5 Mediations of Europe�s �Others�: representations ofAlbanian immigrants in the Greek media

Liza TsalikiFaculty of Communication and Media StudiesNational and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Abstract The economic crisis that swept over Greece and Ireland and threatens theremaining PIGS countries (Portugal, Spain and Italy) overshadowed another area ofcontention and anxiety in Europe - and especially in its margins - the continuous influxof economic immigrants. This problematises and questions preconceptions of what itmeans to be �European� in several areas of the EU. Today, some 58 percent of non-nationals in Greece come from neighbouring Albania, equating the notion of theimmigrant worker to that of the �Albanian�. Within contemporary Greek culture,Albanian origin signifies trouble and raises suspicion, a stereotypical reaction usuallyreified by the representation of the Albanian community in the Greek media. Thischapter explores the cultural making of Europe by examining how Albanians arediscussed and represented in the Greek media.

Keywords: media framing, news reporting, television news, Albanian immigrants

7. Introduction

Although the current economic crisis has brought closer countries like Greeceand Ireland, with Spain and Portugal following suit, it appears that the vision ofa united Europe is becoming dimmer. Despite the incorporation of yet anotherEU member state to the Eurozone �Estonia- on the eve of 2011, Europeanpeoples seem to become gradually unexcited about their common Europeandestiny, as the cracks in the Eurozone, arguably, question and undermine thevery essence of the EU. The overtly ambitious plan of the EuropeanConstitution was hastily abandoned when two major players, France and the

Netherlands, voted against it in 2005, showing the first cracks in project�Europe�, while the intention of the Lisbon Convention in 2000 to guaranteesocial cohesion and obliterate poverty within the Union echoes today like anempty promise. For, while it may be true that the European ideal has alwaysbeen progressing at a slow pace, making room for the contradictory interests ofthe various member states, in the early days, the enthusiasm that guided the firstmember states, when the memories of World War II were still fresh, ensuredthe cohesion of the new entity and justified the compromises made. Currently,though, we are experiencing an age when the lacklustre of the Union is coupledwith an introvert mood due to the economic crisis, and when European leadershave to assign part of their sovereign rights to the Union if the latter is tosurvive; the severity of the unprecedented economic crisis means that nationalgovernments now depend heavily on the developments in the internationalmarkets and, as a result, their ability to intervene politically and resolve issuesis seriously curtailed.

Furthermore, there is growing anxiety across Europe regarding the increaseof illegal migrants and refugees, many of whom seek residence in WesternEurope, though transit through Greece in order to get to their final destination.Even if the migrants eventually move on to other European destinations, underthe Dublin II protocol, Greece is responsible for their asylum applications asthe EU country of first entry - a situation neither the Greeks nor the immigrantslike. According to a wikileak disclosure of the official communication of theUS Ambassador in Athens, while Greece is a migration doorway into Europeshouldering a disproportionate burden of illegal immigrants and asylumseekers, the broader political challenges posed by these waves of migrationapply to all European nations :� integration programmes are of crucialimportance; in the aftermath of the economic crisis, immigration and labourpolicies are under increased scrutiny, and the EU's commitment to human rightsfor refugees and asylum seekers is being tested by the political reality of votersfed up with illegal migration� [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/238229]. Migration is a key cross-cuttingpolitical, national security, human rights, and socioeconomic phenomenon, andhad a strong impact on politics in the EU27 in 2009-10 as the surge in support

at the June 2009 EP elections for rightwing, anti-immigration parties showed[Lodge 2010].

All this indicates that what is meant by �Europe� is yet to be defined andconsensually accepted, leaving many questions unanswered and leading to abuild-up of tensions, especially in the margins of Europe. A number of EUmedia and cultural policies (e.g. RAPHAEL, MEDIA, KALEIDOSCOPE,CULTURE 2000) expected a degree of social cohesion to be mediated throughculture to foster �unity� among EU citizens, thus �polishing� the edges andtensions of heterogeneity within the EU [Sarikakis 2007:80]. However, recentmigratory flows have led to processes of cultural fragmentation, with nationaland international media becoming �invasive others� from within in their questto cultivate a common identity. Obstacles to social cohesion posed by thestructural imbalance across societies and media landscapes, and eurocentristconceptions of �culture� also promote exclusion and social intolerance,especially towards those falling outside the boundaries of official Europeanculture.

This chapter explores some of these tensions, and the ramifications thesehave for the social cohesion of Europe, by looking into the portrayal of thelargest non-EU minority group in Greece - the Albanian immigrant community- in the Greek media. It addresses the following research questions: How do theGreek print and broadcast media present the Albanian immigrant community inGreece? What kinds of notions of Albanian identity do they construct? Thechapter begins by contextualizing the Albanian community in Greece. Itsstarting point is a widespread stereotype regarding Albanians among ethnicGreeks as petty thieves and potential criminals. It then addresses therepresentation of Albanian immigrants in the Greek press and broadcast news.

2. Putting the Albanian immigrant community into context

For many people in Greece, the uncontrolled waves of illegal immigration inthe past few years act as a major economic and social destabilize to which,arguably, can be attributed the electoral losses of the New Democracy regime inOctober 2009, following growing public dissatisfaction with its migration

policy and enforcement, the electoral surge of LAOS (Laikos OrthodoxosSinagermos - Popular Orthodox Alarm) , a far-right party advocating anationalist, anti-immigration agenda [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/238229]. It seems that Greece�s recentlyacquired cultural diversity only superficially facilitates social cohesion and maycurrently undermine it, inasmuch as Europe has difficulties in turning its owndiversity into a process of culturally based social cohesion. Europe is basedlargely on either national or regional characteristics and internal divisions orfragmentations of national and religious cultures, coupled with increasedmigration, create a new, complex set of drivers not adequately or consciouslyenough addressed by existing media policy [Sarikakis 2007: 85].

From the mid-1960s until the end of the twentieth century, there was amarked shift in various European societies from an assimilation policy, whereimmigrants were not to stand out from the perceived uniform national culture,to �integration plus� policies whereby national norms could, up to a point, hostimmigrant cultures and become multicultural. Claims of immigrant/ethnicminorities to be �different� gained legitimacy, and in public rhetoric and in lawit was generally accepted that negative discrimination on racial and ethnicgrounds should not be sustained [Grillo 2007: 979]. The EU itself stressed unityin diversity. By the early twenty-first century, there was a �backlash� or a'cultural-diversity sceptical turn' [Vertovec and Wessendorf 2005]. AroundEurope, the articulation of an �anxiety� regarding �difference� emerged,prevalent in the increasing support for populist, anti-immigration movements,such as LAOS in Greece, the British Nationalist Party, the Front Nationale inFrance, or Forza Italia in Italy and in wider public debates about the rights andwrongs of different ways of living and the governance of diversity. Immigrationhas led to what Sartori called an 'excess of alterity' [2002] with countriesbecoming 'too diverse' [Goodhart 2004], and the presence of communities withvalues conflicting with dominant 'Western' secular norms threatening socialcohesion [Grillo 2007: 979].

Greece was taken by surprise by the reality 16of greater and more diverseimmigration -and thus greater diversity of ethnic groups within it, since fordecades it had been a traditional labour-exporting country, with diaspora beingone of the most important aspects of its history. Greece has a particularunderstanding of the term �multicultural� which is seen as an aspirational valueand finds political expression mainly in the promotion of ethnic cultural events.The reversal of the migratory balance occurred in the 1970s, with the firstwaves of �repatriates� (Greek economic migrants and political refugees)returning to Greece. Migrant workers were first imported in the 1970s, mainlyfrom Poland, Pakistan, the Philippines, Egypt and Morocco [King 2000;Kassimati 2003].

The beginning of immigration to Greece coincided with the border openingin Eastern Europe, following the collapse of the former USSR and EasternEuropean socialist regimes. Political, economic and social developments aswell as demography and geography contributed to a major and �unexpected�change [Rovolis and Tragaki 2006]. Gradually, as Greece became a net receiverof migrants, migration became an issue, causing ripple effects in the country�ssocial and economic life, both at urban and rural levels [Kasimis andPapadopoulos 2005]. The inflow of Albanians relates to ease of entry, politicaland socio-economic developments in Albania after 1990, geographicalproximity, and Greek demand for a cheap and flexible labour force (e.g. inconstruction and agriculture) which was reinforced by the persistence of anextensive informal economy [Labrianidis et al; Iosifides et.al. 2007].

During the 1990s, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, set up the frameworkfor the construction of a �Southern European model� of migration [King 2000]as destination country for hundreds of thousands of immigrants, who now havesettled and work in the country. The Greek labour market quickly acceptedforeign labour, Greek society, however, was unready for so much diversitywithin such a brief period of time, and did not [Kasimis and Papadopoulos2005], something often reiterated in the popular media; least we forget that after

16 For a background into academic and policy discussions on the divisive and separatist characterof multiculturalism and the risk it carries for �sleepwalking into segregation� for any society thatseeks unbridled versions of it, see Grillo 2007.

the Symrni (Izmir) catastrophe of 1922 and influx of immigrants from AsiaMinor, similar xenophobia was apparent. Greek migration policy [most recentlegislature, Law 3386/2005] has been more about controlling and containingimmigration than promoting the social inclusion of immigrants.

The present PASOK-led government placed migration and asylum policyreform high on its current agenda, announcing new measures to combatorganised human smugglers, ease naturalisation requirements for immigrantsborn in Greece, give status to illegal economic migrants, and transfer Greece'sasylum process to a new independent authority- something that reflects theattention paid to immigration and its social, economic, and securityimplications for the country. Following acute criticism from internationalorganisations and regional and domestic NGOs (e.g. Amnesty International,Doctors Without Borders (MSF), the UN Human Rights Council, theInternational Organisation for Migration and various European monitoringbodies), of Greece�s treatment of refugees and its asylum processes, thegovernment aimed to bring in domestic reforms and simultaneously�Europeanise� migration enforcement by putting pressure on the EU to providemore support on border security and revisit the Dublin II agreement (wherebyGreece undertakes responsibility for all migrants entering Europe through itsborders). In certain cases, countries even suspended returning migrants andasylum seekers to Greece under the Dublin II protocol- (e.g. during the last twoyears, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands intermittently halted returns toGreece, citing human rights concerns). In September 2009, the UNHCRreiterated its advice that EU member states not return asylum seekers to Greece.The consolidation of law enforcement agencies (the National Police, FireService, Port Police, and Coast Guard elements) into the new, DHS-like(Department of Homeland Security) Ministry for Citizen's Protection shouldhelp to improve coordination among security services in combating illegalmigration. NGOs largely welcomed the government's proposals to create a new,independent asylum authority separate from the police, and promises to raiseGreece's asylum approval rate to the �European average�, though, the situationon the ground has remained the same, with detention centres filled beyondcapacity [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/238229].

The 2001 census shows that a substantial percentage of immigrants living inGreece together with their families. 17% of the immigrant communitiescomprise children under 14 years old, and a further 8%, older teenagers.Children of immigrants are now part of the Greek student population, withmore in primary and secondary rather than in higher education [Georgopoulou2007]. Second generation immigrants are often treated with derision and arediscriminated against, both socially and at school, due to their nationality andimmigrant status, and are socially excluded.

The sudden influx of immigrants in the 1990s provided the context forserious self-reflection within the host country, a recurrent and contentious issueon every national anniversary (28 October, 25 March) ever since17. The bulk ofthe immigrant population (about 75%) originates from the ex-communistcountries, mainly from the neighbouring Balkan states (65%), while 58% of allnon-nationals) come from one country, Albania. The predominance of onesingle country of origin, equates the notion of the immigrant worker in Greeceto that of the �Albanian� [Rovolis and Tragaki 2006]. The Albanian migrationflows of the 1990s were a multidimensional phenomenon shaped by thepolitical, socio-cultural and economic changes and conditions both in Albaniaand in the various destination countries, above all Greece and Italy. In fact,within current global migratory flows, recent Albanian migration is seen as anexceptional case because of reasons such as the fundamental role migrationplayed in guaranteeing the economic survival of the Albanian society; itsoverall magnitude in relation to the size of the Albanian population; the way itemerged, so suddenly, after years of internal mobility restrictions andisolationist politics; the interconnections of these migratory flows with internalmigration, trafficking and organised crime; the centrality it acquired withinmigration-related debates and policy-making in Greece (and Italy); and thedegree of stigmatisation of Albanian migrants by the host-country (Greek andItalian) media [Mai and Schwandner-Sievers 2003]. Albanian migrants

17 On both occasions, a student parade takes place, causing major public disputes regardingwhether or not immigrants have the right to be the flag carriers- an honorary task, carried out bythe best student at each school. Many people are vehemently against non-Greek (in most cases, ofAlbanian origin) students carrying the national emblem on the occasion of a national anniversary,regardless of the fact that they may be the best performers in their classroom.

experience differential inclusion, a state in which immigrants are incorporatedinto some sections of society, above all the labour market, but denied access toothers, notably welfare care, citizenship and political participation. In thisrespect, Italy and Greece exert a doubly articulated influence on the Albaniansocio-economic context and on the people who inhabit it. On the one hand, theinfluence of Italian and Greek capital and institutions enhance the processes ofdemocratisation and economic development within Albania in line with thewider project of European integration. On the other, the economic andgeopolitical �power� of the two host countries leads to the construction of aperipheral space inhabited by people forced to accept exploitative workingconditions in deregulated and service-oriented job markets. As a result,Albanian migrants are faced with multiple levels of social exclusion,exploitation and marginalisation, and are rhetorically underpinned by harshcampaigns of stigmatisation [Mai and Schwandner-Siervers 943].

The media in particular, both in Greece and Italy, have played a significantrole in the stigmatisation of Albanians by regularly associating them withcrimes of a particularly ferocious or morally reprehensible nature. The Albanianmigrant in Greece and Italy has become what Hall termed the �constitutiveother� [Hall 1996: 4-5] at times of intense political confrontation and socio-cultural and economic change in both host countries. Stereotypicalidentifications with violence and crime led many Albanian immigrants to resortto subversive coping strategies, such as adult baptism and name changing [Maiand Schwandner-Sievers 2003: 943-44; Labrianidis et.al. 2004: 1193], in orderto avoid individual exclusion and to generate trust within the local hostcommunities.

In Greece, Albanian immigrants are predominantly employed as non-specialised labourers in the construction, service and primary sectors,irrespective of their personal skills and type of work in Albania (where theyoften were skilled workers in the industrial sector, craftsmen, scientific ortechnical personnel). This, along with the limited opportunities for formal re-education and training for immigrants in Greece, inevitably leads to gradual de-skilling and a decrease in opportunities for upward social mobility, reinforcing�ethnic specialisation� (e.g. construction for Albanians, personal services forFilipinos etc.). As most Albanian immigrants are channeled to specific jobs

through family and ethnic networks, an �ethnic enclave� economy graduallytakes shape. This ethnic mobility entrapment limits the opportunities ofAlbanian immigrants for wider labour market integration and employmentprogression according to their education, training or other skills [Iosifides et al.2007: 1350].

Furthermore, social relations with Greeks, what Iosifides et al. [2007: 1354]call �bridging social capital�, is very weak and problematises the smooth socialacceptance of Albanians into Greek society. In that respect, it is interesting tosee how Greeks view immigrants. According to the 2003 European SocialSurvey, young Greeks reflect a xenophobic attitude towards immigrants who,regardless of race, religion and economic status, are expected to be totallyassimilated into the host culture. The �other� must first and foremost �accept theGreek way of life�, secondly �speak Greek�, and then �have the relevantqualifications needed�. Immigrants are viewed negatively and seen to beresponsible for �an increase in deviance�; �they take away jobs from Greeks�;�they make Greece a worse place to live�. Overall, young Greeks overestimatethe number of immigrants and would prefer fewer to be accepted. Their viewsgenerally resonate with the views of the rest of the population [Dragona 2007].

3. The symbolic representation of Albanian immigrantsin the Greek media

3.1 THE PORTRAYAL OF THE ALBANIAN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITYIN THE GREK PRESS

Among a variety of public portrayals, news representations play a significantrole in the way people, culture, politics and social life are represented in thepublic eye: news representations contribute as to how people see themselves,their own identity and the identity of the �others�, as well as the relationshipbetween �us� and �them�. News coverage is a means for all social groups tomake their voices heard and communicate their agendas. Which views arecovered, and in which ways, depends on the economic and political structure,the institutional role of the press, and the characteristics of the wider media

environment [Pietikäinen 2003: 583]. News representations of ethnic minoritieshave usually been described as biased and partial, favouring the dominantgroup over the communities of the �others�, the latter frequently beingportrayed within a context of problems, crime and disturbance [Cottle 2000;Halloran 1998; Teo 2000]. Van Dijk [1991] argued that ethnic minorities weremainly represented in the print media in association with crime, violence, socialwelfare and problematic immigration, claiming that it is through newspapersthat elites may affect what �ordinary� people think, therefore giving racist viewspopular currency. He went on to suggest that denial of racism was an importantpart of this process in which positive self-presentation attempts to conceal anddeflect actual racist statements.

The problematic representation of foreign immigrants in the media cannotbe explained by suggesting that journalists around the world are racists, ratherthis reflects journalistic practices and the routine of journalists� daily work,which is similar everywhere [Allan 1999]. In practice journalism relies heavilyon ready-made material: stories compatible with journalistic routines or storiesalready covered in another news outlet, in press releases or in agency reports(i.e. the police) have better chances of ending up in the news. The chance toshape the news in this way favours groups already in an advantageous positionand, conversely, is less favourable to those who do not have such services -ethnic minorities are seldom in such a position of power [Pietikäinen2003:589].

My content analysis of the Greek press examined news representations ofthe Albanian immigrant community. It surveyed three national newspapers,each with a different political orientation: Ta Nea, Kathimerini, and Avgi. TaNea is an influential national paper, part of the Labrakis Foundation, plays asignificant role in shaping public opinion [Bantimaroudis and Kampanellou2007], in the political centre and the PASOK Opposition18; Kathimerini is

18 The selection is based on one title from each political orientation, the Left, the Right and thepolitical Centre, which explains why some of the major national presses, such as Elefterotypia,were not included in the analysis. The sample comprised 540 articles, 403 of which appeared onweekdays and 137 on weekends, over one year (March 2007-2008). All articles including thewords �Albanian� or �Albanians� were collected. Of the three newspapers, Kathimerini carried thelengthiest coverage of the issue with 295 articles (230 on weekdays and 65 on weekends);followed by Ta Nea with 129 articles on weekdays and 39 on weekends; and Avgi with a total of

another influential and more elitist national daily, representing the centre-rightand with a critical eye on the conservative government of New Democracy.Avgi is a small national daily on the political left. Following Winter [2007],mainstream print media are treated as institutionalised (re)producers ofdominant representations within public discourse. A detailed investigation orcomparison of the editorial stances of the three newspapers is outside the scopeof this chapter. It focuses on the re-construction of the Albanian immigrantcommunity by investigating how Greek newspapers cover Albanian economicimmigrants.

3.2 THE PORTRAYAL OF THE ALBANIAN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITYON GREEK TELEVISION

Following the analysis of press representations of Albanians, television newsdiscourse was explored. Some accounts suggest that contemporary TV reportspaint a negative picture of Albanians. �The Albanian� is characterised as:�casual worker�, �marginalised, unemployed, homeless�, often �illiterate with noskills�, of low potential and ability, �doomed to hard and badly-paid jobs�. Thestereotype of deprivation concludes with a blanket condemnation of Albaniansas �criminals� or �hardened Mafiosi� [Labrianidis et al op.cit.: 1191]. Iexamined the evening news on four television channels : NET (publicbroadcaster), and MEGA, ANTENNA, STAR (commercial operators). Each ofthe commercial operators has a different profile: MEGA usually criticises the

77 articles (44 on weekdays and 33 on weekends). Newspaper articles were coded on the basis of27 variables. These variables included length of article, type of article, position in the newspaper,title, issue under consideration, the framing of the news piece, the identity of the Albanians in thearticle, the occurrence of negative or positive evaluations of them, and the source of the newsstory. Weekend editions have a different structure and cover issues at more length in relation toweekday ones; moreover, weekend editions manage higher circulation figures compared to thedaily editions of the same newspaper. The reliability test for the print analysis was doneaccording to North, Holsti, Zanninovich Zinnes (1963): R= 2(C1,2)/C1+C2, where C1, 2 isthe number of categories all researchers were agreed upon, and C1+C2 is the total number ofcases coded by researchers. The equation was applied in 20% of the sample, after randomselection. With 0.7 as the minimum and 1 as maximum, here are the results:

VARIABLERTITLE0.8SUBJECT0.8NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES0.9FRAMING0.7NEWS SOURCE0.8

conservative party of New Democracy (at the time, in office), ANTENNA TV(owned by Pro-ND Kiriakov) swings from centre-left to right (andANTENNA�s flagship broadcast news was unequivocally pro-PASOK).ANTENNA and MEGA are the two major commercial sector players. STARhas a news profile based on lifestyle and celebrity gossip19. Forty two televisionnews stories were found, which comprise a small sample. This reinforces theargument that Albanian immigrants receive scant media attention and hence arenot well provided with a public forum from which to make their agenda known.

4. Main findings and discussion

4.1 TYPE OF NEWS STORIES (NEWSPAPER ARTICLES)

Week days press coverage showed that just over half the stories on Albanians(57%) were main articles (reports of events): commentaries accounted for amodest 18%, and short bulletins for 14%. Detailed reports and interviews wererare (3,7% and 2% respectively). The picture varies slightly over weekends,with 56% of the stories being main articles; a quarter (25%) beingcommentaries, and only 3% short bulletins. There were slightly more detailedreports and interviews (5% and 6% respectively). The variation may beexplained by the fact that weekend editions often devote more space to detailedaccounts and investigations of intricate social, political and economic issues.

19 Sixty prime time news programmes were analysed in the same period (five eachmonth), covering week days and weekends. Selected dates matched closely the dates of the pressanalysis. Twenty-six variables were used, the majority of which match those previously used.This translates into 3,120 news stories (13 stories on average per channel X 60 news programmes= 780 news stories X 4 channels = 3,120). The reliability test for TV coding was done followingNorth, Holsti, Zanninovich Zinnes (1963): R= 2(C1, 2)/C1+C2, where C1, 2 is the number ofcategories all researchers were agreed upon, and C1+C2 is the total number of cases coded byresearchers. The equation was applied in 20% of the sample, after random selection. With 0.7 asthe minimum and 1 as maximum, here are the results: VARIABLES: RELIABILITY SUBJECT 1; INSTITUTION

0.75; STORY NATIONALITY 1; SUBJECT NATIONALITY 0.85; FRAMING 0.75; ALBANIAN�S IDENTITY1 ALBANIAN�S AGE 0.9

ALBANIAN�S PROFESSION 1; ALBANIAN�S RESIDENCE 1; ALBANIAN�S EDUCATION 1; ALBANIAN�S CLASS 1; ALBANIAN�S

ROLE 1; NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES 0.75; POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES 0.9; TALKING HEADS 1; SOURCE 1; NEWSOURCE 1; SOURCE

NATIONALITY 1

Kathimerini is consistently more interested in Albanian-related issues,followed by Ta Nea and to a much lesser extent by Avgi (Figures 1 & 2).

32%

57%

11%

TA NEAKATHIMERINIAVGI

Figure 2. Articles per newspaper (weekends)

When it comes to television, the public broadcaster is marginally moreinterested in reporting Albanian immigrants-related news than are privateoperators MEGA and ANTENNA (36%: 31% and 26%). STAR channel,renowned for its policy to steer away from �serious� news, only rarely coversAlbanians (7%)20 (Figure 3).

20 True to form, the few times this happened on STAR channel, it concerned a middle-aged ex-reality-game-player, Roula Vroxopoulou, who became famous when she married an Albaniansome 25 years her junior. When her young groom left her soon after the wedding, Roula ran afterhim in Albania only to become an instant celebrity in both countries.

36%

26%

31%

7%

NETMEGAANT1STAR

Figure 3. Television coverage

4.2 TITLE OF THE NEWS STORY

Almost 75% of weekday press stories used a neutral heading:�borderguard killed immigrant� ( ) [Avgi09.11.07]; �Kosovo�s independence� (

) [Kathimerini 05.04.07] a quarter, a negative one:�thenationalistic international in action: myth and reality of �Great Albania�( :

) [Avgi 02.12.07]; �the mystery Albanian and thestreets of cocaine� (o )[Kathimerini 12/02/08]and only seldom (5%) did the title predispose thereader positively towards Albanian immigrants - a pattern replicated inweekend headings: �a better future for Kosovo and the neighbours�( ), [Kathimerini17.02.08]; �the industrious hands of the immigrants� (

) [Kathimerini 05/09/07].

TA NEA KATHIMERINI AVGI0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35% 31%29%

10%

1%

23%

1%

5%

Figure 4. Title evaluation per newspaper (weekdays)

This is interesting since the title can frame the article, affecting the ways inwhich readers interpret it. Furthermore, headings are read even if the rest of thenews items are not, and are best recalled [van Dijk 1988; Wodak 1996;Pietikäinen 2003; Gardikiotis et. al. 2004]. Less than ten percent of newsheadings related to Albanian immigrants, confirming the lack of media interestin Albanian-related news. When looking across all three newspapers, in mostcases on weekdays and at weekends, headings portray Albanians in a neutralway (ranging from 31% in Ta Nea and 10% in Avgi) (Figure 4). This showsthat, overall, news discourse is not so negatively disposed towards Albanianimmigrants-related issues, and a moderate tone and style of analysis is adoptedmore often than not.

4.3 EMERGING ISSUES

When looking into the issues under consideration in newspaper articles, themajority during the week (approximately half of them) are politically-oriented.

This corresponds to a heightened political (and media) attention todevelopments in neighbouring FYROM and Kosovo and the Albanian residentsthere, and constitutes foreign rather than domestic news. 18% refer to crimescommitted by Albanians, and 14% have a cultural theme. Tied into this is asharp drop in the percentage of articles on deviant behaviour by Albanians(7%). Again, it may be assumed that crime reports are part of the everydaysubject matter of the daily news compared to weekend editions.

The overall percentage of articles discussing Albanians within a discourse ofcriminality and deviance (25%) serve to construct subject positions21 for themonly to a certain extent. In this respect, I argue that such reports caricatured theAlbanian immigrant community as predisposed to deviant behaviour in alimited way only. It would be interesting, however, to examine how Albaniandeviance from the established order compares to deviance by other immigrantcommunities and Greeks in the print media. Finally, 15% of weekend newsstories have a cultural slant. This means that approximately 30% of the newspieces on Albanians are culturally-oriented which indicates that the print mediado not portray them always and exclusively as deviants.

Similarly, Greek television coverage of Albanian immigrants rose duringperiods of political development in neighbouring FYROM and Kosovo[February and March 2008], where local Albanian populations are involved.However, since the aim of this chapter is to make sense of the way in which theGreek media construct the Albanian immigrant community in Greece, ratherthan the ethnic Albanian communities living in Skopje and Kosovo, it focuseson domestic news, leaving foreign news aside. In this context, Albanian-relatedtelevision news was mostly crime-related (38%). Such stories featured mostlyon ANTENNA news programmes (21%) and much less on MEGA (12%). Thepublic broadcaster barely covered this category of news (5%), and STARchannel, surprisingly, ignored it. The only time Albanian-related issues arose inits news programmes, concerned Roula�s appeal for help to the Greek andAlbanian community so that her groom returned to the marital bed. As a result,family- and relationship-related issues rose to 7% on STAR TV.

21 See Hall, S. et al, 1978 for a comprehensive discussion of the representation of �mugging� byethnic minorities on British newspapers in the seventies.

4.4 FRAMING OF NEWS STORIES

As expected [Cottle 2000; Halloran 1998; Teo 2000], in most cases, theAlbanian-related newspaper piece was presented within a conflictual frame(45%), and only in a few (7.2%) in a consensual one22. Conflictual is the mainmeans of framing news stories over the weekend as well, and in equal measuretoo (46%) (Figure 6). Overall, crime- and cultural news stories are eitherconsensually or neutrally framed across all three newspapers.

Television news about Albanians was mainly presented in a frame ofconflict (86%), and only rarely in a consensual frame (5%). Combining therepresentation of immigrants as �Albanians� (that is only in relation to theirethnic identity) with how certain issues were framed shows thatfamily/relationship-oriented issues were moderately set within a frame ofconflict (33%), while crime-related issues were conflictually over-emphasised.(87%) (Figure 7). A quick cross examination of television and newspapercoverage (where 33% of family-oriented pieces on �Albanians� were presentedin a context of negotiation and 48% of crime-related ones in a context ofconflict) suggests that television news portrayed Albanian migrants in a muchmore negative manner and, therefore, news coverage of Albanians on Greektelevision may work to amplify already existing phobic and xenophobicattitudes towards them.

22Conflictual is the frame where the media emphasise conflict between individuals,groups or institutions as a means of capturing audience interest, as in the case ofpresidential election campaigns; respectively, in consensual frames, the mediaemphasise consent between all parties involved [Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000: 95].

CONFLICT

CONSENT

NEUTRAL

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

46%

7%

24%

Figure 5. Issue framing (weekdays)

4.5 PORTRAYAL OF ALBANIANS

In two-thirds of newspaper reports of Albanians, Albanians existed only as anethnic identity, the word �Albanian� being perjorative and used to describe a�one-label-fits-all� homogeneous group. This follows patterns of journalisticpractice also seen elsewhere, where in Italy �Albanian� is an insult: the choiceof terms inevitably creates a certain angle in the news [Walter 2002; Pietikäinen2003]. Only rarely are Albanians referred to as �immigrants�, �illegalimmigrants�, �foreigners�, or �economic immigrants�, something that mayreflect their invisibility in the eyes of the Greek state and its immigration policyand reinforce their stigmatisation.

When the identity of immigrants (as �Albanians�) is combined with theexistence of positive or negative attributes, 7% of articles present Albanianimmigrants negatively, and only 2% positively indicating therefore gradualacceptance of the Albanian community into their newfound homeland, andalleviating the stereotypical construction of Albanians as Greece�s �constitutive

other� within the print news discourse. The situation on weekends hardlychanges. Bearing in mind that all political stories within the period underexamination concern developments in neighbouring Kosovo and FYROM, Idecided not to look into the kind of attributes (positive or negative) used toqualify Albanian-related political issues (because the majority of them wouldalso refer to the local Albanian population). Instead, more revealing was howcrime-related stories covered Albanian immigrants in Greece. While 18% ofsuch articles did not ascribe any positive attribute (or combination of words) tothem, and few found anything positive to say, only 2% of news stories depictedthem negatively23. That contradicted similar findings regarding mainstreammedia coverage of immigrant minorities (see above). This may reflect a fall inthe level of stigmatisation of Albanian immigrants, once again suggestingacceptance of the �Albanian� in news discourse. Hence, the need to conductcomparative research on the depictions of Albanians in the Greek press over thepast 15-20 years becomes paramount.

On TV news, Albanians exist almost exclusively as an ethnic identity(93%): the term �Albanian� branding them as second-class citizens (with nocitizenship rights in reality). This one-dimensional depiction of Albanianimmigrants may reinforce biased perceptions of them by the mainstream media.If we examine the channel profile, NET, the public broadcaster, and the twocommercial majors treat Albanian immigrants predominantly as �Albanians�(33%: 26% MEGA: 26% ANTENNA), and only rarely as �foreigners�.

As to television news, only 2.5% of news stories said anythingpositive(in the form of attributes or any other qualifications and linguisticconstructions) and only 12% something negative. MEGA used the mostnegative comments about Albanians (13%), while ANTENNA and NET weremore moderate (5% and 2%). MEGA topped negative coverage of Albaniansin political issues (18%) while none of the other three said anything negative.Examining crime-related stories, MEGA�s coverage was the most negative

23Examples are, for negative attributes: �Albanian gangster� (� � Ta Nea,19/06/07); �the specialisation of the Albanian mafia (� , Kathimerini,07/10/07); for positive- �able Albanian craftsmen build firing places� (�

�, Kathimerini 22/3/08; �[the bullet] went through the unfortunateimmigrant� (� �, Avgi, 08/11/07).

(27%), ANTENNA (15%) and NET (7%). STAR TV was responsible for 33%of positive evaluations of Albanian immigrants in family/relationship-orientedissues -although the human interest character of the stories needs to be takeninto account when considering this. Negative Greek television coverage ofAlbanians was low. As with the press, this is due to the slow erosion of distancebetween the immigrant and host communities and the development of a cultureof tolerance within the host society, enhanced by mainstream media discourses.

STAR

ANT1

MEGA

NET

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%

7%

26%

26%

33%

5%

2%

ALBANIANIMMIGRANTSASFOREIGNER

Figure 6. Television portrayal of Albanians

5. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter explored the cultural making of Europe by looking at how some ofEurope�s �others� - Albanian immigrants - are discussed and represented in theGreek media. The influx of Albanian economic immigrants problematisedsocial cohesion while questioning existing preconceptions of what it means to

be �European�. What kind of media representations of the Albanian immigrantsare articulated within Greek press and television news coverage? How mucheasier has it become to be an Albanian in contemporary Greece, as far as thesymbolic representations of Albanian immigrants are concerned, and what doesthis say about the cultural making of Europe�s �others�? These questions framedmy analysis. Overall, contemporary news discourse generally ignores theAlbanian community in Greece. The relative absence of Albanians inmainstream media coverage may weaken their position and participation in thehost society: Albanians are left outside an influential arena for publicdiscussion and decision-making. Therefore, it may be harder for them to exposea larger audience to their agenda. By failing to articulate the diversity of Greeksociety, news media may, whether on purpose or not, contribute to a short-sighted construction of Albanian identity [Wal 2002]. While invisibility in thenews may also be relevant for many other social groups, the marginalisedposition of ethnic minorities means that they are not represented any betteranywhere else. Thus, their position is vulnerable, since media publicity is evenmore important for them. Significantly for the Greek mainstream media, myresearch has also shown that when represented, Albanians are often portrayed ina positive, rather than negative, light. This indicates that discourses ofstigmatisation and caricature in the media may be on the wane.

Print news discourse does not necessarily construct the �Albanians� asGreece�s �constitutive other�, but makes room for an (eventually) smoothcohabitation, exemplified in the large ratio of news stories with neutral titles,the largely moderate tone and style of analysis in news stories, the limitedextent to which the newspaper discourse constructs subject positions ofdeviance for Albanian immigrants, and the fact that almost one third of thenews stories cover cultural rather than crime-related issues. Television newsportrayed Albanian immigrants negatively more so than the press, but suchportrayals were, arguably, limited. Even so, mainstream media are stillpowerful and pervasive enough to construct biased perceptions of them. Theoverall low percentage of negative representations of Albanians suggests thatcontrary to the �differential inclusion� and the existence of �immigrantenclaves� they experience, there is a growing acceptance of the immigrantcommunity within the host country. What that means as to how Europe

mediates the construction of the �other�, and how that will affect the EU in thedawning decade, remains to be seen- perhaps Europe should have opted for�enrichment� of existing structures instead of �enlargement�.

Acknowledgements

My thanks to the Laboratory of Social Research of the Faculty ofCommunication and Media Studies, University of Athens, and DespinaChronaki, M.A. Faculty graduate who co-ordinated the followingundergraduates: Georgia Aitaki, Alexis Bikas, Dimitris Dionisatos, PanagiotisGourgoulios, Maria Hirdari, Stefanos Ikonomou, Maria Kaliviotou, MinaKoukou, Danai Lebessopoulou, Tatiana Mihailidou, Katerina Mitsiopoulou,Kostantinos Serdaris, Haris Tsitsopoulos, Christina Vrodou.

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