PALMQUIST.tree.25. Power and the Boundary of Politics

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25. Power and the Boundary of Politics

by Stephen Palmquist ([email protected])

Here in Part Three we have been learning that philosophy deals not only

with abstract theoretical issues relating to metaphysics, epistemology,

logic, and language usage, but alsowith more concrete practical issues,

such as those relating to science and morality. The philosophy of science

and moral philosophy are both major branches of philosophy: they provide

the basis for applying philosophy to more practical issues relating to

specific sciences or specific ethical situations. In this and the following

lecture I want us to consider one f urther branch of the tree of philosophy,

political philosophy. There are actually a number of other fields of

philosophical inquiry that might be included in Part Three, if we had time.

But for our purposes a discussion of political philosophy can serve as anadequate way of completing our study of how to apply philosophical

thinking in our search for wisdom.

Many of the philosophers we have already studied had much to say about

political philosophy. For example, the main point of Plato's longest and

most systematic book, called Republic, is to set out a rational plan for the

ideal political system.However, many aspects of his proposal appear to

modern readers to be too unrealistic and /or outdated to be considered very

seriously. The suggestion that philosophers ought to be trained to serve askings, for instance, is an idea that has rarely, if ever, been put into practice.

One of the reasons Plato's political philosophy seems so distant f rom our

ownways of thinking about politics is that modern political thought is

rooted to a large extent in the quite different ideas put forward by his star

student. Aristotle's book, Politics, also contains some examples whose

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relevance is limited to the ancient Greek city-states, where the political

systems were early forerunners of modern democracies; yet the main issues

it raises are of timeless interest, transcending their original historical

context in their applicability.Hence,we shall use today's lecture to take a

close look at this classic text in political philosophy.

Aristotle regarded politics not merely as an optional field of philosophical

inquiry, but as an essential task for any philosopher, because "man is by

nature a political animal" ( AP 1253a(37)). In Politics Aristotle attempted to

determine what constitutes the "best" city. (The Greekword for "city",

incidentally, is polis, f romwhich we derive the word "politics".) This

required him not only to discuss what its particular characteristics would

be, but also to analyze the general nature of a city and the different political

systems (" politeiai") that can be used to govern a city. But politeiai include

not only specific governmental structures, but also "the way of life of a city"in general (1295a(133)). Although his analysis is by no means the lastword

on the subject, an examination of Aristotle's ideas can provide a good

sampling of the various ways of drawing the boundary that defines possible

political systems.

Aristotle began his study of politics by claiming that "every city is some

form of partnership ... for the sake of some good", and that the political

philosopher's task is that of "investigating what the city is composed of" ( AP

1252a(35)).He then pointed out that families and business relations are

also examples of partnerships exhibiting something like politics on a lower

level. A partnership between several families gives rise to a village, and a

partnership between several villages gives rise to a city. The partnership

that makes up a city therefore requires certain agreements between

"similar persons, for the sake of a life that is the best possible" (1328a(209)).

Aristotle never suggested that such partners must be similar in every

respect, but that both unity and diversity must exist between the partners

ind

iffer

entr

es

pects

: "a city tends

to come into being at the pointw

hen thepartnership formed by a multitude is self-sufficient" (1261a-b(55-57)). The

ur pose of a city, therefore, is

not [to be] a partnership in a location and for the sake of not committing

injustice against each other and of transacting business. These things must


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necessarily be present if there is to be a city, but not even when all of them

are present is it yet a city, but [the city is] the partnership in livingwell both

of households and families for the sake of a complete and self-sufficient life.

(1280b(99))

Anyone who can participate actively in the political partnership that makesup a city is qualified to be a "citizen". Thus Aristotle defined a citizen as

anyone who can hold a government office: "Whoever is entitled to

participate in an office involving deliberation or decision is ... a citizen in

this city; and the city is the multitude of such persons that is adequate with

a view to a self-sufficient life" ( AP 1275a-b(87)). Sharing in the political

partnership of the city requires the citizen not only to be a capable

decision-maker, but also to be a person who is willing to abide by decisions

made by others. For Aristotle stressed (1277b(92)) that "the good citizen

should know and have the capacity both to be ruled and to rule, and thisvery thing is the virtue of a citizen-knowledge of rule over f ree persons

f rom both [points of view]."

In this sense monarchies,where only one person rules, have no citizens; in

fact, they technically have no city and no politics either, inasmuch as there

is no partnership between equals for the purpose of ruling and being ruled.

This is why Aristotle sometimes contrasted monarchies with what we

would call "republican" (i.e., non-monarchical) political systems: only the

latter are politeiai in the strict sense of the word (though he sometimes

used this term loosely to refer to monarchies as well), so republican

systems occupied his primary attention in Politics.

One of the most interesting aspects of Aristotle's political philosophy is

that, in the course of his discussion, he developed a systematic f ramework

consisting of six possible types of political system. They are distinguished

by the different source of authority and power that characterizes each.

After asserting that "the authoritative element" in a political system must

"be either one or a few or the many", he explains the difference between

"correct" political systems and their "deviations" ( AP 1279a(96)): "when the

one or the few or the many rule with a view to the common advantage, these

political systems are necessarily correct,while those with a view to the

private advantage of the one or the few or the multitude are deviations."


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The names Aristotle assigned each of these six systems are as follows. The

correct form of monarchy is called a "kingship". (In ancient Greek monos

means "alone" or "single"; archos means "ruler". The suffix "-cracy" comes

f rom kratos, meaning "power".) The correct form of "rule by the few" is

"aristocracy", meaning the power is held by the best (aristos) people. And

"polity" is the correct form of majority rule, though Aristotle also used thisterm to refer in a generalway to all political systems. Since he sometimes

contrasted politeiaiwith monarchy, Aristotle in this context probably

intended politeiai to be interpreted in this narrow sense; as such, his claim

was that all non-monarchical systems (i.e., all republics) can be called

polities. In N icomachean E thics ( NE 1160a), he avoided the equivocal use of

"polity" by referring to this third correct political system as "timocracy",

meaning power held by those who own property (timema). Moreover, he

explicitly stated that this term is to be preferred to the term "polity", even

though the latter is the more common of the two terms. However, this brief

account of timocracy is difficult to distinguish f rom oligarchy (see below);

so I shall adopt the usage given in Politics in spite of its possible ambiguity.

Aristotle also described deviations f rom each of the three basically positive

forms of political system:

Deviations f rom those mentioned are tyranny f rom kingship, oligarchy f rom

aristocracy, democracy f rom polity. Tyranny is monarchywith a view to the

advantage of the monarch, oligarchy [rule]with a view to the advantage of

the well off, democracy [rule]with a view to the advantage of those who are

poor; none of them is with a view to the common gain. ( AP 1279b(96))

Let's now examine each of these six political systems in a bit more detail.

In his discussion of kingship, Aristotlewas caref ul to point out that there

are several different kinds of kings. The main distinction is between those

whose authority transcends the law and those who must themselves obey

the law. A political systemwhere the "so-called king" rules "according to

law" is not a true kingship; such a king is more like a "permanent general"

( AP 1287a(113)). A kingship in the true sense of the word is an "absolute

kingship",where "one person has authority over all matters ..., with an

arrangement that resembles household management" (1285b(110-111)). In a

kingship, "the best political system is not one based onwritten (rules) and


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laws", because a good kingwill be able to judge fairly according to the

circumstances of each specific situation, being guided by the general

principles of the law, even though his judgment need not be determined by

them (1286a(111)). As Aristotle put it in AP 1284a(106-107): "If there is one

person so outstanding by his excess of virtue-or a number of persons ...-...

such persons can no longer be regarded as a part of the city.... [For] theythemselves are law."He then pointed out that "ostracism" is the inevitable

fate for such persons "in the deviant political systems" (1284b(108)), even

though in "the best political systems ... persons of this sort will be

permanent kings in their cities."

Although kingship is technically the best political system, Aristotle

preferred aristocracy for several reasons. There is always a danger that the

one man holding all the power will turn bad, so that the best systemwould

degenerate into theworst (i.e., tyranny). The only protection against such aman being overcome by his own selfish desires is for him to accept the rule

of law; thus "it is laws-correctly enacted-that should be authoritative", not

persons ( AP 1282a-b(103)). The nature of law is such that it protects people

against the ever-present danger of being corrupted by their own appetite,

for as Aristotle explained (1287a(114)): "Onewho asks law to rule ... is held

to be asking god and intellect alone to rule, while one who asks man adds

the beast. Desire is a thing of this sort; and spiritedness perverts rulers and

the best men. Hence law is intellect without appetite."

Another problem with kingship in Aristotle's mind is that there is likely to

be more than just one good man in most cities, so the good menwho are not

allowed to rule may not be satisfiedwith the inequality between themselves

and the king. Such an unjust situation is almost inevitably resolved by

replacing the kingwith an aristocracy,where all the rulers are good men

( AP 1286b(112)). (They cannot be goodwomen because, according to

Aristotle,women are not even be allowed to become citizens!) Hence,

Ar

is

totlesu

gges

ted

that, ir

onically, theless

pow

er

a king has

(i.e., the less

heis like a true king), the longer hewill be able to preserve his rule

(1313a(173)).

An "aristocracy ... is in some sense an oligarchy" (oligos means "few"), since

in both types of political system "the rulers are few" ( AP 1306b(159)). The


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difference is that, unlike a typical (i.e., deviant) oligarchy,where the rulers

are chosen merely "on the basis ofwealth", the rulers in an aristocracy are

chosen "in accordance with virtue" (1273a (82)). (When property ownership

is the type of wealth used as one of the main qualifications for choosing who

is given the power and authority to rule in an oligarchy (see e.g., 1279b(96)),

the system could also be called a timocracy. One way of accounting for thepotential ambiguity between the terms "oligarchy" and "timocracy"would

be to note that a timocracy would be a polity if the amount of property

required to be a citizen is very low, whereas itwould be an oligarchy if the

amount is high, since only a few people would then be wealthy enough to be

citizens.) Oligarchy is usually bad for a city, because there is no guarantee

that the rulers will be virtuous (e.g., by looking after the welfare of the poor)

ust because they are rich. An aristocracy, by contrast, is by definition (in

Aristotle's sense of the word) a political systemwhere the few men who are

given the power and authority to rulewill, being virtuous, look after the

interests of those who are not members of the ruling class.

The distinction Aristotle devoted the most attention to in Politics is

between the two extreme forms of non-monarchical government, oligarchy

and democracy. This is probably because these two systems are the ones

found most f requently in real historical cities, both in ancient Greece and in

modern times. For example, he said "law may be oligarchic or democratic"

( AP 1281a(100)), in the sense that "in democratic political systems the

people have authority,while by contrast it is the few in oligarchies"

(1278b(94)). In AP 1279b-1280a(96-97), he explained:

oligarchy is when those with property have authority in the political

system; and democracy is the opposite,when those have authority who do

not possess a [significant] amount of property but are poor ... What makes

democracy and oligarchy differ is poverty andwealth:wherever some rule

on account of wealth,whether a minority or a majority, this is necessarily

an oligar

chy, andw

her

ever

thos

ew

ho ar

e poor

, ad

emocr

acy. Bu

t it tur

ns

out ... that the former are few and the latter many ...

Whereas "the defining principle of aristocracy is virtue" and "that of

oligarchy is wealth", the defining principle of democracy is "the majority

[i.e., the poor] having authority" (1310a(167)).


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Democracy is a political system where a partnership between the "common

people" (démos) determines how power and authority are distributed in the

city. It is therefore characterized by a type of "f reedom" that involves "being

ruled and ruling in turn" ( AP 1317a-b (183)). Such an arrangement of

reciprocal ruling among equals "is law" (1287a(113)). As with most of the

other political systems, Aristotle discussed several varieties of democracy,including the type where "the people become a monarch", in the sense that

"the many have authority [over the law, though] not as individuals but all

together" (1292a(125-6)). In the narrow sense of a political system (i.e., as

excluding monarchies), "a democracy of this sort is not a political system.

For where the laws do not rule there is no political system."

Aristotlewarned that the best political system for a given city cannot be

determined in advance: any of the systems (except tyranny) may end up

being the most appropriate, once the specific situation is taken intoconsideration. Thus, for example, he admitted that sometimes a kingship

will be the best system for a city, even though in general "to have law rule is

to be chosen in preference to having one of the citizens do so" ( AP

1288a(115-116)). Polity, the political system Aristotle thought is most often

to be preferred, is midway between aristocracy and democracy. Yet even in

the case of polity, he granted that "there is nothing to prevent another

political system being more advantageous for certain [cities]" (1296b(136)).

Polity is a political system based on the "golden mean" (see e.g., NE 1106a-

1109b(65-75)), Aristotle's famous principle telling us always to avoid

extremes; in this case it tells us that "the middling sort of life is best" for

both the city and the individual ( AP 1295a(133)). In other words, polity is a

political system where the "middle class", as we would now call it, forms a

majority of people who have the power and authority to rule in a way that

mixes elements of the other three republican systems. The mixture

Aristotle had in mind involves a combination of democracy and oligarchy

(the tw

o extr

emes

) insu

ch aw

ay that their

extr

eme elements w

ill canceleach other out: a polity requires "a mixture of ... the well off and the poor"

(1293b-1294b(129-132)). But it might also mix elements of aristocracy and

oligarchy, as when a polity requires "a lawdistributing offices on the basis

of merit [as in aristocracy] to those who are well off [as in oligarchy]"

(1288a(116)). Whenwe read Aristotle saying that the best sort of oligarchy


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"is very close to so-called polity" (1320b(190)),we must assume this good

oligarchy is actually an aristocracy. For aristocracy and polity are the good

"means" between the bad "extremes" of oligarchy and democracy.

With this in mind, we can now map the relations between the four

republican (non-monarchical) political systems, by using either a simpleflow chart (as in Figure IX.1a), or a 2LAR cross (as in Figure IX.1b) based on

the following two underlying questions: (1) Are there only a few rulers? and

(2) Is the system good (i.e., "correct")?

(a) As a Flow Chart (b) Mapped onto the Cross

Figure IX.1: Four Forms of Republican Political System

These maps help us seewhy Aristotle sometimes virtually equated polity

with aristocracy (e.g., AP 1286b(112)): these systems, as the "means", are

good for most cities, while democracy and oligarchy, as the "extremes", are

bad.

The remaining political system in Aristotle's f ramework is "tyranny".

Technically this is the opposite of (i.e., deviation f rom) kingship. Yet

Aristotle also called it "the extreme form of democracy", and added that

some forms of oligarchy and democracy are "tyrannies", divided among

many persons ( AP 1312b(172)).He explained the relation between tyranny

and the other two deviant political systems as follows:


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Kingship accords with aristocracy,while tyranny is composed of the

ultimate sort of oligarchy and of democracy-hence it is composed of the two

bad political systems and involves the deviations and errors of both of

them....

.... Havingwealth as its end comes f rom oligarchy ..., as does its distrust of the multitude.... From democracy comes their war on the notables ... (1310b-

1311a(168-169))

He then explainedwhy kingship is not worth the risk of tyranny:

Kingships no longer arise today; if monarchies do arise, they tend to be

tyrannies. This is because kingship is a voluntary sort of rule ..., but

[nowadays] there are many persons who are similar, with none of them so

outstanding as to match the extent and the claim to merit of the office.(1313a(173))

Ifwe now add the two forms of monarchy to the four forms of republican

political system,we can put all six systems together in the form of a circular

flow chart, enabling us to see the entire f ramework at a single glance.

Figure IX.2: Aristotle's Six Forms of Political System

In his discussion of political revolutions, Aristotle argued that, although

each system can change into virtually any other system, they tend to


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"undergo revolution more f requently into their opposite than into a

political system of a neighboring sort" ( AP 1316a-b(179-80)). In other

words, a revolution is more likely to be influenced by the internal logic of

the relation between different political systems than by the empirical factor

ofwhat type of system is in effect in a neighboring city.

In AP 1286b(112) Aristotle described more f ully how the progression of

political systems, as represented by the arrows in Figure IX.2, typically

works itself out in real historical situations: political systems normally

start out as kingships, pass over into aristocracies or polities, degenerate

into oligarchies, fall into the grips of a tyranny, and are liberated f rom

oppression by a democracy.Even though moving f rom an aristocracy to a

democracy does "harm to the political system" (1270b (76)), he regarded

democracy as the almost inevitable political system, inasmuch as it serves

as the best protection against tyranny. Yet Aristotle hoped this historicalfact could be overcome by reason, so that the least extreme of the truly good

systems, polity, can become a reality, even though it had rarely existed in

the past. This progression can also be mapped onto a 6CR triangle (with a

few extra arrows added) by placing the three "good" systems on an upward-

pointing triangle and the three


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"bad" systems on a downward-pointingtriangle, as in Figure IX.3 (cf. Figure V.8). Thelines pointing upward to polity are dashed inorder to represent the difficulty of

implementing a transition to this idealsystem.

Aristotle's helpf ul summary of his f rameworkfor political systems in Book VIII, Chapter 10of N icomachean E thics adds several addi-tional points worth mentioning inconclusion.Here kingship is treated as thebest option, for any truly good king willalways have the best inter-

Figure IX.3: Aristotle's Framework as a 6CR

ests of his subjects in mind. Since he has absolute power and authority over

all the people, no one will be able to prevent the king f rom putting his good

will into practice.Even though an aristocracy consists of the "best" men, it

is not as good as kingship, because it is more likely that a few bad menwill

infiltrate the aristocracy and corrupt the intentions of the otherwise good

rulers. Andwhen all property owners are allowed to influence the way laws

are formed and rights are distributed among the citizens, such corruption

becomes even more likely.

Aristotle compared the relationship between the citizen and the city in

these three good political systems to three types of family relationships. Inkingship the king is like a father and the citizen is like a son. In aristocracy

the ruling class is like a husband and the other citizens are like a wife. And

in timocracy (or polity) the relationship between property owners is like

that between siblings. But just as family relationships are not always

harmonious, each of these political systems can be perverted, thus giving


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rise to tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy, respectively.

As we have seen, kingship is the most risky option, because "the worst is

that which is the opposite to the best." When choosing a political system,we

must therefore keep in mind that when we aim at a particular system,we

might end up with its opposite instead. This is why, as we have seen,Aristotle elsewhere defended polity (i.e., timocracy) as the safest option:

even if it slips into democracy, the negative effect on the average citizen is

kept to a minimum, since democracy is "the least bad" of the three bad

political systems. In a "majority rules" system thewill of the majority is

likely to be adversely influenced by the selfish motives of the many bad

peoplewho live in any society, though in some cases this will be balanced by

the good motives of the virtuous people. In the next lecture I shall suggest a

rather surprising way of breaking through the boundary of politics as

defined by Aristotle's system. We shall then conclude Part Three byconsidering what type of political system is wisest for modernwestern

societies as we enter the third millennium.

27. Theocracy: The Ultimate Breakthrough

We hear so much these days about howwonderf ul democracy is that it

probably came as quite a shock for you to learn in the previous lecture that a

philosopher as great as Aristotle regarded it as a bad system! Why do people

believe democracy is so good? Most of you are probably thinking: "becauseit gives us maximum f reedom." But this myth is highly questionable. What

democracy gives its citizens is power and authority to elect officials and

enact laws. If Aristotle is right, the net result is likely to be bad, because the

good menwill probably be in the minority. And in that case, these good men

will be unable to exercise enough control to implement trulywise policies

for the city. The stories of Socrates and Jesus provide two good examples of

how the majority tends to make the wrong decision, for theywere both

sentenced todeath as a direct result of something like a democratic vote.

Despite the many differences between these two events (e.g., Socrates

defended himself at length,whereas Jesus remained silent before his

accusers), there is a basic similarity. In both cases the majority of the

people allowed to voice their opinions felt it would be better for the city to

have these men executed.


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With this in mind, let's examine more closely how Aristotle's three pairs of

political systems differ in the level of f reedom they offer to their citizens. It

is often said that there is no such thing as unlimited f reedom: indeed,

f reedom is normally defined by reference to some limitations, such as the

self-imposed limitations of loyalty to an authority, or obedience to laws. So

the question here is, howdoes each type of political system set up aboundary defining the citizen's f reedom? A king requires a high level of

loyalty f rom his subjects, to the extent that they cannot properly be called

"citizens" at all; but in return a good king gives his subjects a high level of

f reedom. Their daily lives need not be encumbered by excessive laws as long

as they remain loyal to the king. The ruling class in an aristocracy requires a

more moderate level of respect and loyalty, but offers in return only a

moderate level of f reedom. More laws are needed to keep the lower classes

under control, and these laws restrict the f reedom of all citizens. Finally, in

a polity (or timocracy), and even more so in a democracy, the level of

f reedom for the citizens is actually at a comparatively low level-despite the

common belief to the contrary. Why? Because in these systems there is little

or no need for the citizen to be loyal or respectf ul to fellow citizens; so

instead, a complex network of laws must be instituted in hopes of

preventing the stronger citizens f rom mistreating theweaker ones.

In a polity or a democracy the laws take away f reedoms and replace them

with rights. Aristotle's f ramework of political systems clearly reveals that

such a sacrifice of f reedom is the price that must be paid by those whowish

to minimize the risk of tyranny. For a system boasting a higher level of

f reedom can quickly change into its opposite, offering little or no f reedom

to the citizens, but promoting injustice and oppression of a type that is

unlikely to occur in a democracy. (This inverse relationship between

reedom and risk is a key component of the table given in Figure IX.6,

summarizing the Aristotle's six basic types of political system, plus the two

new extremes wewill examine today.) As we shall see in Lecture 27,

Aristotle's terminology is now somewhat outdated. Nevertheless, byproviding a clear f ramework for understanding how political systems

operate (whateverwe call them!), he has demonstrated how loyalty to those

in power forms the boundary that enables political systems to make f reedom

ossible for their citizens.


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This paradox, that higher degrees of f reedom are possible only by sacrificing

more and more of our rights to a higher power, is closely related to another

problem-one that is actually a fairly common theme among political

philosophers. Indeed, many introductory philosophy courses would devote

most or all of the lecture(s) on political philosophy to a discussion of this

other problem, produced by the conflict between f reedom and equality. Bothf reedom and equality are typically regarded as ideals that ought to

characterize a good (and today that usually means a "democratic") political

system. Yet if everyone were totally f ree to do as they pleased, then there

would be a great deal of inequality: the strongwould tend to overpower the

weak; the rich would tend to deprive the poor; the powerf ul would tend to

disregard the powerless; etc. Such an extreme state of having no ruler (and

no rules) is called "anarchy". By contrast, a state of total equality between

everyone could come about only by taking away the f reedom of the people

involved. B.F. Skinner's famous novel, Walden T wo, gives a good example of

this option. The ideal society he imagined is one where psychological

conditioning is used todetermine the relationships between everyone, so

that the people live in a state of harmonious equality, even though they have

no f reedom.

There are two f undamentally different ways of responding to this problem

of the conflict between f reedom and equality. The first is to attempt a

compromise. This is the option taken by democratic political systems (i.e.,

by "republics", to use Aristotle's term [see Figure IX.1]) . There are, of

course, many different ways of conceiving how that compromise can best

be made. For example, socialists do so by tightening governmental control

of the economy, thus reducing the level of inequality by reducing the level of

f reedom,whereas libertarians do so by loosening such governmental

controls and trusting in a natural economic force that will regulate the

changing levels of both f reedom and equality.

Thes

econd r

es

pons

e to this

pr

oblem is

tor

ef us

e to compr

omis

e, on thegrounds that what is needed is a breakthrough. This is the option taken by

utopian political systems. For example, in its original, Marxist form,

communism is a political philosophy that claims it is possible to have a

societywhere individuals enjoy the highest degree of both f reedom and

equality. Karl Marx (1818-1883) believedwork is the most important factor


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giving meaning to a person's life, for we arewhat we do. Marx saw that in

the capitalist societies of his day mostworkers were alienated f rom the

product of their labor by the greedy entrepreneur, who used theworkers as

objects, as a means of making money. If only the people would stand up and

revolt against this and other evils perpetrated by capitalism, he proclaimed,

a new societywould be ushered in. Marx's vision of this society of perfectcommunion between people was one where everyone would givework

"according to their ability" and take the products of labor "according to

their need". Unfortunately, the twentieth century gave us ample proof that

the character and motivations of the people who revolt against injustice

simply are not as pure as Marx dreamed theywould be. Communism as a

political system has failed for precisely the same reason that Marx believed

capitalist-style democracy had failed: in both cases the more people try to

take f reedom and justice into their own hands, the more they ironically

become slaves of the in justice they themselves have created!

There are numerous other models for utopian societies; but today I shall

focus special attention on one alternative to communism that is rarely

acknowledged as a viable political system, even by those who are supposed

to believe in it. This is the vision of a utopia quite different f rom Marx's

communist state or Nietzsche's Superman; for it is a vision of the pur pose o

the earth as determined and controlled not by people breaking through the

alienating limits of a life-denying outlook, but by God breaking through the

hardened shell of human hearts. Most religious people believe not only that

God exists and thatwe can somehow communicate with God, but also that

God has a plan for this world-a plan whose ultimate f ulfillment cannot be

thwarted by any counter-efforts on the part of humanity. Some religious

people believe this plan is confined to a "spiritual" realm, and that in the

"material" realm of (for example) economics and politics, human systems

can f unction quite apart f rom this divine plan.However, the deepest (and

most philosophically-minded) religious thinkers have always affirmed that

such an artificialdistinction is illegitimate. If there is a Godwith a plan,then this plan relates just as closely to the political activities of entire

societies as it does to the personal activities of any individualwithin a given

society.

The best name for the idea that God's rule applies not only to the operation


5 de 30 15/12/2015 20



of divine power in human hearts, but also to its operation in the courtroom

and the market-place, is "theocracy" (with theos meaning "God" and kratos

meaning "power"). Unfortunately, this term has often been used in the past

to refer to a deceptivelysimilar idea that is actually quite opposed to

theocracy in its pure form. Traditionally a political system has been called a

"theocracy" if a religious group (such as a church) regards itself as God'smouthpiece on earth, so thatwhatever policies the leaders formulate must

be accepted by the people as direct commands f rom God. In order to

distinguish this traditional usage f romwhat I believe to be the proper

meaning of "theocracy", I have coined the term "ecclesiocracy" to refer to

any political systemwhere the power is wielded by the leader(s) of an

"assembly" (ekklesia) of religious people. Typical examples of ecclesiocracy

would be the nation of Israel during the period following Ezra and

Nehemiah (i.e., after returning f rom Babylonian exile), most of southern

Europe during the time of the Holy Roman Empire, and the city of Geneva

during the latter part of John Calvin's life.

The reason it is so important to distinguish between ecclesiocracy and

genuine theocracy is that, although the latter is really a vision of the

"kingdom of God on earth" that religious people ought to be regarded as the

best of all possible political systems, the former is a perversion of this

ultimate ideal that fools many sincere believers. Moreover, as we learned

f rom Aristotle, the perversion of an ultimately good system would be an

ultimately bad system.Ecclesiocracy perverts theocracy by replacing God's

autonomous rule in the heart of each individualwith a religious version of

one of the humanly-rooted political systems. This means one or more

human beings end up wielding power over the ordinary members of the

religious assembly,using the name of God as an authenticating guarantee.

Yet this is the tragedy of human religion: that in trying to lead other people

to God many religious believers end up blocking other people f rom receiving

the very spiritual power they believe they are promoting. Indeed, this

happens whenever one person imposes a set of standards upon anotherperson, claiming that God onlyworks in this particular way, so that

everyone who does not conform to this particular conception of "God's

Way"will be rejected by God.

Among the many problems with this all-too-common attitude to religious


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belief s is that it assumes we human beings can actually gras p God;

theocracy, by contrast, assumes only that to follow God's plan a person

must be willing to be gras ped by God. And this usually means being ignorant

of God's Wayuntil the moment it is actually revealed in your own heart. I

believe this "pure" form of theocracy is presented throughout the Bible (and

in the Scriptures of many other world religions, though not in such a pureform) as an actual political system. The difference between theocracy and

all other political systems (including ecclesiocracy) is precisely in the fact

that theocracy alone renounces all rights of human beings to govern

themselves, acknowledging God as the only true governor. In this sense

theocracy can be called a "non-political political system", providedwe

understand that his phrase must be interpreted using synthetic logic. The

political philosophy called anarchy (i.e., "no ruler") actually shares with

theocracy the notion that people only perpetuate injustice when they try to

use laws to govern themselves; however, since it rejects all rule, it cannot

properly be called a political system as such. Viewed f rom the perspective of

someonewho does not believe in God, theocracywould be hard to

distinguish f rom anarchy. The difference, of course, is that theocrats

believe in a common guiding principle that unites everyone together

inwardly,whereas anarchists are left with nothing but infinite diversity and

an irresolvable struggle between opposing wills.

In the Bible, as in other religious literature, the kingdom of God is presented

as something that comes suddenly, invading the realm of human justice

with a divine justice that can neither be predicted nor comprehended in

human categories. This divine invasion is primarily directed toward the

human heart; yet, as theNew Testament makes clear in many ways, a

person's res ponse to this change should not be merely interior, but should

revolutionize every aspect of the person's life. Jesus' suffering in particular

should be seen as a thoroughly political kind of suffering, directly related to

his radical rejection of any human means of achieving


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justice on earth. The message of the cross andresurrection is a theocratic message: only when we dieto humanways of governing ourselves willwe allowGod to permeateuswith a new life characterized by

divine justice. The contrast between this notion andthat of Nietzsche's Superman suggests that we can callthis way of resolving the problems of human injustice"God' s transvaluation of values". The way God's justicebreaks through all forms of human justice (includingthose upheld by supporters of ecclesiocracy), impartinga new meaning towords like "equality" and "rights", isdepicted in Figure IX.4.

Many of the implications of theocracy

Figure IX.4:

God's Transvalua-

tion of Values

as a political system are too complex to be discussed here.However, I will

mention one of the most significant implications: it rejects the idea, so

often taken for granted in modern western culture, that we have rights,

such as the rights to "life, liberty, and happiness". In place of this

assumption it claims that human rights should never be regarded as

anything other than gifts f rom God. Only if we recognize that we have no

rights of our own, and thatwe therefore owe absolute loyalty to God,willwe

be given absolute f reedom. In the Bible this f reedom is not just s piritual, but

also thoroughly political. Theocracy is therefore the direct opposite of

democracy; for the latter emphasi z es human rights in return for strict

limitations on our f reedom. Yet theocracy does not require the destructionof other systems. On the contrary, it can coexist with any of Aristotle's six

systems (even democracy). For the f reedom it offers starts in the human

heart, and loosens our attachment to any and all of the limited, man-made

political system under whose controlwe live.


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The fact that theocracy is described most often in the Bible in terms of a

kingdom suggests it is most properly viewed as a type of monarchical

political system, rather than a republican one. Indeed, ifwe consider

theocracy and its perversion, ecclesiocracy, together with Aristotle's two

forms of monarchical political system, kingship and tyranny,we can depict

their relationship as a perfect 2LAR, arising out of the two questions: (1) Isthe system a religious one? and (2) Is the system good (or "correct")? Just as

theocracy is a religious form of kingship (regarding God as the king),

ecclesiocracy is a religious form of tyranny. The same two maps used in

Figure IX.1 to describe the relations between the four republican political

systems can therefore be used to map the relations between the four

monarchical political systems:

(a) As a Flow Chart(b) Mapped onto the Cross

Figure IX.5: Four Forms of Monarchical Political System

Figure IX.5a shows how ecclesiocracy is the extreme form of theocracy, just

as oligarchy is the extreme form of aristocracy. Moreover, just as kingship

degenerates into tyranny, theocracy degenerates into ecclesiocracywhenthe role appropriate only for a divine being is usurped by human beings. In

this sense, ecclesiocracy is the root form of all tyranny, because its

oppression is spiritual as well as physical.

By putting the 2LAR cross here in Figure IX.5b together with its republican


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correlate in Figure IX.1b,we can now construct a perfect 3LAR. The three

questions that give rise to the complete set of eight possible political

systems are: (1) Is the system monarchical? (2) Is the system either

religious or ruled by a few people? (3) Is the system good (or "correct")?

These eight systems could be mapped onto a double cross (i.e., a pair of

concentric crosses,with one rotated at a 45˚ angle f rom the other). Butinstead of drawing such a complex figure here, I have provided a more

detailed summary of the relationships between the eight systems in the

table given in Figure IX.6. This table lists the eight types of political system

f rom the best to the worst, together with the 3LAR component

corresponding to each. The second column provides a simple description of

how the name for each system is derived f rom some key Greekword

referring to its source of political power. The third and fourth columns

compare the levels of risk, f reedom, and rights provided by each system.

And the fifth column summarizes and expands


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Figure IX.6: Eight Basic Types of Political System

Aristotle's analogy between the citizen-state relationship and the

relationship between various members of a family.

The tru

th or

fals

ity of theocr

acy is

nots

omething that cou

ld

ever

bedemonstrated by any philosophical or scientific proof. Rather, it must be

accepted as a "myth", in the special sense introduced in Lecture 3, as a truth

that is so true that it cannot even be questioned by thosewho live their lives

by its guiding light. This does not mean there is no reason for believing in

theocracy. On the contrary, upon stepping into the myth, a person will

discover God breaking into their life in real, concrete experiences, whose

validity can hardly be doubted. But for this reason-that is, because

theocracy can be validated not by science and the love of wisdom, but only

by experience and the wonder of silence-I shall ref rain f rom discussing thisreligious point of view any f urther at this point; insteadwe shall return to

the topic of religious experience in Week XI.

27. Wisdom on the Boundary: Ideas vs. Ideology

Ifwe now take a step back and look at the variety of solutions we have

considered to the problem of finding the best political system,we mighteasily become discouraged. Indeed, the same could be said for most of the

other topics we have discussed, especially here in Part Three. Without a

doubt, the theme I have come across most f requently in reading students'

insight papers has been the idea that philosophical questions have "no

definite answers"; and this is sometimes used as evidence for the view that

the realities such questions refer to are either nonexistent or irrelevant to

real life.However, I hope I have demonstrated by now that both of these

views are incorrect. Far f rom finding no definite answers to the questions

we have been considering,we have usually found many definite answers!For good philosophers seek definite answers, just as much as natural

scientists do; the problem, of course, is that philosophers are unable to

attain the level of agreement reached by natural scientists, because

philosophical questions are concernedwith ideas, rather than empirical

objects. In other words, the problem raised by the experience of coming face


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to face with a reality we are necessarily ignorant of is usually not the

problem of having nothing to say about it; on the contrary, the problem is

that we have many, apparently conflicting things to say about it. The task of

the philosopher, therefore, is to seek to fit each part of the puzzle together

in such a way that the true aspects of each answer can be recognized for

what they are. Philosophers who regard the love of wisdom as an essentialpart of their taskwill never be satisfiedwith a single, supposedly

all-encompassing answer; yet this is not because they doubt such an answer

exists, but because they have seen a glimpse of its awesome reality!

The alternative to lovingwisdom "on the boundary" between our knowledge

and our recognized ignorance is to single out a single idea or set of ideas and

raise it to the level of absolute truth. When this happens, those who claim to

possess this "truth" typically regard it as their duty to share this gospel (the

"good news" that absolute truth can be knowable!) with others who remainin the dark. Unfortunately, this goal is all too often taken to the extreme of

orcing others to "agree"with the single definite answer that is being taken

as absolutely true. As a result, a set of philosophical ideas that may have a

wealth of insight to offer us is transformed into a political ideology, the very

antithesis of good philosophy. An ideology, as I amusing the term, is any set

of ideas-often very insightf ul ones when viewed objectively, outside their

political (mis)application-that is presented in such a way that the

"believers" regard themselves as having a monopoly on the truth. That is,

when a person denies at the outset the very possibility of other legitimate

perspectives, an ideology is sure to be at work. An ideology is a

well-developed system of thought that is not only treated as a myth by those

who "live in" it, but is forced on those who do not wish to accept the myth as

it stands.

The twentieth century couldwell be called "the century of ideology".

Ideology in politics produced the east-west divide, reaching its climax

during the Col

d Wa

r yea

rs,w

hen the ter

ms

"Mar

xis

t" and

"Capitalis

t"seemed almost to define "evil" to those standing on the other side. In the

realm of morals, the various sorts of religious f undamentalism that cropped

up around theworld illustrate the dangers of ideology better than any other

single example. Whenever people would rather kill those who disagreewith

their ideas than dialoguewith them, an ideology is sure to be operating. But


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ideology operates just as powerf ully, though less obviously, in the sciences-

especially the social sciences, where the differences between (for example)

behaviorists and depth psychologists are often so vast that no dialogue

whatsoever is possible. Rather than seeking out genuine insights wherever

they may be found, those under the control of an ideologywill be unwilling

even to consider that other approaches to their field might be legitimate.And even the natural sciences are not totally immune to the power of

ideologies, though scientists tend to excuse themselves by usingterms such

as "paradigms" to account for their irreconcilabledifferences. The point is

that, ifwe learn any lesson f rom the twentieth century, it should be ideology

backfires. To quote f rom the last book of the Bible: "those who live by the

sword die by the sword" (Revelation 13:10).

With this in mind, I would like towarn against turning theocracy into an

ideology, an "ism" that might be treated as a final solution to all humanity'sproblems. If someonewho has tasted theocratic f reedom ref uses to return

to the boundary of political reality by recognizing that not everyone accepts

the theocratic vision, then such a person will risk turning a system of

potentially insightf ul ideas into a f rightening ideology: theocracy will

degenerate into ecclesiocracy. In this final lecture of Part Three I want us to

explore the challenges of living wiselywith in the realworld. The key to

doing so, I believe, is to be confident enough to uphold our ideas as ideals to

live by, yet humble enough to resist the temptation to turn them into an

ideology.

In discussing various branches of applied philosophy here in Part Three,we

first considered the question of causality that arises in the philosophy of

science.Hume's view of "habit" is a definite answer: it defines his idea of

howwe come to feel that objects and events are governed by a power of

necessary connection. Kant's argument that the "law of causality" is

necessary for the very possibility of experience is a definite answer to the

same q

ues

tion. Thes

e contr

as

ting id

eas w

er

e not pu

t forw

ard

as

mer

eopinions, as ifHumewere saying he preferred to live in England rather than

Scotland, and Kantwere responding that he would prefer Scotland, because

his grandfather had lived there; these menwere expressing views they

believed everyone whowishes to think philosophically ought to affirm as

true. In this case these two definite answers to the same question appear to


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contradict each other, though there may be someway of viewing both as

correct. For example,we could regard Hume's answer as correctly

describing what we can discover by limiting ourselves to the empirical

perspective, while Kant's describes what we discover by also adopting the

transcendental perspective.

Next we considered moral philosophy and the question of right action. Once

again, we saw how Kant, Mill, andNietzsche each proposed a definite

answer to this question; yet their answers came out looking very different.

Likewise this week,when considering political philosophy and the nature

of right government, we saw that Aristotle had six definite answers; yet

subsequent philosophers have proposed still other alternatives that

Aristotle never imagined. When such inevitable conflicts of ideas arise

between different philosophers, we should not infer that such questions

must, in fact, have no answer at all. On the contrary, we should take it as achallenge, to determine which of the definite answers is the most adequate

and /or to show how two or more of these answer can be true

simultaneously, each in its own unique way. In doing the latter we will not

only be establishing a set of justifiable pers pectiveswithin which

knowledge (i.e., science) can arise; we will also be practicing the art of

lovingwisdom, and thereby guarding against the danger of such ideas being

misused as ideologies.

In light of this distinction between wisely respecting the perspectival basis

of all insightf ul ideas and foolishly raising one set of ideas to the absolute

status of an ideology, let us devote the remainder of this lecture to an

examination ofwhat political philosophy best suits the realworld as it now

exists, at the dawn of the third millennium A.D. Without a doubt, the

political ideology that "won" the twentieth century's battle of ideologies is

democracy. Despite the bad press democracy has had f rom many

philosophers, f rom Aristotle down toNietzsche, nearly everyone in modern

wes

ter

ns

ociety now r

egards

it as the

"corr

ect" politicals

ys

tem-per

haps

theleast questioned of all our cultural myths.

Kant is often regarded as one of the ideological founders of modern liberal

democracy.Half of his book, Metaphysics of Morals (1797), and several

influential essays written toward the end of his life, defend a system of


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universal human rights as enforced by a "league of nations"-an idea that has

significantly influenced the subsequent development ofwestern political

systems, including whatwe now call the "UnitedNations".However, what

Kant meant by "rights" is actually quite different f romwhat we nowadays

mean when we use this word. For him our "rights" must arise out of the

concept of right action:

Every action is right which in itself, or in the maxim on which it proceeds, is

such that it can coexist along with the f reedom of the will of each and all in

action, according to a universal law. (SR 45)

That is, an external act (as governed by the domain of politics) can be right

only if it can coexist with the f ree (right) acts of all other individuals. This

principle is not only the basis for a Kantian theory of rights, but also lies at

the foundation of theocracy! Unfortunately, Kant's understanding of humanrights is often taken out of its proper context and used to make rights-based

democracy into a political ideology.

Ifwe were to use Kant and other influential modern philosophers as the

basis for constructing an updated version of Aristotle's f ramework of

political systems, it would look quite different. The main distinctionwould

be between "democratic" and "totalitarian" systems (instead of

"republican" and "monarchical"); socialists and libertarians would repre-

sent the "extreme" forms of democratic systems, while liberals and con-servatives would represent the "mean" forms (cf. Figures IX.1 and IX.5). In

this system "democracy" takes on a far more sophisticated meaning than it

had for Aristotle. Yet our use of "democratic" and Aristotle's use of

"republican" both refer to types of federal system,whereby the people agree

(at least implicitly) to abide by a certain political structure in the hope of

maximizing mutual f reedoms without depriving essential rights. Likewise

and by contrast, our use of "totalitarian" and Aristotle's use of

"monarchical" are both akin to the feudal system,whereby local and /or

national monopolies of land ownership operate without allowing

widespread participation in political decision-making.

The philosopher generally recognized as having put forward the most

sophisticated defence of modern liberal democracy is John Rawls (1921-).

His classic book, A Theory of J ustice (1971), proposes two essentially


25 de 30 15/12/2015 20



Kantian principles as a theoretical foundation:

First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic

liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.

Second

:s

ocial and

economic inequ

alities

ar

e to be arr

anged s

o that they ar

eboth (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b)

attached to positions and offices open to all. (TJ 60)

These principles guarantee equal rights and equal opportunity, respec-

tively, to all citizens. Governments should use the first principle as a guide

for assigning a basic set of rights, such as "life, liberty, and the pursuit of

happiness" (as in the U.S. Bill of Rights), to all persons, regardless of their

race, religion, sex, etc. Rawls' own examples of such rights include the right

to vote, to own property, to speak f reely, etc. The second principle likewiserequires governments to insure that positions such as political offices and

high paying jobs (or any paid employment, for that matter) are open to all

persons without discrimination that is unrelated to their suitability for the

position. The second principle is an attempt to preserve a sense of justice in

spite of economic and social inequalities by defining "injustice" as

inequalities that are not to everyone's mutual benefit.

A considerable portion of Rawls' book is devoted to clarifying and

qualifying these two basic principles of justice. Among the numerous pointsmade in this regard are that basic political rights cannot be traded for social

or economic advantages, that one person's (or group's) misfortunes cannot

be excused by appealing to another person's (or group's fortunes (as a

utilitarian politics might allow), that the principles apply to the way

institutions are to be structured but not necessarily to the waywe treat any

specific person(s) known to us in real-life situations, and that policy-

makers must consider the rights and opportunities of past and f uture

generations just as much as those of the present generation.In aword,

Rawls defined justice as "fairness", arguing that governments are

responsible to look after the less fortunate members of society.His position

sparked such a huge debate thatwe cannot even begin to consider the pros

and cons in this introductory course, except to say that the chief opponents

of such a position are libertarians (e.g., Robert Nozick),who argue that

governmental intervention deprives people of their basic liberties, and


26 de 30 15/12/2015 20



communitarians (e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre),who argue that different

principles of justice arise out of different communities and therefore

cannot be generalized so neatly.

From a Kantian perspective, the major problem with such attempts to

defend a socialist version of liberal democracy is the tendency to assumethat "society" (i.e., government) bestows rights and opportunities onto

people. Kant defended a more individualistic view, whereby each person (in

the form of a "noumenal self") bestows or fails to bestow these rights (along

with corresponding duties) on himself or herself-a difference Rawls

himself acknowledges (TJ 257). This is a problem because it tends to shift

responsibility away f rom persons and toward institutions, thereby tending

to make individuals feel like insignificant "cogs" in the social "machine".

Indeed, for many political theorists nowadays, the responsibility for

bestowing and protecting rights is regarded as being the role of aninternational political body, the United Nations. That this way of defending

democracy is essentially ideological is evident f rom the fact that the

ultimate goal of most such proponents is one-world government. Kant

himself regarded this as a desirable stage in the development of human

political history; but only if those in positions of power remain aware that

the power resides not in the institutions but in the people themselves,

without whom there would be no rights to bestow.

Virtually all proponents of democracy as a prelude to one-world

government unfortunately tend to ignore an aspect of Kant's theory that

was crucial to his overall vision: that democracy is merely a stage in the

long-term development of the human race's political evolution. The ideal

goalwe ought to see all political structures as pointing toward, in Kant's

view, is something very similar towhat I have called "theocracy". Kant

looked forward to a daywhen all outward forms of control people impose on

each other (i.e., all "coercion",whether political, religious, or ideological in

any other w

ay)w

ill givew

ay to aw

or

ldw

her

ein ever

y pers

on lives

f r

eelyand responsibly according to their own awareness of the moral lawwithin

them. This can happen, of course, onlywhen the human race learns once

and for all that the most important virtues in life -the philosophical virtues

of truth, goodness, and beauty-cannot be imposed on others by fiat; rather,

we should encourage each person to use their own reason to decide for


27 de 30 15/12/2015 20



themselves what is true, good, and beautif ul. This, he thought, is an

essentially religious vision, yet it is religionwithout any outward,

ideological form that will cause it to clashwith other ideologies. This

conception of a moral religion, a way of experiencing the meaning of life

without forcing an ideology onto others who may not be open to it, can come

about onlywhen religion and politics merge. Kant referred to this merger asthe "kingdom of ends" in his moral theory and as "the kingdom of God on

earth" in his theory of religion. The latter is such a significant (and often

grossly misunderstood) part of Kant's philosophy that I shall devote two

lectures to the subject in Week XI.

The way forward f rom democracy, ifwe take into consideration this wider

context of Kant's political vision, is to begin doing awaywith the common

assumption that morality can be legislated. The more democracies can

move toward anarchy (i.e., fewer laws, and eventually no laws), the betteroffwe will be. For one thing, this will give people the opportunity to be

genuinely moral, rather than just "politically correct". In the current

situation in most western countries, the majority of people don't care much

about being moral because they have come to believe that the government

legislates morality; this leads to the mythical belief that, as long as I am a

"law abiding citizen", I am morally good. But as Kant's arguments

demonstrate, legal (external) goodness does not necessarily coincide with

moral (internal) goodness. Ironically, legal systems that try to enforce

so-called "moral" laws end up taking awaythe potential praiseworthiness of

the citizens' good actions.

Has the human race developed to the stagewhere all outward political

forms can simply vanish in the near f uture? Obviously not! That this ought

to be our ultimate goal is the grain of truth in Marxist ideology. But to

attempt to implement such policies in the short termwould not be a step

forward, but a grave setback to humanity's political development-as the

tw

entieth centur

y's

exper

imentw

ith Mar

xis

ms

o poignantly illus

tr

ated

.Instead of trying to force the goal ("peace on earth") through ideological

coercion, our aim should be to seek to implement political structures that

have an in-built self-negating form-i.e., structures that discourage by their

very nature anyone whowould seek to raise them to the status of ideology.

The more this happens, the more human beings will learn to trust their own


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inner principles above the feeble attempts of politics to determine right and

wrong by external means. Perhaps the single most important lessonwe can

learn f rom our study of wisdom here in Part Three is that, as we live in

waiting for the daywhen human beings can live in peace without outward

political structures, we mustwelcome differences of opinion rather than

resisting them. The more we can incorporate the idea that "opposition istrue f riendship" into our understanding of political reality, the closer we

will come to bringing the entire human race to a deep awareness ofwisdom

on the boundary.

QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER THOUGHT/DIALOGUE

1.A. What is pow

er

?

B. Where does law come f rom?

2.A. Is anarchy ("no ruler") a political system?

B. Is absolute f reedom possible?

3.A.How can God have a "kingdom" on earth?

B. Would philosophers make good kings?

4.A. Do human beings have any inborn rights?

B. Is anything in the world really fair?

R ECOMMENDED R EADINGS

1. Aristotle, The Politics, Book 4, Ch. 2 ( AP 1289a-b).

2. Aristotle, N icomachean E thics, Book VIII, Ch. 10 ( NE 1160a-1161a).

3. Niccolo Machiavelli, The P rince, tr. G. Bull (Harmondsworth, Middlesex:

Penguin Books, 1961).


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4. Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, The Little P rince, tr. Katherine Woods (New

York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1943).

5. Stephen Palmquist, Biblical Theocracy: A vision of the biblical foun-

dations for a Christian political philosophy (Hong Kong: Philopsychy Press,

1993).

6. Karl Marx and FrederickEngels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, tr.

Samuel Moore (Moscow: Progress Press, 1952[1888]).

7. John Rawls, A Theory of J ustice, ?1, "Two Principles of Justice" (TJ

60-65).

8. Stephen Palmquist, "'The Kingdom of God is atHand!' (Did Kant really

say that?)",

H is

tor

y of Philos

ophy Qu

ar

ter

ly11

(199

4), pp.421

-43

7.

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PALMQUIST.tree.25. Power and the Boundary of Politics