P CHANGE : T BOLIVARIAN C AND 2000 E - The Carter Center · The Carter Center’s Latin American and Caribbean Program and 96 The Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers of the

1

OBSERVING POLITICAL CHANGE IN VENEZUELA

NDITHE CARTER CENTER NDI

OBSERVING POLITICAL CHANGEIN VENEZUELA: THE BOLIVARIAN

CONSTITUTION AND 2000 ELECTIONS

FFFFFINALINALINALINALINAL R R R R REPOEPOEPOEPOEPORRRRRTTTTT

FEBRUARY 2001

LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN PROGRAMTHE CARTER CENTER

ONE COPENHILLATLANTA, GA 30307

(404) 420-5175FAX (404) 420-5196

WWW.CARTERCENTER.ORG

Written ByLaura NeumanJennifer McCoy

THE CARTER CENTER

2

OBSERVING POLITICAL CHANGE IN VENEZUELANDI

3



TABLE OF CONTENTSList of Delegates 5

Foreword 10

Acknowledgments 11

Key Election Terms and Abbreviations 13

Executive Summary 17

Introduction 22

Historical Background 22The Carter Center Role

Voting Background in Venezuela 25

Election of Constituent Assembly 27

Functioning of Constituent Assembly 30

Constitutional Referendum and Floods 33The Carter Center Observation of the ReferendumThe New ConstitutionThe Floods

The Congresillo 39

Preparing for the “Mega-Elections” 40Electoral ReformsCarter Center January MissionContracting Out the Election ProcessCandidates and AlliancesCarter Center March MissionAudit CommitteeTechnical Election PreparationsCampaigning BeginsCarter Center May Mission

The Mega-Elections 49The Carter Center DelegationSupreme Court RulesPresident Carter’s Arrival

THE CARTER CENTER

4


Preparation for July Election 54Congresillo DecisionsTechnical PreparationsCampaigningCivic Audit CommitteeCarter Center July Assessment Mission

July 30, 2000, Elections 60The Carter Center Election Monitoring

Technical ExpertsDelegates ArriveElection DayObservation of Audit

Appeals and Protests

Assessing the May and July 2000 Electoral Process 71

Dec. 3, 2000, Local Elections and Referendum 73

Recommendations 75

Conclusion 78

List of TablesTable 1: The Voting Process 25Table 2: Composition of the Constituent Assembly 28Table 3: El Universal Poll, 3/22/00 42Table 4: Presidential Election Results 66

AppendicesA. The Carter Center Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers 80B. Dec. 15, 1999, Constitutional Referendum Ballot 81C. President Carter Statement, May 27, 2000 82D. May and July 2000 Presidential Ballot 85E. Daily Journal, Saturday,July 29, 2000 86F. Observation Checklist Summary 87G. Presidential Results by State 89H. Governors’ Results 90I. Statement of the Carter Center Delegation, July 31, 2000 92J. Presidential and Governors’ Appeals 94K. Mayoral Appeals by State 95

The Carter Center’s Latin American and Caribbean Program and 96The Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Americas

About The Carter Center 97

5



LIST OF DELEGATES - MAYTHE CARTER CENTER

VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS 2000

LLLLLEADERSHIPEADERSHIPEADERSHIPEADERSHIPEADERSHIP T T T T TEAMEAMEAMEAMEAM

The Honorable Jimmy Carter, 39th President of the United States and Council Chair, USAMrs. Rosalynn Carter, former First Lady of the United States, Carter Center Vice ChairThe Honorable Rodrigo Carazo Odio, former President of the Republic of Costa RicaEstrella Zeledon Lizano, former First Lady of the Republic of Costa RicaAmbassador Dennis Jett, Diplomat in Residence at The Carter Center, former U.S. Ambassador to Peru, USALaura Neuman, J.D., Senior Program Associate for the Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter

Center, USA

IIIIINTERNANTERNANTERNANTERNANTERNATIONALTIONALTIONALTIONALTIONAL D D D D DELEGAELEGAELEGAELEGAELEGATESTESTESTESTES

Louise Allen, USATricia Allen, member of The Carter Center Board of Councilors, USAClaudia Barrientos, Senior Program Officer, National Democratic Institute, Washington D.C., USADr. Carlos Bascuñán, Executive Director, Corporación Justicia y Democracia, Santiago, ChileDr. Julia Buxton, Lecturer of Latin American and Eastern European Politics, Kingston University, EnglandRodrigo Chavez, Entrepreneur and Editorialist, San Salvador, El SalvadorDr. Brian Crisp, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, USAFrancisco Diez, Private Mediator, Consultant and Advisor in private negotiations, Buenos Aires, ArgentinaPablo Galarce, Senior Program Assistant, Americas Division, International Foundation for Election Systems

(IFES), Washington D.C., ChileRonald Gould, Assistant Chief of Electoral Officer, Elections Canada, Ottawa, CanadaDr. Jonathan Hartlyn, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies,

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USADr. Jeremy Hobbs, Principal Research Officer (First Secretary), Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO),

London, EnglandCornelio Marchan, Director, Fundación Esquel, Quito, EcuadorDr. David Myers, Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, USADeborah Palmer, Doctoral Candidate, Oxford University, EnglandDr. Kenneth Roberts, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, USAMaria Rubiales de Chamorro, former Director of the Office of International Observation, Consejo Supremo

Electoral, NicaraguaCelio Santos, Deputy Chief of Electoral Support, Regional Electoral Court of Distrito Federal, Brasilia, BrazilPenelope Spain, Volunteer, The Turimiquire Foundation, Cumaná, Venezuela, USADr. Harold Trinkunas, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,

California, USAVictoria Widgosky, Research Assistant, Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, D.C., Argentina

THE CARTER CENTER

6


CCCCCARARARARARTERTERTERTERTER C C C C CENTERENTERENTERENTERENTER D D D D DELEGAELEGAELEGAELEGAELEGATESTESTESTESTES

Andres Araya, Director of the Carter Center Field Office in Venezuela,Costa Rica

Alex Bick, Research Assistant, Conflict Resolution Program, The Carter Center, USAMaria Carrasco, Graduate Assistant, Latin American and Caribbean Program,

The Carter Center, EcuadorDeanna Congileo, Senior Associate Director of Public Information, The Carter Center, USAFaith Corneille, Program Assistant, Latin American and Caribbean Program,

The Carter Center, USARick Diamond, Photographer, USACurtis Kohlhaas, Events Coordinator, The Carter Center, USANancy Konigsmark, Director of Scheduling, The Carter Center, USADr. Shelley McConnell, Associate Director, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center, USATanya Mújica, Administrative Assistant to the Office of Jimmy Carter, The Carter Center, USAKent Spicer, Financial Analyst, The Carter Center, USA

VVVVVENEZUELANENEZUELANENEZUELANENEZUELANENEZUELAN O O O O OFFICEFFICEFFICEFFICEFFICE P P P P PERSONNELERSONNELERSONNELERSONNELERSONNEL

Jacqueline Mosquera, Logistical Coordinator, Carter Center Field Office in VenezuelaDr. Michael Penfold, Political Analyst, Carter Center Field Office in VenezuelaRafael Sequera, Chauffer, Carter Center Field Office in VenezuelaMaria Isabel Zambrano, Assistant, Carter Center Field Office in Venezuela

7



May delegation

RIC

K D

IAM

ON

D

THE CARTER CENTER

8


LIST OF DELEGATES – JULYTHE CARTER CENTER

VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS 2000

LLLLLEADERSHIPEADERSHIPEADERSHIPEADERSHIPEADERSHIP T T T T TEAMEAMEAMEAMEAM

The Honorable Jimmy Carter, 39th President of the United States and Council ChairMrs. Rosalynn Carter, former First Lady of the United States, Carter Center Vice ChairThe Honorable Rodrigo Carazo Odio, former President of the Republic of Costa RicaThe Honorable Luis Alberto Lacalle, former President of UruguayLaura Neuman, J.D., Senior Program Associate for the Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter

Center, USAAndrés Araya, Director of the Carter Center Field Office in Venezuela, Costa Rica

IIIIINTERNANTERNANTERNANTERNANTERNATIONALTIONALTIONALTIONALTIONAL D D D D DELEGAELEGAELEGAELEGAELEGATESTESTESTESTES

Thomas Bagwell, President, American Proteins, Inc, Georgia, USAVirginia Barr, Spanish Teacher, Waldorf School, Austin, Texas, USAJavier Cabreja, Executive Director, Participación Ciudadana, Santo Domingo, Dominican RepublicLuis Alberto Cordero, Consultant on Electoral Systems and Political Parties, Costa RicaDr. Brian Crisp, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, USAPedro Pablo Díaz, Vice President of the Latin America Group, The Coca-Cola Company, ChileFrancisco Diez, Private Mediator, Consultant and Advisor in private negotiations, Buenos Aires, ArgentinaDr. Mansour Fahimi, Principal Consultant, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Maryland, USADr. Elisabeth Friedman, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Colombia University, New

York, USARonald Gould, Assistant Chief of Electoral Officer, Elections Canada, Ottawa, CanadaMarcel Guzmán de Rojas, President, NEOTEC, La Paz, BoliviaDr. Kathryn Johnson, Assistant Professor of History at Barnard College, Colombia University, New York, USALuc Lapointe, Entrepreneur, Dominican RepublicMichael Magan, Managing Director, the International Division/Western Hemisphere, United States Chamber of

Commerce, Washington, D.C., USAGuillermo Márquez, Lawyer and Legal Consultant, Bogotá, ColombiaDr. David Myers, Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, USADeborah Palmer, Doctoral Candidate, Oxford University, EnglandRafael Roncagliolo, General Secretary, Transparencia, Lima, PeruRaul Rosende, Advisor on Conflict Resolution for the UN Mission in Guatemala, UruguayMaria Rubiales de Chamorro, former Director of the Office of International Observation, Consejo Supremo

Electoral, NicaraguaOmar Sánchez, Program Coordinator, the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America,

Washington, D.C., USABrent Slay, Managing Partner, The Terryberry Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, USA

9



Diane Slay, Community Volunteer, Grand Rapids, Michigan, USADr. William Smith, Professor of Political Science, University of Miami, Florida, USAPenelope Spain, Volunteer, The Turimiquire Foundation, Cumaná, Venezuela, USAEduardo Sterling, International Consultant in Electoral Administration, Costa RicaJeffrey Vasser, Senior Vice President of Finance and Administration, Cipriani International, SA, New Jersey,

USAVictoria Wigodzky, Research Assistant, Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, D.C., Argentina

CCCCCARARARARARTERTERTERTERTER C C C C CENTERENTERENTERENTERENTER D D D D DELEGAELEGAELEGAELEGAELEGATESTESTESTESTES

Dr. Gordon Streeb, Associate Executive Director for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict, The CarterCenter, USA

Ashley Barr, Senior Program Associate, Human Rights Program, The Carter Center, USAAlex Bick, Research Assistant, Conflict Resolution Program, The Carter Center, USAVictoria Cárcamo, Intern, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center, USADeanna Congileo, Senior Associate Director of Public Information, The Carter Center, USAFaith Corneille, Program Assistant, Latin American and Caribbean Program,

The Carter Center, USAKory Hawkins, Intern, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center, USACurtis Kohlhaas, Events Coordinator, The Carter Center, USANancy Konigsmark, Director of Scheduling, The Carter Center, USAJacqueline Mosquera, Logistical Coordinator, Carter Center Field Office in VenezuelaTanya Mújica, Administrative Assistant to the Office of Jimmy Carter, The Carter Center, USAJoan Puckett, Photographer, Official Photographer for The Carter Center July 2000 Venezuela Election

Mission, USAKent Spicer, Financial Analyst, The Carter Center, USA

THE CARTER CENTER

10


On Dec. 6, 1998, Venezuelans clearlyproclaimed their intense desire for changein their political life. The Carter Centerobserved those elections and concluded that theywere a true expression of democracy. Since then,the majority of Venezuelans continued to supportthe radical reform program of President HugoChávez through five more elections and referenda.Other sectors, however, expressed concern thattheir voices were not being heard, and that theauthorities charged with overseeing the electionsand any disputes were not neutral. We, therefore,accepted the invitation of the Venezuela ElectoralCouncil and the presidential candidates to return toVenezuela to monitor the 2000 electoral process.

We enlisted the support of the Council ofPresidents and Prime Ministers of the Americas andwere fortunate to have Luis Alberto Lacalle, formerpresident of Uruguay, and Rodrigo Carazo, formerpresident of Costa Rica, join us for pre-electionvisits and co-lead with me the election delegations.Rosalynn and I prepared to go for the scheduledMay 28 elections and were en route when theSupreme Court announced its suspension. We feltthat was a wise decision and decided to continueour trip, in the hopes of ensuring that all sideswould calmly accept the ruling and Venezuelanswould work together to address the problemsnecessitating the postponement.

We promised to return for the newly scheduledelections and were joined by a second group ofdedicated international delegates, many of them

returning after the May suspension. As always, theVenezuelan people, as well as their official represen-tatives, warmly received us. Although we con-cluded that the presidential election legitimatelyexpressed the will of the people, we found seriousflaws throughout the electoral process, beginningwith the pressure to conduct the May electionsprematurely and concluding with the continueddelays in resolving the appeals for disputed elec-tions. We urge the National Electoral Council toresolve these appeals as soon as possible.

As Venezuela concludes a two-year period ofintense electoral and political activity, we expectthat the country and its leaders will turn theirattention to the serious economic and social needsof its people. We hope that Venezuela will renew itsdemocracy with strong and independent institu-tions, and that the voices of all its citizens will beheard so that Venezuela can serve as a model for atrue participatory and representative democracy.n

President Jimmy CarterChairmanThe Carter Center

FOREWORD

11



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Dr. Jennifer McCoy, director of The CarterCenter’s Latin American and CaribbeanProgram (LACP), initially led the CarterCenter Venezuela project. When Dr. McCoy wenton maternity leave in May 2000, Senior ProgramAssociate Laura Neuman took over projectleadership. We survived the 1999 floods, the Maysuspended elections, Laura’s working all hours andJennifer’s birth to baby Grace, and together, wewant to thank all those who assisted in making thisproject a great success.

The Carter Center mission in Venezuela wasmade possible through the hard work of manydedicated people. We appreciate the political andelectoral insights of our staff in the field: MichaelPenfold, Andrés Araya, and Jaquelyn Mosquera.Michael Penfold provided informed analysis of theconstituent assembly process beginning in August1999 and continuing through the suspended Mayelections. His reports provided the background forthe section on the Constituent Assembly. AndrésAraya spent countless hours advising the CivicAudit Committee, an innovative role for Venezu-elan civil society in elections. When the electionswere suspended, Andrés graciously agreed toremain in Venezuela the additional three months tohead our office in Caracas. Without JaquelynMosquera, the Carter Center mission could nothave functioned. Jackie did it all – from logistics tograph drawing to researching obscure electoralrules. We were blessed to have her. Finally, wewould like to thank Maria Isabel Zambrano whoassisted us during the May elections.

During the May and July elections, we werelucky to have many “veterans” assist us in runningthe expanded Carter Center Venezuela field office,working with the delegates, and preparing theparallel vote tabulation. First and foremost, wemust recognize the tireless efforts of Faith Corneille,

LACP program assistant. Faith organized the fieldoffice staff for the July elections, managed much ofthe preparations leading up to each election, wroteall of our budgets, and consistently remainedcheerful and upbeat. Working alongside Faith wereDebbie Palmer and Victoria Wigodsky, formerLACP interns. Debbie, who never seemed to sleep,prepared the quick count, and accepted any taskthat came her way. Victoria, on loan from theInter-American Dialogue, was an asset to our officewith her perfect Spanish and fantastic disposition.Dr. Shelley McConnell ran the office for the Mayelections. We are thankful to have had her calmhead and years of experience when the May elec-tions were suspended. Finally, we want to thankAlexander Bick and Penelope Spain for theirassistance in the office, interest, and dedication tothe project.

The LACP interns once again proved vital toour mission’s success. From traveling with us onpre-election assessment missions, to assisting duringthe election, editing the briefing books and thisfinal report, and keeping us apprised of the dailyhappenings in Venezuela, we rely heavily on ourinterns’ intellect and energy. We want to thank allof them, those who traveled with us and those whokept things going back home, from the fall 1999class through spring 2001. Heather Sullivan, aformer intern who stayed on to keep our Atlantaoffice running, deserves particular mention for herfortitude in making all the airline reservations andwillingness to give up her whole summer to workon Venezuela. Also to be commended for herstamina is Paula Colmegna who translated thereport, even while studying for her master’s exams.

The Venezuela project would not have beenpossible without the dedication and commitment ofall Carter Center staff, including those who trav-eled with us: Deanna Congileo, Curtis Kohlhaas,

THE CARTER CENTER

12


Nancy Konigsmark, Kent Spicer, and TanyaMújica. Those who stayed in Atlanta and workedjust as hard were: Becky Castle, Tom Eberhart, andIris Frank. Additionally, Ambassadors Dennis Jett,Carter Center ambassador-in-residence, and Gor-don Streeb, associate executive director, lent ustheir wisdom and counsel throughout the missions.

The Carter Center is home to the Council ofPresidents and Prime Ministers, a group of 35present and former Latin American and Caribbeanheads of state. Members of the Council often joinPresident and Mrs. Carter on missions to LatinAmerica. In this case, we were honored by thepresence and insights of former President of CostaRica Rodrigo Carazo, his wife Estrella, and formerPresident of Uruguay Luis Alberto LaCalle.

The Carter Center mounted 10 assessmentmissions and observations. On each of these mis-sions, superb electoral and political experts, includ-ing Harold Trinkunas, David Myers, MarcelGuzman de Rojas, Eduardo Sterling, PatricioGajardo, Roy Saltman, and Luis Alberto Corderojoined us. The Carter Center also would like toacknowledge the people behind the lens, RickDiamond and Joan Puckett, who took great picturesthat have allowed us to share our mission with

Carter Center staff Laura Neuman, Tanya Mújica,Faith Corneille, Alexander Bick, Gordon Streeb,Mistye Godsey, Curtis Kohlhaas, Debbie Palmer,Penelope Spain, and Deanna Congileo.

JOA

N P

UC

KET

T

Jennifer McCoyDirector, LACPThe Carter Center

Laura NeumanSenior Program Associate, LACPThe Carter Center

others. Lastly, preparing and running aparallel vote tabulation is a difficult andoften thankless job. Therefore, we want totake this opportunity to recognizeMansour Fahimi, who in a very shortperiod of time, prepared a statisticallysplendid sample and to whom we willalways be indebted.

The Carter Center was fortunate tohave united two groups of experiencedand professional delegates. Therefore, wewant to thank our May and July delega-tions for taking the time out of their livesto join us in Venezuela for this meaningfulexperience.

The mission was funded throughgenerous grants from the UNDP, U.S. Agency forInternational Development/LAL/RSD, the BritishEmbassy, and the Ford Foundation. We also re-ceived in-kind support from BellSouth, Coca-Cola,and TelCel. All of the views found in this report arethose of The Carter Center and do not necessarilyreflect the opinions of our donors.

Finally, we want to thank the VenezuelanElectoral Council for its responsive answers to allour requests for information, the Red deObservadores Nacionales for working with us onthe parallel vote tabulation, and all of the candi-dates and government officials who met with us andkept us informed. We are grateful for the warmreception we received in Venezuela and congratu-late all Venezuelans on their demonstrated desirefor democracy in their country. n

13



KEY ELECTION TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONSAcción Democrática Democratic Action party. The traditional social

democratic party in Venezuela.

Acta en cero The initial tally sheet printed by every voting machine atthe start of the voting process. It is supposed to indicatethat the voting machine registers no votes for any party.

Actas (de Escrutinio) Tally sheets printed out or hand-written at the end of thevoting process at each voting table.

Automatización Generic name given to the automation of the votingprocess.

Boleta Electoral Electoral Ballot.

Centro de Totalización An automated vote tallying center. There is one of theseper state (23), plus one for the Federal District, and anational tallying center that aggregates results fromregional centers. In these elections, they are managed bythe Spanish company Indra.

Centro de Votación A voting center, typically established in a school to servethe surrounding neighborhood. It usually has multiplevoting tables clustered into groups of three which share avoting machine.

Circumscripción Voting district. Important for the regional elections, butless so in the presidential elections.

Comandante de Guarnición The local garrison commander that controls troopsdeployed for the Plan República in a given area.

Comité de Auditoria A group of seven nongovernmental, civil societyorganizations that handled the process wherein privatecompanies bid to audit Venezuela’s automated votingsystem. This is expected to include an audit of themachines’ operations in the polling sites, the transmissionof the tally sheet results to regional and national countingcenters, and the summation of those results for eachcandidate.

THE CARTER CENTER

14


Consejo Nacional Electoral The five-member and five alternates of the NationalElectoral Council (CNE) which organizes and monitors thevoting process across Venezuela.

COPEI Traditional Christian democratic party in Venezuela.

Material Electoral Materials used at the voting tables, excluding the ballots.Includes pens, folders, ink, stamps, labels, and privacybooths.

Cuaderno de Electores Register of voters assigned to a specific voting table.

CUFAN Comando Unificado de las Fuerzas Armadas (Armed ForcesUnified Command) which controls the 70,000 troopsdeployed as part of the Plan República.

Encuentro Nacional New political group supporting Claudio Fermín for thepresidency.

ES&S Election Systems and Software, a private company based inOmaha, Neb., that made the machines used to collect andcount ballots and transmit results in Venezuela’s elections.

Impresora Computer printer used by each voting machine to print thetally sheets at the beginning and end of the voting process.

Izquierda Democrática New political party backing Francisco Arias Cárdenas for thepresidency.

Junta Electoral Regional (JER) Regional Electoral Council. Charged with supervisingelections on the state level, as well as tallying and confirminglocal electoral results.

La Causa R Party based on independent union movement. A strongnational party after the 1993 elections, it has a more limitedregional presence today and supported Arias for thepresidency.

Maquina de votación Vote tabulating machine.

15



MAS Traditional socialist party in Venezuela. Part of theelectoral coalition supporting candidate Hugo Chávez,although it backed its own candidates in other races.

Mega-elecciones The elections planned for May 28, 2000, that werepostponed. These elections represent only a part of thosethat were to be held in the mega-elections.

Mesa Electoral A voting table, officially consisting of five poll workers whosit at a table to administer the vote. A voting center canhave from one to nine voting tables, typically clustered ingroups of three, sharing a voting machine.

Miembro de Mesa Poll worker, many of whom will have worked in the 1998election.

Miembro principal Primary poll worker, selected by the CNE.

Miembro suplente Alternate poll worker selected by the CNE to replace anyprimary poll worker who fails to appear on election day.

Movimiento Quinta República Fifth Republic Movement. Party of candidate HugoChávez. It has its origins in the Movimiento BolivarianoRevolucionario, the group of military officers thatsupported the 1992 coup attempts.

Patria Para Todos (PPT) Leftist party that split from the La Causa R party.Supported Hugo Chávez in the 1998 presidential race, aspart of the Polo Patriótico, but for 2000, the party ran itsown candidates in several states.

Plan República Refers to both the plan and the personnel of the armedforces electoral security operation. Plan República aredeployed at all polling sites, and although many are youngsoldiers, each polling center has an officer in charge. Thisplan has been implemented in every election since 1963and is a source of pride for the Venezuelan military.

THE CARTER CENTER

16


Polo Patriótico (Patriotic Pole) An electoral alliance that brought together several newand old left and left-center parties to support candidateHugo Chávez in 1998. The MVR remained the key player inthe alliance and replaced references to the Polo in mostpublic discourse in the 2000 campaign. Included the MASand PPT, though the latter split in several states.

Presidente de Mesa The presiding officer of a voting table.

Secretario de Mesa The secretary of a voting table. The second-ranking officer.

Tarjeta PCMCIA (“flashcard”) Electronic memory card that stores the electoral software foreach voting machine and keeps track of votes cast. The cardis inserted into the machine when the polls open and an actaen cero prints to show the card has not registered any votesas yet.

Tarjetón Alternative name for an electoral ballot.

Testigos Políticos Party witnesses to the voting process. These should have freeaccess to the polling sites during the electoral process.

Urna Ballot box.

17



11111OverviewOverviewOverviewOverviewOverview: Venezuela under President HugoChávez undertook a bold experiment torevamp its political system and addresseconomic inequities and poverty. The country heldseven votes in two years as voters chose HugoChávez to lead them in December 1998 and thensupported his radical reform program, beginningwith a new constitution. A Constitutional Assemblywas elected in July 1999 to draft a new constitution,which voters approved in December 1999. Everyelected position in the country was then presentedto the voters again in a two-stage election in Julyand December 2000. While we do not believe thatthe election irregularities would have changed the2000 presidential results, the significantpoliticization of the elections and organizationaldeficiencies contributed to a lack of confidence inthe process and the nonpresidential results, thusleading us to characterize the July 2000 elections asflawed.

2Carter Center roleCarter Center roleCarter Center roleCarter Center roleCarter Center role: The Carter Centermonitored this entire process, beginning withthe regional and presidential elections in thefall of 1998, continuing through the work of theConstitutional Assembly in 1999, and concludingwith an international delegation for the July 2000elections and observation of recounts and appealsresolution. We maintained one or morerepresentatives in the country during this two-yearperiod to report to us regularly, and we hosted 10additional study missions and interim delegations toreport on preparations for and dispute resolutionfollowing each election.

3Voting Process:Voting Process:Voting Process:Voting Process:Voting Process: Venezuela changed its votingsystem in 1998 with the introduction of theworld’s first nationwide electronic network to

transmit voting results to central authoritiesimmediately after the polls close. The automatedprocess, in which optical scanners receive andcount ballots and then transmit the results tocentral headquarters via modem, involved some7,000 voting machines for 92 percent of the voters,while 8 percent still voted manually.

4The Constituent AssemblyThe Constituent AssemblyThe Constituent AssemblyThe Constituent AssemblyThe Constituent Assembly: In 1998, then-candidate Hugo Chávez campaigned on apromise to rid the country of the corruptpolitics that he argued had deprived the majority ofVenezuelans of their birthrights in this oil-richnation. His strategy to accomplish political changecentered on the call for a new constitution,although at the time, he did not clarify what type ofchanges he deemed necessary. In April 1999,Venezuelans approved a referendum questioncalling for a Constituent Assembly, and on July 25,1999, they elected that assembly. The governingcoalition (Polo Patriótico) won 122 seats out of131. The “opposition parties” won only six seats,even though they received 38 percent of the vote,due to an atypical plurinominal electoral system,the high level of coordination within the governingcoalition, and the disorganization and discreditingof the opposition. Finally, an unusually highnumber of null votes began to raise questions invoters’ minds about the voting machines’performance and accuracy.

5Writing the New Constitution:Writing the New Constitution:Writing the New Constitution:Writing the New Constitution:Writing the New Constitution: TheConstituent Assembly initially focused onintervening in the legislative and judicialbranches, declaring itself to have superior authority.It severely curtailed the activities of the Congresselected in November 1998 and began to investigateand suspend judges deemed to be unfit or corrupt.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE CARTER CENTER

18


Although its mandate was six months (until Jan.31, 2000), the assembly set a Nov. 15 deadline tofinish the draft constitution. Working in 20commissions, the assembly received manyproposals from society, as well as one fromPresident Chávez. Under pressure to finish aheadof time, the assembly eventually had to curtaildebate on the individual articles as it moved toapprove entire blocks of chapters presented by theConstitutional Commission of the Assembly. Theassembly finished its deliberations Nov. 19 andscheduled a popular referendum to approve thenew constitution Dec. 15, 1999.

6Constitutional Referendum and Floods:Constitutional Referendum and Floods:Constitutional Referendum and Floods:Constitutional Referendum and Floods:Constitutional Referendum and Floods:Four “opposition” assembly members, theCatholic Church, and the private sectorumbrella organization, Fedecamaras, led a growing“No” vote against approval of the draftconstitution. The campaign grew nasty, and voterconfidence in the machines eroded as the reportsof the problems of the null votes in the July 1999election grew. The Organization of AmericanStates (OAS) and The Carter Center sent smalltechnical teams to study the referendum inpreparation for the expected elections thefollowing year. The Carter Center recommendedthat the National Electoral Council (CNE)conduct an audit of the voting machinesimmediately following the referendum vote toraise voter confidence regarding the machines.The council agreed to carry out a limited audittwo days after the referendum, but was thwartedby the worst flooding in a century in Venezuela.Voters approved the referendum 72 percent to 28percent, with a turnout of 45 percent of registeredvoters.

7The New Constitution:The New Constitution:The New Constitution:The New Constitution:The New Constitution: The major changesfrom the 1961 constitution included:immediate presidential re-election andexpansion of the presidential term from five to six

years; a move from a bicameral to a unicamerallegislature; a new appointed post of vice president;a new Federal Council to decide on nationalresources to be distributed to the states andmunicipalities; the creation of two new branches ofgovernment – electoral and “citizen’s” (anti-corruption); a reinvigorated state role in providingfor the social well-being of citizens; an introductionof popular referenda; reduced civilian control of themilitary; and a new name for the country – theBolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

8The Congresillo:The Congresillo:The Congresillo:The Congresillo:The Congresillo: In a controversial move,the Constituent Assembly appointed new“transitory” members of the Supreme Court,National Electoral Council, and the Citizen’s Power– attorney general, ombudsman, and comptrollergeneral. Critics viewed these appointments aspartisans of the president. The assembly thendissolved itself on Feb. 1 and appointed a smallerlegislative committee, the Congresillo, to legislateuntil the new National Assembly was elected.Although the new constitution became effectiveDec. 31, 1999, the country lived in a transitorylegal state for all of the year 2000, as the temporaryappointments made by the Constituent Assemblyremained in place.

9May “mega-elections”:May “mega-elections”:May “mega-elections”:May “mega-elections”:May “mega-elections”: The vote for all of theelected positions in the country was set forMay 28, 2000. With more than 33,000candidates for 5,000 positions, these would be themost complicated elections ever witnessed by TheCarter Center. The Carter Center sent two staffdelegations in January and March to viewpreparations, opened a field office in April, and senta pre-electoral delegation in early May to assess thecampaign conditions. These missions found growingskepticism about the neutrality and the technicalpreparedness of the CNE, as the complexities ofpreparing a database of 33,000 candidate names,creating more than 1,200 unique types of ballots

19



and printing 40 million ballots, and programmingcommonly called burning a special “flashcard”(electronic memory card) for each of the 7,000voting machines began to overwhelm the council.

10The Audit:The Audit:The Audit:The Audit:The Audit: The Carter Center proposed to the CNE that international observers conduct anaudit of a small sample of voting machines on thenight of the election to boost the deterioratingconfidence in the technical aspects of the election.The council responded with its own proposal toform a Civic Audit Committee to write the termsof reference and choose a private company toconduct the audit. The Carter Center agreed toserve as advisors to this committee. Delays informing the committee, however, meant that itswork could not be completed in time and thecommittee suspended its activities days before thescheduled May elections.

11The Campaign:The Campaign:The Campaign:The Campaign:The Campaign: President Chávez faced two opponents – former AD leader and Caracas mayor ClaudioFermín and fellow 1992 coup-conspirator Lt.Colonel Francisco Arias Cárdenas. Arias Cárdenaswas a popular governor of the oil-producing stateof Zulia and had split with his former comrade.Although President Chávez maintained his lead inthe polls, Arias Cárdenas soon displaced Fermín asthe second-place runner, garnering middle- andupper-class support. The campaign became tenseas clashes occurred and intimidation of candidates,election workers, and media was reported.

12Postponing the Elections:Postponing the Elections:Postponing the Elections:Postponing the Elections:Postponing the Elections: An appeal filed by two nongovernmental organizations led to Supreme Courthearings on the preparations for the elections,specifically the failure to educate voters on thecandidates and the voting procedures. The CNEfinally admitted on May 25 that it would not be

ready for the elections. The Supreme Court orderedthe elections suspended, three days before thescheduled vote. The Carter Center had alreadymounted its international observer mission, with 40delegates, including President and Mrs. Carter andformer Costa Rica President Rodrigo Carazo andMrs. Carazo, on the ground. The delegation leadersmet with the presidential candidates and urged calmand an open debate to decide on the new electiondate, whether the elections should be separated intotwo parts, and the potential re-composition of theCNE.

13Preparations for the July Elections:Preparations for the July Elections:Preparations for the July Elections:Preparations for the July Elections:Preparations for the July Elections: The national legislative committee, the Congresillo, appointed new electionauthorities and set July 30 for the national,governors, and mayoral elections, and Dec. 3 forstate legislature and local council elections. TheCivic Audit Committee renewed its efforts to selecta private company to perform the electoral audit,and The Carter Center continued to advise thecommittee and prepare for another internationaldelegation. Questions about the technicalpreparedness continued, however, as the electiondate was set earlier than electoral technicians hadrecommended. Lack of voter education, failure toconduct public simulations of the voting system, andinsecurity of the voting machines and electoralmaterials after the May postponement raiseduncertainty about the July elections. Finally, theCNE ruled that the audit of the machines plannedfor immediately after polls closed would not startuntil the following afternoon.

14Election Day:Election Day:Election Day:Election Day:Election Day: Carter Center observers monitored the elections in 16 of the 23 states, as well as the Federal District.The delegation found voters participatingenthusiastically, though waiting in long lines,political party witnesses in 75 percent of the votingcenters visited, and problems or malfunctions with

THE CARTER CENTER

20


20 percent of the machines observed. Voterturnout was 58 percent, somewhat higher thanrecent Venezuelan elections. President Chávez wasre-elected with 59 percent of the vote to AriasCárdenas’ 37 percent, and Fermín’s 3 percent. ACarter Center quick count confirmed these results.

15Audit:Audit:Audit:Audit:Audit: The Carter Center observed the audit of the voting machines carried out by a private firm selected by theCivic Audit Committee. The Center foundinconsistencies in methodology, erratic hours, andincomplete audits. Although we witnesseddeficiencies in the portions of the audit observed,we were unable to evaluate the entire auditprocess. The firm contracted to complete the auditreported a confidence rate of 95 percent in theelectoral process, with a 2.5 percent margin oferror.

16Appeals and Protests:Appeals and Protests:Appeals and Protests:Appeals and Protests:Appeals and Protests: Violent protests broke out in four states, disputing the governors’ and mayoral elections, andmore than 300 appeals were filed, including thosefrom presidential candidate Arias Cárdenas and 21gubernatorial candidates in 18 states. The mostcommon complaints were assertions of pre-markedballots, inconsistencies between the number ofvoters listed as having voted and the number ofvotes recorded, and an excessive number of nullvotes. As of January 2001, the CNE had decidedonly 38 percent of the appeals. Still pending werethe appeals of the presidential candidate and two ofthe most visible governors races.

17Assessment of the Elections:Assessment of the Elections:Assessment of the Elections:Assessment of the Elections:Assessment of the Elections: While we do not challenge the legitimacy of the presidential election, we did findserious shortcomings throughout the electoralprocess. The 2000 elections began under a cloud oflegal controversy with the naming of a new CNEand a new electoral statute in a manner

inconsistent with the new constitution. The Mayelections were suspended due to the CNE’s failureto complete the necessary tasks. Political pressure toschedule the elections early and include all posts ledto an extremely complex election in which a novicecouncil, perceived as partisan, was unable to meetthe challenges. The July election continued todemonstrate deficiencies as the CNE neglected toeducate voters and poll workers in a timely manner,failed to conduct appropriate national tests andsimulations that could have exposed automatedmachinery glitches, and continued to delay theresolution of pending appeals.

18Dec. 3 Election and Referendum:Dec. 3 Election and Referendum:Dec. 3 Election and Referendum:Dec. 3 Election and Referendum:Dec. 3 Election and Referendum: Local and state legislative elections were held Dec. 3, along with a controversialreferendum calling for the suspension of nationallabor leaders and new direct labor elections to beheld within six months. Although the referendumpassed easily, turnout was only 23 percent. Laborleaders claimed the referendum violated theconstitution, which protects union leaders fromstate intervention. Threats of international sanctionsfor potential violations of international labor codesdissipated as the national labor leadershipvoluntarily resigned following the referendum andnegotiated with the CNE on the terms of the newelection.

19Recommendations:Recommendations:Recommendations:Recommendations:Recommendations: Following the 1998 election observation, The Carter Center provided a number ofrecommendations to advance the Venezuelanelectoral process. They included: more emphasis oneducating the voters, enhanced training of pollworkers, improving the electoral registry, re-engineering the voting process to reduce congestionin the voting center and long waits to vote,clarifying the substitution rules for candidates, andreducing the ballot complexity. The Carter Centercontinues to urge these modifications. Throughout

21



the observation of the 2000 elections, The CarterCenter privately and publicly provided suggestionsand recommendations to the CNE. Most of thesewere not employed.

With the goal of contributing to the advance-ment of the Venezuelan electoral process, TheCarter Center continues to urge the above reforms,as well as: a) extensive national simulations, open tothe parties and observers, of the automated system;b) pre- and post-hoc audits of the system andelectoral registry as a routine part of the electoralprocess; c) extensive consultation in the selection ofthe CNE directors to ensure wide confidence intheir neutrality and capacity; and d) timely resolu-tion of appeals.

20Elections and Democracy:Elections and Democracy:Elections and Democracy:Elections and Democracy:Elections and Democracy: Venezuelan political leaders argue that they are developing a strong participatorydemocracy. Indeed, the government has consultedits citizens multiple times in the past two years onquestions of national import. Nevertheless, therepresentative nature of democracy requires strongand independent institutions that can withstand theshifts in popularity of individual politicians. Theselection of perceived partisan officials for thetransitory posts of justices and election authorities in2000 and the failure to follow the constitutionalprovisions once again in the naming of thosepositions in 2001 weakens institutionalindependence and citizen confidence. Venezuela’stask as it renews its democracy is to ensure that therepresentative and republican dimensions of itsdemocracy match the participatory dimension. n

THE CARTER CENTER

22


Venezuela has been a democracy for fourdecades, beginning with the transition fromthe authoritarian regime of General MarcosPerez Jiménez in 1958. From 1959 to 1993, it heldnine presidential elections and experienced fourpeaceful transfers of power between opposingparties. The election results for these offices weregenerally accepted and viewed as legitimate,although it was widely acknowledged that small-scale fraud occurred episodically.1

Until 1993, democratic transfers of poweroccurred exclusively between the two traditionalparties, social democratic Acción Democrática(AD) and Christian democratic Comité deOrganización Política Electoral Independiente(COPEI), which together had garnered over 90percent of the votes in every election since 1973.During the 1993 elections, this pattern of a strong,two-party system began to collapse, resulting in theelection of a former president, Rafael Caldera, withthe backing of a heterogeneous group of politicalparties. Remarkably, his supporters did not includethe party he had founded, COPEI. Although thepopulace accepted the election of Rafael Caldera aslegitimate, there were suspicions of electoral fraudconcerning the allegedly low vote totals for a newleft-labor party, La Causa R. President Caldera tookoffice during a tumultuous period, which followedthe indictment and ouster of a president and twofailed coup attempts. His term in office was markedby the collapse of the financial system, the periodic

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1 The Venezuelan phrase “acta mata voto” refers to thewidespread perception that AD and COPEI, occasionallyalong with the third party-MAS-would divide up thecongressional votes received by smaller parties in order tomaintain the dominant position of the larger parties. Thechanged vote tally (acta) at a voting table, would thus “kill”the vote (mata voto).

The Carter Center has been engaged inelectoral observation in Venezuela since1998. We maintained one or morerepresentatives in the country during this two-yearperiod to report to us regularly, hosted 10additional study missions and interim delegations toreport on preparations for and dispute resolutionfollowing each election, and observed twopresidential elections. During this period, wewitnessed a marked difference in the politicalclimate in which the 2000 elections were held,including fewer consensuses on the designation ofthe members of the CNE, the dates of the elections,and the design of the elections. Lack oftransparency, neglect of voter education, andcontinued failures to conduct national simulationsundermined public confidence in the process.

While we do not believe that the electionirregularities would have changed the presidentialresults, the significant politicization of the electionsand organizational deficiencies contributed to a lackof confidence in the process and some of the results,thus leading us to characterize these elections asflawed.

INTRODUCTION

23



suspension of constitutional guarantees, and a deepand persistent economic crisis.

This pattern of political uncertainty sustaineditself in the 1998 elections, as evidenced by thedramatic shifts in public opinion polls during thefirst nine months of the election year. In December1997, Irene Sáez, the mayor of the Chacao districtof Caracas, led in the polls with 40 percent of voterpreference, followed by Claudio Fermín, a formerleader of AD with 35 percent. Following herdecision to accept the backing of the traditionalparty, COPEI, Irene Sáez’s popularity began todecline in March. By April 1998, she had droppedto 18 percent in voter preferences. Meanwhile,Hugo Chávez, a former lieutenant colonel in theVenezuelan army and a leader of one of the failed1992 coup attempts, began his dramatic ascent.Henrique Salas Römer, a former governor ofCarabobo state, also began to receive popularsupport. These shifts in popular opinion and thefact that both front-runners were independentscreated a high degree of uncertainty surroundingthe outcome of the 1998 elections.

Adding to the uncertainty, a new electoral lawmandated the automation of the voting system andthe selection of a new, nonpartisan CNE. Thesesteps were taken to reduce the possibilities forelectoral fraud and increase the transparency of the1998 elections. The 1998 legislative elections wereheld in November and the presidential electionsfollowed in December. It was at these elections thatHugo Chávez surged ahead to win the presidencywith 56.2 percent of the vote. His closest competi-tor, Henrique Salas Römer, received 39.97 percentof the popular vote.

THE CARTER CENTER ROLE INVENEZUELA

To help reduce some of the uncertaintysurrounding the process, the CNE decidedto take the unprecedented step of invitinginternational observers to witness the 1998elections. In September, Dr. Rafael Parra Pérez,CNE president, invited former U.S. PresidentJimmy Carter and the Council of Presidents andPrime Ministers of the Americas to participate aselectoral observers during the elections. InDecember 1998, President Carter led a delegationof 42 international observers, which concluded thatthe presidential election met internationaldemocratic standards.2

Following the election, President Chávez beganimplementing the cornerstone of his plan forchange, a new constitution. Beginning with theConstituent Assembly election, The Carter Centerstationed a representative in Venezuela to monitorthe political climate, follow the constitution draft-ing, and provide in-depth analysis. With a studymission to the Dec. 15, 1999, referendum, TheCarter Center began its 2000 electoral observationmission. We returned to Venezuela three times in asmany months and in April 2000 opened a fieldoffice staffed with an international elections expert,a Venezuelan elections expert, and an assistant. Thefield office provided daily updates to the Atlantastaff and advised the civil society organizations inconstructing the terms for an open and competi-tively contracted audit of the Venezuela electoralsystem.

The Carter Center again mounted a 40-plus-person delegation for the May 28 elections, only tohave the election suspended after the arrival of all

2 See Carter Center Special Report Series: Observation ofthe 1998 Venezuelan Elections, by Harold Trinkunas andJennifer McCoy.

THE CARTER CENTER

24


our team members. The field officeremained open throughout thesubsequent period in which yetanother newly appointed CNE pre-pared for the most complex electionin Venezuela’s history. We sent anassessment team to Caracas in earlyJuly and Carter Center technicalexperts arrived 10 days before theJuly 30 election. Monitoring the July30 election were 43 internationaldelegates led by President and Mrs.Carter, former Costa Rica PresidentRodrigo Carazo, and former UruguayPresident Luis Alberto Lacalle.Although our field office was officiallyclosed in mid-August, we continuedto have a presence in Venezuela withan elections and political expert monitoring theappeal process and the Dec. 3 local elections andreferendum. Finally, we sent a Carter Center studymission in November 2000. n

Dr. Jennifer McCoy confers with President Carter during theDecember 1998 presidential elections.

REN

AT

O C

APP

ELLE

TI

25



The National Electoral Council, ConsejoNacional Electoral (CNE), administerselections in Venezuela. The CNE iscomprised of five directors and five substitutes. Apresident, vice president, and second vice presidentare chosen from among the directors. The CNE isresponsible for the organization of the entireprocess, including educating the voters, enforcingthe electoral law, and determining appeals.

Venezuela, witha total populationof 24,169,807people, is dividedinto 23 states inaddition to theFederal District ofCaracas. For elec-toral purposes, eachstate and theFederal District issubdivided intodistricts. Eachdistrict has at leastone voting center, with the larger districts havingmany more. Nationally, there are 8,403 votingcenters that accommodate the 11,720,660 regis-tered Venezuelan voters. The voting centers aregenerally located in central locations such asschools and churches, which also provide for ease ofsupplies and security. Each manual voting centermay have up to 10 voting tables (“mesas”), andeach automated center has a maximum of threetables. In total, there are 10,556 voting tables. Ateach table, there is a maximum of 1,800 voters.

Venezuela’s election administration is one of themost complex in the world, as 92 percent of theregistered voters use an entirely automated process.For the automated voting centers, the electionballoting is done by filling in ovals on a paper ballot

VOTING BACKGROUND IN VENEZUELA

Population 24,169,807Registered Voters 11,720,660 Venezuelans

74,780 Non-citizens who hadlived in Venezuela for at least 3years (municipal election only)

Voting Centers 4,849 Automated 3,554 Manual

Voting Tables (Mesas) 6,998 Automated 3,558 Manual

and inserting the ballot into a machine that opti-cally scans the ballot for the voter’s selections. Atthe end of the day, the machine electronicallytransmits the results from that voting center to acentral location in each state and Caracas, whereyet another machine totals all of the results. Theother 8 percent of voters rely upon manual votingusing the same ballot. Nationally, there are 4,857voting centers using more than 7,000 automatic

voting machines. The machines were originallymanufactured and sold to the CNE by U.S.-basedElection Systems and Software (ES&S). Indra, aSpanish-based company, has assisted the CNE inmanaging the automated process since its inceptionin 1998.

The vote tabulating machines are designed toscan ballots as they are introduced into the ballotboxes, keeping a running tally of the votes cast on aremovable PCMCIA memory card, commonlycalled the “flashcard.” This card is programmedwith software that only reads the ballots assigned tothat specific voting station.

The voting centers and electoral materials areguarded by soldiers, approximately 80,000 of whommobilize nationwide under the Plan República – an

Table 1Table 1Table 1Table 1Table 1

THE CARTER CENTER

26


electoral security plan routinely used in Venezuelaelections. In addition to guarding the materials, theofficers of the Plan República deliver all of thevoting materials and electoral machines and arestationed at each voting center to insure order onthe day of election. n

Automated voting machineused in Venezuela since 1998.

ELIZ

AB

ETH

MIN

A

27



In his 1998 campaign for president, HugoChávez ran on a platform of change includingre-writing the 1961 constitution. He camethrough on that campaign promise when in April1999 a referendum on the question of a newconstitution was put to the voters and approved.

On July 25, 1999, 6,600,196 Venezuelans,representing 54 percent of registered voters, went tothe polls to choose drafters for the new magnacarta. This represented the fourth vote in only sixmonths: the 1998 legislative and presidentialelections and the April 1999 referendum onwhether to write a new constitution. The results ofthe July 25, 1999 election of a Constituent Assem-bly demonstrated the desire of the Venezuelanpeople to support President Chávez’s radical politi-cal reform program. The Polo Patriótico, a coalitionof political parties supporting the Chávez govern-ment, including the Movimiento Quinta República(MVR), Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS), andPartido Patria para Todos (PPT), obtained 122seats out of 131. The candidates of the opposition3 ,most of whom ran on an individual basis withoutthe support of established political parties, obtainedonly six seats. The remaining three seats wereassigned to representatives of indigenous groupswho were elected through a different electoralprocedure. Although the “opposition parties”received approximately 38 percent of the totalvotes, they won only six seats.

These electoral results left an opposition withvirtually no political presence in the ConstituentAssembly. Consequently, the opposition could only

influence decisions regarding the new constitutionaldesign through public opinion and the ability topersuade their opponents of the convenience (orinconvenience) of a particular constitutionalreform. In contrast, the members of the PoloPatriótico had absolute dominion over the Con-stituent Assembly with a 93 percent representation.This situation left the Chávez government free ofalmost all obstacles to influence the decisions of theConstituent Assembly.4

The explanation for this lopsided electoraloutcome is threefold. First, the electoral preferencesof most Venezuelan voters clearly favored theconvocation of an assembly according to the termsfixed by President Chávez. This situation facilitatedthe transference of public support from the presi-dent, and his proposal to elect a ConstituentAssembly, to those candidates running with anofficial backing.

Second, the electoral system that was adopteddid not allow for some of the votes obtained by theopposition to be transformed into ConstituentAssembly seats. The electoral system, originallydesigned by the Presidential Commission for theConstituent Assembly (COCO) with participationof groups from civil society, was a “plurinominal”system. This system intended to personalize thevote by allowing the electorate to vote for individu-als rather than party lists. In theory, the electoralsystem was not a first-past-the-post system becausethere was more than one seat for the national andregional districts.5 In practice, however, it had thesame majoritarian effect over the way votes were

ELECTION OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

3 It is important to note that the term “opposition” inVenezuela refers to individuals who do not support Chávez’sgovernment. It is not appropriate to talk about an organizedopposition as such in Venezuela. Rather, the opposition isnot a party nor a movement, but a group of unlinkedindividuals.

4 As it will be explained below, there is some evidence thatthe Polo Patriótico is a heterogeneous group, complicatingPresident Chávez’s ability to easily dominate the Assembly.5 There were 23 regional districts with seats varying betweentwo and 13 and a national district with 24 seats.

THE CARTER CENTER

28


counted: In districts with more than one seat, thecandidate with the most votes was elected. Further-more, the electoral system did not include a propor-tional formula of any sort for the representation ofthe minorities.

The third reason for the sweeping success of thePolo Patriótico in the Constituent Assembly elec-tions was the effectiveness of its candidates tocoordinate the vote to diminish its dispersion. Thecandidates from the Polo Patriótico were very wellorganized and managed to reduce the dispersion oftheir vote by limiting the number of candidates,thus augmenting their electoral support even more.

On the other hand, most candidates from theopposition suffered in the electoral process becausethey were linked to the weak economic and politi-cal performance of Venezuela’s democracy duringthe last 20 years. The electorate was unable toperceive these candidates as agents promotingpolitical and economic change. The poor reputa-tion of the long-established political parties, ADand COPEI, deterred these candidates from seekingtheir support, thus creating for most candidates ofthe opposition a political dilemma. They did notwant to be linked to these traditional parties but

still would have favored some organi-zational support to compete againstthe Polo Patriótico. Most of them didnot accept the support from thesetraditional political parties due to thehuge electoral costs that this decisionwould have entailed. So, they de-cided to run on an individual basis,thus fragmenting the vote. Further,the opposition candidates wereconcentrated in Caracas with manymore candidates than seats available.

The effect of the electoral system,combined with the efficient coordi-nation of the vote of the PoloPatriótico through the widespreaduse of the chuleta6 , as well as the

dispersion of the vote of the opposition, jointlyexplains the overwhelming majority presence of theChavistas in the Constituent Assembly. The PoloPatriótico was able to coordinate the vote bydistributing a chuleta, including the slate ofChavista candidates, among their electorate toassist them when casting their votes on electionday. The opposition, reluctant to identify them-selves with party labels, was unable to providevoters with similar chuletas. Only at the regionallevel did some governors of the opposition decideto provide support to a few independent candidatesby distributing their chuletas among regional voters.The political effect of the chuleta can explain theunintended effect of an electoral system that,despite attempting to personalize the vote, onlymanaged to motivate the creation of electoral listsfor each party.

In states such as Anzoátegui, Cojedes, Falcón,Lara, Miranda, Monagas, Portuguesa, Yaracuy,Zulia, Amazonas, Delta Amacuro, and Vargas, the

CCCCCOMPOSITIONOMPOSITIONOMPOSITIONOMPOSITIONOMPOSITION OFOFOFOFOF THETHETHETHETHE C C C C CONSTITUENTONSTITUENTONSTITUENTONSTITUENTONSTITUENT A A A A ASSEMBLSSEMBLSSEMBLSSEMBLSSEMBLYYYYYPartyPartyPartyPartyParty MembersMembersMembersMembersMembers Party CoalitionParty CoalitionParty CoalitionParty CoalitionParty Coalition

MVR 53 Polo PatrióticoChavistas (Runningon an Individual Basis) 36 Polo PatrióticoMAS 12 Polo PatrióticoPPT 12 Polo PatrióticoPCV 2 Polo Patriótico27-N (Military) 2 Polo PatrióticoOpposition 6Indigenous Groups 3Others 5Total 131

6 The chuleta (meaning in Venezuelan slang, notes fromwhich to copy in exams) provided voters with the list of theofficial candidates for which they were to vote at theregional and national level.

Table 2Table 2Table 2Table 2Table 2

29



opposition was not able to obtain a single seat,despite having received at least 40 percent of thevote. At the national level, the opposition ob-tained four seats solely because the number ofcandidates included in the official chuleta waslower (it included only 20 candidates) than thedistrict magnitude of 24. Certainly, it is unreason-able to deny the significant support of the Venezu-elan electorate for the official candidates. But italso would be a mistake, nonetheless, to overlookthe effect of the electoral system that, unintention-ally, exacerbated the presence of the PoloPatriótico within the Assembly.

Following the July 25, 1999, ConstitutionalAssembly election, serious questions were raisedregarding the electoral machines and overallelectoral system because an unusually high numberof null votes7 were detected. Miriam Kornblith, aCNE board member, led an investigation into the

irregularities encountered during theJuly 25 elections. AlthoughKornblith claims that these irregu-larities would not have changed theelectoral results, and therefore didnot affect the final composition ofthe Constituent Assembly, theinvestigation revealed importanttechnical problems related toelectronic deficiencies in the opticalscanners’ reading of the ballots.After auditing the electoral ma-chines and counting the effectivenumber of votes in a selectednumber of electoral centers, theinvestigation concluded that therewere a substantial number of nullvotes that should have counted as

legitimate votes. These irregularities were detectedin electoral centers throughout the country, exceptin the state of Delta Amacuro. The states with thehighest average of irregular null votes includedDistrito Federal, Aragua, Amazonas, Apure, Lara,Monagas, and Yaracuy. These same phenomenawere observed in different municipalities within eachof these states.

The main hypothesis adopted by the CNE,Indra, and ES&S to explain the irregularities wasfailure to properly maintain the glass optical scan-ners. The CNE rejected the possibility of electoralfraud. The July 1999 election was the first in whichIndra undertook responsibility for all components ofthe election, including machine maintenance. TheCNE requested documentation from Indra toexplain the machine failures and asked that itexamine and repair all of the 7,000 electoral ma-chines before the next election. Finally, hearingswere held before the Congress to ascertain thesource of the errors and whether they affected theelection’s final outcomes. n

Chavez’s Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) and alliancecandidates won 93 percent of the seats in the ConstitutionalAssembly.

ALE

X B

ICK

7 A null vote can include undervoting, where there was nomark on the ballot, and overvoting, whereby an electorvoted too many times for one position. Null votes are alsothose not read properly by the election machine’s opticalscanner.

THE CARTER CENTER

30


The Constituent Assembly, with a six-monthmandate to complete the drafting of aconstitution, began its work soon after theJuly 1999 election. However, it soon becameapparent that the dominant position of the PoloPatriótico would create several problems for thefunctioning of the Constituent Assembly. The lackof an opposition, for instance, served to reduce thequality of debates and quantity of varying propo-sals. The opposition that existed was fragmentedand those political actors who were not fullyrepresented in the Assembly felt that because of thelack of wide parti-cipation, they wereunable to influence therules to be designed toregulate the futuredemocratic process. Tocurb the growingdiscontent, the PoloPatriótico gavemembers of the opposition, such as constitutionallawyer Allan Brewer-Carias, important positionswithin the Assembly and created a public office toreceive proposals for reforming the constitutionpresented by nongovernmental organizations(NGOs), political parties, and civil associations.The perception of most of these groups, however,was that they remained unable to influence thedebate in a specific way.

The Constituent Assembly, presided over byLuis Miquilena, was organized into 20 commissionsdealing with issues that included executive powers,territorial organization, human rights, economics,legislative powers, moral branch, armed forces,administration of justice, and decentralization. Eachmember could choose which commission to partici-pate in but could not sit on more than two. The

FUNCTIONING OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

organization of the different commissions andinitiation of debates was slow, primarily because ofthe lack of administrative support and low level ofparticipant preparation on the constitutional topics.One of the most important characteristics of theAssembly was the lack of technical and legal adviceavailable to each of these committees.

Meetings of the various Constituent Assemblycommissions were open to the public, althoughnecessitating advance accreditation, and televiseddaily. The public was offered the possibility ofinforming the debate by submitting proposals or

concerns, and therecontinued an atmo-sphere of freedom ofspeech and press,further increasing theAssembly’s transpar-ency.

The first act ofthe Constituent

Assembly was to declare itself the “original sourceof the popular will and expression of the people’ssovereignty,” thus making the other branches ofpower, particularly the judiciary and legislature,subordinate to the decisions adopted by the Assem-bly. According to this decision, the Assembly couldintervene, reform, or terminate any of the existingpolitical powers. From its inauguration in earlyAugust, the Assembly focused less on the variousconstitutional designs and more on the creation ofemergency commissions to evaluate the perfor-mance of the judicial and legislative branches. Forexample, the Constituent Assembly declared asituation of “judicial emergency.” The decreeestablished the creation of a Commission of Justice,which was charged to present within 20 days a seriesof reforms, including the removal of “corrupt”

The first act of the Constituent Assemblywas to declare itself the “original source of

the popular will and expression of thepeople’s sovereignty...”

31



TH

E C

AR

TER

CEN

TER

judges from their positions. This resulted in theresignation of the president of the Supreme Court,Cecilia Sosa, and a confrontation (physical andverbal) between the Congress and the ConstituentAssembly.

The Congress, too, was subject to the Constitu-ent Assembly’s decrees when the latter mandated apartial suspension of the activities of the legislatureand prohibited its ordinary and extraordinarymeetings. The Constituent Assembly met in theCongressional building for half the day, while theCongress met the other half. The ConstituentAssembly limited the number of areas in which theCongress’ Standing Committee, Finance Commit-tee, and Comptroller Committee were able to act.This decree led to a violent confrontation betweenthe members of the Congress and the Assembly.The party leaders of AD and COPEI claimed thatthe decree was the initiation of an authoritarianregime. President Chávez and members of theAssembly argued instead that the Assembly had theright to claim its originario (originating) powers,intercede in the other branches of government, anddeepen the process of democratization which they

claim had been hindered by the traditional AD andCOPEI parties. In the end, the Congress voluntarilyagreed to suspend its activities and the ConstituentAssembly continued its work in the CongressionalBuilding.

At one point in its early deliberations, theConstituent Assembly considered suspending notonly the National Congress but also the governorsand mayors. After resounding criticism from withinand outside the country, including a letter fromformer President Carter to President Chávez, theAssembly withdrew this suggestion.

The members of the Assembly discussed variousdraft constitutions, including one presented byPresident Chávez. President Chávez’s proposalintroduced several significant political reforms tothe 1961 constitution. Among them: creating newmoral and electoral branches, introducing the figureof a vice-president, deepening the process of admin-istrative decentralization while strengtheningnational fiscal control, creating a Federal Council toauthorize financial transfers to local entities, intro-ducing four different types of referendums, givingcomplete control to the president over the armed

Isaías Rodriguez,Constituent Assembly

member and Venezuela’sfirst vice president, speakswith Jennifer McCoy and

Laura Neuman.

THE CARTER CENTER

32


forces, relaxing the requirements to introduceconstitutional reforms, incorporating the re-elec-tion of the president and extension of his term fromfive to six years, and extending the period forgovernors from three to four years with re-election.

Time was the most important constraint duringthe drafting process of the new constitution. In anattempt to meet the timetable imposed by Presi-dent Chávez and approved by presiding chair LuisMiquilena for approval of the new constitution byNovember 15, 1999, the Constituent Assemblywas forced to amend the rules to shorten the timefor debate and discussion. This effort to acceleratethe discussion process diminished the quality of thenew constitution in numerous ways: articles wereapproved without sufficient debate, others wereapproved despite being inconsistent with the rest ofthe constitutional text, and attempts by civilsociety to participate in the process suffered fromthe haste to finish deliberations.

As a result, the Constitutional Commission, asubgroup of assembly members, attempted, in avery short period of time, to make the initial draftpresented by the different commissions consistentand more concise. The power attributed to theConstitutional Commission to reduce and changethe content of the articles, in order to present acoherent version to the floor, was highly contested.Some members of the Constitutional Commissionbelieved that it was necessary to modify the draft;others thought that the Commission did not havethat authority. Conflict escalated to such heightsthat two key member resigned from the commis-sion. The final draft that was presented to the floorfor discussion had almost 400 articles, compared tothe initial draft containing 800 articles.

The floor decided to discuss the draft presentedby the Constitutional Commission “article byarticle”. However, the time constraint imposed byPresident Chávez soon forced the assembly tochange this rule. Discussions under the “article byarticle” rule were very slow and left most members

exhausted. The assembly had managed to approveonly 80 articles in two weeks, despite having discus-sion sessions that lasted more than 15 hours. Toaccelerate the process, the new rules determinedthat the floor would only discuss in blocks thechapters of the draft presented by the ConstitutionalCommission as well as those articles consideredhighly controversial (e.g. freedom of press, bicamer-alism vs. unicameralism of the Congress, and presi-dential reelection). This change of rules certainlyachieved its goal, namely, to accelerate the ap-proval of the new constitution, but the cost mayhave been a sacrifice in the quality and consistencyof its content. n

33



The Constituent Assembly completed itswork Nov. 19, 1999. Althoughthe public should have had at least 30 daysto review the constitution, the referendumremained on its previously scheduled date, Dec.15, 1999.

Because of the rushed nature of the debate,Venezuelans were not quite sure what the finalprovisions entailed. Although the Assembly triedto fully inform the public about the content of thenew constitution, there were no institutionalmechanisms in place to incorporate correctionsonce the reactions from civil society were heard.

As analyses became available, a movement toreject the constitution grew, led by four oppositionAssembly members, including respected constitu-tional lawyer Allan Brewer-Carias and politicalleader Claudio Fermín. Criticism of the constitu-tion ranged from its incoherence and logicalinconsistencies to its failure to prohibit abortion,and from its relaxation of civilian control over themilitary to its reinstatement of statist social securityand labor provisions. Organizations from the

Catholic Church to the private business confedera-tion Fedecamaras came out in favor of the “no”vote.

The debate turned nasty as President Chávezcampaigned for the “yes” vote and aggressivelyattacked his opponents. Critics charged that thegovernment was using state resources to support the“yes” vote, and fear of electoral fraud grew. Oppo-nents were increasingly focusing on the unusuallyhigh number of null votes in the July 1999 election,raising suspicions that the new electronic votecounting machines used successfully in the 1998elections were either not functioning properly orwere being manipulated to affect the vote count.Confidence in the machines and the NationalElectoral Council (CNE) was suffering. The groupJuntos por el No publicly questioned thereferendum’s transparency and called for neutralinternational and national observers.

THE CARTER CENTER OBSERVATIONOF THE REFERENDUM

The Carter Center sent a small team,including Dr. Jennifer McCoy, director ofthe Latin American and Caribbean Program(LACP), Laura Neuman, LACP senior programAssociate, election experts Roy Saltman andPatricio Gajardo, IFES, political consultant Dr.Michael Penfold, and LACP intern Beth Mina, tostudy the December referendum. Before arriving, werequested that the CNE consider performing asimple audit of the election machinery immediately

CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM AND FLOODS8

ALE

X B

ICK

Discarded leaflets urge Venezuelans to vote “yes”for the new Bolivarian Constitution.

8 This section draws on “Democracatic Autocracies?Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez,” Jennifer L. McCoy, CurrentHistory, February 2000.

THE CARTER CENTER

34


following the referendum. This audit would includea manual count of randomly selected automatedtables and a comparison with the results generatedby the machine. In this way, the CNE could insurethat the machines were correctly reading the ballotsand raise the confidence of the electorate.

The Carter Center felt it particularly importantthat the audit exercise be open to the public andmedia, and it be completed as soon after theelection as possible to deter any question of tamper-ing. The CNE agreed and tentatively scheduled theaudit for two days following the elections.

The day of the referendum, heavy rains, andfailure of the election workers to arrive, delayed theopening of many polls, but by 10 a.m., 85 percentof the voting stations were open and their machinesreporting to central headquarters. The polls were toclose at 4 p.m., but by late afternoon, voter turnoutwas estimated at only 40 percent. Shortly before4 p.m., the president of the Constituent Assembly,Luis Miquilena, appeared on national television tocall for an extension of the vote. The NationalElectoral Council quickly met and at 4 p.m. an-nounced a two-hour extension to allow morepeople to vote. By the time the voting centers

received the news, 12 percent of thepolling stations had already transmittedtheir results and closed. Another groupreopened and had to do a separate tallysheet counting the additional votesmanually. Others stayed open until6 p.m. In the end, the turnout in-creased to only 45 percent, consistentwith recent Venezuelan elections.

The Carter Center team visited 25mesas and saw six openings of thevoting tables and four closings. Themajority of locations that the CarterCenter representatives visited openedlate due to the rains and had little or noline of voters waiting to cast theirballots.

At the voting centers, we found that most ofthe poll workers had been selected by the randomlottery system begun in 1998 and were thus trainedon voting procedures by the CNE. However, wherethere were not enough workers present, partywitnesses assumed the roles. At the tables that theCenter visited, it found predominantly witnesses forthe “yes” vote. Those supporting the “no” vote weremonitoring less than half of the voting tables.

Top – Bottom: Laura Neuman, Patricio Gajardo, Elizabeth Mina,Roy Saltman, and Jennifer McCoy observed the December 1999constitutional referendum.

Pollworker demonstrates constitutional referendumballot on Dec. 15, 1999.

ELIZ

AB

ETH

MIN

A

TH

E C

AR

TER

CEN

TER

35



As The Carter Center had found in previouselections, the polling officials appeared to under-stand the procedures and Plan República guardswere stationed at each site. Limited observationsindicated that the voting machines were function-ing properly except for difficulties accepting theballots, which may have been a result of the highlevel of moisture. To address this difficulty, somevoting centers stopped using the machines andinstead had the voters place their ballots in acardboard box. The electoral workers then per-formed a manual count of the ballots.

The Carter Center teams reported seeingalmost no independent observers, either national orinternational. This is in accord with CNE state-ments before the elections that due to the shortperiod of time given for the organization of thereferendum, it would be very difficult to inform andhave sufficient independent monitors in the differ-ent electoral centers. As a consequence, during thereferendum the monitoring process relied more onparty members than on independent citizens.

THE NEW CONSTITUTION

The final vote tally, with 45 percent voter turnout, was 72 percent in favor and 28percent against the constitution, with 4percent null votes. The newconstitution both reassured andalarmed people. In many respects, itwas not as radical as some hadpredicted. In other respects, itappeared to maintain and even deepencentralized, presidential control inVenezuela, along with a statistapproach to economic affairs, whilereducing civilian control over themilitary.

The major political changes from the 1961constitution included immediate presidential re-election (previously reelection was allowed after 10years) and expansion of the presidential term fromfive to six years, thus giving Hugo Chávez thepotential to be in office 13 years. It changed theCongress from a bicameral to a unicameral NationalAssembly and created a new appointed vice presi-dent. With regard to decentralization, it maintainedthe federal structure with elected governors andmayors, but created a new Federal Council todecide on national resources to be distributed to thestates and municipalities. It further restrictedrevenue-raising authority of those entities.

In an attempt to replace the centralized“partyarchy” that had grown up in Venezuela inrecent decades, the new constitution ended thestate subsidies that had helped the dominant partiesbuild extraordinary hierarchical organizations. Onthe other hand, it reinstated the proportionalrepresentation electoral rule that, while normallyallowing for more diverse representation, in Venezu-ela had strengthened the control of the partyheadquarters, as leaders determined the slates of

When the voting machine would not accept her ballot, this votercast her ballot manually.

LAU

RA

NEU

MA

N

THE CARTER CENTER

36


candidates and candidates became accountable tothose leaders rather than to constituents.

In economic terms, the constitution continuedto protect private property rights, but it gave theresponsibility to the state for the social well-being ofits citizens, including the right to health and hous-ing. The new constitution obligated the CentralBank to report to the National Assembly, raisingfears among some of reduced Central Bank au-tonomy. It protected the petroleum industry fromprivatization, though allowing other sectors to beprivatized.

The new constitution widened from three tofive the public powers: executive, legislative,judicial, electoral, andcitizen’s powers. The latteris aimed at controllingcorruption and consists ofa Citizen’s Council madeup of the public prosecu-tor, the comptrollergeneral, and the newly-created ombudsman(public defender). The citizen’s power is also vestedwith the authority to nominate the members of theSupreme Court and National Electoral Councilfrom lists presented by civil society organizations,who are ultimately ratified by the Congress.

The new constitution moves toward moredirect democracy by establishing the possibility ofpopular referenda that can be called either by thepresident or by 10 percent of the eligible voterssigning petitions, with the power to revoke legisla-tion and recall elected officials.

The constitution does a good job of protectinghuman rights, though an initial draft raised the ireof the media when it called for the citizens’ right to“truthful and opportune” information. At the lastminute, a clause was added to read: “truthful,opportune, and impartial, without censure.”

Finally, the new constitution gave the militarythe right to vote, in contrast to the previous consti-

tution, and reduced civilian control over themilitary. For example, the Congress no longerapproves promotions within the military, which hadbeen an attempt at civilian oversight in the previ-ous constitution but which had also resulted inpoliticization of the armed forces. More noteworthy,perhaps, are the obligations that the new constitu-tion omits: the apolitical and nondeliberativecharacter of the military, leading some to fear themilitary would begin to make political pronounce-ments; and the duty to respect the constitution anddefend the stability of democratic institutions. Itfurther gives the armed forces authority in mattersof police administration and investigation.

Opponents to the constitution in the privatesector argued that it reversesprogress in the labor andsocial security provisions byreinstating onerous em-ployee dismissal compensa-tion and by reducing thepossibilities of privatepension plans. The Catholic

Church opposed it for not guaranteeing the protec-tion of life since conception and appearing to givethe state control over education. Others opposed itfor reversing the trend toward decentralization andstrengthening, instead, presidential control. Withthe referenda provisions allowing the president tocall for the repeal of legislation through a referen-dum, the provision for the National Assembly todelegate unlimited decree powers to the president9,and the weakening of civilian control over themilitary, the new constitution appears to give thepresident disproportionate powers to the otherbranches of government, particularly the legisla-

The new constitution movestoward more direct democracy ...

9 Venezuelan presidents have traditionally been delegatedspecial decree powers in finance and economic powers bythe Congress (Ley Habilitante), but the new constitutiongranted this delegated power in virtually any legislativearena.

37



ture.10 Finally, opponents opposed the change inname of the country to the Bolivarian Republic ofVenezuela for being both expensive and partisan.

THE FLOODS

The rains that began in the days before thereferendum continued throughout electionday. These heavy rains led to massiveflooding in the northern coastal states, particularlythe state of Vargas. Though final death tallies maynever be known, it was estimated that 400,000Venezuelans had lost their homes and as many as50,000 may have

Documents

P CHANGE : T BOLIVARIAN C AND 2000 E - The Carter Center · The Carter Center’s Latin American and Caribbean Program and 96 The Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers of the