Overseas employment contract -

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-58011 & L-58012 November 18, 1983VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE SERVICES, INC.,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROGELIO BISULA RUBEN ARROZA JUAN GACUTNO LEONILO ATOK, NILO CRUZ, ALVARO ANDRADA, NEMESIO ADUG SIMPLICIO BAUTISTA, ROMEO ACOSTA, and JOSE ENCABOrespondents.Antonio R. Atienza for petitioner.The Solicitor General for respondent NLRC,Quasha, Asperilia, Ancheta &- Valmonte Pena Marcos Law Offices for private respondents.R E S O L U T I O NGUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:Before the Court en banc is a motion to reconsider the decision promulgated on July 20, 1982 which set aside the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission and reinstated the decision of the National Seamen Board.To better understand the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration, we reiterate the background facts of the case, Taken from the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission:t.hqwIt appears that on different dates in December, 1978 and January, 1979, the Seamen entered into separate contracts of employment with the Company, engaging them to work on board M/T' Jannu for a period of twelve (12) months. After verification and approval of their contracts by the NSB, the Seamen boarded their vessel in Japan.On 10 January 1919, the master of the vessel complainant Rogelio H. Bisula, received a cable from the Company advising him of the possibility that the vessel might be directed to call at ITF-controlled ports said at the same time informing him of the procedure to be followed in the computation of the special or additional compensation of crew members while in said ports. ITF is the acronym for the International Transport Workers Federation, a militant international labor organization with affiliates in different ports of the world, which reputedly can tie down a vessel in a port by preventing its loading or unloading. This is a sanction resorted to by ITF to enforce the payment of its wages rates for seafarers the so-called ITF rates, if the wages of the crew members of a vessel who have affiliated with it are below its prescribed rates. In the same cable of the Company, they expressed its regrets for not clarifying earlier the procedure in computing the special compensation as it thought that the vessel would 'trade in Caribbean ports only.On 22 March 1979, the Company sent another cable to complainant Bisula, this time informing him of the respective amounts each of the officers and crew members would receive as special compensation when the vessel called at the port of Kwinana Australia, an ITF-controlled port. This was followed by another cable on 23 March 1979, informing him that the officers and crew members had been enrolled as members of the ITF in Sidney, Australia, and that the membership fee for the 28 personnel complement of the vessel had already been paid.In answer to the Company's cable last mentioned, complainant Bisula, in representation of the other officers and crew members, sent on 24 March 1979 a cable informing the Company that the officers and crew members were not agreeable to its 'suggestion'; that they were not contented with their present salaries 'based on the volume of works, type of ship with hazardous cargo and registered in a world wide trade': that the 'officers and crew (were) not interested in ITF membership if not actually paid with ITF rate that their 'demand is only 50% increase based on present basic salary and that the proposed wage increase is the 'best and only solution to solve ITF problem' since the Company's salary rates 'especially in tankers (are) very far in comparison with other shipping agencies in Manila ...In reply, the Company proposed a 25% increase in the basic pay of the complainant crew members, although it claimed, that it would "suffer and absorb considerable amount of losses." The proposal was accepted by the Seamen with certain conditions which were accepted by the Company. Conformably with the agreement of the parties which was effected through the cables abovementioned, the Seamen were paid their new salary rates.Subsequently, the Company sought authority from the NSB to cancel the contracts of employment of the Seamen, claiming that its principals had terminated their manning agreement because of the actuations of the Seamen. The request was granted by the NSB Executive Director in a letter dated 10 April 1979. Soon thereafter, the Company cabled the Seamen informing them that their contracts would be terminated upon the vessel's arrival in Japan. On 19 April 1979 they were asked to disembark from the vessel, their contracts were terminated, and they were repatriated to Manila. There is no showing that the Seamen were given the opportunity to at least comment on the Company's request for the cancellation of their contracts, although they had served only three (3) out of the twelve (12) months' duration of their contracts.The private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of earned wages with the National Seamen Board. The Vir-jen Shipping and Marine Services Inc. in turn filed a complaint for breach of contract and recovery of excess salaries and overtime pay against the private respondents. On July 2, 1980, the NSB rendered a decision declaring that the seamen breached their employment contracts when they demanded and received from Vir-jen Shipping wages over and above their contracted rates. The dismissal of the seamen was declared legal and the seamen were ordered suspended.The seamen appealed the decision to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the NSB and required the petitioner to pay the wages and other monetary benefits corresponding to the unexpired portion of the manning contract on the ground that the termination of the contract by the petitioner was without valid cause. Vir-jen Shipping filed the present petition.The private respondents submit the following issues in their motion for reconsideration:t.hqwA. THIS HONORABLE COURT DID VIOLENCE TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD THAT THE SEAMEN VIOLATED THEIR CONTRACTS IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION THAT THE SEAMEN DID NOT VIOLATE THEIR CONTRACT.B. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT VIR-JEN'S HAVING AGREED TO A 25% INCREASE OF THE SEAMEN'S BASIC WAGE WAS NOT VOLUNTARY BUT WAS DUE TO THREATS.C. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT; ASSUMING THAT THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT COULD BE TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF, THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD VIOLATED THE SAME.D. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT FIND PETITIONER VIRJEN LIABLE FOR HAVING TERMINATED BEFORE EXPIRY DATE THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO LEGAL AND JUSTIFIABLE GROUND FOR SUCH TERMINATION.E. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PREPARATION BY PETITIONER OF THE TWO PAYROLLS AND THE EXECUTION OF THE SIDE CONTRACT WERE NOT MADE IN BAD FAITH.F. THIS HONORABLE COURT INADVERTENTLY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.At the outset, we are faced with the question whether or not the Court en banc should give due course to the motion for reconsideration inspite of its having been denied twice by the Court's Second Division. The case was referred to and accepted by the Court en banc because of the movants' contention that the decision in this case by the Second Division deviated fromWallem Phil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor(L-50734-37, February 20, 1981), a First Division case with the same facts and issues. We are constrained to answer the initial question in the affirmative.A fundamental postulate of Philippine Constitutional Law is the fact, that there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts are required to take their bearings. (Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948; Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98; Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226). The majority of the Court's work is now performed by its two Divisions, but the Court remains one court, single, unitary, complete, and supreme. Flowing from this nature of the Supreme Court is the fact that, while ' individual Justices may dissent or partially concur with one another, when the Court states what the law is, it speaks with only one voice. And that voice being authoritative should be a clear as possible.Any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, whether en banc or in Division, may be modified or reversed only by the Court en banc. (Section 2(3), Article X, Constitution.) In the rare instances when one Division disagrees in its views with the other Division, or the necessary votes on an issue cannot be had in a Division, the case is brought to the Court en banc to reconcile any seeming conflict, to reverse or modify an earlier decision, and to declare the Court's doctrine. This is what has happened in this case.The decision sought to be reconsidered appears to be a deviation from the Court's decision, speaking through the First Division, inWallem Shipping, Inc. v. Hon. Minister of Labor(102 SCRA 835). Faced with two seemingly conflicting resolutions of basically the same issue by its two Divisions, the Court. therefore, resolved to transfer the case to the Court en banc. Parenthetically, the petitioner's comment on the third motion for reconsideration states that the resolution of the motion might be the needed vehicle to make the ruling in the Wallem case clearer and more in time with the underlying principles of the Labor Code. We agree with the petitioner.After an exhaustive, painstaking, and perspicacious consideration of the motions for reconsideration and the comments, replies, and other pleadings related thereto, the Court en banc is constrained to grant the motions. To grant the motion is to keep faith with the constitutional mandate to afford protection to labor and to assure the rights of workers to self-organization and to just and humane conditions of work. We sustain the decision of the respondent National labor Relations Commission.There are various arguments raised by the petitioners but the common thread running through all of them is the contention, if not the dismal prophecy, that if the respondent seamen are sustained by this Court, we would in effect "kill the hen that lays the golden egg." In other words, Filipino seamen, admittedly among the best in the world, should remain satisfied with relatively lower if not the lowest, international rates of compensation, should not agitate for higher wages while their contracts of employment are subsisting, should accept as sacred, iron clad, and immutable the side contracts which require them to falsely pretend to be members of international labor federations, pretend to receive higher salaries at certain foreign ports only to return the increased pay once the ship leaves that port, should stifle not only their right to ask for improved terms of employment but their freedom of speech and expression, and should suffer instant termination of employment at the slightest sign of dissatisfaction with no protection from their Government and their courts. Otherwise, the petitioners contend that Filipinos would no longer be accepted as seamen, those employed would lose their jobs, and the still unemployed would be left hopeless.This is not the first time and it will not be the last where the threat of unemployment and loss of jobs would be used to argue against the interests of labor; where efforts by workingmen to better their terms of employment would be characterized as prejudicing the interests of labor as a whole.In 1867 or one hundred sixteen years ago. Chief Justice Beasley of the Supreme Court of New Jersey was ponente of the court's opinion declaring as a conspiracy the threat of workingmen to strike in connection with their efforts to promote unionism,t.hqwIt is difficult to believe that a right exists in law which we can scarcely conceive can produce, in any posture of affairs, other than injurious results. It is simply the right of workmen, by concert of action, and by taking advantage of their position, to control the business of another, I am unwilling to hold that aright which cannot, in any, event, be advantageous to the employee, and which must always be hurtful to the employer, exists in law. In my opinion this indictment sufficiently shows that the force of the confederates was brought to bear upon their employer for the purpose of oppression and mischief and that this amounts to a conspiracy, (State v. Donaldson, 32 NJL 151, 1867. Cited in Chamberlain, Sourcebook on Labor, p. 13. Emphasis supplied)The same arguments have greeted every major advance in the rights of the workingman.And they have invariably been proved unfounded and false.Unionism, employers' liability acts, minimum wages, workmen's compensation, social security and collective bargaining to name a few were all initially opposed by employers and even well meaning leaders of government and society as "killing the hen or goose which lays the golden eggs." The claims of workingmen were described as outrageously injurious not only to the employer but more so to the employees themselves before these claims or demands were established by law and jurisprudence as "rights" and before these were proved beneficial to management, labor, and the nation as a whole beyond reasonable doubt.The case before us does not represent any major advance in the rights of labor and the workingmen. The private respondents merely sought rights already established. No matter how much the petitioner-employer tries to present itself as speaking for the entire industry, there is no evidence that it is typical of employers hiring Filipino seamen or that it can speak for them.The contention that manning industries in the Philippines would not survive if the instant case is not decided in favor of the petitioner is not supported by evidence. The Wallem case was decided on February 20, 1981. There have been no severe repercussions, no drying up of employment opportunities for seamen, and none of the dire consequences repeatedly emphasized by the petitioner. Why should Vir-jen be all exception?The wages of seamen engaged in international shipping are shouldered by the foreign principal. The local manning office is an agent whose primary function is recruitment and who usually gets a lump sum from the shipowner to defray the salaries of the crew. The hiring of seamen and the determination of their compensation is subject to the interplay of various market factors and one key factor is how much in terms of profits the local manning office and the foreign shipowner may realize after the costs of the voyage are met. And costs include salaries of officers and crew members.Filipino seamen are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen from any other country in the world. Otherwise, there would not be so many of them in the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea on this globe. It is competence and reliability, not cheap labor that makes our seamen so greatly in demand. Filipino seamen have never demanded the same high salaries as seamen from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and other developed nations. But certainly they are entitled to government protection when they ask for fair and decent treatment by their employer, and when they exercise the right to petition for improved terms of employment, especially when they feel that these are sub-standard or are capable of improvement according to internationally accepted rules. In the domestic scene, there are marginal employers who prepare two sets of payrolls for their employees one in keeping with minimum wages and the other recording the sub-standard wages that the employees really receive, The reliable employers, however, not only meet the minimums required by fair labor standards legislation but even go way above the minimums while earning reasonable profits and prospering. The same is true of international employment. There is no reason why this Court and the Ministry of Labor and Employment or its agencies and commissions should come out with pronouncements based on the standards and practices of unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners, who claim they cannot survive without resorting to tricky and deceptive schemes, instead of Government maintaining labor law and jurisprudence according to the practices of honorable, competent, and law-abiding employers, domestic or foreign.If any minor advantages given to Filipino seamen may somehow cut into the profits of local manning agencies and foreign shipowners, that is not sufficient reason why the NSB or the ILRC should not stand by the former instead of listening to unsubstantiated fears that they would be killing the hen which lays the golden eggs.Prescinding from the above, we now hold that neither the National Seamen Board nor the National Labor Relations Commission should, as a matter of official policy, legitimize and enforce cubious arrangements where shipowners and seamen enter into fictitious contracts similar to the addendum agreements or side contracts in this case whose purpose is to deceive. The Republic of the Philippines and its ministries and agencies should present a more honorable and proper posture in official acts to the whole world, notwithstanding our desire to have as many job openings both here and abroad for our workers. At the very least, such as sensitive matter involving no less than our dignity as a people and the welfare of our workingmen must proceed from the Batasang Pambansa in the form of policy legislation, not from administrative rule making or adjudicationAnother issue raised by the movants is whether or not the seamen violated their contracts of employment.The form contracts approved by the National Seamen Board are designed to protect Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners who can take care of themselves. The standard forms embody the basic minimums which must be incorporated as parts of the employment contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.) They are not collective bargaining agreements or immutable contracts which the parties cannot improve upon or modify in the course of the agreed period of time. To state, therefore, that the affected seamen cannot petition their employer for higher salaries during the 12 months duration of the contract runs counter to established principles of labor legislation. The National Labor Relations Commission, as the appellate tribunal from decisions of the National Seamen Board, correctly ruled that the seamen did not violate their contracts to warrant their dismissal.The respondent Commission ruled:In the light of all the foregoing facts, we find that the cable of the seamen proposing an increase in their wage rates was not and could not have been intended as a threat to compel the Company to accede to their proposals. But even assuming, if only for the sake of argument, that the demand or proposal for a wage increase was accompanied by a threat that they would report to ITF if the Company did not accede to the contract revision - although there really was no such threat as pointed out earlier the Seamen should not be held at fault for asking such a demand. In the same case cited above, the Supreme Court held:Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken.But even if there had been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but natural for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, the refusal to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same, they were only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of expression is contrary to law and public policy. There is no serious misconduct to speak of in the case at bar which would justify respondents' dismissal just because of their firmness in their demand for the fulfillment by petitioner of its obligation it entered into without any coercion, specially on the part of private respondents. (Emphasis supplied).The above citation is fromWallem.The facts show that when the respondents boarded the M/T Jannu there was no intention to send their ship to Australia. On January 10, 1979, the petitioner sent a cable to respondent shipmaster Bisula informing him of the procedure to be followed in the computation of special compensation of crewmembers while in ITF controlled ports and expressed regrets for not having earlier clarified the procedure as it thought that the vessel would trade in Carribean ports only.On March 22, 1979, the petitioner sent another cable informing Bisula of the special compensation when the ship would call at Kwinana Australia.The following day, shipmaster Bisula cabled Vir-jen stating that the officers and crews were not interested in ITF membership if not paid ITF rates and that their only demand was a 50 percent increase based on their then salaries. Bisula also pointed out that Vir-jen rates were "very far in comparison with other shipping agencies in Manila."In reply, Vir-jen counter proposed a 25 percent increase. Only after Kyoei Tanker Co., Ltd., declined to increase the lumps sum amount given monthly to Vir-jen was the decision to terminate the respondents' employment formulated.The facts show that Virjen Initiated the discussions which led to the demand for increase . The seamen made a proposal and the petitioner organized with a counter-proposal. The ship had not vet gone to Australia or any ITF controlled port. There was absolutely no mention of any strike, much less a threat to strike. The seamen had done in act which under Philippine law or any other civilized law would be termed illegal, oppressive, or malicious. Whatever pressure existed, it was mild compared to accepted valid modes of labor activity.We reiterate our ruling inWallem.Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. The records fail to establish clearly the commission of any threat, But even if there had been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but natural for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, who refused to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same, They were only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their form of expression is contrary to law and public policy. ...Our dismissing the petition is premised on the assumption that the Ministry of Labor and Employment and all its agencies exist primarily for the workinginan's interests and, of course, the nation as a whole. The points raised by the Solicitor-General in his comments refer to the issue of allowing what the petitioner importunes under the argument of "killing the hen which lays the golden eggs." This is one of policy which should perhaps be directed to the Batasang Pambansa and to our country's other policy makers for more specific legislation on the matter, subject to the constitutional provisions protecting labor, promoting social justice, and guaranteeing non-abridgement of the freedom of speech, press, peaceable assembly and petition. We agree with the movants that there is no showing of any cause, which under the Labor Code or any current applicable law, would warrant the termination of the respondents' services before the expiration of their contracts. The Constitution guarantees State assurance of the rights of workers to security of tenure. (Sec. 9, Article II, Constitution). Presumptions and provisions of law, the evidence on record, and fundamental State policy all dictate that the motions for reconsideration should be granted.WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are hereby GRANTED. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.1wph1.tFernando, C.J., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.EN BANCG.R. Nos. L-57999, 58143-53 August 15, 1989RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA, ANTONIO TANEDO, AMORSOLO CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO BRACIA, RAMON DE BELEN, ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN MALABANAN, ROMEO HUERTO and VITALIANO PANGUE,petitioners,vs.THE HON. JUDGE ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO and MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC.,respondents.G.R. Nos. L-64781-99 August 15, 1989RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA, ANTONIO TANEDO, RAYMUNDO PEREZ, AMORSOLO CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO BRACIA, CATALINO CASICA, VITALIANO PANGUE, RAMON DE BELEN, EDUARDO PAGTALUNAN, ANTONIO MIRANDA, RAMON UNIANA, ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN MALABANAN, ROMEO HUERTO and WILFREDO CRISTOBAL,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD (now the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration), and MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC.,respondents.Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pe;a and Nolasco for petitioners.Samson S. Alcantara for private respondent.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:These petitions ask for a re-examination of this Court's precedent setting decision inVir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.(125 SCRA 577 [1983]). On constitutional, statutory, and factual grounds, we find no reason to disturb the doctrine in Vir-Jen Shippingand to turn back the clock of progress for sea-based overseas workers. The experience gained in the past few years shows that, following said doctrine, we should neither deny nor diminish the enjoyment by Filipino seamen of the same rights and freedoms taken for granted by other working men here and abroad.The cases at bar involve a group of Filipino seamen who were declared by the defunct National Seamen Board (NSB) guilty of breaching their employment contracts with the private respondent because they demanded, upon the intervention and assistance of a third party, the International Transport Worker's Federation (ITF), the payment of wages over and above their contracted rates without the approval of the NSB. The petitioners were ordered to reimburse the total amount of US$91,348.44 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency representing the said over-payments and to be suspended from the NSB registry for a period of three years. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of the NSB.In a corollary development, the private respondent, for failure of the petitioners to return the overpayments made to them upon demand by the former, filed estafa charges against some of the petitioners. The criminal cases were eventually consolidated in the sala of then respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo. Hence, these consolidated petitions, G.R. No. 64781-99 and G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53, which respectively pray for the nullification of the decisions of the NLRC and the NSB, and the dismissal of the criminal cases against the petitioners.The facts are found in the questioned decision of the NSB in G.R. No. 64781-99.From the records of this case it appears that the facts established and/or admitted by the parties are the following: that on different dates in 1977 and 1978 respondents entered into separate contracts of employment (Exhs. "B" to "B-17", inclusive) with complainant (private respondent) to work aboard vessels owned/operated/manned by the latter for a period of 12 calendar months and with different rating/position, salary, overtime pay and allowance, hereinbelow specified: ...; that aforesaid employment contracts were verified and approved by this Board; that on different dates in April 1978 respondents (petitioners) joined the M/V "GRACE RIVER"; that on or about October 30, 1978 aforesaid vessel, with the respondents on board, arrived at the port of Vancouver, Canada; that at this port respondent received additional wages under rates prescribed by the Intemational Transport Worker's Federation (ITF) in the total amount of US$98,261.70; that the respondents received the amounts appearing opposite their names, to wit: ...; that aforesaid amounts were over and above the rates of pay of respondents as appearing in their employment contracts approved by this Board; that on November 10, 1978, aforesaid vessel, with respondent on board, left Vancouver, Canada for Yokohama, Japan; that on December 14, 1978, while aforesaid vessel, was at Yura, Japan, they were made to disembark. (pp. 64-66, Rollo)Furthermore, according to the petitioners, while the vessel was docked at Nagoya, Japan, a certain Atty. Oscar Torres of the NSB Legal Department boarded the vessel and called a meeting of the seamen including the petitioners, telling them that for their own good and safety they should sign an agreement prepared by him on board the vessel and that if they do, the cases filed against them with NSB on November 17, 1978 would be dismissed. Thus, the petitioners signed the "Agreement" dated December 5, 1978. (Annex C of Petition) However, when they were later furnished xerox copies of what they had signed, they noticed that the line "which amount(s) was/were received and held by CREWMEMBERS in trust for SHIPOWNERS" was inserted therein, thereby making it appear that the amounts given to the petitioners representing the increase in their wages based on ITF rates were only received by them in trust for the private respondent.When the vessel reached Manila, the private respondent demanded from the petitioners the "overpayments" made to them in Canada. As the petitioners refused to give back the said amounts, charges were filed against some of them with the NSB and the Professional Regulations Commission. Estafa charges were also filed before different branches of the then Court of First Instance of Manila which, as earlier stated, were subsequently consolidated in the sala of the respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo and which eventually led to G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53.In G.R. Nos. 64781-99, the petitioners claimed before the NSB that contrary to the private respondent's allegations, they did not commit any illegal act nor stage a strike while they were on board the vessel; that the "Special Agreement" entered into in Vancouver to pay their salary differentials is valid, having been executed after peaceful negotiations. Petitioners further argued that the amounts they received were in accordance with the provision of law, citing among others, Section 18, Rule VI, Book I of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code which provides that "the basic minimum salary of seamen shall not be less than the prevailing minimum rates established by the International Labor Organization (ILO) or those prevailing in the country whose flag the employing vessel carries, whichever is higher ..."; and that the "Agreement" executed in Nagoya, Japan had been forced upon them and that intercalations were made to make it appear that they were merely trustees of the amounts they received in Vancouver.On the other hand, the private respondent alleged that the petitioners breached their employment contracts when they, acting in concert and with the active participations of the ITF while the vessel was in Vancouver, staged an illegal strike and by means of threats, coercion and intimidation compelled the owners of the vessel to pay to them various sums totalling US$104,244.35; that the respondent entered into the "Special Agreement" to pay the petitioners' wage differentials because it was under duress as the vessel would not be allowed to leave Vancouver unless the said agreement was signed, and to prevent the shipowner from incurring further delay in the shipment of goods; and that in view of petitioners' breach of contract, the latter's names must be removed from the NSB's Registry and that they should be ordered to return the amounts they received over and above their contracted rates.The respondent NSB ruled that the petitioners were guilty of breach of contract because despite subsisting and valid NSB-approved employment contracts, the petitioners sought the assistance of a third party (ITF) to demand from the private respondent wages in accordance with the ITF rates, which rates are over and above their rates of pay as appearing in their NSB-approved contracts. As bases for this conclusion, the NSB stated:1) The fact that respondents sought the aid of a third party (ITF) and demanded for wages and overtime pay based on ITF rates is shown in the entries of their respective Pay-Off Clearance Slips which were marked as their Exhs. "1" to "18", and we quote "DEMANDED ITF WAGES, OVERTIME, DIFFERENTIALS APRIL TO OCTOBER 1978". Respondent Suzara admitted that the entries in his Pay-Off Clearance Slip (Exh. "1") are correct (TSN., p. 16, Dec. 6, 1979).Moreover, it is the policy (reiterated very often) by the ITF that it does not interfere in the affairs of the crewmembers and masters and/or owners of a vessel unless its assistance is sought by the crewmembers themselves. Under this pronounced policy of the ITF, it is reasonable to assume that the representatives of the ITF in Vancouver, Canada assisted and intervened by reason of the assistance sought by the latter.2) The fact that the ITF assisted and intervened for and in behalf of the respondents in the latter's demand for higher wages could be gleaned from the answer of the respondents when they admitted that the ITF acted in their behalf in the negotiations for increase of wages. Moreover, respondent Cesar Dimaandal admitted that the ITF differential pay was computed by the ITF representative (TSN, p. 7, Dec. 12, 1979)3) The fact that complainant and the owner/operator of the vessel were compelled to sign the Special Agreement (Exh. "20") and to pay ITF differentials to respondents in order not to delay the departure of the vessel and to prevent further losses is shown in the "Agreement" (Exhs. "R-21") ... (pp. 69-70, Rollo)The NSB further said:While the Board recognizes the rights of the respondents to demand for higher wages, provided the means are peaceful and legal, it could not, however, sanction the same if the means employed are violent and illegal. In the case at bar, the means employed are violent and illegal for in demanding higher wages the respondents sought the aid of a third party and in turn the latter intervened in their behalf and prohibited the vessel from sailing unless the owner and/or operator of the vessel acceded to respondents' demand for higher wages. To avoid suffering further incalculable losses, the owner and/or operator of the vessel had no altemative but to pay respondents' wages in accordance with the ITF scale. The Board condemns the act of a party who enters into a contract and with the use of force/or intimidation causes the other party to modify said contract. If the respondents believe that they have a valid ground to demand from the complainant a revision of the terms of their contracts, the same should have been done in accordance with law and not thru illegal means. (at p. 72, Rollo).Although the respondent NSB found that the petitioners were entitled to the payment of earned wages and overtime pay/allowance from November 1, 1978 to December 14, 1978, it nevertheless ruled that the computation should be based on the rates of pay as appearing in the petitioners' NSB-approved contracts. It ordered that the amounts to which the petitioners are entitled under the said computation should be deducted from the amounts that the petitioners must return to the private respondent.On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the NSB's findings. Hence, the petition in G.R. Nos. 64781-99.Meanwhile, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53 moved to quash the criminal cases of estafa filed against them on the ground that the alleged crimes were committed, if at all, in Vancouver, Canada and, therefore, Philippine courts have no jurisdiction. The respondent judge denied the motion. Hence, the second petition.The principal issue in these consolidated petitions is whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the amounts they received from the private respondent representing additional wages as determined in the special agreement. If they are, then the decision of the NLRC and NSB must be reversed. Similarly, the criminal cases of estafa must be dismissed because it follows as a consequence that the amounts received by the petitioners belong to them and not to the private respondent.In arriving at the questioned decision, the NSB ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to the wage differentials as determined by the ITF because the means employed by them in obtaining the same were violent and illegal and because in demanding higher wages the petitioners sought the aid of a third party, which, in turn, intervened in their behalf and prohibited the vessel from sailing unless the owner and/or operator of the vessel acceded to respondents' demand for higher wages. And as proof of this conclusion, the NSB cited the following: (a) the entries in the petitioners Pay-Off Clearance Slip which contained the phrase "DEMANDED ITF WAGES ..."; (b) the alleged policy of the ITF in not interfering with crewmembers of a vessel unless its intervention is sought by the crewmembers themselves; (c), the petitioners' admission that ITF acted in their behalf; and (d) the fact that the private respondent was compelled to sign the special agreement at Vancouver, Canada.There is nothing in the public and private respondents' pleadings, to support the allegations that the petitioners used force and violence to secure the special agreement signed in Vancouver, British Columbia. There was no need for any form of intimidation coming from the Filipino seamen because the Canadian Brotherhood of Railways and Transport Workers (CBRT), a strong Canadian labor union, backed by an international labor federation was actually doing all the influencing not only on the ship-owners and employers but also against third world seamen themselves who, by receiving lower wages and cheaper accommodations, were threatening the employment and livelihood of seamen from developed nations.The bases used by the respondent NSB to support its decision do not prove that the petitioners initiated a conspiracy with the ITF or deliberately sought its assistance in order to receive higher wages. They only prove that when ITF acted in petitioners' behalf for an increase in wages, the latter manifested their support. This would be a logical and natural reaction for any worker in whose benefit the ITF or any other labor group had intervened. The petitioners admit that while they expressed their conformity to and their sentiments for higher wages by means of placards, they, nevertheless, continued working and going about their usual chores. In other words, all they did was to exercise their freedom of speech in a most peaceful way. The ITF people, in turn, did not employ any violent means to force the private respondent to accede to their demands. Instead, they simply applied effective pressure when they intimated the possibility of interdiction should the shipowner fail to heed the call for an upward adjustment of the rates of the Filipino seamen. Interdiction is nothing more than a refusal of ITF members to render service for the ship, such as to load or unload its cargo, to provision it or to perform such other chores ordinarily incident to the docking of the ship at a certain port. It was the fear of ITF interdiction, not any action taken by the seamen on board the vessel which led the shipowners to yield.The NSB's contusion that it is ITF's policy not to intervene with the plight of crewmembers of a vessel unless its intervention was sought is without basis. This Court is cognizant of the fact that during the period covered by the labor controversies inWallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Minister of Labor(102 SCRA 835 [1981];Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC(supra) and these consolidated petitions, the ITF was militant worldwide especially in Canada, Australia, Scandinavia, and various European countries, interdicting foreign vessels and demanding wage increases for third world seamen. There was no need for Filipino or other seamen to seek ITF intervention. The ITF was waiting on its own volition in all Canadian ports, not particularly for the petitioners' vessel but for all ships similarly situated. As earlier stated, the ITF was not really acting for the petitioners out of pure altruism. The ITF was merely protecting the interests of its own members. The petitioners happened to be pawns in a higher and broader struggle between the ITF on one hand and shipowners and third world seamen, on the other. To subject our seamen to criminal prosecution and punishment for having been caught in such a struggle is out of the question.As stated inVir-Jen Shipping(supra):The seamen had done no act which under Philippine law or any other civilized law would be termed illegal, oppressive, or malicious. Whatever pressure existed, it was mild compared to accepted and valid modes of labor activity. (at page 591)Given these factual situations, therefore, we cannot affirm the NSB and NLRC's finding that there was violence, physical or otherwise employed by the petitioners in demanding for additional wages. The fact that the petitioners placed placards on the gangway of their ship to show support for ITF's demands for wage differentials for their own benefit and the resulting ITF's threatened interdiction do not constitute violence. The petitioners were exercising their freedom of speech and expressing sentiments in their hearts when they placed the placard We Want ITF Rates." Under the facts and circumstances of these petitions, we see no reason to deprive the seamen of their right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution and the fundamental law of Canada where they happened to exercise it.As we have ruled inWallemPhil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor, et al. supra:Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is now well-taken. The records fail to establish clearly the commission of any threat. But even if there had been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but natural for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, who refused to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same. They were only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of expression is contrary to law and public policy. ... (at page 843)We likewise, find the public respondents' conclusions that the acts of the petitioners in demanding and receiving wages over and above the rates appearing in their NSB-approved contracts is in effect an alteration of their valid and subsisting contracts because the same were not obtained through mutual consent and without the prior approval of the NSB to be without basis, not only because the private respondent's consent to pay additional wages was not vitiated by any violence or intimidation on the part of the petitioners but because the said NSB-approved form contracts are not unalterable contracts that can have no room for improvement during their effectivity or which ban any amendments during their term.For one thing, the employer can always improve the working conditions without violating any law or stipulation.We stated in theVir-Jencase (supra) that:The form contracts approved by the National Seamen Board are designed to protect Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners who can take care of themselves. The standard forms embody the basic minimums which must be incorporated as parts of the employment contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code).They are not collective bargaining agreements or immutable contracts which the parties cannot improve upon or modify in the course of the agreed period of time. To state, therefore, that the affected seamen cannot petition their employer for higher salaries during the 12 months duration of the contract runs counter to estabhshed principles of labor legislation. The National Labor Relations Commission, as the appellate tribunal from the decisions of the National Seamen Board, correctly ruled that the seamen did not violate their contracts to warrant their dismissal. (at page 589)It is impractical for the NSB to require the petitioners, caught in the middle of a labor struggle between the ITF and owners of ocean going vessels halfway around the world in Vancouver, British Columbia to first secure the approval of the NSB in Manila before signing an agreement which the employer was willing to sign. It is also totally unrealistic to expect the petitioners while in Canada to exhibit the will and strength to oppose the ITF's demand for an increase intheirwages, assuming they were so minded.An examination of Annex C of the petition, the agreement signed in Japan by the crewmembers of the M/V Grace River and a certain M. Tabei, representative of the Japanese shipowner lends credence to the petitioners' claim that the clause "which amount(s) was received and held by CREWMEMBERS in trust for SHIPOWNER" was an intercalation added after the execution of the agreement. The clause appears too closely typed below the names of the 19 crewmen and their wages with no similar intervening space as that which appears between all the paragraphs and the triple space which appears between the list of crewmembers and their wages on one hand and the paragraph above which introduces the list, on the other. The verb "were" was also inserted above the verb "was" to make the clause grammatically correct but the insertion of "were" is already on the same line as "Antonio Miranda and 5,221.06" where it clearly does not belong. There is no other space where the word "were" could be intercalated. (See Rollo, page 80).At any rate, the proposition that the petitioners should have pretended to accept the increased wages while in Vancouver but returned them to the shipowner when they reached its country, Japan, has already been answered earlier by the Court:Filipino seamen are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen from any other country in the world. Otherwise, there would not be so many of them in the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea on this globe. It is competence and reliability, not cheap labor that makes our seamen so greatly in demand. Filipino seamen have never demanded the same high salaries as seamen from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and other developed nations. But certainly they are entitled to government protection when they ask for fair and decent treatment by their employer and when they exercise the right to petition for improved terms of employment, especially when they feel that these are sub-standard or are capable of improvement according to internationally accepted rules. In the domestic scene, there are marginal employers who prepare two sets of payrolls for their employees one in keeping with minimum wages and the other recording the sub-standard wages that the employees really receive. The reliable employers, however, not only meet the minimums required by fair labor standards legislation but even go away above the minimums while earning reasonable profits and prospering. The same is true of international employment. There is no reason why this court and the Ministry of Labor and Employment or its agencies and commissions should come out with pronouncements based on the standards and practices of unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners, who claim they cannot survive without resorting to tricky and deceptive schemes, instead of Government maintaining labor law and jurisprudence according to the practices of honorable, competent, and law-abiding employers, domestic or foreign. (Vir-Jen Shipping,supra, pp. 587-588)It is noteworthy to emphasize that while the Intemational Labor Organization (ILO) set the minimum basic wage of able seamen at US$187.00 as early as October 1976, it was only in 1979 that the respondent NSB issued Memo Circular No. 45, enjoining all shipping companies to adopt the said minimum basic wage. It was correct for the respondent NSB to state in its decision that when the petitioners entered into separate contracts between 1977-1978, the monthly minimum basic wage for able seamen ordered by NSB was still fixed at US$130.00. However, it is not the fault of the petitioners that the NSB not only violated the Labor Code which created it and the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code but also seeks to punish the seamen for a shortcoming of NSB itself.Article 21(c) of the Labor Code, when it created the NSB, mandated the Board to "(O)btain the best possible terms and conditions of employment for seamen."Section 15, Rule V of Book I of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides:Sec. 15. Model contract of employment. The NSB shall devise a model contract of employment which shall embody all the requirements of pertinent labor and social legislations and the prevailing standards set by applicable International Labor Organization Conventions. The model contract shall set the minimum standards of the terms and conditions to govern the employment of Filipinos on board vessels engaged in overseas trade. All employers of Filipinos shall adopt the model contract in connection with the hiring and engagement of the services of Filipino seafarers, and in no case shall a shipboard employment contract be allowed where the same provides for benefits less than those enumerated in the model employment contract, or in any way conflicts with any other provisions embodied in the model contract.Section 18 of Rule VI of the same Rules and Regulations provides:Sec. 18. Basic minimum salary of able-seamen. The basic minimum salary of seamen shall be not less than the prevailing minimxun rates established by the International Labor Organization or those prevailing in the country whose flag the employing vessel carries, whichever is higher. However, this provision shall not apply if any shipping company pays its crew members salaries above the minimum herein provided.Section 8, Rule X, Book I of the Omnibus Rules provides:Section 8.Use of standard format of service agreement. The Board shall adopt a standard format of service agreement in accordance with pertinent labor and social legislation and prevailing standards set by applicable International Labor Organization Conventions. The standard format shall set the minimum standard of the terms and conditions to govern the employment of Filipino seafarers but in no case shall a shipboard employment contract (sic), or in any way conflict with any other provision embodied in the standard format.It took three years for the NSB to implement requirements which, under the law, they were obliged to follow and execute immediately. During those three years, the incident in Vancouver happened. The terms and conditions agreed upon in Vancouver were well within ILO rates even if they were above NSB standards at the time.The sanctions applied by NSB and affirmed by NLRC are moreover not in keeping with the basic premise that this Court stressed in theVir-Jen Shippingcase(supra) that the Ministry now the Department of Labor and Employment and all its agencies exist primarily for the workingman's interest and the nation's as a whole.Implicit in these petitions and the only reason for the NSB to take the side of foreign shipowners against Filipino seamen is the "killing the goose which lays the golden eggs" argument. We reiterate the ruling of the Court inVir-Jen Shipping(supra)There are various arguments raised by the petitioners but the common thread running through all of them is the contention, if not the dismal prophecy, that if the respondent seamen are sustained by this Court, we would in effect "kill the hen that lays the golden egg." In other words, Filipino seamen, admittedly among the best in the world, should remain satisfied with relatively lower if not the lowest, international rates of compensation, should not agitate for higher wages while their contracts of employment are subsisting, should accept as sacred, iron clad, and immutable the side contracts which require: them to falsely pretend to be members of international labor federations, pretend to receive higher salaries at certain foreign ports only to return the increased pay once the ship leaves that port, should stifle not only their right to ask for improved terms of employment but their freedom of speech and expression, and should suffer instant termination of employment at the slightest sign of dissatisfaction with no protection from their Government and their courts. Otherwise, the petitioners contend that Filipinos would no longer be accepted as seamen, those employed would lose their jobs, and the still unemployed would be left hopeless.This is not the first time and it will not be the last where the threat of unemployment and loss of jobs would be used to argue against the interests of labor; where efforts by workingmen to better their terms of employment would be characterized as prejudicing the interests of labor as a whole.xxx xxx xxxUnionism, employers' liability acts, minimum wages, workmen's compensation, social security and collective bargaining to name a few were all initially opposed by employers and even well meaning leaders of government and society as "killing the hen or goose which lays the golden eggs." The claims of workingmen were described as outrageously injurious not only to the employer but more so to the employees themselves before these claims or demands were established by law and jurisprudence as "rights" and before these were proved beneficial to management, labor, and the national as a whole beyond reasonable doubt.The case before us does not represent any major advance in the rights of labor and the workingmen. The private respondents merely sought rights already established. No matter how much the petitioner-employer tries to present itself as speaking for the entire industry, there is no evidence that it is typical of employers hiring Filipino seamen or that it can speak for them.The contention that manning industries in the Philippines would not survive if the instant case is not decided in favor of the petitioner is not supported by evidence. The Wallem case was decided on February 20, 1981. There have been no severe repercussions, no drying up of employment opportunities for seamen, and none of the dire consequences repeatedly emphasized by the petitioner. Why should Vir-Jen be an exception?The wages of seamen engaged in international shipping are shouldered by the foreign principal. The local manning office is an agent whose primary function is recruitment and who usually gets a lump sum from the shipowner to defray the salaries of the crew. The hiring of seamen and the determination of their compensation is subject to the interplay of various market factors and one key factor is how much in terms of profits the local manning office and the foreign shipowner may realize after the costs of the voyage are met. And costs include salaries of officers and crew members. (at pp. 585-586)TheWallemShippingcase, was decided in 1981.Vir-Jen Shippingwas decided in 1983. It is now 1989. There has'been no drying up of employment opportunities for Filipino seamen. Not only have their wages improved thus leading ITF to be placid and quiet all these years insofar as Filipinos are concerned but the hiring of Philippine seamen is at its highest level ever.Reporting its activities for the year 1988, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) stated that there will be an increase in demand for seamen based overseas in 1989 boosting the number to as high as 105,000. This will represent a 9.5 percent increase from the 1988 aggregate. (Business World,News Briefs,January 11, 1989 at page 2) According to the POEA, seabased workers numbering 95,913 in 1988 exceeded by a wide margin of 28.15 percent the year end total in 1987. The report shows that sea-based workers posted bigger monthly increments compared to those of landbased workers. (The Business Star,Indicators, January 11, 1988 at page 2)Augmenting this optimistic report of POEA Administrator Tomas Achacoso is the statement of Secretary of Labor Franklin M. Drilon that the Philippines has a big jump over other crewing nations because of the Filipinos' abilities compared with any European or westem crewing country. Drilon added that cruise shipping is also a growing market for Filipino seafarers because of their flexibility in handling odd jobs and their expertise in handling almost all types of ships, including luxury liners. (Manila Bulletin,More Filipino SeamenExpected Development,December 27, 1988 at page 29).Parenthetically, the minimum monthly salary of able bodied seamen set by the ILO and adhered to by the Philippines is now $276.00 (id.) more than double the $130.00 sought to be enforced by the public respondents in these petitions.The experience from 1981 to the present vindicates the finding inVir-Jen Shippingthat a decision in favor of the seamen would not necessarily mean severe repercussions, drying up of employment opportunities for seamen, and other dire consequences predicted by manning agencies and recruiters in the Philippines.From the foregoing, we find that the NSB and NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding the petitioners guilty of using intimidation and illegal means in breaching their contracts of employment and punishing them for these alleged offenses. Consequently, the criminal prosecutions for estafa in G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53 should be dismissed.WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The decisions of the National Seamen Board and National Labor Relations Commission in G. R. Nos. 64781-99 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered holding the petitioners not guilty of the offenses for which they were charged. The petitioners' suspension from the National Seamen Board's Registry for three (3) years is LIFTED. The private respondent is ordered to pay the petitioners their earned but unpaid wages and overtime pay/allowance from November 1, 1978 to December 14, 1978 according to the rates in the Special Agreement that the parties entered into in Vancouver, Canada.The criminal cases for estafa, subject matter of G. R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53, are ordered DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 80918 August 16, 1989JOSEFINA M. PRINCIPE,petitionervs.PHILIPPINE-SINGAPORE TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. and CHUAN HUP AGENCIES, PTE. LTD., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYEES EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION,respondents.R. C. Carrera Law Firm for petitioner.Eladio B. Samson for private respondent.GANCAYCO,J.:Once again this Tribunal is faced with the issue of the validity of the quitclaim executed by the employee's heir in favor of the employer.Petitioner is the widow of the late Abelardo Principe who was then the Chief Engineer of M/V OSAM Falcon, a commercial vessel of Singaporean registry owned by Chuan Hup Agencies, Pte. Ltd. (Chuan Hup for brevity), one of the private respondents herein, who is the principal of Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. (PSTSI), also a private respondent herein. The contract of employment of the deceased with private respondent Chua Hup provides, among others, that Principe would receive Singapore $2,800.00 a month to commence on September 7, 1982, medical benefits and insurance coverage through group hospitalization and surgical insurance and group and personal accident insurance for a capital sum of US$75,000.00. It also provides that the laws of Singapore shall apply in cases of disputes arising out of the said appointment and that said disputes are to be resolved by the courts of the Republic of Singapore.1On September 15,1982, while Principe was on duty in Malintoc Field, Palawan, Philippines, he suddenly contracted a serious illness which eventually resulted to his death.2On July 5, 1983, petitioner filed a complaint3against PSTSI with the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), seeking the payment of death compensation benefits and other benefits accruing to her deceased husband. While the aforesaid case was pending, the parties entered into a compromise agreement. On December 22, 1983, petitioner executed a release and quitclaim in favor of PSTSI in consideration of the sum of Seven Thousand Pesos (P7,000.00) together with hospital, burial and other incidental expenses previously disbursed by PSTSI in favor of petitioner's deceased husband.4Consequently, Atty. Wellington Lachica, counsel for petitioner, with the latter's conformity, filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice against PSTSI and without prejudice as against Chuan Hup5On the basis of the compromise agreement and the motion to dismiss dated November 23, 1983, the POEA issued an order dated December 27, 1983, dismissing petitioner's complaint with prejudice against PSTSI.On April 21, 1986, petitioner filed with the POEA another claim for death benefits against PSTSI, this time including Chuan Hup. The new case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 86-04-328. In the decision dated January 27, 1987, the POEA dismissed the complaint on the ground that there exist identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the previous case, POEA Case No. L-635-83 and the new case, and that the present case is barred by prior judgment based on a compromise agreement in the previous case.6Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).lwph1.tIn a resolution dated September 25, 1987, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.7Hence, the present petition.It is the position of the petitioner that the release and quitclaim that she signed in favor of private respondent PSTSI is null and void on the ground that the consideration given in exchange thereof in the amount of P7,000.00 is extremely low and unconscionable. Petitioner added that she was merely misled to sign the quitclaim due to the assurance given by PSTSI that it will help her recover the death compensation and insurance proceeds due her deceased husband. She argued that even on the assumption that the quitclaim is valid, the release should benefit PSTSI alone and should not include Chua Hup as the quitclaim was executed only in favor of PSTSI. Further she contended that notwithstanding the quitclaim executed in favor of PSTSI, the latter may still be held liable since it is an agent of Chuan Hup here in the Philippines.8The Solicitor General supports petitioner's view stating that the principle ofres judicatais inapplicable to the case at bar since petitioner and PSTSI agreed that the dismissal of the suit against the latter is without prejudice insofar as the principal Chuan Hup is concerned; that the quitclaim is null and void as the consideration given is unconscionably low as it is not even equal to one percent (1%) of petitioner's claim; and that the quitclaim is inequitable and incongrous to the declared policy of the State to afford protection to labor, citing Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.9We rule for the petitioner.The release and quitclaim in question reads as follows: JOSEFINA M. PRINCIPLE, of legal age, widow, and resident at 1287-E, G. Tuazon St., Sampaloc, Manila in favor of PHILIPPINE-SINGAPORE TRANS-PORT SERVICES, INC., a domestic corporation domiciled and having its principal place of business at 205 Martinez Bldg., Dasmarinas, Manila.WITNESSETH, that:WHEREAS, on July 5, 1983, Josefina M. Principe fled a complaint for death benefits against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. as a shipping agency of Chuan Hup Agencies Pte. Ltd. of the Republic of Singapore for the death of her husband, Engr. Abelardo D. Principe, on September 15, 1982 in Matinloc Field, Offshore Palawan, Philippines while in the course of as employment as Chief Engineer of OSAM Falcon' in POEA Case No. (L) 635-83 of thePhilippine Overseas Employment Administration, entitled Josefina M. Principe vs. Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc.;'WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to settle the above- entitled case amicably.NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P7,000.00), Philippine currency and of the hospital, burial and other incidental expenses previously disbursed by Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., receipt of which in full is hereby acknowledged to her full and complete satisfaction, JOSEFINA M. PRINCIPLE have (sic) released and discharged, as she hereby releases and discharges, Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its directors, officers, employees, principals and agents from any and all claims, actions obligations and liabilities which she have or might have against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. in connection with the death of her husband Abelardo D. Principe on September 15, 1982 in Matintoc Field, Offshore Palawan under the circumstances narrated in the aforementioned case.That she hereby represents and warrants to Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. that she is the surviving spouse legally entitled to claim for damages/support which may arise from the death of said Abelardo D. Principe, and further, that she hereby manifests that any and all rights or claims which she, as a surviving forced heir of the late Abelardo D. Principe might have against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its directors, employees, principals and agents arising out of or by reason of the death of said Abelardo D. Principe are hereby deemed waived and discharged and she have (sic) Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its directors, officers, employees, principals and agents and whoever may be held liable, completely free and harmless from any claim and/or liabilities that may arise from the death of said Abelardo D. Principe (sic).That in the event that any other person/persons, as surviving spouse of the deceased Abelardo D. Principe should claim against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. for such damages/support arising from the death of Abelardo D. Principe, and the claim is held valid, then Josefina M. Principe hereby undertakes and agrees to reimburse to Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. the amounts hereunder received, plus legal interest therein.That she further states that the foregoing consideration is voluntarily accepted by her as a full and final compromise, adjustment and settlement of any and all claims that she may have against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its directors, officers, employees, principals and agents; and she hereby irrevocably affirm (sic) that Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. has made this settlement solely to buy peace, avoid litigation and on human consideration, and she acknowledges that the payment of said consideration is not and shall never be construed as an admission of liability or obligation by Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its officers, directors, employees, principals and agents.10It is true that a compromise agreement once approved by the court has the effect ofres judicatabetween the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery. However, settled is the rule that the NLRC may disregard technical rules of procedure in order to give life to the constitutional mandate affording protection to labor and to conform to the need of protecting the working class whose inferiority against the employer has always been earmarked by disadvantage.11The Court finds that the compromise agreement entered into by the petitioner in favor of PSTSI was not intended to totally foreclose her right over the death benefits of her husband. First, the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner through Atty. Lachica before the POEA, which cited the compromise agreement entered into by the parties, clearly and unequivocally reflects the undertaking that the release is without prejudice as regards private respondent Chuan Hup. This fact was acknowledged in the decision of POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso in POEA Case No. (L) 86-04-328. It is surprising why both the POEA and the NLRC failed to consider this aspect in the resolution of the second complaint filed by the petitioner against PSTSI and Chuan Hup.The second complaint was filed by petitioner to enforce the joint and several liability of PSTSI and Chuan Hup per joint affidavit of responsibility executed by said parties in entering into a principal agent relationship after PSTSI failed to live up to its commitment to assist petitioner in the recovery of death compensation.12This observation is supported by the provisions of the release signed by the petitioner wherein the parties referred to therein were only the petitioner and PSTSI. The release is from any claim against PSTSI. Chuan Hup is not a party thereto. He cannot be considered covered by the release.Moreover, the Court sees no reason why petitioner, with the assistance of a counsel would ever agree to foreclose her right against Chuan Hup over the death benefits of her husband in exchange for a very measly sum of Seven Thousand Pesos (P7,000.00). They must have been aware that should she pursue her case, she was assured of getting at least One Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred Singapore dollars (US$100,800.00). This Court has laid down the rule in similar cases that applying the Singapore Maritime Laws in case of a seaman's death, the heirs of the seaman should receive the equivalent of 36 months wages of the deceased seaman.13The fact that petitioner received the sum of P7,000.00 only should not be taken to mean as a waiver of her right. The circumstances she was confronted with during that time left her with no other alternative but to accept the same as she was in dire need of money due to the sudden death of her husband. PSTSI contends that it was precisely because of her need for cash that petitioner thereby totally waived her right over the death benefits of her husband. We do not think so. What is plausible is the protestation of petitioner that PSTSI took advantage of her financial distress and led her to signing the release and quitclaim without explaining the consequences to her. While it may be true that her counsel assisted her in the process, said counsel must have been persuaded by the assurance of PSTSI that it shall help obtain for her the corresponding benefits from Chuan Hup.Even assuming for the sake of argument that the quitclaim had foreclosed petitioner's right over the death benefits of her husband, the fact that the consideration given in exchange thereof was very much less than the amount petitioner is claiming renders the quitclaim null and void for being contrary to public policy.14The State must be firm in affording protection to labor. The quitclaim wherein the consideration is scandalously low and inequitable cannot be an obstacle to petitioner's pursuing her legitimate claim.15Equity dictates that the compromise agreement should be voided in this instance.Lastly, it must be noted that the first complaint of petitioner was merely an action against PSTSI whereas in the second complaint Chuan Hup was already included. The POEA ruled that the second complaint was merely an afterthought, and that it was a product of a pre-conceived mind considering the interval of time from the issuance of the order of dismissal in the previous case and the institution of the second complaint. We do not think so. On the contrary, the Court holds that the delay was due to PSTSI's failure to make good its promise to assist the petitioner in recovering the death benefits of her husband. We see no other reason thereby. Hence, even if the second action was filed beyond the three (3) year reglementary period as provided by law for such claims, We cannot buy PSTSI's argument that the claim is already barred. The blame for the delay, if any, can only be attributed to PSTSI.On the other hand, PSTSI argues that it cannot be held responsible on the ground that the aforesaid affidavit of undertaking with Chua Hup is applicable only to those members of the crew recruited by PSTSI in the Philippines for and in behalf of its principal Chuan Hup and that since Principe was directly hired by Chuan Hup, PSTSI cannot be held responsible as it has no privity of contract with those personnel recruited in Singapore.The argument is untenable. This is the first time PSTSI raised this defense when it had all the chance to do so below. Moreover, if PSTSI honestly believed it had no privity of contract with Principe who was directly recruited by Chuan Hup, then there is no reason why it entered into a compromise agreement with herein petitioner. From the very start, it should have asked for the dismissal of the case against it on the ground of lack of cause of action, but it did not do so. What is obvious is that Principe was actually recruited by PSTSI and that he signed the employment contract with the principal Chuan Hup. Thus, private respondents stand jointly and severally liable for the claim of petitioner.Anent the argument that the Philippine courts are without jurisdiction over the subject matter as jurisdiction was, by agreement of the parties, vested in the courts of the Republic of Singapore, it is well-settled that an agreement to deprive a court of jurisdiction conferred on it by law is void and of no legal effect.16In this jurisdiction labor cases, are within the competence of the National Labor Relations Commission.With respect to petitioner's monetary claim, since the parties agreed that the laws of Singapore shall govern their relationship and that any dispute arising from the contract shall be resolved by the law of that country, then the petitioner is entitled to death benefits equivalent to 36 months salary of her husband.17As the wage of deceased Abelardo Principe was S$2,800.00 a month, then petitioner is entitled to a total of S$100,800.00.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The resolution of the NLRC dated September 25,1987 is hereby set aside and another decision is hereby rendered ordering private respondents PSTSI and Chuan Hup Agencies, Pte. Ltd. to jointly and severally pay petitioner the sum of S$100,800. 00 in its equivalent in Philippine pesos. This decision is immediately executory.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO,petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION,respondents.QUIASON,J.:The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's Administrator, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:(1) to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in POEA Cases Nos.L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460; (2) to render a new decision: (i) declaring private respondents as in default; (ii) declaring the said labor cases as a class suit; (iii) ordering Asia International Builders Corporation (AIBC) and Brown and Root International Inc. (BRII) to pay the claims of the 1,767 claimants in said labor cases; (iv) declaring Atty. Florante M. de Castro guilty of forum-shopping; and (v) dismissing POEA Case No. L-86-05-460; and(3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-288).The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al., v. Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-799 andL-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied the three-year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the Philippines instead of the ten-year prescriptive period under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (ii) denied the"three-hour daily average" formula in the computation of petitioners' overtime pay; and(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-220).The petition in G.R. Nos. 105029-32, entitled "Asia International Builders Corporation, et. al., v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al." was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 andL-86-05-460, insofar as it granted the claims of 149 claimants; and(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of NLRC insofar as it denied the motions for reconsideration of AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59; 61-230).The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modified the decision of POEA in four labor cases: (1) awarded monetary benefits only to 149 claimants and (2) directed Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco to conduct hearings and to receive evidence on the claims dismissed by the POEA for lack of substantial evidence or proof of employment.Consolidation of CasesG.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the Third Division while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raffled to the Second Division. In the Resolution dated July 26, 1993, the Second Division referred G.R. Nos. 104911-14 to the Third Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14,Rollo, p. 895).In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division granted the motion filed in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 for the consolidation of said cases with G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32, which were assigned to the First Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14,Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-30,Rollo, pp. 369-377, 426-432). In the Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the First Division granted the motion to consolidate G.R. Nos. 104911-14 with G.R. No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14,Rollo, p. 1109; G.R. Nos. 105029-32,Rollo, p. 1562).IOn June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (POEA Case No. L-84-06-555). The claimants were represented by Atty. Gerardo del Mundo.BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII (G.R. No. 104776,Rollo, pp. 13-14).At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the complaint and was given, together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to file its answer.On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of AIBC and BRII, ordered the claimants to file a bill of particulars within ten days from receipt of the order and the movants to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the bill of particulars. The POEA Administrator also scheduled a pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984.On July 13, 1984, the claimants submitted their "Compliance and Manifestation." On July 23, 1984, AIBC filed a "Motion to Strike Out of the Records", the "Complaint" and the "Compliance and Manifestation." On July 25, 1984, the claimants filed their "Rejoinder and Comments," averring, among other matters, the failure of AIBC and BRII to file their answers and to attend the pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984. The claimants alleged that AIBC and BRII had waived their right to present evidence and had defaulted by failing to file their answers and to attend the pre-trial conference.On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the "Motion to Strike Out of the Records" filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out in the order.On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to comply with the Order of October 2, 1984 and filed an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA Administrator direct the parties to submit simultaneously their position papers, after which the case should be deemed submitted for decision. On the same day, Atty. Florante de Castro filed another complaint for the same money claims and benefits in behalf of several claimants, some of whom were also claimants in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 (POEA Case No. 85-10-779).On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their "Compliance" with the Order dated October 2, 1984 and an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA direct the parties to submit simultaneously their position papers after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. On the same day, AIBC asked for time to file its comment on the "Compliance" and "Urgent Manifestation" of claimants. On November 6, 1984, it filed a second motion for extension of time to file the comment.On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC that its motion for extension of time was granted.On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure to file their answers.On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a "Comment" praying, among other reliefs, that claimants should be ordered to amend their complaint.On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the order.On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking the reversal of the said order of the POEA Administrator. Claimants opposed the appeal, claiming that it was dilatory and praying that AIBC and BRII be declared in default.On April 2, 1985, the original claimants filed an "Amended Complaint and/or Position Paper" dated March 24, 1985, adding new demands: namely, the payment of overtime pay, extra night work pay, annual leave differential pay, leave indemnity pay, retirement and savings benefits and their share of forfeitures (G.R. No. 104776,Rollo, pp. 14-16). On April 15, 1985, the POEA Administrator directed AIBC to file its answer to the amended complaint (G.R. No. 104776,Rollo, p. 20).On May 28, 1985, claimants filed an "Urgent Motion for Summary Judgment." On the same day, the POEA issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers to the "Amended Complaint," otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present evidence and the case would be resolved on the basis of complainant's evidence.On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a "Motion to Dismiss as Improper Class Suit and Motion for Bill of Particulars Re: Amended Complaint dated March 24, 1985." Claimants opposed the motions.On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his directive to AIBC and BRII to file their answers in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the NLRC, together with a petition for the issuance of a writ of injunction. On September 19, 1985, NLRC enjoined the POEA Administrator from hearing the labor cases and suspended the period for the filing of the answers of AIBC and BRII.On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA Administrator to include additional claimants in the case and to investigate alleged wrongdoings of BRII, AIBC and their respective lawyers.On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants filed a complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-777) against AIBC and BRII with the POEA, demanding monetary claims similar to those subject of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In the same month, Solomon Reyes also filed his own complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-779) against AIBC and BRII.On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro & Associates asked for the substitution of the original counsel of record and the cancellation of the special powers of attorney given the original counsel.On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of the claim to enforce attorney's lien.On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money claims (POEA Case No. 86-05-460) in behalf of 11 claimants including Bienvenido Cadalin, a claimant in POEA Case No. 84-06-555.On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed on February 27, 1985 and September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA Administrator, it is not amiss to mention that two cases were filed in the Supreme Court by the claimants, namely G.R. No. 72132 on September 26, 1985 and Administrative Case No. 2858 on March 18, 1986. On May 13, 1987, the Supreme Court issued a resolution in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing the POEA Administrator to resolve the issues raised in the motions and oppositions filed in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-86-05-460 and to decide the labor cases with deliberate dispatch.AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489), questioning the Order dated September 4, 1985 of the POEA Administrator. Said order required BRII and AIBC to answer the amended complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a resolution dated November 9, 1987, we dismissed the petition by informing AIBC that all its technical objections may properly be resolved in the hearings before the POEA.Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was filed on September 22, 1988 by claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18 co-claimants against the POEA Administrator and several NLRC Commissioners. The Ombudsman merely referred the complaint to the Secretary of Labor and Employment with a request for the early disposition of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. The second was filed on April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P. Bautista and Rolando R. Lobeta charging AIBC and BRII for violation of labor and social legislations. The third was filed by Jose R. Santos, Maximino N. Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII of violations of labor laws.On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution dated December 12, 1986.On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA Administrator its motion for suspension of the period for filing an answer or motion for extension of time to file the same until the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of the order of the NLRC dismissing the two appeals. On April 28, 1987, NLRCen bancdenied the motion for reconsideration.At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit their respective position papers. On June 24, 1987 claimants filed their "Urgent Motion to Strike Out Answer," alleging that the answer was filed out of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed their "Supplement to Urgent Manifestational Motion" to comply with the POEA Order of June 19, 1987. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their position paper. On March 4, 1988, claimants filed their "Ex-ParteMotion to Expunge from the Records" the position paper of AIBC and BRII, claiming that it was filed out of time.On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro filed their memorandum in POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On September 6, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their Supplemental Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII filed its "Reply to Complainant's Memorandum." On October 26, 1988, claimants submitted their "Ex-ParteManifestational Motion and Counter-Supplemental Motion," together with 446 individual contracts of employments and service records. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a "Consolidated Reply."On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 and the other consolidated cases, which awarded the amount of $824,652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants.On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their "Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal" from the decision of the POEA. On the same day, AIBC also filed its motion for reconsideration and/or appeal in addition to the "Notice of Appeal" filed earlier on February 6, 1989 by another counsel for AIBC.On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their "Answer to Appeal," praying for th