner contends that claims 1-4, 6, 8-13, and 22-27 are

unpatentable as anticipated by Schneider, and that claims 4-7 are

unpatentable for obviousness over Schneider in combination with Brenton or

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IETF NAT. Pet. 30-42, 57-60. We exercise our discretion and determine

that those grounds of unpatentability are redundant to the grounds of

unpatentability on which we initiate inter partes review. Accordingly, we

do not authorize inter partes review on the remaining grounds of

unpatentability asserted by Petitioner against claims 1-13 and 22-27 of the

’612 patent. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the information presented

in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner

would prevail in showing that claims 1-13 and 22-27 are unpatentable.

However, we have not made a final determination with respect to the

patentability of these claims.

V. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is:

ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review is

hereby instituted as to claims 1-13 and 22-27 of the ’612 patent based on the

following grounds of unpatentability:

A. Claims 1-3, 8-13, and 22-27 as anticipated under 35 U.S.C.

§ 102 by Julkunen;

B. Claims 1-4, 6, 10, 12, 13, 22-24, and 26 as anticipated under 35

U.S.C. § 102 by Brenton;

C. Claims 4 and 6 as unpatentable for obviousness under 35

U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of Julkunen and Brenton; and,

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D. Claims 5 and 7 as unpatentable for obviousness under 35

U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of Julkunen, Brenton, and IETF NAT;

FURTHER ORDERED that no other grounds of unpatentability are

authorized for the inter partes review as to claims 1-13 and 22-27 of the

’612 patent;

FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37

C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial. The trial

will commence on the entry date of this decision; and

FURTHER ORDERED that an initial conference call with the Board

is scheduled for 3:30 p.m. on January 9, 2014. The parties are directed to

the Office Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,765-66 (Aug. 14,

2012) for guidance in preparing for the initial conference call, and should be

prepared to discuss any proposed changes to the Scheduling Order entered

herewith, and any motions the parties anticipate filing during the trial.

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PETITIONER:

Matthew Kreeger

Brian Ho

MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP

[email protected]

[email protected]

Michael J. Schallop

Van Pelt, Yi & James LLP

[email protected]

PATENT OWNER:

David McPhie

Ben Haber

Irell & Manella LLP

[email protected]

[email protected]