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Other Issues in Game Other Issues in Game TheoryTheory
BusinessBusinessNegotiationsNegotiations
ContractsContracts
Dominant Strategy• Regardless of whether FIRM 2 chooses strategy A,
B, or C, FIRM 1 is better off choosing “a”!• “a” is Player 1’s Dominant Strategy!• Dominance is a solution strategy --- but doesn’t
always lead to “resting point” --- so we introduce the Nash solution --- Nash equilibrium
FIRM 1
FIRM 2 A B C
A ------ 12, 11 11,12 14,13
b 11,10 10,11 12,12
c 11,15 10,13 13,14
FIRM 1
FIRM 2 A B C
A ------ 12, 11 11,12 14,13
b 11,10 10,11 12,12
c 11,15 10,13 13,14
Putting Yourself in your Rival’s Shoes
• What should FIRM 2 do?– 2 has no dominant strategy!– But 2 should reason that 1 will play “a”.– Therefore 2 should choose “C”.
FIRM 1
FIRM 2 A B C
A ------ 12, 11 11,12 14,13
b 11,10 10,11 12,12
c 11,15 10,13 13,14
The Outcome
• This outcome is called a Nash equilibrium:– “a” is player 1’s best response to “C”.– “C” is player 2’s best response to “a”.
A NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN WHICH EVERY PLAYER PLAYS A PURE STRATEGY IS CALLED A PURE STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM
ANY STRATEGY THAT IS NOT COMPLETELY DETERMINISTIC, BUT INSTEAD INVOLVES CHANCE (RANDOMIZATION), IS CALLED A MIXED STRATEGY --- SO A NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN WHICH AT LEAST ONE PLAYER PLAYS A MIXED STRATEGY IS CALLED A MIXED STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM
COORDINATION GAMES USUALLY RESULT IN MIXED STRATEGIES AS WELL AS PURE NASH
STRATEGIES ARE BASED ON 210
VOLT APPLIANCE VS
120 VOLT APPLIANCE
Firm 2
210 v 120 v
Firm 1
210 v 100, 100 0, 0
120 v 0,0 100,100
A MORE SIMPLIFIED COORDINATION GAME
Firm 2
210 v 120 v
Firm 1
210 v 100, 100 0, 0
120 v 0,0 100,100
There is 1 mixed strategy {1/2[210v], ½[120v]} for each firm
There are 2 pure Nash {both firms choose 210 v} and
{ both firms choose 120 v }
Both get
8 years
Funk gets 2 yrs
Naylor gets 10 years
Funk gets 10
Naylor gets 2
Both get
4 years
confess
mum
mum
confess
Naylor
Funk
Two stock brokers, Funk and alias, Naylor, are indicted by the N.Y. Attorney General for allegedly making use of illegal inside information --- but the evidence is weak
The attorney general brings them in to interrogate, one at a time
Both Funk and Naylor have two possible strategies, confess or remain mum
4 possible strategies are outlined in the normal form game below
Both get
8 years
Funk gets 2 yrs
Naylor gets 10 years
Funk gets 10
Naylor gets 2
Both get
4 years
confess
mum
mum
confess
Naylor
Funk
SO, WHAT’S GOING TO HAPPEN HERE? THE DOMINANT STRATEGY FOR BOTH BROKERS IS TO CONFESS!
BUT EACH IS DOING WORSE THAN IF THEY COULD TRUST EACH OTHER AND ONLY GET 4 YEARS BASED ON THE WEAK EVIDENCE BY REMAINING MUM (OH,OH, HERE COMES THE ROLE OF THE DEFENSE ATTORNEYS!)
THIS IS THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME
(5, 5) (-2, 8)
(8, -2) (2, 2)
Price = $2,000
Price = $1,000
Price = $2,000
Price = $1,000
Israelsen
Simmons
Now recall the problems with the “Sweezy” or Kinked demand curve oligopoly case we introduced in Ch. 9
If one firm reduces price, the rival firm will match this action by also reducing price, but will not match price increases
Suppose now we have two firms, Simmons and israelsen who react on pricing Suppose now we have two firms, Simmons and israelsen who react on pricing of their product and reap the profits (in $millions) given in the normal form of their product and reap the profits (in $millions) given in the normal form given belowgiven below
(5, 5) (-2, 8)
(8, -2) (2, 2)
Price = $2,000
Price = $1,000
Price = $2,000
Price = $1,000
Israelsen
Simmons
What is going to happen here?What is going to happen here?
If Simmons and Israelsen form some sort of cartel --- then there is incentive to not follow through on the agreement, however supposed to be binding
The Nash is that both lower their price from $2,000 to $1,000 in hopes of capturing the market
(5, 5) (-2, 8)
(8, -2) (2, 2)
Price = $2,000
Price = $1,000
Price = $2,000
Price = $1,000
Israelsen
Simmons
Now suppose they offer a “most favored customer clause” , whereby a customer who buys early at a high price gets a rebate if price is later set at a lower price --- the rebate will lower profits ---- so the payoff is now given below
(5, 5) (-2, 8)
(8, -2) (2, 2)
Price = $2,000
Price = $1,000
Price = $2,000
Price = $1,000
Israelsen
Simmons
We now get two pure Nash {both firms set price at $2,000} and {both firms set price at $1,000}
And then we get a mixed strategy { both firms choose price = $2,000 with probability 4/5, and choose price = $1,000 with probability 1/5}
So the weight on the choice suggest the most favored customer clause provides incentives to hold at the $2,000 price --- a possible way out of the kinked demand curve
Suppose Dell and GE are considering engaging in a joint venture. Each will have to invest $12 million in assets that are of no value outside the project (specialized or specific investments and costs)
If both firms act in accord with their promises, the annual “economic profit” to each firm is $3 million
If one or both do not act in accord with promises, then the annual profit is as shown in the following normal form
(3, 3) (6, -2)
(-2, 6) (0, 0)
Dell
Accord
No accord
Accord No accord
GE
Economic profit in $millions
BOTH FIRMS HAVE THE OPTION TO NOT PLAY THE GAME
Will a contract be drawn up and signed by both parties?
Yes --- the Nash equilibrium is (3,3)
Without such a contract, each firm would have incentive to go their separate ways after investment ---- managers may be reluctant to take the risk of investment --- so trust is what binds the contract --- coordination
(3, 3) (6, -2)
(-2, 6) (0, 0)
Dell
Accord
No accord
Accord No accord
GE
Economic profit is profit above what could have been earned in alternative investment opportunities for the $12 million
THIS IS NOT A PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME
WHEN IS A THREAT CREDIBLE?
Firms often signal to each other to indicate intentions --
(2, 3) (3, -1)
(7, 11) (11, 8)
Youngberg
Low price
High price
Low price High price
McKenna
Youngberg announces it is moving to lower price --- McKenna then intends to significantly lower its own price signaling willingness to engage in price war {see the payoff matrix below}
But McKenna’s threat is not credible --- profits at high price are more than profits at low price --- dominant strategy for McKenna is high price, irrespective of Youngberg’s price ---- Nash is (7,11)