Osceola County Jail Report

8/9/2019 Osceola County Jail Report

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Gonzalez, Mary '8;' FY IFrom: Upchurch, JamesSent: Monday, April 26, 2010 3:09 PMTo: Sapp, George; Von Hoene, KathleenCc: Hancock, John A.Subject: Security Audit Report Draft - Osceola County JailAttachments: 4-26-1 OcoverletterOsceola audit.doc; Osceola County Jail Review.docPlease find attached the draft cover letter and audit report concerning the Osceola County Jail. Please advise if you haveany changes, etc. Thanks!James R. UpchurchChief, Bureau o f Security OperationsFlorida Department o f Corrections850-41 0-4390


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FLORIDADEPARTMENT ofCORRECTIONS

ity Employer

GovernorCHARLIECRISTsecretaryWALTER A. McNEIL

r Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 http://www.dc.state.fl.us

Mr. Fred Hawkins, Jr.ChairmanCounty Commissioner, District 5Osceola County1 Courthouse Square, Suite4000Kissimrnee, FL 34741-5433Re: Security Audit-Osceola County Jail FacilityDear Chairman Hawkins:In response to your March 22, 2010 letter, the security audit of the Osceola County Jailconducted during the period April 5-8, 2010 is attached. The focus of this audit was primarilylimited to escape prevention issues and possible enhancements intended to reduce the likelihoodof hture such incidents. The criterions utilized were derived fiom our department's establishedsecurity standards. Those specific standards selected for application to the jail are those generic toany secure corrections facility, prison or jad, which houses persons posing a significant threat topublic safety. Hopehlly the observations and recommendations in this report will prove to be ofsome benefit as you strive to enhance security at the facility.We wish to express our thanks to the staff and managers at the facility for the helphlness andcooperation exhibited throughout the assessment period. It was certainly evident that a number ofimprovements have already been initiated and plans for others put in place. Staff at all levelsappeared genuinely interested in our suggestions and obviously interested in improving thesecurity program at the facility.Please advise if there are any questions or concerns after reviewing the report or if anyclarification or M h e r assistance is needed.Sincerely,

James R. UpchurchChief; Bureau of Security Operations


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850-41 0-4390Cc:Walter A. McNed, SecretaryGeorge Sapp, Deputy Secretary o f Institutions and Re-EntryKathleen Von Hoene, General CounselSusan Stephens, Senior Attorney, General Counsel


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FLORIDADEPARTM ENT ofCORRECTIONS

Equal Opportunig Employer

GovernorCHARLIE CRISTSecretaryWALTER A McNEIL

Blair Stone Road Tallahass ee,FL 32399-2500 http://www.dc.state.fl.us

Osceola County Jail Security AssessmentApril 5-8,2010

During the period of April 5-8, 2010, a security audit was conducted at the Osceola County Jail.This audit focused primarily on the escape prevention components of the security program at thejail in light of recent events leading up to the requested assessment. A team of security consultantsoperating under the direction of James R. Upchurch, Bureau Chief of Security Operations, FloridaDepartment of Corrections conducted the audit. Team members for this audit were CorrectionalServices Consultants Thomas Hester and Joseph Falk.During the course of the evaluation, the team examined the buildings and grounds of the facility.Additionally, the team inspected the perimeter and interviewed officers throughout the facility onboth shifts. The team also interviewed key supervisory and management staff, reviewed operatingprocedures, post orders, and pertinent documentation such as inventories and checkout logs forweapons, security equipment, and sensitive items. Key control and inmate transportationprocedures were also reviewed.The matters discussed in this report are of a sensitive security nature and should be consideredconfidential and excluded fiom public release.PERIMETERObsewation: Several drain grates within the facility have pipes over 10 inches in circumference.There is no supportingdocumentation to show that these drains are inspected daily to ensure theyhave not been tampered with.Recommendation: To prevent inmates from gaining access to drainage pipes that provide accessoutside the secure perimeter, assign each drainage pipe a number for easy identification and createa site map to be utilized daily by staff inspecting them to ensure allof these drain gratings areinspected and that this inspection is documented.Obsewation: There are several storage sheds located within the secure perimeter that createhiding spots and visually impede clear sight lines within the facility.Facility Action: Several of these sheds were removed during the review and others arereportedly scheduled for removal.


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Recommendation:Remove the remaining sheds fiom within the secure perimeter. This will allowfor a better line of sight for perimeter and internal security sta EObsewation: Upon questioning perimeter staff in the assigned roving perimeter vehicle,stationary perimeter posts, and the recreation field tower, it was clear to the auditors that theassigned staff were unsure as to what level of force they are authorized to use in the event of anescape attempt fiom the secure perimeter of the facility.Recommendation: When the security supervisory staff are conducting required security checks,perimeter staff should be questioned as to the appropriate response to an inmate attempting toescape. Any discrepancies or uncertainty should be clarified as to the expected appropriateresponse and use of force as outlined in the perimeter post orders. We also recommend that theinstructive language in the post orders be worded more clearly and specifically; for example:

Where time permits, give a verb al order to stop an dfir e a warning shot before the inmatereaches the perimeter fence.Thefirearm shall not befired at the inmate until he/she has begun to pass over, through,or under the perimeter fence.

Obsewation: There is no electronic perimeter detectiodalert system in place on the facilityperimeter.Recommendation:Install an electronic perimeter detectiodalert system on the facility'sperimeter. There are several options for such a system including fence-mounted sound andvibration sensing detection systems and non-lethal electrified fence systems providing detection,deterrence and an enhanced barrier. Either of these two options would work well for thisapplication and can be combined with an integrated perimeter camera system that can be utilizedto instantlyview intrusion detection events and dispatch perimeter staff as necessary. TheDepartment of Correctionsutilizes both of these systems extensively and can serve as a resourcein this regard. The anticipated cost of either system is dramaticalk less than the estimatereportedly provided to jail facility staff for such a system. Additionally, such a system combinedwith an adequate razor wire enhanced chain link barrier can significantl~educe the recurringcosts associated with multiple manned perimeter posts as is presently in place at the facility. Thesystem's one-time acquisition cost and minimal recurring maintenance cost along with the needfor only one armedlmanned vehicular post will significantly reduce costs while providingenhanced security and escape prevention for the facility.Obsewation: The perimeter fence in zone 9 is too close to the Work Release Center and isapproximately 4 feet shorter than the rest of the perimeter fence allowing an inmate to easily climbon the Work Release Center roof and then jump over the perimeter fence.Facility Action: A meeting was held by facility security managers with a vendor during theperiod of our review to implement the following recommendation.Recommendation: Move the perimeter fence out approximately5 feet and raise it to 12 feet tomatch the rest of the perimeter.Obsewation: Razor wire around the perimeter is not attached to the fence fabric or to a concreteapron at the base of the fence to prevent it fiom being pulled away fiom the fence andforoff theground.


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Recommendation:Attach the razor wire to the fence fabric approximately every foot with stainless steel hog rings and to the other rolls of razor wire to create a solid immoveable stack. Attach the razor wire to the concrete apron and where no apron is present drive rebar into the ground approximately three feet deep at five-foot intervals to which the razor wire can be securely attached. Obsewation: Perimeter staff are armed with a 40-cahier pistol and a can of pepper foam. Recommendation:If it is afkned that lethal weapons may be used to prevent escapes fiom the facility, consider equipping perimeter staff with a 12 gauge, 870-pump shotgun as a primary weapon and the 40-caliber pistol as a secondary weapon. We recommend that the ammunition selected for the shotgun have relatively short range effectiveness due to the close proximity of residential neighborhoods and the Turnpike. Post order language should include a caution that the firearm should not be discharged until the officer is sure of the target and what lies beyond. Obsewation: The access gate for the recreation tower is approximately 60 feet away fiom the tower, which requires the officer to walk with a loaded weapon within the secure perimeter. Recommendation:Seal off the existing gate and install a new gate directly behind the tower with appropriate fencing. This will ensure the inmates do not have the ability to come in contact with the assigned, armed staff member. Obsewation: The recreation tower does not have a fence around to prevent inmates fiom accessing it and gaining access to weapons. Recommendation:Secure this tower with fencing and razor wire to prevent inmates fiom gaining access to the tower or move the recreation tower outside the secure perimeter. Obsewation: Form 1100.01, Daily Fire Safety 1Security 1Sanitation Inspection Checklist, should be completed within the first three hours of each shift per post order # 400.06. There was no documentation to demonstrate that this inspection was completed within the required time fiame. This form is computer generated with no staff signatures required therefore no staff can be held accountable for completing the required inspections. Recommendation:Add the date and time to the FSSO inspection stamp for the logs and print the form out each shift for staff completing the inspection to sign. Obsewation: The fencing attached to the Work Release Center allows inmates to gain access to the roof Recommendation:Remove all fencing that is attached to the Work Release Center or secure the fence with a sufficient pyramided amount of razor wire to prevent inmates fiom accessing the roof. Obsewation:Not all fencing that intersects with the perimeter fence has a sufficient amount of razor wire to prevent inmates fiom climbing the intersecting fence and using it to go over the outer perimeter fence Recommendation:Affix razor wire to the top of all interior cross fencing that intersects with the perimeter fence in a tripodlpyrarnid configuration for at least ten feet prior to the intersection to prevent inmate access.


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Observation: Perimeter lighting does not adequately light the perimeter fence area. The facility does have portable lights (temporary) to help overcome this deficiency. Recommendation: Perimeter lighting should be enhanced to provide clear visibility of the fence line and the interior area between the facility buildings and the fence. In consideration of the close proximity of residential neighborhoods and concerns about "light pollution" in this area, it is recomrnended that directional lighting fixtures be mounted to poles at a height no greater than 15 feet. Although generally desirable, backlighting external to the perimeter fence should be kept to a minimum. When coupled with the other perimeter security enhancements recomrnended in this report, adequate lighting for the areas subsequently covered by this plan should be sufficient. Observation: During the review, it was observed that the height the grass on the facility grounds was relatively high. This would allow an inmate to get within close proximity of the fence without being detected. Facility Action: The grass was mowed during the review. Recommendation: Maintain the grounds to a standard that would allow for a clear view from the roving perimeter post and from within. Observation: The trash compactor located in the kitchen sally port area next to the perimeter fencehas a minimal amount of razor wire affixed for security purposes. Recommendation: Install 12-foot chain link fencing with appropriate razor wire attached to the top to better contain and secure this area. Observation: Utility poles are located next to the perimeter fence. Recommendation: All utility poles that are in close proximity to the perimeter fence need to have razor wire installed in a manner sufficient to prevent climbing. Observation: There is nothing to impede access to the outside of the facility from the administrative building if an inmate were to gain access to the roof Recommendation: Fencing, razor wire, and the previously referenced electronic detection system with integrated cameras should be installed on top ofthe administration building between the booking area and the point where zone 13 intersects with the building by the visitor entrance. This will assist in preventing inmates from gaining access outside the perimeter if they gain access to the roof When a building is located in the perimeter and is therefore part of the containment features of a facility, it should be included in the 360degree continuous perimeter security system. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS:Recommendation: Razor wire should be added to the entire interior roofline of the WorkRelease building to prevent unauthorized roof top access due to the proximity of this building tothe perimeter.Recommendation: We recommend that all interior containmentlcross fencing be assessed as towhether it is needed based on the security purpose it serves. If needed it should be 12" in heightand preferably have poured concrete at its base or alternatively a bottom rail to prevent easyaccess underneath. Twenty-four to thirty inch diameter, reinforced long barbed razor wire shouldbe attached to the top portion of all cross fencing throughout the facility to impede access fromeither side.


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Recommendation: Any cros s fencing intersecting with the perimeter fence o r building where theroof may be accessible fi-om the t op of the fence should have the appropriate type of razor w ireattached on both sides and the top (pyramidltripod) of the fence for at least a ten (10)-foot spanon the intersecting fence. Razor wire should be placed vertically in the intersecting cornerextending towards the ground n ot extend low er than seven (7) feet. The opening at the bottom ofthe razor wire roll will be closed and secured.LOCK AND KEY CONTROLObservation: Staff were observed to have personal sets of keys for the facility. These keysaccessed secure areas such as housing units throughou t the facility. Th e keys are not accoun tedfor daily and are taken home by the staff during off duty hours.Facility Action: Facility administration initiated identification o f all keys and the creation o ffacility key rings for the se staff during the review.Recommendation: Inspect allpersonal keys brought into the facility to ensure they are not keysto the facility. Staff who are in possession o f such keys should be required to surrender them tothe facility. Keys that access the facility should be issued to staff on a daily basis and should bereturned at the end o f the workday in order to acco unt for all keys.Observation: Vehicle keys are stored in the Supp ort Sup ervisors office and were not tag ged o rhung on key hooks in the key cabinet for easy identification. If a set were missing it would beimpossible to do a quick site check to identi@ he missing set.. The re were also loose keys in thecabinet for vehicles.Recommendation: Each key ring should have a chit that identifies the number o f keys and thekey ring number that co rresponds with the hook num ber in the key box for quick identificationand key accountability. Each key ring should be brazed o r secured in a manner to preventunauthorized removal or addition of keys to the key rings.Observation: Keys are not being signed out properly on the key logs. The number of keys on thekey ring are not being docum ented and the key log reflects the area the staff member works asopposed to the s taff member's name who is receiving the keys.Recommendation: Insure that the control room staff complete the key issue log form by enteringthe name o f the individual staff member to whom the keys are being issued. The staff memberreceiving the keys should not fill out this form.Observation: Emergency keys are not sealed in the emergency key cabinet, thus allowing staffthe opportunity to access restricted areas without prior approval and without properlydocumenting the reason for the use o f these keys.Recommendation: Stor e these keys in a secure cabinet with a num bered seal affixed to preventunlimited access to restricted areas. These seals should be checked at the beginning of eac h shiftand notated o n the daily report log.Observation: The dead latch mechanism on rem otely controlled doo r locks in the W ork R eleaseCenter, which prevents someo ne fi-om "carding" the do or open, was not functioning properly onnumerous doo rs in the Work Release Center.


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Recommendation: IdentifL those locks that are not hctioning properly and repair as needed. The locks in the Work Release Center should be evaluated for replacement due to the number of keys that were noted on personal key rings. Observation: There is no system in place to check the emergency keys to ensure the keys and locks kc t ion properly if an emergency was to occur. Recommendation: All emergency keys should be physically checked on all locks on at least a quarterly basis. Observation: Cross fencing gate locks were not security grade padlocks. Recommendation: Padlocks for cross fence gates should be a security grade and should be restricted to a minimum number of necessary key rings authorized by the chief of security. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that a complete key recall be implemented wherein all facility keys are physically inventoried and the results compared to available key purchase documents, previous inventory documents, etc. Depending upon the results of this exercise, it may well be advisable to rekey the facility to get a "f?esh start" on insuring a comprehensive key control process. There were sufficient key accountability concerns evidenced during this audit to just@ this exercise as a priority. COUNTS

Observation: During the course of the review, it was observed that the facility countsdocumented on the Day Report Log did not correspond to the actual number of inmates countedduring the facility head count.Recommendation: The facility's automated intake system should be utilized during counts toaccurately account for all inmates presently housed in the facility. These totals should then betransposed to the Day Report log. All gains and loses should also be notated on the Day Reportlog in order to justifj and verifi the changes in the count.CONFINEMENTAND HIGH RISK INMATESObservation: The cell searches of the high-risk cells are not consistently documented on theHousing Unit log or the Day Report log with the number of staff conducting the search. Thesesearches were also reportedly being completed within approximately 30-minute time periods foreighteen cells. Because, by procedure, inmates have to be restrained prior to being removed fiomtheir cells and considering the actual process and time requirement of conducting a thoroughsearch, the period reported is not reasonably feasible.Recommendation: Complete all the required documentation with the officers and the rank of thestaff members conducting the searches for accountability and insure that searches are thoroughand accurately documented.Observation: The cell doors in FB pod do not have a food flaplcuff port for feeding andhandcuffing inmates housed in these cells. These cells house disciplinary confinement and high-


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risk inmates. Staff has to violate the facility procedure 400.20, High Risk Inmates, by opening thedoor without the inmate properly restrained.Recommendation: Move the inmates that are in these cells to cells that have a food flaplcuff portor modifL the cell doors by adding a food flaplcuff port. This would ensure improved officersafety and compliance with procedure requirements.TOOLS AND SENSITIW ITEMSObservation:There is no current inventory for tools or disposable items, i.e. (hacksaw blades, razor blades). There was also no verification process to account for tools on a daily basis. Recommendation: Fully implement the recently developed tool control procedure that was presented to the audit team. Observation: A forklift was being stored within the kitchen sally port area and not secured or disabled to prevent an inmate fiom utilizing it as an escape tool. Facility Action: The forklift was removed and placed under the awning by the booking area. Recommendation: The forklift should remain parked under the awning by the booking area outside the secure perimeter. Observation: Caustics stored in the warehouse were being monitored correctly. However, caustics stored in other areas throughout the facility were not listed on perpetual inventories to control and account for their use. Recommendation: Review the areas outside of the warehouse that caustics are stored, place these items on inventories, and ensure the proper MSDS information sheets are readily available. Observation: Milk crates, pallets, and bread racks were stacked along side of the building in the kitchen sally port area providing the potential for easy access to the roof. Recommendation: Create a secure area to store these items outside of the secure perimeter and remove them daily. Observation: Telephones located in open, direct supervision D and F Pod officers' stations allow direct access to outside lines thus allowing unnecessary and unauthorized access by staff and inmates alike to these unrestricted lines. Recommendation: Allow unrestricted line access only through a switchboard or implement a code system whereby follow-up review of phone usage can be implemented. Observation: Roof top access ladders were unsecured. Recommendation: All roof top ladders should be covered with expanded metal to prevent access fiom below or climbing up the sides. These should be inspected each shift to ensure that they are secure. ENTERING AND EXITING THE FACILITYObservation: Staff and visitors entering the Facility are not thoroughly searched. When the handheld metal detector alerts on a particular area of an individual, that area is not completely clearedby subsequent pat search. Staff are also not required to remove their shoeshots when a metaldetector alert indicates metal in the area of these objects.


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Facility Action: Procedures were being implemented to better search staff and visitors duringthe review such as outlined in the recommendation below.Recommendation: When the metal detector alerts, a physical pat search of the area will beconducted to identie the object that has caused the alarm. When shoes alert they must beremoved and passed through the x-ray machine to ensure no contraband is present.

Observation: Maintenance staff were observed bringing contractual staff into the facility throughthe kitchen sally port instead of going through the main entrance and being properly searched.Recommendation: Require that all staff enter through the main entrance and are properlyidentified and searched prior to entering the facility. The kitchen sally port should be used fordeliveries only and not for pedestrian traffic in and out of the facility.Observation: Vehicles making deliveries through the kitchen sally port are not being thoroughlysearched prior to entering or exiting the facility. These vehicles were also observed unsecuredwhile inside the kitchen sally port area.Recommendation: Create a procedure describing the proper method for searching vehicles whenentering and exiting the facility. This should also include the requirement that vehicles be lockedwhen they are inside the secure perimeter and secured with a steering wheel locking device if lefiunattended for any length of time. In addition, whenever the sally port gate is opened rovingperimeter staff should be present in the area for additional support.ARSENALObservation: Security equipment stored in the mini-arsenal within the secure perimeter was notproperly accounted for on form 400.004, Pool Weapon 1Gear 1Ammunition Inventory Sheet,

The form indicated there should be 675 40-caliber rounds when there were actually 685rounds present.The form indicated there should have been 45 40-caliber magazines when there wereactually 39 present.

The watch commander completes this form on each shfi.Recommendation: Ensure that this form is being completed properly. Consider moving the miniarsenal out of the secure perimeter and utilize the arsenal in the administration building.Observation:Ammunition stored in the mini arsenal and the arsenal located in the administrationbuilding had incorrect inventories.

40-caliier duty ammunition inventory indicated 6200 rounds when there were actually6199 rounds on hand.40-caliier training inventory indicated 4750 rounds when there were actually 4700 roundson hand..223-caliier rounds inventory indicated 500 rounds when there were actually 550 roundson hand.

Recommendation: Place all bulk ammunition in one storage area and maintain the inventory inthe same physical location as the ammunition.STAFF SAFETY


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Observation: The view windows in the B pod doors accessing the inmate housing areas were covered and did not allow staff the ability to see into the pods when entering. Recommendation: Clean the paintlfilm fiom the windows to allow staff to see into the pod when entering in the event of an emergency.

Documents

Osceola County Jail Report