Published in 1982 byOsprey Publishing LtdMember company of the George Philip Group12-14 Long Acre, London WC2E 9LP© Copyright 1982 Osprey Publishing LtdReprinted March 1983Reprinted and revised May 1983, September 1983,May 1984

This book is copyrighted under the Berne Convention.All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for thepurpose of private study, research, criticism or review,as permitted under the Copyright Act, 1956, no part ofthis publication may be reproduced, stored in aretrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by anymeans, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical,optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, withoutthe prior permission of the copyright owner. Enquiriesshould be addressed to the Publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Battle for the Falklands.—(Men-at-arms series; 133)1: Land forces1. Falkland Islands War, 19821. Fowler, William II. Series997.11 F30311

ISBN 0-85045-482-4

Filmset in England byTameside Filmsetting Limited,Ashton-under-Lyne, Lancashire

Printed in Hong Kong

Author's note:The author wishes to record his gratitude to the followingfor their generous help in the preparation of this book;Public Relations Dept., Ministry of Defence; Globe andLaurel; Gunner; The Royal United Services Institute;The Sunday Times; The Daily Telegraph; TimeMagazine; Peter Abbott; John Chappell; Geoff Cornish;Simon Dunstan; Adrian English; Paul Haley; LeeRussell; and Digby Smith. Under the circumstances thepublishers feel it may be desirable to note that a donationhas been made to the South Atlantic Fund.

This book is dedicated to Christine, for her patienceand good company during the events described within.

Battle for the Falklands (1) Land Forces

Introduction'I remember just before the battle of Antietam thinking . . .

that it would be easy after a comfortable breakfast to come

down the steps of one's house pulling on one's gloves and

smoking a cigar, to get on to a horse and charge a battery up

Beacon Street, while the ladies wave handkerchiefs from a

balcony. But the reality was to pass a night on the ground in

the rain, with your bowels out of order, and then, after no

particular breakfast, to wade a stream and attack the enemy'.

(Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, recallinghis service in the American Civil War)

With the lethal tidying-up of the Falklandsbattlefield still in progress and claiming lives andlimbs, millions of words have already been writtenand spoken about Operation 'Corporate', thecombined service operations that liberated theislanders from Argentine occupation. Inevitably,much remains to be revealed; this book can only bea summary of what is known at the time of writing.Perhaps more important is its other purpose. Theview of war from a Press desk, radio station ortelevision studio is often a cosily sanitised version ofwhat is in reality a grinding mixture of fatigue,confusion and ignorance at all levels; of moments ofgreat fear, and others of intense exhilaration; and ofa tough humour that welds close-knit groups closerstill under pressure. I hope that this brief accountwill convey something of this reality, so eloquentlyrecalled by Oliver Wendell Holmes when he lookedback on his own war.

There is no space here for more than the briefestnote on the background to the war. The FalklandIslands and their dependency of South Georgia area group of rocky, barren islands in the south-westcorner of the South Atlantic Ocean. They have apopulation of about 1,800 souls, 1,000 of them

living in the little 'capital' of Stanley and theremainder scattered around the heavily indentedcoasts in isolated, more or less self-sufficient sheepfarming settlements.

The islands have never been settled by theArgentine, although for a brief period during theconfused years which saw her war of independencefrom Spain she did plant a minute garrison onthem. This was removed, bloodlessly, by Britain in1833; since when settlement by civilians has slowlyincreased, the inhabitants being entirely of Britishstock. Argentina's notional claim is based uponproximity, and a supposed sovereignty whichultimately rests upon the Papal declaration of 1493which sought arbitrarily to divide the unoccupieddiscoveries in the New World between Spain andPortugal—a pronouncement which failed toimpress the rest of the world even then. Resting her

(Cont. on p. 5)

2 April: a LARC-5 vehicle of the Argentine Marines' 1stAmphibious Vehicle Bn. approaches as Royal Marines ofNP8901 are searched by Argentine Marine Commandos. Thisis one of a series of photographs which had a considerableeffect on British public opinion. (MoD)

Chronology

19 March Argentine scrap merchants land on1982 South Georgia and raise flag.

Diplomatic exchanges begin.2 April Argentine Marine forces invade East

Falkland. After three-hour fight, 67-man Royal Marine garrison ordered tosurrender by Governor Hunt.

3 April United Nations Security Council passesResolution 502, calling on Argentina towithdraw troops. Argentine Marinesforce surrender of 22-man garrison ofSouth Georgia, after two Argentinehelicopters shot down and a frigatebadly damaged.

5 April First warships of British Task Force sailfrom UK. Lord Carrington and twojunior Foreign Office ministers resign.

7 April Announcement of 200-mile ExclusionZone around Falklands, to becomeeffective 12 April, by Ministry of Defencein London.

25 April Argentine submarine Santa Fé damagedby RN helicopters and forced to beach atGrytviken, South Georgia. 25/26 April,South Georgia recaptured by 22 SASRegt. and 42 Cdo.RM.

30 April US diplomatic mediation abandoned;US government announces unequivocalsupport of Britain.

1 May RAF Vulcan and Task Force Harriersattack Stanley airport in first of manyraids.

2 May ARA General Belgrano sunk by RNsubmarine.

4 May HMS Sheffield struck by Argentine air-launched Exocet missile and burns out,sinking later.

7 May Announcement of extension of TotalExclusion Zone to within 12 miles ofArgentine coast.

14 May 22 SAS Regt. raid Argentine airfield onPebble Island.

21 May Task Force establishes beachhead at SanCarlos on East Falkland. HMS Ardentsunk by Argentine air attack. At least 14Argentine aircraft shot down.

23 May HMS Antelope crippled by air attack,sinks next day. At least six aircraft shotdown.

24 May Air attacks continue; eight aircraft shotdown.

25 May Air attacks continue. HMS Coventrysunk; Atlantic Conveyor, carryingimportant stores and helicopters, struckby air-launched Exocet and burns out.Several Argentine aircraft shot down.

26 May British troops move out of beachhead ontwo routes.

28 May 2nd Bn. The Parachute Regt. takesGoose Green and Darwin in prolongedfighting. Survivors of 1,400-strongArgentine garrison surrender to 600paratroopers the next morning.

31 May Troops of 42 Cdo.RM established onMt. Kent.

2 June British troops in sight of Stanley.8 June Argentine air attack on LSLs Sir Tristram

and Sir Galahad at Fitzroy; heavycasualties among 1st Bn. The WelshGuards.

11 /12 Series of night attacks on high groundJune west of Stanley; Mt. Longdon, Two

Sisters and Mt. Harriet captured. Land-launched Exocet missile strikes HMSGlamorgan but damage controlled.

13/14 Tumbledown, Mt. William and WirelessJune Ridge taken in night attacks. Argentine

troops flee final positions before Stanley.White flags seen. Argentine commander,Gen. Menendez, agrees to parley withMaj.Gen. Moore.

14 June Unconditional surrender of Argentinetroops on Falklands at 2O59hrs localtime.

claim upon unbroken occupation, administration,and national settlement since 1833, Britain hasoffered to submit the dispute to the InternationalCourt of Justice—an offer declined by Argentina.Her claim is taught as holy writ in Argentineschools, however, and generations of Argentineshave been raised to believe it implicitly. It has anemotional significance for them at least equal to theresponsibility Britain feels toward the liberties of theislanders, or 'kelpers' as they are nicknamed, fromthe thick beds of seaweed which blanket the shores.The fact that the islanders have always made cleartheir determination to retain their British identityand liberties has not silenced Argentine rhetoricabout 'colonialism'.

The British Foreign and Commonwealth Officehas long recognised the practical benefits, both tothe islanders and to Britain, of a good workingrelationship between the Falklanders and theArgentine; but the islanders' understandablereluctance to fall into the hands of an immature andunstable country currently ruled by a militarydictatorship with a horrific record of secret policekidnappings, tortures and murders has preventedthe long-drawn negotiations from bearing fruit. Inearly 1982 the announcement of the imminentwithdrawal of the Royal Navy's ice patrol shipHMS Endurance, and various other marks ofapparent inattention, prompted the currentmilitary Junta in Buenos Aires to suppose that amilitary grab would be allowed to succeed withoutmore than token resistance. Such an adventure wasattractive as a distraction for the Argentine publicat a time of soaring inflation and political unease.

A causus belli was engineered by the planting of aparty of supposed 'scrap merchants' on SouthGeorgia, whose ostensibly innocent presence wascompromised by the raising of the Argentine flag,and the tiny Royal Marine force despatched 22 mento South Georgia's port of Grytviken to keep an eyeon the Argentine party at Leith. It was at this pointin what seemed a trivial dispute that, on the night of1/2 April 1982, the Junta led by Gen. LeopoldoGaltieri made its move. On 3 April British PrimeMinister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher faced anappalled and furious House of Commons toannounce that Argentine armed forces had landedon British sovereign territory; had captured the menof Royal Marine detachment NP8901; had run up

3 Para practising helicopter drill with Sea Kings on the SSCanberra during the Task Force's voyage south; they wear lifejackets and '58 pattern CEFO. Helmet camouflage is topersonal taste. (MoD)

the Argentine flag at Government House; and haddeclared the islands and their population to beArgentine.

The InvasionIn fact, local indications gave the tiny RM garrisona couple of days' warning. The arrival of Maj. MikeNorman's detachment to relieve the 1980-81detachment of Maj. Gary Noott gave the islands'governor, Mr. Rex Hunt, a total force of 67 menarmed with infantry weapons, including theGeneral Purpose Machine Gun, the 66mm anti-tank rocket launcher, and the 84mm Carl Gustavanti-tank weapon. Maj. Norman assumedcommand on 1 April, and deployed his men at keypoints.

The airfield is on a headland east of the town ofStanley, joined to it by a narrow isthmus alongwhich runs a surfaced road. While the airfield had

5

been obstructed, two beaches north of it wereconsidered likely landing points; and it was alongthe enemy's only axis of advance from this directionthat four of the sections were deployed, with ordersto delay that advance and to withdraw when thepressure became too great. No.5 Section (Cpl. Duff)was south of the airfield, with a GPMG teamcovering the beach. At Hookers Point on theisthmus was No. 1 Section (Cpl. Armour); behindthem were N0.2 (Cpl. Brown) on the old airstrip,and N0.3 (Cpl. Johnson) near the immobilisedVOR directional beacon.

No. 4 Section (Cpl. York) were placed at thenarrow harbour entrance with a Gemini assaultboat, and ordered to resist any naval attempt toenter the harbour. The MV Forrest was put on radarwatch in Port William, the outer harbour. No.6Section covered the south of the town from MurrayHeights, with an OP on Sapper Hill. Main HQwere at Government House, on the west of thetown, where Maj. Noott assisted Mr. Hunt; Maj.Norman, in overall command, was at Look OutRocks. Mr. Hunt had ordered that there should beno fighting in the town itself, to safeguard civilianlives.

In the early hours of 2 April Forrest reportedcontacts off Mengary Point and Cape Pembroke,and helicopters were heard near Port Harriet.Argentine accounts would later identify thesecontacts as the aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo,

2 Para personnel test-fire GPMG and SLRs over the stern of theNorland ferry during the voyage south. At this stage a ratherlight-hearted attitude prevailed, as few believed the TaskForce would be sent into battle in earnest. (MoD)

the destroyers Hercules, Segui and Comodoro Py, thelanding ship Cabo San Antonio, and three transports.The force they carried was reported as 600 Marinesand 279 Army and Air Force personnel, a battalionof amphibious APCs, and Marine Commandospecial forces including frogmen.

Argentine sources place the first landing at CapePembroke, where frogmen landing from assaultcraft secured the lighthouse and its small RMobservation post. The first landing recorded by theBritish was by a heli-borne force of 150 Marinesnear Mullet Creek, tasked with neutralising anydefenders of the Moody Brook RM barracks andthen moving on to capture the governor. They wereshortly afterwards reinforced by another 70 men, allbeing landed by Sea Kings from the carrier. Atbetween 0530 and 0605—sources differ — theyreached the empty barracks, and proceeded to clearit with automatic fire and white phosphorousgrenades: odd tactics for troops who would later beclaimed to have 'used blank ammunition to save

lives'. The noise of this attack alerted the menaround Government House. Both sides agree thatthe firefight there began at 0615.

It was to last for three hours, while the dawnbroke and brightened. Argentine figures forcasualties were one killed and two wounded. RoyalMarine estimates were rather higher, but could notbe confirmed: five dead and 17 wounded.

Even in the grimmest moments there can behumour, as when the section covering the harbourcalled in that it had three targets to engage with itsGPMG, and asked, 'What are the priorities?'

'What are the targets?', came the reply from HQ.'Target No. 1 is an aircraft carrier, Target No.2 is

a cruiser, Target. . .', at which point the line wentdead. The harbour section in fact managed toevade capture for four days after the invasion.

Lt. C. W. Trollope, with Sgt. Sheppard, was atthe old airfield with No. 2 Section, and at 0630reported ships to the south. Moments later he heardtracked vehicles, and was soon able to count 16LVTP-7S of the Argentine Marines 1st AmphibiousVehicles Bn. coming over the ridge from York Bay.As the section withdrew in the face of theseformidable vehicles, which have a turret-mounted12.7mm machine gun, Marine Gibbs stopped thelead APC with a 66mm hit on the passengercompartment, while Marines Brown and Best put a

6

round of 84mm through the front. 'No one was seento surface . . .' The other APCs deployed to openfire, and the section fell back again.

By 0830, with Argentine troops clearly ashore ingreat numbers, Maj. Norman and Mr. Hunt lookedat the options. These included an attempt at escapeand evasion into the interior, where the governorcould set up an alternative seat of government; or afirefight that would be 'determined, unrelenting,but relatively short-lived'. The governor, who wasCommander-in-Chief under the Emergency PowersOrdnance of 1939, decided on the depressing optionof surrender to save civilian lives.

For the Argentine forces it was a moment oftriumph. The sky blue and white national flag wasrun up on every pole in sight. An Iwo Jima-stylescenario of Marines grouped around a flag pole atdawn was followed by a more formal parade for thecameras, with Marine Commandos in their knittedcaps and quilted jackets forming one side of a hollowsquare, and others in camouflage uniforms facingthem.

Mr. Hunt declined to join these ceremonies, oreven to shake hands with Gen. Oswaldo Garcia,

'temporary military governor of the Malvinas', andAdm. Carlos Busser, commander of the MarineCorps. Mustering his full diplomatic dignity, he wasdriven off to the airfield for evacuation to theUnited Kingdom via Montevideo, complete withplumed hat and sword. The Royal Marines were tofollow the same route rather later.

It was to prove a Pyrrhic victory for Argentina.The photos of the young Royal Marines, tired facessmeared with camouflage cream, being disarmedand marched off by an equally young but ratherofficious Argentine Commando caused great publicanger in Britain. Rightly or wrongly, the Britishpublic finds the image of British troops with theirhands up inflaming. It was this rather forlorn imagewhich made the Task Force politicallyacceptable—even inevitable.

South GeorgiaUnder normal circumstances a lieutenant is neverlikely to have a wholly independent command—letalone the scrutiny of the world while he exercises it.

Lt. Keith Mills, OC the 22-man RM detachmentaboard the ice patrol vessel HMS Endurance, was

summoned by Capt. N. J. Barker on 31 March andordered to (a) be a military presence on the island ofSouth Georgia; (b) protect the British AntarcticSurvey party at Grytviken in the event of anemergency; and (c) to maintain surveillance overthe Argentine 'scrap merchants' at Leith, a derelictwhaling station.

Radio transmissions from Stanley left them in nodoubt that they would be next. The Argentinevessel Bahia Paraiso, with its own Marinedetachment, was known to be in the area. Lt. Millsselected a position at King Edward Point coveringapproaches to Grytviken; he also picked awithdrawal route, along which the Marines stashedtheir 'E and E' kits and rucksacks. They wired thebeach, and booby-trapped the jetty and theapproaches to their position.

At 1230 on 2 April the Bahia Paraiso made afleeting appearance. Next day she returned,sending a message announcing the surrender of the'Malvinas' and the dependencies. Mills played for

As tracers rise into the dusk sky, soldiers man an improvised.50cal. MG position on a cargo container lashed to the deck ofthe Canberra. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

time, reading this back using an HF net whichallowed the Royal Navy and BAS call signs to hearas well. The Argentines called on the defenders toassemble on the beach to surrender. By now thefrigate Granville had entered the bay, and ahelicopter was overhead. The Bahia Paraiso wasinformed that there was a British military presenceon the island, with orders to resist a landing. Afurther attempt at stalling failed, and a secondhelicopter appeared. The frigate headed for theopen sea again; one of the helicopters landed, andeight Argentine Marines jumped out 40 yards fromLt. Mills. One of them took aim, and Mills returnedto his defensive position. The Argentines openedfire, and another helicopter dropped troops on thefar side of the bay, who opened up with machineguns. The Royal Marines now returned fire.

Their automatic bursts ripped into the Pumahelicopter, which lurched across the bay trailingsmoke, and crash-landed on the far side; nobodyemerged. Two Alouette helicopters which landedtroops across the bay were engaged, and one ofthem was hit, landing heavily and taking no furtherpart in the action. This was already a respectableengagement; but the Royal Marines were now to

8

achieve a success unique in the campaign. Thefrigate headed back to shore and began to give firesupport to the Argentine troops; she had a 3.9in.gun, but seems to have used her twin 40mm on thisoccasion. Lt. Mills ordered his men to hold fire untilshe was well within the bay, with less chance oftaking swift evasive action; and then hit her with the84mm anti-tank weapon.

Fired by Marine Dave Combes, the Carl Gustavround hit the water about ten yards short of the shipand ricochetted into the hull, holing it close to thewaterline. The frigate turned to avoid further fire,and while it did so it was raked with MG and riflefire, more than 1,000 hits being reported later by anArgentine officer. At least two 66mm LAW roundshit near the forward turret, jamming its elevationmechanism; and, according to one report, a second84mm round may have struck the Exocet launchersabaft the funnel, which fortunately for the crew didnot explode. Rapidly retreating beyond small armsrange, the Granville continued to fire in support ofthe troops who were closing in to outflank theBritish position.

After causing a number of casualties, and withretreat cut off except down the steep cliffs, Lt. Millstook the initiative to parley with an enemy officer.He pointed out that since each side had the otherpinned down, both would inevitably suffer heavilyif the action continued; to avoid this he was pre-pared to surrender. He had a wounded man, and hehad achieved his aim of forcing the invaders to useforce. He had also guaranteed good treatment forhis men. They had a long sea journey to anArgentine base, and a further four days' confine-ment, before being flown to Montevideo and on toBritain, with the section from Stanley harbourwho had avoided capture on 2 April. Lt. Mills waslater awarded the DSC.

The Task Force andits Opponents

In Britain there was considerable national anger atthe invasion. Apart from the humiliation of seeingRoyal Marines marched off as prisoners, there werethe transmitted voices of the islanders: part West

Men of 42 Commando, Royal Marines at Grytviken. MCompany-'The Mighty Munch'-recaptured South Georgiaalongside men of D Sqn., 22 SAS Regt. on 25 April. (MoD)

Country, part Midland, but wholly British. Thethought of their misfortune had a powerful impact.Some voices of dissent were heard from the extremeLeft as the Task Force was prepared, but these wereconfined to an entirely predictable quarter, and thedegree of publicity they attracted—particularly inBuenos Aires—was quite unrepresentative ofnational feeling. It is hard to imagine any otherissue which could attract more than 80 per centunanimous support for government action inopinion polls.

The recall of the men of the Royal Marines and 3Para came as something of a surprise. Dramaticannouncements and chalked signs aroused the

Lt.Cdr. Alfredo Astiz of the Argentine Navy, wearing Marinescamouflage clothing and the blue-grey winter SD cap of a navalofficer, signs the surrender of the enemy garrison on SouthGeorgia on board HMS Plymouth, watched by Capt. N. J. Barkerof HMS Endurance (right) and Capt. D. Pentreath of Plymouth (farright). (MoD)

9

LCMs from HMS Fearless head towards Blue Beach, San Carloswith men of 40 Cdo.RM on the morning of 21 May. (MoD)

curiosity of commuters at London stations. In 45Commando there was some difficulty in convincingmen due for Easter leave that this was not somehorrible April Fool's joke. As one group wereinformed: 'Now listen, men, the good news—thereisn't any. The bad news—Argentina has invadedthe Falkland Islands. Everyone has been recalled.Your leave has hereby been cancelled.'

The Task Force carrier group set sail on Monday5 April, and by the evening of Friday the 9th SSCanberra was putting to sea with the main body of 40and 42 Commandos and 3 Para; 45 Cdo. wereaccommodated aboard the RFA Stromness, RFAResource and two LSLs which sailed at intervals overa week. As Canberra eased away from the dock atSouthampton she was cheered by a vast crowd ofrelatives and well-wishers, and military bandsserenaded her departure with the GavinSutherland song 'Sailing'. (This has become sopopular since the Rod Stewart recording was usedas the signature tune for a successful TVdocumentary series about HMS Ark Royal that it isalmost an unofficial anthem for Britain's maritimeforces.)

Another song which now has associations withthe departure of troops for the Falklands is Tim

Rice and Andrew Lloyd Webber's 'Don't Cry ForMe, Argentina'—quickly modified by some wits tothe more bellicose 'Don't Try For Me, Argentina'; itwas to these ironic strains that 2 Para left theirAldershot barracks. The battalion was accom-modated aboard the Europic Ferry and the MVNorland. Like the men of the Royal Artillery, RoyalEngineers and Blues and Royals, aboard otherRoyal Fleet Auxiliary and Merchant Marinevessels, they began a period of intensive onboardtraining. The Blues and Royals were aboard Elk—atransport whose master, like many of his breed, wassoon to display an impressively warlike spirit,demanding ever more machine guns to jury-rig allover his ship!—and had with them four Scimitarand two Scorpion light tanks forming MediumRecce Troop, B Squadron, and one Samson ARV.

The real surprise came when the governmentannounced that the liner Queen Elizabeth 2 was to berequisitioned on 1 May. She would carry the men of5 Infantry Brigade—2nd Bn. The Scots Guards,1st Bn. The Welsh Guards, 1st Bn. 7th GurkhaRifles, and their supporting units—who wouldreinforce 3 Cdo.Bde., which now consisted of thethree RM Cdos. with 2 and 3 Para attached. Theirvehicles would be carried by the Baltic Ferry andNordic Ferry, their artillery and stores by AtlanticCauseway. Before embarking 5 Inf.Bde. went to theSennybridge training area in Wales to bring

1 0

themselves to peak efficiency, using liveammunition and live air attacks. It was hoped thatthe notoriously rainy weather in the area wouldsimulate the Falklands climate as closely as possible.On cue, central Wales obliged with a minorheatwave.

The QE2, converted to take helicopters, sailed on12 May. She nosed out of Southampton on a sunnyWednesday; families and friends, many of thewomen in tears, waved to the soldiers lining thedecks. The intensely moving occasion was slightlydeflated when one serviceman's wife brought adelighted roar from the troops by stripping to thewaist, and her bra was swung aboard the statelyliner to yells of approval.

The preparation and despatch of the Task Forcecame as a surprise to the Argentine Junta. In thatmale-dominated society Mrs. Thatcher's responsewas seen as a typically female overreaction. WhileUS Secretary of State Haig pursued his exhaustingshuttle diplomacy, the Argentine enjoyed a surge ofnational pride. Although there were many, both inBuenos Aires and Britain, who could not believethat the Task Force would be used in earnest, theJunta took the precaution of reinforcing the islands.After their defeat they were to claim that they hadbeen beaten by a high-technology nation:examination of their weapons and equipmentshowed almost the opposite.

With military men heading the government, theforces were subject to fewer financial constraintsthan their opposite numbers. They had shoppedwell in Europe and the USA, and though some oftheir warships were old the armour, artillery andinfantry weapons were good. The garrison had 30105mm and four 155mm guns, of Italian andFrench origins respectively. Their mortars included81mm and heavy 120mm types. They hadexcellent Swiss 35mm and German 20mm twin AAcannon mountings, some at least with Skyguardradar; AA missile launchers included the FrenchRoland and British Tigercat, and the BritishBlowpipe man-portable system. It came as a nastysurprise to the men of the Task Force to discoverthat not only was much of the electronic equipmentsuperior to their own—but some of the better pieceswere British-built. One piece of Direction Finding

equipment could locate a transmitter after it hadbeen on the air for a matter of seconds.

Particularly ironic was one Argentine claim, inthe aftermath of defeat, that British night-fightingaids were of unprecedented sophistication. The aidsused by Argentine troops were a generation aheadof British equipment. Testing a captured set of the'goggles', which could be worn with ease by a footsoldier, an officer of 2 Para was able to identify byname a man looking through a house window—whose glass degrades vision—across 30 metres ofstreet and through a second window, at night. Thenight sights for the Argentine FN rifles were lighterand more compact than British equivalents, and thescale of issue meant that more were available to anArgentine platoon.

To cover against air and sea attack the garrisonhad Westinghouse AN/TPS-43 mobile radar setsvalued at around £6 million, and land-basedversions of the French Exocet anti-ship missile.Light armour was provided by 12 French PanhardAML armoured cars with 90mm guns; thesewheeled vehicles were reckoned to be more suitableafter the Marines' APCs had cut up Stanley's roads,but in fact they played little or no part in thefighting. Most, perhaps all of the LVTP-7S seem tohave left the islands before the liberation, but whenStanley fell the Task Force captured about 150trucks and jeeps.

A photograph that for many people summed up the essentialpoint of the campaign; above the San Carlos landing beaches,RSM Laurie Ashbridge of 3 Para enjoys a cup of tea withdelighted local families. (MoD)

I I

With their numerous grass strips for privateaircraft and the 'flying doctor', the Falklands wereideal for helicopters and STOL aircraft. Theenemy air forces flew in at least twelve Pumas,two Chinooks, nine Bell 'Hueys' and two AgustaA109 gunships. Up to two dozen turbo-propPucara COIN aircraft were dispersed at Stanley,Goose Green and Pebble Island; with its goodSTOL performance and mix of cannon and under-wing ordnance, it was a formidable battlefieldsupport machine.

At the individual level the troops were armedwith the FN rifle, some with a folding stock, and allwith a burst or automatic capability. The machineguns were the FN/MAG, almost identical to theBritish GPMG, and, at squad level, the heavy-barrel FN. Hand grenades were from a number of

origins, but soldiers who have been on the receivingend said that they functioned effectively. Althoughone elegant dress sword was captured at San Carlos,the officers' normal sidearm was the 9mm Browningpistol.

The British Task Force was described as 'a wellbalanced force", but the same could also be said ofthe Argentine garrison pouring into the Falklands.As the heavy equipment was put ashore at theharbour the troops were flown into Stanley, andplodded off to their temporary accommodation —mostly pup-tents—laden with packs, kit bags andweapons. They were a mixture of conscripts, someof whom were reported to be only beginning theirservice, and more experienced soldiers. The Pressstories about 15 year-olds in the ranks should beweighed against the fact that the most recent call-up

1 2

category were 19 year-olds of the 1962/63 register.(Most Task Force soldiers were aged between 18and 25 years.)

The engineers began a vast obstacle constructionoperation to deny the British routes out from theirlikely landing areas. The Argentine assessment wasthat the British would go for Stanley in a coup de mainwhich would ensure the fall of the islands. Therewere two axes which could be followed. One wasstraight in over the beaches to the east; these wereobstructed with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines(waterproof plastic types) as well as wire, andpebble-filled oil drums. The kelp itself was a usefulbarrier at many points. The second axis, mostfavoured in that it offered good landing sites close tothe capital, was north and east to Stanley from theFitzroy inlets on the south coast. Working on thisanticipation of enemy aims, the garrison laidminefields to block the possible routes inland. Theyalso held back stocks of mines which were later usedto thicken up local defences, and to block groundnot otherwise covered. A rough total of 12,000mines has been reported.

It is an ancient military axiom that he whodefends everything ends up defending nothing.Gen. Mario Benjamin Menendez, the governor and

Royal Marines dug in to cover the San Carlos beachhead; theGPMG is mounted on a sustained fire tripod, although its butthas not been removed as is normal in the SF role. Two boxes ofammunition are stowed as part of the parapet. Under thethreat of shellfire, overhead cover is taken seriously, but themachine gunner clearly maintains a fairly optimisticattitude: sharper prints of this picture show a Snoopymascot attached to his sights! (MoD)

garrison commander, clearly made an effort not tofall into this error. He was assisted in his planning byan intelligence brief prepared in Buenos Aires byGen. de Bda. Alfredo Sotero, Jefe II/Inteligencia.Fifteen copies of this secret brief were prepared,copies 02 to 13 being sent to the Military Governorof the Malvinas. This secret document contained amix of information. At the back were pictures ofships and equipment likely to be in the Task Force,with technical details. There was more interestingmaterial at the beginning, however.

The role and structure of special forces wereexplained, as well as the structure of conventionalforces; moreover, between pages 5 and 14 theintelligence officers looked at British options. Thetwo options examined were the direct attack onStanley, against which Menendez was to prepare;and the less obvious choice of a landing in a remotearea which would provide a base for building uppressure on the Argentine garrison.

13

Some of the 1,200-odd Argentine prisoners taken at GooseGreen are marched off to the 'cage', 29 May; their winterparkas, made in Israel, gave inferior protection to the range oflayered clothing worn by the Task Force, and some probablycame from northern areas and so had great difficultyacclimatising to the freezing Falklands winter. (MoD)

The conclusions drawn by Sotero's staff werethat the main threat was from night attacks; andthat helicopters, the key to mobility, were thereforea priority target. They were able to say (on 17 April)that the helicopters would be carried aboard acontainer ship. They felt that the direct assaultoption would be too costly in lives; and that theindirect approach would be too slow, as the USAand USSR would put a stop to the fighting bypolitical pressure. However, their assessment of thepre-landing operations was entirely correct:

'Amphibious reconnaissance by the SBS landedfrom one or more submarines ahead of the mainbody of the Task Force.

'Isolation of the zone selected for the amphibiousassault by the Task Force, and establishment of airsuperiority over the zone.

'Clearing of any minefields laid on the stretch ofcoast selected for the landing.

'Final reconnaissance by the SBS and eventuallyby the SAS.

'Special operations by members of the SBS andSAS, especially on the night before the principalamphibious landing.'

Having blocked the likely routes around Stanley,Menendez covered the beaches and high groundwith OPs which could report movement andlandings. Larger settlements like Pebble Island, andFox Bay on West Falkland, received their own self-contained garrisons. The spine of high ground,running from San Carlos through Mt. Usborne,Wickham Heights, and eastwards to Mts.Challenger and Kent was picketed with OPs;although the men dug in on the high ground (only705m at its highest) were not artillery spotters, theywere to do their job effectively, and had good radiocommunications with Stanley. When they sawmajor movement or landings they would call in,and the mobile reserve could be heli-lifted in to sealoff a landing and launch a counter-attack.

On the Falkland Islands the population washaving to live with occupation. To confirm hisstanding, Gen. Galtieri flew into Stanley to swear inGen. Menendez as governor. To the delight of thelocals and the horror of Argentine soldiers the flag,straining in the winter wind, was suddenly tumbledto the mud as the flag pole snapped—just at the

14

moment when Menendez was taking his oath.At first the Argentine soldiers tried to make

friendly contact with the civilians; but the truecharacter of the Argentine regime was revealedwhen the head of the local police was replaced by anArgentine intelligence officer named Maj. PatricioDowling. Dowling—part Irish, part Argentine, andnicknamed 'the Gauleiter' because of his Alsatiandogs and 'cold, creepy manner'—revealed thatBuenos Aires had some 500 dossiers on inhabitantsof the islands.

There was, however, a lighter note to theoccupation. As part of their inept 'hearts and minds'programme the Argentines offered the islanderstelevision sets on which they would be able to watchthe World Gup, for a modest down-payment of £10each and easy terms thereafter. The 'kelpers' stillhave their TVs, with 140 more instalmentpayments to go—but the debt collector has beenshipped home . . .

South Georgia andPebble Island

The wastes of South Georgia could never bedescribed as 'occupied' by the small Argentinegarrisons at Leith and Grytviken, commanded bythe sinister Lt.Cdr. Alfredo Astiz; the BritishAntarctic Survey party were still at large, as was atwo-girl TV team who happened to be making adocumentary on wildlife at the time. Indicationsthat the Task Force appeared to be detachingelements towards South Georgia led to thegarrison's reinforcement by another platoon ofMarines, shipped in by the submarine Santa Fé.Before they arrived British troops had alreadylanded.

It is unclear who was first ashore: the SAS, SBS,or Royal Marines. One Marine was certainly withthe TV team at one point, since the girls filmed himteaching them to handle a 9mm pistol. He mayhave come in via HMS Endurance, which wascruising in the area acting as a communicationslink. Otherwise the first recorded landing was on 21April, by 15 men of Mountain Troop, D Sqn., 22

SAS Regiment, on the Fortuna Glacier. Taskedwith reconnoitring the enemy garrison, they foundconditions on the glacier impossible; 100mph windsswept away their shelters, and 'environmentalcasualties' were imminent. The Wessex 5 helicoptersent to extract them from RFA Tidespring crashedon take-off from the glacier in appalling 'white-out'conditions; so did the second Wessex whichattempted the mission. Eventually the Wessex 3from HMS Antrim, flown by Lt.Cdr. Ian Stanley onhis seventh mission in two days, managed to lift outthe SAS and the stranded aircrew—a grossoverload of 17 passengers—in a feat of airmanshipwhich earned Lt.Cdr. Stanley the DSO. Withinhours another team was ready to land, this timeusing Gemini inflatable assault boats.

The 30kw (40hp) outboard engines of theGeminis are temperamental even under training

Cheerful soldiers of 2 Para after the enemy surrender at GooseGreen. Note new fibre helmets, with and without camouflage;and first field dressings taped to webbing, along with smokegrenades. (MoD)

15

conditions, as the author has discovered; and thistime they turned nasty. Fifteen men of 2 SBS andBoat Troop, D Sqn., 22 SAS Regt. set out in fiveboats. Almost as soon as the first was launched itsengine failed, and three men were swept away intothe Antarctic night. A second suffered the same fate.(One crew were recovered by helicopter, and theother made a landing, waiting five days beforeswitching on their Sarbe beacon in case theyjeopardised the operation.) The other boats landedat Grass Island and set up OPs; the garrison did notappear alert.

The events that led to the recapture of the islandwere an excellent example of the combination ofgood luck and judgement that is needed in war. OnSunday 25 April naval helicopters spotted thesubmarine Santa Fé leaving the island afterdelivering reinforcements. Depth-charged on thesurface and badly damaged, she was forced to turnback for Grytviken, and was then strafed withgunfire and AS.12 missiles by Endurances, Wasp andforced to beach.

The original plan envisaged a set-piece landingby M Coy., 42 Cdo; however, the SAS squadroncommander on board HMS Antrim urged that theland forces should seize the opportunity presentedby the confusion of the attack on Santa Fe, and go for

Men of Support Coy., 1/7th Gurkha Rifles with a capturedenemy twin 20mm AA cannon near Goose Green; some ofthese weapons were pressed into British service. The exposedposition of this gun is odd, given the excellence of many enemypositions. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

an immediate landing. By mid-afternoon 30 SASmen and Maj. Sheridan, second in command of 42Cdo., were ashore; followed up by men of M Coy.,they moved the three miles to Grytviken, whosegarrison were under observation by a NavalGunfire Support Forward Observer from 148Bty.RA, who specialise in this task. The NGSFOcalled down the first of what would total 6,700rounds of NGS by the end of the Falklandscampaign. Since the emphasis at this stage was onlimiting casualties, he did not bring down fire anycloser than 800m from identified positions: thebombardment was a demonstration of superiorfirepower, falling in a controlled pattern whichcould have left the enemy in no doubt that theRoyal Navy could have hit them if it had wanted to.

The defenders' morale took a further knock whenthe SAS appeared on the enemy position tonegotiate their surrender: the Argentine officerprotested 'You have just run through a minefield!'Presumably located by watching the area avoidedby the enemy as they moved around, the mines mayhave been lifted, or the safe lane observed andnoted, during a previous close reconnaissance of theposition.

The enemy at Grytviken were 'bounced' intosurrendering by the SAS, who proceeded to run theUnion flag up the pole; after refusing a radioinvitation to surrender, the 16 men at Leith werepersuaded to do so without a fight by a personalvisit from the SAS and Marines the following day.The British forces ashore were initiallyoutnumbered by the garrison, which wassubsequently found to total 156 Marines and Navypersonnel, and 38 civilians.

In view of the earlier Argentine repatriation ofthe Royal Marines captured on 2/3 April, it wasdecided to send the Argentine prisoners home viaMontevideo. The slightly Renaissance quality ofthe whole episode was reinforced when the captainof Santa Fé and Lt. Cdr. Astiz were dined aboard oneof the British warships. In Argentina the response tothe defeat was not to ascribe it to guile and superiorfirepower—as had Astiz in the surrender documenthe signed aboard HMS Plymouth—but simply todeny it had happened, and to claim that their'lizard commandos' were still in action for daysafterwards. There were a few minor casualties onthe Argentine side, one submarine crewman losing

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2 June: Guardsmen of 5 Inf.Bde. come ashore at San Carlosunder the watchful eye of an AA sentry with a short-barrelBrowning M2 .50cal. machine gun. His CEFO includes thelightweight pick; and he is sitting on a rucksack of civilianorigin. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

a leg; and a sailor was unfortunately shot dead inerror while the Santa Fé was being moved undersupervision—an unhappy end to an operation thatseemed barely credible, since not one man had beenkilled in action. The Ministry of Defence were atpains to explain that although the Argentineprisoners were treated according to the GenevaConvention, this did not mean that Britain and theArgentine were 'at war'.

The Spanish Press later revealed that Astiz wasan officer active in the 'Dirty War' waged by theJunta in the mid-1970s against internal opposition;one source described him as 'a senior torturer". TheSwedish and French governments expressed adesire to interview him in connection with thedisappearance of their nationals in Argentina; thesewere, respectively, a 17 year-old girl shot in the backand driven away in a car, never to be seen again,and a pair of elderly nuns engaged in medical work.Though briefly held in the UK, Astiz was deported

to Montevideo (where, intriguingly, he is reportedto have disappeared) when it was established thatthere was no provision of the Geneva Conventionunder which he could be questioned against his willby authorities of a third party.

Pebble IslandThe raid on Pebble Island on 14 May seemedalmost an echo from another war, so reminiscentwas it of SAS operations around the Mediterraneanin the Second World War.

Why was this tiny community on the northernedge of West Falkland attacked? Firstly, and webelieve most importantly, there was an Argentinemobile radar installation there which represented aserious threat to the already-planned landings bythe Task Force at San Carlos across the northernend of Falkland Sound. Secondly, the air strip alsoboasted a detachment of Pucara ground attackaircraft which represented a threat to the landings;and the destruction of these, useful in itself, would'cover' the destruction of the radar installation,which might otherwise point too clearly toimminent major movement in the area. PebbleIsland was also a staging post for C-130 flights from

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A Sea King lifts heavy equipment in the background asGuardsmen of 5 Bde. move inland through comrades diggingin. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

the Argentine mainland, whose cargo could be off-loaded there for onward shipment by smalleraircraft or the small ships which operated aroundthe coasts. A cynic might also suggest that there wasa need for good news after the loss of HMS Sheffield;despite the claim that the Task Force had a freehand, there were moments when it seemed as if theCabinet was asking them to deliver some goodnews.

On the night of 11 May eight SAS men—two'sticks'—had landed on West Falkland oppositePebble Island, and on the 13th they crossed toestablish OPs on the rolling ground directly eastof the objective. On the night of 14/15 Maythey marked a landing zone for helicopters to land45 men and a naval gunfire expert on the island.The SAS are quick to claim that the NGSFO wasthe first man ashore. The party was split into anassault group and a cover party, the former toattack the targets and the latter to keep the garrisonoccupied. The landing was late, and a night marchacross the island left only half an hour for the attack;for this reason a plan to contact the civilians in thelittle community was abandoned.

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Automatic fire from the covering party, and4.5m. shells called in at a rate of one every twoseconds by the NGSFO, kept many of the enemy intheir trenches. The demolition men would havecarried in their rucksacks handy-sized charges ofplastic explosive, which is both stable andwaterproof, with short lengths of safety fuse to allowthem time to withdraw. They probably placed alltheir charges in the cockpits of the Pucaras, todestroy the instruments and to prevent thecannibalisation of one aircraft to repair another. Inall they destroyed six Pucaras, a Short Skyvan andfive other light aircraft (variously reported as beingPuma helicopters or Aermacchis); as well as theradar set and an ammunition dump.

During the withdrawal they were attacked by theArgentine garrison, but this interference endedwhen the officer who was urging his men forwardwas spotted and shot. The only British casualtieswere two men slightly wounded.

Apart from its material effects, the raid was usefulin that it worried the Argentine garrisons, and gavethem a pattern to expect when more raids tookplace—a situation which would be exploited duringthe landings at San Carlos. Dates are not available,but it is known that SAS reconnaissance partieslanded during the campaign at Weddell, Port

Stephen, Fox Bay, Chartres, Dunnose Head, PortHoward, Warrah House, Mt. Robinson, Mt.Rosalie, and Byron Heights, all on West Falkland;at Carcass Island, Keppel Island, Sea Lion Islandand Lively Island; and, on East Falkland, in theMiddle Bay area*, San Carlos, Camilla House*,Douglas, Teal Inlet, Rincon Grande, Port Louis,Diamond Mt., Kydney Island, Mt. Low*, Mt.Kent* and Stanley*( * = contact with the enemy).

San Carlos and AfterThe landings on the Falklands began with a disasteron the night of 18 May when a Sea King helicopterferrying men of 22 SAS Regt. from a briefing lostpower on take-off and crashed in the sea—apparently as a result of birdstrike. In the crash 19men of this small and hand-picked unit were lost; allcasualties are tragic, but these were men ofexceptional skills.

As the main landing force approached thebeaches at San Carlos, the guides who had beenashore since 1 May moved down to mark thelanding sites, having checked the area for mines and

A Scimitar of the Blues and Royals, complete with a neat'basha' for the crew, in position at Bluff Cove. The 30mmRarden cannon proved effective in the infantry support role.The 'CVR(T)30' Scimitar has a ground pressure of only .35kgper square inch, giving excellent floatation on the soft groundencountered along the northern axis of advance on EastFalkland. The passive night vision equipment for commander,gunner and driver came in extremely useful during the finalnight battles before Stanley. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

enemy troops. As part of the deception plan, whichinvolved naval shelling of targets near Bluff Coveand Fitzroy, the SAS put in a major raid on thegarrison at Darwin and Goose Green; this was bothto mislead enemy intelligence officers as to Britishintentions, and to keep the garrisons tied up andunable to intervene at San Carlos. About 40 SASmen made a night approach march—laterdescribed by one trooper as 'the toughest hike I'veever done with the SAS'—laden with a mix ofweapons which were to be used to give theimpression of a full battalion attack. The attackachieved all it set out to do: automatic fire, mortarbombs and anti-tank missiles kept the Argentineforces quiet. The 80-lb. loads carried by each manon the outward leg were considerably lightened bythe time they withdrew. It is probable that anumber of the other raids listed above also occurredon this night, 20/21 May.

Back at San Carlos, the LCMs were moving

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Gurkhas prepare to take off from Darwin to clear enemy OPs inthe hills, 5 June. Four soldiers rode in each Scout, with feetbraced on the skid. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

through the darkness from HMS Intrepid andFearless while the guns of the frigates and destroyersbegan to soften up targets ashore. On FanningHead a troop of Argentines were routed by theSBS in a fierce firefight. The LCMs beached, andthe Scorpions and Scimitars of the Blues and Royalswere first down the ramps to give supporting fire.By 0730 the landings by 40 Cdo. and 2 Para on BlueBeaches 1 and 2 were complete. As the dawn rose 45Cdo. came ashore at Red Beach in Ajax Bay, and 3Para, followed by 42 Cdo. in reserve, at GreenBeaches 1 and 2 close to San Carlos Settlement.

First casualties were three aircrew of two Gazellehelicopters of 3 Cdo.Bde. Air Squadron shot downby the retreating Argentines, apparently with smallarms fire. At least one Argentine Pucara oftwo or three shot down that day was destroyed bySAS troops—who enjoyed a wider choice ofweapons—with a US-made Stinger SAM. That

morning nine 'cold, wet and miserable' enemyprisoners were taken, but ground resistance wasbrief. The air attacks began in earnest at about1030 hrs, however, and went on for the next fourdays with some frequency; it is thought that someenemy aircrew made up to three sorties daily.

As the air defences around San Carlos wereimproved, the Blowpipes were supplemented byRapier SAMs, by the CAP Sea Harriers operatingwell out to sea, and by the 'gun line' of warshipswith their shipboard systems. The Press aboard theTask Force ships christened San Carlos Water andthe northern reaches of Falkland Sound 'BombAlley', as the duel between the FAA's Mirages,Daggers and Skyhawks on the one hand, and theArmy and Royal Navy SAM and gun crews on theother, grew ever more savage.

For the Rapier crews, operations were unlikeanything they had experienced on ranges orsimulators. 'The broad, U-shaped valleys meantangle-of-depression problems for the ridge sites, notto mention mist and low cloud; while the valleybottoms severely limited arcs and coverage. Fast jetsat 50 feet and travelling at speeds up to and in excessof 500 knots are difficult enough; but add frequentobscuration behind pimples of land, multipleweapons systems all firing at flat trajectories, andthe majority of targets being acquired at ranges of3km or less—and you have something not cateredfor either in the training films or at the Hebrides.'The new tactics were learned, however, and 40 percent of the total hits were achieved by 'tail-chaser'missiles.

One lieutenant in 2 Para watched an Argentinepilot switch on his afterburner as a heat-seekingmissile nosed towards his aircraft. The massivethermal signature immediately attracted themissile, and the pilot's desperate attempt to achieveescape by speed was his death warrant. The firstkills credited to Rapier came when '33 Charlie' of TBty. (Shah Sujah's Troop), commanded by Sgt. G.J. 'Taff' Morgan, took two Skyhawks.

The problems besetting the SAM crews weresimilar to those facing the enemy pilots. The shapeof San Carlos Water gave incoming aircraft littletime to fix a target, whereas the longer approachesalong Falkland Sound gave them a clearer run atthe Royal Navy's 'gun line'. It was on 23 May thatthe FAA, after a day's absence, returned in

2 0

strength. They lost six to eight jets; but succeeded inhitting HMS Antelope, and that night her dramaticend lit up the sky and the hills around San CarlosWater.

The forces ashore now comprised all three RoyalMarine Commandos and both Para battalions,with a Tactical Brigade Headquarters. Supportarms from the invaluable Commando LogisticRegt. were ashore, including the RN SurgicalSupport Team, which took over the derelictrefrigeration plant at Ajax Bay for lack of anythingbetter. They performed miracles in this dank ruin,christened by the piratical Surgeon Cdr. 'Rick'Jolly as 'The Red and Green Life Machine'. For thenext few days the main task was to offload stores andammunition. The loss of Atlantic Conveyor on 25 Maybrutally changed Brig. Julian Thompson's plans for

\ an airmobile advance, with a shock reminiscent of

81mm mortar crew of 42 Cdo.RM on Mt. Kent. Elements of 42Cdo. were heli-lifted forward 60km in blizzard conditions, toan LZ on which the SAS and enemy troops were still fighting;and stayed there for six days in temperatures of — 12 C, for thefirst two nights without their sleeping bags. They broughtdown fire on anything that moved, until finally relieved by 45Cdo. (MoD)

the ghastly problems thrown in by Directing Staffin the late stages of an exercise. With Atlantic Con-veyor the Task Force lost stores, RE vehicles, butworst of all, three Chinook and eight Wessex heli-copters. It was this loss which obliged the RoyalMarines and 3 Para to make their epic 'yomp' alongthe northern route across East Falkland, a feat ofold-fashioned infantry stamina which the enemyhad not considered possible.

Orders for the move out from San Carlos wereissued on 26 May. It was hardly a 'breakout', sincethe Argentines had not pressed the beachhead. Onthe northern route, 3 Para would move to Teal Inletand 45 Cdo. to Douglas Settlement, with 42 Cdo. inreserve, while 40 Cdo. covered the beachhead;meanwhile 2 Para would move south to CamillaCreek House by 27 May, and would attack GooseGreen and Darwin the day after.

Men of 40 Cdo. captured an officer of ArgentineMarines on the 27th in the vicinity of San Carlos;later that day an air attack hit a British ammunitiondump, and the men around San Carlos had adisturbed night as it continued to explode.Meanwhile enemy OPs on high ground overlooking

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A Royal Marine, impressively clean-shaven, photographed inblowing snow during the final phase of operations beforeStanley. Note first field dressings taped to both SLR butt andbelt—all bullets have an exit as well as an entry hole . . . Hoodswere only worn up when out of the line and in danger offrostbite: in action they are bad for the hearing, which can befatal. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

2 Para's route reported their movement, andMenendez heli-lifted his reserves from Mt.Challenger down to Goose Green and Darwin.Suddenly the garrison, estimated at 500 men mostlyfrom the Air Force, was swollen to 1,400, goodtroops, dug in and alert.

Goose GreenThe battle which followed lasted throughout theday and night of 28 May. It was fought over veryopen ground, and against an enemy who withdrewslowly through fixed positions prepared in depth,supported by three 105mm guns, mortars, and20mm and 35mm twin AA mountings firing in theground role. The Paras were supported by three105mm light guns of 8 Bty., 29 Cdo.Regt. RA,which had received a total of 800 tons ofammunition. The British found that the Argentine

positions were often linear, as opposed to the all-round positions taught in the British Army; but theychose their ground well, and the trenches hadexcellent visibility. Machine gun positionssometimes had two guns on sustained fire mounts,positioned to give 360° cover.

It was a line of such trenches that Lt.Col. H.Jones, CO of 2 Para, attacked with men of HQ Coy.when it was holding up the advance of hisbattalion. His death from wounds did notslacken the impetus of 2 Para's attack; butafterwards there was time to remember an officerwho wished, in the best traditions of The ParachuteRegiment, to lead from the front. A posthumousaward of the Victoria Cross was later announced.

Darwin was taken by mid-morning on the 28th,and Goose Green airfield by the afternoon. Thecommunity was surrounded at last light, and thesurrender took place on the following morning.During this fighting the Paras found their 81mmmortars most effective against enemy positions;they also brought their Milan anti-tank missilesinto action. Designed to penetrate inches of tankarmour, and with a range of anything between 25and 2,000 metres, they proved both accurate anddevastating, and became the infantry's ownportable artillery.

The enemy surrender at Goose Green wasachieved through a remarkable piece of diplomacyby Maj. Chris Keeble, acting CO of 2 Para, and theSpanish-speaking Capt. Rod Bell RM. Keeble senttwo captured Argentine NCOs forward under aflag of truce with an appeal to Air Cdre. WilsonPedrozo, the enemy commander, that as a Catholiche should spare the lives of his men. (It should benoted that, whether through confusion or intent,a flag of truce had not been honoured by theenemy earlier in this engagement.) Keeble'spreoccupation with securing an agreement whichwould safeguard the lives of civilians in the settle-ment proved to be irrelevant: Pedrozo seemedfar more concerned that he should have anopportunity to parade and address his men. Havingestablished their priorities, both sides carried on.The parade, speech, and surrender took place; theParas released the civilians, who had been lockedin a single building for a month—and discoveredthat they had fought and won a battle at odds oftwo to one against.

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The photographs of long lines of prisoners withone or two guards dotted among the columns,reminiscent of North Africa in the Second WorldWar, were a major boost to British morale; and ablow to the Argentines, who had put in good troopsin strength, and lost. The casualty figures showedhow the training and motivation of 2 Para had paidoff: they had lost 13 killed and 34 wounded, against250 enemy dead and missing and about 150wounded. Among the British dead were the crew ofa Scout helicopter piloted by Lt. Dick Nunn RM.Blowpipe claimed its first kill for the British with theshooting down of a Pucara by 3 Cdo.Bde. AirDefence Troop.

On 30 May 45 Cdo. reached Douglas, and 3 ParaTeal Inlet. They had crossed terrain which isdifficult even in good weather, and had done it inhail, rain squalls and icy winds. Leg and ankleinjuries were numerous, since the 'going' was eitherrock, marsh, or rough highland grassland. The menwere carrying all their own kit, as well as weaponsand ammunition, and some loads weighed 120lb. or

even more.On the same day Maj.Gen. Jeremy Moore RM,

The bleak battlefield west of Stanley, seen from Goat Ridgelooking east. Left background. Tumbledown; right back-ground, Mt. William. The terribly exposed terrain, acrosswhich the British advanced against enemy who had had weeksto dig in on the dominating features, is shown clearly here.(Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

commander of the land forces now that theyexceeded one brigade with the arrival of 5 Inf.Bde.at San Carlos, took over the direction of thecampaign. The arrival of the Guards and Gurkhas,who had transferred from QE2 to Canberra at SouthGeorgia, was not publicly announced for somedays.

On 31 May men of K Coy., 42 Cdo. were heli-lifted 30km out in advance of the British forwardtroops to occupy Mt. Kent, a key position outsideStanley. It had already been aggressivelyreconnoitred by a squadron of 22 SAS Regt., whohad harassed the garrison and established that itwas not large—the bulk of this unit had been lost atGoose Green and Darwin. The Royal Marines werereinforced by two 81mm mortars and three 105mmlight guns. Meanwhile 3 Para moved from TealInlet to Estancia House, and then to high ground tothe west. The rest of 42 Cdo. were moved up to

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A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

reinforce K Coy., consolidating on Mts. Kent andChallenger. The eight AFVs of the Blues and Royals,who had followed the northern route, moved south-east towards Kent and Challenger; they hadsurvived some very hard terrain, and had provedthe worth of their design concept.

With the Marines and Paras on Kent andChallenger, a busy time followed while PoWs weremoved back from Goose Green and the men andequipment of 5 Bde. were brought forward; onepriority was to bring 7, 8 and 79 Btys. of 29 Cdo.Regt. RA forward with 1,000 rounds per gun—atask which stretched the reduced heli-lift capacity.Movement was by air, weather permitting, but theLSLs were also used. The long winter nights gavecover from air attack and observation alike. On 4June the LSL Sir Tristram, and LCMs from HMSIntrepid, moved 2nd Scots Guards around thesouthern coast to the Bluff Cove area. When theylanded after their freezing and exhausting journeythe Guards were revitalised by a Falklandshousewife who opened up her deep-freeze andcooked chops all round.

These landings at Fitzroy had become possibleafter Maj. John Crosland of 2 Para made a discreet

As 2nd Bn. The Scots Guards dig in on the open ground, and aWessex lifts away on its tireless shuttle back and forth withmore men and supplies, the Gazelle of 5 Bde. commander Brig.Tony Wilson lands on Goat Ridge. Note the modification whichsends the exhaust heat upwards, a counter to enemy heat-seeking SAMs, and the rocket pods mounted on the transversebar through the fuselage. Details will be found in MAA 135, 'AirForces'. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

phone-call to Reg Binney, the farm manager atFitzroy. This call on 3 June established that theArgentines had pulled out the day before. Men of 2Para were hastily lifted forward by helicopter tosecure the area; this coup saved a slow advance tocontact, and also saved 5 Bde. from the problempresented by the bridge at Fitzroy, which is hard tobypass.

The Gurkhas of 1/7GR took over at Goose Greenfrom 2 Para; led by their new CO, Lt.Col. DavidChaundler, who had made a water jump from aC-130 to join them, the Paras now came undercommand of 5 Brigade. The Gurkhas made asuccession of airborne attacks on suspected enemypositions which had been left behind the forwardedge of the battle area. The Press called it 'moppingup'; if the domestic analogy is retained, it was morelike a series of sharp squirts of insecticide bringing

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Enemy shells fall among 2nd Scots Guards as they dig in belowGoat Ridge; the white burst is phosphorus. (Paul Haley,'Soldier' Magazine)

down troublesome flies. With four men riding eachScout helicopter, the Gurkhas would put in parties ofabout a dozen men to attack suspected OPs, coveredby Gazelles with SNEB rockets. This efficienttechnique netted an enemy party from WestFalkland armed with SAM-7 missiles.

As men and ammunition were being moved upto the perimeter around Stanley by sea and air,patrols were going out nightly to dominate no-man's-land and to examine minefields anddefences. The SAS and SBS were active on bothEast and West Falkland. One journalist watched anSAS 'stick' report the details of a fighting patrolnear Stanley, and was impressed by the matter-of-fact phrases preferred by the SAS to the rather moreflamboyant 'zapping' and 'wasting' of Paras andMarines: 'Took two, wounded two, killed three.' Itis ironic that after their surrender the Argentineswere to complain about superior night-fightingaids: it was not the equipment, but rather the menwho were in their element by night.

A Harrier strip had now been completed at PortSan Carlos—after a delay caused by loss of metalmatting on Atlantic Conveyor—and aircraft operatingfrom it were now called in against 155mm gunpositions which had been shelling 3 Cdo.Bde.troops.

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FitzroyThe cycle of triumph and tragedy which hadbecome the rhythm of 'Corporate' hit a tragicallylow note on 8 June, when Argentine jets suc-cessfully bombed the LSLs Sir Tristram and SirGalahad at Fitzroy. Although the former had almostcompleted off-loading by 1700hrs, large numbersof men from 1st Bn. The Welsh Guards were stillaboard Sir Galahad when she was hit. In theexplosions and raging fire which followed, 41 WelshGuardsmen and two Sappers died, and another 46Guardsmen were wounded, some of them veryseverely; total casualties from the raid were 146, ofwhich 63 died.

As the lifeboats and rafts reached the shore,soldiers waded into the freezing water to assist thesurvivors. Helicopters flew straight into theblinding smoke-pall above the deck, whereammunition was exploding, to snatch other men offthe ship; and used the down-draught of their rotorsto push life rafts away from blazing oil on the water.When the casualties had been moved off the beach,somebody made the welcome discovery thatlifeboats contain emergency rations, includingvarious high-energy items. That night some soldierssupplemented combat rations with condensed milkand other prizes.

There was a further air raid on the beach thatevening, but by now missile batteries and automaticweapons had been set up, and four out of fiveSkyhawks were reported knocked down. One

soldier watched others engage the aircraft withsmall arms—a technique taught in the British Armysince its successful use by the Vietcong. He saw oneaircraft start its bombing run, and then: 'You couldalmost see the pilot thinking "Oh, no!" and rollaway', as the sky above the bay filled up with redtracer—and with the four unseen ball roundswhich accompanied each tracer round. That wasone A-4 which did not make it home, althoughothers sank an LCM that day, with the loss of fourMarines and two RN ratings.

The Argentine estimates of the losses caused atFitzroy were greatly inflated, and the Ministry ofDefence and the commanders on the spot realisedthat it would benefit their plans if Menendez wereled to believe that the British capability to launchan attack had been disrupted.

The Final BattlesOn 10 June Brig. Thompson gave orders for thecapture of Mt. Longdon, Two Sisters, Mt. Harrietand Goat Ridge. Many of these features resemblethe Dartmoor Tors: outcrops of rock at the top oflong, exposed hillsides, some of them linked bysaddles of high ground but—in clear weather—giving the defenders excellent visibility. The troopsto be used were 42 Cdo., 45 Cdo., 3 Para, 1st WelshGuards (one company, with two companies 40Cdo.), and 2 Para under command and in support.

The men of 3 Para were to assault and captureMt. Longdon, and 2 Para would move so as to beable to support them. To their south, 45 Cdo. was totake Two Sisters. South again, 1st Welsh Guardswith two companies of 40 Cdo. under commandwould secure a start line for an attack on Mt.Harriet, from which 42 Cdo. would then assaultand capture that feature while the compositebattalion remained in reserve. Although there wasto be no unusual artillery preparation, and theattack was to go in as silently as possible in the initialstages, there was considerable gunfire support laidon for the subsequent stages. Five batteries of 29Cdo. Regt. RA, two of them in support from 5Inf.Bde., were supplemented by four RN warships:HMS Avenger for 3 Para, Glamorgan for 45 Cdo.,Yarmouth for 42 Cdo., and Arrow for an SASsquadron making a simultaneous assault on MurrelHeights. The CO of 29 Cdo.Regt. RA co-ordinatedthe fire support, and had an 'on call' list of 47

targets. During the fighting on the night of 11/12June 3,000 rounds would be fired, some on targets50 metres from the forward friendly positions.

When the fighting was over the announcementthrough MoD in London spoke of Argentinesoldiers being 'surprised in their sleeping bags'.They may have started off like that, but the nightwas to see heavy fighting on all positions.

On Mt. Longdon, 3 Para fought a fierce battlewith the Argentine 7th Inf.Regt., who had dugthemselves in among the crags and who used theirnight snipers very effectively. The capture of thefeature cost 3 Para 17 dead and 40 wounded. Duringthis action Sgt. Ian McKay took command of hisplatoon when his officer had been shot in both legs,and went forward to destroy three Argentinemachine gun positions with hand grenades. Hereceived a posthumous VC. On Two Sisters 45 Cdo.were faced by a reinforced company of the 4th Inf.Regt., with .50cal. machine guns in strong positions;45 Cdo. lost four dead and eight wounded.

The remainder of 4th Inf.Regt. were on Mt.Harriet. The Welsh Guards Recce Platoon 'shot in'a diversionary attack on the west side of the featureusing Milan, while 42 Cdo. hooked round to thesouth and assaulted it from the rear. The Argentineswere taken by surprise in this classic infantry attack,and the Royal Marines took their objective for one

Mortar Platoon, 1st/7th Gurkha Rifles take a break after firingall night during the battle for Tumbledown and Mt. William on13/14 June. They wear olive green rainproofs, CW caps and '43pattern steel helmets. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

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killed and 13 wounded. During this series of attackssome Argentine soldiers came in to surrender fromadjoining positions not under direct attack; thesight of the incoming fire, and the prospect of asimilar fate sooner or later, were apparentlysufficient to overcome the inadequate leadership oftheir officers and NCOs and the poor motivation ofthese conscripted defenders of the 'Malvinas'.

It was while giving NGS to 45 Cdo. in this nightbattle that HMS Glamorgan was hit and damaged bya land-launched Exocet missile.

In the original plan the attack would have beenpressed the following night, with 2 Para assaultingWireless Ridge under command of 3 Cdo.Bde.,while 2nd Scots Guards attacked Mt. Tumbledownand the Gurkhas went for Mt. William. In the eventthe attack was postponed for 24 hours. In themeantime artillery fire was exchanged with theenemy 105mm and 155mm guns around Stanley,and the airport runway was brought under fire.

By this stage in the campaign artillery fire hadshown itself to be very effective. Though Argentinesoldiers might not be killed in great numbers, theconstant pounding of British 105mm shells forcedthem underground and sapped their morale.Some officers watched their young conscriptsoldiers reduced to silent immobility by the shelling:'they were stunned'. During the nights of 10 to 13June helicopters brought forward over 400 roundsper gun; by the end of the fighting it was reportedthat some guns were down to six rounds, and thatover 2,400 rounds had been fired in the finaladvance.

The enemy gunners returned this fire, and onePara officer remarked afterwards that 'steadyshelling by 155s eventually makes you rathershaky'. He recalled how many non-smokers hadtaken to tobacco, and not as tentative schoolboysmokers might, but as veteran 40-a-day men. Even3 Cdo.Bde. HQ was not spared surprises; A-4Sdropped retard bombs on its position at Bluff Peaknear Mt. Kent, although fortunately there were nocasualties. One Marine officer remarked: 'You canget used to shelling, but no man gets used tobombing!'

Patrols were still going out to establish theposition of Argentine minefields. These operationsrequire patience, and a quiet courage that makesdemands upon even the strongest soldier. The

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minefield reconnaissance was extremely testing,and one sergeant went out three nights insuccession—on the third night on his own, after hisfirst two patrols had suffered casualties.

At 0030hrs on the night of 13/14 June, 2nd ScotsGuards put in a diversionary attack on a position2km south of their main objective on Tumbledown.The attack ran into an enemy platoon and tookcasualties, but it allowed G Coy. to get a lodgementon the objective.

The Scots Guards attack was part of a Brigadeplan including subsequent attacks on Mt. Williamand Sapper Hill by the 1st/7th Gurkha Rifles and1st Welsh Guards. The Scots Guards had HMSYarmouth and Phoebe on call, and the guns of 4 FieldRegt. and 7 Bty., 29 Cdo.Regt. at priority call andunder the control of Maj. R. T. Gwynn with 2SG;when they started firing they did not let up for morethan three minutes at a time for the next 14 hours.In addition, the 'Jocks' had three mortar platoonsand a platoon of Browning .50cal. machine guns insupport. The battalion was committed to a three-phase assault consisting of company attacks ondifferent parts of the feature.

As Left Flank Coy. moved forward from the GCoy. position it took casualties from enemy mortars,machine guns and snipers; there was also someshelling of G Coy. and battalion headquarters. LeftFlank were caught in a difficult position, with highrocks on each side and only a 50-metre wide valleyin front. Capt. W. D. Nicol, the RA FOO with thelead company, brought down heavy fire on theenemy—a task made difficult by the fact that thetwo sides were only 100 metres apart in pitchdarkness. For the gunners there were also theproblems of clearing a crest line and co-ordinatingilluminating rounds. Left Flank remained pinneddown until, following this heavy bombardment,they put in a vigorous company attack and securedtheir objective by o82ohrs; it was during this actionthat the Guardsmen made a very effective assaultwith fixed bayonets, a tactic normally held to beanachronistic in these days but which still has itsuses. Afterwards they discovered that their enemyhad been the Argentine 5th Marine InfantryBattalion. Scots Guards casualties were nine deadand 41 wounded; enemy casualties were about 100,and the 27 prisoners included the battalioncommander.

The Gurkhas were tasked to move round thenorthern flank of Tumbledown when it had beensecured. As they advanced they came underobserved artillery fire, suffering ten casualties. Theirtroubles were increased by reports of a minefieldstretching north from Tumbledown, but by greatgood fortune they passed its southern boundary.While the Gurkhas were moving across their startline the Welsh Guards were advancing in the south,and here they ran into minefields laid to cover thisaxis, two Marines having their feet blown off. Itwas slow work feeling a way forward through theminefield in the dark; an RA sergeant working asassistant to the battery commander attached to1 WG said later that he had never in his life followedso closely in the footsteps of his BC.

By dawn the Gurkhas were on Mt. William, andto the north 2 Para were on Wireless Ridge. Apartfrom NGS the Paras had enjoyed direct supportfrom the Blues and Royals, the rapid-fire 30mmRarden cannon of the Scimitar proving veryeffective. They lost three dead and 11 wounded.

From the newly captured features the Britishtroops, squinting in an icy, snow-laden wind, could

Casevac on the morning of 14 June: 'walking wounded' ScotsGuards make their way to a Scout. In fact the Guardsman withthe bandaged head was severely injured, and his mates carryhis kit. At right, carelessly caught by the camera, a Marine ofM & AW Cadre, identified by his M16, only carried by specialforces. Other tell-tale indicators, we are told, were thesuperior Gortex rainproofs worn by some SAS men; and theload-carrying jerkins, similar to the old 1943 Battle Jerkin,worn by some SBS Marines in preference to webbing equip-ment. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

see the Argentine soldiers leaving their trenches andstreaming back into Stanley. The gunners hastenedthis retreat, as FOOs watched and corrected the fireon the tiny, stumbling figures showing dark againstthe white ground. 'It was a most pathetic sight, andone which I never wish to see again', recalled theCO of 4 Field Regt.RA.

It was rime for Gen. Moore to use discretion aswell as strength. Brig. Thompson called off a cluster-bomb attack on Sapper Hill by Harriers from AjaxBay when the jets were only three minutes fromweapons release. (The Harriers had already usedlaser-guided bombs against Argentine AA positionswith great effect that morning.) Contact had beenmade with the Argentines through a Spanish-speaking Royal Marines officer, Capt. Rod Bell,who was based on HMS Fearless. The word was

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9 June, between Bluff Cove and Fitzroy: a 105mm light guncrew of C Sub., 29 'Corunna' Bty., 4 Field Regt.RA prepare tosend on its way to Sapper Hill one of the 2,400 rounds firedduring the final advance on Stanley. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier'Magazine)

passed via a civilian doctor in Stanley, and ameeting was arranged with Menendez. White flagsbegan to appear all over Stanley.

The men of 2 Para had reached the race coursewhen they were ordered to halt, much to theirchagrin. Troops of J Coy., 42 Cdo. moved throughthem into the town; it was they who would laterenjoy a personal triumph when they ran up aFalklands Islands Union flag on the mast atGovernment House. It was the flag they had keptever since the firefight with Argentine Marines on 2April—these were the men of NP8901, returned viathe UK after their repatriation by the Argentines.

The Argentine surrender was not filmed orphotographed, in contrast to the Argentinecoverage of a victory considerably less hard-won.Even the Instrument of Surrender was a curiously-muted document: a simple sheet of typewrittenpaper. The surrender became effective at 2359hrsZulu on 14 June, 2059hrs local time. Menendezmade an alteration before signing, crossing out thewords 'unconditional' and 'Lafonia' for the sake ofhis self-respect.

A signal was sent to London via the SAS link withHereford. In it Maj.Gen. Moore allowed himself amodest flourish for posterity: 'The Falkland Islandsare once more under the government desired bytheir inhabitants. God Save the Queen. Signed:J.J.Moore'.

An Argentine poster torn from a wall in Stanleyand brought home by a member of the Task Force

takes the form of a florid passage of blank verse; atone point it contains the lines: '. . . What are theseBritish, anyway? Low-born mercenaries, who donot know what they are fighting for!' In aninterview shortly after his victory Gen. Mooreanswered for his men:

'The basic difference was that they were fightingfor the islands; we were fighting for the islanders'.

ConclusionGeneral Moore was to quote Wellington afterWaterloo when he described the victory as a 'near-run thing'. As at Waterloo, the military facts hadpointed to a victory for the enemy. In both actions itwas the British soldier who won, and his strength ofcharacter and belief in what he was fighting for—mostly, the close bond which ties a military unittogether—which saw him through.

It is a military axiom that one of the keys tosuccess is selection and maintenance of aim. Theaim was to get the Argentine forces off the islands,and the best way to do this was to get to Stanley. Inpursuing this aim the Task Force was blessed with agovernment that did not waver—probably the firstone since 1945.

Crucially, the difference was between the officersand soldiers on the two sides. When I asked a youngPara officer what he saw as the worst and bestfeatures of the enemy, he said without a moment';pause, 'The relationship between the officers andmen—neither respected the other'; and then, after apause for thought, 'They dug good positions'.

This relationship was exemplified when ajournalist watched a British battalion commandercheck the list of his men killed and wounded after anattack. He knew their family backgrounds andcharacters, their skills, even their favourite sports.General Menendez did not know how many menwere in and around Stanley when he surrendered—he was mistaken by a margin of thousands.

British troops and journalists found to theirsurprise that the Argentine Army issued twodistinctly different ration packs: an assault ration,and a large 'GS' type pack which contained morefood, of better quality, extra comforts, and an issue

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of cigarettes and whisky. When in the field Britishofficers use identical 24-hour ration packs to theirmen, and if feeding is done centrally it is a traditionthat they wait until all their men have been fedbefore joining the queue. The religious and politicaltracts stuffed in every Argentine ration pack areunlikely to have made up for the way officersgenerally 'acquired' the larger pack.

Reports published in Buenos Aires reinforced thisimpression of deficient leadership. Conscripts werepunished by being forced to stand in the open infreezing rain without gloves, boots or headgear; andthis punishment was for deserting their posts to go insearch of food. No army can allow its men tostraggle off looking for food—and no army shouldoblige them to do so. There were moments whenrations did not reach British units on the Falklands,but the men knew that this was not because of apolicy of giving them the least, last. The Argentineshad food available in Stanley, but it was notbrought forward to outlying positions.

The soldiers who invaded the Falklands werecapturing an island and an idea; the men wholiberated them were less concerned with the countrythan with the people, and the principle. Conscripts

can be good soldiers when they are well led andtrained. The poor leadership suffered by most of theArgentines led to fantastic rumours growingamong them—such as the story that Gurkhas killedtheir own wounded and ate their prisoners, and thatBritish special forces were mingling with thedefenders dressed in Argentine uniform andspeaking perfect Spanish. The military historianhears echoes of the Battle of the Bulge in oneArgentine soldier's report that 'There was so muchfear we tried to find questions to ask them that anArgentine would know easily, but that an Englishcommando would not know, even if he spokeperfect Spanish'.

In training British officer cadets learn one lessonVery early: 'There is no such thing as a bad soldier,only a bad officer'. The relationships betweenofficers and men of both sides in the Falklandscampaign, and the results which flowed from them,have borne out this lesson yet again.

Scots Guards bring in Argentine prisoners fromTumbledown; note the bulk of the IWS—individual weaponsight—a passive night vision device. Argentine equivalentswere smaller, lighter, and handier. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier5

Magazine)

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'It's all over!' Jocks of 7 Platoon, G Coy., 2SG hear the news ofvictory on 14 June. This battle-stained group display anamazing miscellany of clothing and equipment: second rightwears the quilted trousers worn under the CW suit; beside himis a soldier—a piper?—in a Glengarry; behind him is theGPMG number with IWS fitted, probably the most effectiveuse for this device. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

The Plates(Research by Michael Chappell .

and Martin Windrow)

The haste with which the British were forced tomount a winter campaign in the South Atlantic ledto the use of a variety of combat clothing. Apartfrom personally-acquired civilian items,surprisingly often seen in photos of the campaign,the main outfits were as follows:1. Windproof suits. Developed from the SecondWorld War smock and over-trousers popularlyassociated with the SAS, these suits were worn bymen of the RM 3rd Cdo.Bde., 2 and 3 Para, and —presumably—the SAS and RM SBS sections.Identifying features are 'bellows' smock pockets, ayoke seam where the hood is attached, and absence

of epaulettes. There are two patterns: the 'RMpattern" with a wire-stiffened hood, and 'epaul-ettes' for rank slides on the chest and back; andwhat might be termed the 'SAS pattern', with norank slide straps and an unstiffened hood. Bothhave velcro fastening at cuff and ankle. The officialnomenclature is 'Arctic windproof combat smockand trousers'. The colour is the usual BritishDPM camouflage of light green, yellow, lightred-brown, and black.2. 'Cold Weather' (CW) suits of parka and over-trousers, both with quilted liner garmentssometimes seen worn exposed—a dark greensleeveless waistcoat and trousers. These were issuedto 5th Inf.Bde., and are occasionally seen worn byparatroopers. Identifying features are epaulettes, astiffened hood, 'patch' pockets on the chest,'bellows' pockets on the skirt, and a strap-fastenedparka cuff. Also in DPM. Note that both thewindproof and CW suits have oversize buttons, and'bellows' pockets on both thighs of the trousers.

Foul-weather clothing—basically, thin rain-proofs— appeared in at least three varieties:DPM rainproof smocks and over-trousers (5 Bde.);similar items in olive green (5 Bde.); and a curiousolive green waterproof smock which appears to

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have a white inner lining—reversible?—seen inboth the Commandos and the Para battalions. Inaddition, ponchos were seen being worn from timeto time, a most unusual sight in the British Army.

Headgear included at least five varieties ofhelmet, mostly worn covered by layers of sacking,scrim nets, etc.: the new paratroopers' fibre, the oldparatroopers' steel, the 1943 steel, the RAC steelworn by RN and some RM personnel, and the AFVcrews' fibre. Pile-lined CW caps in DPMcamouflage were widely worn, as were unit berets,DPM field caps, knitted cap-comforters, etc. Wheremetal badges were worn they were normally dulled.

Footwear included the standard 'boots DMS',the 'Northern Ireland', and an amazing collec-tion of civilian fell boots scattered among the issueArctic footwear of the Marines. Rubber calf-length 'galoshes' or over-boots were issued inquantity, but a variety of civilian waterproofleggings were also seen. Photos indicate that mosttroops who made the 'long tab' across the north ofEast Falkland finished it in standard boots DMSand ankle puttees.

Equipment was basically the issue 1958 patternin all its variations, but with the addition of avariety of rucksacks. Notable are the olivenylon GS, SAS and Paratroop issues; the webbing'Bergen'; and a job lot of civilian rucksacks whichseem to have been bought up from a well-knownchain of sports and working clothes suppliers atshort notice, some in most unmilitary colours! Afinal point is that this campaign did not seem toinvolve the display of 'festoons' of belted GPMGammunition, most of which seems to have beencarried in pouches or bandoliers.

A1: Private, 3rd Bn. The Parachute RegimentApart from the new fibre paratroopers' helmet, thissoldier could belong to any battallion or commandowhich served in the Falklands. He wears thewindproof parka and over-trousers, DMS bootsand puttees. His equipment is standard '58 Patternwith '44 Pattern waterbottle, NBC gear, and togglerope; the rucksack is the Para issue, with ponchoroll and lightweight shovel attached. His weapon isthe standard SLR with Trilux SUIT sightattached. He is a living, aching reminder that in thedays of shoulder-fired missiles and massivesupporting firepower, wars are still won by the

infantryman who can march, dig and shoot betterthan his enemy.

A2: Brigadier Julian Thompson RMThe commander of 3rd Commando Brigade wearsthe windproof smock and DPM field cap, '58Pattern webbing belt and pistol holster. His rank, inblack cut-out form, is displayed both on the chest ofthe smock and—apparently a Royal Marinepeculiarity—on the cap front. (Brig. Tony Wilsonof 5th Inf.Bde. wore the maroon Para beret with thegold lion cap badge of his rank; and a parachutesmock of current pattern with the parachute brevetand the maroon 'DZ patch' of 1 Para on the rightsleeve, and the battalion's maroon lanyard at theright shoulder.)

A3: Royal Marine, Naval Party 8901Cradling his 84mm anti-tank weapon, this 'Booty'wears the temperate climate combat dress of theRoyal Marines, in which the tiny garrison wasphotographed after its capture: green Commandoberet with darkened globe-and-laurel badge; DPMcombat smock and olive green trousers, DMS bootsand puttees; and '58 Pattern fighting order, usuallysupplemented with drab khaki bandoliers.

B1: Lieutenant-Colonel H. Jones, 2nd Bn. The ParachuteRegiment

It is our sincere hope that it will not be felt in poortaste to record in this book the appearance of thisgallant officer, as he led his battalion in the attack atGoose Green which cost him his life, but whichadded an impressive chapter to the record of TheParachute Regiment. An eyewitness reports thatLt.Col. Jones paused to change the magazine of hisSterling SMG before moving on to tackle a furtherArgentine MG position, and shortly after this washit twice in the back, dying of his wounds somehours later. We have depicted him wearing the fullsuit of windproof clothing of 'RM pattern', with hisranking—on the light blue backing of theregiment—on the chest tab. The maroonregimental beret has the dulled cap badge; theequipment is '58 Pattern Combat EquipmentFighting Order (CEFO) with NBC gear.

B2: Sergeant, 2nd Bn. The Parachute RegimentThis NCO, getting off a 'double tap' with his SLR

(from which the Trilux sight has been removed forclose quarter fighting, but which retains the sightbracket), wears the standard DPM parachutesmock: the windproof parka has been removed andstowed behind his shovel, but he retains the over-trousers. On the right sleeve of the smock is theparachute brevet, above the blue 'DZ patch' of 2Para, above rank chevrons. The current patternfibre helmet has a DPM cover; padded blackleather 'Northern Ireland' gloves are worn.

B3: Sniper, 2nd Bn. The Parachute RegimentThe Paras, at least, took their snipers to theFalklands, as shown by photographic evidence; thissniper has worked forward of the assault groups,and now settles down to shoot at the target he hasstalked.

Though hardly visible, our sniper wears the oldsteel paratroops' helmet and the home-made snipersmock: a very oversize combat smock stitched allover with yards of scrim and hessian, which is still asexcellent a form of camouflage as when first

Marines of 45 Cdo., leaning into the weight of their packs,march into Stanley at the end of the long 'yomp'. Carrying theSLR in this way, with magazine and pistol grip trapped againstthe belly with both hands and arms braced on pouches,spreads the weight across both forearms. (MoD)

introduced in 1915. The modified No.4 rifle is nowdesignated Sniper Rifle L4A1; the sight Telescope,Sighting, L1A1. The high standard of camouflage ismatched by high standards of marksmanship andfieldcraft.

C1: GPMG number, 3rd Bn. The Parachute RegimentThe standard section MG is the General PurposeMachine Gun, 7.62mm, normally issued three perplatoon, giving a total of between 50 and 60 perinfantry battalion. (In the Falklands 2 Para, atleast, had six per platoon.) The paratrooper whowields it wears the regimental beret, and the green-white 'smock, combat, reversible' seen in manyphotos of the campaign. Under it his DPM para-chute smock would bear on the right sleeve the green'DZ patch' of this battalion. He has the Pararucksack, '58 Pattern CEFO with NBC equipment,and the steel helmet.

C2: LMG number, Royal Marine CommandosThe excellent and much-loved Bren LMG of theSecond World War has not entirely disappearedfrom the British forces. In its modified 7.62mmform, and rechristened 'L4A2', it still has a role as alighter and handier section weapon than the belt-

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fed GPMG, and is issued particularly for tropicalservice. Photos show that it was used in theFalklands; note that the change to the NATO7.62mm round caused the adoption of a straightmagazine compatible with SLR magazines in placeof the old 'banana'. The Marine wears thewindproof parka, olive green trousers, and olivegreen waterproof leggings.

C3: MG number, 2nd Bn. The Scots GuardsThe Guardsman wears the khaki Foot Guards beretwith dull bronzed 'cap star', and the CW parka suit.His weapon is more interesting then his outfit: theshort-barreled .50cal. Browning M2 anti-aircraftconversion, whose sudden resurrection for theFalklands campaign came as something of asurprise, but which by all accounts provedinvaluable. Large numbers were bought from theUSA in the early 1950s, the intention being to armall vehicles for AA defence, in the US Armymanner. The 1-ton and 3-ton vehicles weremodified to mount the .50cal., and the School ofInfantry ran courses in the use of the weapon.However, the policy changed; the gun was neverissued, and the course was discontinued in the mid-'50s. That the weapons should have been held instore for a quarter of a century is extraordinary—that battalions should have found instructors in itsuse during the brief period before the landings iseven more so! Accounts of the fighting beforeStanley suggest that the Browning was issued to aplatoon within HQ Company—in this battalion, atleast—and that it was used with some effect againstArgentine ground positions, as well as adding heavymetal to the curtain of light flak over the landingbeaches.

D: Support WeaponsD1. Rapier (British Aerospace)Designed as a battlefield defence system againstsupersonic aircraft, Rapier is a land-mobile, air-portable surface-to-air tactical guided missile. Theguidance system is semi-automatic command to lineof sight. The solid-propellant rocket, with an HEwarhead, weighs 143lbs. and is 7ft. 4ins. long; itsceiling is approximately 16,400ft., and its speed isbelieved to be about Mach 2. In the Falklands itwas operated by batteries of Light Air DefenceRegiments, Royal Artillery, and by the Royal Air

Meanwhile, in the streets of Stanley, Marines of 42 Cdo. pauseto fraternise during a house clearing patrol. In the backgroundis the police station, hit by AS.12 missiles fired from aWessex 5 helicopter flown by Petty Officer Ball the previousweek, when it was an enemy command post. (MoD)

Force Regiment. On occasion, when it had recentlybeen 'shaken up' by urgent landing on shore, thecrews were unable to 'set up' the complex controlsystems before the arrival of enemy air strikes; and itproved tricky to operate in a role for which it hadnever been intended, i.e. firing downwards fromhilltops at enemy aircraft passing down valley floorsor over crowded anchorages at mast height.Overall, however, its performance was verysatisfactory, and it is believed to have beenresponsible for 14 aircraft 'kills'.

D2: Blowpipe (Short Bros.)This man-portable surface-to-air missile is alsooperated by elements of LAD Regts., RA,providing close-range defence against aircraftattacking at low altitude—ideally, aircraft cominghead-on at the operator. It can acquire targetsflying away, but does not have the endurance of'burn' for a long tail-chase. Guidance is byradio/optical tracking. The solid-propellant rocket

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A local boy is given a ride on the Blues and Royals' SamsonARV. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

has an HE warhead. Blowpipe's weight is 47lbs., itslength 4ft. 7ins. An estimated nine aircraft fell tothis weapon in the Falklands. Here the operatorwears standard CW suit and cap.

D3: 81mm mortar (RARDE)The 'battalion commander's artillery', the 81mmmortar is highly accurate and capable of a rate offire of 15rpm. It can throw bombs out to amaximum range of 4,500m (with charges 1 to 6)and 5,660m with charges 7 and 8; these chargesrefer to supplementary propellant explosive chargesclipped to the tail. The HE round weighs 9.7lbs.;alternatives are WP, smoke and illuminatingrounds. It is operated by a crew of three, in thespecialist mortar platoon of the infantry battalion'ssupport company. It weighs 79lbs. The crewmenare shown here wearing a mixture of rainproofand CW clothing; note Welsh Guards beret.

D3:Milan(Euromissile)This second-generation wire-guided missile, man-portable and weighing 5olbs., provides the infantrybattalion with an anti-tank capability, and replacesthe Mobat, etc., recoilless guns. The guidancesystem is semi-automatic: the operator has only tokeep his cross-hairs on the target. The maximumrange is 2,000m, and flight time to that range is 12½seconds. The missile uses solid propellant, and has ahollow charge HE warhead capable of penetrating352mm of armour plate at an angle of 650. TheParas, Welsh Guards and 7th Gurkha Rifles, inparticular, found the Milan of great value inattacking well-prepared Argentine infantry

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positions, against which it proved absolutelydevastating. The operator wears the olive greenrainproof suit, and the 1943 steel helmet.

E1: Sergeant, Royal Corps of Military PolicePhotos suggest that as soon as the Argentinesurrender came into effect at Stanley the RMPs of atleast one unit's detachment quickly 'smartened up'.Their normal traffic control duties presented fewproblems, under the circumstances; but theprocessing of PoWs was a heavy burden indeed . . .

This NCO wears the RMP scarlet beret withbronze cap badge; the DPM combat smock, with abrassard in the same cloth combining a personalparachute brevet, small black-on-green rankchevrons, and the MP patch; olive green polyesteroverall trousers, which were not a popular item; andover-boot 'galoshes'. The '58 web belt supports thepistol case for the 9mm Browning, a taped-on fielddressing, and the S6 respirator pouch.

E2: Piper, 1st Bn., 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own GurkhaRifles

Photos show that 1/7GR took their pipers to theFalklands, as did 2SG, whose pipe major followedworthily in the traditions of his predecessors bycomposing a new piece entitled 'The Crags ofTumbledown' to commemorate the battalion'sengagement at that place. The Gurkha piper wearsthe regiment's Rifle green beret and silver capbadge, and CW smock and over-trousers.

In the background a squad of happy Marinespass in a truck, one of them (based on a figureimmortalised by news film) flying a large Unionflag from the antenna of his PRC351 radio.

F1: Major-General Jeremy Moore RMThe GOC ground forces of the South Atlantic TaskForce had two personal 'trademarks' which werenoted from photos and news film: a unique field cap(possibly Norwegian) in faded olive, bearing hisrank insignia in black cut-out form; and a smallolive green back-pack of civilian origin, which hewas still wearing when he ran down the steps of thetransport aircraft which flew him home to RAFBrize Norton. Otherwise his outfit was severelyorthodox, comprising windproof DPM parka andtrousers, and a '58 web belt with pistol holster. Noteranking on DPM chest tab.

F2: Surgeon Commander, Royal Navy Surgical SupportTeam

Specialists such as medical personnel, engineers,etc., serving alongside the three Royal MarineCommandos wear the cap badge of their parentservice or organisation on the green beret whichsignifies success in the Commando course. TheMarines have Royal Navy doctors; and one,Surgeon Commander 'Rick' Jolly RN, became awidely-known 'face' after he had appeared in frontof an audience of millions on the TV screen, beinginterviewed outside the derelict refrigeration plantat Ajax Bay in which the medical team were forcedto carry out more than 100 major operations in thedays and nights following the landings. Underunavoidable conditions of cold, filth, and dangerthe teams achieved the remarkable success of'sending out alive anyone who came in alive'; this,with two unexploded Argentine bombs lodged inthe building only feet from the operating tables, andunder intermittent air attack which blew up anammunition dump nearby, and obliged thesurgeons to operate wearing steel helmets. Theofficer wears his Royal Navy cap badge on theCommando beret, and his commander's shoulderranking in gold, divided by the surgeon's red stripes,on the front tab of the windproof parka.

F3: Corporal, 1st Bn., 7th Duke of Edinburgh's OwnGurkha Rifles

The Gurkha wears the DPM combat smock withthe similarly patterned over-trousers of the CW suit,a knitted cap comforter, 'galoshes', and 'NI gloves'.The '58 CEFO equipment includes the lightweightpick, and a Gurkha peculiarity: a DPM cover forthe kukri knife at the right hip. Rank chevrons areworn on the right sleeve only, in the traditionalRifles colours of black on green common to allGurkha units. The black shoulder patches areindicators of the battalion (triangle, right shoulder)and company (circle, 'C Coy., left shoulder); othersare a square for 'B' Coy., a cross for HQ etc.

F4 is a detail view of the maroon beret of the twobattalions of The Parachute Regiment whichserved in the Falklands; F5, the pile-lined, DPMcloth CW cap. The cap badges of the major unitswhich served in the campaign are presented againsta narrow backing of their beret colours: left, top tobottom: Royal Marines, Parachute Regiment,

Welsh Guards, Blues & Royals (on midnight blue);right, top to bottom: 22 SAS Regiment, RoyalArtillery (on midnight blue), Scots Guards, 7thGurkha Rifles; centre, Army Air Corps. Only spaceprevents us from including the badges of thosesupporting units and organisations whosepersonnel faced the same dangers, and withoutwhose efforts the Task Force would have failed. .

G1: Cabo, Argentine infantryThis junior NCO is identified by the thin-above-thick shallow chevrons worn in black above the leftbreast pocket. Other insignia were one thickchevron (Dragoneante, private); two thin aboveone thick (Cabo 1°, senior corporal); one thin abovetwo thick (Sargento, sergeant); and one thin barabove one thick bar (Sargento 1°, senior sergeant).

Unit and formation insignia do not seem to havebeen worn on combat clothing by the vast majorityof troops. One prisoner photo shows a small groupat Stanley wearing on the left shoulder a squarewhite patch with an unidentifiable device, but thesemay not even be Army personnel. One, out ofseveral score colour photos in the Argentine Pressexamined while preparing this book, seems to showmen wearing in the same position a mid-greenshield shape. On service dress the infantry unitswear such a patch, edged gold and with gold crossedrifles in the centre; the photo referred to showed nogold, though it was of poor quality and if a blackfield version of the insignia was worn it might nothave shown up—but this is pure speculation. Onthe padded parka (Plate H2) a very few troops wore

Some of the enemy Panhard armoured cars, which seem tohave remained parked in the street near Stanley waterfrontthroughout the battle. Foreground, the RA badge on a greenberet identifies a gunner of 29 Cdo.Regt., Royal Artillery;background, one of 3 Cdo.Bde.'s Sno-Cat tracked vehicles.(Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)

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With an expressive gesture of disgust, an Argentine prisonerhurls down his rifle. The faces of his comrades tell their ownstory. (MoD)

a small rectangular patch of the Argentine tricolourflag mid-way between left shoulder and elbow.

The US steel helmet is fitted with one of twoidentified camouflage covers, this one in a streaky'fernleaf pattern of drab green and brown overochre. The goggles, almost universally worn, weresometimes clear but usually had amber or pinklenses—an aid to acquiring night vision at dusk?The field dressing was normally worn under thegoggle strap at the rear; figure G2, whose slunghelmet has the more usual string netting, displaysthe common first field dressing, in white with ablue panel and a red cross in the corner.

The olive drab fatigues have exposed buttons;many jackets did not have shoulder straps. Highblack combat boots were universal. The equipmentharness was usually in this grey-green paintedleather; most riflemen wore two pouches, a bayonetfrogged on the left hip, a canteen in a simple olivecloth cover on the rear (usually olive plastic,sometimes the old aluminium US type), and a smallpack on the right hip. This had a 'window' for nameand number—see G2 — and may have held fieldrations, respirator and NBC kit. The wash-leathergloves were widely issued. The grenade isunidentified but may be Italian. The 'prong'bayonet shown here only fitted the solid-buttversion of the FN rifle—the more common folding-butt type is shown in the background. There wassome use of the old US 'walkie-talkie' radio.

G2: Argentine infantrymanSome troops wore the US M.56 combat jacket,identifiable by its fly front and shoulder straps. Thefield cap with pile-lined flaps was common, as was

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the knitted toque worn round face and neck. Mencarrying the heavy-barrel FN/FAL with bipod, asthe section light machine gun, usually wore four oreven six pouches around the belt. The belt wassometimes brown, as here. The light 'assault pack'in the foreground attached to the slits in the rear ofthe shoulder harness; it seems to be a folded shelter-half strapped up with a blanket, and the spade—often the old German Wehrmacht type—was thrustunder the straps. A frequent alternative was ahorse-shoe blanket roll round the body. In thebackground are men with the US 3.5m. rocketlauncher, fitted with a folding bipod; and a carryingvest for rifle grenade rounds, with four across theback and one each side of the chest.

H1: General de Brigada Mario Benjamin MenendezThe Argentine commander of the 'Islas Malvinas'wears a stiffened olive field cap with a small enamelcockade in the national colours of pale blue andwhite. His field jacket, similar to that of his men butof better quality, bears gold general officer's leaveson both collar points. This is exposed in the openneck of a type of drab tan quilted, hooded jacketwith knit cuffs seen in photos of some Argentineofficers. He wears wash-leather gloves, and carries ahelmet with the 'fernleaf camouflage cover held bya narrow black band. The jacket has flapped sidepockets; and on the left breast is a cloth strip bearinghis rank insignia—a single gold 'sun' of elaboratedesign, embroidered on a red felt disc.

H2: Cabo Primero, Bn.Inf. de Marina 5The standard protective clothing throughout thegarrison was this padded, hooded parka with azipped front covered by a snap-fastened fly, andknitted cuffs. The red rank chevrons are speculative;a few photos definitely show red instead of the usualblack, but we have been unable to find a phototying this feature in with other identified unitfeatures. Since the chevrons worn on the Marineservice uniform are red, we show them, tentatively,on this Marine figure. The Marine beret, in blue-grey, and the gold badge of crossed cannons andanchor with the Argentine national crestsuperimposed, are shown in photos. For someunexplained reason some personnel wore it pulledright, but most pulled it to the left as illustrated.

Equipment is otherwise as for the infantry. The

folding-stock FN rifle has a grenade in place, andanother is slung on the harness; the red tabs areprobably a safety feature removed before firing.Note drab khaki bandolier.

H3 & H4: Teniente and enlisted man, MarineCommandos

Two companies are known to have served on theFalklands, numbered 601 (the normal code forArmy troops) and 602. The first is a permanentunit, trained to US Ranger standards; the second isthought to have been a newly-raised companyassembled for the campaign from men who hadqualified as commandos but were then serving withother units. A unit commander is mentioned in theenemy Press, Lt.Col. Ali Mohamed Seineldin('Turco'), but whether he commanded bothcompanies collectively is not certain. Pre-warphotos from Argentina show this camouflageuniform—similar but not identical to Britishpattern—worn with a dark green beret. Photosfrom the Falklands during the campaign show theuniform as illustrated here. Camouflage clothingis only worn by these special forces, making themeasy to identify on the battlefield.

The officer wears a rank patch on his left breastpocket, as is normal throughout the land forces. Theinsignia of this rank are one silver and one gold star.Other ranks wear one silver (Alferez, ensign); threesilver (Capitan, captain); and one, two and threemore elaborate gold 'suns' for the field ranks. Thephoto we copy in this plate shows a mouldedrubber/plastic composition version of the officers'parachute brevet, in yellow, blue and white.Leather equipment is light brown. Both Browning9mm and Colt .45 pistols were used by theArgentines.

The soldier wears the same uniform, with acombat jerkin in place of equipment harness. Thishas two grenade pockets high on the chest, withelasticated loops above; below these are twomagazine pockets on each side, vertically arranged;and a small pack is built into the rear of the jerkin.The archaic sword-bayonet is incompatible withthe FN rifle, but was definitely carried by at leastsome of these troops.

The Commandos were among the few troops todistinguish themselves. Late in May, during theadvance across the island, an OP of 3 Cdo.Bde.'s

Mountain and Arctic Warfare cadre (an elite sub-unit) spotted a helicopter-inserted team of 16 menof Argentine Marine Commando Company 602operating from a building known as Top MaloHouse near Mt. Simon. As Harrier strikes werenot available, they 'took out' the enemy in aclassic infantry attack. Nineteen Royal Marinesattacked the 16 Argentine Marines, driving themout of the cover of the house with 66mm rocketsand then engaging them in the open. The resultwas three dead, seven wounded and six un-wounded prisoners, for British casualties of threewounded.

H5: Argentine Marine Commando, Stanley, 2 AprilSources differ over whether the spearhead of theinvasion was provided by 601 or 602 Company ofthis organisation; the former seems more likely.Much photographed during the searching of themen of NP8901, the men of the first sub-units toattack key points wore this outfit and a set ofwebbing quite different from the normal issue,resembling US and French models. Magazinesfor the silenced Sterling 9mm SMG were carriedin double leather pouches painted grey-green,but brown pistol holsters were worn. Note goggleshanging round neck.

Persistent rumours that British troops met inbattle 'US mercenaries' probably sprang fromincidents when Commandos made this claim inthe (apparently mistaken) belief that it would savetheir lives in the heat of action. Enquiries in US

In the sea of discarded and rapidly rusting enemy weapons,one FN displays the kind of religious postcard issued inArgentine ration packs. Many of the troops wore rosariespinned to their combat jackets. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier'Magazine)

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mercenary circles fail to produce any corroborationfor an inherently unlikely story. American-trained,some of the Commandos probably speak American-

accented English; some certainly wear the'different equipment' mentioned by British wit-nesses to some of these incidents: see H4 and above.

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