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In the Theater of Global Jihad [325]

Chechen militant group within the ranks of Osama bin Ladens elite

force, the International Islamic Front for Confronting the Crusaders

and the Jews. The Chechen group, known as the Majlis-al-ShuraAl-Askari-e-Mujahedin Al-Shishan [Military Advisory Council of the

Mujahedin of Chechnya], immediately established a distinct presence

among the Islamist-Jihadist forces in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pakistani intelligence officials noted the decisive role that this mixed

force of Chechens, Uzbeks, and Uighurs would play during battles in

Waziristan in October and November, citing them as the most profes-

sional and hardened fighters facing Pakistani security forces. A sprinkleof Uzbek, Chechen, and Uighur mujahedin also appeared in the ranks of

the Taliban and Gulbaddin Heckmatyars Hizb-i-Islami Afghanistan,

offering their expertise and manpower to the various Afghan forces in

eastern and southern Afghanistan, where most of the fighting against

U.S. and coalition forces was taking place.

Chechen mujahedin were now dispersed throughout Pakistans

badlands. In late November 2004, a few Chechens attempted to rob amoney changer in Quetta, whom they accused of stealing money from

the jihad. One of them was arrested and subjected to a few days of tor-

ture by the Pakistani police, finally identifying their safe house. As the

police were closing in, most of the Chechen mujahedin escaped. But four

of them remained, and they managed to hold the vastly larger force of

police at bay for more than a day, inflicting heavy casualties before they

were overwhelmed and killed by the police. The Waziristan police chief

announced that his forces had recovered grenades, explosives, and bomb-

making material from the house. In March 2005, Pakistani intelligence

agents uncovered a plot by Chechen mujahedin in Waziristan to kid-

nap and execute a senior Russian diplomat and his family in Islamabad.

Chechen mujahedin were later observed casing key Russian diplomatic

facilities throughout Pakistan. A police raid on a safe house in Islamabad

turned up communiqus in the name of the Majlis-al-Shura Al-Askari-

e-Mujahedin Al-Shishan taking responsibility for the operationbutthe Chechens involved, as well as a Saudi accomplice, managed to evade

the Pakistani dragnet and find refuge in Waziristan.

The growing presence of Chechen mujahedin was noted by


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American and Pakistani officials as the fighting escalated in the spring

of 2005. In one early May engagement in eastern Afghanistan, a small

group of Chechens and Pakistanis held their ground and gave coverto retreating Afghan and Arab mujahedin as superior U.S.-led forces

closed in on them. According to the governor of Zabol Province, two

Chechens and one Pakistani were killed in the standoff (and about forty

more Afghans were killed by U.S. aerial bombing of the withdrawing

force). These were well-trained, well-armed people . . . not just a rogue

group, Colonel James Yonts told the Associated Press. They didnt

flee, they stood and fought.By early summer, every substantial clash between Pashtun tribal

forces and U.S. and Pakistani security forces saw Chechens and Uzbeks

play a leading, and often decisive, role. The Chechens always led from

the front and elected to hold the line while covering the withdrawal of

their fellow mujahedin. Their success led to an increase in the flow of

foreign mujahedin into camps in Waziristan, from where they launched

operations in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. One senior Western secu-

rity official noted that there had been an increase in foreign fighters:

Chechens, Arabs, Middle Easterners in the region, explaining that

Western intelligence [could] see this from the dead bodies and also

from the radio traffic we pick up in different languages.

One milestone in the escalating war in Afghanistan was a major

special operation against elite U.S. forces in the eastern province of

Kunar, on June 28, 2005a series of clashes that signaled, more clearly

than the ongoing resistance in other parts of Afghanistan, a new phase

in the war. The decision to launch the strategic offensive was based on

the jihadists new confidence in their grassroots support in Afghani-

stan. In mid-June, Mullah Akhtar Usmani assured the Saudi daily

Al-Sharq al-Awsatthat the Taliban was enjoying greater support from

the Afghan people because of American brutality against Muslims and

their bias against Muslim countries. . . . The Taliban are everywhere. In

some places they are very dominant and in others they are not. They aredominant in the eastern, southern and southwestern provinces. This

widespread grassroots presence, the jihadists felt, would help to sustain

and support their offensive in Afghanistan.


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was a mujahedin spy. The early warning allowed jihadist commanders

to coordinate operations with local forcesincluding the non-Afghan

experts from across the border. Abd-al-Hadi al-Afghani and a smallteam of senior expert terrorists dictated the roles to be played by the non-

Afghan mujahedin through specialized groups from several countries.

On June 28, a composite force of Afghan mujahedin and non-

Afghan expert terrorists waited in scattered positions for the SEAL team

to be inserted by helicopter into the rugged and isolated Shorek Darra in

Kunars Manogay district. Once on the ground, deep in enemy territory,

the SEAL team was surrounded and subjected to intense fire from severaldirections. According to jihadist reports, two of the SEALs were killed in

the firefight, while the other two managed to evade the ambushing forces.

Mullah Muhammad Ismail, one of Kunars military commanders cooper-

ating with the jihadist forces, later reported that he had known that the

American soldiers were on a spying mission as they were taking pictures

and carried different instruments to perform their job.

One of the ambushing forces goals was to capture the American

soldiers and their equipment. (On August 5, Al-Arabiyah TV broad-

cast a series of interviews with the British and French mujahedin in

this group, in which they were shown analyzing recently captured mili-

tary documents, plans, and maps for the U.S. command in Afghani-

stanitems reportedly retrieved from a computer carried by a SEAL.)

Although the Americans were killed before they could be captured,

the fighters had succeeded in spiriting away their binoculars and other

equipment. The Afghan mujahedin were able to track down the third

SEAL (who had been wounded in the initial clash), cornering him and

ultimately killing him after a long firefight. (The jihadists had expected

to capture this SEAL alive, prompting a series of premature false claims

by Taliban commanders that one of the SEALs had been captured and

eventually beheaded.) The fourth SEAL evaded the mujahedin for

more than a day, until he was offered shelter in an Afghan village elders

home in accordance with the tenets ofPushtunwali (the tribal code ofconduct). The elder sent emissaries to notify Kunar provincial gover-

nor Asadullah Wafa, although it wasnt until July 2 that the SEAL was

finally picked up by U.S. forces.


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In the Theater of Global Jihad [329]

After the initial ambushes, the events of June 28 continued to

unfold as the jihadist commanders had planned. As expected, the

SEALs radioed back to their base, calling for an emergency rescue andreinforcements. According to jihadist reports, the Afghan spywith the

help of an expert terroristused the captured equipment to activate an

emergency signal for extraction by a helicopter, and the jihadists were

able to activate a distress beacon for the rescue helicopter to home in on

as they tried to locate the SEALs. The MH-47 Chinook, with eight

SEALs and eight Army crewmen onboard, flew straight into a second

jihadist ambush near Asadabad, with devastating results. Taliban Muja-hedin shot down the aircraft while it was flying close to the ground,

Commander Mullah Rauf explained, Using only small arms and simple

[RPG-7] rockets. Mullah Muhammad Ismail reported that the heli-

copter caught fire after being hit by rockets fired by the Taliban. None

on board survived. (Afghan jihadist sources acknowledged privately

that Chechen expert mujahedin had fired the lethal RPG barrage and

that the operation was attributed to the Taliban to boost morale among

Afghans.) Mullah Ismail reported that the jihadist forces managed to

vacate the area before a pair of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and

a pair of A-10 Warthog attack jets swarmed in after the downing of

the Chinook. The U.S. jet fighters and helicopters were still scrambling

over the area and some bombing had already taken place by the time his

forces safely reached their hideouts, Mullah Ismail asserted. The non-

Afghan teamincluding a few Chechens, two British, and one French

mujahedinwas back in its Pakistani safe haven by the end of the day.

The downing of the Chinook was a strategic first for the mujahe-

dina distinct shift from the defensive attrition and terrorizing of the

American forces and Afghan population to new offensive operations

against foreign forces, designed to force their withdrawal and, eventu-

ally, to replace the regime of Hamid Karzai in Kabul with an Islamist

regime. Indeed, the Taliban and jihadist leaders were quick to claim

responsibility for the Kunar operation and to stress its ramifications.As Kunar was the stronghold of jihad versus the Russian communists,

explained local mujahedin commander Mullah Salar Haqyar, thank

God it is the same against the Americans right now. Leading Taliban


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commander Mullah Dadullah told the Pakistani dailyAusafthat the

Kunar incident was the opening shot in a decisive offensive, declaring

that the current spree of attacks against the United States will continuetill Septemberwhen the next Afghan parliamentary elections would

be heldand thereafter. The dramatic success in Kunar had paved the

ground for victory of the Taliban and now people are willing to cooper-

ate with them. . . . Now attacks will be launched against the enemys

army from all sides, Mullah Dadullah predicted. He also claimed that

there is disorder in the official Afghan Army and its high-level officers

are in contact with the Taliban.Mullah Dadullah, described as the military coordinator for the

Taliban, elaborated on the significance of the Kunar clash in a July 18

interview with Al-Jazeera TV.The unfolding jihadist offensive was char-

acterized by significant changes in tactics, types of weapons, financial

support, and support of the Afghan people, he said, emphasizing the

growing grassroots support among Afghans and their ability to supply a

regular flow of accomplished fighters for the cause. All Afghan people

are Muslims; they all have weapons and know how to use their weapons.

The majority of them are supporter[s] of [the] Taliban and their Jihad

against the enemies of Islam. Few have been drawn to the dollars [i.e.,

attracted by cash incentives to join the American side]. There are also

Arab mujahedin in Afghanistan. Mullah Dadullah announced that the

jihadist forces currently have advanced weapon systems and [they] are

getting even more advanced weapons, [and] logistic and hi-tech sup-

port systems in the next few months. The jihadist command struc-

ture was also adapting to meet the challenges of the new offensive. On

July 25, spokesman Mofti Latifollah Hakimi explained that the Tal-

iban had established two 14-member military councils from Kunar to

Ghazni and from Ghazni to Balkh, which would be holding consulta-

tions with the Mujahedin Supreme Council in all affairs.

By the summer of 2005, the Islamist-Jihadist leaders were con-

vinced that these new forces and weaponry would enable them to defeatthe U.S.-led forces through a new series of swift and audacious strikes.

Taking cities is not part of our present tactics, Mullah Dadullah

explained on Al-Jazeera. Our tactics now are hit and run; we attack

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