Ortega - Cuban Merchants, Slave Trade Knowledge and the Atlantic World, 1790s-1820s

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Ortega) Jose? G u a d a I u p e

Cuban

Merchants)

Slave

Trade Knowledge)

and the Atlantic

World)

17985 18285

t-

Colonial

Latin American historical review) v. 15 n. 3)) 8 8 ~

p.225-251 _

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Cuban

Merchants

Slave

Trade

Knowledge

and the

Atlantic W

orId

1790s-1820s

JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA

In 1794, Mariano Carbo and his associate Pedro Diago,

newcomers to the Atlantic slave trade, hired Captain Ignacio Pica and a

crew and outfitted a ship, the Nuestra Senora del Carmen with goods

and provisions for a slaving expedition. While sailing in the Caribbean,

Captain Pica found himself under siege by the French corsair

Brutus.

Outgunned, outclassed, and outmaneuvered, Captain Pica and his crew

concluded that resisting the French corsair would be futile and

surrendered to Captain Jean Garican without incident. The French

sailors set sail for Charleston, South Carolina, with their prize, the

Nuestra Senora del Carmen in tow.

As will be seen, the story

o Nuestra Senora del Carmen

does

not end with this encounter. Indeed, the connections and interactions

described above reveal the economic structural hurdles encountered by

Cuban slave merchants in the early 1800s and illustrate the

international and domestic commercial infrastructures established by

these individuals to overcome initial problems o growth related to the

Atlantic slave trade.

These aspects

o

merchant activity in the Atlantic

slave trade, largely ignored by the current historiography o the Cuban

slave trade, become closely linked with the transformation

o

slave

1 While this essay focuses on Cuban slave merchants, their activities were part o

larger social and economic transformations

on

the island. For more information, there

are a number

o

essential works on eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Cuban society

that should be consulted: Franklin

W.

Knight, Slave Society

in

Cuba during the

Nineteenth Century (Madison: University o Wisconsin Press, 1970); Franklin

W.

Knight, Origins o Wealth and the Sugar Revolution in Cuba,

1750-1850,

Hispanic

American Historical Review 57:2

(1977):243;

and Allan J. Kuethe, Cuba 1753-1815:

Crown

Military and

SOCiety

(Knoxville: University o Tennessee Press, 1986). Sherry

Johnson's work fills a huge gap in

the historiography o colonial Cuba. Sherry Johnson,

The Social Transformation

o

Eighteenth-Century Cuba (Gainesville: University Press

o

Florida, 2001), 2-3,

14 15.

Laird W. Bergad has significantly expanded our

knowledge o Caribbean slave societies. Bergad's microanalysis o Matanzas allows

him to gauge the impact that sugar had on technology, ecology, and culture. Laird W.

Bergad, Cuban Rural Society in the Nineteenth Century: The Social and Economic

History

o

Monoculture

in

Matanzas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990),49,

62.


4/29

-

~ ~

~ ~

226

COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER

2006

merchants into merchant bankers

(refaccionistas)

whose presence and

influence became crucial to Cuba's economy.2

Just five days after seizing the Nuestra Senora del Carmen,

Captain Garican and the French crew of the Brutus caught sight of a far

more desirable prize on the horizon, the frigate Dos Hermanos, which

was returning from the African coast laden with 207 slaves and bound

for Havana. Refusing surrender, Captain Archibald Galbrach, a

seasoned English slave trader, briefly eluded the French before being

forced to engage them. No match for the combat-ready crew

of

the

Brutus, the Dos Hermanos was soon rendered inoperative; the French

cannons inflicted catastrophic structural damage, destroyed its food and

water provisions, and fatally wounded one

of

its captives. Ironically, by

capturing the two slaving vessels, the French crew faced a dilemma:

abandon the

Nuestra Senora del Carmen

or forsake the

Dos Hermanos

readily exchangeable and highly lucrative cargo.

3

The entrepreneurial Captain Ignacio Pica offered Captain

Garican a practical solution to his problem: sell the salvaged Dos

Hermanos and its slave cargo to him. Garican agreed and within

twenty-six hours they finalized the transaction in the middle of the

Caribbean Sea. The ships then sailed to Charleston where Captain Pica

exchanged the 207 slaves and battered ship for a note worth 25,000

pesos. Upon his return to the pOli of Havana, Captain Pica discovered

that news of his escapades on the high seas had preceded him. Felipe

Allwood, the financier of the

Dos Hermanos,

had requested an

injunction from the Merchant Tribunal, demanding that Pica return the

207 slaves.

4

2 See note 9.

3 Letter relating to Mariano Carbo and Felipe Alwood regarding the frigate Los Dos

Hermanos and a cargo of slaves guided by Ignacio Pica, [date illegilble] 1798, Archivo

Nacional de Cuba (hereinafter cited

as

ANC), Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 113, no.

6.

Cuban historians agree that the first successful slave voyage from Havana to Africa

took place on 18 September 1798. Manuel Moreno Fraginals, El ingenio: complejo

economico social cubano del azucar (La Hahana: Editorial

de

Ciencias Sociales, 1978),

1 50. For a maritime history of French privateering in Charleston, see Melvin H.

Jackson, Privateers in Charleston, 1793-1796; n Account o a French Palatinate in

South Carolina

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1969).

Errors due in part to phonetic spelling abound in the record. In Spanish court

documents, Captain Jean Garican, a French merchant based in Charleston, is listed as

Jean Gaillard. Jackson,

Privateers in Charleston,

69 71. Spanish merchant tribunals

were charged with reviewing commercial disputes between traders and merchants.

Litigants submitted their disputes to a jury of peers

who

reviewed the merits of each

case; see

Codigo de comercio comentado por una sociedad de abogados

(Barcelona:

Libreria

de

Ramon Pujal, 1857),24-49.


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JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA 227

The Dos Hermanos incident goes beyond the traditional

interpretations o imperial economic and political hegemony in the

Atlantic world. While North Atlantic powers altered the dynamics

o

the slave trade through geopolitical struggles and abolitionist policies

in

the early nineteenth century, it was the sum o individual human

encounters and exchanges that formed this community. Essentially,

Felipe Allwood's financial defeat on the high seas represents the abrupt

decline o British commercial influence in the Cuban slave trade, while

Mariano Carbo's and Pedro Diago's interloping activities

as

backers o

Nuestra Senora del Carmen symbolize the steady and systematic

emergence

o

Cuban participation in a crowded and complex industry

carried out through adaptation.

With notable exceptions, the historiography

o

the Cuban slave

trade emphasizes the larger political manifestations and demographic

transformations o this commerce.

s

Few o these works focus on trade

organization and merchant development. For example, David Murray

primarily reviews British diplomatic and military efforts to suppress the

Cuban slave trade. Moreno Fraginals' classic work on the sugar

industry remarks on various significant social and economic aspects o

the slave trade, but the author's analysis is dispersed throughout three

volumes. David Eltis' exceptional study outlines

an

integrated Atlantic

world by employing quantitative evidence while Spanish imperial

control and political largesse take center stage in Pablo Tomero's text.

Sherry Johnson comments on antagonisms between elite ranks o

slave merchants in the Atlantic slave trade. However, the strength

o

her contribution rests on the discussion o the intra-Caribbean trade

carried out by petty merchants during the early stages o Spanish

liberalization o slave trade legislation.

6

5 This study follows the traditional political periodization o the early Spanish slave

trade, marked by Spanish liberalization in 1789, English abolition in 1807, and Spanish

abolition between 1817 and 1820. While recognizing the interplay between geopolitics

and society, the discourse nonetheless emphasizes the fundamental social and economic

interactions between individuals in the Atlantic world. For the periodization o the

Cuban slave trade, see Jose Luciano Franco, Comercio clandestino de esc/avos (La

Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1996), and Fraginals, El ingenio. Both Corwin

and David Murray discuss in detail the changes brought about

to

the trade by the North

Atlantic powers, including the abolition

o

the slave trade by Great Britain and the

United States, the end

o

the Napoleonic Wars, and the imposition and enforcement o

slave trade treaties upon Spain by the United Kingdom.

6

David

R

Murray,

Odious Commerce: Britain Spain and the Abolition o the Slave

rade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Other essential studies include

Herbert S Klein, The Middle Passage: Comparative Studies in the Atlantic Slave Trade


6/29

228 COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006

Scholars largely place Cuban slave merchants at a distinct

disadvantage vis-it-vis other Atlantic merchants. According to these

interpretations, Cuban slave merchants were either outpaced by North

American domination, dependent on North Americans, or relied

heavily on American and British carriers. ? That English, American,

and Portuguese shippers possessed a competitive advantage n this

specialized field in the early nineteenth century is undeniable.

8

However, the language employed by scholars (domination,

dependency, and reliance) implies a unilateral association that often

overlooks the more nuanced dimensions of economic and social

relationships. The interactions between Cuban and North Atlantic

merchants were not necessarily based on economic domination or

commercial dependency. Indeed, throughout this era, Cuban slave

merchants expanded their knowledge of the slave trade by manipulating

existing North Atlantic commercial and financial networks.

For Cuban slave merchants, the period between the l790s and

1820s

is

characterized by three capitalist productive phases, namely

competition, growth,

and

efficiency. Between 1789 and 1807, Cuban

participation in a highly competitive environment marked by

geopolitical instability resulting from the French Revolution, the

obstruction

of

trade brought about

by

the Napoleonic Wars, and, to a

lesser extent, the British abolitionist movement, yielded lackluster

results

for

a potentially burgeoning domestic industry. However, from

1808 to 1817, Cuban slave merchants expanded their commercial

knowledge, experience, and financial capabilities to continue the

(Princeton: University

of

Princeton Press, 1978); David Eltis,

Economic Growth and

the nd of he Transatlantic Slave Trade

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987);

Pablo Tornero Tinajero, Crecimiento econ6mico y trans ormaciones sociales: esclavos

hacendados y comerciantes en la Cuba colonial 1760-1840

(Madrid: Ministerio de

Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1996); Moreno Fraginals,

El ingenio;

and Franco,

Comercio clandestino. Sherry Johnson's work sheds much needed light on the early

development of the Cuban slave trade. Sheny Johnson, The Rise and Fall of Creole

Participation in the Cuban Slave Trade, 1789-1796,

Cuban Studies

(2000):52-75. For

the transformative effects of warfare and military spending on the Atlantic slave trade,

see Evelyn

P

Jennings, War

as

the 'Forcing House of Change': State Slavery in Late

Eighteenth-Century Cuba,

he William and Mary Quarterly 62:3

(2005):411-40.

7 Johnson, The Rise and Fall of Creole Participation, 52; and Franco, Comercio

ciandestino 89

Eltis' approach is slightly more neutral. Eltis,

Economic Growth 44.

8

Torres Ramirez asserts that despite royal privileges, Spanish commercial efforts

w r hampered by a general lack of organization and the inability to establish direct

trade with western Africa in the eighteenth century. Bibiano Tones Ramirez, La

compafiia gaditana

de

negros

(Sevilla: La Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos,

1973),111-18.


7/29


process

o

growth and development. Despite British enforcement

o

the

slave treaty ending Spanish participation in 1817, by the 1820s, Cuban

slave merchants were fully entrenched in the Atlantic slave trade and

linked their activities

to

the domestic production

o

sugar. While

political shifts looming in the background altered the Atlantic world, it

was

the sum

o

individual human encounters that propelled the

expansion o the Cuban slave trade.

Cuban slave merchants anchored their successes in the Atlantic

world

by

developing vertical integration and by establishing

supplemental commercial services such as shipping and insurance.

Indeed, as a social identifier the term slave merchant is limiting and

misleading, since these individuals performed multiple functions in

Cuban society and the economy; they could have easily been labeled

merchant bankers or landowners hacendados) as well. The term slave

merchant is a misnomer popularized by the British abolitionist

movement, which was 'later adopted by historians. As a result

o

its

longevity and its usefulness in comparative historical articulation, the

terrn will be retained as appropriate for the task at hand.

9

When

describing specific economic functions, however, other labels will be

employed to reflect such distinctions. For example, a well-established

Cuban slave merchant

o

the 1820s could finance slave voyages to

Africa, export sugar to North Atlantic economies, finance sugar mills,

and acquire plantations and urban real estate. Immediately following

the limited successes o Cuban slave merchants in the 1790s, this new

group ascended in the early 1800s and consolidated a clear economic

and social presence in Havana by the early 1820s.

When analyzing the Atlantic slave trade, the paradigm o

peninsular-creole is especially limiting and oftentimes implies a clear

division

o

interests between regional groups. t cannot fully describe

the intricate social and economic relations among individuals in the

9 For the period under study, Cuban slave merchants identified themselves

as

merchants, or

comerciantes,

not as slave merchants or

negreros.

In nineteenth

century Cuba, the term

comerciante

was a generic term applied to any individual

associated with the import-export trade; this included merchants exporting sugar,

importing slaves, and

refaccionistas.

A

refaccionista

provided landowners with

revolving credit accounts and financial services for a mill's yearly operation. The term

mercader

was reserved for retail merchants. For an overview

o

the historiography on

Spanish American merchants,

see

James Lockhart, The Merchants o Early Spanish

America, in f

Things

of

the Indies: Essays Old and New

n

Early Latin American

History

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000),158-82. For linguistic mutations o

the terms mercader and comerciante, see Fred Bronner, Urban Society in Colonial

Spanish America,

Latin American Research Review

21: 1 (1986): 15


8/29


Atlantic setting. In general, then, this work utilizes the term IISpanish

merchant

when discussing the larger commercial interests of

individuals, vis-a-vis other Atlantic traders. This designation is

especially useful when elaborating on commercial activities in the

Atlantic Ocean and the African coast, where the regional origins of

Spanish captains, sailors, and slave factors agents who procured

slaves and advised those interested in the business were often blurred

because

of

the transient nature

of

their occupations. The term

IICuban

merchant

is applied herein to merchants who, regardless of origin, not

only conducted business on the island but also established economic

and social roots in Cuba.

As will be seen, the origin

of

a given merchant within the

Spanish empire had little to

do

with social integration in Cuba. Instead,

t was a combination of economic functions and associations that

defined

an

individual s place in society.

n

1814, the House

of

Inglada

hired Captain Miguel Moran on consignment for a series of voyages to

West Africa. Moran, along with Ignacio Inglada, Gabriel Lombillo, and

Jose Marfa Zequeira, were among the six significant investors. Despite

the fact that all four individuals were close associates and slave

merchants by trade, a clear socioeconomic division existed between

them. Lombillo arrived in Havana from the Spanish province

of

Malaga

in

the early 1800s and in due course acquired the title of Count of the

House of Lombillo. Zequeira was a Catholic priest from a well

established family that had arrived in Cuba in the mid-1600s. Inglada

was a merchant from Barcelona who eventually returned to Spain in

1821 after amassing a fortune. Compared

to

his business partners,

Moran s socioeconomic background was rather ordinary. Arriving in

Cuba

in the early 1800s from Jij6n, Moran married, established

permanent residency in Havana, and purchased a modest home. n spite

of assimilating into Cuban society, his occupation

as

the captain of a

slave ship eclipsed his financial activities and served as his main

identity

for

his close associates. 10

While Moran s commercial dealings were similar if not

identical

to

those of his cohorts, the group did not consider Moran

to

be

one of them. To Inglada, Zequeira, and Lombillo, Moran was an

adventurer, a mere mercenary. When a dispute over profits and

commissions arose, the claims and contentions between the different

members exposed distinct social tensions. For instance, regarding

10 Isidro Inglada against Miguel Monin regarding slave expeditions, 26 February

1821, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, first section, leg. 260, no 1


9/29


Moran's assertions that he was

an

investor in the voyage and not an

employee of the firm, Inglada and his associates acrimoniously

declared the following:

What truly causes indignation

is

that Moran comes to us

wanting more, but it was Inglada who sacrificed his

personal industry and capital. Now he (Moran) is

complaining that he exposed his life to the dangers ofth

seas and the deadly climates of the ports and roads

of

Africa and that

he

struggled and navigated them with the

help of his African assistants? He wants more for such

considerations? Why, because we enjoyed the bosom

of

our families? He received his fee and he got what he

deserved. How can

he

call himself a partner without

actually being one?

While Moran invested matching shares in several voyages,

Inglada, Zequeira, and Lombillo did not regard him

as

a financier or

capitalist like themselves. Yet it

is

apparent that Moran rightfully

considered himself

an

equal investor of the enterprise, stating: "I came

into this enterprise with cash

in

hand, and from the beginning I owned

one-sixth

of

the expedition. But Inglada never respected my interests

and went against my explicit orders." lnglada argued that

Moran "was

not an equal partner because

he

served

as

a tr nsporter and was not

involved in the subsequent sale

of

the cargo." He continued by adding

that Moran simply enjoyed a "few leisurely outings"

in

the Atlantic and

that "he has gained enough income

to

make his family happy." 2 By

emphasizing Moran's commercial activities in West Africa,

downplaying his role on the domestic side of the business, and directly

linking these pursuits with his social standing and income potential in

Havana, the other members of the company delineated clear-cut

socioeconomic boundaries within the group.

In a vigorous Atlantic society like Havana, a merchant could

neutralize the effects

of his

humble beginnings or render his geographic

origins irrelevant by following an established commercial career

Isidro Inglada versus Miguel Moran regarding accounts and slave expeditions, 22

April 1823, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, third section, leg. 261, no. 4, fol. 452. Unless

otherwise indicated, all translations are the author's.

2 Isidro Inglada versus Miguel Moran regarding slave expeditions,

8

December

82 and

4

February 1822, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, first section, leg. 260, no. 1;

emphasis added.


10/29


trajectory-trading slaves, exporting sugar, financing voyages and/or

agricultural estates thus transcending the matter of initial regional

connections, whether in the Iberian Peninsula or Spanish America.

Regardless

of

regional locality, Inglada (peninsular), Lombillo

(peninsular), and Zequeira (creole) all shared a common socioeconomic

identity

by

financing and provisioning slave voyages and linking these

commercial activities with the Cuban part of the trade. However,

notable social nuances between slave merchants established a

discemable hierarchical order. While Moran was also a financier, his

direct link to Africa, where he continued trafficking and physically

handling slaves, reduced his socioeconomic status among other

merchants in Havana.

This particular case also demonstrates some

of

the commercial

variations found within the general designation of slave merchant.

From Inglada's perspective, who sought to elevate his own position in

the company, Moran was a common trader involved in some of the

least attractive aspects

of

the business, such as extended absences

in

the

Atlantic Ocean, constantly facing the perils of the seas, exposure to

extreme environmental elements along with the possibility

of

disease,

and contact with the African continent. Zequeira was an investor who

participated in the Atlantic slave trade on a casual and indirect basis. As

the director of the merchant house, Inglada, like many other merchants,

began his career

as

a slave factor for an affiliated firm before he

branched out independently, reinvested, collected his profits, and then

returned to the Iberian Peninsula. 'Lombillo at first shared several

socioeconomic characteristics with Inglada, such as operating the

business through partnerships, determining the market value of slaves

in Havana, overseeing transactions with planters, and arranging the

terms of payment or credit. But unlike Inglada, who kept his

commercial activities situated within the Havana harbor, Lombillo

expanded even further into the economy and society by vertically

integrating every aspect of the business, establishing roots on the island

and becoming a Cuban merchant. However, completion of this process

often took a generation.

Despite the unbridled enthusiasm of merchants on the island,

transitioning from general maritime commerce into a highly specialized

business occupied by more experienced North Atlantic powers proved

difficult for Cuban merchants. Without a doubt, island merchants not

only lacked practical experience and technical knowledge for

participation in such a complex venture, but also the necessary social

and economic infrastructure in the Atlantic world. As Havana


11/29


merchants soon discovered, entering the Atlantic slave trade was not a

simple matter

o

provisioning a vessel and sailing it to West Africa.

The process involved a number o intricate and interrelated

stages on both sides o the Atlantic in which Cuban merchants were not

competitive during the initial liberalization

o

the slave trade. As will

be

seen, several limitations, including a dearth

o

marketable goods,

trained sailors, and slave factors, vague trading regulations,

underdeveloped commercial contacts in West Africa, and the absence

o Spanish slave factories (discussed below), held back the growth o a

stable trading apparatus for two decades following Spain's 1789 decree

liberalizing the slave trade.

Specifically, the residual effects o centuries-old mercantilist

traditions hampered the initial expansion

o

the Cuban slave trade.

Cuban merchants lacked the necessary trading goods to purchase slaves

in

West Africa due to antiquated commercial networks. While the

Spanish Crown declared free trade in 1778 with much pomp and

circumstance, the concept o free trade was far from the classic

nineteenth-century definition

o

the phrase. Instead, the royal decree

continued

to

safeguard mercantilist principles. While Cadiz merchants

lost their legal stranglehold on trade with the Americas, they

maintained a de

facto monopoly with New Spain. Regulations lacked

the institutional incentives to encourage Spanish merchants to seek

other markets. For the merchants o Cadiz, Havana continued to

represent a commercial backwater o the Spanish empire with limited

market appeal vis-a-vis Mexico.

3

The required commodities for

exchange in West Africa were unavailable in Cuba or were relatively

more expensive than those found in other North Atlantic ports.

Frustrated by the Crown's flawed approach to the liberalization o slave

trade laws, Cuban merchants organized and advocated change.

4

Along

with hacendado groups, Cuban merchants proposed a political and

economic framework based on sugar and slavery that would ultimately

3 For Spanish merchants, New Spain continued to be their most lucrative market

well into the 1800s. Indeed, between 1797 and 1819, Cadiz averaged 77 percent

o

all

Spanish exports

to

the Americas. For the same period, 55.2 percent

o

Cadiz exports

were shipped to New Spain, while the West Indies absorbed a mere 6.5 percent o total

exports. John Fisher, Imperial 'Free Trade' and the Hispanic Economy, 1778-1796,

Journal

o

Latin merican Studies 3:

(1981):22-23, 39, 45; and John R. Fisher,

Commerce and Imperial Decline: Spanish Trade with Spanish America, 1797-1820,

Journal o Latin merican Studies 30:3 (1998):462, 470, 473, 476.

4

For

an

analysis

o

the administrative inconsistencies in Spanish commercial policy

at the tur o the nineteenth century, see Fisher, Commerce and Imperial Decline,

478.


12/29


transform the island. Swayed by active lobbying efforts, the Crown

tacitly recognized the growing commercial potential o its citadel

colony. 5

In the wake

o

Cuban merchant demands and political upheaval

in Saint Domingue, the Crown introduced a number o administrative

incentives designed to stimulate the Cuban sugar economy, and the

liberalization o the slave trade n 1789 formed the cornerstone o such

efforts. 6 Nevertheless, despite the expansive trading concessions

introduced by the Crown in the 1790s, Cuban slave merchants did not

immediately capitalize upon imperial policies. For at least ten years

after the 1789 edict, merchants

o

various nationalities supplied the

island with slaves from readily available secondary markets in Jamaica,

Dominica, New Providence, and Charleston. Even so, the number

o

Havana-based expeditions and imports from these destinations were

relatively inconsequential compared to the combined French, Dutch,

English, and American efforts. Smaller domestic carriers, trading an

assortment o goods and foodstuffs besides slaves, led most o these

expeditions,l?

A high proportion o intra-Caribbean expeditions arriving in

Havana transported fewer than five slaves per voyage. In all likelihood,

these merchants were profiting from newly enacted Spanish trading

provisions granting export tax exemptions on colonial goods shipped to

foreign ports for the purpose o importing slaves into Cuba.

8

American

merchants adopted a similar commercial pattern, selling shipments

o

5 Dale Tomich, The Wealth o Empire: Francisco Arango y Parrefto, Political

Economy, and the Second Slavery, Comparative

Studies

in

Society and History

45:1

(2003):4-28. Arango y Parrefto held that technology and innovation would modernize

Cuba's sugar industrial complex and establish a competitive edge against foreign

producers. Francisco de Arango y Parrefto, Discurso sobre la agricultl.lra de la Habana

y medios para fomentaria, in Obras de D

Francisco

de

Arango

y

Parreno

(La

Habana: Direcci6n de

Cultura, Ministerio

de

Edl.lcaci6n, 1952), 1:137-38.

6 Albeit with minor restrictions, the slave trade was now open to all foreigners and

Spaniards alike, thus eliminating a long tradition o granting monopolies to a few firms.

By

expanding the docking rights in Havana's harbor for foreign vessels from eight to

forty days, the Spanish Crown enabled merchants to fully negotiate fair market prices

for

their slaves while potentially reducing the number o illicit sales on the island. In

tum, Crown concessions

to

Spanish merchants authorized the exportation o any

commodities deemed necessary for the successful completion

o

African expeditions.

Royal Decree regarding the sale o l.Illseasoned slaves, 2 April 1804, ANC, Real

Consulado, leg. 74, no. 2836.

7 Johnson, The Rise and Fall o Creole Participation, 55.

8

James Ferguson King, Evolution o the Free Trade Principle in Spanish Colonial

Administration, The Hispanic

merican Historical Review

22: I (1942):54-55.


13/29


flour in Havana with four or five slaves imported from the nearby

Dutch islands to circumvent the Spanish ban on direct trade with its

colonies. 9 The cargoes o the petty Cuban slave merchants were

similarly mundane, consisting

o

foodstuffs from New England and St

Agustine, and lumber from New Orleans.

20

More than a decade after

the liberalization o the slave trade, Cuban merchants were failing to

meet domestic demand

for

slaves on the island, prompting individuals

newly entrenched in this industry to assess their own shortcomings and

institute methods to address them.

A relative newcomer to Havana, Santiago de la Cuesta y

Manzanal represented the second wave o slave merchants who, as a

group, consolidated a domestic commercial apparatus by the 1820s. His

critical treatise

o

1803

outlines the structural difficulties still haunting

Cuban slave merchants in the early nineteenth century. Although

clearly frustrated with royal indifference to long-standing demands by

Spaniards in Cuba for the liberalization

o

the slave trade, Cuesta y

Manzanal stopped ShOli o blaming the Crown for the general lack

o

domestic experience in transatlantic commercial ventures. According to

Cuesta y Manzanal, Spanish political indifference to merchant

demands, combined with foreign monopolies, impeded the

development

o

a Havana-based slave trading system? Moreover, new

royal regulations establishing quotas for Spanish sailors aboard Cuban

slaving vessels actually produced unintended consequences. By

discouraging Cuban merchants from exclusively hiring foreign

nationals, the decrees reduced the free exchange

o

commercial

information and thereby diminished the overall growth

o

the industry.

Yet several Cuban slave merchants circumvented imperial legislation.

Regardless

o

royal regulations, individuals such

as

Cuesta y Manzanal

maintained close ties with British and American slave traders.

22

19 Linda K Salvucci, "Atlantic Intersections: Early American Commerce and the

Rise o the West Indies (Cuba)," Business History Review 79:4 (2005):803; and

Murray, Odious Commerce 14

20 Jolmson, "The Rise and Fall

o

Creole Participation," 57.

2 Observations made by Cuesta Manzanal and Company regarding the slave trade,

23

November 1803, ANC, Real Consulado, leg. 74, no. 2836. Seeking a dynamic

Spanish Royal commercial policy, Francisco Arango y Parrefio and the Havana-based

Royal Consulate actively sought the perspectives

o

Havana slave merchants to bolster

their demands for an expansion o slave trade. Franco, Comercio clandestino 92-93.

22 Cuesta y Manzanal and his close associates, Francisco Hernandez and Martin

Tarafa, maintained active commercial ties with foreign slave merchants for the

plU1Jose

o trade knowledge acquisition. Observations made by Cuesta Manzanal and Company

regarding the slave trade, 23 November 1803, ANC, Real Consulado, leg. 74, no. 2836;


14/29


15/29


commercial duplication

of

Liverpool merchant houses. Indeed, these

merchants were actively seeking guidance

from

their English

counterparts.

26

The proposed method

of

absorption centered on the

creation

of

Spanish merchant houses in London and Liverpool to

transmit credit and provisions and coordinate direct voyages to Africa

from Cuba. Merchants in Havana proposed the formation of floating

slave factories anchored off the coast to compete with Portuguese,

French, English, and American slave factories in Africa. Each floating

slave factory would consist

of

a principal ship warehousing general

merchandise purchased in England. Spanish slavers would rendezvous

with the primary ship, exchange information on the current state of the

trade, and acquire the necessary goods to trade with African merchants.

As part

of

the floating slave factory complex, smaller and faster ships

would sail to London and Havana, communicate with financiers, and

report on the status

of

their dealings. The entire commercial apparatus

was billed as a floating slave trade school, where the Spanish would

gain valuable experience in the Atlantic slave trade.

27

Throughout most

of

the 1810s the social and economic ties

established between British and Spanish slave traders in previous

decades continued. Yet the nature of such relations began to change;

Spanish merchants were no longer juni0r partners. Increasingly,

merchants directly financed expeditions to Africa from Cuba.

Additionally, the ships were now regularly staffed with Spanish crews

and officers. However, despite continued growth, companies in Havana

persistently encountered commercial and structural bottlenecks that

impeded their unrestrained progress.

Acquiring technical knowledge for the Atlantic slave trade was

not particularly difficult in itself, and Spanish merchants were no less

capable than their European counterparts in matters

of

commerce.

Nevertheless, experience

of

the pitfalls

of

conducting business on the

African coast, including notable human losses on the high seas, marked

Johnson, The Rise and Fall

of

Creole Participation, 62; and Tomero, Crecimiento

econ6mico transformaciones sociales 54-55.

26

Document relating to the formation

of

a national company for the purpose

of

establishing the slave trade directly with the coast

of

Africa, 12 January 1803, ANC;

Asuntos Polfticos, leg. 106, no

9

The proposal stated: We should precisely gain

knowledge under the auspices

of

the slave trading nations, and by this we

me n

the

English, adding, Both the English and the French have actively maintained the

requisite knowledge and the best establishments in Africa with a great deal

of

p r e ~ o n d e r n c e and without interruption.

2 General prospectus

of

the first operations proposed by the African Company

of

Havana, 15 February 1803, ANC, Asuntos Politicos, leg. 106, no. 9


16/29

238 COLONIAL

LA

TIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006

the second major phase

of

Spanish participation in the Atlantic slave

trade.

The topographical complexities

of

the West African coastline

placed a premium on excellent seamanship. High surfs from December

to April made landings difficult and often dangerous, sometimes

resulting in significant losses, injuries, and death. Avoiding such

hazards required that a vessel seek the safety

of

deeper waters rather

than anchoring near the shore.

28

Nevertheless, at times inexperienced

crews anchored too close to the shore, hoping to facilitate the loading

of

their human cargo. Sometimes such shortcuts came at a high price.

Strong winds and violent waves could batter, shove, and relocate

vessels onto bars or reefs. Despite some losses, y the 1810s Spaniards

had acquired the specialized nautical skills from British and American

crews.

29

Obtaining the practical knowledge for the maintenance of

human health during the voyage

to

the Americas was somewhat of an

elusive task for Spanish and foreign merchants alike in the early

nineteenth century. Typical prerequisites for a successful voyage

included a seasoned crew with prior experience in slave trading, a

doctor with a familiarity

in

caring for captives on long journeys, and a

captain with a general concern for slave nourishment and hygiene. The

development of health regulations and standards for human cargo came

about relatively late in the Atlantic slave trade. With the passage

of

the

Dolben s Act in 1788, British legislators established guidelines that

became the industry s standard. In short, the Dolben s Act emphasized

28

George

E

Brooks,

Yankee

Traders

Old Coasters and African Middlemen; A

History o American Legitimate Trade with West Africa in the Nineteenth Century

(Brookline, Mass.: Boston University Press, 1970),

80

29

Brooks,

Yankee Traders Old Coasters and African Middlemen

80. Poor

seamanship and leadership

on one

Spanish vessel resulted

in

fatal consequences.

Amidst conflicting advice from crew members, Captain Juan Agustin Conill sailed the

polacre San

Francisco de Paula

up the Bight of Biafra, anchoring near the Port of

Calabar. Soon after loading

301

slaves, winds and fierce waves thrashed the vessel,

positioning

it

on top

of

a sandbar. Anchored and failing to employ

its

sails, the

San

Francisco

took the brunt

of

the tumultuous storm. Unable to sail, the vessel capsized

and began its steady descent into the sea. Most of the crew members abandoned the

ship and were rescued by nearby vessels. However, the slaves remained imprisoned for

six hours as the ship continued

to

sink.

All 301

slaves perished. Ranking officers,

including the captain, were of

Spanish origin. The harbor pilot was English. Merchants

based in Cuba had funded the expedition and the ship had originally set sail from

Havana. Juan Agustin Conill, captain of the polacre

San Francisco

de

Paula

regarding

a shipment of slaves, [date illegible] 1817, ANC Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 134, no. 3


17/29


health and hygiene, mandated a fixed ratio

o

five slaves per three tons,

and compelled ship owners to hire trained surgeons.

D

Paralleling the English experience o the previous century,

heavy human losses in the Atlantic characterized the Spanish slave

trade o the early l810s. After several well-publicized maritime

disasters, administrative officials in Havana feared that sea-borne

illnesses would infect the general population. As modem bureaucrats,

Havana officials focused their attention on the general disregard

o

maritime regulations by domestic merchants. Although slave merchants

were not beyond reproach, early Spanish slave trade regulations, unlike

the British codes o 1788, lacked specific guidelines for slave welfare

during the voyage to the Americas. The general maritime codes o the

Royal Regulations

o

the Council

o

Cadiz

o

1791 suggested staffing

all commercial voyages with a surgeon or barber ( bleeder ) when

ferrying passengers. However, most Cuban ships bound for Africa

never met the required surgeon-to-passenger ratio. Ship owners

violated the spirit

i

not the letter o the commercial codes when their

returning vessels, loaded with hundreds o

slaves, lay beyond the reach

o Spanish bureaucrats.

3

Like their British counterparts, merchants and officials in

Havana hypothesized that a direct correlation existed between

excessive slave deaths and the availability

o

on-board surgeons.

Following a disproportionate number

o

seemingly preventable deaths

o both slaves and crew members on the frigates Dos Amigos

Consejero Brillante Rosa

and

Amistad

in the early 1810s, the Havana

municipal council established an investigative committee led by Tomas

Romay, the director o Surgery and Medicine.

32

.

Dr. Romay's medical report contrasted modemity and

barbarity, juxtaposing advancements in law and logic with the

30 The effectiveness

o

mandating surgeons on slave ships is questioned by Richard

H. Steckel and Richard A. Jensen, New Evidence on the Causes o Slave and Crew

Mortality in the Atlantic Slave Trade, The Journal

o

Economic HistOlY 46:1 (1986):

57 -77. In discussing the cubic displacement o maritime vessels, the terms ton and

tonnage are often employed. Tonnage refers to either the size

o

the vessel or the

amount

o

the ship's cargo. Timoteo Q'Scanlan, Diccionario maritimo espanol (Madrid:

ImRrenta Real, 1831), 526-28.

1

Document related to the health and well-being

o

slaves crossing from the coast

o

Africa to Havana, 9 July 1811, ANC, Junta de Fomento, expo 752, leg. 150, no. 7409,

fols.5-8.

32 Document related to the health and well-being

o

slaves crossing from the coast

o

Africa to Havana, 1 April 1811 ~ U d 17 July 1811, ANC, Junta de Fomento,

expo

752,

leg. 150 no. 7409, fo1s. 1-2.


18/29

240 COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUl\1MER 2006

immorality, greed, and ignorance

o

Cuban slave merchants. Dr.

Romay chastised two ship owners in particular for their tight-fisted

approach

to

an already depraved business by declaring, As a result o

a complete disregard o stated regulations, or perhaps because o the

miserly economy and stinginess o two individuals, 192 have

perished. ,33

t

seemed incomprehensible to Dr. Romay that slave

merchants could not grasp the logic

o

spending 1,000 pesos for a

surgeon's salary i the outlay would have been recovered by saving

three slaves. To emphasize his position Dr. Romay added the following

to his harangue:

Argiielles and Alcocer participate

in

an unjust, depraved,

and barbarous commerce. Is the agricultural

development

o

the island and the prosperity

o

a few

individuals preferable to the life o even one

man?34

While Romay's tone certainly echoed the British abolitionist rhetoric o

the era, it did not actually call for a cessation o the slave trade. In fact,

Romay

was

an ardent supporter

o

the purported civilizing aspects o

slavery. Although Romay may have sympathized with the wretched

state o slaves during their voyage to the Americas and the manner in

which Africans were ripped from their homes and entombed in the

abyss of the sea, he nonetheless displayed the typical European

condescension toward African culture. For Dr. Romay, Africans

wander

in

the jungle, without a home, without laws and without

religion. Nevertheless,' Dr. Romay believed that the moment they

entered a slave ship Africans became royal vassals, subject to Spanish

legal protection and the benefit o religion. ,35

Romay's mission

led

him to Captain Jose Pereira Sira o the

Portuguese brigantine Buen Amigo which had docked in Havana

before saj1jng to Pernambuco. The 130-ton Buen Amigo sailed from

Africa with 319 slaves on a 34-day voyage, losing one captive. The

33

Document

related to the health and

well-being

of slaves crossing

from

the coast of

Africa

to Havana,

12

July

1811,

ANC, Junta

de Fomento, expo

752, leg. 150,

no.

7409,

fo .

5.

34

Document

related to the health

and

well-being

of slaves crossing from the coast of

Africa

to Havana,

12

July

1811,

ANC, Junta

de Fomento,

expo 752, leg. 150, no. 7409,

fo . 5.

35 Document related to the

health

and

well-being

of slaves crossing from the

coast

of

Africa to Havana,

12 July

1811, ANC, Junta

de Fomento, expo

752, leg.

150,

no. 7409,

fol.

5.


19/29

JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA

241

vessel conspicuously lacked a surgeon but nevertheless managed a

survival rate far superior to similar Spanish ships o

the

time. When

queried about his success, Captain Sira responded that the key

to

his

high survival rates was his fair and moral treatment o slaves.

Apparently, Captain Sira adopted measures for their relative comfort

below deck and permitted the slaves to regularly walk the deck and

breathe the pure air. Sira added that he kept l l treatment and terror

to a minimum. However, Sira's most important recommendations

concerned the quantity and quality

o

food and the abundant supply

o

drinking water administered to slaves during their

captivity.36

Based on empirical investigations, Romay's conclusions

emphasized the general neglect and poor treatment slaves received

from Spanish crews during their voyage to Cuba. Romay especially

believed that tight packing was economically inefficient because it

resulted in high death rates. For example, the

Amistad

which lost 545

o its 733 captives at sea, exceeded the recommended tonnage

requirements outlined by the British regulations

o

1788. The doctor

hypothesized that because the vessel left the African coast during the

rainy season, the weather generated squalid living and foul breathing

conditions, resulting in respiratory problems for all onboard. Romay

discounted the idea that providing slaves with ample provisions would

have reduced the number o deaths. Romay's conclusions, however,

contradict the extensive historiography on the topic of tight packing,

which does not find any correlation between overloading and death

rates.

7

Regardless

o

the validity

o

its conclusions, Romay's

committee and the investigative apparatus it employed point to a

discemable exchange

o

slave trade knowledge among Atlantic

merchants. Overall, the information that the committee gathered and

presented sought to improve the efficiency o this rapidly expanding

but loosely regulated Spanish

industry.38

36 Document related to the health and well-being o slaves crossing from the coast

o

Africa to Havana,

12

July 1811, ANC, Junta de Fomento, expo 752, leg. 150 no. 7409,

fo1. 5. Smith argues that as African intermediaries, Portuguese merchants played a vital

role

in

the Spanish Atlantic slave trade. Smith's second assertion, that the Portuguese

financed slave voyages to Cuba, is not as convincing. Gervase Clarence-Smith, The

Portuguese Contribution to the Cuban Slave and Coolie Trades in the Nineteenth

Century, Slavery

nd

Abolition

5:

I (1984):24-33.

7

The

Middle Passage by Herbert Klein is still the most authoritative account on

matters

o

life and death on the high seas.

38

The report was submitted to the Royal Consulate, a commercial committee

occupied by Spanish merchants and planters. For an overview on the importance o

Spanish Royal Consulates, see Robert Smith,

The

Spanish Guild Merchant: A History


20/29

4

COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006

Indeed, Romay's findings provide clues that may be relevant to

the excessive death rates on the

Consejero

and the

Brillante Rosa.

nUke their Portuguese counterpart, the Buen Amigo the length of the

voyages of both Spanish frigates surpassed that

of

the Portuguese

vessel by twenty to thirty days. Scholars have indicated that death rates

among slave ships varied between points of embarkation, suggesting

that epidemics played a relatively small role and that food and,

specifically, water supplies were

far

more important considerations.

The

daily ration of a pint

of

water for slaves proved to be physically

debilitating. Inadequate water supplies and the Spanish approach to

slave purchases in Africa may have been the primary causes

of

high

death rates on Cuban vessels.

39

Throughout the

181Os,

Spaniards lacked national slave

factories in AfHca; thus, captains were compelled to sail along the coast

and purchase slaves on a piecemeal basis. This commercial reality

inadvertently extended the duration

of

the voyage. Additionally, as

captains sailed the coast to complete their cargo, previous slave

purchases were kept below deck, where temperatures reached up

to 13

degrees, increasing perspiration and dehydration. Such commercial

procedures compromised foodstuffs and water supplies, consequently

challenging the immune systems of slaves and crew members alike.

Additionally, the necessity of avoiding the hurricane season

in

the

Caribbean (between July and September) compelled Spanish

expeditions to sail for the African coast between November and May,

the

hottest months in Africa.

o

Thus, the provision

of

foodstuffs and

water and the coordination of departure and travel times to and from

West Africa proved to be causal factors in human mortality.

The height of the African wet season may also have exposed

trading ventures to unnecessary economic risks. One particular incident

in

1815 illustrates how poor planning and inexperience hampered a

Cuban expedition to West Africa, which ultimately resulted in

o

he

Consulado

1250-1700

(Durham: Duke University Press, 1940). Peter Lampros

argues that planters in Havana controlled the Royal Consulate during the early

nineteenth century. Peter Lampros, Merchant-Planter Cooperation and Conflict: The

Havana

Consulado, 1794-1832 (Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1980),

19.

39 Kenneth F. Kiple and Brian

T.

Higgins, Mortality Caused by Dehydration During

the

Middle Passage,

Social Science History

13:4 (1989):422.

40

David Eltis, Mortality and Voyage Length in the Middle Passage: New Evidence

from

the Nineteenth Century,

The Journal

of

Economic History

44:2 (1984):301-08;

James

C. Riley, Mortality on Long-Distance Voyages

in

the Eighteenth Century,

The

ournal of

Economic History

41:3

1981

):651-56; and Kiple and Higgins, Mortality

Caused by Dehydration During the Middle Passage, 424.


21/29


contagion. Primarily financed by Isidro Inglada, the Spanish schooner

Restauradora

an-ived in Port Bonny in the middle o the African wet

season. This season, approximately between June and October

depending on the coast, presented a number o commercial and

practical problems that increased the likelihood o illness among the

crew and slave cargo. Due to impassable roads, the number o slaves

available for purchase in Africa decreased during the rainy season,

which, in effect, extended the duration

o

slaving expeditions.

41

The administrative investigation o the

Restaurada

illustrates

these points. Pounded by ton-ential rains, Captain Santiago Valdez

failed to meet his consignment obligations. Compounding matters, the

crew and the slave cargo became seriously ll soon after setting sail. n

onboard epidemic resulted in the deaths

o

fifty-two slaves, the captain,

and

the

boatswain. A lack o provisions and medical assistanoe further

debilitated the health o everyone onboard. The general disan-ay proved

to be so

severe that a British naval crew who boarded the Spanish

vessel abandoned efforts

to

capture the prize, allowing the

Restaurada

to

sail for Havana unimpeded. However, the ship never reached

Havana; instead, it lumbered into Santiago de Cuba. Suffering from

serious bouts o fever and dysentery, the remaining slaves were sold at

a discount to slave traders dealing

in

unhealthy slaves.

42

The consequences o not having a network

o

Spanish slave

factories

on

the African coast became especially apparent for merchants

from the mid- to late-l 8 IOs During this period, Spanish captains

reported significant slave shortages in Africa, a fact that forced them to

alter their purchasing patterns. Instead o purchasing one or two large

contingents o Africans, Spanish merchants now had

to

acquire them in

41

Isidro Inglada against Miguel Moran regarding slave expeditions, 1 March 1819,

ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, first section,

leg

260, no

1;

Brooks,

Yankee Traders 9;

and Kiple and Higgins, Mortality Caused by Dehydration, 425. B.K. Drake does not

find a correlation between seasonality

o

departure and climatic considerations with

Liverpool-based slave voyages. Utilizing four separate analyses

o

voyages from

Liverpool to Africa in the years 1791-1794, 1798, 1799, and 1804-1807, Drake

demonstrates that between 48-60 percent

o

all voyages left during the defined wet

season, implying that the season

o

departure played a minimal role in the planning

o

Liverpool slave expeditions. Drake, The Liverpool-African Voyage, 130-32.

42 Francisco de Paula Moreno de Mora substantiating the death o 52 slaves on the

schooner

Restauradora

originating from the coast

o

Africa,

21

February 1819, ANC,

Tribunal de Comercio,

leg

287,

no

4 For a description

o

the effects

o

dysentery on

slaves during the Middle Passage and a discussion

o

the varieties

o

this ailment, see

R B Sheridan, The Guinea Surgeons on the Middle Passage: The Provision

o

Medical Services in the British Slave Trade,

The International Journal

o

African

Historical Studies

14:4 (1981):3-4.


22/29

244 COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORlCAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006

groups

o

less than ten. Sailing the entire coast to purchase slaves

gradually was not uncommon, but such an inefficient method prompted

noticeable shipping delays 43 Par example, the brigantines Anti/ope and.

Noticioso traveled the African coast for six months, each purchasing

approximately two hundred slaves. Captain Moran counted thirty-three

major vessels waiting for slaves in the Rio Pongo during this time.

On these new commercial circumstances, Moran remarked: I am

convinced that this voyage will be exceedingly long and take no

comfort in saying that the [slave] cargo has reached its upper limit.

Moran purchased a total o sixty-one slaves in just over a three-month

period. His previous five expeditions for the House

o

Inglada averaged

552 slaves per voyage. As supplies

o

slaves fluctuated on the African

coast in the late 1810s, slave factors proved to be highly valuable

contacts.

44

Another facet influencing the growth

o

any Cuban firm was its

degree o association with foreign intermediaries on the African

continent.

45

While access to national slave factories may have increased

the profitability

o

the Spanish slave trade in the long run, merchants

adapted

to

logistical and spatial shortcomings o the 1810s by dealing

with foreign slave factors directly. In 1816, for example, Juan, Antonio

and Jose O'Parrill, descendants

o

Ricardo O'Farrill y O'Daly,

an

eighteenth-century slave merchant, formed a company with Jacob

Faber, an American, and a Mr. Goss, an Englishman, for the purpose o

directly importing African slaves to Havana.

46

Both Faber and Goss

4 Ramon de Bustillo and Mariam de Mendive accrediting insurance losses as a result

o ship seizures,

23

October 1815,23 May 1816, and

23

April 1818, ANC, Tribunal de

Comercio, leg. 32, no

10

44 Isidro Inglada against Miguel Moran regarding slave expeditions, I March 1819

and 8 November 1821, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, first section, leg. 260, no. 1

45 Joan Fayer, African Interpreters in the Atlantic Slave Trade, Anthropological

Linguistics 45:3 (2003):284, 286, 288; and Paul E Lovejoy and David Richardson,

Trust, Pawnship, and Atlantic History: The Institutional Foundations

o

the Old

Calabar Slave Trade, The American Historical Review 104:2 (1999):334-36.

46 For a genealogical history o the O'Farrill clan in Cuba, see Francisco Xavier de

Santa Cruz y Mallen, conde de San Juan de Jaruco, Historia defamilias cubanas (La

Habana: Editorial Hercules, 1942), 3:334-49. Ricardo O'Farrill's involvement in the

illicit slave trade is often celebrated by Cuban historians but details o his career and

contributions are few. Jose Luciano Franco, Comercio clandestino 22. For statistics on

Havana slave imports in the eighteenth century, see Colin A Palmer, Human Cargoes:

The British Slave Trade to Spanish America 1700-1739

(Chicago: University o

Illinois Press, 1981), 104-06.

p


23/29


were seasoned traders with well-established social and economic ties to

African slave traders at Gallinas River, Sierra Leone.

47

Faber and Goss owned slave factories in Rio Pongo, near

Guinea, and maintained active personal relationships with two local

African leaders, Charles and William Gomez, sons of a Portuguese

slave trader. Biracial and multi-cultural, both Charles and William were

educated in England and were fluent in three languages, in many ways

following the classic career pattern of African intermediaries. Faber

and Goss benefited handsomely from socio-political unrest in western

Africa and transmitted their good fortune to their associates in the

Americas.

48

Commercial networks with African slave factors increased

efficiency and profitabil ity for Cuban firms because direct contact with

foreign merchants brought financiers increased accountability and

detailed market information. Trust was at a premium at this juncture

because the opportunity for embezzlement was relatively high. Indeed,

the O'Farrills quickly discovered the penalties of dealing with unproven

factors on the African coast.

Despite providing Faber with 34,082 pesos worth of

merchandise to exchange for slaves, the enterprise failed to yield steady

returns for the O'Farrills. Initially, the thirty- to ninety-day shipping

delays engendered concern among the O'Farrills, but their anxieties

were mollified as slaves started trickling into Havana. However, as the

two-year association with Faber matured, the O'Farrills' earlier

apprehensions were validated. The 01Farrills discovered that Faber h d

sold their slave shipments to other traders. Based on an investigation

of

the company's financial records, the Havana Merchant Tribunal

concluded that Faber embezzled well over 100,000 pesos and 108

slaves.

49

The fact that the incident illustrates the failure of a Cuban firm

in the Atlantic slave trade is incidental. More importantly, this episode

exemplifies that as Cubans increasingly financed direct voyages to

47 Jacobo Faber and Martin Zavala regarding the founding

of

a slave factory (est.

1816), [date illegible] 1827, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 467,

no

3.

48

George Howland, Captain George Howland's Voyage to West Africa, in

New

England Merchants

in

Africa: A History hrough Documents 1802

to 1865, ed.

Norman

R

Bennett and George E Brooks (Brookline, Mass.: Boston University Press,

1965),87.

49

Jacobo Faber and Martin Zavala regarding the founding

of

a slave factory (est.

1816), [date illegible] 1827, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 467, no. 3; Jacobo Faber

and Martin Zavala regarding accounts and insolvency of the former, ANC, Tribunal de

Comercio, leg. 166, no. 9, fols. 1-3; and Jacobo Faber and Martin Zavala

as

partners

of

a firm involved in the slave trade, ANC, Reales Cedulas y Ordenes, leg. 83, no. 45, fol.

1


24/29


Africa, the commercial and social ties between merchants on both sides

o the Atlantic expanded as well.

Despite economic bottlenecks in the 18l0s, Havana slave

merchants did manage to master many o the commercial techniques

that made their Liverpool counterparts so successful in the Atlantic

world during the eighteenth century. While smaller slave merchants

continued investing

in

slaving expeditions, individuals or firms such as

Cuesta Manzanal y Hermano, the O'Farrills, the Lombillos, Joaquin

G6mez, and Pablo Sarna occupied extensive segments o the Cuban

slave trade by integrating other related commercial enterprises. In

essence, these individuals represented the highest tier o Cuban

merchants. Although still directly involved in the slave trade late in

their lives, they nevertheless reached a level in their careers where it

was no longer necessary

to

deal personally with slaves. At this juncture,

these merchants served

as

administrators or directors who facilitated

and financed almost every aspect

o

the Atlantic sugar commercial

complex. As directors o merchant houses, they offered a multitude o

services which were directly or indirectly related to the slave trade,

including purchasing vessels, provisioning ships, paying customs

officials, exporting sugar, leasing royal slave barracks, providing credit

for domestic slave purchases, and financing sugar mills 50

The Spanish Commercial Codes referred to these individuals as

ship owners

or

provisions merchants

armadores);

however, such titles

were not commonly used through the 1820s. People serving multiple

economic and social functions still referred to themselves generically as

merchants. While ship owning among larger merchants was not

uncommon, ownership was incidental

to

the aforementioned interests

and activities. Strategies

o

vertical integration on the Atlantic side o

the business were not unusual, but they involved providing services

that supplemented shipping cargo such

as

ship brokering, consignment,

and stevedoring. The merchant in charge, or the merchant house he

directed, was responsible for hiring a captain and crew, a doctor, and

interpreters, as well as advancing their salaries. Still, it was not

uncommon for a merchant house to hire a captain and his ship on a

consignment basis. Doing so insulated the company from additional

costs and risks, such

as

slave shortages

on

the African coast and the

50

Antonio Bocalandro requesting that Joaquin Gomez sunender accounting books

relating to Bocalandro's sugar mill, 29 August 1824, 2 September 1824, 4 September

1824, 6 September 1824, 25 November 1824, and 2 December 1824, ANC,

Escribanias, Ponton, leg. 143, no. 7

p


25/29


growing threat

o

capture and condemnation by the British Navy after

1817.

51

Certainly, the notoriety that larger slave merchants achieved

late

in

their careers implies a highly specialized field; however, the

slave trade remained interconnected with other related commercial

activities such as buying and selling sugar and insuring African

expeditions.

Incorporated in 1795, the Maritime Insurance Company o Havana

(MICH) was part

o

a burgeoning Cuban commercial and financial

infrastructure utilized by merchants to gradually consolidate the sugar

and

slave industries by the 1820s.

52

The company's charter, like other

European insurance firms o the period, indemnified against the usual

perils o the seas including fire, thieves, and pirates, as well as seizures

and restraints from friends and enemies. Typical coverage included the

total loss

o

the vessel, goods, freight, and current market value o

slaves.

53

Bolstering its business portfolio beyond the port o Havana,

the

company dispatched agents to several Spanish ports including

Cadiz, Barcelona, Santander, Coruna, Tenerife, Veracruz, New

Orleans, Cartagena, and Buenos Aires.

54

51

One o the main points

o

contention between Isidro Inglada and Miguel Moran

was

determining whether the latter was

an

equal partner in the finn or whether the

former hired him on

a consignment basis, The outcome o the decision determined the

monetary value each individual would collect from the slaving expedition. Isidro

Inglada against Miguel Moran regarding slave expeditions,

30

October 1821 and 8

November 1821, ANC, Tribunal

de

Comercio, first section, leg. 260, no.

1.

52

Turnbull notes that while initially conceived by Cuban slave merchants as a

parallel commercial service, MICH eventually diversified its portfolio. David Turnbull,

Travels in the

West

Cuba: With Notices

o

Porto Rico and the Slave Trade (London:

Printed for Longman, Onne, Brown, Green,

and

Longmans, 1840),

141.

For MICH

losses to the British abolitionist campaign, see Ramon de Bustillo and Mariam de

Mendive accrediting insurance losses as a result o ship seizures, 23 October 1815, 24

October 1815,3 February 1816,5 March 1816, and

23

April 1818 ANC, Tribunal de

Comercio, leg. 32, no. 10.

53 A,D.M. Forte, Marine Insurance

and

Risk Distribution in Scotland before 1800,

Law and History Review 5:2 (1987):393-412; Solomon Huebner, The Development

and Present Status

o

Marine Insurance in the United States,

Annals

o

the American

Academy

o

Political and Social Science

26 (1905):241-72; and John G. Clark, Marine

Insurance in Eighteenth-Century La Rochelle, French Historical Studies 10:4

(1978):572-98. For Cuban examples

o

qualification and justification

o

anticipated

profits attributed to total losses

o

slave cargo for insurance purposes, see Jaime

Vilardebo y Ferrer substantiating and qualifying losses on a slave expedition to Africa,

15

November 1820, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 513, no.

29;

and Yriarte, Lasa,

and Company ascertaining certain information regarding slave values in 1814, [date

illegible] 1818, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 260, no.

5.

54

Calendario manual y gufa deforasteros de la Isla de Cuba para el ano

de

1795

(Havana: la Imprenta de la Capitanla General, 1795), 69.

i

I

I:

Ii

I,

[i

I :

. ,.

.

I.:i


26/29


In the early 1800s, the primary office and meeting place

of

MICH

was

the home

of

Mariano Carbo, located near the commercial district

of Havana. For Carbo, underwriting voyages formed one of many

commercial functions he

performed in Cuba. In addition to his

underwriting and slaving activities, he owned two

of

the largest sugar

mills in western Cuba.

55

This career pattern was not unlike many of the

other investors in MICH who described themselves as either

hacendados or merchants but at times possessed facets

of

each social

type. The board

of

directors included Joseph Manuel Lopez, Gabriel

Raymundo de Azacarte, Bonifacio Larrifiaga, Bernabe Martinez de

Pinillos, and Pedro Diago; all were prominent members of Cuban

society and were involved in a number

of

sugar commercial activities

such as slave imports, financing plantations, or landowning. Indeed, the

structure and organization of MICH reflects the lack

of

specialization

in Spanish commerce in the early nineteenth century.

56

The list

of

common investors was a veritable who's who of

Cuban society at the tum of the nineteenth century. Aside from the

usual counts and countesses, the individuals represented a cross-section

of the different social groups within the sugar mill complex, including

petty merchants, merchant bankers, established import-export firms,

slave factors, slave merchants, the patrician landed elite, and newly

established peninsulars, such as Cuesta y Manzanal. In essence, MICH

included almost every major type

of

individual in Cuban slave society,

with the obvious exception

of

slaves. While not organized in the classic

corporate structure, MICH provided an important venue for the

collection and dissemination of

information related to shipping and

commerce and served as a vital nexus for social and economic

associations in Cuban slave society.

57

Slave merchants were also part of a larger financial network that

invested heavily in the domestic sugar industry. As slave merchants

gained capital, many became merchant bankers. Merchant bankers

were critical components

in

the development

of

the Cuban sugar

55

Meeting regarding sugar and debts between Mariano Carbo and Multra, Carbonell,

and Company, 9 April

1799 31

May 1799, 14 June 1799, and

15

June 1799, ANC,

Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 116, no 12

56

Compania

de

Seguros

Maritimos

establecida

en

la ciudad

de

la

Havana

en

1795

Jose Marti Cuban National Library; and Jesus Maria Valdaliso, The Rise of Specialist

Firms in Spanish Shipping and Their Strategies of Growth, 1860

to

1930, usiness

History Review 74:2 (2000):267-300.

57 Compania de Seguros Maritimos establecida

en

la Giudad

de

la Havana en 1795

Jose Marti Cuban National Library.


27/29


industry because rapid economic growth outpaced the expansion

of

formal banking institutions.

58

Throughout the first decades of the

nineteenth century, merchant houses based in Havana developed and

maintained financial links with hacendados in rural Cuba. Among the

few members in Cuban society with surplus liquid capital, slave

merchants positioned themselves as the primary creditors

of

sugar

mills. The refacci6n contracts between merchants and hacendados

included financing for almost every aspect

of

the sugar production

process. Simpler agreements consisted of direct loans permitting

hacendados ultimate discretion in the credit's disbursement. Typically,

however, sugar contracts consisted of advances against future crops

including specific stipulations addressing the quantity and quality of

sugar and agreements on final market prices. Far more complex

arrangements included supplying hacendados with agricultural tools,

machinery, clothing, food, and slaves for one or several succeeding

harvests.

59

As

mediators between domestic and world markets, Cuban

merchants acquired the necessary knowledge to exploit the price

fluctuations through sugar mill contracts.

60

The provision of

comprehensive goods and services oftentimes compounded the roles

of

merchant bankers, transforming them into de facto administrators

or

trustees of the sugar mills under contract. While not necessarily

in

charge

of

the day-to-day operations of the sugar mill, their overarching

responsibilities placed merchant bankers in positions of significant

influence over their clients, especially those with smaller and medium

sized sugar mills. By serving as a broker between hacendados

suppliers, and sugar exporters, the merchant banker wielded significant

58 The first Royal Bank of Ferdinand VII was not established in Havana until 1827;

however, its value

as

a public lending institution remains in question. Primarily

discounting promissory notes and issuing bills of exchange, the bank's three-month

credit terms and a low ceiling on loans severely limited its usefulness to hacendados

who required financing for a year

or

more. The harvest season for sugar lasted nine

months and much longer for coffee; thus, a three-month loan was inadequate for

most

planters. Turnbull, Travels

in

the

West

96-98. The Spanish Bank of Havana,

the

Society of Industrial Credit, and the Society of Territorial Cuban Credit were

established in 1854, 1856, and 1857, respectively. Jacobo Pezuela,

Diccionario

geogrijico estadfstico historico de la isla de Cuba

(Madrid: Impr. del Estab. de

Mellado, 1863),3:317-33.

59

Documents relating to the sale of the sugar mill San Jose to Bonifacio Gonzalez

Larrinaga, 7 February 1804, 30 July 1814, 3 October 1814, and

25

September 1834,

ANC, Escribanias, Guerra, leg. 500, no. 6564, doc. no. 6 no. 9.

60 Creditor meetings regarding debts incurred by Nicolas de Menive, July 1824, 4

November 1824, and 16 August 1824, ANC, Escribanias, Daumy, leg. 804, no.

1.


28/29


economic influence over his clients. Ultimately, the manipulation of

credit structures enabled merchant bankers to dispossess landowners

of

their sugar mills.

61

As their careers developed, many slave merchants

followed a pattern

of

becoming merchant bankers and eventually

landowners themselves. The objective among merchants of increasing

their social significance vis-a-vis patrician

hacendados

partially

explains the aforementioned development. However, the merchant

acquisition

of

land also formed part of the initial process

of

vertical

integration

or

for that matter, the result of simple investments

of

I

. 1

6

surp us capIta.

Economic growth driven by rapid expansion in international trade,

particularly in sugar exports, transformed the fortunes of many

individuals on the island. However, since plantation owners, regardless

of the size of their sugar mills, relied on merchant bankers for a steady

influx

of

slaves, goods, services, and financing, the social influence

held by Cuban merchants increased disproportionately. With such

comprehensive roles, slave

merchants -now

turned into merchant

bankers-became the most dynamic social group of the Cuban

economy, rapidly acquiring wealth, privilege, and status.

Within a generation, Cuban slave merchants mastered and

improved the commercial techniques utilized by British and American

slave merchants in the Atlantic world. Slave merchants however, not

only maintained

an

Atlantic perspective but also acted within the

imperial system by investing their slave trade profits domestically.

Cuban slave merchants established a viable and competitive economic

presence on the island. As a result of executing almost every aspect of

the slave trade, including provisioning, insurance, and finance, Cuban

merchants developed a commercial and financial infrastructure in

Havana that propelled the island's economic growth. By and large,

Cuban merchants abandoned mercantilist philosophies and the

commercial monopolies in favor of practical-knowledge exchanges

with their Atlantic counterparts. Indeed, cooperation between Cuban

slave merchants and French privateers, as exemplified in the os

ermanos

incident, was not isolated but rather part of a larger

commercial network that merchants constructed in the 1790s. Lacking

61

Administration

of

the sugar mill San Francisco, 30 June 1832, ANC, Audiencia

de La Habana, leg. 267, no.

11.

62

After Carbo's bankruptcy proceedings, Ramon Hano y Vega purchased the sugar

mill Jestls Nazareno, in the early nineteenth century and his cousin, Joaquin G6mez,

subsequently acquired San Ignacio several years later. Liquidation of the House of

Mira Pie and Company, 4 March 1830,