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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PERFECT 10, INC.,Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.No. 05-15170

VISA INTERNATIONAL SERVICED.C. No.ASSOCIATION; FIRST DATA CV-04-00371-JWCORPORATION; CARDSERVICE

INTERNATIONAL

, INC

.; HUMBOLDT

OPINIONBANK; MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL,INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Northern District of CaliforniaJames Ware, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and SubmittedDecember 4, 2006Pasadena, California

Filed July 3, 2007

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Alex Kozinski, andMilan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.;Dissent by Judge Kozinski

7829

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COUNSEL

Howard E. King (argued) and Stephen D. Rothschild, King,Holmes, Paterno & Berliner, LLP, Los Angeles, California,for the plaintiff-appellant.

Jeffrey N. Mausner, Berman, Mausner & Resser, Los Ange-les, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Daniel J. Cooper, Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-

appellant.

Andrew P. Bridges (argued), John C. Nishi, Winston &Strawn LLP, San Francisco, California, for defendant-appellee Mastercard International Incorporated.

Mark T. Jansen, Nancy L. Tompkins, Anthony J. Malutta,Townsend and Townsend and Crew LLP, San Francisco, Cal-ifornia, for defendant-appellee Visa International ServiceAssociation.

Robert A. Van Nest, Michael H. Page, R. James Slaughter,

Keker & Van Nest, LLP, San Francisco, California, fordefendants-appellees First Data Corp., Cardservice Interna-tional, Inc., and Humboldt Bank.

OPINION

MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge:

Perfect 10, Inc. (Perfect 10) sued Visa International ServiceAssociation, MasterCard International Inc., and several affili-

7833PERFECT 10 v. VISA INTERNATIONAL

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ated banks and data processing services (collectively, theDefendants), alleging secondary liability under federal copy-right and trademark law and liability under California statu-tory and common law. It sued because Defendants continueto process credit card payments to websites that infringe Per-fect 10s intellectual property rights after being notified byPerfect 10 of infringement by those websites. The districtcourt dismissed all causes of action under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim uponwhich relief can be granted. We affirm the decision of the dis-trict court.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Perfect 10 publishes the magazine PERFECT10 andoperates the subscription website www.perfect10.com., bothof which feature tasteful copyrighted images of the worldsmost beautiful natural models. Appellants Opening Brief at1. Perfect 10 claims copyrights in the photographs publishedin its magazine and on its website, federal registration of thePERFECT 10 trademark and blanket publicity rights formany of the models appearing in the photographs. Perfect 10alleges that numerous websites based in several countries

have stolen its proprietary images, altered them, and illegallyoffered them for sale online.

Instead of suing the direct infringers in this case, Perfect 10sued Defendants, financial institutions that process certaincredit card payments to the allegedly infringing websites. TheVisa and MasterCard entities are associations of memberbanks that issue credit cards to consumers, automatically pro-cess payments to merchants authorized to accept their cards,and provide information to the interested parties necessary tosettle the resulting debits and credits. Defendants collect feesfor their services in these transactions. Perfect 10 alleges that

it sent Defendants repeated notices specifically identifyinginfringing websites and informing Defendants that some oftheir consumers use their payment cards to purchase infring-

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ing images. Defendants admit receiving some of these notices,but they took no action in response to the notices after receiv-ing them.

Perfect 10 separately alleges that it formerly had a mer-chant account with defendant First Data Corporation (FDC)but that in the Spring of 2001 FDC terminated the account.FDCs stated reason for the termination is that the percentageof Perfect 10s customers who later disputed the charges attri-buted to them (the chargeback rate) exceeded contractual lim-its. Perfect 10 claims these chargeback rates were temporarilyand substantially inflated because Perfect 10 was the victim

of hackers who were subsequently investigated by the SecretService. Appellants Opening Brief at 13. Perfect 10 claimsthat FDC was aware of this and was also aware that Perfect10s chargeback rate dropped to within association limits oncethe hacking ceased, but that FDC nevertheless placed Perfect10 on an industry-wide black list of terminated accounts.

Perfect 10 filed suit against Defendants on January 28,2004 alleging contributory and vicarious copyright and trade-mark infringement as well as violations of California lawsproscribing unfair competition and false advertising, violationof the statutory and common law right of publicity, libel, andintentional interference with prospective economic advantage.Defendants moved to dismiss the initial complaint underFRCP 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion, dis-missing the libel and intentional interference claims with prej-udice but granting leave to amend the remaining claims. In itsfirst amended complaint, Perfect 10 essentially repeated theallegations in its original complaint concerning the survivingcauses of action and Defendants again moved to dismissunder FRCP 12(b)(6). The district court granted the Defen-dants second motion in full, dismissing all remaining causesof action with prejudice. Perfect 10 appealed to this court.

JURISDICTION

The district court had original jurisdiction over the copy-right and trademark claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and


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1338 and supplemental jurisdiction over the related state lawclaims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367. This court has appellate

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district courts dismissal for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

FRCP 12(b)(6). Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

(9th Cir. 2002). On appeal, we take all of the allegations of

material fact stated in the complaint as true and construe them

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. A com-plaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt

that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief.Id. (internal citations omit-

ted).

Although a plaintiffs allegations are generally taken as

true, the court need not accept conclusory allegations of law

or unwarranted inferences, and dismissal is required if the

facts are insufficient to support a cognizable claim. City of

Arcadia v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 411 F.3d 1103, 1106 n.3(9th Cir. 2005); see also Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471-

72 (9th Cir. 1992). The court may also affirm on any ground

supported by the record even if the district court did not con-

sider the issue. Fields v. Legacy Health Sys., 413 F.3d 943,958 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005); Arc Ecology v. United States Dept

of the Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005).

We review de novo the district courts interpretation of

state law. Rodriguez, 314 F.3d at 983.


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DISCUSSION

SECONDARY LIABILITY UNDER FEDERAL

COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK LAW

A. Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement

Perfect 10 alleges that numerous websites based in several

countriesand their paying customershave directly

infringed its rights under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101,et. seq.1 In the present suit, however, Perfect 10 has sued

Defendants, not the direct infringers, claiming contributoryand vicarious copyright infringement because Defendants pro-

cess credit card charges incurred by customers to acquire the

infringing images.

We evaluate Perfect 10s claims with an awareness that

credit cards serve as the primary engine of electronic com-

merce and that Congress has determined it to be the policy

of the United States(1) to promote the continued develop-

ment of the Internet and other interactive computer services

and other interactive media [and] (2) to preserve the vibrantand competitive free market that presently exists for the Inter-

net and other interactive computer services, unfettered by

Federal or State regulation. 47 U.S.C. 230 (b)(1), (2). 2

1While Perfect 10s complaint does not clearly specify which of Perfect

10s rights are being infringed, it appears that at least four such rights are

potentially at issue: reproduction (17 U.S.C. 106(1)); derivative works

(17 U.S.C. 106(2)); distribution of copies (17 U.S.C. 106(3)); and pub-

lic display (17 U.S.C. 106(5)).2Congress expressed similar sentiments when it enacted the Digital Mil-

lennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. 512, one of the stated pur-

poses of which was to facilitate the robust development and world-wideexpansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, develop-

ment, and education in the digital age. S. Rep. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998).


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1. Contributory Copyright Infringement

Contributory copyright infringement is a form of secondaryliability with roots in the tort-law concepts of enterprise liabil-ity and imputed intent. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction,Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996); Perfect 10, Inc. v.Amazon.com, Inc. et.al., ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 1428632(9th Cir. May 16, 2007). This court and the United StatesSupreme Court (Supreme Court) have announced various for-mulations of the same basic test for such liability. We havefound that a defendant is a contributory infringer if it (1) hasknowledge of a third partys infringing activity, and (2) in-

duces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing con-duct. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.2004) (citing Gershwin Publg Corp. v. Columbia ArtistsMgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). In an Inter-net context, we have found contributory liability when thedefendant engages in personal conduct that encourages orassists the infringement.A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omit-ted). InMetro-Goldwin-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,the Supreme Court adopted from patent law the concept ofinducement and found that [o]ne infringes contributorilyby intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement.

545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005).

3

Most recently, in a case alsobrought by Perfect 10, we found that an actor may be contri-butorily liable [under Grokster] for intentionally encouragingdirect infringement if the actor knowingly takes steps that aresubstantially certain to result in such direct infringement.Amazon.com, 2007 WL 1428632, at *17.

3In her concurring opinion in Grokster, Justice Ginsburg identifiedanother strand of contributory liability in the Supreme Courts jurispru-dence, i.e., liability based on distributing a product distributees use toinfringe copyrights, if the product is not capable of substantial or com-mercially significant noninfringing uses. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 942 (cit-ing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,442 (1984)). Even assuming Defendants offer a product for these pur-poses, Perfect 10 does not claim that the product of credit card servicesis incapable of substantial and commercially significant noninfringinguses.


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[1] We understand these several criteria to be non-contradictory variations on the same basic test, i.e., that onecontributorily infringes when he (1) has knowledge of anoth-ers infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes toor (b) induces that infringement. Viewed in isolation, the lan-guage of the tests described is quite broad, but when onereviews the details of the actual cases and controversiesbefore the relevant court in each of the test-defining cases andthe actual holdings in those cases, it is clear that the factualcircumstances in this case are not analogous. To find thatDefendants activities fall within the scope of such testswould require a radical and inappropriate expansion of exist-

ing principles of secondary liability and would violate thepublic policy of the United States.

a. Knowledge of the Infringing Activity

[2] Because we find that Perfect 10 has not pled facts suffi-cient to establish that Defendants induce or materially contrib-ute to the infringing activity, Perfect 10s contributorycopyright infringement claim fails and we need not addressthe Defendants knowledge of the infringing activity.4

4We note that an anomaly exists regarding the concept of notice in sec-

ondary copyright infringement cases outside a FRCP 12(b)(6) context.Congress addressed the issue of notice in the DMCA, which grants a safeharbor against liability to certain Internet service providers, even thosewith actual knowledge of infringement, if they have not receivedstatutorily-compliant notice. See Perfect 10 v. CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d 751(9th Cir. 2007), amended and superceded, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL1557475 (9th Cir. May 31, 2007); 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3). Because Defen-dants are not service providers within the scope of the DMCA, they arenot eligible for these safe harbors. The result, under Perfect 10s theories,would therefore be that a service provider with actual knowledge ofinfringement and the actual ability to remove the infringing material, butwhich has not received a statutorily compliant notice, is entitled to a safeharbor from liability, while credit card companies with actual knowledgebut withoutthe actual ability to remove infringing material, would benefitfrom no safe harbor. We recognize that the DMCA was not intended todisplace the development of secondary liability in the courts; rather, wesimply take note of the anomalous result Perfect 10 seeks.


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b. Material Contribution, Inducement, or Causation

[3] To state a claim of contributory infringement, Perfect10 must allege facts showing that Defendants induce, cause,or materially contribute to the infringing conduct. See, e.g.,Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1076. Three key cases found defendantscontributorily liable under this standard: Fonovisa, 76 F.3d259;Napster, 239 F.3d 1004; and Grokster, 545 U.S. 913. InFonovisa, we held a swap meet operator contributorily liablefor the sale of pirated works at the swap meet. In Napster, weheld the operator of an electronic file sharing system liablewhen users of that system employed it to exchange massivequantities of copyrighted music. In Grokster, the SupremeCourt found liability for the substantially similar act of dis-tributing software that enabled exchange of copyrightedmusic on a peer-to-peer, rather than a centralized basis.5 Per-fect 10 argues that by continuing to process credit card pay-ments to the infringing websites despite having knowledge ofongoing infringement, Defendants induce, enable and contrib-ute to the infringing activity in the same way the defendantsdid in Fonovisa, Napsterand Grokster. We disagree.

1. Material Contribution

[4] The credit card companies cannot be said to materiallycontribute to the infringement in this case because they haveno direct connection to that infringement. Here, the infringe-ment rests on the reproduction, alteration, display and distri-bution of Perfect 10s images over the Internet. Perfect 10 hasnot alleged that any infringing material passes over Defen-dants payment networks or through their payment processingsystems, or that Defendants systems are used to alter or dis-play the infringing images. In Fonovisa, the infringing mate-rial was physically located in and traded at the defendants

5Because the Grokstercourt focused primarily on an inducement the-ory rather than a material contribution theory, our primary discussion ofGroksteris located below in the inducement section of this opinion.


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market. Here, it is not. Nor are Defendants systems used tolocate the infringing images. The search engines in Ama-zon.com provided links to specific infringing images, and theservices in Napsterand Groksterallowed users to locate andobtain infringing material. Here, in contrast, the services pro-vided by the credit card companies do not help locate and arenot used to distribute the infringing images. While Perfect 10has alleged that Defendants make it easier for websites toprofit from this infringing activity, the issue here is reproduc-tion, alteration, display and distribution, which can occurwithout payment. Even if infringing images were not paid for,there would still be infringement. See Napster, 239 F.3d at

1014 (Napster users infringed the distribution right by upload-ing file names to the search index for others to copy, despitethe fact that no money changed hands in the transaction).

Our analysis is fully consistent with this courts recentdecision in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, where we found thatGoogle could be held contributorily liable if it had knowl-edge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available using itssearch engine, could take simple measures to prevent furtherdamage to Perfect 10s copyrighted works, and failed to takesuch steps. 2007 WL 1428632, at *19. The dissent claims

this statement applies squarely to Defendants if we just substi-tute payment systems for search engine. Dissent at 7866.But this is only true if search engines and payment systemsare equivalents for these purposes, and they are not. Thesalient distinction is that Googles search engine itself assistsin the distribution of infringing content to Internet users,while Defendants payment systems do not. The Amazon.comcourt noted that Google substantially assists websites to dis-tribute their infringing copies to a worldwide market andassists a worldwide audience of users to access infringingmaterials.Id. Defendants do not provide such a service. Theyin no way assist or enable Internet users to locate infringing

material, and they do not distribute it. They do, as alleged,make infringement more profitable, and people are generallymore inclined to engage in an activity when it is financially


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profitable. However, there is an additional step in the causalchain: Google may materially contribute to infringement bymaking it fast and easy for third parties to locate and distrib-ute infringing material, whereas Defendants make it easier forinfringement to be profitable, which tends to increase finan-cial incentives to infringe, which in turn tends to increaseinfringement.6

[5] The dissent disagrees with our reading ofAmazon.comand charges us with wishful thinking, dissent at 7866, andwith draw[ing] a series of ephemeral distinctions, dissent at

7890. We respectfully disagree and assert that our construc-tion of the relevant statutes and case law is completely consis-tent with existing federal law, is firmly grounded in bothcommercial and technical reality and conforms to the publicpolicy of the United States. Helping users to locate an imagemight substantially assist users to download infringingimages, but processing payments does not. If users couldntpay for images with credit cards, infringement could continueon a large scale because other viable funding mechanisms areavailable. For example, a website might decide to allow usersto download some images for free and to make its profitsfrom advertising, or it might develop other payment mecha-nisms that do not depend on the credit card companies.7 Ineither case, the unlicensed use of Perfect 10s copyrightedimages would still be infringement.8 We acknowledge that

6As discussed in note 11, infra, the dissents claims that payment pro-cessing is an essential step in the infringement process, dissent at 7867,and that Defendants are directly involved in every infringing transactionwhere payment is made by credit card, dissent at 7873, suggests that thedissent believes that the Defendants are directly infringing when they pro-cess these payments.

7As discussed more fully in the vicarious infringement section, infra,Perfect 10s factual allegations are not to the contrary.

8We recognize that Google is not the only search engine available toInternet users, and that users do not necessarily need Google to locateinfringing images. The distinction we draw, however, is not specific to


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Defendants payment systems make it easier for such aninfringement to be profitable, and that they therefore have theeffect of increasing such infringement, but because infringe-ment of Perfect 10s copyrights can occur without usingDefendants payment system, we hold that payment process-ing by the Defendants as alleged in Perfect 10s FirstAmended Complaint does not constitute a material contribu-tion under the test for contributory infringement of copyrights.9

Google; it is between location services and payment services. Becauselocation services lead Internet users directly to infringing images and oftendisplay them on the website of the service itself, we find that location ser-

vices are more important and more essentialindeed, more materialto infringement than payment services are.

9Our dissenting colleague assures us that we would not jeopardize Inter-net commerce by finding Defendants liable because he has every confi-dence that this court will simply find that other providers of essentialservices may contribute to infringement, but not materially so. Dissent at7875. We take little comfort in his assurances because the predicate of ourcolleagues optimistic view of future judicial refinement of his new worldof secondary liability is a large number of expensive and drawn-out piecesof litigation that may, or may not, ever be filed. Meanwhile, what wouldstop a competitor of a web-site from sending bogus notices to a credit cardcompany claiming infringement by its competitor in the hope of puttinga competitor out of business, or, at least, requiring it to spend a great deal

of money to clear its name? Threatened with significant potential second-ary liability on a variety of fronts under the dissents proposed expansionof existing secondary liability law, perhaps the credit card companieswould soon decline to finance purchases that are more legally risky. They,after all, are as moved by Adam Smiths invisible hand as the next setof merchants. If that happened, would First Amendment rights of consum-ers be trampled? Would Perfect 10 itself be adversely impacted becauseno credit card company would want to take a chance on becoming second-arily liable?

We similarly take little comfort in the dissents resurrection of thedance-hall-owner/absentee-landlord cases as a source of any principleddistinction in this area. Dissent at 7874-75. Those tests were developed fora brick-and-mortar world, and, as the Napsterand Grokstercourts implic-itly recognized by paying little attention to them, they do not lend them-selves well to application in an electronic commerce context. In decidingthis case, we are well-advised to follow the lead of the Supreme Courtsand our own courts cases confronting online commerce issues.


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Our holding is also fully consistent with and supported bythis courts previous holdings in Fonovisa andNapster. Whilethere are some limited similarities between the factual scenar-ios in Fonovisa andNapsterand the facts in this case, the dif-ferences in those scenarios are substantial, and, in our view,dispositive. In Fonovisa, we held a flea market proprietor lia-ble as a contributory infringer when it provided the facilitiesfor and benefitted from the sale of pirated works. 76 F.3d 259.The court found that the primary infringers and the swap meetwere engaged in a mutual enterprise of infringement andobserved that it would be difficult for the infringing activity

to take place in the massive quantities alleged without thesupport services provided by the swap meet. These servicesinclude, among other things, the provision of space, utilities,parking, advertising, plumbing, and customers. 76 F.3d at264. But the swap meet owner did more to encourage theenterprise. In 1991, the Fresno County Sheriff raided the swapmeet and seized 38,000 counterfeit recordings.Id. at 261. TheSheriff sent a letter to the swap meet operator the followingyear notifying it that counterfeit sales continued and remind-ing it that it had agreed to provide the Sheriff with identifyinginformation from each vendor, but had failed to do so.Id. TheFonovisa court found liability because the swap meet operatorknowingly provided the site and facilities for the infringingactivity. Id. at 264.

InNapster, this court found the designer and distributor ofa software program liable for contributory infringement. 239F.3d 1004. Napster was a file-sharing program which, whilecapable of non-infringing use, was expressly engineered toenable the easy exchange of pirated music and was widely soused. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 n.5 (quoting documentauthored by Napster co-founder which mentioned the needto remain ignorant of users real names and IP addresses

since they are exchanging pirated music ). Citing theFonovisa standard, the Napster court found that Napstermaterially contributes to the users direct infringement by


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knowingly providing the site and facilities for that infringe-ment. 239 F.3d at 1022.

Seeking to draw an analogy to Fonovisa and, by extension,Napster, Perfect 10 pleads that Defendants materially contrib-ute to the infringement by offering services that allow it tohappen on a larger scale than would otherwise be possible.Specifically, because the swap meet in Fonovisa created acommercial environment which allowed the frequency of thatinfringement to increase, and the Napster program increasedthe frequency of infringement by making it easy, Perfect 10argues that the Defendants have made available a payment

system that allows third-party infringement to be profitable,and, consequently, more widespread than it otherwise mightbe. This analogy fails.

The swap meet operator in Fonovisa and the administratorsof the Napster and Grokster programs increased the level ofinfringement by providing a centralized place, whether physi-cal or virtual, where infringing works could be collected,sorted, found, and bought, sold, or exchanged.10 The provisionof parking lots, plumbing and other accoutrements inFonovisa was significant only because this was part of pro-

viding the environment and market for counterfeit recordingsales to thrive.

Defendants, in contrast, do no such thing. While Perfect 10has alleged that it is easy to locate images that infringe itscopyrights, the Defendants payment systems do not causethis. Perfect 10s images are easy to locate because of the verynature of the Internetthe website format, software allowing

10In fact, as virtually every interested college student knewand as theprograms creator expressly admittedthe sole purpose of the Napsterprogram was to provide a forum for easy copyright infringement. See Nap-ster, 239 F.3d at 1020 n.5. Perfect 10 does not contend that Defendantspayment systems were engineered for infringement in this way, and wedecline to radically expand Napsters cursory treatment of material con-tribution to cover a credit card payment system that was not so designed.


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for the easy alteration of images, high-speed connectionsallowing for the rapid transfer of high-resolution image files,and perhaps most importantly, powerful search engines thatcan aggregate and display those images in a useful and effi-cient manner, without charge, and with astounding speed.Defendants play no role in any of these functions.

Perfect 10 asserts otherwise by arguing for an extremelybroad conception of the term site and facilities that bears norelationship to the holdings in the actual cases and controver-sies decided in Fonovisa and Napster. Taken literally, Per-fect 10s theory appears to include any tangible or intangiblecomponent related to any transaction in which infringingmaterial is bought and sold. But Fonovisa andNapsterdo notrequire or lend themselves to such a construction. The actualdisplay, location, and distribution of infringing images in thiscase occurs on websites that organize, display, and transmitinformation over the wires and wireless instruments that makeup the Internet. The websites are the site of the infringe-ment, not Defendants payment networks. Defendants do notcreate, operate, advertise, or otherwise promote these web-sites. They do not operate the servers on which they reside.Unlike the Napster (and Grokster) defendants, they do not

provide users the tools to locate infringing material, nor doesany infringing material ever reside on or pass through any net-work or computer Defendants operate.11 Defendants merelyprovide a method of payment, not a site or facility ofinfringement. Any conception of site and facilities that

11Moreover, if the processing of payment for an infringing transactionwere as central to the infringement as the dissent believes it to besee,e.g., dissent at 7867 (payment processing is an essential step in theinfringement process), dissent at 7873 (Defendants are directly involvedin every infringing transaction where payment is made by credit card)it is difficult to see why Defendants would be not be directinfringers ofthe distribution right. Not even Perfect 10 has gone so far as to allege thattheory herePerfect 10 would undoubtedly be quite surprised to learn,after years of litigation attempting to expand the scope of secondary liabil-ity, that Defendants are directinfringers after all.


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encompasses Defendants would also include a number ofperipherally-involved third parties, such as computer displaycompanies, storage device companies, and software compa-nies that make the software necessary to alter and view thepictures and even utility companies that provide electricity tothe Internet.

Perfect 10 seeks to side-step this reality by alleging thatDefendants are still contributory infringers because they couldrefuse to process payments to the infringing websites andthereby undermine their commercial viability.12 Even thoughwe must take this factual allegation as true, that Defendantshave the power to undermine the commercial viability ofinfringement does not demonstrate that the Defendants mate-rially contribute to that infringement. As previously noted, thedirect infringement here is the reproduction, alteration, dis-play and distribution of Perfect 10s images over the Internet.Perfect 10 has not alleged that any infringing material passesover Defendants payment networks or through their paymentprocessing systems, or that Defendants designed or promotedtheir payment systems as a means to infringe. While Perfect10 has alleged that Defendants make it easier for websites toprofit from this infringing activity, the infringement stems

from the failure to obtain a license to distribute, not the pro-cessing of payments.

2. Inducement

[6] In Grokster, the Supreme Court applied the patent lawconcept of inducement to a claim of contributory infringe-ment against a file-sharing program. 545 U.S. 913. The courtfound that one who distributes a device with the object ofpromoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clearexpression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringe-ment, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third

12This allegation is considered below under vicarious infringement, butwe also address it here in terms of contributory infringement.


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parties.Id. at 936-37. Perfect 10 claims that Groksteris anal-ogous because Defendants induce customers to use their cardsto purchase goods and services, and are therefore guilty ofspecifically inducing infringement if the cards are used to pur-chase images from sites that have content stolen from Perfect10. This is mistaken. Because Perfect 10 alleges no affirma-tive steps taken to foster infringement and no facts suggest-ing that Defendants promoted their payment system as ameans to infringe, its claim is premised on a fundamental mis-reading ofGroksterthat would render the concept of induce-ment virtually meaningless.

[7] The Grokster court announced that the standard forinducement liability is providing a service with the object ofpromoting its use to infringe copyright. Id. [M]ere knowl-edge of infringing potential or actual infringing uses wouldnot be enough here to subject [a defendant] to liability. Id.at 937. Instead, inducement premises liability on purposeful,culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing tocompromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovationhaving a lawful promise. Id. Moreover, to establish induce-ment liability, it is crucial to establish that the distributorscommunicated an inducing message to their . . . users, theclassic example of which is an advertisement or solicitationthat broadcasts a message designed to stimulate others tocommit violations. Id. The Grokster court summarized theinducement rule as follows:

In sum, where an article is good for nothing else butinfringement, there is no legitimate public interest inits unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice inpresuming or imputing an intent to infringe. Con-versely, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conductof selling an item with substantial lawful as well as

unlawful uses, and limits liability to instances ofmore acute fault than the mere understanding thatsome of ones products will be misused. It leaves


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breathing room for innovation and a vigorous com-merce.

545 U.S. at 932-33 (internal citations and quotation marksomitted).

Perfect 10 has not alleged that any of these standards aremet or that any of these considerations are present here.Defendants do, of course, market their credit cards as a meansto pay for goods and services, online and elsewhere. But itdoes not follow that Defendants affirmatively promote eachproduct that their cards are used to purchase. The software

systems in Napster and Grokster were engineered, dissemi-nated, and promoted explicitly for the purpose of facilitatingpiracy of copyrighted music and reducing legitimate sales ofsuch music to that extent. Most Napster and Grokster usersunderstood this and primarily used those systems to purloincopyrighted music. Further, the Grokster operators explicitlytargeted then-current users of the Napster program by sendingthem ads for its OpenNap program.Id. at 925-26. In contrast,Perfect 10 does not allege that Defendants created or promotetheir payment systems as a means to break laws. Perfect 10simply alleges that Defendants generally promote their cards

and payment systems but points to no clear expression oraffirmative acts with any specific intent to foster infringe-ment.

[8] The Amazon.com court recognized this distinction andapplied it in a matter fully consistent with our analysis in thiscase. While theAmazon.com court did not bifurcate its analy-sis of contributory liability into material contribution liabil-ity and inducement liability, it did recognize thatcontributory liability may be predicated on actively encour-aging (or inducing) infringement through specific acts. Ama-zon.com, 2007 WL 1428632, at *16 (quoting Grokster, 545

U.S. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). It also found thatGoogle could be held contributorily liable if it has actualknowledge that specific infringing material is available using


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its system, and can take simple measures to prevent furtherdamage, but does not. Id. at *18 (internal citations and quo-tation marks omitted). While this test is read more naturallyas a test for material contribution than as a test for induce-ment, under an inducement analysis Defendants are notwithin its scope. As discussed above, Perfect 10 has notalleged any specific acts intended to encourage or induceinfringement. And moreover, Defendants are distinguishableunder theAmazon.com test because, unlike Google, infringingmaterial is not available using [their] system of paymentprocessing.Id. That system does not facilitate access to web-sites, id.; infringers do not use it to copy, alter, distribute ordisplay infringing material; and consumers do not use it tolocate, view or download the infringing images. Rather, allparties involved simply use Defendants system to processpayments for that infringing material.

[9] Finally, we must take as true the allegations that Defen-dants lend their names and logos to the offending websitesand continue to allow their cards to be used to purchaseinfringing images despite actual knowledge of theinfringementand perhaps even bending their associationrules to do so. But we do not and need not, on this factual

basis, take as true that Defendants induce consumers to buypirated content with their cards. Inducement is a legal deter-mination, and dismissal may not be avoided by characterizinga legal determination as a factual one. We must determinewhether the facts as pled constitute a clear expression of aspecific intent to foster infringement, and, for the reasonsabove noted, we hold that they do not.

2. Vicarious Copyright Infringement

[10] Vicarious infringement is a concept related to, but dis-tinct from, contributory infringement. Whereas contributory

infringement is based on tort-law principles of enterprise lia-bility and imputed intent, vicarious infringements roots lie inthe agency principles of respondeat superior. See Fonovisa,


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76 F.3d at 261-62. To state a claim for vicarious copyrightinfringement, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has (1)the right and ability to supervise13 the infringing conduct and(2) a direct financial interest in the infringing activity.Ellison,357 F.3d at 1078; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 (citations omit-ted). The Supreme Court has recently offered (in dictum) analternate formulation of the test: One . . . infringes vicari-ously by profiting from direct infringement while declining toexercise a right to stop or limit it. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930(internal citations omitted). Perfect 10 alleges that Defendantshave the right and ability to control the content of the infring-

ing websites by refusing to process credit card payments tothe websites, enforcing their own rules and regulations, orboth. We hold that Defendants conduct alleged in Perfect10s first amended complaint fails to state a claim for vicari-ous copyright infringement.

a. Right and Ability to Supervise the InfringingActivity

[11] In order to join a Defendants payment network, mer-chants and member banks must agree to follow that Defen-dants rules and regulations. These rules, among other things,

prohibit member banks from providing services to merchantsengaging in certain illegal activities and require the membersand member banks to investigate merchants suspected ofengaging in such illegal activity and to terminate their partici-pation in the payment network if certain illegal activity isfound. Perfect 10 has alleged that certain websites are infring-ing Perfect 10s copyrights and that Perfect 10 sent notices ofthis alleged infringement to Defendants. Accordingly, Perfect10 has adequately pled that (1) infringement of Perfect 10scopyrights was occurring, (2) Defendants were aware of the

13Fonovisa essentially viewed supervision in this context in terms ofthe swap meet operators ability to control the activities of the vendors, 76F.3d at 262, andNapsteressentially viewed it in terms of Napsters abilityto police activities of its users, 239 F.3d at 1023.


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infringement, and (3) on this basis, Defendants could havestopped processing credit card payments to the infringingwebsites. These allegations are not, however, sufficient toestablish vicarious liability because even with all reasonableinferences drawn in Perfect 10s favor, Perfect 10s allega-tions of fact cannot support a finding that Defendants have theright and ability to control the infringing activity.

In reasoning closely analogous to the present case, theAmazon.com court held that Google was not vicariously liablefor third-party infringement that its search engine facilitates.In so holding, the court found that Googles ability to controlits own index, search results, and webpages does not giveGoogle the right to control the infringing acts of third partieseven though that ability would allow Google to affect thoseinfringing acts to some degree. Amazon.com, 2007 WL1428632, at *20-21. Moreover, and even more importantly,the Amazon.com court rejected a vicarious liability claimbased on Googles policies with sponsored advertisers, whichstate that it reserves the right to monitor and terminate part-nerships with entities that violate others copyright[s]. Id. at*20 (alteration in original). The court found that

Googles right to terminate an AdSense partnershipdoes not give Google the right to stop directinfringement by third-party websites. An infringingthird-party website can continue to reproduce, dis-play, and distribute its infringing copies of Perfect10 images after its participation in the AdSense pro-gram has ended.

Id. This reasoning is equally applicable to the Defendants inthis case. Just like Google, Defendants could likely take cer-tain steps that may have the indirect effect of reducinginfringing activity on the Internet at large. However, neither

Google nor Defendants has any ability to directly control thatactivity, and the mere ability to withdraw a financial carrotdoes not create the stick of right and ability to control that


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vicarious infringement requires. A finding of vicarious liabil-ity here, under the theories advocated by the dissent, wouldalso require a finding that Google is vicariously liable forinfringementa conflict we need not create, and radical stepwe do not take.

Perfect 10 argues that this courts decision inNapstercom-pels a contrary result. TheNapstercourt found a likelihood ofvicarious liability because Napster had the right and abilityto police its system and failed to exercise that right to preventthe exchange of copyrighted material. 239 F.3d at 1023. TheNapster program created a forum for the exchange of digital

music files and the program administrators had the ability toblock certain users from accessing that forum to upload ordownload such files. As pled by Perfect 10, Defendants alsoprovide a system that allows the business of infringement forprofit to operate on a larger scale than it otherwise might, andDefendants have the ability to deny users access to that pay-ment system.

This argument fails. The Napster programs involvementwithand hence its policing power overthe infringementwas much more intimate and directly intertwined with it thanDefendants payment systems are. Napster provided userswith the tools to enable the easy reproduction and distributionof the actual infringing content and to readily search out andidentify infringing material. Defendants payment systems donot. Napster also had the right and ability to block user accessto its program and thereby deprive particular users of accessto their forum and use of their location and distribution tools.Defendants can block access to their payment system, butthey cannot themselves block access to the Internet, to anyparticular websites, or to search engines enabling the locationof such websites. Defendants are involved with the paymentresulting from violations of the distribution right, but have nodirect role in the actual reproduction, alteration, or distribu-tion of the infringing images.14 They cannot take away the

14The same analysis of Defendants role in any violation of the distribu-tion right under 17 U.S.C. 106(3), discussed in note 11, supra, is equally


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tools the offending websites use to reproduce, alter, and dis-tribute the infringing images over the Internet. They can onlytake away the means the websites currently use to sell them.15

Perfect 10 offers two counter-arguments. Perfect 10 firstclaims that Defendants rules and regulations permit them torequire member merchants to cease illegal activitypresumably including copyright infringementas a conditionto their continuing right to receive credit card payments fromthe relevant Defendant entities. Perfect 10 argues that thesecontractual terms effectively give Defendants contractual con-

trol over the content of their merchants websites, and thatcontractual control over content is sufficient to establish theright and ability to control that content for purposes ofvicarious liability. In the sense that economic considerationscan influence behavior, these contractual rules and regulationsdo give Defendants some measure of control over the offend-ing websites since it is reasonable to believe that fear of los-ing access to credit card payment processing services wouldbe a sufficient incentive for at least some website operators to

applicable here. While the Napster program allowed its operators to blockusers from violation of the distribution right, Defendants policing

power is limited to refusing to process payments resulting from such vio-lations and does not extend to directly stopping the violations themselves.

15The conclusion that the Defendants operate outside the scope of theNapsterrule is further bolstered by considerationthough as persuasiveauthority onlyof this courts opinion in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), which the SupremeCourt vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). In Grokster, wefound the defendants not vicariously liable in part because they could notblock individual users or remove copyrighted material from the network.Id. at 1165. Similarly, because none of the infringing images resides onor passes through present Defendants own systems or any systems overwhich Defendants exercise direct control, Defendants have no ability toactually remove infringing material from the Internet or directly block its

distribution. This distinguishes credit card companies from Napster, whichcould block access to the tools needed for the easy reproduction and distri-bution of the actual infringing content.


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comply with a content-based suggestion from Defendants. Butthe ability to exert financial pressure does not give Defen-dants the right or ability to control the actual infringing activ-ity at issue in this case. Defendants have no absolute right 16

to stop that activitythey cannot stop websites from repro-ducing, altering, or distributing infringing images. Rather, thecredit card companies are analogous to Google, which weheld was not liable for vicarious copyright infringement eventhough search engines could effectively cause a website todisappear by removing it from their search results, and reservethe right to do so. Like Google, the credit card companiescannot stop any of the third-party websites from reproduc-

ing, displaying, and distributing unauthorized copies of Per-fect 10s images because that infringing conduct takes placeon the third-party websites. Amazon.com, 2007 WL1428632, at *20. Defendants can only refuse to process creditcard payments to the offending merchant within their paymentnetwork, or they can threaten to do so if the merchant doesnot comply with a request to alter content. While either optionwould likely have some indirect effect on the infringing activ-ity, as we discuss at greater length in our analysis of the Grok-sterstop or limit standard below, so might any number ofactions by any number of actors. For vicarious liability to

attach, however, the defendant must have the right and abilityto supervise and control the infringement, not just affect it,and Defendants do not have this right or ability.

Perfect 10 relies heavily on the reasoning ofFonovisa andNapster to support this argument, but that reliance is mis-placed. The swap meet operator in Fonovisa and the softwareoperator in Napster both had the right to remove individual

16We do not, as the dissent suggests, hold that an absolute right to stopthe infringement is a prerequisite for vicarious liability. Dissent at 7878-79. Rather, we consider the Defendants inability to directly control theactual infringing activities of third-party websitesreproduction, alter-ation, display, and distribution over the Internet, not over Defendantspayment systemsas evidence that they, much like Google, lack the rightand ability to control those activities.


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infringers from the very place the infringement was happen-ing. Defendants, like the defendants in Amazon.com, have nosuch right. As already discussed, Defendants cannot takeaway the software the offending websites use to copy, alter,and distribute the infringing images, cannot remove thosewebsites from the Internet, and cannot themselves block thedistribution of those images over the Internet. Defendants canrefuse to process credit card payments for those images, butwhile this refusal would reduce the number of those sales, thatreduction is the result of indirect economic pressure ratherthan an affirmative exercise of contractual rights.17

Perfect 10 also argues that were infringing websites barredfrom accepting the Defendants credit cards, it would beimpossible for an online website selling adult images to com-pete and operate at a profit.18 While we must take this allega-

17We do not hold, as the dissent suggests, that the ability to exert finan-cial pressure is categorically insufficient to establish sufficient control forvicarious liability. We recognize that financial pressure is often very pow-erful, but it is precisely for this reason that we hesitate to expand the lawof vicarious liability to encompass the sort of financial pressure Defen-dants may exert. The dissent believes that the gravamen of right and abil-ity to control is the practical ability to limit infringement. Dissent at7878-79. But if this were true, despite the dissents protestations to thecontrary, there are many providers of essential services who could limitinfringement by refusing to offer those services. If practical ability is thetest, it does not matter if software operators, network technicians, or evenutility companies do not have a contractual right to affect the websitescontent. It is an article of faith of the free market that, subject to certainlimited exceptions, one can refuse to deal with anyone for any reason, andby refusing to deal with the offending websites, these providers could limitinfringement.

18Specifically, Perfect 10 defines Stolen Content Websites as web-sites . . . that routinely offer for sale to the public stolen [images], FirstAm. Compl. at 2, 6 (emphasis added), and alleges that Stolen ContentWebsites cannot exist without the knowledge and direct participation of

the financial institutions that process the credit card transactions for suchunlawful material, id. at 2, 7. We do acknowledge that at this proce-dural stage, Perfect 10 is entitled to all reasonable inferences, but we


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tion as true, it still fails to state a claim because it conflatesthe power to stop profiteering with the right and ability tocontrol infringement. Perfect 10s allegations do not establishthat Defendants have the authority to prevent theft or alter-ation of the copyrighted images, remove infringing materialfrom these websites or prevent its distribution over the Inter-net. Rather, they merely state that this infringing activitycould not be profitable without access to Defendants creditcard payment systems. The alleged infringement does not turnon the payment; it turns on the reproduction, alteration anddistribution of the images, which Defendants do not do, and

which occurs over networks Defendants do not control.

[12] The Supreme Courts recent decision in Groksterdoesnot undermine the validity of this distinction. As we held inAmazon.com, 2007 WL 1428632, at *19-20, Grokster doesnot stand for the proposition that just because the servicesprovided by a company help an infringing enterprise generaterevenue, that company is necessarily vicariously liable forthat infringement. Numerous services are required for thethird party infringers referred to by Perfect 10 to operate. Inaddition to the necessity of creating and maintaining a web-

site, numerous hardware manufacturers must produce thecomputer on which the website physically sits; a softwareengineer must create the program that copies and alters thestolen images; technical support companies must fix any hard-ware and software problems; utility companies must providethe electricity that makes all these different related operationsrun, etc. All these services are essential to make the busi-nesses described viable, they all profit to some degree fromthose businesses, and by withholding their services, they

understand this to be a factual allegation that the Stolen Content Web-sites could not continue to exist as websites offering images for sale

online should defendants withdraw their services, not an allegation that thewebsites would completely vanish or that infringement by these sites in allits forms would necessarily cease.


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could impairperhaps even destroythe commercial viabil-ity of those business. But that does not mean, and Groksterbyno means holds, that they are all potentially liable as vicariousinfringers. Even though they have the right to refuse theirservices, and hence the literal power to stop or limit theinfringement, they, like Defendants, do not exercise sufficientcontrol over the actual infringing activity for vicarious liabil-ity to attach.

b. Obvious and Direct Financial Interest in theInfringing Activity

[13] Because Perfect 10 has failed to show that Defendantshave the right and ability to control the alleged infringing con-duct, it has not pled a viable claim of vicarious liability.Accordingly, we need not reach the issue of direct financialinterest.

B. Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement

The tests for secondary trademark infringement are evenmore difficult to satisfy than those required to find secondarycopyright infringement. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Stu-

dios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265(noting that trademark infringement liability is more nar-rowly circumscribed than copyright infringement). While thetests for such infringement are somewhat different in thetrademark context, Perfect 10s factual allegations in supportof these claims are essentially identical to those alleged inPerfect 10s copyright claims, and they fail to state a claim forsimilar reasons.

1. Contributory Trademark Infringement

[14] To be liable for contributory trademark infringement,

a defendant must have (1) intentionally induced the primaryinfringer to infringe, or (2) continued to supply an infringingproduct to an infringer with knowledge that the infringer is


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mislabeling the particular product supplied. Inwood Labs.,Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982). When thealleged direct infringer supplies a service rather than a prod-uct, under the second prong of this test, the court must con-sider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over thethird partys means of infringement.Lockheed Martin Corp.v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999).For liability to attach, there must be [d]irect control andmonitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party toinfringe the plaintiffs mark. Id.

Perfect 10 has failed to plead a viable claim under either

prong ofInwood Labsand, by extension, Lockheed Martin.First, it has not pled facts showing that Defendants intention-ally induced infringement of Perfect 10s mark. Perfect 10has alleged that Defendants are providing critical support towebsites that are using the PERFECT 10 mark in a mannerthat is likely to cause the public to believe that they are autho-rized by Perfect 10. Its factual allegations in support of thisclaim are identical to those it made in support of its copyrightclaims. These allegations, however, cite no affirmative acts byDefendants suggesting that third parties infringe Perfect 10smark, much less induce them to do so.

[15] Second, Perfect 10 has failed to allege facts sufficientto show [d]irect control and monitoring of the instrumental-ity used by a third party to infringe the plaintiffs mark.Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 984. Perfect 10 claims that theproduct or instrumentality at issue here is the credit cardpayment network through which Defendants process pay-ments for infringing material. Appellants Opening Brief at39. As discussed at length above, this network is not theinstrument used to infringe Perfect 10s trademarks; thatinfringement occurs without any involvement of Defendantsand their payment systems. Perfect 10 has not alleged that

Defendants have the power to remove infringing materialfrom these websites or directly stop their distribution over theInternet. At most, Perfect 10 alleges that Defendants can


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choose to stop processing payments to these websites, andthat this refusal might have the practical effect of stopping orreducing the infringing activity. This, without more, does notconstitute direct control. See Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at985 (While the landlord of a flea market might reasonably beexpected to monitor the merchandise sold on his premises,[defendant] NSI cannot reasonably be expected to monitor theInternet.) (citation omitted).

2. Vicarious Trademark Infringement

Vicarious liability for trademark infringement requires afinding that the defendant and the infringer have an apparentor actual partnership, have authority to bind one another intransactions with third parties or exercise joint ownership orcontrol over the infringing product.Hard Rock Caf Licens-ing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7thCir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted), followed by Sym-antec Corp. v. CD Micro, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1275(D. Or. 2003).

Perfect 10 argues that Defendants are liable as follows:Defendants and the Stolen Content Websites are in a symbi-

otic financial partnership pursuant to which the websites oper-ate their businesses according to defendants rules andregulations and defendants share the profits, transaction bytransaction. Appellants Opening Brief at 40. For the samereasons that this relationship does not establish right andability to control for copyright purposes, neither does itestablish such a symbiotic relationship or joint ownershipor control for trademark purposes. Defendants process pay-ments to these websites and collect their usual processingfees, nothing more.

[16] Perfect 10 further argues that Defendants acceptance

of a charge binds the Stolen Content Website to provide theinfringing images to third parties. Appellants Opening Briefat 40. Even if legally relevant, Perfect 10s allegation is


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legally incorrect. It is the websites contracts with the con-sumers that bind the websites to provide the infringingimages, not the websites relationship with Defendants.19 Thewebsites contracts with Defendants are merely a means ofsettling the resulting debits and credits among the websitesand the relevant consumers. We hold that Perfect 10 fails tostate a claim for vicarious trademark infringement.

CALIFORNIA STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW

CLAIMS

[17] In addition to its federal copyright and trademarkclaims, Perfect 10 pled causes of action for unfair competi-tion, false advertising, violation of the right of publicity, libel,and intentional interference with economic relations. We holdthat the district court properly dismissed all these claims withprejudice.

A. California State Law Claims of Unfair Competition

and False Advertising

Defendants do not dispute Perfect 10s claims that the web-

sites themselves are potentially violating California state andcommon law prohibiting unfair competition and false adver-tising. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, et. seq., and17500, et. seq. Defendants do, however, argue that Emery v.Visa International Service Association, 95 Cal. App. 4th 952(2002), precludes liability for Defendants in this case, bothunder secondary liability and aiding and abetting theories.Defendants are correct on both counts.

19The dissent claims that no contractual relationship arises between theinfringers and consumers until Defendants process a payment. Dissent at7886. Even if true as a factual and legal matterand given the absence

of any citation, it is difficult to know whether this is truethis resultsfrom a decision of the websites to delay formation of the relationship, notfrom any requirement Defendants impose on the transaction.


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In Emery, a California appellate court affirmed a grant ofsummary judgment in favor of Visa, finding that Visa did notexercise the requisite control over merchants marketing for-eign lottery tickets to impose secondary liability under thestates unfair competition or false advertising laws.Id. at 959-964. Emery found that an unfair practices claim under sec-tion 17200 cannot be predicated on vicarious liability. . . . Adefendants liability must be based on his personal participa-tion in the unlawful practices and unbridled control over thepractices that are found to violate section 17200 or 17500.Id. at 960 (internal citations omitted). Because Visa itselfplayed no part in preparing or sending any statement thatmight be construed as untrue or misleading under the unfairbusiness practices statutes, it could not be liable for unfaircompetition. Id. at 964. The false advertising claim also nec-essarily failed because even if Visa allowed the merchants touse its logo, trade name, or trademark, it would not be liablefor false advertising. There is no duty to investigate the truthof statements made by others. Id. (citations omitted). Emeryis dispositive of Perfect 10s claims that the Defendants aresecondarily liable under California unfair competition andfalse advertising laws and the district court properly dismissedthem.20

In an attempt to avoid the impact ofEmery, Perfect 10argues on appeal that it alleged aiding and abetting theories ofliability in its complaints, and further, that the district courtimproperly dismissed these civil claims under a criminal stan-dard of aiding and abetting. Perfect 10 fails to establish a via-

20The dissent argues that Emery does not preclude Perfect 10s claimsbecause the only defendant inEmery was Visa International Service Asso-ciation, whereas Perfect 10 has also sued the member merchant banks whoissue cards and process payments from merchants. Dissent at 7886-87.This distinction is only relevant if the activities of the member banks con-stitute personal participation in the infringing activity, and for all the rea-sons discussed above, those banks are not personally involved in thereproduction, alteration, or distribution of the infringing images. Rather,they merely process payments related to those activities.


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ble claim on these theories as well. The only authority offeredby Perfect 10 in support of such liability is an opinion whichis now uncitable in California: Schulz v. Neovi Data Corpora-tion, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 46 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2005), super-ceded by 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 758 (Cal. 2005), cause transferredby 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471 (Cal. 2007), transferred to -- Cal.Rptr. 3d --, 2007 WL 1723535 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Jun 15,2007).

Furthermore, even under the standards announced in thesuperceding Schulz opinion, Defendants would not be liable.The Schulz court found a credit card company potentially lia-ble for its role in facilitating an illegal online lottery becausethat company went far beyond merely processing creditcards. 2007 WL 1723535, at *6. In support, the court citedspecific statements from a company representative in whichhe personally assured an agent of the website that the defen-dant company did not have any problem with the operationof the [illegal] lottery site and had a stronger stomach thanother payment processors. Id. Perfect 10 alleges no similarconduct hereDefendants merely process credit card pay-ments.

B. Aiding and Abetting the Websites Violations ofPerfect 10s Right of Publicity

Perfect 10 alleges that Defendants aided and abetted thewebsites violations of Perfect 10s rights of publicity,acquired by assignment from its models, in violation of Cal.Civil Code 3344 and the common law right of publicity.This aiding and abetting claim fails for the same reasons asthe aiding and abetting claims under unfair competition andfalse advertising. Even if such liability is possible under Cali-fornia lawa proposition for which Perfect 10 has providedno clear authorityDefendants lack sufficient control or per-

sonal involvement in the infringing activities to be so liable.See Schulz, 2007 WL 1723535, at *5-6;Emery, 95 Cal. App.4th at 962-63.


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C. Libel and Intentional Interference with ProspectiveEconomic Advantage

The district court dismissed Perfect 10s claims of libel andintentional interference with prospective economic advantagewith prejudice on multiple grounds. We affirm on the groundthat both are time-barred. Under California law, a libel claimmust be filed within one year of publication of the allegedlylibelous statement, Cal. Civ. Proc. 340(c), and an intentionalinterference claim must be filed within two years of theunderlying harmful act, Cal. Civ. Proc. 339. Perfect 10claims the same underlying wrongful act as the basis for bothclaims: its placement on the industry black list in the Springof 2001. However, Perfect 10 failed to file suit until January2004well beyond the statute of limitations applicable toeach claimand has failed to show any possible exceptionunder either statute. Those claims are time-barred.

CONCLUSION

We decline to create any of the radical new theories of lia-bility advocated by Perfect 10 and the dissent and we affirmthe district courts dismissal with prejudice of all causes of

action in Perfect 10s complaint for failure to state a claimupon which relief can be granted.

AFFIRMED.

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, dissenting for the most part:1

Federal law gives copyright owners the exclusive right todistribute copies [of their works] . . . to the public by sale.

1I join part C of the California Statutory and Common Law Claimssection of the opinion, dealing with plaintiffs libel and prospective eco-nomic advantage claims.


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17 U.S.C. 106(3). Plaintiff alleges that certain third partiesit refers to as the Stolen Content Websites unlawfully copyits protected images and sell them to the public, using defen-dants payment systems as financial intermediaries. Accord-ing to plaintiff, the Stolen Content Websites maintain nophysical presence in the United States in order to evade crimi-nal and civil liability for their illegal conduct. First Am.Compl. at 8 26. Plaintiff also claims that Defendants do notenforce their own rules against [the] Stolen Content Websitesbecause Defendants do not want to lose the substantial reve-nues and profits they receive from the websites. Id. at 10

35. Plaintiff has repeatedly notified defendants that they areabetting the sale of stolen merchandise by knowingly provid-ing crucial transactional support services for the sale of mil-lions of stolen photos and film clips worth billions of dollars,id. at 1 5, but to no avail. Frustrated in its effort to protectthe rights Congress has given it, plaintiff turns to the federalcourts for redress. We should not slam the courthouse door inits face.

Accepting the truth of plaintiffs allegations, as we must ona motion to dismiss, the credit cards2 are easily liable for indi-rect copyright infringement: They knowingly provide a finan-

cial bridge between buyers and sellers of pirated works,enabling them to consummate infringing transactions, whilemaking a profit on every sale. If such active participation ininfringing conduct does not amount to indirect infringement,

2Throughout this dissent, I refer to defendants collectively as credit cardcompanies or credit cards. In so doing, I am adopting the same simplifyingassumptions as the majority. I am aware that Visa and MasterCard dontdeal directly with merchants; rather, merchants obtain credit card accountsfrom banks, which are in turn authorized by Visa or MasterCard to usetheir respective payment systems. Some of the other defendants areinvolved in clearing these transactions. For a description of how the sys-tem works, seeEmery v. Visa Intl Serv. Assn, 95 Cal. App. 4th 952, 956(2002). It may well be that some of the defendants will be absolved of lia-bility because they have no direct contact with merchants or consumers,but that is a matter to be sorted out after discovery.


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its hard to imagine what would.3

By straining to absolvedefendants of liability, the majority leaves our law in disarray.

Contributory Infringement

We have long held that a defendant is liable for contribu-tory infringement if it materially contributes to the infringingconduct.A&M Records, Inc. v.Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted) (citingGershwin Publg Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). Our recent opinion in Per-

fect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., slip op. at 5751 (9th Cir.2007), canvasses the caselaw in this area and concludes thatGoogle could be held contributorily liable if it had knowl-edge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available using itssearch engine, could take simple measures to prevent furtherdamage to Perfect 10s copyrighted works, and failed to takesuch steps. Amazon, slip op. at 5793. Substitute paymentsystems for search engine in this sentence, and it describesdefendants here: If a consumer wishes to buy an infringingimage from one of the Stolen Content Websites, he can do soby using Visa or MasterCard, just as he can use Google tofind the infringing images in the first place. My colleagues

engage in wishful thinking when they claim that Googlessearch engine itself assists in the distribution of infringingcontent to Internet users, while Defendants payment systems

3As the majority points out, maj. op. at 7842 n.6, 7846 n.11, plaintiffsallegations might also support a theory of direct infringement. See FirstAm. Compl. at 8 30 (Defendants, jointly with the Stolen Content Web-sites, are engaged in . . . the willful and systematic infringement of theintellectual property rights of plaintiff and others). Because plaintiff hasnot argued this theory on appeal, we have no occasion to address it. Butthe fact that defendants may also be committing direct infringement doesnot diminish their responsibility as indirect infringers for providing essen-tial services to buyers and sellers of stolen merchandise. A defendant can

be liable for both direct and indirect infringement based on the same con-duct. See, e.g.,Alcatel USA, Inc. v.DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772,791 (5th Cir. 1999).


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do not and that [h]elping users to locate an image mightsubstantially assist users to download infringing images, butprocessing payments does not. Maj. op. at 7841, 7842.4

The majority struggles to distinguish Amazon by positingan additional step in the causal chain between defendantsactivities and the infringing conduct. Id. at 7842. Accordingto the majority, Google may materially contribute toinfringement by making it fast and easy for third parties tolocate and distribute infringing material, whereas Defendantsmake it easier for infringement to be profitable, which tendsto increase financial incentives to infringe, which in turn tendsto increase infringement.Id. The majority is mistaken; thereis no additional step. Defendants participate in every creditcard sale of pirated images; the images are delivered to thebuyer only after defendants approve the transaction and pro-cess the payment. This is not just an economic incentive forinfringement; its an essential step in the infringement pro-cess.

In any event, I dont see why it matters whether there is anadditional step. Materiality turns on how significantly theactivity helps infringement, not on whether its characterized

as one step or two steps removed from it. The majority recog-nizes that Defendants make it easier for websites to profitfrom this infringing activity, maj. op. at 7841; that defen-dants conduct tends to increase infringement, id. at 7842;that defendants have the effect of increasing . . . infringe-ment, id. at 7843; that Defendants have the power to under-mine the commercial viability of the Stolen Content

4Neither Google nor the credit cards here were designed for infringe-ment. The majority tries to distinguish this case fromNapsterandMetro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005),where defendants services were designed for no other purpose. Maj. op.at 7845 n.10, 7849. But Napsterand Groksterare not the endpoint of thiscourts caselaw: Even though Google has many legitimate, noninfringinguses,Amazon held that it would be guilty of contributory infringement ifit could modify its service to avoid helping infringers.


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Websites and that they make it easier for websites to profitfrom this infringing activity, id. at 7847; that Defendantscould likely take certain steps that may have the indirecteffect of reducing infringing activity on the Internet, id. at7852-53; and that defendants could reduce the number ofthose [infringing] sales, id. at 7856. Taking the majority atits word, it sounds like defendants are providing very signifi-cant help to the direct infringers.

My colleagues recognize, as they must, that helping con-sumers locate infringing content can constitute contributoryinfringement,5 but they consign the means of payment to sec-

ondary status. Maj. op. at 7846 (Defendants merely providea method of payment . . . .); id. at 7850 ([A]ll partiesinvolved simply use Defendants system to process paymentsfor that infringing material.); id. at 7854 (They can onlytake away the means the websites currently use to sell [theinfringing images].); id. at 7855 (Defendants can onlyrefuse to process credit card payments to the offending mer-chant within their payment network . . . .). But why is locat-ing infringing images more central to infringement thanpaying for them? If infringing images cant be found, therecan be no infringement; but if infringing images cant be paidfor, there can be no infringement either. Location services and

payment services are equally central to infringement; themajoritys contrary assertion is supported largely by disparag-ing use of merely, simply and only. See also id. at 7852([M]ere ability to withdraw a financial carrot does notcreate the stick of right and ability to control . . . .). 6

5Amazon, as well as Napsterand Grokster, hold as much.6The majority argues that [b]ecause location services lead Internet

users directly to infringing images, and often display them on the websiteof the service itself, we find that location services are more important andmore essentialindeed, more materialto infringement than paymentservices are. Maj. op. at 7842-43 n.8. Skipping lightly over the fact thatwe lack the power to find anything, the majority admits that paymentservices are important, essential and material. That location services mayor may notbe more so, is of no consequence; this is not a race wherethere can be only one winner.


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The majority dismisses the significance of credit cards byarguing that infringement could continue on a large scale[without them] because other viable funding mechanisms areavailable. Maj. op. at 7842.7 Of course, the same could besaid about Google. As the majority admits, if Google wereunwilling or unable to serve up infringing images, consumerscould use Yahoo!, Ask.com, Microsoft Live Search, A9.comor AltaVista instead.Id. at 7842-43 n.8. Even if none of thesewere available, consumers could still locate websites withinfringing images through e-mails from friends, messages ondiscussion forums, tips via online chat, typo-squatting,

peer-to-peer networking using BitTorrent or eDonkey, offlineand online advertisements (see pp. 7882 infra), disreputablesearch engines hosted on servers in far-off jurisdictions oreven old-fashioned word of mouth. The majoritys claim thatsearch engines could effectively cause a website to disappearby removing it from their search results, maj. op. at 7855, isquite a stretch.

If the test for contributory infringement really were whetherinfringement could continue on a large scale [without the aidof the defendant] because other viable . . . mechanisms areavailable, Amazon should have absolved Google of liability

because of the availability of such obvious alternatives. ButAmazon held that Google could be liable for contributoryinfringement because it substantially assists users in findinginfringing materials; the existence of other means of infringe-

7The majoritys claim that Perfect 10s factual allegations are not tothe contrary, maj. op. at 7842 n.7, is simply not accurate. Indeed, else-where in the opinion, the majority concedes that plaintiff has made a fac-tual allegation that the Stolen Content Websites could not continue toexist as websites offering images for sale online.Id. at 7856 n.18. Howthen can the majority hold here, apparently as a matter of law, that defen-dants are absolved of liability because other viable funding mechanismsare available? Maj. op. at 7842. If we accept as true, as the majority saysit does, that the Stolen Content Websites will no longer be able to sell theirimages, how can we hold that they could still do so by developing other(unknown and unsuspected) ways to get paid?


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ment was not even considered because no case has suggestedthis to be a relevant consideration. The majoritys other via-ble . . . mechanisms test conflicts with Amazon, Napster,Groksterand every other material assistance case that I knowof.

The majority does even worse when it tries to describe theother viable funding mechanisms that could serve as alter-natives to credit cards: According to the majority, the StolenContent Websites might. . . make [their] profits from adver-tising or mightdevelop other payment mechanisms that donot depend on the credit card companies. Maj. op. at 7842(emphasis added). This shows that my colleagues have ahealthy imagination but contravenes our responsibilities, themost fundamental of which is that we must work with thefacts the parties presented below, not invent new facts onappeal. Defendants have presented no evidence that thepirates could survive without credit cards, nor could they, asthe case is still at the motion to dismiss stage. Even if specula-tion as to what the Stolen Content Websites might do wereadmissible evidence, which I seriously doubt, we must stillwait for one of the parties to present it, not conjure it up our-selves.8 At the pleadings stage, we must accept plaintiffs alle-

gations that credit cards are indispensable to the operation ofthe Stolen Content Websites, and that these websites would beforced out of business without them. See First Am. Compl. at2 7 (Stolen Content Websites cannot exist without theknowledge and direct participation of [defendants].); id. at10 35 ([T]he Stolen Content Websites would be eradicat-ed.). If my colleagues cant justify their result without con-

8I note in passing that, even if we were to accept the majoritys specula-tions, they would be insufficient. That the Stolen Content Websitesmight change the way they do business or develop alternative paymentmechanisms hardly proves that other viable funding mechanisms areavailable. Maj. op. at 7842 (emphasis added). The majoritys prognosti-cation as to what might happen in the future leaves open the likelihoodthat it will nothappen, and positively admits that there are no viable alter-native payment mechanisms today.


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tradicting plaintiffs allegations, this is a pretty good hint thattheyre wrong. See also p. 7869 n.7 supra; pp. 7878 n.15,7848-50 infra.

The majoritys attempt to distinguish location services frompayment services by trying to show that there are viable alter-natives for the latter but not the former cuts entirely againstthem. As plaintiff alleges, and experience tells us, there arenumerous ways of locating infringing images on the Internet,but there are no adequate substitutes for credit cards when itcomes to paying for them. A few consumers might use checksor money orders to pay for infringing images, but this wouldbe far more cumbersome, time-consuming and risky thanusing credit cards. See pp. 7845-46 & n.14 infra. If it matteredwhether search engines or credit cards are more important topeddling infringing content on the Internet, the cards wouldwin hands down.

But it doesnt matter. Material assistance turns on whetherthe activity in question substantially assists infringement.Amazon, slip op. at 5793. It makes no difference whether theprimary infringers might do without it by finding a wor-karound, which is why the majority can cite no case support-

ing its analysis. We presume that primary infringers havegood reasons for selecting a particular means to infringe, andthat other ways to do so will be more costly, more cumber-some and less efficient. Moreover, infringement can alwaysbe carried out by other means; if the existence of alternativeswere a defense to contributory infringement then there couldnever be a case of contributory infringement based on mate-rial assistance. The majority makes some very newand verybadlaw here.

The majority also makes a slightly different argument:While Perfect 10 has alleged that Defendants make it easier

for websites to profit from this infringing activity, the issuehere is reproduction, alteration, display and distribution,which can occur without payment. Even if infringing images


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were not paid for, there would still be infringement. Maj. op.at 7840-41. What the majority seems to be arguing here is thathelping an infringer get paid cannot materially assist infringe-ment because the actual process of infringementreproduction, alteration, display and distributiondoes notinclude payment. There are two problems with this argument.The first is that the Stolen Content Websites are alleged toinfringe plaintiffs right of distribution by sale. 17 U.S.C. 106(3). Its not possible to distribute by sale without receiv-ing compensation, so payment is in fact part of the infringe-ment process. Second, this argument runs head-on into

Amazon, where we held that helping to find infringing imagesmaterially assists infringement, even though locating infring-ing images also isnt reproduction, alteration, display [or]distribution. To be sure, locating images, like paying forthem, makes it a lot easier to infringe, but neither is intrinsicto the infringement process, as the majority conceives it.

Nor can todays opinion be squared with Fonovisa, Inc. v.Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). InFonovisa, defendant allowed known infringers to sell piratedworks from stalls at its swap meet. We found material assis-

tance based on the fact that it would [have been] difficult forthe infringing activity to take place in the massive quantitiesalleged without the support services provided by the swapmeet. 76 F.3d at 264. The pivotal role played by the swapmeet in Fonovisa is played by the credit cards in cyberspace,in that they make massive quantities of infringement possi-ble that would otherwise be impossible. Indeed, the assistanceprovided here is far more material than in Fonovisa. A piratekicked out of a swap meet could still peddle his illicit waresthrough newspaper ads or by word of mouth, but you cant dobusiness at all on the Internet without credit cards. Plaintiff

thus plausibly alleges that the Stolen Content Websiteswould be eradicated if defendants withdrew their support.First Am. Compl. at 10 35.


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The majority rejects Fonovisa by pointing out that the swapmeet there provided a centralized place for the infringementto take place, maj. op. at 7845, whereas defendants here haveno direct connection to [the] infringement, id. at 7840.9 Butmaterial assistance does not depend on physical contact withthe infringing activity. If you lend money to a drug dealerknowing he will use it to finance a drug deal, you materiallyassist the transaction, even if you never see the drugs. Or, ifyou knowingly drive a principal to the scene of the crime, youprovide material assistance, even if nothing happens duringthe ride. See United States v.Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1076-79

(9th Cir. 2007). Material assistance turns on whether the con-duct assists infringement in a significant way, not on pedanticfactual distinctions unrelated to how much the activity facili-tates infringement.

Sure, a marketplace for pirated works (as in Fonovisa) oran index for such works (as in Napster and Grokster) isimportant to infringement, but so is a means of getting paid.Defendants are directly involved in every infringing transac-tion where payment is made by credit card, which (accordingto plaintiff) amounts to virtually every sale of pirated works.First Am. Compl. at 9 35. Credit cards dont provide some

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