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Portion of chart INT 52 - North Pacific Ocean (reduced). ................. 4
Summary .................................................................................. 5
Sources of information .............................................................. 6
Daeyang Honey - Introduction .................................................. 7
- Loading the Daeyang Honey ........................... 7
- Outline drawing of cargo and tank spaces ........ .8
- Loading plan ................................................. 12
Voyage to Japan - 14 to 19 October ........................................ 14
- Typhoon Colleen - 18 to 26 October.. ............ .14
Sketch of area of Typhoon Colleen ............................................ 15
Chart of active tropical storms ................................................. 16
Previous loadings in Australia ..................................................... 19
Comment .................................................................................. 21
Conclusions .............................................................................. 22
Owners Submission ..................................................................... 23
Attachments:
1 Basic port information sent to Master . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2 Loading sequence/plan as submitted by Daeyang Honey . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 Satellite photograph of Typhoon Colleen 22 October 1992 . . . . . . . . 26
4 Comparision of loading sequence, Port Hedlandand Koolan Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5 Particulars of ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Portion of chart INT 52 - North Pacific Ocean (reduced)
Noon 22 October 1992 Daeyang Honey
/ PAPUA ritw CI”’
,-_- - SEA I
The South Korean bulk ore carrierDaeyang Honey sailed from KoolanIsland, Western Australia on 14October 1992, with a crew of 28. Theship was loaded with a full cargo ofabout 122,300 tonnes of low-gradeiron ore, bound for the Japanese portof Mizushima.
In the afternoon of 22 October, asignal from a float-free emergency-position indicator radio beacon(EPIRB) was detected by the search-and-rescue polar orbiting satellitesystem (COSPAS-SARSAT), about 300miles east of the Philippine Islands,close to the area of the typhoonColleen. The EPIRB was identified ascoming from the Daeyang Honey.
An initial air search by the UnitedStates authorities based on theIsland of Guam was hindered by badweather associated with the typhoon.On 25 October, in better flyingconditions, a liferaft was located andships in the area were requested tosearch for survivors and wreckage.
On 26 October the liferaft wasrelocated and a little later the EPIRB,surrounded by debris, was alsosighted. The motor vesselAzaleaeverett was diverted to theposition of the EPIRB, where debrisand the beacon were found, but nosurvivors. At about the same time,the motor vessel Bum Ju located theliferaft and positively identified it asbelonging to the Daeyang Honey.
The Daeyang Honey had loaded ironore on a number of occasions at theAustralian ports of Dampier and PortHedland.
U n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h eNav igat ion (Mar ine Casua l ty )Regulations the Inspector undertookan investigation of how the DaeyangHoney was loaded in Australia, withthe aim of passing this and otherinformation available within Australia,to the maritime authorities in theRepublic of Korea, in accordancewith the International MaritimeOrganization resolution A.637 (16),Cooperation in Marine CasualtyInvestigations.
Staff of BHP Koolan Island
BHP Port Hedland
Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd, Seoul
The Western Australian Police Force
The Commonwealth Quarantine andInspection Service
Australian Customs Service
Australian Maritime Safety Authority,Ship and Personnel Safety Branch
Australian Maritime Safety Authority,Maritime Rescue Co-ordinationCentre
Times: All times are given in ship’stime, unless otherwiseindicated. From arrival atKoolan Island to 17 or 18October the Daeyang Honeykept zone time UniversalCoordinated Time (UTC) +8hours. From 18 October to 22October the ship was keepingUTC +9 hours.
Characteristics
The Daeyang Honey, registered in theRepublic of Korea, was an ore carrierof 123,745 tonnes deadweight at asummer draught of 15.645m. It wasbuilt by Kawasaki Heavy industries,K o b e a n d l a u n c h e d a s t h eYachiyosan Maru in 1970 andclassed with Nippon Kaiji Kyokai. Theship was bought by Pan OceanShipping, of Seoul, South Korea in1983 and entered service under theS o u t h K o r e a n f l a g a n d i t sclassification was changed to theKorean Register.
Pan Ocean Shipping owns a mixedfleet of more than 76 ships varyingin age from four years to more than24 years: more than 60 of its fleetbeing bulk carriers or bulk orecarriers. The company also acts asmanager for another seven ships.
The Daeyang Honey was 270.00m inlength, with a beam of 42m andmoulded depth of 22.20m. The shipwas powered by a MAN K10Z86/16diesel engine developing 16,918kW.The vessel had three cargo holds of44.7m, 86.7m and 66.2m in lengthrespectively, and nine hatches, twoto No 1 hold, four to No 2 hold andthree to No 3 hold. As an ore carrierdesigned for cargoes with a highstowage factor, the actual cargoholds did not extend to the ship’ssides, but were down the centre linewith a double bottom beneath theholds, and ballast tanks and a fueltank down either side of the ship.
Loading the Daeyang Honey
Initial notification that the DaeyangHoney was to load at Koolan Islandwas received by the BHP-Utahshipping agency, Koolan Island, on 7September 1992. The vessel waschar tered by Kawasak i S tee lCorporation of Japan, to load about120,000 tonnes of low-grade iron oreand shipped on a free-on-board basisfor the company’s steel works at theport of Mizushima.
Koolan Island is in Yampi Sound, 70miles north of the Western Australiantown of Derby and is run by BHP-Utah. Iron ore has been shipped fromthe Island since 1965. The loadingberth, on the south side of the Islandand sheltered from wind andprevailing swells, is approached by afairway known as the Canal.
The berth is 170.7m long but hasadditional mooring dolphins to takeships of up to 160,000 tonnesdeadweight with maximum beam of44m. Sh ips are loaded by atravelling, re t rac tab le , lu f f ingconveyor, which can move a totaldistance of 118.9m, thus requiringlarger vessels to shift along theberth during loading in order to reachall hatches. The depth at the berth is16.5m below datum and there is atidal range of 10.7m. The minimumdepth in the approach channel is20.1m.
On 25 September, the Port Officer atKoolan Island, sent a facsimilemessage to the ship’s principalagents with details of the ship loaderand the distance of its travel alongthe berth, the tidal range, the depthalongside and in the approaches tothe berth (Attachment 1).
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On 29 September the DaeyangHoney advised Koolan Island of anestimated time of arrival (ETA) of1800 on 9 October. A number ofroutine telexes regarding details ofthe ship were also exchanged.
On 2 October the principal agentsreceived a telex from the DaeyangHoney’s master advising of theloading sequence by hatch:
Sequence Hatch Tonnage1 5 60002 8 70003 2 70004 3 80005 6 60006 7 80007 9 100008 4 60009 1 1290010 6 600011 3 700012 2 450013 9 254714 4 600015 8 750016 7 650017 4 7000
18* 9 200019* 2 2000
(*indicates final trimming)
The master detailed a final stowageplan of:
Hatch 1 12900 tonnesHatch 2 13500 tonnesHatch 3 15000 tonnesHatch 4 13000 tonnesHatch 5 12000 tonnesHatch 6 12000 tonnesHatch 7 14500 tonnesHatch 8 14500 tonnesHatch 9 14547 tonnes
This telex was passed by facsimile toBHP Koolan Island.
The master of the Daeyang Honeyrevised the ship’s ETA to the morningof 9 October. On 8 October, herequested pra t ique by rad io ,indicating in the message that theship had changed ballast on passagein accordance with the AustralianQuarantine and Inspection Serviceguidelines to prevent the spread ofharmful marine organisms fromships’ ballast water. The Quarantineand Inspec t ion Serv ice , Por tHedland, granted pratique at 1015on 8 October , based on theinformation supplied by the master.
The Daeyang Honey arrived in YampiSound at 0840 on 9 October 1992with a crew of 29. As the berth wasoccupied by a ship completingloading, the master took the ship toanchor about 2 miles west of NaresPoint.
At 1220 the pilot boarded and thevessel proceeded via the “Canal”towards the berth. Two tugs, theFullerton Cove and the Latrobe weremade fast to assist in the berthingoperation: the Fullerton Cove by atowing line to the’ Daeyang Honey’sport bow, and the Latrobe alongsidejust forward of the bridge, secured bytwo lines from the tug’s bow. Whenoff the berth, the Daeyang Honeyturned through 180 degrees to moorstarboard side to the berth. Whenthe vessel was turned, the towinghawser to the Fullerton Cove wasreleased, and the tug came to apos i t ion a t the break o f theforecastle to push the DaeyangHoney alongside. It, too, wassecured by two lines from its bow.
The berthing was without incidentand the vessel passed the first lineat 1400, by 1450 the vessel wasmade fast. The tidal height at 1400was 4.97m above datum, giving adepth of water alongside of 21.47m.
At 1535 the pilot undertook adraught survey. The ship’s arrivaldraught was observed as 10.20mforward, 10.99m aft, giving a meandraught of 10.595m. The observedmidships draughts were 10.595mport and 10.59m starboard, giving astarboard list and an observed meanof 10.51m, giving the ship a slighthog (the distortion of a ship’s hullwhen the bow and stern of the vesselare lower than their normal positionin relation to the middle portion ofthe vessel - opposite to “sag”).
There are no resident customs,quarant ine and inspect ion, orimmigration officers resident onKoolan Island. The West AustralianPolice Force undertake the routined u t i e s o n b e h a l f o f t h e s eCommonwealth agencies.
On arrival the Sergeant of Policeboarded the vessel and completedthe arrival formalities. He formed theopinion that the master was efficientand had a good command of English.All documents required from themaster were properly completed. Henoted that all statutory safety andpollution certificates were valid,having expiry dates as follows:
InternationalLoad Line
25 June 1995
International 25 June 1993Safety EquipmentInternational 25 June 1995Safety EquipmentInternational 25 June 1995Safety RadioInternational 25 June 1995Oil Pollution Prevention
As part of the quarantine inspection,the Police Sergeant inspected thegalley, food stores and garbage-holding arrangements on the aftermooring platform (the poop deck). Hestated that the deck was covered ina substant ia l amount of rust .However, he did not make anyobservation of the condition of theship forward of the accommodationblock.
The BHP Agency officer also boardedon arrival and found the masterhelpful and efficient. The alley wayswere clear and apparently clean, butthe officer could make no commenton the condition of the hull, orexterior decks.
Both the Police Sergeant and theAgency Officer were involved in therepatriation of the ship’s thirdengineer, who ‘was signed off theship on medical grounds.
Before loading began the mate gavethe pilot and the operator of the shiploader the vessel’s required loadingsequence. The sequence was thesame as that detailed by the masteron 2 October. The loading-sequencesheet showed the distribution ofballast and its discharge, thebending moments, sheer forces andestimated draught for each stage ofthe loading operation (Attachment 2).
Loading solid bulk cargoes, such asiron ore, is governed by theprovisions of Marine Orders Part 34(Cargo and Cargo Handling - SolidBulk Cargoes), which give effect tothe Code of Safe Practice for SolidBu lk Cargoes, 1991 ed i t ion ,published by the InternationalMaritime Organization. Under theCode, iron ore is a cargo which isneither likely to liquefy nor does itpossess any chemical hazards.Notwithstanding this, the shipper isrequired to provide the master withdetails of the stowage factor andangle of repose. At Koolan Island,such advice is not provided in writtenform.
Loading began at 1540 on 9 Octoberand continued, subject to shiftchanges and other routine delays,until noon on 14 October. Accordingto the Loading Detai l Sheetsmaintained by the ship- loaderoperators, the ship shifted on fouroccasions (although the loadingsequence submitted by the shipanticipated five shifts) when movingthe loader from hatch 8 to hatch 2,hatch 4 to hatch 1, hatch 2 to hatch9 hatch and from 9 to hatch 2.
The loading chute, to throw the cargoto the port side of the ship, was puton board into No 4 hold on theafternoon of 12 October, but it wasnot used until the final stages of theloading operation, to remove astarboard list. The rate of loadingduring the operation wasunremarkable with pours of between2000 and 2800 tonnes an hour.
The loading sequence originallystipulated by the master of theDaeyang Honey was followed, with
the exception of the final pour intoNo 6 hatch. The amount of cargoloaded into 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 hatchspaces respectively was within 50tonnes of the ship’s original loadingplan. However more than 1000tonnes less than originally plannedwas taken into hatch spaces 2 and 9and an excess of more than 800tonnes into No 6 hatch. Examinationof the loading records shows thatthese adjustments in distributionwere undertaken during the finalt r imming operat ion and i t i sreasonable to conclude that thechange of distribution was at thedirection of the ship’s staff.
According to loading records basedon the readings of the weightometerconnected to the ship loader, thefinal distribution of cargo was asfollows:
No 1 Hatch 12,949 tonnesNo 2 Hatch 12,461 tonnes
Total No 1 Hold 25,410tonnes
No 3 HatchNo 4 HatchNo 5 Hatch
15,040 tonnes13,056 tonnes12,047 tonnes
No 6 Hatch 12,844 tonnes
Total No 2 tiold 52,987 tonnes
No 7 Hatch 14,559 tonnesNo 8 HatchNo 9 Hatch
14,352 tonnes13,424 tonnes
Total No 3 Hold 42,505 tonnes
Total all holds 120,902 tonnes
By draught survey the total loadedwas 122,270 tonnes, a difference of1368 or an adjustment of 1.0114 onthe weightometer readings.
Load
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Final draught survey readings gave:
Mean draught forward 15.40m
Mean draught aft 15.80m
Mean draught 15.60m
Draught midships port 15.60m
Draught midships stbd 15.75m
When loading was completed, the
ship had a slight starboard list and
had a sag of 0.075m.
The ‘Certificate of Analysis” issued
by the BHP Minerals Yampi laboratory
showed that the ore loaded into the
Daeyang Honey had an actual
average moisture content of 1.68 per
cent and the size of the ore particles
varied between 100mm and less
than 150 microns.
The Daeyang Honey sailed from
Koolan Island at 1300 on 14 October
with a crew of 28. The height of tide
was 9.69m on an ebb tide, giving a
depth in the berth of 26.19m. The
unberthing of the ship was assisted
by the tugs Fullerton Cove and
Latrobe, the Fullerton Cove towing
forward and the Latrobe alongside
aft. The sailing proceeded normally
and no incidents were observed or
reported. The pilot ensured that the
ship kept to the north of the fairway,
clear of the 10 fathom (18m) contour
off Nares Point. With the ship’s
e n g i n e s o n half maximum
manoeuvring revolutions, he did
observe some mud stirred up from
the bottom in the area of 11 fathoms
north-west of Nares Point. The pilot
left the Daeyang Honey at about
1400, when 0.3 miles north-west of
Nares Point and transferred to an
inward-bound ship.
Based on hourly tidal predictions
supplied to Koolan Island by the
National Tidal Facility, Flinders
University, and calculations based on
the “Tidecalc” program of the UK
Hydrographic office, the Daeyang
Honey was afloat at all t imes.
According to the loading program
supplied to the terminal by the ship,the deepest draught was estimated
as a little under 16.3m. This stage
would have been reached at a time
between 0500 and 0700 on 14
October. The least depth predicted in
the berth between these times was
17.48m (16.5m datum + 0.98mtide) at 0640, leaving an under-keel
clearance of 1.18, based on tidal
predictions.
At the time the ship sailed, the tide
was 9.71m above datum, and the
ship passed over the shallowest part
of the “Canal” (28.7m of water) at
about 1400, giving an under keel
clearance of 13m.
14 to 19 October
The Master entered a sailing planwith the Australian Maritime RescueCoordination Centre, under theAustralian Ship Reporting System(AUSREP), nominating a position of12 degrees south, 122 degrees 32minutes east at 0500 UTC (1300WAST) 15 October for leaving thescheme. He also nominated anarrival time at the port of Mizushima,Japan of 1500UTC on 25 October at12 knots.
The Daeyang Honey sent a “finalreport” (exit from area) under theAUSREP scheme at 0450 on 15October. No further details wereincluded in the message.
The master sent messages to hisowners on 14 (departure report) 16,19 and 21 October, and a deviationreport. It is apparent from thepositions given in the messages thatt h e s h i p s a i l e d t h r o u g h t h eIndonesian Archipelago, west ofTimor, through Selat Ombai andbetween the islands of Baru andSeram through Selat Manipa.Between 16 October and 19 Octoberthe ship averaged a speed of a littlemore than 12 knots.
Typhoon Colleen - 18 to 26October
Typhoon Colleen, a tropical cyclone,developed to the east of thePhilippines on about 18 October
1992. Or ig ina l l y a tropicaldepression, it developed into atropical storm, and shipping receivedthe first warning of the system inapproximate position 12 degreesnorth, 131 degrees east, at 1940UTC on 18 October 1992 (0440 on19 October, UTC +9). At 1800 UTCon 19 October (0300 on 19 October)it was reported in position 14degrees north, 128 degrees 48minutes east.
According to experts within theSpecial Services Unit of the Bureauof Meteorology, using additionalinformation in a “hind cast”, thesystem originated at 0000 UTC on18 October in approximate position11 degrees 30 North, 132 degreesEast. The system moved north-westuntil 20 October.
On 19 October the master sent anoon position of 04 degrees 53minutes north 127 degrees 49minutes east. At about the sametime typhoon Colleen was centred inapproximate position 13 degreesnorth 130 degrees east, some 530miles to the north of the DaeyangHoney, travelling in a north-westerlydirection at about 8 knots.
The weather forecast issued by theJapan Meteorological Agency at0300 on 20 October predicted thatthe Colleen would continue to moveslowly in a west-north-westly directionwith winds of 45 knots at its centre.At that time the Daeyang Honey wasin a position 330 miles south andslightly east of the typhoon’s centre.
However, Colleen curved to the north
and east on 20 October, and it
Sketct of area of Typhoon Colleen
SARAWAK
CHART INT 52-NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN(Scale I : IO. 000. 000 at the Equator)
SULAWESI SEA
19
Q f
/
E2LR
8
‘ -
Chart of active tropical storms
North-east Indian Ocean and China Sea
October 1 ‘92
t
0R
. .:,j:j’ I;“‘.:::
.:’ ,::j:, ,?
..,.. ‘g.::: :...
became centred on an area of 40
miles radius and virtually stopped.
Plots of the reported position of the
centre suggests that the system in
fact completed a tight circle at a
speed of about 2 knots during 21,
22, 23 and into 24 October. On 22
and 23 October the system was
upgraded from a “tropical cyclone: to
a “severe tropical cyclone” with
increased average wind speeds of 65
and 70 knots.
On 21 October at 0900 local time, in
position 12 degrees 03 minutes
north 130 degrees 47 minutes east,
the master sent a “change of
course” report to his owners. At the
same time typhoon Colleen was
centred on a position 13 degrees 42
minutes north 130 degrees 26
minutes east. The system had
moved east and south of the
previous day’s position slowing to
three knots, while the wind speed
within the typhoon intensified and
sea conditions further deteriorated.
The Daeyang Honey was at this time
100 miles from the centre of the
typhoon, and would reportedly have
experienced winds of 50 knot
average wind speed, with heavy
swells and breaking waves.
Three hours later, at 1200 local time,
the master sent a routine noon
report in position 12 degrees 04
minutes north, 130 degrees 43
minutes east. In three hours, the
vessel had covered a distance of four
miles, making good a course of 285
degrees. The vessel was effectively
hove to. This was the last message
received from the Daeyang Honey.
It is not known whether or not the
Daeyang Honey continued on that
course, or whether the ship turned
southward. By the early afternoon of
22 October, the centre of typhoon
Colleen had tracked south and was
within 50 miles of the Daeyang
Honey’s last reported position. The
ship would have been experiencing
the maximum force of the winds at
75 to 85 knots with very high seas
and swell.
Tropical storms and typhoons are
common in the North-West Pacific
and China Sea with an average
frequency of 30.5 a year, with the
maximum average frequency in
August with 6.8 systems. In October
an average of 4.3 systems occur¹.
Between 15 to 20 of the systems
can be expected to generate winds of
force 12 (64 knots) or stronger, with
mean wave heights of 14m or more².
It is recommended that any vessel
should keep at least 100 miles from
the centre of such systems.
At 0656 UTC (1556 ship’s time) on
22 October, a signal from a 406 Mhz
EPIRB was detected through the
¹Meteorology for mariners (Third Edition). London. 1978²The Marinres Handbook (6th Edition). Hydrographer of the Navy.Taunton 1989
international search-and-rescue
satellite system (COSPAS/SARSAT),
by the United States Rescue
Coordination Centre, Guam. Over the
following six hours a further five
positions were detected through
satellite, confirming that the Daeyang
Honey’s EPIRB was transmitting from
an approximate position of 11
degrees 22 minutes North, 130
degrees 48 minutes East. The
detected position was about 80
miles from the centre of typhoon
Colleen, to the north of the ship’s
position (Attachment 3).
Air searches were hampered by the
extreme weather conditions until 25
October, when a liferaft was sighted.
On 26 October search conditions
were excellent and an airborne
search located debris, the EPIRB and
a liferaft. Searching surface craft,
the Bum Ju (also owned by Pan
Ocean Shipping) and the Liberian
cargo ship Azaleaeverett were
diverted to the area. The EPIRB was
recovered from position 12 degrees
43 minutes North, 132 degrees 18
minutes East and the liferaft from
position 12 degrees 24 minutes
North, 132 degrees East. The search
on 26 October and subsequent
searches d id no t loca te any
survivors.
It is not known what action the
master took to avoid Colleen. The
alternative, longer route to Japan,
west of Sulawesi and Luzon was also
affected by tropical storm activity,
with Typhoon Angela active west of
Manila, between 16 October and 23
October. In any case, the master
would not have known of the
formation of Colleen until sometime
on 19 October, by which time the
Daeyang Honey was south and east
of the Philippine Islands. Charting
the progress of the typhoon over 19
and 20 October, he could have
expected the system to clear his
intended route by 21 to 22 October.
As it was, the system doubled back
on i tsel f , curving towards the
equator.
It was, therefore, inevitable that,
unless the master slowed the vessel
or altered course some time between
1200 and 2400 on 20 October, the
Daeyang Honey would be within 100
miles of the centre
As it was, it seems
take act ion unt i l
October.
of the typhoon.
that he did not
0900 on 21
Since April 1990, the Daeyang Honeyhad loaded in north-west Australianports on seven previous occasions:Port Hedland in September 1990,March, July and September 1992;and Dampier in April 1990, February1991 and July 1991.
The ship was subject to a Port StateControl inspection in March 1992and again in September 1992 by theAustralian Maritime Safety AuthoritySurveyor , Port Hedland.
During the March inspection, 14deficiencies were brought to themaster’s notice, none were of majorsignificance and most were rectifiedat Port Hedland. The surveyor wassat isf ied that any outstandingdeficiencies did not affect the safetyof the ship.
In September, 12 deficiencies werenoted, including that
The engine room skylight could notbe closed remotely.
The funnel door could not beclosed.
The “goose necks” of the maindeck after vents were corrodedand wasted.
The mushroom ventilator on aftermain deck could not be closed.
The main deck water-tight doorswere found to be not watertight.
The ship was allowed to sail withoutthe repair to the remote engine roomskylight closing device, because itcould be closed locally, on theundertaking that it would be repairedat the next port. All the otherdeficiencies noted were rectifiedbefore the ship sailed.
The surveyor stressed that he didnot car ry ou t any s t ruc tura linspection, but his assessment wasthat the ship’s condi t ion wascompatible with its age. He said thecrew car r ied ou t the i r du t iesefficiently and seemed to know whatthey were doing. He also recalledthat the master had told him that theship had spent three monthsship yard in Korea undergoing athat involved 850 tonnes ofsteel work.
in arefitnew
Pan Ocean Shipping submitted that,based upon the report of 17February 1992, examinations by theKorean Register of Dayeang Honey’slongitudinal strength showed that theship conformed to and exceeded thestrength requirements of the Society.
Records for the loadings of March,July and September 1992 confirmthat the vessel changed its ballastwater at sea in accordance with theguidelines issued by the AustralianQuarantine and Inspection Service.On these occasions, the total ballaston arrival varied between 38,060tonnes and 42,600 tonnes andmean draughts between 7.07m and7.61m. This compares with 72,162tonnes of ballast on arrival at KoolanIslands and a correspondingly deeperd r a u g h t o f 10 .595m. On a l loccasions the vessel was hoggedbetween 0.027m and 0.10m.
Records showing the loadingsequence, as nominated by themaster, for the visits to Port Hedlandin July and September, and thenominated loading sequence atKoolan Island show similar, althoughnot identical, planning (Attachment4). The Port Hedland loadings werepredicated on a sequence of 20pours into the nine hatches,effectively two pours a hold with afinal two pours, 4000 tonnes ofcargo, for trimming the ship. TheKoolan Island loading consisted of aplanned sequence of 19 pours, No1hold being loaded in one pour of12,900 tonnes.
The ac tua l load ing sequence
followed, with the exception of the
August load ing , fo l lowed the
nominated sequence with some,
apparently minor, variations. The
loading at Port Hedland on 2 to
4 August, involved loading from two
“shiploaders” simultaneously, for a
period of 2 hours 10 minutes. The
complete loading involved 22
significant pours of cargo, as a result
of changes from lump ore to iron ore
fines and back again.
Without full details of the ship and a
knowledge of the actual sequence of
ballast discharge related to the
amount and disposition taken on
board at any time, no accurate
assessment can be made of the
stresses placed on the ship during
these l o a d i n g s . A cursory
examination would suggest that any
change in the planned loading was
not especially significant.
From the loading plan submitted bythe mate at Koolan Island there isevery indication that the loading wasplanned carefully and the bendingmoment and sheer stress for eachphase of the operation calculated,based on the information provided tothe ship by the classification society.I t shou ld be no ted tha t th isinformation is based on the originalinformation supplied to the vessel asnew.
The statements made by the shorestaff at Koolan Island and the AMSAsurveyor at Port Hedland indicatethat those responsible for loadingt h e s h i p w e r e e f f i c i e n t a n dcompetent.
The master had been attached to theship for some t ime. Howeverexamination of the crew lists fromJuly, September and October showsthat the crew were changed regularly,and that five officers and a numberof ratings had joined the shipimmediately before the voyage toKoolan Island.
From evidence available, it isapparent that nothing happened atKoolan Island that contributed to the
loss of the ship. The speed ofloading of 2800 tonnes maximum isrelatively slow, and there seems littleremarkable in the sequence ofloading or the distribution duringloading.
The weather conditions experiencedby the Daeyang Honey off thePhilippines were severe. However,with the known frequency of suchstorms (in October averaging one aweek) the potential conditions couldnot be described as unusual orunexpected. Based on the forecastby the Japan Meterological Agency,theoretical systems and statisticalrecords, it could have been expectedthat Colleen would have continued inits original direction or curved to thenorth-east: it was very unusual forsuch a system to curve and tracktowards the equator. It should benoted that an officer of the Bureau ofMeteorology’s Regional SpecialisedMeteorological Centre in Darwin,described the typhoon Colleensystem as a “forecasting nightmare”because of the unusual path itfollowed in moving during 20 to 22October towards the equator,“acharacteristic rarely displayed bysuch systems”.
1. Nothing occurred at Koolan Islandthat contributed to the loss of thevessel.
2. The cargo loaded contained nocharacteristic that would haveinvolved an increased risk over thenormal ore shipped from KoolanIsland.
3. The failure to supply the masterwith a written loading declaration had
no bearing on the loss of the ship.The information on Koolan Island ironore, contained in such a declaration,would not have altered or modifiedthe loading of the cargo.
4. The Daeyang Honey encountered asevere tropical storm (typhoon)during 21 and 22 October. It wouldseem that the ship foundered fromwhatever cause in the ear lyafternoon of 22 October 1992. Thestorm must be considered to havesignificantly contributed to the loss.
Pan Ocean Shipping made a numberof submissions relating to the draftreport, sent to them under theprovisions of sub-regulation 16(3) ofthe Navigation (Marine Casualty)Regulations. Where appropriatethese submissions have beenadopted into the text of the finalreport.
In referring to the comment on theweather at page 21 (last paragraph)Pan Ocean Shipping submitted thatthe second sentence of the lastparagraph could be misconstrued.Thesentence reads,
“ H o w e v e r w i t h t h e k n o w nfrequency of such storms (in
October averaging one a week) thepotential conditions could not bed e s c r i b e d a s u n u s u a l o runexpected. ”
Pan Ocean are of the view that thefrequency of such storms is notrelevant, given that Colleen took anunusual and unexpected course.They are concerned les t thesentence reflect adversely on theMaster’s navigation and judgment.
The Inspector considers that theweather conditions that may beanticipated for any given voyage isrevelant to the planning and actionsof any master and that the sentenceis revelant. The Inspector acceptsunreservedly that the path oftyphoon Colleen was extremelyunusual and could n o t b eanticipated.
Copy of basic Port Informationsent to Master - Daeyang Honey
22 September 199
-REMARKS Koolan Island
VESSELS CAN EXCEED BERTH DEPTH BYCOMPLETING LOADING ON A RISING TIDE.
MAXIMUM DRAFT IS GOVERNED BY TIDAL RANGE.
SIDEVIEW OF LOADING FACILIT IES ,I
ALONGSIDE P L A N
Loading sequence/plan assubmitted by Daeyang Honey
il
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Satellite photograph of typhooncolleen 0231 UTC (1311 UTC +9)on 22 October 1992
Comparision of loading sequence,Port Hedland and Koolan
PORT HEDLAND11-13 MARCH 1992
Jl JNo 1 HOLD No 2 HOLD No 3 HOLD
PORT HEDLAND2-4 AUGUST 1992
No 1 HOLD No 2 HOLD No 3 HOLD
PORT HEDLAND11-12 SEPTEMBER 1992
I t
No 3 HOLD
KOOLAN ISLAND9-14 OCTOBER 1992
No 1 HOLD No 2 HOLD No 3 HOLD
DAEYANG HONEY PAST LOADINGS
Ott
9-14
Arrival Dept
Draught
F(Mn)
10.2
15.4
A(Mn)
10.99
15.8
Mn F&A
10.595
15.6
Mid Mn
10.51
15.675
Hog/Sag
HO.08
so.015
BALLAST/CARGO
72162
122,270
42426
108,122
38056
121,894
42618
120,046
Sept
11-12
Arrival Dept
7.02
14.11
8.20
15.08
7.61
14.595
7.51
14.70
HO.10
so.105
August
2-4
Arrival Dept
6.43
15.42
7.71
15.67
7.07
15.545
7.03
15.685
HO.04
so.14
ACTUAL HATCH (#)
QUANTITIES LOADED
Koolan Is
<-----PORT HEDLAND----->
Ott
Sept
August
March
9-14
11-12
2-4
11-13
Hatch (#)
quantities 1
12949
12417
13023
12828
212616
13602
13359
13650
315737
15183
14678
14233
413055
12553
13067
13833
512047
12923
11438
11233
612843
11591
11579
11974
714559
14230
14382
14181
814522
14020
14318
144401
913422
13959
14125
13711
Total
121750
120478
119969
120046
March
11-13
Arrival Dep
7.1
15.57
8.035
15.69
7.5675 15.63
7.53
15.68
HO.0275 SO.05
Particulars of ship
Name
Flag
Lloyd’s Number
Call Sign
Owners
Classification
Type
Builder
Year Built
Length
Breadth
Depth
Summer Draught
Gross Tonnage
Net Tonnage
Summer Deadweight
Engine
Engine Power
Propeller
Crew
Daeyang Honey (ex Yachiyosan Maru)
South Korea
7013537
D9JV
Pan Ocean Shipping
Korean Registry (ex Nippon Kaiji Kyokai)
Motor Ore Carrier
Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd. - Kobe
1970
270.00m
42.00m
32.20m
15.042m
64,955
22,050
123,745 tonnes
MAN 10 cylinder
16,918kW
One fixed
28
