OSDM Ships Manoeuverability Availabilty Study

Ship Manoeuverability Availability Study (OSDM)

The below shown equipment breakdown tree has been made on board the Ms Oosterdam, HAL’s second Vista class vessel.NB6076.Lloyds number 9221281.This breakdown needs to be checked and verified on board the Zuiderdam, Westerdam and Noordam.A similar breakdown has been made for the Signature class (Eurodam and Nieuw Amsterdam).

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The goals and objectives are to:

1. Identify those aspects of propulsion and steering related systems that are not redundant.2. Identify the failures associated with the essential ship control and manoeuvring systems and sub systems.3. Evaluate the effectiveness of the existing redundancies.4. Identify via the below shown equipment breakdown lists the high risk (critical) areas by means of using the investigation reports as well

as the knowledge of HAL’s ships and office personnel.

All is about reliability, of which there are 3 variances:

Structural reliability (depending on a tree of all kinds of sub systems, as per below) →should be a new build decision, AZIPODS are maybe a good example…).Usage reliability (depending on sub systems based on running time) – should be implemented in our maintenance management.Reliability and knowledge of ships personnel – present necessary training / keep experienced personnel.

Nowadays maintenance management is based on “situation dependent (rising cooling water temperatures, vibration increase), corrective (oil change, replace filters/bearings after certain running hours), preventive (planning engine overall, switchboard maintenance, order parts) & time based (based on experience (studies from manufacturers), increase of incident cases and adjusted accordingly”, which is all based on safety & reliability.

Operators need to know what the specific incident behavior of certain equipment is and which components are the causes.

Statistics are the key parameters to identify these, this project is based on modifications to avoid incidents or delay the incidents.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS:

CHAPTER NUMBERS CONTENTS PAGE NUMBERS1 MAIN DIESEL ENGINES AND GTG 5-482 GENERATORS 49-513 MAIN SWITCH BOARDS 52-654 UPS / INVERTERS 66-675 PROPULSION 68-816 EMG SWITCHBOARD / GENERATOR 82-877 CASE STUDY FIRE IN AFT

ENGINE ROOM88-113

7 CASE STUDY FIRE IN FWD ENGINE ROOM

114-142

8 AUTOMATION 143-1669 ESD SYSTEM 167-175

10 VENTILATION SYSTEM 176-17911 BRIDGE AND NAVIGATION

EQUIPMENT180-184

12 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS 185-19613 SUMMARY 197-211

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NOTE:

Black text means: none Critical.

Blue text means: to be reviewed.

Red text means: Critical.

Green text means: Medium-high or critical (Anchor mode).

(xx) Amount of past problems.

Below breakdown is depending on the DG (Or GTG) / Switchboard configuration and the nature of the fault.

Port-mode→ in most cases One DG (Or GTG) configuration.

Manoeuvre-mode→ Two DG’s or more.

Sea-mode→ Two DG’s (Or GTG) or more.

Anchor-mode→ One DG (16 Cylinder) (See supported documents).

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ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION:

1. MAIN DIESEL ENGINES (DG’S) →Sulzer ZAV40S / GTG LM2500 GE.

1A: Main diesel engines (DG’s)

DG1, DG3 and DG4 are 16 Cylinder type DG’S.DG2 and DG5 are 12 Cylinder type DG’S.

1B: One GTG (Gas Turbine) (LM2500)

1A: Main diesel engines (DG’s)

1.1.1. Cooling Systems: cooling water – freshwater- HT (pressure and temperature).1.1.2. Starting air system.1.1.3. Fuel system.1.1.4. Lubrication system (LO).1.1.5. Exhaust gas.1.1.6. Control and engine monitoring system (AC70 / S800).1.1.7. Overspeed conditions.

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1.1.1. Cooling Systems: cooling water – freshwater- HT (pressure and temperature).

1.1.1. a→ Cooling water DG combined system / Coolers (cooler change over) (pressure dip).1.1.1. b→Temperature and Pressure Sensors.1.1.1. c→Cooling water LT, HT, SW and pre-heat pumps and their supplies.1.1.1. d→Nozzle cooling water system.

General indication:

Sub Group Trip DG Trip propulsion Loss of power Sea-mode Manoeuvre- Port-mode Anchor mode Past problems1.1.1.a X possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-High yes1.1.1.b medium critical Low risk Medium-High yes1.1.1.c possible medium critical Low risk Medium-High yes1.1.1.d none

Possible means: Depends on the DG configuration(This configuration depends on how many engines are connected in the AFT and FWD engine rooms) and nature of the fault,

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Individual Sub groups:

1.1.1. a→Cooling water DG combined system.

AFT engine room:

System consists of a combined 2 LT cooler system and 1 HT cooler system.LT system has 2 combined regulators, HT system has 1 regulator.Each DG has also its own HT regulator that could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel in case of a single failure.

Description Supported documents

available

Possible single failure

Redundant set-up

Awareness / training crew /

maintenance

Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode

Port-mode Anchor mode Past problems

DD/GG 1-2-3 LT COOLING WATER COOLER XA/062C

yes yes yes Yes (see note) medium critical No risk Medium-high Yes (5)

DD/GG 1-2-3 LT COOLING WATER COOLER XA/062D


DD/GG 1-2-3 HT COOLING WATER COOLER XA/061B

yes yes no Yes (see note) medium critical No risk Medium-high Yes (2)

Past Problems: Clogged coolers, especially on the seawater side of the LT coolers.

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Note: Crew on board needs to be aware and instructed about the critical aspects of this combined cooling water set-up, working on a single engine could affect the entire AFT engine room.

Incorrect operation of the HT by-pass valve on the evaporator could cause high temperatures on the engine, causing a direct shutdown of the DG’s. A modification needs to be made in order to monitor the HT by-pass valve feedback signals in the ECR; this is not possible on the OSDM (It can only be monitored on the evaporator).

A single component failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the DG configuration.

The behavior of the control valves need to be reviewed in case of a loss of power.

Combined systems could be reviewed in order to reduce the risk of failures, specially the HT cooling system.

Recommendation:The install of a second HT cooler and regulator needs to be taken into consideration.

HT cooling system is a long enclosed single system that is easily affected by un-prevented leaks (most of the time on the HT line to the Evaporators).

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FWD engine room:

System consists of a combined 2 LT cooler system and 1 HT cooler system.LT system has 2 combined regulators, HT system has 1 regulator.Each DG has also its own HT regulator that could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel in case of a single failure.


available


Redundant set-up


maintenance



DD/GG 4-5 LT COOLING WATER COOLER XA/062A


DD/GG 4-5 LT COOLING WATER COOLER XA/062B


DD/GG 4-5 HT COOLING WATER COOLER XA/061A

yes yes no Yes (see note) Medium critical No risk Medium-high Yes (2)

Past Problems: Clogged coolers, especially on the seawater side of the LT coolers.

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Note: Crew on board needs to be aware and instructed about the critical aspects of this combined cooling water set-up, working on a single engine could affect the entire FWD engine room (DG4 and DG5)

This also depends if the GTG is on line or not.

Incorrect operation of the HT by-pass valve on the evaporator could cause high temperatures on the engine, causing a direct shutdown of the DG’s. A modification needs to be made in order to monitor the HT by-pass valve feedback signals in the ECR; this is not possible on the OSDM (It can only be monitored on the evaporator).

A single component failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the DG configuration.

The behavior of the control valves need to be reviewed in case of a loss of power.

Combined systems could be reviewed in order to reduce the risk of failures, specially the HT cooling system.

Recommendation:The install of a second HT cooler and regulator needs to be taken into consideration.

HT cooling system is a long enclosed single system that is easily affected by un-prevented leaks (most of the time on the HT line to the Evaporators).

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Sea water regulators AFT and FWD engine rooms.

2 regulators have been installed for the regulation of sea water for both engine rooms, a single failure of one the regulators will affect the aft cross-over temperatures (and pressure) which will affect the LT cooling system for the DG’s.

Items: Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode

Port-mode Anchor-mode Past problems. Awareness / training crew / maintenance


Supported documents

available

Sea water temperature control valveVR01005_032

Medium risk High risk Low risk Medium-high Yes (3) yes yes yes

Sea water temperature control valveVR01005_035

Medium risk High risk Low risk Medium-high Yes (3) yes yes yes

Recommendation:The below mentioned modification has been made on the Osdm, this modification needs to be checked and verified on all other Vista class vessels:

Modification made on board the Osdm:A cross connection has been made between the AFT and FWD cross-over in such a way that sea water can be supplied to the LT coolers from the FWD cross-over in case the AFT cross over is not available for some reason (Think of cleaning of the AFT cross-over).

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1.1.1. b → Temperature and Pressure Sensors.

Automatic HT temperature and pressure set points for the individual DG’s are set as per below:Temperature:Set point is 81 degrees Celsius.H1 alarm is set to 93 degrees Celsius.L1 alarm is set to 60 degrees Celsius.60 seconds shutdown is set at 97 degrees Celsius.

Pressure:H1 is set to 5.5 bar.L1 is set to 4 bar.60 seconds shutdown is set at 2.7 bar.

Single failure of cooling water HT temperature and pressure switches could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the engine configuration.

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1.1.1. c→Cooling water LT, HT, SW and Pre-heat pumps and their supplies.

AFT engine room:

Items Power supplies Redundant set-up Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor mode Past problems

DD/GG FW LT PUMP N3, XB/046C

GSP FZ/432QF, 43211 AFT MSBD

YES NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK Yes (1)

DD/GG FW LT PUMP N4, XB/046D



AUX LT PUMP N1, XB/037A

GSP FZ/428QF, 42810 AC COMP.RM


DD/GG SW PUMP N3, XB/045C



DD/GG SW PUMP N4, XB/045D



AUX SW PUMP N1, XB/039A

GSP FZ/428QF, 42811 AC COMP.RM


HT PUMP MECHANICAL –

DRIVEN BY ENGINE

N/A YES (3 DG IN AFT ENGINE ROOM)

NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK Yes (1)

PRE-HEAT PUMP XA/065B

FZ/QF482000 # 48227 AFT MSBD

NO NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK Yes (1)

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Main LT from AFT engine room is supplying the cooling for the PS Azipod / Cyclo and propulsion transformers.All motors have been replaced in the past, main issue is the excessive heat generated inside the terminal connection supply box which caused the motor to burn-out.

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FWD engine room:

Items Power supplies Redundant set-up Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor mode Past problems

DD/GG FW LT PUMP N2, XB/046B

GSP FZ/341QF, 34111 FWD MSBD


DD/GG FW LT PUMP N1, XB/046A



AUX LT PUMP N2, XB/037B



DD/GG SW PUMP N1, XB/045A



DD/GG SW PUMP N2, XB/045B



AUX SW PUMP N2, XB/039B



HT PUMP MECHANICAL –

DRIVEN BY ENGINE

N/A YES (2 DG IN FWD ENGINE ROOM)

NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK Yes (1)

PRE-HEAT PUMP XA/065A

FZ/QF385000 #38521 B-DK EVAP

ROOM

NO NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK Yes (1)

Main LT from FWD engine room is supplying the cooling for the STBD Azipod / Cyclo and propulsion transformers.

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All motors have been replaced in the past, main issue is the excessive heat generated inside the terminal connection supply box which caused the motor to burn-out.

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General note:

Auxiliary LT and SW pumps and relevant coolers are all located in different compartments.

Auxiliary LT and Auxiliary SW pumps and coolers Location pumps

Auxiliary SW pump N1, XB/039A AC-Compressor room

Auxiliary SW pump N2, XB/039B D-deck PS evaporator room

Auxiliary LT pump N1, XB/037A AC-Compressor room

Auxiliary LT pump N2, XB/037B D-deck PS evaporator room

Auxiliary cooler XA/038A AC-Compressor room

Auxiliary cooler XA/038B D-deck PS evaporator room

AC seawater pump N3, XA/494C AC-Compressor room

Evaporator SW pump XD/107AA D-deck PS evaporator room

The following modifications have been made on board the OSDM.1. A cross connection has been installed between the discharge of AC seawater pump N3 (XA/494C) and the

inlet of the auxiliary cooler, this has been done in order to maintain the redundancy in case of a failure (Maintenance) of the auxiliary seawater pump XA/039A.

2. A cross connection has been made between the emergency main fire line and the seawater side of the auxiliary cooler in case you would lose (Maintenance or failure) auxiliary seawater pump XA/039B

Note: It is recommended to install a bigger cross connection mainly because it will not be possible to run all DG’s of this cross connection at the moment (See supported documents).

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3. A cross connection has been made between the suction of the evaporator SW pump XD/107AA and the suction of the auxiliary SW pump XA/039B, this way the auxiliary LT SW side is connected via the shore connection to the LT SW side.(This is the cross connection between the AFT and FWD seawater cross-over) (LT coolers can be supplied with SW from the FWD cross-over in case the AFT cross-over is unavailable)(See supported documents).

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Auxiliary cooling is used for: 1. Stabilizers.2. Bow Thrusters.3. Air compressor F.W. coolers.4. Boiler forced circulation feed water pumps.5. Condensate drain cooler.6. Water treatment unit.7. Provision freezing condensers.8. Propulsion excitation transformers.9. Main transformers E.R. substations.10. Main transformers accommodation substations.11. Galley transformers.12. ECR13. AFT and FWD MSBD rooms.14. PS and STBD Cyclo converter rooms.15. Black-out pumps C.W. starting air compressors (AFT and FWD).16. Condensate sample cooler.17. Power pack incinerator.

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Auxiliary SW can be connected to the main SW system in both engine rooms by means of the use of the shore connection.

Recommendations:

It might be wise to install a cross-connection (Emergency) between the main LT and the auxiliary LT systems, to ensure that cooling will be available for essential equipment in case of an emergency such as fire / flooding / leakages.

Main LT system can be isolated as this is not installed as one complete system (AFT and FWD engine rooms); Auxiliary LT system needs to be reviewed as this is installed as one complete system.Auxiliary LT system would not be available in case of let’s say a leakage at the lowest point (System would drain completely).This would mean that complete system needs to be isolated in order to repair the leakage, resulting in the loss of vital equipment needed to maintain the vessels redundancy and manoeuverability (Loss of excitation transformers might be a good example) (Power might be available but propulsion will not be).

It might be wise to install a cross-connection (Emergency) between main LT AFT engine room and main LT FWD engine room.

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1.1.1. d→ Nozzle cooling water system.

AFT engine room: System consists of a combined header tank, two redundant nozzle cooling water pumps and 3 nozzle cooling water coolers, one for each DG.


available


Redundant set-up


maintenance



DG1 NOZZLE CW COOLER XA/069B

yes yes no Yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none

DG2 NOZZLE CW COOLER XA/069E


DG3 NOZZLE CW COOLER XA/069C


NOZZLE CW PUMP XA/052C

yes yes yes yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none

NOZZLE CW PUMP XA/052D


HEADER TANK XA/081B

yes yes no yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none

DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLIESNOZZLE COOLING WATER PUMP XA/052C GSP FZ/432QF # 43214 AFT MSBDNOZZLE COOLING WATER PUMP XA/052D GSP FZ/442QF # 44214 AFT MSBD

Single failure of the nozzle cooling water system or its components will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.DG can run without nozzle cooling water for about 2 hours without damaging the DG (HFO) (Even longer on MGO).

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FWD engine room: System consists of a combined header tank, two redundant nozzle cooling water pumps and 2 nozzle cooling water coolers, one for each DG.


available


Redundant set-up


maintenance



DG4 NOZZLE CW COOLER XA/069A


DG5 NOZZLE CW COOLER XA/069D


NOZZLE CW PUMP XA/052A


NOZZLE CW PUMP XA/052B


HEADER TANK XA/081A

yes yes no yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none

DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLIESNOZZLE COOLING WATER PUMP XA/052A GSP FZ/331QF # 33114 FWD MSBDNOZZLE COOLING WATER PUMP XA/052B GSP FZ/341QF # 34113 FWD MSBD

Single failure of the nozzle cooling water system or its components will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.DG can run without nozzle cooling water for about 2 hours without damaging the DG (HFO) (Even longer on MGO).

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1.1.2. Starting air system:

General:

Starting air system on board the OSDM consists of 4 starting air compressors.

2 Starting air compressors are located in the AFT engine room (B-deck PS AFT engine room, FR. 90-98).

2 Starting air compressors are located in the FWD engine room (B-deck SB evaporator room, FR. 138-146).

System has been set-up as one combined system between the AFT and FWD engine rooms, but works as well as for the individual set-up in AFT and FWD engine rooms, in case you need to separate the 2 engine rooms.

System has been set-up with 2 starting air receivers, 1 for AFT and 1 for FWD engine rooms.


1.1.2. a→Power supplies Starting air compressors. 1.1.2. b→Power supplies (Emergency) cooling pumps. 1.1.2. c→Pressure switches and logic. 1.1.2. d→Set-up Starting air vessels.

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1.1.2. a→Power supplies Starting air compressors. AFT engine room:

Items Power supplies Redundant set-up Possible single failure Awareness / training crew / maintenance

Supported documents available

Past problems

Comp.N3 XM/228C FZ/QF482000, 48213 no yes yes yes none

Comp.N4 XM/228CA FZ/QZ942000, 94223 no yes yes yes none

FWD engine room:



Past problems

Comp.N1 XM/228AA FZ/QZ941000, 94114 no yes yes yes Yes (1)

Comp.N2 XM/228AB GSP FZ/341QF, 34123 no yes yes yes Yes (1)

Note: Starting air compressors 1 and 4 are fed from the emergency switchboard.

Recommendation: All starting air compressors need to have a redundant power supply; this will be a low cost modification and can be done by the crew on board.

Past problems:Damaged fly-wheel on compressors 1 and 2.

A single component failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

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1.1.2. b→Power supplies (Emergency) cooling pumps.

AFT engine room:



Past problems

Cooling pump XA/048C

GSP FZ/432QF #43212 AFT MSBD

Yes yes yes yes none

Cooling pump XA/048D


yes yes yes yes none

(EMG)Cooling pump XA/048F

FZ/QZ942000 #94217 EMG SWBD


FWD engine room:



Past problems

Cooling pump XA/048A

GSP FZ/331QF #33135 FWD MSBD

Yes yes yes yes none

Cooling pump XA/048B

GSP FZ/341QF # 34112 FWD MSBD


(EMG)Cooling pump XA/048E

FZ/QZ941000 # 94110 EMG SWBD


A single component failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

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1.1.2. c→Pressure switches and logic.

Supported documents are available.A single component failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

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Items Redundant set-up Possible single failure Awareness / training crew / maintenance


Past problems

Pressure switches / logic



1.1.2. d→Set-up Starting air vessels.

System has been set-up with 2 starting air receivers, 1 for AFT and 1 for FWD engine rooms.

System has been set-up in such a way that it can be used as a combined system (normal set-up) or as an individual engine room specific (AFT or FWD) if needed in case of an emergency.

Starting air vessel for the AFT engine room is located in the PS B-deck AFT engine room, FR. 86-94.

Starting air vessel for the FWD engine room is located in the SB B-deck evaporator room, FR. 138-146.

The following systems are connected to the DD/ GG starting air system:

1. Air receiver for AFT whistle.2. Starting air receiver for emergency diesel generator.3. Emergency starting air compressor for emergency diesel generator (See recommendation).4. Control air system→ service air system.5. Emergency diesel fire pump.6. Engines DG1-2-3-4-5 starting air.

Recommendation: Install a separate compressor / air vessel in a technical space between D-deck and deck 10 that will mainly serve as a general back-up for engine room starting air systems as well as for the emergency generator starting air system, fed from the emergency switchboard (Air feedback).

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1.1.3. Fuel system:

General:

Fuel systems are in general an important factor and risk for the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

Fuel systems could generate many single failures, simple because it is a large and complicated system.

Fuel pressures and temperatures need to be monitored at all times.


1.1.3. a→H.F.O. / D.O. services, AFT and FWD engine rooms.1.1.3. b→Logic and power supplies Booster pumps and feeder pumps, AFT and FWD engine rooms.1.1.3. c→Blackout gravity valves, AFT and FWD engine rooms.1.1.3. d→H.F.O.Transfer system.1.1.3. e→H.F.O.Separation system. 1.1.3. f→D.O.Transfer / Separation system.1.1.3. h→L.O.Purifier system.

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1.1.3. a→H.F.O. / D.O. services, AFT and FWD engine rooms.System has been designed to run on either H.F.O. or on DO (M.G.O.).System has a redundant set-up; it can be used as a combined system between the AFT and FWD engine rooms as well as for the independent engine room set-up.

H.F.O. system has a redundant set-up, but: Each fuel module has only 1 suction pipe from the H.F.O. service tank with only 1 quick closing

valve, if this quick closing valve would accidentally shut you will lose the complete module.

Recommendation: Install 2 separate suction valves with 2 quick closing valves.

D.O. (M.G.O.) system has no redundant set-up. When running on M.G.O. both engine rooms take suction from 1 suction line with only 1 quick

closing valve, if this valve would shut a blackout will be the result (Single failure). Regulations in certain areas like the Californian coast require the ship to change-over from H.F.O.

to M.G.O. 3 miles before the end of the sea voyage, meaning that often the ship sails on 2 or 3 engines running on M.G.O.

Tank capacity is way too small, maximum quantity of the M.G.O. service tank 2S is only 37.4m3.

Recommendation: Install a bigger M.G.O. service tank or combine the GTG M.G.O. service tank with the DG M.G.O. service tank by means of a permanent connection between the 2 tanks or by means of opening both suction valves on the suction line (Communicating vessels)(See supported documents)

Install 2 separate suction valves with 2 quick closing valves.

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1.1.3. b→ Logic and power supplies Booster pumps and feeder pumps, AFT and FWD engine rooms.

AFT engine room:



Past problems

Feeder pump N3 XD/144BA

FZ/QF480000 # 48014 AFT ENGINE

ROOM

no yes yes yes none

Feeder pump N4 XD/144BB

AS001QFB # Q52 AFT MSBD


Booster pump N3 XD/144BD

FZ/QF480000 # 48016 AFT ENGINE ROOM

no yes yes yes none

Booster pump N4 XD/144BE

AS001QFB # Q53 AFT MSBD


Pressure Switch for Booster / Feeder

N/A no yes yes yes none

Feeder / Booster pumps N4 are equipment with a redundant power supply set-up coming from AS001QFB located in the AFT MSBD.Feeder / Booster pumps logic is only equipped with 1 pressure switch.

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FWD engine room:



Past problems

Feeder pump N1 XD/144AA

FZ/QF381000 # 38114 NEXT TO GTG

no yes yes yes none

Feeder pump N2 XD/144AB

AS001QFA # Q52 FWD MSBD


Booster pump N1 XD/144AD


no yes yes yes none

Booster pump N2 XD/144AE

AS001QFA # Q53 FWD MSBD


Pressure Switch for Booster / Feeder

N/A no yes yes yes none

Feeder / Booster pumps N2 are equipment with a redundant power supply set-up coming from AS001QFA located in the FWD MSBD.Feeder / Booster pumps logic is only equipped with 1 pressure switch.

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AFT and FWD engine rooms:

Items: Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor-mode Past problems.

Loss of Booster pumps Medium low-risk Medium-risk Low-risk Medium none

Loss of Feeder pumps Medium low-risk Medium-risk Low-risk Medium none

Loss of Pressure switch Medium low-risk Medium-risk Low-risk Medium none

Note:

There is no need to change the logic of the booster / feeder pumps, nor is there a reason to combine the logic with the logic for the D.O.black-out valve.

A single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

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1.1.3. c→ Blackout gravity valves, AFT and FWD engine rooms.

Each engine room is equipped with a D.O. black-out valve for the D.O. supply by means of gravity to the 3 engines in the relevant engine room, coming from the D.O. tank GO06P.

GO06P is located in the emergency generator room on Deck 10.

AFT engine room:

Item Power supplies Redundant set-up Possible single failure Awareness / training crew / maintenance


Past problems

Black-out valve NL/001DV

AU/821UE # Q7 YES (Valve by-pass handle)

YES YES YES Yes (2)

A single component failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.Past problems due to leaking valve, this has been rectified (Valve installed incorrectly).

FWD engine room:

Item Power supplies Redundant set-up Possible single failure Awareness / training crew / maintenance


Past problems

Black-out valve NL/021DV

AU/836UE # Q7 YES (Valve by-pass handle)

YES YES YES Yes (2)

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A single component failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.Past problems due to leaking valve, this has been rectified (Valve installed incorrectly).

1.1.3. d→ H.F.O.Transfer system.



Past problems

H.F.O Transfer pump N1 XA/501A

FZ/432QF # 43221 AFT MSBD

Yes yes yes yes Yes (1)

H.F.O Transfer pump N2 XA/501B

FZ/442QF #44218 AFT MSBD

yes yes yes yes Yes (1)

A single component failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.Past problems were related to issues with the mechanical seal (Leaking).

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1.1.3. e→ H.F.O.Separation system (Purifiers).

AFT engine room:



Past problems

HFO Electric heater XM/158BG

GSP FZ/442QF #44220 AFT 11KV MSBD

no yes yes yes Yes (1)

Purifier starter module XM/158BC



Purifier starter module XM/158BD



A single component failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.Past problems related to burned-out heating elements.

FWD engine room:



Past problems

HFO Electric heater XM/158AG

GSP FZ/341QF #34122 FWD 11KV MSBD


Purifier starter module XM/158AC



Purifier starter module XM/158AD

FZ/QF383000 # 38311 PS FWD PURF.ROOM (Sludge purifier room)


A single component failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.Past problems related to burned-out heating elements.

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1.1.3. f→ D.O.Transfer / Separation system.



Past problems

M.G.O. Transfer pump XE/500

FZ/QZ942000 # 94213 EMG SWBD


M.G.O. Transfer pump XB/502

FZ/341QF # 34117 FWD MSBD


Purifier starter module XM/159C


no yes yes yes none

A single M.G.O. transfer pump failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.A single failure with the purifier components system could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

Recommendation: The M.G.O. transfer pumps are the only components that have a redundant set-up of the M.G.O. system. System set-up needs to be reviewed and needs to be modified for any future new build HAL vessels.

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1.1.4.→ DG Lube oil (L.O.) system.

Each DG is equipped with a single pre-lube pump; each pump is supplied from the emergency switchboard.Each Pre-lube pump has a manually by-pass (DG can start without pre-lube pump).



Past problems

Pre-lube pump DG1 XE/274BC

FZ/QZ942000 # 94210 AFT MSBD

no yes yes yes Yes (1) related to electrical overload

Pre-lube pump DG2 XE/274EC

FZ/QZ942000 # 94212 AFT MSBD

no yes yes yes none

Pre-lube pump DG3 XE/274CC

FZ/QZ942000 # 94211 AFT MSBD

no yes yes yes Yes (1) related to electrical overload

Pre-lube pump DG4 XE/274AC

FZ/QZ941000 # 94111 FWD MSBD

no yes yes yes none

Pre-lube pump DG5 XE/274DC

FZ/QZ941000 # 94112 FWD MSBD

no yes yes yes none

DG LO Transfer pumpXA/185A

GSP FZ/432QF # 43218 AFT MSBD

no yes yes yes none

Note: There is only one DG LO transfer pump, Located in the PS AFT purifier room, AFT engine room.This pump is for the transfer of the LO from the storage tanks to the DG’s sump. Normally the sumps are full but it could happen that LO needs to be transferred in case of an emergency, meaning that this cannot be done as this pump does not have an emergency supply (Think of the Rotterdam scenario).Recommendation: Install a change over switch and emergency supply for clean LO transfer pump XA/185A.Install a cross connection between the clean and dirty LO pumps, this way you will create a redundant set-up in case the clean LO pump breaks down mechanically (See supported documents).

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Each DG is equipped with a single L.O. temperature regulator, L.O. cooler, self cleaning filter, duplex filter, L.O. inlet / outlet temperature sensor and LO pressure switch.

The temperature sensor for each DG has the following temperature set-limits:

H1→60°CL1→ 45°CSet point is set to 55°C60 seconds shut down (AC70) is set to 65°CFilters are equipped with an automatic generated alarm in case the filter is clogged (No delay).L.O. outlet temperatures alarms are monitored with no delay in the alarm.

LO pressure:

Each running DG has the following pressure set limits:H1→8 barL1→ 4 bar (Alarm setting).60 seconds shut down (AC70) is set to 3 bar.

Note: Crew on board needs to be aware and instructed about the critical aspects of the DG L.O. system.

A single failure of one of the components could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the DG configuration.

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1.1.4.a → LO Purifier system.

AFT engine room L.O. purifier system consists of 3 purifier starter modules, 1 for each relevant DG.

FWD engine room L.O. purifier system consists of 2 purifier starter modules, 1 for each relevant DG.

AFT engine room:



Past problems

Purifier starter module XM/199BC

FZ/QF 480000 # 48010 AFT ENGINE

ROOM


Purifier starter module XM/199BD


ROOM


Purifier starter module XM/199BE


ROOM


FWD engine room:



Past problems

Purifier starter module XM/199AA

FZ/QF 381000 # 38111 NEXT TO GTG


Purifier starter module XM/199AB

FZ/QF 383000 # 38310 PS FWD

SLUDGE PURIFIER ROOM


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A possible single component failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.Past problems were related to incorrect maintenance handlings (Human error).

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1.1.5. Exhaust gas:

General:

Each DG is equipped with a cylinder exhaust gas temperature monitoring system.The alarm set points for the cylinder exhaust gas temperatures are set as per below:

H1→500°CL1→50°C

There is no alarm delay.

Exhaust gas is easily influenced by the following:

Behavior of the turbo charger and its temperature. Injection valves. Set-up of the fuel pumps. Coolers.

It is important that maintenance intervals are followed as per manufactures instructions (Turbo overhaul, inspection / cleaning of the coolers, change of the fuel pumps at the correct interval.

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Functionality of exhaust gas / turbo charger temperatures:

There is no 60 seconds shut-down implemented when these temperatures exceeds their limits.

Note: Cylinder / turbo charger exhaust temperatures can be blocked on the automation system in case of just a sensor failure

Items: Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor-mode Past problems. Awareness / training crew / maintenance


Supported documents

available

Cylinder exhaust

temperatures

No risk No risk No risk No risk none yes yes Yes (10)

Turbo charger exhaust temp.

No risk No risk No risk No risk none yes yes Yes (10)

Single failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

Past problems were all related to sensor failures or wrong sensor indications.

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1.1.6. Control and Engine Monitoring:

General:

Each DG is controlled and monitored by the following:AC70: start / stop and safeties of each DG individually.S800: monitoring of each DG individually.

AC70 and S800 are located in the same cabinet, one control cabinet for each DGControl cabinets for DG1, DG2 and DG3 are located in the AFT MSBD.Control cabinets for DG 4 and DG5 are located in the FWD MSBD.

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There are two conditions implemented for the shutdown of the relevant DG(s) in case of failures.

60 seconds delayed shutdowns. Direct shutdowns.

60 seconds delayed shutdowns:

1. L.O. temperature >65°C.2. L.O. pressure <3bar.3. HT cooling water pressure <2.7bar.4. Cylinder cooling water outlet temperature <97°C.5. Main bearing temperature >95°C.6. Generator bearing temperature >100°C.7. Generator winding temperature >140°C.8. Turbo charger (T/C) temperature >120°C.

How it works: PMS is starting the next DG in the sequence when any of the above mentioned 60 seconds delayed shutdowns are activated.If any of the above mentioned 60 seconds shutdowns remain active for the duration of 60 seconds the relevant affected DG will shutdown.

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1 Medium High No risk High Yes (5) yes yes yes

2 Medium High No risk High none yes yes yes







Note: Past problems were mainly caused by sensor failures or incorrect sensor monitoring.

Single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

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Direct shutdowns:

The below shown alarms will cause a direct shutdown of the relevant DG (s).

1. Earth switch on.2. Mechanical over speed.3. Pneumatic shut down activated.4. Governor critical failure.5. ECR EM stop activated.6. Electrical over speed.7. Generator protection trip.8. Mechanical LO stop.9. Oil mist High.

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1 Medium risk High risk Low risk Medium-high none yes yes yes

2 Medium risk High risk Low risk Medium-high Yes (1) yes yes yes


4 Medium risk High risk Low risk Medium-high Yes (1) yes yes yes





Single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the DG configuration as well as the alertness of the operators in the ECR.

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1.1.6. a→ Engine protection system (AC70). 1.1.6. b→ DG Governor. 1.1.6. c→ Woodward 723 digital governor (Hardware / Software / Synchronizer).

1.1.6. a→ Engine protection system (AC70).

Each DG is controlled and monitored by the following:AC70: start / stop and safeties of each DG individually.S800: monitoring of each DG individually.

AC70 and S800 are located in the same cabinet, one control cabinet for each DGControl cabinets are located in the AFT MSBD for DG1, 2, and 3.Control cabinets are located in the FWD MSBD for DG4, 5.

1.1.6. b→ DG Governors

Crew has the knowledge and supported documents available in case a Governor needs to be changed.Single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the DG configuration.

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1.1.6. c→ Woodward 723 digital governor (Hardware / Software / Synchronizer).Knowledge (crew) and supported documents are available in case a digital governor needs to be changed.Crew should not adjust any of the parameters.

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1.1.7. Overspeed conditions.

1.1.6. a→Governor (major problem). 1.1.6. b→Fuel rack / Fuel pumps (major problem). 1.1.6. c→Emergency Stop.

Sub Groups Trip DG Trip propulsion

Loss of power


Port-mode Anchor-mode

Past problems


maintenance



1.1.6.a x possible possible medium critical Low risk Critical Yes (1) yes yes yes1.1.6.b x possible possible medium critical Low risk Critical none yes yes yes1.1.6.c x possible possible medium critical Low risk Critical none yes yes yes

Possible means: depending on the load and DG configuration.Single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the DG configuration as well as the alertness of the operators in the ECR.Past problems were related to the governor of DG4 and DG5 causing a blackout of the vessel.

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1B: One GTG (Gas Turbine) (LM2500)

The OSDM has been equipped with one GTG from GE.The GTG runs about 2 hours each week due to the high fuel cost (MGO) (70 liters per minute).The GTG is available and is considered as DG6 during normal operations, the GTG cannot be used in case of emergencies such as brown-outs and blackouts.Average GTG start-up time is 20 minutes and none of its auxiliary equipment is fed from the EMG switchboard.

All auxiliaries are supplied from two GSP panels in the FWD MSBD. Motors A and heaters are fed from GSP FZ/331QF. Motors B are fed from GSP FZ/341QF.

EQUIPMENT FED FROM BREAKER NUMBERENCLOSURE VENT FAN A GSP FZ/331QF 33121GENERATOR LO PUMP A GSP FZ/331QF 33122

FUEL FWD PUMP A GSP FZ/331QF 33120TURBINE LO HEATER GSP FZ/331QF 33128

GENERATOR LO HEATER GSP FZ/331QF 33129HYDRAULIC STARTER HEATER GSP FZ/331QF 33130

ENCLOSURE VENT FAN B GSP FZ/341QF 34121GENERATOR LO PUMP B GSP FZ.341QF 34120

FUEL FWD PUMP B GSP FZ/341QF 34119

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2. GENERATORS:

2.1.1. Bearings (temperature). 2.1.2. Air cooler. 2.1.3. Excitation (brushless). 2.1.4. Neutral point. 2.1.5. Voltage regulator (AVR) (Individual and 2 master AVR’s). 2.1.6. Voltage transformers (Excitation / Actual value measurements). 2.1.7. Control System / Sensors / Detectors / winding temperature. 2.1.8. Current transformers (Differential / Actual value measurements). 2.1.9. Diodes.

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Sub Groups Trip DG / generator

Trip propulsion

Loss of power



Past problems


maintenance



2.1.1. >100°C X possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes

2.1.2. none yes yes yes

2.1.3. X possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes

2.1.4. none yes yes yes


2.1.6. possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes


2.1.8. possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes

2.1.9. X (short) possible possible medium critical Low risk critical Yes (2) yes yes yes

Possible means: depending on the DG and load configuration.Single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the DG and configuration.Past problems were related to issues with the diodes of DG1 and DG4 (2004)Diodes were exchanged before it became an issue (Good PM practice)

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3. MAIN SWITCHBOARD(S) 11KV (AFT AND FWD).

3.1.1. Protection Devices switchboards. 3.1.2. Auxiliary supplies. 3.1.3. Interconnectors (Bus-tie). 3.1.4. Breakers and Contactors. 3.1.5. Protections Switchboard users. 3.1.6. Switchboard Users (Only main E.R. / propulsion transformers at the moment).

General:

Training of the crew is a vital key element for the understanding and the safe operations of the 11KV main switch board(s).Training is available, but training intervals need to be reviewed as there are many electricians that have not been to any of the training courses.

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3.1.1. Protection Devices switchboards. 3.1.1. a→ Key interlock system. 3.1.1 .b→ Power Transducers. 3.1.1. c→ Arc detection. 3.1.1. d→ Voltage and Current transformers. 3.1.1. e→ Bus riser and VT set-up (See 3.1.5. Protections switchboard users). 3.1.1. f→ Non-preferential trips.


Loss of power



Past problems


maintenance



3.1.1.a none yes no yes

3.1.1.b none yes yes yes

3.1.1.c x possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes

3.1.1.d none yes yes yes

3.1.1.e x x Affected swbd

medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes

3.1.1.f none yes yes yes

Possible means: depending on the DG (load) and switchboard configuration.Single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the switchboard and DG configuration.

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3.1.2. Auxiliary supplies. 3.1.2. a→ UPS / Battery back-up and change over principle (See 4.1.1Battery and UPS supplies).

3.1.3. Interconnectors (Bus-tie). 3.1.3. a→ Switching procedure and logic.

Sub Group Trip DG Trip propulsion

Loss of power



Past problems


maintenance



3.1.3.a possible X (half) possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes

Interconnectors will open in case of excessive Overcurrent / unbalance Overcurrent / over and Under voltage as well as Overfrequency (depends on the severity, level 1 / 2 or in some cases 3) (With levels we refer to the different REF / Synpol trip settings).This is done via the generator protection devices.

Possible means: depending on the DG (load) and switchboard configuration.Single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the switchboard and DG configuration.

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3.1.4. Breakers and Contactors. 3.1.4. a→ Mechanical interlocks. 3.1.4. b→ Opening / Closing / Under voltage coils (Single critical failure). 3.1.4. c→ Spare breakers and Contactors (Available and tested with testing date) (See recommendation).


Loss of power



Past problems


maintenance



3.1.4.a none yes yes yes3.1.4.b x possible possible medium critical Low risk critical Yes (1) yes yes yes3.1.4.c yes yes

Possible means: depending on the DG configuration / affective user breaker(s) as well the nature of the fault.Single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the switchboard / affective user breaker(s) and the DG configuration.Past problem were related to DG1 11KV breaker.

Recommendation:The following spare breakers should be available (and tested) at both switchboards:1 DG breaker (Available on Osdm).1 Propulsion breaker (Most important breaker to have available at both switchboards) (Two propulsion breakers available on the Osdm).(Think of a fire / flooding in AFT or FWD engine room in combination with a faulty breaker) (One Contactor available on the Osdm).

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3.1.5. Protection Switchboard users.

3.1.5. a→ Ref unit for VT cubical (Single critical failure, opening of all switchboard users, possible BO). 3.1.5. b→ Ref units for switchboard users (Obsolete product, failure of individual REF unit could cause

possible BO).

BO means black-out. REF means microprocessor based protection and control unit.

3.1.5. c→ Synpol Generator protection units (Alternator protection / Diesel control unit / PMS). 3.1.5. d→ Communication Bus Configurations (Modbus RS485 RTU). 3.1.5. e→ Selectivity Relay Study (XX) means the number of the REF protection relay, (50) means relay

50.

Sub Groups

Trip DG Trip propulsio

n

Loss of power


Port-mode

Anchor-mode

Past problems


maintenance



3.1.5.a x x x medium critical Low risk critical Yes (1) yes yes yes3.1.5.b possible possible possible medium critical Low risk critical Yes (2) yes yes yes3.1.5.c x possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes3.1.5.d possible possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes3.1.5.e possible possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes

Possible means: depending on the DG and switchboard configuration / affected user(s) breaker and nature of the fault.Selectivity relay study: fault depends on the correct system parameters.

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Single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the switchboard / affective user breaker(s) and the DG configuration.Failure of the REF unit of the VT cubicle was related to human error which opened all the users of the AFT 11KV MSBD (Wood ward service engineer tripped the REF unit of the VT cubicle).

Selectivity of the protections:

All feeders are equipped with short circuit protections (Overcurrent relays or differential).Below shown summary of protection devices and their equipment has been (Lloyds / ABB) reviewed for a better understanding of the protection used as well as for possible modifications needed in order to minimize the loss of power / propulsion.

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Generator protections: (REF / Synpol).

1. Differential protection (87)→trip.2. Overcurrent (overload) protection (51)→trip. 3. Short circuit protection (50)→trip.4. Current negative sequence (46)→trip.5. Under voltage protection (27)→trip.6. Overvoltage protection (59)→trip.7. Loss of excitation protection (32R)→trip.8. Reverse active power protection (32)→trip.9. Underfrequency (81<)→trip at level 2.10.Overfrequency (81>)→trip at level 2.11.Ground overvoltage (59N)→alarm.12.Stator ground fault protection (67N)→trip.

Note: Lock-out relay (86) is always activated when the generator CB trips.

Neutral point :(REF)

1. Zero sequence Overcurrent protection (51N)→alarm.

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Bus Bars: (REF).

1. Under voltage protection (27) →trip propulsion and E.R.transformers.2. Overvoltage (59) →alarm.3. Ground overvoltage (59Vo) →alarm.4. Underfrequency (81) →alarm.

Inter Connector FWD MSBD: (REF) #107.

1. Cable thermal Overcurrent protection (49) →alarm.2. Overcurrent protection (51) →trip.3. Short circuit protection (50) →trip.4. Ground Overcurrent protection (51N)→trip.

Inter Connector AFT MSBD: (REF)#208.

1. Overcurrent protection (51)→trip.2. Short circuit protection (50)→trip.3. Differential protection (87)→trip of both 107 and 208 interconnectors.4. Ground Overcurrent differential protection (87N) →alarm.

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Propulsion Transformer Feeders: (REF) (4 in total).

1. Overcurrent protection (51) →trip.2. Short circuit protection (50) →trip.3. Ground Overcurrent protection (51N) →trip.4. Unbalanced load protection (46) →alarm.5. Differential protection (87) →trip.

FWD and AFT E.R.transformer feeders: (REF) (3 in total, 3 on line, 2 on load).

1. Thermal Overcurrent protection (49) →alarm.2. Overcurrent protection (51) →trip.3. Short Circuit protection (50) →trip.4. Ground Overcurrent protection (51N) →trip.5. Unbalanced load protection (46) →alarm.

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Accommodation transformer feeders: (REF) (6 in total, all on line).

1. Thermal Overcurrent protection (49) →alarm.2. Overcurrent protection (51) →trip.3. Short circuit protection (50) →trip.4. Directional ground Overcurrent protection (67N) →trip.5. Unbalanced load protection (46) →trip.6. Under voltage protection (27) →trip.7. Short circuit protection (breaker fuses).

Galley transformer feeder: (REF) (1 in total, on line).

1. Thermal Overcurrent protection (49) →alarm.2. Overcurrent protection (51) →trip.3. Short circuit protection (50) →trip.4. Directional ground Overcurrent protection (67N) →trip.5. Unbalanced load protection (46) →trip.6. Under voltage protection (27) →trip.7. Short circuit protection (breaker fuses).

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Thruster motor feeders: (REF) (3 in total).

1. Thermal Overcurrent protection (49) →alarm.2. Short circuit Overcurrent (50) →trip.3. Locked rotor protection (start-up) (51LR) →trip.4. Too long starting Overcurrent (48) →trip.5. Start too long starting Overcurrent (51) →trip.6. Locked rotor protection, during running (51) →trip.7. Unbalanced load protection (46) →alarm.8. Directional ground Overcurrent protection (67N) →trip.9. Under voltage motor shedding (27-1) →trip.10.Under voltage lockout motor starting (27-2) →lock motor contactor.

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AC Compressor motor feeders: (REF) (4 in total).

1. Thermal Overcurrent protection (49) →alarm.2. Short circuit Overcurrent (50) →trip.3. Locked rotor protection (start-up) (51LR) →trip.4. Too long starting Overcurrent (48) →trip.5. Start too long starting Overcurrent (51) →trip.6. Locked rotor protection, during running (51) →trip.7. Unbalanced load protection (46) →alarm.8. Directional ground Overcurrent protection (67N) →trip.9. Under voltage motor shedding (27-1) →trip.10.Under voltage lockout motor starting (27-2) →lock motor contactor.

Note: Protection Relay Study has been reviewed by Ronald Jansen (ABB). New settings have been approved by Lloyds. New settings have to be uploaded on the OSDM in 2009. Supported documents are available and on file.

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3.1.6. Switchboard users:

3.1.6. a→ Main E.R.transformers (3 in total).

3.1.6. aa→ Buchholz relays: Single failure that could cause to lose part of the switchboard / propulsion.

Items Supplied from Feeding Affected switchboardMain E.R transformer FZ/003 TFA FWD MSBD # 131 FWD 690V MSBD FWD 690V MSBD USERSMain E.R transformer FZ/003 TFB AFT MSBD # 232 AFT 690V MSBD AFT 690V MSBD USERSMain E.R transformer FZ/003 TFC AFT MSBD / FWD MSBD # 133 OR 234 AFT OR FWD 690V MSBD AFT 0R FWD 690V MSBD USERS

FZ/003TFA and FZ/003TFB are normally on line.FZ/003TFC is considered as back-up transformer that supplies either the AFT or FWD 690V MSBD.

3.1.6. ab→ Faulty secondary main E.R. transformer breaker: Opening of the secondary transformer breaker in case of breaker failure (users) without the opening of the primary breaker will cause a loss of power of the 690V relevant switchboard / Propulsion.

Switchboard logic prevents the automatic change over to the spare transformer (this is good practice and should not be changed (training on board).

3.1.6. ac → Transformer logic and switching procedures (training on board).3.1.6. ad → Transformer safeties.3.1.6. ae → Oil leakages.

E.v.W Page 70



Loss of power



Past problems


maintenance



3.1.6.aa possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes3.1.6.ab x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes3.1.6.ac possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes3.1.6.ad possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes3.1.6.ae possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H Yes (2) yes yes yes

Possible means: depending on the DG and switchboard configuration and nature of the fault.Single failure could (will) affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.Past problems were related to oil leakages on transformers FZ/003TFA and FZ/003TFB.

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3.1.6. b→Propulsion transformers (4 in total).

3.1.6. ba → Buchholz relays. 3.1.6. bb → Transformer safeties.3.1.6. bc → Oil leakages.

Items Supplied from Affected Azipod PS / STBDPs propulsion transformer FZ/001TFA FWD 11KV MSBD # 121 PSPs propulsion transformer FZ/001TFB AFT 11KV MSBD # 222 PSSb propulsion transformer FZ/001TFC FWD 11KV MSBD # 123 STBDSb propulsion transformer FZ/001TFD AFT 11KV MSBD # 224 STBD


Loss of power



Past problems


maintenance



3.1.6.ba x possible medium critical No risk Critical none yes yes yes3.1.6.bb possible possible medium critical No risk Critical none yes yes yes3.1.6.bc possible possible medium medium No risk medium Yes (2) yes yes yes

Possible means: depending on the DG and load configuration. Single failure will affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.Past problems were related to oil leakages on both FWD PS and SB propulsion transformers.

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4. UPS / Inverters and Battery back-up systems.

General:Battery back-up could be vital in case of loss of propulsion / power.


4.1.1. a→ Logic and change-over procedures UPS / Inverters (training on board). 4.1.1. b→ Battery discharge procedures.

Each vessel needs to be supplied with adequate rated battery discharge banks in order to discharge the batteries while the UPS / inverter is on line (Available on OSDM).

4.1.1. c→ Preventive maintenance. 4.1.1. ca→ Ensure that Battery tests / UPS, Inverter digital readings PM (Preventive

Maintenance) is done is in a correct way (Training on board).Sub Groups Trip DG Trip

propulsionLoss of power



Past problems


maintenance



4.1.1.a possible possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes4.1.1.b possible possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes4.1.1.c yes yes yes

Possible means: depending on the DG, switchboard and propulsion configuration as well as the nature of the fault.Single failure (s) could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the nature of the fault.

No work should be performed on the UPS / Inverter / Batteries at sea or during manoeuvering and anchor mode, unless it is an absolute emergency.

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Power Supplies UPS / Inverters:Items Supplied from Redundant Power Supplies

FZ/901QB→EDG starting battery charger. EMG SWBD XA/873A # 929 NO

FZ/919QB→Bridge battery charge panel. EMG SWBD XA/873 # 919 NO

FZ/009QB→Emergency light inverter. EMG SWBD XA/873 # 903 NO

XM/001QBB→SB propulsion converter. FZ/313QF STBD AZIPOD ROOM GSP – FZ/424QF PS AZIPOD ROOM GSP

YES

XM/001QBA→PS propulsion converter. FZ/313QF STBD AZIPOD ROOM GSP – FZ/424QF PS AZIPOD ROOM GSP

YES

GH/002CO→Hotel management system 2. FZ/004QFA SUBSTATION 4 # D51 - EMG SWBD XA/873A # 924 YES

FZ/003QB→FWD MSBD 110VDC battery charger. FWD 690V MSBD # 399 - FZ/QZ94100 # 94123 FWD MSBD YES

FZ/004QB→AFT MSBD 110VDC battery charger. AFT 690V MSBD # 498 – FZ/QZ94200 # 94220 AFT MSBD YES

GH/001COA→Hotel management system 1. FZ/003QFA SUBSTATION 3 # C50 - EMG SWBD XA/873 # 923 YES

GH/001COB→Hotel management system 1. FZ/004QFA SUBSTATION 4 # D50 - FZ/QZ947000 # 16 EMG POWER PANEL UNDER BOAT 9

YES

GB/001CO→PA system 1. FZ/QFE30000 # 13, ELEC LOCKER OPP. CABIN 8031 - EMG SWBD XA/873A # 921

YES

GB/002CO→PA system 2. FZ/002QFA SUBSTATION 2 # B50 – EMG SWBD XA/873 # 922 YES

NI/001CO→Bridge equipment. FZ/QFE30000 # 12, ELEC LOCKER OPP. CABIN 8031 –EMG SWBD XA/873A # 912

YES

AS/001QFA→FWD MSBD distribution panel. FWD 690V SWBD # 391 - EMG SWBD # 910 YES

AS/001QFB→AFT MSBD distribution panel. AFT 690V MSBD # 490 - EMG SWBD # 911 YES

AS/002QBA→FWD MSBD UPS 2. AS/001QFA FWD MSBD – AS/001QFB AFT MSBD YES

AS/002QBB→AFT MSBD UPS 1. AS/001QFA FWD MSBD – AS/001QFB AFT MSBD YES

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AS/002QBC→ECR UPS 5. AS/001QFA FWD MSBD – AS/001QFB AFT MSBD YES

5. Propulsion Systems (Azipod).5.1.1. Control Systems.5.1.2. Hydraulic Systems.5.1.3. Steering Control Systems.5.1.4. Cooling Systems.5.1.5. Lubrication Systems.

General:Azipods are vital for the manoeuverability of the vessel.Note:Complete PS Azipod has been replaced on the OSDM due to damaged windings (2006).Training of the crew regarding the Azipod control and sub systems is a must (Training intervals need to be reviewed, especially for the crew that never sailed with the Azipod system).Azipod isolation and entrance procedures need to be followed at all times, failure of doing so could endanger the safe working situation as well as the manoeuverability of the vessel.

Individual Sub groups:5.1.1. Control Systems.

5.1.1.a→Cyclo Converter.5.1.1.b→Azipod Information Unit (AIU).5.1.1.c→Azipod Data Transmission System.

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5.1.1.d→Excitation.5.1.1. e→ Propulsion motor monitoring system.

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5.1.1. a→ Cyclo Converter. 5.1.1. aa→ High Speed Breakers 5.1.1. ab→ Thyristor Bridges (Phase units). 5.1.1. ac→ Cooling system. 5.1.1. ad→ Excitation Bridge. 5.1.1. ae→ Auxiliary Supplies (UPS) (See chapter 4). 5.1.1. af→ Control and monitoring unit. 5.1.1. ag→ Propulsion transformers. 5.1.1. ah→ Interlocks. 5.1.1. ai→ Cyclo converter room ventilation.

5.1.1. aj→ AC800 modules (Software). 5.1.1. ak→ Feedback of Azipod encoder signals.

GRB units (Cyclo converter cubical R2). Bechoff receivers (Cyclo converter cubical R2). Fiber optical / serial data transmission (From Azipod to Cyclo). CMC and ZMC computers.

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Loss of power



Past problems


maintenance



5.1.1.aa possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (4) yes yes yes

5.1.1.ab possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.1.ac Yes (2) yes yes yes

5.1.1.ad possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (2) yes yes yes

5.1.1.ae possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.1.af possible possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.1.ag possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.1.ah none yes yes yes

5.1.1.ai possible possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.1.aj possible x medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.1.ak possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (4) yes yes yes

Possible means: Depends on the load reduction of the network in case of loss of propulsion load.Single failure could (will) affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the nature of the fault.Keep in mind that in case of failure of one (or more) of these components that this will only trip one Azipod / Cyclo converter, meaning that the vessel will still have 50% of its manoeuvre capacity.

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Single failures:

Items Nature of the fault Redundant set-up Partial Loss of propulsion

5.1.1. aa Opening of the high speed breaker due to intermittent encoder signals

yes no

5.1.1. ac Broken cooling pump on PS and SB A-side Cyclo converter

yes no

5.1.1. ad Loss of excitation due to fault on the PS Azipod rotor / loss of excitation on SB

yes yes

5.1.1. ak Encoder failure on PS and SB Azipod yes no

Note: Items descript under 5.1.1.ak are indeed the weakest link of the Azipod / Cyclo converter control.Set-up is redundant but needs to be reviewed.

Keep in mind that in case of failure of one (or more) of these components that this will only trip one Azipod / Cyclo converter, meaning that the vessel will still have 50% of its manoeuvre capacity.

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5.1.1. b→ Azipod Information Unit (AIU).

5.1.1. ba→ AC800 Modules (Software).

A hard reset for more than 3 seconds on the AC800 module will erase the software program.

5.1.1. bb→ Cabinet Cooling. 5.1.1. bc→ LCON (Optical / Serial converter) (loss of propulsion).

Note: 5.1.1. ba→ Backup software needs to be available on board at all times (On dedicated laptop).Crew on board needs to be familiar with the procedure to upload the software (Upload instructions and software are not available on OSDM).Sub Groups Trip DG Trip




Past problems


maintenance



5.1.1.ba possible x medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes5.1.1.bb depends medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes5.1.1.bc possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

Possible means: Depends on the load reduction of the network in case of loss of propulsion load.Single failure could (will) affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.Keep in mind that in case of failure of one (or more) of these components that this will only trip one Azipod / Cyclo converter, meaning that the vessel will still have 50% of its manoeuvre capacity.

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5.1.1. c→ Azipod Data Transmission System.

5.1.1. ca→ Auxiliary slip ring. 5.1.1. cb→ CMC and ZMC

There are two CMC and two ZMC computers for each Azipod.

5.1.1. cc→ Profibus and Ethernet lines (independent).


Loss of power



Past problems


maintenance



5.1.1.ca possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes5.1.1.cb possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (2) yes yes yes5.1.1.cc possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

Possible means: Depends on the load reduction of the network in case of loss of propulsion load.Single failure could (will) affect redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the nature of the fault.Past failures related to PEP modules on the PS Azipod and ZMC failure on the STBD side Azipod.


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5.1.1. d→ Excitation.

5.1.1. da→ Excitation transformers. 5.1.1 .db→ Independent Supplies. 5.1.1. dc→ Automatic change-over in case of loss of power supply. 5.1.1. dd→ Excitation Bridge inside Cyclo converter. 5.1.1. de→ Transformer cooling / room ventilation. 5.1.1. df→ Transformer safeties.Sub Groups Trip DG Trip




Past problems


maintenance



5.1.1.da possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.1.db possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.1.dc possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.1.dd possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (1) yes yes yes

5.1.1.de possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.1.df possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

Possible means: Depends on the load reduction of the network in case of loss of propulsion load as well as the nature of the fault.Keep in mind that in case of failure of one (or more) of these components that this will only trip one Azipod / Cyclo converter, meaning that the vessel will still have 50% of its manoeuvre capacity.

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5.1.1. e→Propulsion motor monitoring system.

5.1.1. ea→ RDS (Remote Diagnostic System).

Working on OSDM.There have been many issues with the RDS system in the past, the hard drive has been replaced 8 times.

5.1.1. eb→ GOP panels. 5.1.1. ec→ Bearing conditioning monitoring (DtectX1 / Swantech).

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5.1.2. Hydraulic Systems.

5.1.2. a→ Hydraulic motors (4 in total) 5.1.2. b→ In case of hydraulic leakage (Fault separation block). 5.1.2. c→ Flushing pump. 5.1.2. d→ Hydraulic power pack.

Sub Groups Trip propulsion

Loss of power Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode

Port-mode Anchor-mode Past problems Awareness / training crew /

maintenance



5.1.2.a possible possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.2.b Yes (1) yes yes yes

5.1.2.c none yes yes yes

5.1.2.d possible possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

Possible means: Depends on the nature of the fault as well as on the load reduction of the network in case of a failure.Fault separation block has been completely changed on the PS due to internal component failure.Keep in mind that in case of failure of one (or more) of these components that this will only trip one Azipod / Cyclo converter, meaning that the vessel will still have 50% of its manoeuvre capacity.

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5.1.3. Steering control system.

5.1.3. a→ Steering pumps. 5.1.3. b→ Steering motors. 5.1.3. c→ Steering motor starters. 5.1.3. d→ Steering gear control panels (Local / ECR / Bridge). 5.1.3. e→ Power supplies. 5.1.3. f→ Steering Locking / brake system 5.1.3. g→ Emergency steering. 5.1.3. h→ Emergency Emergency steering. 5.1.3. i→ Room ventilation. 5.1.3. j→ Control and monitoring. 5.1.3. k→ Fast steering mode (Only possible in Manoeuvre mode, 2 pumps). 5.1.3. l→ Steering mechanical set-up. 5.1.3. m→ Slewing bearing and sealing system.

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Sub Groups

Trip DG Trip propulsion

Loss of power



Past problems


maintenance



5.1.3.a x medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.3.b x medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (2) yes yes yes

5.1.3.c x medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (5) yes yes yes

5.1.3.d medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.3.e possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.3.f medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.3.g medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.3.h medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.3.i medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (2) yes yes yes

5.1.3.j possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.3.k medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.3.l medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

5.1.3.m medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

Possible means: depends on the nature of the fault.Past problems: 2 faulty steering motors and 5 steering control soft starters have been replaced.Keep in mind that in case of failure of one (or more) of these components that this will only trip oneAzipod / Cyclo converter, meaning that the vessel will still have 50% of its manoeuvre capacity.

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5.1.3.J→ Control and Monitoring. 5.1.3. Ja→ EMRI system.

General:The complete EMRI control system is build up as 2 independent systems, one for PORT and one similar for the STBD Azipod.Each control system is governed by one of 2 redundant PLC’s. One active and one in hot standby mode.System would still function in case of PLC’s failure (NFU and hand steering modes).System has an independent cable routing.

Keep in mind that in case of a failure of one (or more) of the EMRI components that this could (will) affect only 1 Azipod / Cyclo converter, meaning that the vessel will still have 50% of its manoeuvre capacity.

The situation will be different in case of a fire in the electrical locker on deck 8, opposite cabin 8010, as most of the EMRI equipment is centrally located in that electrical locker.Redundancy and manoeuverability will be affected in such a case, keep in mind that even than you can still locally control the steering system (s).

EMRI SYSTEMS Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode

Port-mode Anchor-mode Past problems Awareness / training crew / maintenance


Supported documents

availablePS EMRI SYSTEM medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

SB EMRI SYSTEM

medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

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5.1.4 Cooling systems.

5.1.4. a→Cooling air unit. 5.1.4. b→Heat exchanger. 5.1.4. c→Suction / Pressure chamber. 5.1.4. d→Room ventilation. 5.1.4. e→Fan logic / Starters / Power supplies.


Loss of power



Past problems


maintenance



5.1.4.a No risk none yes yes yes

5.1.4.b No risk none yes yes yes

5.1.4.c No risk none yes yes yes

5.1.4.d Low Low No risk Low Yes (2) yes yes yes

5.1.4.e Low Low No risk Low none yes yes yes


Note item 5.1.4.d: inadequate Azipod room cooling when the vessel set sail from the yard, this has been resolved.

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5.1.5 Lubrication Systems.

5.1.5. a→ Thrust bearing. 5.1.5. b→ Propeller bearing. 5.1.5. c→ Seal Oil. 5.1.5. d→ Drainage system. 5.1.5. e→ Shaft seal arrangement. 5.1.5. f→ Purifiner.


Loss of power



Past problems


maintenance



5.1.5.a No risk none yes yes yes

5.1.5.b No risk none yes yes yes

5.1.5.c No risk none yes yes yes

5.1.5.d No risk none yes yes yes

5.1.5.e No risk none yes yes yes

5.1.5.f No risk Yes (2) yes yes yes


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6. Emergency Switchboard / Emergency Generator.

6.1.1. Emergency switchboard.6.1.2. Emergency generator.

General:Emergency facilities such as emergency switchboard, its users and the emergency generator are vital for the overall vessels safe and redundant operation.Failure of one of the components will affect the redundancy and could affect the manoeuverability of the vessel.Note: The Complete EMG has been replaced on OSDM (March 2006)


6.1.1. Emergency switchboard.

6.1.1. a→ Switchboard description / logic. 6.1.1. b→ Inverter and Battery set-up. 6.1.1. c→ Switchboard Safeties. 6.1.1. d→ Transfer line and breakers. 6.1.1. e→ Switchboard users. 6.1.1. f→ Room set-up / Ventilation. 6.1.1. g→ Auxiliary transformers. 6.1.1. h→ Masterpack breakers / spare breakers.

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Sub Groups Trip EMG Trip transfer

line

Preferential trip

Loss of emg power



Past problems


maintenance



6.1.1.a none yes yes yes

6.1.1.b Yes (20) yes yes yes

6.1.1.c possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

6.1.1.d medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

6.1.1.e none yes yes yes

6.1.1.f none yes yes yes

6.1.1.g medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

6.1.1.h possible possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

Possible means: Depends on the nature of the failure.Single failure will affect the redundancy and could affect the manoeuverability of the vessel.Past problems were all related to internal component failures of the inverter (Fan sensors are a good example).

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6.1.2. Emergency generator.

6.1.2. a→ Safeties. 6.1.2. b→ Radiator fan / Cooling (Modification made, in case of damper feedback failure). 6.1.2. c→ Starting batteries / UPS (See chapter 4). 6.1.2. d→ Fuel set-up. 6.1.2. e→ Starting air set-up / starting air receiver. 6.1.2. f→ Control cabinet. 6.1.2. g→ Mechanical set-up.Sub Groups Trip EMG Trip

transfer line

Preferential trip

Loss of emg power



Past problems


maintenance



6.1.2.a possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

6.1.2.b x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H

Yes (1) yes yes yes

6.1.2.c none yes yes yes

6.1.2.d possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

6.1.2.e Yes (1) yes yes yes

6.1.2.f possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

6.1.2.g medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

Possible means: Depends on the nature of the failure.Medium risk (sea-mode), critical risk (Manoeuvre-mode) and medium-high risk (Anchor mode) with faulty transfer line to 690V MSBD (Running (on line) EMG feeding the EMSB users).Past problems: air starter motor has been replaced / EMG cooler has been replaced (Leakage).

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Automatic starting control selection should always be selected to “electric start” and not to “pneumatic start” during the normal sailing configuration.

Recommendation:

Source a different manufactory of an emergency generator for future new HAL vessels.Consider the install of a second emergency generator / switchboard for future new HAL vessels.

6.1.2. d→ Fuel set-up:

Note: Fuel supply to EMG is done via a single feeder line with 1 quick closing valve and 1 manual valve from the DO tank in the EMG room, single failure of one of these valves will cut-off the fuel supply to the EMG.There is no by-pass line on the EMG fuel system.

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6.1.2. a→ Safeties 6.1.2. aa→ Overspeed (max speed setting + 15%). 6.1.2. ab→ Lube-oil preheating high temp. 6.1.2. ac→ Lube-oil low / very low pressure. 6.1.2. ad→ Lube-oil high temperature >115°C. 6.1.2. ae→ Speed governor (Major failure). 6.1.2. af→ Combustion air / Exhaust gas (ambient room, temp). 6.1.2. ag→ Cooling (fresh) water >100°C. 6.1.2. ah→ Bearings (temperature).

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Sub Groups Trip EMG Trip transfer

line

Preferential trip

Loss of emg power



Past problems


maintenance



6.1.2.aa x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

6.1.2.ab x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

6.1.2.ac none yes yes yes

6.1.2.ad x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

6.1.2.ae x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

6.1.2.af possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

6.1.2.ag x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

6.1.2.ah possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H

none yes yes yes

Possible means: Depends on the nature of the failure.Medium risk (sea-mode), critical risk (Manoeuvre-mode) and medium-high risk (Anchor mode) with faulty transfer line to 690V MSBD (Running (on line) EMG feeding the EMSB users).

Recommendation:Common alarms to automation need to be reviewed; there should be no common alarms, just individual alarms.

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7. Case study using chapters 1-6.

Scenario A:

1. Vessel is at sea, enroute to Hawaii, 2 days sailing (away) from the Californian coast.2. Complete loss of power and propulsion.3. Fire in the AFT engine room.4. Emergency Diesel Generator did not start.5. AFT engine room equipment cannot be used . 6. AFT 11KV / 690V SWBD users and equipment cannot be used .

Scenario B:

1. Vessel is at sea, enroute to Hawaii, 2 days sailing (away) from the Californian coast.2. Complete loss of power and propulsion.3. Fire in the FWD engine room.4. Emergency Diesel Generator did not start.5. FWD engine room equipment cannot be used .6. FWD 11KV / 690V SWBD users and equipment cannot be used .

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Goals for scenarios A and B:

1. Restore power / propulsion and Manoeuverability of the Vessel (Vital).2. Restore vacuum systems / galley and kitchen equipment / AC / drinking water (evaps) / potable

water / cabin power / Chiller and Freezer compressor / other passenger and crew facilities.

These scenarios will indicate the redundancy / non-redundancy of the ships systems in case of an emergency and the possible changes that need to be implemented in order to maintain the redundancy of the ships systems.

Scenario A:

1. Vessel is at sea, enroute to Hawaii, 2 days sailing (away) from the Californian coast.2. Complete loss of power and propulsion.3. Fire in the AFT engine room.4. Emergency Diesel Generator did not start.5. AFT engine room equipment cannot be used .6. AFT 11KV / 690V SWBD users and equipment cannot be used .

Below facts are based on one of the worst possible scenarios.

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1. No access to the AFT engine room.2. No access to the AFT MSBD (both entrance doors to the AFT MSBD are located in the AFT engine room).3. Emergency generator transfer line was selected to the AFT 690V MSBD (410) before the fire / blackout.4. No starting air available, air vessel only has a pressure of 8 bar (Not enough to start DG).5. Essential equipment to start the first DG on the FWD MSBD is available, but only via the normal 690V

supplies and not via the 690V emergency supplies.

Booster pump (pump overhaul). Starting air compressor (change bearings of the motor). Combined set-up from AFT to FWD engine is not available due to the fire.

6. DO gravity valve FWD engine is not opening, no gravity feed to the DG.7. DO gravity valve by-pass line has a broken handle, no gravity feed to the DG.8. Only way to restore the power at this point is by means of the “ELECTRICAL FEEDBACK” procedure, pending

if EMG will start.9. Soon you will find out that this will not work because of the following reasons:

Important: The release of CO² in the affected engine room could be of vital importance, it is important that the decision to release CO² is made in a timely matter.

It is equally important that the engineers will isolate the combined systems between AFT and FWD engine rooms as soon as possible in order to prevent further damage (Think of combined starting air system as an example).

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Emergency generator transfer line was selected to the AFT 690V MSBD (410) before the fire / blackout.This means that breaker 410 in the AFT MSBD is closed, breaker 410 does not have an under voltage coil, meaning that this breaker can only be opened manually which is not possible (No access to AFT MSBD).

Note: EMG transfer line 410 (AFT) and 309 (FWD) are mechanically and electrically interlocked (See SWBD description and explanation) (Spare breaker keys are located in the Elec Workshop on the OSDM) (if needed).

We basically need to have 410 open and 309 closed before we can commence the “FEEDBACK” - procedure.

Breaker number Under voltage coil MN Opening shunt MX Closing coil XF Modification needed410 AFT MSBD X possible309 FWD MSBD X possible909 EMG SWBD X X X No901 EMG SWBD X X X No

Conclusion: Not possible to restore power and propulsion at this point with the above mentioned conditions.

Modifications needed:

Item Needed modification Nature of modification Revise plan approval Outside contractorBreaker 410 Possible solution** Install under voltage coil yes yesBreaker 309 Possible solution** Install under voltage coil yes yesAFT MSBD X Install a small manhole **

(SEE NOTE)yes yes

FWD MSBD X Install a small manhole ** (SEE NOTE)

yes yes

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Note: A small entrance / exit manhole needs to be installed for both AFT and FWD MSBD, in order to access or escape from the MSBD’s in case of an Engine room fire (Current access doors are all installed on the engine room side).

These access / exit manholes need to be installed at the back wall of the 690V SWBD’s.This should be a relatively easy as well as a low cost modification.

AFT MSBD → manhole access via Engine workshop on B-deck.FWD MSBD → manhole access via B-deck stairway behind the ECR.

** The implementation of under voltage coils could complicate the installation; this could be a high-cost solution.

Other solution:

There is also the possibility to physical remove (disconnect) the transfer line feeder cable (410) to the AFT MSBD from the EMG SWBD, keep in mind that this would be a timely exercise.Transfer feeder lines (410-309) are both connected to the top bus bar of cubical 1A of the EMG SWBD XA/873A (Cables are painted with fire resistant paint and not marked).

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Knowing the above, but in order to continue with the scenario A: We say that the machinist made a hole in order to access the AFT MSBD from the engine workshop on B-deck (At this point we are tampering with the integrity of the areas).Proceed with the “FEEDBACK” operation.

1. Go to the AFT MSBD (Protected with BA set, fire (CO² RELEASE) on the other side of the A60 bulkhead) (MSBD should not be affected in case of release of CO² in the ENGINE room as this is classified as a different area of CO² release).

2. Perform the below necessary shown actions.

690V MSBD Open breaker / set to manual Rack-out breaker Take key (interlock with 309)410 X X X402 X504 X

3. Open the following breakers ( time and safety permitted)

690V MSBD Open breaker / set to manual Rack-out breaker Comments570 Already open X512 Already open X514 Already open X454 Already open X

All other users 690V MSBD X11KV MSBD

208 Already open X234 Already open X If not racked out already232 Already open X248 Already open X

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4. Go to FWD MSBD room. 5. Perform the below shown actions.

690V MSBD Close breaker Insert key Open breaker (set to manual) Rack-out breaker Comments309 X X301 Set to manual

All 690V users X11KV MSBD

107 Already open X133 Already open X If not racked out already

6. Go to ECR. 7. Perform the below shown actions (If not done already).

Supply / Feeder / other Supply from AFT 11KV MSBD

Breaker # EMG stop ECR Fuel shut down Off position EGP panel

Select rolling-mode(autom.)

DG 1 XA/872B 202 X XDG 2 XA/872B 204 X XDG 3 XA/872B 206 X X

Substation 1 XA/872B 246 XSubstation 2 XA/872B 244 XSubstation 3 XA/872B 242 XGalley Substation XA/872B 248 X

Transformer FZ/003TFB XA/872B 232 XTransformer FZ/003TFC XA/872 A - B 133-234 XAll elevators X

8. Go to EMG room (or send somebody).9. Open breaker 942 for the supply of FZ/QZ942000 located in the AFT MSBD.

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10.Select the selector switch in cabinet 1G located in XA/873A to “FEEDBACK”.11. Start EMG, following the procedure for “DEAD” - ship scenario.12.Make sure EMG is running (stable condition, voltage and frequency).13.Close breaker 901 by pushing “CLOSING” on cubicle 1E, or directly on the breaker (on button).14.Close breaker 909 by pushing “CLOSING” on cubicle 1G, or directly on the breaker (on button).15.EMG is now feeding the FWD 690V SWBD via breaker 309.16. Go to FWD MSBD room.17.Close the following essential (GSP’s) breakers in order to have the auxiliary equipment available to start the

first DG (DG 4, 5).

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Necessary Equipment: Supply from 690VMSBD CLOSE BREAKER # CHECK IF RUNNING / POWERXD/144AD booster pump 1 FZ/QF381000#38116 381 XXD/144AA feeder pump 1 FZ/QF381000#38114 381 X

Starting air compressor XM/228AB (N2)

GSP FZ/341QF#34123 341 X

Cooling pump starting air compressor

XA/048A - XA/048B

GSP FZ/331QF#33135 for XA/048AGSP FZ/341QF#34112 for XA/048B

331

341 (ALREADY CLOSED)

X

XSecondary Equipment:Seawater cooling pump N2 -

XE/045BGSP FZ/341QF#34110 341 (ALREADY CLOSED)

LT FW cooling pump N1 - XE/046A GSP FZ/331QF#33113 331 (ALREADY CLOSED)LT FW cooling pump N2 -XE/046B GSP FZ/341QF#34111 341 (ALREADY CLOSED)

Combustion air fan GSP FZ/325QF #32516 DG5 #32517 DG4

325

Emergency power available for the following users:

Supply from EMG SWBD/ AS/001QFA (FWD MSBD ROOM)

Breaker number remarks

Starting air compressor XM/228AA (N1)

FZ/QZ941000 FWD E.R.EMG power panel 94114 Compressor cannot be used (change bearings)

Emergency cooling pump for starting air compressor (XE/048E)

FZ/QZ941000 FWD E.R.EMG power panel 94110 Can be used

XE/144AE Booster pump N2 AS/001QFA FWD MSBD Q52 Booster pump cannot be used (pump overhaul)

XE/144AB Feeder pump N2 AS/001QFA FWD MSBD Q53 Can be used

DG4 AC70/S800 CABINET AU604 AS/001QFA FWD MSBD Q19 – Q20 Can be used

DG5 AC70/S800 CABINET AU605 AS/001QFA FWD MSBD Q21 – Q22 Can be used

GTG S800 CABINET AU606 AS/001QFA FWD MSBD Q23 Can be used

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18. Start starting air compressor N2.

Start DG (on the DG) once required starting air pressure is available to start the DG. (Minimum 12 bars, nominal 27bar) (DG should always be started from engine room, minimum use of air).

19. Go to the FWD MSBD room.20. Connect (Manually) the DG to the 11KV MSBD (Once the DG is stabilized, voltage / frequency)(Following

available procedure).21. Close manually the primary transformer breaker 131 for FZ/003TFA from the 11KV MSBD. **22.Go to the EMG room or send somebody (somebody should be present already).23.Select the selector switch in cabinet 1G located in XA/873A from “FEEDBACK” to “AUTO” position.24.Go to the FWD 690V SWBD (somebody should be present) in order to select breaker 301 to auto.25.Breaker 301 should close automatically, if not close manually.26. At this point the logic of 301/909 and 901 will open breaker 901.27.EMG will not stop automatically, this needs to be stopped manually (it is advisable not to stop the EMG).28. Close all 690V SWBD user breakers.29. Power has been restored to the FWD MSBD.30. EMG SWBD is powered via the FWD MSBD.31.Go to ECR .32. Start next DG and connect this to the FWD MSBD (this should be possible by means of auto

synchronization or manual synchronization from FWD MSBD / ECR).33. At this point we have enough power to start the propulsion.

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Equipment needed / things we need to do before we can start the propulsion:

Necessary equipment Supply from Breaker number # Supply Available Blocking of high-speed breakers on

Cyclo conv.

Remarks

PS propulsion transformer FZ/001TFA

FWD MSBD 121 YES Depends on the cable routing (FIRE AFT E.R.)

PS propulsion transformer FZ/001TFB

AFT MSBD 222 NO YES (AQ2) No users AFT MSBD are available

SB propulsion transformer FZ/001TFC


SB propulsion transformer FZ/001TFD

AFT MSBD 224 NO YES (BQ2) No users AFT MSBD are available

PS Excitation transformer FZ/002TFA

AFT MSBD 406 NO Select excit. transformer to FWD MSBD


FWD MSBD 305 YES Select excit. transformer to FWD MSBD

SB Excitation transformer FZ/002TFB

AFT MSBD 408 NO Select excit. transformer to FWD MSBD


FWD MSBD 307 YES Select excit. transformer to FWD MSBD

GSP FZ/424QF auxiliary equipment for SB propulsion

AFT MSBD 424 NO GSP 424 can be fed from GSP 313

GSP FZ/313QF auxiliary equipment for PS propulsion


PS Steering pumps Via FZ/001CTA

GSP FZ/313QF -EMG SWBD

31310913

YES (fed via 424)YES

Depends on the cable routing (FIRE AFT E.R.)

SB steering pumps Via FZ/001CTB


42410914

YESYES

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1. See above shown table.2. Go to both Cyclo converter rooms .3. Open the permission switches on the high-speed breakers as indicated in the table.4. Supply GSP FZ/424QF (SB) from GSP FZ/313QF (PS) (INTERLOCK VIA PADLOCK).5. Padlock key located on breaker 42401 on GSP FZ/424QF.6. Open breaker 42401 on GSP FZ/424QF (SB Cyclo-converter room).7. Remove padlock and close breaker 42402 on GSP FZ/424QF (SB Cyclo-converter room).8. Remove padlock and close breaker 31302 on GSP FZ/313QF (PS Cyclo-converter room).9. Clear alarms on Cyclo-converter GOP screens.10.Go to B-deck transformer room .11. Select both excitation transformers supply to the FWD MSBD by means of switching the selector

switch on the transformer (1 excitation transformer is already selected to the FWD MSBD).12.Go to the ECR .13. Clear alarms on the ECR GOP screens.14.The “PM READY START” light starts flashing (on GOP).15. Start the propulsion.16.Transfer propulsion control to the bridge, once stable and running.

You will only have half a winding available on each Azipod.

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17.The below shown bow thrusters are available if needed.

Bow thruster number Supply from breaker # AvailableBT1 YA/764A 161 YESBT2 YA/764B 262 NOBT3 YA/764C 163 YES

At this point the ships manoeuverability has been restored (Depending on the routing of the cables!!!).

Suggested (needed) modifications / changes.

Items Suggested modification Nature of modification Revise plan approval Outside contractorStarting air compressors Yes (low-cost) Normal and EMG supply X X (ships crew)

Cable runs yes Re-routing / reviewing of vital supply cables from

switchboard.

X X

Electricians / engineers need to be trained for emergency scenarios because it could happen 1 day.2nd/3rd electricians should all be BA trained, although they may not be assigned to a fire team.

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IMPORTANT FACTS FOR SCENARIO “A”:


But:

Both HFO transfer pumps are located in the AFT PS purifier room; these pumps will not be available due to fire in the AFT engine room.Running DG’s in the FWD engine room have therefore a limited HFO supply in service and settling tanks.Approximate 1 or 2 days depending on the engine configurations and load.

System could be changed over to M.G.O. after the HFO FWD tanks are emptied, M.G.O. tanks are located fwd of the fwd engine room on the OSDMM.G.O. service tank has a limited capacity of 37.4m3 (high level at 30m3), but there is a way to combine the GTG M.G.O. service tank by means of communicating vessels which will increase the total amount of M.G.O. availability as descript on page 23Knowing that one 16 cylinder DG is using 48m3 per day and that one 12 cylinder DG is using 36m3 per day it is safe to assume that vessel will have the capability to sail with this configuration pending if the M.G.O transfer pump located in the FWD STBD purifier room is available.

Note: One M.G.O. transfer pump is located in the AFT PS purifier room (Not available due to fire). One M.G.O. transfer pump is located in the FWD STBD purifier room (Should be available).

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Recommendation:HFO transfer pumps need to be relocated; set-up should have one HFO transfer pump in AFT and one in the FWD engine rooms!!!M.G.O. set up needs to be reviewed and recommended modifications should be implemented in order to reduce the risk of losing the M.G.O. system as well.

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Scenario A, Part 2:

2. Restore vacuum systems / galley and kitchen equipment / AC / drinking water (evaps) / potable water / cabin power / Chiller and Freezer compressor / other passenger and crew facilities.

Power is available for the below shown equipment (Depending on the routing of the cables!!!).

Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsVacuum collecting

system N1GSP FZ/945QZ

Potable water room94516 HIGH yes

Vacuum collecting system N2

GSP FZ/945QZPotable water room

94517 HIGH yes


GSP FZ/945QZPotable water room

94518 HIGH yes


FZ/QZ942000 AFT MSBD

94214 HIGH NO No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD




Vacuum systems 1, 2 and 3 are available (FWD zones of the vessel). Power for systems 4 and 5 is available, but power panel FZ/QZ942000 is located in the AFT

MSBD room (This panel has already been isolated (step 9) from the EMSB via breaker 942). There is a way to combine these vacuum systems, but we can safely assume that this is not

possible due to the fire in the AFT E.R. (Piping is routed via AFT E.R.).

Note 1: No technical water (See page 106) means no flushing of the toilets, system will work but you will have a lot of flushing and vacuum problems.

Note 2:Sewage will directly be pumped over board (Emergency scenario).

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Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsFresh water generator

XA/107A FWD 690V SWBD 365 MEDIUM HIGH YES

Fresh water generator XA/107B

AFT 690V SWBD 466 MEDIUM HIGH NO No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD

Fresh water generator XA/107C

FWD 690V SWBD 367 MEDIUM HIGH YES

Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsCold potable water pump

EP1 / YE440AGSP FZ/945QZ 94510 MEDIUM HIGH YES

Cold potable water pump EP2 / YE440B

GSP FZ/945QZ 94511 MEDUIM HIGH YES

Cold potable water pump EP3 / YE440C

GSP FZ/327QF 32726 MEDIUM HIGH YES

Potable water transfer pump EP1 / YE/442A

GSP FZ/327QF 32711 LOW YES

Potable water transfer pump EP2 / YE/442B


Galley hot water circ.pump 1 / YE/445A

GSP FZ/945QZ 94514 MEDIUM YES

Galley hot water circ.pump 2 / YE/445B

GSP FZ/327QF 32714 MEDIUM YES

Accommodation hot water pump EP1 - YE/444A


Accommodation hot water pump EP2 - YE/444B

GSP FZ/327QF 32713 MEDIUM YES

Conclusion : water is available.

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It is important that we have the availability of the grey water pumps in the FWD engine room as per below:

Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsGrey water tank MS01P

GREY WATER PUMP 3 YE/514 E

GREY WATER PUMP 4YE/514 F

GSP FZ/333QF

GSP FZ/333QF

FWD VACUUM COL.ROOM

33314

33315

MEDIUM

MEDIUM

YES

YES

Grey water tank MS04C GREY WATER PUMP 5

YE/514 G GREY WATER PUMP 6

YE/514 H

GSP FZ/333QF

GSP FZ/333QF

FWD VACUUM COL.ROOM

33316

33317

MEDIUM

MEDIUM

YES

YES

Grey water tank MS06P GREY WATER PUMP 8

YE/514 L GREY WATER PUMP 9

YE/514 M

GSP FZ/428QF AC ROOM

GSP FZ/327QF POT.W.RM

42814

32717

MEDIUM

MEDIUM

NO

YES

SUPPLIED FROM AFT MSBD

Grey water tank MS06C GREY WATER PUMP 14

YE/514 RGREY WATER PUMP 10

YE/514 T


GSP FZ/331QF FWD MSBD

42815

33125

MEDIUM

MEDIUM

NO

YES

SUPPLIED FROM AFT MSBD

Conclusion: Grey water pumps are available.But:Grey water pumps are not available in all zones, meaning that shower facilities etc in zones without the grey water pumps are only available for a limited time (Until tanks are full).

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Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsLaundry Substation feeder FZ/008TFA

FWD 690V MSBD 315 LOW YES

Laundry Substation feeder FZ/008TFB

AFT 690V MSBD 416 LOW NO No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD

Laundry grey water pump 1 YE/514C


Laundry grey water pump 2 YE/514D


Laundry hot technical water circ.pump

YE/446


Technical water distribution pump 1

YE/441A

GSP FZ/436QF 43610 LOW NO No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD


YE/441B

GSP FZ/436QF 43611 LOW NO No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD

Conclusion: Laundry is not available (Normally no technical water means no washing) (See notes).

Note 1:Potable water-technical water transfer line connection is available on OSDM, meaning that you could use this connection to utilize the laundry facilities by using potable water instead of technical water.

Note 2:Potable water is used to utilize the laundry facilities on the OSDM for some reason.

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Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsAccommodations

Substation fire zone 1AFT MSBD 11KV 246 HIGH NO No equipment / users

available from AFT MSBD

Accommodations Substation fire zone 2

AFT MSBD 11KV 244 HIGH NO No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD




FWD MSBD 11KV 145 HIGH YES Back-up not available





AC compressor 1 / YB/685A

FWD MSBD 11KV 151 HIGH YES

AC compressor 2 / YB/685B


AC compressor 3 / YB/685C

FWD MSBD 11KV 153 HIGH YES

AC compressor 4 / YB/685D


AC Hot water pump 1 YA/683A


32914 HIGH YES

AC Hot water pump 2 YA/683B



AC Chilled water pump 1 YA/682A


32912 HIGH YES

AC Chilled water pump 2 YA/682B



AC Chilled water pump 3 YA/682C


32913 HIGH YES

Conclusion : AC is available / Accommodation Substations 4, 5 and 6 are available.

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Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsPS Stabilizer

YA/770AFZ/QZ941000 EMG

SWBDFWD 690V SWBD

94118

373

LOW YES

YES

SB StabilizerYA/770B

FZ/QZ941000 EMG SWBD

AFT 690V SWBD

94119

472

LOW YES

NO No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD

Conclusion : Stabilizers are available.

Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsAFT Mooring winch

substation FZ/010QFFWD 690 MSBD 321 LOW YES Depending on the cable

routingAFT Mooring winch

substation FZ/010QFAFT 690V MSBD 420 LOW NO No equipment / users


FWD Mooring winch substation FZ/011QF

FWD 690 MSBD 319 LOW YES


AFT 690V MSBD 418 LOW NO No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD

Note: Breakers 42001 (1A) and 42002 (1B) need to be swapped in order to supply the AFT mooring winches (Breakers are located in the AFT mooring winch substation).

Conclusion : AFT and FWD mooring winch substations are available.

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Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsProvision store SWBD

XM/695AAFT 690V MSBD 422 HIGH NO No equipment / users

available from AFT MSBDFreezer compressor

XE/695AXM/695A HIGH NO

Chiller compressorXE/695D

XM/695A HIGH NO

Provision storeSWBD XM/695B

FWD 690 MSBD 323 HIGH YES Depending on the cable routing

Freezer compressorXE/695B

XM/695B HIGH YES

Chiller compressorXE/695C

XM/695B HIGH YES

Freezer circulation pump N1 XS/695AA

XM/695A HIGH NO No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD

Freezer circulation pump N2 XS/695CA

XM/695B HIGH YES

Chiller circulation pump N1 XS/695DA

XM/695A HIGH NO No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD

Chiller circulation pump N2 XS/695BA

XM/695B HIGH YES

Conclusion : Only 1 Freezer / Chiller compressor available.

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Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsFWD BOILER

XM/004AFWD 690V MSBD 363 HIGH YES

Economizer pump XE/094A DG4

FWD 690V MSBD FZ/331QF # 33116 MEDIUM HIGH YES Important for a dirty boiler

Economizer pump XE/094D DG5

FWD 690V MSBD FZ/341QF # 34115 MEDIUM HIGH YES Important for a dirty boiler

Technical water distribution pump N1

YE/441A

AFT 690V MSBD FZ/436QF # 43610 HIGH NO No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD


XE/441B

AFT 690V MSBD FZ/436 # 43611 HIGH NO No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD

Distilled water distribution pump N1

XA/103A

FWD 690V MSBD FZ/QF385000 # 38520SUPPLYING MODULE

XM/104 LOCATED IN B-DECK EVAP ROOM

HIGH YES DISTILLED UNIT IS LOCATED IN FRONT OF

DG5


XA/103B

FWD 690V MSBD FZ/QF385000 # 38520 SUPPLYING MODULE

XM/104 LOCATED IN B-DECK EVAP ROOM

HIGH YES DISTILLED UNIT IS LOCATED IN FRONT OF

DG5

INCINERATOR N1 XM/568A

FLUE GAS FAN

FWD 690V MSBDVIA FZ/QF389000

FZ/QZ941000

389

94121

MEDIUM-LOW

MEDIUM LOW

YES

YES

Depending on the cable routing

Incinerator MGO transfer pump N1

XA/148A

CENTRAL INCINERATOR PANEL XM/568A

24 Q1 MEDIUM-LOW YES LOCATED IN SB FWD PURIFIER ROOM


XA/148B

CENTRAL INCINERATOR PANEL XM/568B

24 Q1 MEDIUM-LOW NO LOCATED IN SB FWD PURIFIER ROOM BUT FED FROM FZ/QF488000 FED

FROM AFT MSBD

Conclusion : Only 1 Boiler / Incinerator available.

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Items Supplied from Priority Available CommentsAll Elevators EMG SWBD MEDIUM YES

Conclusion : Elevators are available (No elevators should be used in case of a fire).

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Power not available for the below shown equipment:


Substation fire zone 1AFT 11KV MSBD 246 HIGH NO No equipment / users



AFT 11KV MSBD 244 HIGH NO No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD



Galley transformer FZ/004TFG


Conclusion: No power available for fire zones 1, 2 and 3. Emergency lights available in public areas, but not in the passenger and crew cabins

(Small EMG light at the entrance of the cabin only). Cooking facilities not available.

Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available Comments690V BACK-UP MSBD

GALLEY BACK-UP

BACK-UP FOR Accommodation sub

stations 1-2-3

BACK-UP FORAccommodation sub

stations 4-5-6

FZ/003TFC

690V BACK-UP MSBD

690V BACK-UP MSBD

690V BACK-UP MSBD

504

570

514

512

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

LOW

NO

NO

NO

NO

No equipment / users available from AFT MSBD

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Suggested (needed) modifications / changes.1. Review the set-up of the cabin emergency lights.2. 690V Back-up (spare) SWBD should be physically divided from the AFT MSBD.3. Review the set-up of the galley transformer / galley back-up transformer.4. Review the set-up for the back-up supplies for all substations.

Items Suggested modification Nature of modification Revise plan approval Outside contractorCabin EMG lights Yes (high-cost) Add emg lights (note 1) yes yes

690V back-up Yes (high-cost) Remove from AFT MSBD yes yesGalley supplies Yes (high-cost) Different set-up (note 2) yes yes

Note 1: Passenger / crew cabins have a small emergency light (battery operated) that will work for a couple of hours only.

Note 2: What if there is a fire in substation 1 → you will lose your galley transformer as well as your galley back-up transformer (they physically need to be separated from the room).

Above findings should be used to improve the systems (availability) for possible future new builds.

Modifying the existing installation on the OSDM would generate a very high cost.

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Scenario B:

1. Vessel is at sea, enroute to Hawaii, 2 days sailing (away) from the Californian coast.2. Complete loss of power and propulsion.3. Fire in the FWD engine room.4. Emergency Diesel Generator did not start.5. FWD engine room equipment cannot be used .6. FWD 11KV / 690V SWBD users and equipment cannot be used .

Below facts are based on one of the worst possible scenarios.

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1.No access to the FWD engine room.2.No access to the FWD MSBD (both entrance doors to the FWD MSBD are located in the FWD engine room).3.Emergency generator transfer line was selected to the FWD 690V MSBD (309) before the fire / blackout.4.No starting air available, air vessel only has a pressure of 8 bar (Not enough to start DG).5.Essential equipment to start the first DG on the AFT MSBD is available, but only via the normal 690V supplies and not via the 690V emergency supplies.

Booster pump (pump overhaul). Starting air compressor (change bearings of the motor). Combined set-up from AFT to FWD engine is not available due to the fire.

6. DO gravity valve AFT engine is not opening, no gravity feed to the DG.7. DO gravity valve by-pass line has a broken handle, no gravity feed to the DG.8.Only way to restore the power at this point is by means of the “ELECTRICAL FEEDBACK” procedure, pending if EMG will start. 9.Soon you will find out that this will not work because of the following reasons:

Important: The release of CO² in the affected engine room could be of vital importance, it is important that the decision to release CO² is made in a timely matter.

It is equally important that the engineers will isolate the combined systems between AFT and FWD engine rooms as soon as possible in order to prevent further damage (Think of combined starting air system as an example).

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Emergency generator transfer line was selected to the FWD 690V MSBD (309) before the fire / blackout.This means that breaker 309 in the FWD MSBD is closed, breaker 309 does not have an under voltage coil, meaning that this breaker can only be opened manually which is not possible (No access to FWD MSBD).

Note: EMG transfer line 410 (AFT) and 309 (FWD) are mechanically and electrically interlocked (See SWBD description and explanation) (Spare breaker keys are located in the Elec Workshop on the OSDM) (if needed).

We basically need to have 309 open and 410 closed before we can commence the “FEEDBACK”-procedure.

Breaker number Under voltage coil MN Opening shunt MX Closing coil XF Modification needed410 AFT MSBD X possible309 FWD MSBD X possible909 EMG SWBD X X X No901 EMG SWBD X X X No

Conclusion: Not possible to restore power and propulsion at this point with the above mentioned conditions.

Modifications needed:

Item Needed modification Nature of modification Revise plan approval Outside contractorBreaker 410 Possible solution** Install under voltage coil yes yesBreaker 309 Possible solution** Install under voltage coil yes yesAFT MSBD X Install a small manhole **

(SEE NOTE)yes yes

FWD MSBD X Install a small manhole ** (SEE NOTE)

yes yes

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Note: A small entrance / exit manhole needs to be installed for both AFT and FWD MSBD, in order to access or escape from the MSBD’s in case of an Engine room fire (Current access doors are all installed on the engine room side).

These access / exit manholes need to be installed at the back wall of the 690V SWBD’s.This should be a relatively easy as well as a low cost modification.

AFT MSBD → manhole access via Engine workshop on B-deck.FWD MSBD → manhole access via B-deck stairway behind the ECR.

** The implementation of under voltage coils could complicate the installation; this could be a high-cost solution.

Other solution:

There is also the possibility to physical remove (disconnect) the transfer line feeder cable (309) to the FWD MSBD from the EMG SWBD, keep in mind that this would be a timely exercise.Transfer feeder lines (410-309) are both connected to the top bus bar of cubical 1A of the EMG SWBD XA/873A (Cables are painted with fire resistant paint and not marked).

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Knowing the above but in order to continue with the scenario B: We say that the machinist made a hole in order to access the FWD MSBD from B-deck stairway behind the ECR (At this point we are tampering with the integrity of the areas).Proceed with the “FEEDBACK” operation.

1. Go to the FWD MSBD (Protected with BA set, fire (CO² RELEASE) on the other side of the A60 bulkhead) (MSBD should not be affected in case of release of CO² in the ENGINE room as this is classified as a different area of CO² release).

2. Perform the below necessary shown actions.

690V MSBD Open breaker / set to manual Rack-out breaker Take key (interlock with 410)309 X X X301 X

3. Open the following breakers ( time and safety permitted)

690V MSBD Open breaker / (set to manual) Rack-out breaker Comments353 Already open X

All other users 690V MSBD X11KV MSBD

107 Already open X133 Already open X (If not racked out already) X131 Already open X

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4. Go to AFT MSBD room. 5. Perform the below shown actions.

690V MSBD Close breaker Insert key Open breaker (set to manual) Rack-out breaker Comments410 X X402 Set to manual

All 690V users X11KV MSBD

208 Already open X234 Already open X (If not racked out already)

6. Go to ECR. 7. Perform the below shown actions (If not done already).

Supply / Feeder / other Supply from FWD 11KV MSBD Breaker # EMG stop

ECRFuel shut

downOff position

EGPSelect rolling-

modeDG 4 XA/872A 101 X XDG 5 XA/872A 103 X XGTG XA/872A 105 X Not available

Substation 4 XA/872A 145 XSubstation 5 XA/872A 143 XSubstation 6 XA/872A 141 X

Transformer FZ/003TFA XA/872A 131 XTransformer FZ/003TFC XA/872 A - B 133-234 XAll elevators X

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8. Go to EMG room (or send somebody).9. Open breaker 941 for the supply of FZ/QZ941000 located in the FWD MSBD.10.Select the selector switch in cabinet 1G located in XA/873A to “FEEDBACK”.11. Start EMG, following the procedure for “DEAD” - ship scenario. **12.Make sure EMG is running (stable condition, voltage and frequency).13.Close breaker 901 by pushing “CLOSING” on cubicle 1E, or directly on the breaker (on button).14.Close breaker 909 by pushing “CLOSING” on cubicle 1G, or directly on the breaker (on button).15.EMG is now feeding the AFT 690V SWBD via breaker 410.16. Go to AFT MSBD room.17.Close the following essential (GSP’s) breakers in order to have the auxiliary equipment available to start the

first DG (DG 1, 2 or 3).

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Necessary Equipment Supply from 690VMSBD CLOSE BREAKER # CHECK IF RUNNING / POWERXD/144BD booster pump 3 FZ/QF480000#48016 480 XXD/144BA feeder pump 3 FZ/QF480000#48014 480 X

Starting air compressor XM/228B-1(N3)

FZ/QF482000#48213 482 X

Cooling pump starting air compressor XA/048C - XA/048D

GSP FZ/432QF#43212 for XA/048CGSP FZ/442QF#44212 for XA/048D

432

442

X

XSecondary Equipment

Seawater cooling pump N3 - XE/045C GSP FZ/432QF#43210 432 (ALREADY CLOSED)LT FW cooling pump N3 - XE/046C GSP FZ/432QF#43211 432 (ALREADY CLOSED)LT FW cooling pump N4 - XE/046D GSP FZ/442QF#44211 442 (ALREADY CLOSED)

Combustion air fan GSP FZ/426QF #42617 DG1 #42616 DG2 #42618 DG3

426

Emergency power available for the following users:

Supply from EMG SWBD / AS/001QFB (AFT MSBD ROOM)

Breaker number remarks

Starting air compressor XM/228CA(N4)

FZ/QZ942000 AFT E.R. EMG power panel 94223 Compressor cannot be used (change bearings)

Emergency cooling pump for starting air compressor XA/048F

FZ/QZ942000 AFT E.R. EMG power panel 94229 Can be used

XD/144AE Booster pump N4 AS/001QFB AFT MSBD Q53 Booster pump cannot be used (pump overhaul)

XD/144AB Feeder pump N4 AS/001QFB AFT MSBD Q52 Can be used

DG1 AC70/S800 CABINET AU601 AS/001QFB AFT MSBD Q13 – Q14 Can be used



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18.Start starting air compressor N3.19. Start DG (on the DG) once required starting air pressure is available to start the DG (minimum 12 bar,

nominal 27bar) (DG should always be started from engine room, minimum use of air).20. Go to the AFT MSBD room.21. Connect (Manually) the DG to the 11KV MSBD (Once the DG is stabilized, voltage / frequency)(Following

available procedure).22. Close manually the primary transformer breaker 232 for FZ/003TFB from the 11KV MSBD.23.Go to the EMG room or send somebody (somebody should be present already).24.Select the selector switch in cabinet 1G located in XA/873A from “FEEDBACK” to “AUTO” position.25.Go to the AFT 690V SWBD (somebody should be present) in order to select breaker 402 to “AUTO”.26.Breaker 402 should close automatically, if not close manually.27. At this point the logic of 402/909 and 901 will open breaker 901.28.EMG will not stop automatically, this needs to be stopped manually (it is advisable to not stop the EMG).29. Close all 690V SWBD user breakers.30. Power has been restored to the AFT MSBD.31. EMG SWBD is powered via the AFT MSBD.32.Go to ECR .33. Start next DG and connect this to the AFT MSBD (This should be possible by means of auto synchronization

or manual synchronization from AFT MSBD / ECR).34. At this point we have enough power to start the propulsion.

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Necessary equipment Supply from Breaker number #

Supply Available Blocking of high-speed breakers on

Cyclo conv.

Remarks

PS propulsion transformer FZ/001TFA

FWD MSBD 121 NO YES (AQ1) No users FWD MSBD are available

PS propulsion transformer FZ/001TFB

AFT MSBD 222 YES

SB propulsion transformer FZ/001TFC

FWD MSBD 123 NO YES (BQ1) No users FWD MSBD are available

SB propulsion transformer FZ/001TFD

AFT MSBD 224 YES


AFT MSBD 406 YES Select excit. transformer to AFT MSBD


FWD MSBD 305 NO Select excit. transformer to AFT MSBD


AFT MSBD 408 YES Select excit. transformer to AFT MSBD


FWD MSBD 307 NO Select excit. transformer to AFT MSBD

GSP FZ/424QF auxiliary equipment for SB propulsion

AFT MSBD 424 YES

GSP FZ/313QF auxiliary equipment for PS propulsion

FWD MSBD 313 NO GSP 313 can be fed from GSP 424

PS Steering pumps Via FZ/001CTA


31310913

YES(fed via 424)YES

SB steering pumps Via FZ/001CTB


42410914

YESYES

E.v.W Page 135



1. See above shown table.2. Go to both Cyclo converter rooms. 3. Open the permission switches on the high-speed breakers as indicated in the table.4. Supply GSP FZ/313QF (PS) from GSP FZ/424QF (SB) (INTERLOCK VIA PADLOCK).5. Padlock key located on breaker 31301 on GSP FZ/313QF.6. Open breaker 31301 on GSP FZ/313QF (PS Cyclo Converter Room).7. Remove padlock and close breaker 31302 on GSP FZ/313QF (PS Cyclo Converter Room).8. Remove padlock and close breaker 42402 on GSP FZ/424QF (SB Cyclo Converter Room).9. Clear alarms on Cyclo Converter GOP screens.10.Go to B-deck transformer room. 11. Select both excitation transformers supply to the AFT MSBD by means of switching the selector

switch on the transformer (1 excitation transformer is already selected to the AFT MSBD).12.Go to the ECR. 13. Clear alarms on the ECR GOP screens.14.The “PM READY START” light starts flashing (on GOP).15. Start the propulsion.16.Transfer propulsion control to the bridge, once stable and running.

You will only have half a winding available on each Azipod.

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17.The below shown bow thrusters are available if needed.

Bow thruster number Supply from breaker # AvailableBT1 YA/764A 161 NOBT2 YA/764B 262 YESBT3 YA/764C 163 NO


Suggested (needed) modifications / changes.

Items Suggested modification Nature of modification Revise plan approval Outside contractorStarting air compressors Yes (low-cost) Normal and EMG supply X X (ships crew)

Cable runs yes Re-routing / reviewing of vital supply cables from

switchboard.

X X

Electricians / engineers need to be trained for emergency scenarios because it could happen 1 day.2nd/3rd electricians should all be BA trained, although they may not be assigned to a fire team.

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IMPORTANT FACT FOR SCENARIO “B”:


However:

The distilled water unit is located in the FWD engine room (Front of DG5), which is not available.

The AFT boiler can only run for a little while until the hot well has reached low level, technical water pumps are available as they are supplied from the AFT MSBD GSP, which means that this is not a problem because a permanent technical water emergency connection is located at the hot well (AFT E.R.).

Note 1: Operator needs to be aware that action needs to be taken in case the hot well reaches a low level, operator needs to go down and open the technical water emergency filling valve.(This should be a pro-active handling).

Note 2: Purifier HFO electric heater and the module HFO electric heater are located in the AFT PS purifier room (Both heaters can be used in case steam is not available).



Past problems

HFO Purifier Electric heater XM/158BG



HFO Module Electric heater XD/114AH



(There have been a few incidents were both heaters were only partial available on the OSDM due to burned-out heating elements).

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BUT:

No purifiers will be available due to no distilled water; there is also no HFO transfer connection to the service tanks

Explanation:

When purifiers are not available the relevant DG’s will only be on-line for as long as fuel is available in the service tank.There is another possibility by means of opening both suction valves of the service and settling tanks in order to get more HFO, but this is not advisable because the HFO fuel transfer line is a common line between the AFT and FWD service and settling tanks (We want to contain the fire and not spread the fire to the AFT engine room).

Could try to by-pass the purifiers, but this could be a risky exercise (Un-purified HFO will be supplied to the DG).

“Worst” case:

AFT engine room DG’s will run for as long as you have HFO available in the service tank.Running the AFT engine room DG’s on M.G.O. is not an option because of the below mentioned reason:

Fuel module has to be switched to M.G.O., which is not available as the pipes from the service tank 2SB run through the FWD engine room, it is also not possible to transfer M.G.O. to the emergency diesel tank (GO06P has a small capacity of 11.2M3).

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Result:

Knowing that one 16 cylinder DG is using 48m3 per day (12 cylinder DG = 36m3 per day) it is safe to assume that vessel will lose its redundancy and manoeuverability depending on the amount of HFO available in the service tank (Worst case = 70m3) within 1 day, resulting in the final loss of power / propulsion.

Emergency generator will be available until the MGO emergency tank is empty (Emergency generator uses about 12 liter per minute running on 1800RPM’s, this is 700 liters per hour, so it is safe to assume that emergency generator will run for about 15 hours only without the availability of the MGO transfer pumps).

Recommendations:

A: Review the set-up of the distilled water unit.Install a separate distilled water unit in the AFT engine room

B: Review the MGO tank set-up.MGO system should be completely separated between AFT and FWD engine rooms.

C: Install technical water connection on the distilled line to the purifiers (Emergency use only).

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Scenario B, Part 2:

2. Restore vacuum systems / galley and kitchen equipment / AC / drinking water (evaps) / potable water / cabin power / Chiller and Freezer compressor / other passenger and crew facilities.

Power is available for the below shown equipment (Depending on the routing of the cables!!!).

Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsVacuum collecting

system N1GSP FZ/945QF

Potable water room94516 HIGH yes


GSP FZ/945QFPotable water room

94517 HIGH yes


GSP FZ/945QFPotable water room

94518 HIGH yes



94214 HIGH yes



94215 HIGH yes

Toilet facilities are available in all zones of the vessel.Note 1:Sewage will directly be pumped over board, if necessary (Emergency scenario).

Note 2:No technical water (Page 132) means no flushing of the toilets, system would still work but you will have an increase of vacuum and flushing problems.

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Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsFresh water generator

XA/107AFWD 690V SWBD 365 MEDIUM HIGH NO No equipment / users

available from FWD MSBDFresh water generator

XA/107BAFT 690V SWBD 466 MEDIUM HIGH YES

Fresh water generator XA/107C

FWD 690V SWBD 367 MEDIUM HIGH NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsCold potable water pump

EP1 / YE440AGSP FZ/945QZ 94510 MEDIUM HIGH YES

Cold potable water pump EP2 / YE440B

GSP FZ/945QZ 94511 MEDIUM HIGH YES

Cold potable water pump EP3 / YE440C

GSP FZ/327QF 32726 MEDIUM HIGH NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

Potable water transfer pump EP1 / YE/442A

GSP FZ/327QF 32711 LOW NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

Potable water transfer pump EP2 / YE/442B

GSP FZ/327QF 32712 LOW NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

Galley hot water circ.pump 1 / YE/445A


Galley hot water circ.pump 2 / YE/445B

GSP FZ/327QF 32714 MEDIUM NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

Accommodation hot water pump EP1 - YE/444A


Accommodation hot water pump EP2 - YE/444B

GSP FZ/327QF 32713 MEDIUM NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

Conclusion : Water is available, but the capacity for the making and distribution of fresh water is limited.

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It is furthermore important that we have the availability of the grey water pumps AFT engine room as per below:

Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsGrey water tank MS17S

GREY WATER PUMP 1 YA/514 A.

GREY WATER PUMP 2YA/514 B

GSP FZ/436QFPROVISION COMP.ROOM

GSP FZ/436QFPROVISION COMP.ROOM

43617

43618

MEDIUM

MEDIUM

YES

YES

Conclusion: Grey water pumps are available.

But:

Grey water pumps are not available in all zones, meaning that shower facilities etc in zones without the grey water pumps are only available for a limited time (Until tanks are full).

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Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsLaundry Substation feeder FZ/008TFA

FWD 690V MSBD 315 LOW NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

Laundry Substation feeder FZ/008TFB

AFT 690V MSBD 416 LOW YES Depending on the cable routing

Laundry grey water pump 1

FZ/333QF 33312 LOW NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

Laundry grey water pump 2


Laundry hot technical water circ.pump



YE/441A

FZ/436QF 43610 LOW YES Depending on the routing of the pipes


YE/441B

FZ/436QF 43611 LOW YES Depending on the routing of the pipes

Conclusion : Laundry is not available for washing.

Grey Water Pumps and Hot Technical Water Circulation Pump are not available. Technical Water Distribution Pumps (power) are available, but it is safe to assume that no

technical water is available due to the fact that piping is routed through the fwd engine room.(There is a cross connection between Potable water and Technical water).

But: Laundry facilities could become available by following the below recommendation in case of a fire in the engine room spaces:Change technical water supply to potable water supply in order to use the laundry facilities (Laundry on OSDM is utilized via Potable water for some reason).

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Recommendation:

A: Review the set up of the technical water pumps as these pumps are located in the far most aft part of the engine room, while the main consumer (Laundry) is located in the far most fwd part of the vessel.

B: Install a technical water emergency pump in the FWD sewage room (Two technical water tanks are available on the OSDM.

AFT engine room: Technical water tank N18 STBD, frames 40-50.FWD engine room: Technical water tank N3 STBD, frames 254-270.

C: Install isolations valves for the technical water system between the AFT and FWD engine room spaces in such a Way that you can still supply technical water to the users in the AFT engine room in case FWD engine is not available.

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Substation fire zone 1AFT MSBD 11KV 246 HIGH YES


AFT MSBD 11KV 244 HIGH YES


AFT MSBD 11KV 242 HIGH YES Back-up is available, depending on the cable routing


FWD MSBD 11KV 145 HIGH NO Back-up is available. depending on the cable routing


FWD MSBD 11KV 143 HIGH NO Back-up is available, depending on the cable routing


FWD MSBD 11KV 141 HIGH NO Back-up is available, depending on the cable routing

AC compressor 1 YB/685A

FWD MSBD 11KV 151 HIGH NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

AC compressor 2 YB/685B


AC compressor 3 YB/685C

FWD MSBD 11KV 153 HIGH NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

AC compressor 4 YB/685D


AC Hot water pump 1 YA/683A


32914 HIGH NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

AC Hot water pump 2 YA/683B


42817 HIGH YES

AC Chilled water pump 1 YA/682A



AC Chilled water pump 2 YA/682B


42816 HIGH YES

AC Chilled water pump 3 YA/682C



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Conclusion:

AC is available / Accommodation Substations 1 and 2 are available. Substation 3 is available depending on the cable routing of the main supply and / or back-up power supply.

Substation 4, 5 and 6 are available pending on the cable routing of the back-up supply.

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Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsPS Stabilizer

YA/770AFZ/QZ941000 EMG

SWBD FWD 690V SWBD

94118

373

LOW NO

NO

No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

SB StabilizerYA/770B

FZ/QZ941000 EMG SWBD

AFT 690V SWBD

94119

472

LOW NO

YES

No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

Conclusion : Only SB stabilizer is available.

Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsAFT Mooring winch

substation FZ/010QFFWD 690 MSBD 321 LOW NO No equipment / users

available from FWD MSBDAFT Mooring winch

substation FZ/010QFAFT 690V MSBD 420 LOW YES


FWD 690 MSBD 319 LOW NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD


AFT 690V MSBD 418 LOW YES Depending on the cable routing

Note: Breakers 31901 (1A) and 31902 (1B) need to be swapped in order to supply the FWD mooring winches (Breakers are located in the FWD mooring winch substation).

Conclusion : AFT and FWD mooring winch substations are available.

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Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsProvision store SWBD

XM/695AFT 690V MSBD 422 HIGH YES

Freezer compressorXE/695A

XM/695A HIGH YES

Chiller compressorXE/695D

XM/695A HIGH YES

Provision storeSWBD XM/695B

FWD 690 MSBD 323 HIGH NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

Freezer compressorXE/695B

XM/695B HIGH NO

Chiller compressorXE/695C

XM/695B HIGH NO

Freezer circulation pump N1 XS/695AA

XM/695A HIGH YES

Freezer circulation pump N2 XS/695CA

XM/695B HIGH NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

Chiller circulation pump N1 XS/695DA

XM/695A HIGH YES

Chiller circulation pump N2 XS/695BA

XM/695B HIGH NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD

Conclusion : Only 1 Freezer / Chiller compressor available.

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Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available CommentsFWD BOILER XM/004A FWD 690V MSBD 363 MEDIUM HIGH NO No equipment / users

available from FWD MSBDINCINERATOR N1 FWD 690V MSBD

VIA FZ/QF389000389 MEDIUM NO No equipment / users

available from FWD MSBDAFT BOILER XM/004B AFT 690V MSBD 464 MEDIUM HIGH YES BOILER is available.

ECONOMIZER PUMP XE/094B DG1

AFT 690V MSBD FZ/432QF # 43216 MEDIUM HIGH YES Important for a dirty boiler

ECONOMIZER PUMP XE/094E DG2


ECONOMIZER PUMP XE/094C DG3



YE/441A

AFT 690V MSBD FZ/436QF # 43610 HIGH YES


XE/441B

AFT 690V MSBD FZ/436 # 43611 HIGH YES


XA/103A

FWD 690V MSBD FZ/QF385000 # 38520SUPPLYING MODULE

XM/104 (B-deck evap rm).

HIGH NO DISTILLED UNIT LOCATED IN FRONT OF DG5


XA/103B

FWD 690V MSBD FZ/QF385000 # 38520 SUPPLYING MODULE

XM/104 (B-deck evap rm)

HIGH NO DISTILLED UNIT LOCATED IN FRONT OF DG5

INCINERATOR N2XM/568B

FLUE GAS FAN

AFT 690V MSBDVIA FZ/QF488000

FZ/QZ942000

488

94219

MEDIUM-LOW

MEDIUM-LOW

YES

YES

INCINERATOR IS NOT AVAILABLE


XA/148A

CENTRAL INCINERATOR PANEL XM/568A

24 Q1 MEDIUM-LOW NO LOCATED IN SB FWD PURIFIER ROOM


XA/148B

CENTRAL INCINERATOR PANEL XM/568B

24 Q1 MEDIUM-LOW NO LOCATED IN SB FWD PURIFIER ROOM

Conclusion : AFT Boiler available / Incinerator not available.

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Items Supplied from Priority Available CommentsAll Elevators EMG SWBD MEDIUM YES

Conclusion : Elevators are available (Do not use the elevators in case of a fire).

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Power not available for the below shown equipment:


Substation fire zone 1AFT 11KV MSBD 246 HIGH YES


AFT 11KV MSBD 244 HIGH YES


AFT 11KV MSBD 242 HIGH YES Depending on the cable routing


FWD 11KV MSBD 145 HIGH NO No equipment / users available from FWD MSBD





Galley transformer FZ/004TFG

AFT 11KV MSBD 248 HIGH YES

Conclusion : Accommodation Substations 1 and 2 are available. Substation 3 is available depending on the cable routing of the main supply and / or back-

up power supply. Substation 4, 5 and 6 are available pending on the cable routing of the back-up supply. Emergency lights available in public areas, but not in the passenger and crew cabins

(Small EMG light at the entrance of the cabin only). Cooking facilities are available.

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Items Supplied from Breaker # Priority Available Comments690V BACK-UP MSBD

GALLEY BACK-UP

BACK-UP FOR Accommodation sub

stations 1-2-3

BACK-UP FORAccommodation sub

stations 4-5-6

FZ/003TFC

690V BACK-UP MSBD

690V BACK-UP MSBD

690V BACK-UP MSBD

504

570

514

512

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

LOW

YES

YES

YES

YES

Depending on the cable routing for substation 3

Depending on the cable routing

Suggested (needed) modifications / changes.1. Review the set-up of the cabin emergency lights.2. 690V Back-up (spare) SWBD should be physically divided from the AFT MSBD.3. Review the set-up of the galley transformer / galley back-up transformer.4. Review the set-up for the back-up supplies for all substations.

Items Suggested modification Nature of modification Revise plan approval Outside contractorCabin EMG lights Yes (high-cost) Add emg lights (note 1) yes yes

690V back-up Yes (high-cost) Remove from AFT MSBD yes yesGalley supplies Yes (high-cost) Different set-up (note 2) yes yes

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Note 1: Passenger / crew cabins have a small emergency light (battery operated) that will work for a couple of hours only.

Note 2: What if there is a fire in substation 1 → you will lose your galley transformer as well as your galley back-up transformer (they need to be physically separated from the room).

Above findings should be used to improve the systems (availability) for possible future new builds.

Modifying the existing installation on the OSDM would generate a very high cost.

Note:

ECR could become unavailable in case of a spread of the fire in the FWD engine room to the adjacent engine room areas (Settling tank area).

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8. AUTOMATION SYSTEMS (I.A.S).

I.A.S. = Integrated Automation System.

8.1.1. Power distribution panels and UPS for alarm columns (See chapter 4).8.1.2. Main UPS for automation plant.8.1.3. I.A.S. configuration overview.8.1.4. Distribution of Main controllers.8.1.5. Distribution of controller functions.8.1.6. Operator stations (OS).8.1.7. Master bus 300 (MB300) and LAN main control network configurations and cable routing.8.1.8. Power Management System (PMS) configuration.

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General:

The behavior of the Automation plant in case of an Engine room fire such as descript in the above chapter 7 depends on a lot of factors, in general it is safe to assume that most of the wiring (Automation plant I/O) routed in the affected engine room spaces will burn (out) which results in short circuits and ground failures of the designated circuits (I/O).

The I/O units installed in the affected engine room spaces will not be available anymore for the designated installed equipment, this will result in an accumulation of fault messages in the direction of the AC450, it is difficult to speculate how this AC450 will react, but in the worst case the AC450 will shut down completely.

The Automation network would in general function as designed (redundant design) regardless the shutdown of the affected AC450.

There could be a possibility that the Automation network (functions) will respond with a delay, meaning that the information flow towards and from the ECR (operators) will be delayed as well!!

AC450 = Redundant Controller, type AC450 (The function and set-up of the AC450 will be explained in chapter 8.1.5).

I/O = Input / Output modules.

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8.1.1. Power distribution panels and UPS for alarm columns.

8.1.1. a→Power Distribution Panels.

AS/001QFA→FWD 11KV MSBD.

AS/001QFB→AFT 11KV MSBD.

8.1.1. b→Change over circuits (Normal and Emergency Supply).

8.1.1. c →24V UPS and batteries.

8.1.1. d→Internal components.

8.1.1. e→Users 690V / 220V / 24V.

8.1.1. f→220V UPS and batteries.

8.1.1. g→Users 220V UPS→E.R. alarm monitoring systems.

8.1.1. h→Static switch 220V UPS.

E.v.W Page 157


Sub group Supported documents

available


Redundant set-up


maintenance


Port-mode Anchor-mode Past problems

8.1.1.a yes yes yes yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none


available


Redundant set-up


maintenance



8.1.1.b yes yes yes yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none


available


Redundant set-up


maintenance



8.1.1.c yes yes yes yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none


available


Redundant set-up


maintenance



8.1.1.d yes yes yes yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none

E.v.W Page 158



available


Redundant set-up


maintenance



8.1.1.e yes yes yes yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none


available


Redundant set-up


maintenance



8.1.1.f yes yes yes yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none


available


Redundant set-up


maintenance



8.1.1.g yes yes no yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none


available


Redundant set-up


maintenance



8.1.1.h yes yes no yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none

Note: Power distribution panels are set-up in a redundant way, a single component failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel. E.R. alarm columns are not set-up in a redundant way, a single internal / external component failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

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8.1.2. Main UPS for automation plant.

8.1.2.a→ Power distribution panels.

8.1.2.b→ Inverter / Batteries.

8.1.2.c→ Static switch.

8.1.2.d→ Users.

Sub group Supported documents available


Redundant set-up

Awareness / training crew / maintenance






Redundant set-up







Redundant set-up





E.v.W Page 161




Redundant set-up




8.1.2.d yes yes yes yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none

Note:

The controllers, I/O’s and D/G safeties are fed from both UPS units, system is therefore fully redundant and will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel in case of a single component failure.

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8.1.3. I.A.S configuration overview.

8.1.3.a→Redundant controllers for AFT and FWD engine rooms.

8.1.3.b→Dedicated single CPU controllers.

8.1.3.c→Routing of the main control network.

8.1.4.d→High degree of I/O distribution.


available


Redundant set-up


maintenance





available


Redundant set-up


maintenance




E.v.W Page 163



available


Redundant set-up


maintenance




Note: Routing of the main control network has been done in a redundant ring configuration with the point to point connections of the nodes and is in place above the watertight bulkhead level.


available


Redundant set-up


maintenance



8.1.3.d yes yes yes yes No risk No risk No risk No risk Yes (4)

(Redundancy and) Manoeuverability of the vessel will not be affected due to a possible single failure of the I.A.S. configuration.Past problems were related to faulty S800 control and monitoring units.

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8.1.4. Distribution of main controllers.

8.1.4.a→Single controllers type AC410.

8.1.4.b→Redundant controllers type AC450.


available


Redundant set-up


maintenance



8.1.4.a yes yes no yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none

Note: Single controllers dedicated to PORT and STBD users within the fire zone.

On the OSDM we have 2 single dedicated controllers for the PORT and STBD propulsion systems (AC410-1P and AC410-1S).

Items Supported documents available


Redundant set-up


Loss of propulsion

Redundant power supplies

Redundant network

Past problems

AC410-1P yes yes no yes no yes yes none

AC410-1S yes yes no yes no yes yes none

(Redundancy and) Manoeuverability of the vessel will not be affected due to a possible single failure of a single controller.

E.v.W Page 165


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Single controller is set as an independent system, propulsion auxiliaries remain running.

Auxiliaries would have to be started locally if a failure of the AC410 persists, but propulsion itself would not be affected.

The install of a redundant (instead of a single) controller for the propulsion systems should be taken into consideration (Future vessels).


available


Redundant set-up


maintenance




Note: There are 3 redundant controllers, AC450-2 / AC450-3 / AC450-4.



Redundant set-up


Loss of propulsion


Redundant network

Past problems

AC450-2 yes yes yes yes no yes yes none



Redundant controllers dedicated to all users within the fire zone.(Redundancy and) Manoeuverability of the vessel will not be affected due to a possible single failure of the redundant controllers.

E.v.W Page 167


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8.1.5. Distribution of controller functions.

8.1.5.a→Fore section (main fire zone 4).

8.1.5.b→Forward engine room (main fire zone 3).

8.1.5.c→Aft engine room (main fire zone 2).

8.1.5.d→Aft section (main fire zone 1).

8.1.5.a→Fore section (main fire zone 4)

Redundant AC450-4 control / monitoring functions related to fire zones 4-5-6-7 including data links to: Valve control system. HVAC system. Napa loading computer.



Redundant set-up


Loss of propulsion


Redundant network

Past problems

8.1.5.a yes yes yes yes no yes yes none

Note: (Redundancy and) Manoeuverability of the vessel will not be affected due to a possible single failure of the redundant controller.

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8.1.5.b→Forward engine room (main fire zone 3).

Redundant AC450-3 control / monitoring functions related to fire zone 3 including the following: Control / monitoring related to DG 4-5 and GTG, forward MSBD and other equipment related in this fire

zone. P ower Management System (PMS) functions related to DG 4-5 and GTG DG 4-5 and GTG start / stop control system via separated S800 I/O (One I/O cabinet per generator / GTG). Data link to separated switchboard monitoring system (Any I/O’s related to PMS including breaker control

are hardwired).



Redundant set-up


Loss of propulsion


Redundant network

Past problems

8.1.5.b yes yes yes yes no yes yes none

Note : (Redundancy and) Manoeuverability of the vessel will not be affected due to a possible single failure of the redundant controller.

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8.1.5. c→ Aft engine room (fire zone 2).

Redundant AC450-2 control / monitoring functions related to fire zone 2 including the following: Control / monitoring related to DG 1-2-3, aft MSBD and other equipment related in this fire zone. P ower Management System (PMS) functions related to DG 1-2-3. DG 1-2-3 start / stop control system via separated S800 I/O (One I/O cabinet per generator). Data link to separated switchboard monitoring system (Any I/O’s related to PMS including breaker control

are hardwired).



Redundant set-up


Loss of propulsion


Redundant network

Past problems

8.1.5.c yes yes yes yes no yes yes none

Note : (Redundancy and) Manoeuverability of the vessel will not be affected due to a possible single failure of the redundant controller.

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8.1.5.d→Aft section (main fire zone 1).

Single AC410-1P control / monitoring functions related to fire zone 1 including the following: Control and monitoring for the PORT propulsion system. Data link for the PORT Cyclo Converter.

Single AC410-1S control / monitoring functions related to fire zone 1 including the following: Control and monitoring for the STBD propulsion system. Data link for the STBD Cyclo Converter.



Redundant set-up


Loss of propulsion


Redundant network

Past problems

8.1.5.d yes yes no yes no yes yes none

Note : (Redundancy and) Manoeuverability of the vessel will not be affected due to a possible single failure of the single controller (PORT or STBD).

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8.1.6.Operator Stations (OS).

The operator stations are used for the operator’s communication.The printers connected to the operator stations are used for alarm, event and data log printouts.



Redundant set-up


Loss of propulsion


Redundant network

Past problems

8.1.6 yes yes yes yes no yes yes Yes (6)

Note: Operator station(s) in the engine room spaces fail due to excessive heat and vibrations.

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8.1.7. M aster b us 300 (MB300) main control network configuration and cable routing.

The master bus 300 (MB300) is a high performance network based on IEEE 802.3 with an ISO class 4 connection-oriented transport protocol, ensuring flow control and reliability with multiple priorities.The MB300 consists of two networks in order to provide a fully redundant configuration: network 11 and network 12

Wire break(s) will not affect the functionality of the network. Short circuit (s) on the connection between the individual node and the switch will not affect the

functionality of the network. Complete loss of connections to the controllers in the FWD (or AFT) engine room due to flooding / fire will

not affect the remaining controllers in the other areas (including the operator stations). Main bus network is routed outside the engine spaces.



Redundant set-up


Loss of propulsion


Redundant network

Past problems

8.1.7. yes yes yes yes no yes yes none

Note : (Redundancy and) Manoeuverability of the vessel will not be affected due to a possible single failure of the redundant network (s).

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8.1.8. P ower M anagement S ystem (PMS) configuration .

Note: The PMS functions are located in the main process controllers type AC450.

PMS functions for DG 1-2-3 are located in the main process controller AC450-2 (fire zone 2). PMS functions for DG 4-5-GTG are located in the main process controller AC450-3 (fire zone 3).

The PMS for DG 1-2-3 and DG 4-5-GTG will function independently should (for some reason) the bus-tie breaker be open.

The PMS configuration will continue the automatic operation of DG 1-2-3 in case of a mayor failure (fault) in fire zone 3 (fire / flooding) and vice versa for DG 4-5-GTG in case of a major failure (fault) in fire zone 2 (fire / flooding).

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The following PMS functions are included for a generator configuration consisting of the amount of 5 DG’s and one GTG:

1. Start / Stop control of DG.2. DG standby program including automatic control of the DG auxiliaries.3. DG Slow turning.4. Synchronization / connection of the generator to the bus bar.5. Automatic connection of the DG after a blackout.6. Load dependent DG start / stop program.7. Heavy load program.8. Start sequence program.9. Process alarms and system supervision.10.DG load control set point control to the electronic governor.11.Interface to the electronic governor.12.Blackout recovery program.13.Control of various breakers for transformers, substations etc.14.Interface to propulsion motor(s) control system(s).

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General:

Power management system operating modes:

Port mode:

The load dependant start / stop program is available for all DG’s (as mentioned above).

Minimum one generator will be connected and required additional generator sets will be started / stopped if required due to an increase in load / fault on the already connected set (The GTG will be considered as the last in sequence should it be selected into standby mode).

An automatic transfer from port mode to manoeuvre mode will be made when the Azipod auxiliaries are started.

Manoeuvre mode:

The load dependant start function is in operation but the load dependant stop function is blocked.

Minimum two generators will be connected and required additional generator sets will be started if required due to an increase in load / fault of the already connected set (The GTG will be considered as the last in sequence should it be selected into standby mode).

Manoeuvre mode will be automatically activated when:

1. Any propulsion breaker transformer breaker is closed.2. Propulsion auxiliary run start is activated.3. Any thruster breaker is closed.

Sea mode:

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The load dependant start function is in operation but the load dependant stop function is blocked if only two DG-sets are connected.

Minimum two generators will be connected and required additional generator sets will be started if required due to an increase in load / fault of the already connected set (The GTG will be considered as the last in sequence should it be selected into standby mode).



Redundant set-up


Loss of propulsion


Redundant network

Past problems

8.1.8. yes yes yes yes no yes yes none

Note : (Redundancy and) Manoeuverability of the vessel will not be affected due to a possible single failure of the redundant PMS network (s).

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Alaska port mode: (Not used).

The Alaska port mode can only be selected with the GTG available in standby and ready position.The GTG will be connected and the DG sets will remain in standby.The next DG in sequence will be started and connected at fault on the GTG.The Alaska port mode is blocked when:

Any propulsion transformer breaker is closed. Propulsion auxiliary run start is activated. Any thruster breaker is closed.

Alaska sailing mode: (Not used).

The Alaska sailing mode can only be selected with the GTG available in standby and ready position.The GTG will be connected together with two 12 cylinder DG’s in order to have the DG load above 50%.The next DG in sequence will be started and connected at fault on the connected sets.

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Anchor mode:

Anchor mode has been implemented in 2011 as part of the fuel saving scope.

Criteria for activating anchor mode:1. Vessel arriving at the tendering position and lowering the anchor (Keep in mind that the lowering of

the anchor is not an interlock with the anchor mode, basically anchor mode can be enabled without the use of the anchor) (Should this be changed into an interlock mode function?).

2. Switch-off all bow thrusters.3. Switch-off either the PS or STBD side Azipod.4. Select Zero RPM on the Azipod that will be used for anchor mode operations (Either PS or STBD).5. Ensure that the main breakers of the selected Azipod remain closed!!

Note:The normal start-up logic of the Azipod requires two DG’s connected to the network, however operation with one DG connected to the network is possible when the main breakers are not opened, while reducing the amount of connected DG’s.

6. Select Anchor mode on the VDU (IAS) (Mode 6), this will automatically disconnect the remaining DG’s on line, excluding the first DG in the sequence (DG1 or DG3 or DG4) (16 Cylinder DG’s).

Note: Maximum two AC sets can stay on line (Anchor mode does not recognize the local start-up of 3rd AC-set).

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Criteria for de-activating anchor mode:1. Select Maneuver mode (Manually) on the VDU (IAS) (Mode 2) or select any other operating mode).

Notes:A: the activation of any other operating mode will result in a DG start request.B: if you choose to select port mode (Single DG on line) you have to make sure that the Azipod is switched off before the activation of the port mode (Main breakers open and auxiliaries off). Failure of doing so will result in the start request of a 2nd DG

The following conditions will de-activate the anchor mode configuration:A. Load of the running DG reaches 88% (Start request of 2ND DG within 2 seconds, pre-warning at

85% DG load).B. Start request of the auxiliaries of the not running Azipod / Cyclo.C. Start request of a bow thruster.D. Start request of a 3rd AC set (Anchor mode does not recognize the start-up of a 3rd AC set

locally) (Should this be changed?).E. Any shutdown condition of the running DG.F. Azipod trip: Port mode will be activated.

Note: Activating of the anchor mode will be a ships staff decision as it could (will) affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.Anchor mode operating mode is generating a high reactive power, this is limiting the active power in a huge way, plus that a high reactive power is bad for the efficiency of the apparatus, Azipod is this instance.

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9. EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN SYSTEM (E.S.D.).

General:

The E.S.D. system consists of 25 control cabinets, located in various areas of the vessel.Each cabinet monitors and controls different elements of the E.S.D. system, fire doors, dampers, fans, etc.

Each cabinet is equipped with a set of input / output circuit boards, used by the E.S.D. system to monitor (inputs) the status of safety related elements, and to control (outputs) such elements.

Simple example:

For instance a fire door is monitored by an input, linked to the limit switch associated to the door (which indicates that the door is closed) and it is controlled by an output, connected to a relay (which cut the power of the magnet associated to the door).

Each cabinet is connected to the E.S.D. network with a redundant link, to ensure reliability of the system.Both networks are made by a horizontal backbone, with vertical sections for each fire zone.One network runs in the upper decks, the other one in the lower decks of the vessel.Cable breaks will not affect the functionality of the system.

Each cabinet is supplied via a redundant power supply, normal and emergency supply.Each cabinet has its own CPU, able to perform monitoring and control of safety elements, and also able to execute sequences.

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The redundant network and the communication software have been designed in order to allow each node of the network to have a complete view of all the information acquired by the other nodes.

One of the main functions in charge to the E.S.D. system is the execution of the shut-down sequences related to the CO² release in the dedicated areas.

The physical release of CO² is a manual action. E.S.D. is requested to perform, before the physical gas release, a shutdown procedure that isolates the area

and, in some cases, stop the machinery in those areas.

Philosophy:

As mentioned before, the E.S.D. system is controlled by means of inputs / outputs (I/O’s), all relevant equipment that is required to be part of the E.S.D. system has been reviewed in the so called I/O matrix, cause and effect matrix.E.S.D. system software has been programmed according this cause and effect matrix.

It is of vital importance that this matrix is correct, incorrect programming of the E.S.D. software could cause for instance the vessel to blackout when e.g. wrong machinery is stopped in e.g. the wrong engine room.

Activation of the E.S.D. hard wired switches for the AFT engine room should not stop the equipment in the FWD engine room and vice versa.

Single failure like the above could (will) affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the nature of the fault.

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Safety monitoring and control system (SMS):

The SMS is a monitoring system, interfacing the mandatory safety sub-systems foreseen on the vessel.The SMS shall:

Interface the main ship safety sub-systems, acquiring data from them. Present to the SMS operators the status of all the elements monitored, by means of graphic Man Machine

Interface (MMI) and vector drawings. Detect all the safety alarms generated by safety sub-systems, and automatically reporting them to the SMS

operators.

The SMS (OWS) is a distributed system, with one workstation in the wheelhouse and one in the ECR. (Hard drives are sensitive to failures, one of the weakest links of the system).Recommendation: Install PC with a redundant hard drive, or install a solid state drive in order to minimize the failures of the workstations.

The safety systems interfaced are:

1. Fire detection system (Serial line RS 232).2. High fog system (Serial line RS 422).3. Watertight door system (Serial line RS 422).4. E.S.D. (RJ 45 to Ethernet HUB).

The network is not redundant, as the SMS for this class of vessels is pure monitoring system, which doesn’t replace any statutory system or function.Single failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

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Location of the ESD cabinets:

number Description Label Deck FZ Frame Location Normal power supplies Emergency power supplies

PY/901ES ESD CABINET FPD1 1 1 48 PS EL. LOCKER OPP. CABIN 1112 FZ/QLR37000 FZ/QM9DO000PY/902ES ESD CABINET FPD2 5 1 51 PS EL. LOCKER OPP. CABIN 5152 FZ/QLR46000 FZ/QM9DR000PY/903ES ESD CABINET FPD3 A 2 54 PS WT DOOR STATION FZ/QFT12000 FZ/QM9DH000PY/904ES ESD CABINET FPD4 A 2 54 PS WT DOOR STATION FZ/QFT12000 FZ/QM9DH000PY/905ES ESD CABINET FPD5 3 2 108 PS AC STATION TENDER 16 FZ/QFT13000 FZ/QM9DJ000PY/906ES ESD CABINET FPD6 7 2 73 PS CORRIDOR OPP CABIN 7093 FZ/QLT57000 FZ/QM9DL000PY/907ES ESD CABINET FPD7 9 2 66 STB EL. LOCKER OPP TOILET FZ/QLT57000 FZ/QM9DM000PY/908ES ESD CABINET FPD8 9 2 66 STB EL. LOCKER OPP TOILET FZ/QLT57000 FZ/QM9DM000PY/909ES ESD CABINET FPD9 A 3 147 PS E.C.R. FZ/QFU10000 FZ/QM9CZ000PY/910ES ESD CABINET FPD10 A 3 147 PS E.C.R. FZ/QFU10000 FZ/QM9CZ000PY/911ES ESD CABINET FPD11 2 3 162 PS EL. LOCKER NEXT TO GANGWAY PS FZ/QFU12000 FZ/QM9DA000PY/912ES ESD CABINET FPD12 2 3 164 PS EL. LOCKER NEXT TO GANGWAY PS FZ/QFU12000 FZ/QM9DA000PY/913ES ESD CABINET FPD13 5 3 134 PS AC STATION OPP CABIN 5110 FZ/QLU49000 FZ/QM9DC000PY/914ES ESD CABINET FPD14 10 3 114 PS EL. LOCKER NEXT FAN ROOM FZ/QLU14000 FZ/QM9DF000PY/915ES ESD CABINET FPD15 A 4 194 STB WATERTIGHT DOOR EMERGENCY STATION FZ/QLV10000 FZ/QM9CQ000PY/916ES ESD CABINET FPD16 4 4 213 PS EL. LOCKER AC STATION OPP CABIN 4078 FZ/QLV51000 FZ/QM9CV000PY/917ES ESD CABINET FPD17 9 4 171 PS AC STATION NEXT PAX LIFT FZ/QLV13000 FZ/QM9CY000PY/918ES ESD CABINET FPD18 A 5 261STB WATERTIGHT DOOR EMERGENCY STATION FZ/QFW10000 FZ/QM9CJ000PY/919ES ESD CABINET FPD19 3 5 260 SB EL. LOCKER FAST RESCUE BOAT FZ/QFW10000 FZ/QM9CJ000PY/920ES ESD CABINET FPD20 9 5 252 PS EL. LOCKER NEXT HAIR SALON FZ/QFW16000 FZ/QM9CO000PY/921ES ESD CABINET FDP21 A 6 294 PS EL. LOCKER NEXT CABIN A030 FZ/QFX12000 FZ/QM9CA000PY/922ES ESD CABINET FPD22 4 6 338 STB EL. LOCKER OPP CABIN 4003 FZ/QFX16000 FZ/QM9CE000PY/923ES ESD CABINET FPD23 8 6 330 MS SAFETY CONSOLE BRIDGE FZ/QFX18000 FZ/QM9CG000PY/924ES ESD CABINET FPD24 9 6 290 PS EL. LOCKER NEXT GYM FZ/QFX20000 FZ/QM9CG000PY/925ES ESD CANINET FPD25 2 7 346 MS FWD MOORING SUBSTATION FZ/QFX15000 FZ/QM9CB000

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Item Supported documents

available


Redundant set-up



Redundant network

Past problems

ESD SYSTEM yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes (2)

Past problems were related to faulty computers (OWS) in ECR and on the bridge.

Item Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor-mode

ESD SYSTEM Medium Critical Low risk Medium-high

In general we can conclude that a correct set-up of the E.S.D. system is vital for the overall safe operations of the vessel.

Observation:The set-up of the E.S.D. system and its equipment has not been installed according to the fail safe mode philosophy (Which is the correct way of installation).

Fail safe mode means that equipment will stop in case of wire break, or burned-out signal cables to the local E.S.D. cut-off relay (s).(Fail safe mode means in general that the (DC) relays are always energized, which in-creases the chance of component failures).

E.S.D. monitors the equipment with a so called, Monitored, Normally open contact.

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Explanation:

Circuit boards IOM 402, DEM 401 and REM 402 (See supported documentation) are monitoring the inputs and outputs.Inputs are usually employed in:

-Emergency stops.-Hard switch selectors.

The monitoring of a channel is implemented by an 8.2KΩ resistor placed at the end of the cable. Even when the contact is open, there is a small current going through the resistor, which is monitored by the board.In case of a cable break, the board detects the absence of current and signals a fault on the channel.

-Fans and pumps (Accommodation and machinery).

In this case the monitoring of a channel is implemented using the coil of the relay placed at the end of the line.In case of cable break, the board detects the absence of current and signals a fault on the channel.

Manual action is required when such a channel alarm is triggered; equipment can only be switched off by means physically isolation of the relevant equipment.

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The E.S.D. system consists of 23 hard wired switching stations (local panels).

Panel ID / Tag number

Services Location

PY/101QI FIRE DAMPERS & VENTILATION – SMOKE EXTRACTION – OVERBOARD DISCHARGE CONTROL – MACHINERY AND OIL PUMPS

ECR MIMIC CONSOLE

PY/102QI FIRE DOORS – FIRE DAMPERS & VENTILATION – SMOKE EXTRACTION – OVERBOARD DISCHARGE CONTROL – SIDE DOORS MIMIC

WHEELHOUSE SAFETY CONSOLE

PY/103QI – PY/104QI AFT PURIFIER ROOM (LOCAL SAFETY PANELS – HARD SWITCHES) D-DECK FR.96 – FR102PY/105QI AFT PURIFIER ROOM (LOCAL SAFETY PANELS – HARD SWITCHES) B-DECK FR.92

PY/106QI – PY/107QI PS FWD PURIFIER ROOM (LOCAL SAFETY PANELS – HARD SWITCHES) D-DECK FR.114 – FR.122PY/108QI – PY/109QI SB FWD PURIFIER ROOM (LOCAL SAFETY PANELS – HARD SWITCHES) D-DECK FR.114 – FR.122PY/110QI – PY/112QI INCINERATOR ROOM (LOCAL SAFET PANELS – HARDSWITCHES) D-DECK FR.86 – FR.106

PY/111QI INCINERATOR ROOM (LOCAL SAFET PANELS – HARDSWITCHES) B-DECK FR.86PY/116QI PS LIFEBOAT AREA (LOCAL SAFET PANELS – HARDSWITCHES) DECK 3 FR.78PY/117QI PS LIFEBOAT AREA (LOCAL SAFET PANELS – HARDSWITCHES) DECK 3 FR.280PY/118QI SB LIFEBOAT AREA (LOCAL SAFET PANELS – HARDSWITCHES) DECK 3 FR. 78PY/119QI SB LIFEBOAT AREA (LOCAL SAFET PANELS – HARDSWITCHES) DECK 3 FR.280

PY/120QI – PY/121QI BUNKER STATION (LOCAL SAFET PANELS – HARDSWITCHES) A-DECK FR.82 – FR. 86PY/122QI – PY/123QI BUNKER WATER STATION (LOCAL SAFET PANELS – HARDSWITCHES) A-DECK FR.82 – FR. 86

These hard wired stations are important in case equipment needs to be isolated / stopped locally; activation of the wrong switches could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

Local stations (yellow high-lighted) are located on an open deck (deck 3), it is a recommendation to remove them from the open decks and relocate them inside the electrical lockers on deck 3(Lloyds / NSI approval needed).This should be a low-cost modification.It is a fact that these local stations and its components suffer from the influence of Mother Nature, which could cause a shutdown / stop of the relevant equipment.

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Conclusion of the FMEA: (See supported documents).

FMEA = Failure Mode Effect Analysis.

It is a system with a high fault tolerance and a high level of redundancy.

See below ESD FMEA table:

EQUIPMENT NAME FUNCTION FAILURE MODE FAILURE CAUSE LOCAL FAILURE EFFECTS

END FAILURE EFFECTS

FAILURE DETECTION ALTERNATIVE PROVISION

Ships UPS 220V 60HZ (EMG Supply)

Uninterrupted power supply

Loss of ships UPS (EMG Supply)

Generic board fault Loss of one UPS supply line on each

equipment

none yes Automatic change over to normal supply

Ships UPS supply line cables

Feeder of equipment via UPS

Break or short circuit Fire or mechanical damage

Loss of the UPS supply line of one or

more equipment

none yes Automatic change over to normal supply

Normal power supply Feeder of equipment via normal supply


Loss of normal supply line

none yes Automatic change over to UPS supply

AC /DC converter for mimic led controller

Supply of 24VDC Electric or electronic failure

Short circuit or electronic damage

Loss of one AC/DC converter

none yes Redundancy of AC/DC converter

ACB for AC/DC converter for mimic

led controller

Protection of the supply lines

Electric fault Short circuit of mechanical damage

Loss of one supply line and one AC/DC

converter

none yes Redundancy of the feeder line and

converterFuse for mimic led

controllerFeed the individual mimic led controller

Blown fuse Short circuit Partial loss of fire door & damper

none yes Supervision to be handled with the

OWSACB for AC/DC

converter for local PMCS cabinet

Protection of supply lines

Electric fault Short circuit or mechanical damage

Loss of one supply line and one AC/DC

converter

none yes Redundancy of feeder line and

converterAC/DC converter for

local cabinetsSupply of 24VDC Electric or electronic

faultShort circuit or

electronic damageLoss of one AC/DC

converternone yes Redundancy of

AC/DC converterI/O module fuse Protection of a single

moduleBlown fuse Short circuit Loss of module and

relevant I/O signalsStatus indication and ESD not available for connected devices

yes Crew intervention required: replace the

blown fuseI/O module Concentrate the I/O

signalsElectronic failure Mechanical or

electronic damageLoss of module and relevant I/O signals

Status indication and ESD not available for connected devices

yes Crew intervention required,: replace the

damaged unit

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EQUIPMENT NAME FUNCTION FAILURE MODE FAILURE CAUSE LOCAL FAILURE EFFECTS

END FAILURE EFFECTS

FAILURE DETECTION ALTERNATIVE PROVISION

CPU module Handles the internal and external data

transmission

Electronic failure Mechanical or electronic damage

Loss of local ESD cabinet

Local ESD cabinet including connected devices not available

for ESD system

yes Crew intervention required: replace the

damaged unit

OWS 1 or 2 Shows alarm and system status

Electric or electronic failure

Mechanical or electronic damage

Loss of 1 OWS plus printer

Loss of one OWS yes ESD has to be handled by remaining

OWSEthernet bus lines to

SMS systemConnects OWS 1 & 2

with SMSBreak or short circuit Fire or mechanical

damageLoss of one of the Ethernet bus lines

none yes Alarm on remaining OWS, crew

intervention requiredMain field bus M6 Connect the bus line

controller (Master) to the system net


Loss of one main bus line to OWS 2

none yes Alarm on OWS 2, automatic switch to the other bus line

Reserve field bus line R6

Connect the bus line controller (Slave) to

the system net


Loss of one reserve bus line to OWS 2

none yes Alarm on OWS 2, automatic switch to the other bus line

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10. VENTILATION SYSTEMS:

General:

Single failure with any HVAC system will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, But theStarting / stopping of the HVAC systems in a correct matter would be a vital execution in case of a fire, failure of doing so could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability, depending on the location(s) of the fire.

HVAC systems (stop / start of ventilation systems) are controlled and monitored via the ESD / SMS systems, as well as by means of other control and monitoring systems such as automation and ATISA control system.

Ventilation stop and damper closure:

The E.S.D. system allows the operator to stop ventilation / close dampers of some specific areas of the vessel:

General stop / closure. Stop of ventilation / closure of dampers associated to staircases. Stop of ventilation / closure of dampers associated to a specific area of the vessel. Stop of ventilation / closure of dampers for engine room spaces.

Note:

It is important that dampers are tested according to the Amosw DFD001 recommended intervals and procedures.DFD001 clearly describes that closure of the dampers need to be visually verified, this does not happen all the time (Crew needs to be instructed in order to do so).

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Note:

The input contact for the hard switch is monitored, normally open.The output contact for the fan stop or fan start is monitored, normally open.The input contacts for the fan feedback are not monitored.The input contacts for the damper positions are not monitored.

It is important that correct maintenance intervals are conducted and that the crew is aware of any failures within the HVAC systems in order to rely on the safe and correct functioning of the equipment in case of an emergency situation.Not be able to start / stop certain fans could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability depending on the affected location(s) (Spread of fire).

Item Supported documents

available


Redundant set-up



Redundant network

Past problems

HVAC SYSTEM yes yes no yes no no Yes (30)

Item Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor-mode

HVAC SYSTEM

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Conclusion:

1. No redundant power supply for fan starters.2. No redundant bus communication from the ATISA supervision system.3. No redundant power supply for the ATISA control cabinet (1 UPS supply).4. In most cases just one power supply for multiple fan units from the main sub stations for supply and

exhaust fans.

Power supplies are looped from one HVAC unit to the next HVAC unit in the same fire zone, with only 1 feeder line.Failure of the feeder line will affect multiple HVAC units.

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Smoke Extraction:

Smoke extraction system is an important function for the safe operation of the vessel in case of an emergency (Fire).The E.S.D. system allows the operator to start / stop the smoke extraction in the area where this function is foreseen by regulations (Areas which spans three or more decks).The actions to be performed are the following:

1. Closure of the fire doors surrounding the areas.2. Stop the ventilation in the area.3. Activation of proper ventilation to evacuate smoke from the area. Typically the exhaust fans in the upper

decks are activated, as well as some supply fans in the lower decks.

Note:

The input contacts for the hard switch and FDS contact is monitored, normally open.The output contact for the fan start or fan stop is monitored, normally open.The input contacts for the fan running status are not monitored.The input contacts for the damper positions are not monitored.

It is important that correct maintenance intervals are conducted and that the crew is aware of any failures within the smoke extraction system in order to rely on the safe and correct functioning of the system in case of an emergency situation.Not be able to start / stop certain fans (smoke extraction) could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability depending on the affected area (s) (Spread of fire).

1.

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11. BRIDGE AND NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT:

General:

It is of vital importance that the navigation officers are well instructed and trained in case of a sudden black-out, loss of propulsion and loss of navigation equipment which will (could) directly influence the manoeuverability of the vessel.

Navigation officers need to know what the specific incident behavior of certain equipment is and which components are the causes.It is a must that they are able to identify the failures associated with the essential ship control and manoeuvring systems and sub systems.

Navigation officers need to have the knowledge of the following essential criteria’s:

1. What navigation equipment is available during a black-out?2. The easiest way to perform a crash stop.3. How to use the back-up controls.4. What will happen in case of a steering gear failure, or accidentally stopping of the wrong steering

pump?5. What to do when one Azipod won’t turn anymore?6. What happened when the RPM order fails during joystick sailing mode?7. What to do in case of a steering gear hydraulic locking alarm?

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1. What navigation equipment is available during a black-out?

The below shown list specifies which navigation equipment will be (will not be) available during a normal black-out (with emergency generator) or during a black-out without the availability of the emergency generator.

ITEMS TYPE OF BACKUP TYPE OF BLACK-OUTNORMAL BLACK-OUT

WITH EMERGENCY GENERATOREMERGENCY GENERATOR

FAILUREJUNCTION BOX FOR ECHOSOUNDER UPS NI/001CO YES YESVHF AERONAUTIC UPS NI/001CO YES YESW.H. STBD CONSOLE SECT. A UPS NI/001CO YES YES

W.T. DOORS CONTROL STATION UPS NI/001CO YES YESJUNCTION BOX FOR WIND SPEED UPS NI/001CO YES YESS-BAND ANTENNA RADAR 1 UPS NI/001CO YES YESS-BAND ANTENNA RADAR 2 UPS NI/001CO YES YESX-BAND ANTENNA RADAR UPS NI/001CO YES YESX-BAND BOW ANTENNA RADAR UPS NI/001CO YES YESRADAR JUNCTION BOX UPS NI/001CO YES YESS-BAND TRANSCEIVER UNIT FOR RADAR SYSTEM UPS NI/001CO YES YESX-BAND TRANSCEIVER UNIT FOR RADAR SYSTEM UPS NI/001CO YES YESX-BAND TRANSCEIVER UNIT FOR RADAR SYSTEM UPS NI/001CO YES YESMULTIPILOT INTERCONNECTION BOX SYSTEM 1 UPS NI/001CO YES YESJUNCTION BOX FOR AUTOPILOT SYSTEM GB/001AM UPS NI/001CO YES YESJUNCTION BOX FOR INTEGRATED NAVIGATION SYSTEM UPS NI/001CO YES YESCONSOLE TERM. BOARD FOR CONNINGPILOT (INTEG.NAV.) UPS NI/001CO YES YESTHRUSTER SYSTEM – MAIN PLC UNIT IN W.H. UPS NI/001CO YES YESJUNCTION BOX FOR ECHOSOUNDER UPS NI/001CO YES YESFIRE DETECTION VDU UPS NI/001CO YES YESWHISTLES PANEL AUTOMATION. Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESSOUND SIGNAL SURVEILLANCE CONTROL PANEL. Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESSIGNAL LIGHT SYSTEM Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESDGPS RECEIVER Batt. FZ/919QB YES YES

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SOUND SIGNAL SURVEILLANCE CONTROL PANEL Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESGYROCOMPASS SYSTEM Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESGYROCOMPASS SYSTEM Batt. FZ/919QB YES YES

AUTOPILOT SYSTEM Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESFUSE SUPPLY & SWITCH. BOX – PROPULSION SYSTEM Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESCONTROL BOX ELECTRIC SHAFT – PROPULSION SYSTEM Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESEL. SHAFT BOX – PROPULSION SYSTEM Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESPORT PLC & RELAY BOX – PROPULSION SYSTEM Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESSTBD PLC & RELAY BOX – PROPULSION SYSTEM Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESMODE ILLUM. CTRL BOX – PROPULSION SYSTEM Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESBRIDGE ALARM SYSTEM Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESINTEGRATED NAVIGATION SYSTEM Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESC.U.P. FOR REMOTE CONTROL LIGHT Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESSPEED PILOT CALL BUTTON Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESSAILOR VHF TRANSCEIVER Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESMASTERCLOCK 20097 NI/001CO YES YESSMS ETHERNET HUB Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESW.H. CENTER CONSOLE SECT. B INSTR. ILLUMINATION Batt. FZ/919QB YES YESPOWER SUPPLY SAILOR N163S Batt. FZ/919QB YES YES

RESERVE NAVIGATION LIGHTS MIMIC PANEL Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NOSIGNAL LIGHT CONTROL PANEL Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NOFUSE SUPPLY & SWITCH. BOX Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NOEM. LIGHT WHEELHOUSE – CHART TABLE Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NOEM. LIGHT WHEELHOUSE – SPOTLIGHT CONSOLE Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NOEM. LIGHT WHEELHOUSE – SAFETY CENTER Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NOEM. LIGHT WHEELHOUSE Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NOC.P.U. FOR REMOTE CONTROL LIGHT Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NO

EM. LIGHT WHEELHOUSE – SPOTLIGHT CONSOLE Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NOEM. LIGHT WHEELHOUSE – SPOTLIGHT CONSOLE Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NO

DOOR CONTROL UNIT Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NOSISTEMA TALK BACK SYSTEM Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NO

E.v.W Page 197


E.S.D. REMOTE CABINET PY/923 Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NOE.S.D. REMOTE CABINET PY/924 Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NOMULTI SOCKET Emerg. FZ/QM9CG000 YES NOWHISTLES PANEL AUTOMATION Emerg. FZ/QR9BA000 YES NOWHEATHER FAX Emerg. FZ/QR9BA000 YES NOPOWER SUPPLY & AMPLIFIER BOX PORT N.1 Emerg. FZ/QR9BA000 YES NOPOWER SUPPLY & AMPLIFIER BOX PORT N.2 Emerg. FZ/QR9BA000 YES NOPOWER SUPPLY & AMPLIFIER BOX STBD N.1 Emerg. FZ/QR9BA000 YES NOPOWER SUPPLY & AMPLIFIER BOX STBD N.2 Emerg. FZ/QR9BA000 YES NOFIRE DETECTION STANDARD CABINET Emerg. FZ/QR9BA000 YES NOSAILOR VHF TRANSCEIVER Emerg. FZ/QR9BA000 YES NOAC DISTRIBUTION PANEL Emerg. FZ/QR9BA000 YES NOSIGNAL LIGHT CONTROL PANEL Emerg. FZ/QR9BA000 YES NOVOYAGE DATA RECORDER Emerg. FZ/QR9BB000 YES NOELECTRIC WHISTLE ZETHORN AC CONTROL Emerg. FZ/QR9BB000 YES NOJUNCTION BOX MIN/MAX WITH 14 T.B. Emerg. FZ/QR9BB000 YES NO

E.v.W Page 198


Items 2-7:

Items Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor-mode

Item 2

Item 3 Medium Critical No risk Medium high

Item 4 Medium Critical No risk Medium high

Item 5 Critical No risk



Single failure of relevant equipment and / or an incorrect corrective action will (can) affect the manoeuverability of the vessel.

E.v.W Page 199



Redundant set-up Awareness / training crew / maintenance

Past problems

Item 2 yes yesItem 3 yes yes yes yes noneItem 4 yes yes yes yes Yes (2)Item 5 yes yes yes yes noneItem 6 yes yes yes yes noneItem 7 yes yes yes yes none


12. FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS.

General:

The correct functioning of the fire suppression systems is a must; in-correct handling and / or not functioning of those systems will (could) affect the redundancy and Manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the affected area(s) (Spread of fires).

Main Systems are:

12.1.1 → Hi-Fog System.12.1.2 → C0² System.12.1.3 → Fire fighting System.12.1.4 → Fire alarm system.


9.1.1 → Hi-Fog System.

8.1.1. a → General.12.1.1. b → Hi-Fog Units.12.1.1. c → Protected areas.

E.v.W Page 200


12.1.1. a → General.

The Marioff Hi-Fog System uses water under high pressure, and is based on established hydraulic principles and technology. The special designed spray nozzles cause the water to enter the space as fine fog (mist) at high speed.The small droplets yield a very large total water surface area, providing efficient cooling of the fire and surrounding gases. The high speed of the small droplets enables the fog to penetrate hot flue gases and reach the combustion source, even in large, hidden fires.

E.v.W Page 201


12.1.1. b → Hi-Fog Units.

General:

For the guarantee of the maximum reliability, the Hi-Fog System is equipped with two identical pump units SPAU 5+1, located in separate compartments (Both on the PS on OSDM).Both pump units are dimensioned to maintain the full water pressure and volume for SOLAS required 280m² Accommodation area(s).

In case of a failure of the active (Master) pump unit, the other (Slave) pump unit can be selected for use by the selection switch, located in the ECR panel and wheelhouse panel (Nitrogen banks will always be available in case of dual pump failures; maintaining of the HI-fog pressure).

Recommendation (Future new builds).One Hi-Fog Unit needs to be installed on the PS and one on SB, at the moment they are located in separate compartments, but both on the PS hull side (C-D deck). Possible collision could damage both units.

Recommendation: (OSDM).

Hi-fog pump unit(s) consists of several MANUAL valves without any feedback indication (Valve open / close indications).It could happen that valves are closed during maintenance or inspections of the unit(s) and accidentally not be opened after the maintenance or inspections are completed.It is recommended that all valves of the Hi-fog pump units will be sealed and that a valve opening / closing log is kept in the ECR in order to prevent accidentally mistakes which could affect the redundancy (and manoeuverability) of the vessel in case of a fire.

E.v.W Page 202



12.1.1. b → Hi-Fog Units.

12.1.1. ba →Power Supplies. 12.1.1. bb →Control panels. 12.1.1. bc →Flow control. 12.1.1. ba →Power Supplies.

Both Hi-Fog Units have redundant power supplies, one supply from the 690V main SWBD and one from the 690V EMG SWBD.



Redundant set-up




Hi-fog units yes yes yes yes none

Hi-Fog Units Normal Power Supply Emergency Power Supply Redundant Set-upYA/485A FWD 690V MSBD # 369 EMG SWBD XA/873 # 925 YESYA/485B AFT 690V MSBD # 474 EMG SWBD XA/873 # 926 YES

YA/485A, system 1 is located on D-deck, FR.200-206.YA/485B, system 2 is located on C-deck, FR.226-230.

E.v.W Page 203


12.1.1. bb →Control panels.

The Hi-Fog System includes the following control and indication panels:

Control panel in wheelhouse, Hi-Fog release panel in ECR, Hi-fog PLC cabinet and the Hi-fog pump unit control panels. The primary indication system for the Hi-fog alarms is the SMS system, were alarms are given from the Hi-fog PLC cabinet.

The Hi-fog PLC cabinet is used to handle the system signals and is connected to the HI-fog pump units, Mimic panel, VDR system and the release panel in the ECR.

VDR = Voice Data Recorder.

ECR PLC cabinet is the only cabinet that has a redundant power supply.

Recommendation: Install a normal power supply in order to improve the redundancy in case of power failures.

PLC cabinet has a 24VDC battery back-up which should last for 12 hours.PLC software is saved to flash type memory.PLC cabinet is equipped with two PLC-units working identically; PLC failure in one does not affect the performance of another one.

Items Normal Supply Emergency Supply Past ProblemsHi-fog PLC Cabinet YM/485 ECR FZ/QFU10000 IN ECR ON

DECK A # UB028FZ/QM9CZ000 OPP.COM OFFICE ON

DECK 1 # 9CZ28none

Hi fog PLC Cabinet YM/485C deck 7 NO FZ/QM9CF000 OPP. CABIN 7034 DECK 7 # 9CF50

none

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12.1.1. bc →Flow control.

If the flow monitor malfunctions, and the system pressure will drop the pump unit will receive a start signal from the low pressure switch, when the pressure drops below 17bar.

E.v.W Page 205


12.1.1. c → Protected areas.

Hi-fog system protects the following areas:

-Public, service and storage areas as per IMO Res. A800 (19).-Machinery spaces (Total protection) as per IMO MSC / Circ. 913.-Deep fat fryers as per ISO 15371:2000.

Modifications:

Safety upgrades for Hi-fog, fire detectors and CO² system have been implemented for the engine room spaces.OSDM modifications have been completed in May 2011.

2 extra loops have been installed in respectively MVZ 2 and 3 while the existing systems remained untouched.The new loops have been provided with extra new type IR flame detectors and smoke detectors which have been programmed in such way that they will work together with the existing ones as one system with improved coverage.

Release of Hi-fog is triggered by either 2 smoke / heat detectors or 1 flame detector (UV or IR) without any delay.With the exception of the emergency generator room, were Hi-fog is triggered by a combination of 1 smoke / heat detector and 1 flame detector (UV or IR) without any delay.

E.v.W Page 206


9.1.2 → C0² System.

Power supplies main C0² control cabinet:

CO² CONTROL CABINET YM/536AA NORMAL POWER SUPPLY EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY REDUNDANTPOWER SUPPLIES FZ/QLT57000 ELECTRICAL LOCKER DECK

9 AFT LIDO, FRAME 66 STBD FIRE ZONE 2FZ/QM9DM000 ELECTRICAL LOCKER

DECK 9 AFT LIDO, FRAME 66 STBD FIRE ZONE 2

YES (NOT)

Note: the power supplies for the master CO² control cabinet (YM/536AA) located in the CO² room are redundant, but both power supplies, normal and emergency, are coming from the same electrical locker, meaning that this is not a fully redundant set-up (Think of a fire in the relevant locker).

CO² control and monitoring cabinet will be affected in case of a fire in the electrical locker, deck 9 aft lido, frame 66 STBD, fire zone 2.

No alarms and monitoring of the CO² system will be available in case both power supplies would be lost.CO² can still be released (Without alarms and warnings).

Recommendation:

Physically remove one of the incoming power supplies (Normal or Emergency supply) from the relevant electrical locker and relocate this to another electrical locker in the same fire zone (Fire zone 2).This should be a low cost modification which could be done by the ship’s crew.

E.v.W Page 207


9.1.3 → Fire fighting System.

General:

OSDM fire fighting system consists of a Hydrofore tank, topping-up pump, two fire pumps and two emergency fire pumps.

1. Hydrofore tank YA/478.2. Topping-up pump YA/483.3. Fire pump 1 YA/482A.4. Fire pump 2 YA/482B.5. Emergency fire pump YA/479.6. Emergency diesel driven fire pump YD/476AA.7. Bilge double acting piston pump XB/405 (This bilge pump can be used as a fire pump if needed).

Hydrofore tank, topping-up pump, emergency fire pump and fire pump 1 are all located in one area, close to the STBD hull side, Frames 170-182.

Topping-up pump, emergency fire pump, fire pump 1 are all connected to the FWD cross-over.Fire pump 2 is connected to the AFT cross-over.

Recommendation:Set-up needs to be reviewed; fire fighting capacity will significantly decrease in case of a flooding / fire in the compartment (Frames 170-182).

Should there be a cross connection between the AFT and FWD cross-over? (Suction of the emergency fire pump).

E.v.W Page 208


Power supplies:Items: Normal Supply Emergency supply Redundant Power Supply

TOPPING UP PUMP YA/483 NO FZ/QZ948000 # 948000 DK3 FZ 5 PS HYDRAULIC LOCKER

NO

EMERGENCY FIRE PUMP YA/479 NO EMG SWBD XA/873A # 918 NOMAIN FIRE PUMP 1 YA/482A GSP FZ/430QF # 43014

AFT SEWAGE ROOM.NO NO

MAIN FIRE PUMP 2 YA/482B NO EMG SWBD XA/873A # 920 NOBILGE DOUBLE ACTING PISTON P

XB/405GSP FZ/442QF # 44217

AFT ENGINE SERVICE GSP N2NO NO

Emergency fire pump YA/479 can be started from the bridge as per SOLAS requirement.All other pumps can be started from the ECR.

Recommendation:Main fire pump # 1 YA/482A is the only pump connected to a normal power supply.In my opinion all fire pumps should be equipped with a change over switch which allows the pumps to get their supplies from either the normal 690V SWBD or from the EMG SWBD in case of an emergency.This should be a low cost modification which could be done by the ship’s crew.

Emergency fire diesel driven pump YD/476AA:This unit is located on the deck 1 AFT mooring deck and can only be started locally.The unit is equipped with a remote controlled non-return valve AIO19, which does not make any sense because this pump can only be started locally.

Recommendation:Remote controlled non-return valve AIO19 needs to be replaced by a manual valve, a remote controlled valve could become a single failure that could affect the fire fighting capability in case of an emergency.This should be a low cost modification which could be done by the ship’s crew (NSI approval needed).

E.v.W Page 209


9.1.4 →Fire alarm system.

General:

The Salwico fire detection system is a state-of-the-art, analogue-addressable, fire detection system designed to meet marine and industrial requirements.

System set-up is fully redundant (Backbone bus, network, PSU, CPU, Detector loops), system is linked to VDR, ESD, SMS, HI-FOG, TRAFFIC LIGHT system, Sliding cover, I.A.S, PA system and external lighting system (Overboard lights).System consists of 4 fire detection standard control cabinets.

Power supplies standard control cabinets:Items: Normal power supplies Emergency power

suppliesPossible single failure Redundant set-up Past problems

IJ/001UE FZ6, DECK 8 BRIDGE

FZ/QFX18000 # XB814, ELEC LOCKER OPP. 8010

FZ/QR9BA000 # 9BA16 ELEC LOCKER OPP.8010

yes Yes (NO) none

IJ/002UE FZ5, PS DECK 3 ELECTRICAL LOCKER OPP.

FAST RESCUE BOAT

FZ/QFW11000 # WB110 ELEC LOCKER OPP. FAST RESCUE BOAT DK 3 SB

FZ/QM9CK000 #9CK15 ELEC LOCKER OPP. FAST RESCUE BOAT DK 3 SB

yes Yes (NO) none

IJ/003UE FZ4, SB DECK 3 OPP.SHOP MGR OFFICE

FZ/QLV48000 # VE850 ELEC LKR OPP.

SHOP MGR OFFICE

FZ/QM9CT000 # 9CT50 ELEC LKR OPP.

SHOP MGR OFFICE

yes Yes (NO) none

IJ/004UE, FZ1,SB DK 3 ELEC LOCKER ENTRANCE

DINING ROOM DK 3

FZ/QLR39000 # RD950ELEC LOCKER ENTRANCE

DINING ROOM DK 3

FZ/QM9DP000 # 9DP10 ELEC LOCKER ENTRANCE

DINING ROOM DK 3

yes Yes (NO) none

Cabinets have a redundant set-up of the power supplies, but control cabinets are installed in the same electrical lockers as the incoming normal and emergency power supplies. All equipment will be lost in case of a fire in the affected electrical locker, which means that detector loops coming from the affected control cabinet will not function anymore (Which results in no fire detection in the relevant fire zone (s)).

E.v.W Page 210


Recommendation:

Physically remove one of the incoming power supplies (Normal or Emergency supply) from the relevant electrical locker and relocate this to another electrical locker in the same fire zone.This should be a low cost modification which could be done by the ship’s crew.

This will not solve the issue in case of a fire, but normal and emergency supplies feeding one component should not be coming from the same electrical locker as this could (will) affect the redundancy of the systems.

E.v.W Page 211


13. SUMMARY:

Level of redundancy: Reasonable.

Both scenarios descript in chapter 7 indicate that the systems in both engine rooms are not as redundant as it should be, this needs to be reviewed because 2 separate engine rooms should really mean that all systems should be redundant.

Level of experience:

We can conclude that the overall knowledge and experience level (at the moment) on board the OSDM is of a high standard, bear in mind that there is always room for improvement.

Note: Five engineers on board the OSDM have done their apprentice ship on board of one of the Vista class vessels.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that feasible modifications will be implemented on the OSDM; it is furthermore recommended that the findings indicated in this report will be used (implemented) in the ship specifications of the future new HAL vessels.

E.v.W Page 212


List with suggested recommendations:

Item numbers:

Descriptions: Document Page numbers:

1 HT COOLER AND REGULATOR 8-102 CROSS CONNECTION AFT / FWD CROSS-OVER 113 BIGGER CROSS CONNECTION SW AUX COOLER AND MAIN

FIRE LINE15

4 CONNECTION MAIN LT – AUXILIARY LT 185 CONNECTION MAIN LT AFT-FWD ENGINE ROOMS 186 REDUNDANT POWER SUPPLIES STARTING AIR COMPRESSORS 227 ADD STARTING AIR COMPRESSOR / AIR VESSEL 258 SUCTION VALVES / QUICK CLOSING VALVES HFO / MGO 279 MGO TANK 27

10 MGO SET-UP 3411 LO TRANSFER PUMP XA/185A 3512 TRAINING INTERVALS 11KV MSBD 5113 CYCLO SOFTWARE 72

E.v.W Page 213


List with suggested recommendations:

Item numbers:

Descriptions: Document Page numbers:

14 COMMON ALARMS EMG 8715 INSTALL MANHOLE AFT-FWD MSBD ROOMS 91 / 11616 HFO TRANSFER PUMP 10217 DISTILLED WATER UNIT / CONNECTION TO PURIFIER 12818 TECHNICAL WATER PUMPS 13319 ESD HARDWIRED CONTROL CABINETS / COMPUTER 169 / 17320 HI-FOG PUMP UNITS 18721 POWER SUPPLY HI-FOG PLC CABINET 18922 CO² CONTROL CABINET 19223 FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM 19324 FIRE ALARM SYSTEM 19625 OVERALL TRAINING 1-21126 OVERALL MAINTENANCE INTERVALS 1-211

Please review the block diagrams (Component failures) indicated on the below shown pages (200-211).

E.v.W Page 214


Governor

Engine sp

eed pickups

Oil mist

detector

Engine HT re

gulator

Engine LT

regu

lator

Engine SW

regulat

or

Engine co

olers (LT

/ HT)

Engine co

ntrol S

ystem AC70

Engine co

ntrol a

nd monito

ring S8

00

HT temperature se

nsors

Electr

ic module

heater

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3 3

1 12

6

4

12

5

1

Engine related component failures on board the OSDM

Osdm

E.v.W Page 215


Summary Engine related component failures:

1. Governor related items: DG2 synchronizer, DG4/DG5 governor failure (Blackout).2. Engine speed pickup failures: DG1 – DG3 and DG5.3. Oil mist detector: Failure on DG4 caused a complete blackout in 2004.4. Engine HT regulator: DG3, regulator card error.5. Engine LT regulator: Burned motors on DG4 and DG5.6. Engine SW regulator: regulator control cards, all DG’s.7. Engine coolers: Dirty LT coolers AFT and FWD engine rooms.8. Engine control system AC70: Complete AC70 has been replaced on DG4.9. Engine monitoring system S800: S800 modules have been replaced on DG1 and DG5.10.HT temperature sensors: The figure must be around 200 times, due to vibrations and faulty sensors, HT

sensor 60 second shutdown have been modified in 2011.11.Fuel electric module heater: several issues due to faulty heating elements.

E.v.W Page 216


Governor10% Engine speed pickups

10%

Oil mist detector3%

Engine HT regulator3%

Engine LT regulators7%

Engine SW regulators21%

Engine coolers 14%

AC703%

S8007%

HT sensors17%

Electric module heater3%

OSDM ENGINE RELATED COMPONENT FAILURES

GovernorEngine speed pickupsOil mist detectorEngine HT regulatorEngine LT regulatorsEngine SW regulatorsEngine coolers AC70S800HT sensorsElectric module heater

Above shown figures are based on information from AMOSW, investigation reports and knowledge of the crew on board.There will always be a % of failures that is not recorded in AMOSW and that is not mentioned in the investigation reports (OSDM has been sailing since 2003).

1.

E.v.W Page 217


High sp

eed breakers

Azipod ro

om coolin

g (PS/SB

)

Azipod ex

citati

on (PS/SB)

Azipod en

coder (

PS/SB)

PEP m

odules (PS)

CMC and ZMC computer

s

Hydraulic power p

ack (P

S / SB)

Steeri

ng gear (

PS / SB)

Cyclo co

ntrol b

oard (P

S / SB)

RDS System (S

B)

Cyclo co

oling pump (P

S/SB)

Complete PS Azip

od0123456789

10

42 2

4

1 1 1

9

2

8

31

Propulsion related component failures on board the OSDM

Series 1

E.v.W Page 218


Summary Propulsion related component failures:

1. High speed breakers: All related to Azipod encoder failures.2. Azipod room cooling: Issues existing when the vessel set sail has been resolved.3. Azipod excitation: Related to PS Azipod rotor and SB control circuit.4. Encoders: Encoder failures on both Azipods.5. PEP module: PS Azipod.6. CMC and ZMC computers: One ZMC failure on STBD Azipod.7. Hydraulic power pack: Fault separation block has been replaced on the PS.8. Steering gear: Five issues related to broken steering gear soft starters, 2 issues related to human error

(Stopping of a running steering gear pump) and 2 issues related to the steering gear motor failure (Motors have been replaced, one on PS and one on STBD).

9. Cyclo control boards: Issues on PS and STBD Cyclo due to reprogramming of the CCB cards.10.RDS: Hard drive has been replaced 8 times since 2003.11.Cyclo converter cooling pumps: 2 pumps have been replaced on the PS and one on the STBD side.12.Complete Azipod: PS Azipod has been replaced in 2006.

E.v.W Page 219


High speed breakers11%

Azipod room cooling5%

Excitation5%

Encoders11%

PEP module3%

CMC and ZMC computers

3%Hydraulic power

pack3%

Steering gear24%

Cyclo control boards5%

RDS21%

Cyclo converter cool-ing pumps

8%

Complete Azipod failure3%

OSDM PROPULSION RELATED COMPONENT FAILURES

High speed breakersAzipod room coolingExcitationEncodersPEP moduleCMC and ZMC computersHydraulic power packSteering gearCyclo control boardsRDSCyclo converter cooling pumpsComplete Azipod failure


E.v.W Page 220


trip of p

ropulsio

n

Black-out

Brown-out . . . . . . . . . . . .

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6 6

4

Loss of power / propulsion trip (partial loss of) propulsion on board the OSDM

Brown-outBlackouttrip of propulsion

Osdm has been sailing since 2003.Loss of propulsion: Excitation failure (1), Encoder failures (4) and power failure (1).Blackouts: Governor Failures (2), Shore connection (3) and oil mist detector (1).Brown-outs: Under voltage coils (2), REF unit (1) and unbalanced net work (1).

E.v.W Page 221


Automation (S800 m

odules)

Operator station (O

S)

ESD sy

stem

HVAC syste

m (Elec

trica

l componen

ts)

UPS / Invert

er (Contro

l cards)

11KV MSBD

Starti

ng air compres

sors

690V Sub stati

ons (Gro

und failu

res)

EMG SW

BD

EMG Gen

erator (Star

ting related

)

Complete EMG

Cooler EMG . . .

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

4 63

30

2 1

20

14 6

0

20

General component failures (Important systems) on board the OSDM

Summary of general component failures (Important systems):

E.v.W Page 222


1. Automation system: 4 faulty S800 modules.2. OS: 6 failures related to heat and vibrations.3. ESD computers: Computer on the bridge has been replaced twice; ECR computer has been replaced one

time.4. HVAC systems: All main motors have been replaced on all AC-sets; other problems were all related to the

HVAC distribution systems.5. 11KV MSBD: Issues related to REF units, DG breaker and tripping of the aft VT cubicle REF unit.6. Starting air compressors: Issues related to damaged fly-wheels (Human error).7. 690V MSBD and distribution: Main issue is the ground failures.8. EMG starting: Issues related to faulty starter motor as well as incorrect settings of starting relay.9. EMG: EMG has been replaced in 2006.10.Cooler EMG: Cooler has been replaced in 2010.

E.v.W Page 223


AUTOMATION5%

OS8% ESD

4%

HVAC39%

11KV MSBD5%

STARTING AIR COMPRESSORS

3%

690V DISTRIBUTION8%

EMG COMPLETE REPLACEMENT

1%

EMG STARTING ISSUES26%

EMG COOLER1%

OSDM GENERAL COMPONENT FAILURES

AUTOMATIONOSESDHVAC11KV MSBDSTARTING AIR COMPRESSORS690V DISTRIBUTIONEMG COMPLETE REPLACEMENTEMG STARTING ISSUES


E.v.W Page 224


Conclusion:

Electr

ical C

omponent failu

res

Human erro

rs

Mechan

ical co

mponent failu

res . . . . . . . . . .0

40

80

120

129

5 29

Summary component failures / human errors on board the OSDM

MECHANICAL COMPONENT FAILURESHUMAN ERRORSELECTRICAL


E.v.W Page 225


Recommendations:

1. Ongoing training for new crew, there are still crew members that have not done their required trainings.2. Seattle HR department needs to make sure that the experience levels remain of a high standards by means of

implementing the correct planning intervals (Crew needs to stay a minimum of 4 contracts on the same vessel as this is beneficial for crew and vessel).

3. Implement a scheduled interval for a controlled black-out as this is the only way to fully prove that systems, back-up systems are reliable.

Scheduled black-outs are beneficial for ship crew (First hand learning curve).

Controlled black-outs will possible improve the understanding of the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel in case of real black-outs, loss of propulsion, this should really be part of the preventive maintenance plan as operators need to know what the specific incident behavior of certain equipment is and which components are the causes, in fact it is a big part of the so called usage reliability which is based on running time (usage) of the systems (reliability of back-up batteries is most likely the best example).

4. Review training schedules and training facilities, more so called “training on board schedules” needs to be implemented (First hand learning curve) (Cabin availability is key to success).Re-instate the shore based advanced life fire fighting training as done in the past.Review the availability of the training courses for non-Asian officers in Subic Bay as many courses are only available for Asian crew and officers.

5. Keep experienced crew; review the contract duration set-up, many experienced crew members thinking of leaving due to the change in their 3-2 to 4-2 contract duration set-up.

E.v.W Page 226

Documents

OSDM Ships Manoeuverability Availabilty Study