Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
A multi-facet model of organizational learning
Raanan Lipshitz and Micha PopperUniversity of Haifa
andVictor J. FriedmanRuppin Institute
August , 2000
Send comments to:Dr. Raanan Lipshitz
Department of PsychologyUniversity of HaifaHaifa, Israel, 31905
1
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to map the many facets of organizational
learning into an integrative and parsimonious conceptual framework that can
help researchers and practitioners identify, study, and introduce
organizational learning to organizations. Today many organizations aspire to
be a learning organizations, but the proliferation of this subject both in the
literature and in practice has not necessarily led to greater clarity about what
this actually means. This paper addresses this gap between theory and
practice by providing a working definition of “productive organizational
learning” and then describing the conditions under which organizations are
likely to learn. The model presented draws on scholarly organizational
learning literature, practitioners accounts, and our own experiences as
researchers and practitioners. It argues that learning by organizations, as
distinct from learning in organizations, requires the existence of
organizational learning mechanisms. These mechanisms, which represent the
“structural facet,” are necessary but not sufficient for generating productive
organizational learning. The quality of organizational learning depends on
additional facets of organizational learning, cultural, psychological, policy and
contextual which facilitate, or inhibit, learning. The paper describes these
facets and the relationships between them. It argues that there is no single
path or one best set of arrangements for creating learning organizations.
Rather, the model provides the basis for experimenting with alternative
configurations in order to understand and promote learning in a particular
organization.
2
Several seminal works on organizational learning were skeptical about the
ability of organizations to learn. March and Olsen (1976) asked what
organizations could actually learn in the face of barriers such as superstitious
learning and the ambiguity of history. Argryris and SchÖn (1978) provided an
affirmative answer to the question, “what is an organization that it may
learn?” (p. 8), but devoted most of their work to studying and overcoming
human reasoning and behavioral patterns that limit learning. Over a decade
later, Huber’s (1991) evaluation of the literature still focused on the
“obstacles to organizational learning from experience” (p.95). Reflecting on
the state of the literature itself, Huber (1991) concluded that “the landscape
of research on organizational learning” was “sparsely populated”, that there
was a lack of cumulative and integrative work, that there was little
agreement on what organizational learning is, and that there were few
research-based guidelines for managers wishing to promote it.
More recently, however, Barnett (n.d.) showed that “Although the
definitions of organizational learning are somewhat varied, there is also a
noticeable convergence of key terms and their meanings” (p. 8), and there
seems to be little question that organizations can learn and that learning is
critical for long-term survival:
The companies that are going to be able to become successful, or remain
successful, will be the ones that can learn fast, can assimilate this
learning, and develop new insights…companies are going to have to
3
become much more like universities than they have been in the past.
Companies tended to think that they knew a lot, and therefore tried to be
efficient in doing what they thought they knew. But now it’s a matter of
learning (Michael Porter, quoted in Starkey, 1998, p. 532).
An important turning point in the study of organizational learning
occurred when Senge (1990 a) reframed the issue as the “art and practice of
the learning organization.” Through this reframing, “learning” became a
qualifier for those organizations which have a capacity for learning and for
distinguishing them from organizations with “learning disabilities” (Senge
1990 a). Today it would be hard to find any organization that does not
aspire to be a learning organization and “companies with outstanding
reputations – Shell, Mercedes Benz, Rover, Isvor Fiat – baptize themselves as
‘learning organizations’” (Gerhardi, 1999, p. 103).
One of the problems with this framing is the implication that an
organization either is, or is not, a learning organization. This “either…or”
framing does not provide a good window through which to observe and make
sense of a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon such as organizational
learning. Furthermore, the proliferation of research, practice, and literature
on organizational learning has not necessarily led to a clearer understanding
of what it means to be a learning organization. As with many issues in the
social sciences, the more closely the phenomenon of organizational learning
has been observed and studied, the more complex and ambiguous it has
become. Thus, the very concept of organizational learning remains
(notwithstanding helpful clarifications by Barnett, n.d., and Easterby-Smith,
1997) “as elusive as it is popular” (Roth, 1996, p. 1) and “in essence, the
4
learning organization has become a management Rorschach Test: whatever
one wants to see in the learning organization is seen” (Yeung, Ulrich, Nason
& Von Glinow, 1999, p. 10).
Advocates of organizational learning have tried to create more
comprehensive models of the knowledge and skills necessary for generating
learning practices. For example, Willard (1994) surveyed some 30 books and
articles relevant to promoting organizational learning and came up with a list
of no fewer than 23 required skills and attributes. The problem with this
work, and other works like it, is that they offer complex, but hardly useful,
guides to identifying or developing learning organizations. Many of these
skills and attributes seem to be good overall advice for organizational
development or good management (e.g. Garvin, 1993) rather than aimed
specifically at organizational learning.
The objective of this paper is to map the many facets of organizational
learning in a way that can help researchers and practitioners identify, study,
and build learning organizations. This "map " (Figure 1), which we explicate
in the remainder of this paper, addresses the question, “under what
conditions are organizations more likely to learn productively?” Our map
aspires to be complete enough to accurately capture the factors which
influence organizational learning and parsimonious enough to be easily
grasped and followed. It draws on organizational learning theory and
research, our own findings as researchers and consultants, and quotations
from practitioner accounts of learning by their own organizations. Although
accounts by or about CEO’s and other managers provide useful, concrete
illustrations of the facets, they should be regarded with skepticism and not
5
be taken as valid proofs of effectiveness. Indeed, the map itself is intended
to provide researchers with a framework for formulating hypothesis about
organizational learning and to guide practitioners in experimentation with
promoting it.
------------------------------Insert Figure 1 here
------------------------------The paper begins with a brief discussion of the concept of productive
organizational learning and then describes five “facets” which make up our
model. The structural facet addresses the problem of distinguishing
between learning by organizations and learning in organizations. It describes
the kinds of organizational arrangements necessary for attributing learning to
organizations. The cultural facet specifies normative behaviors that generate
productive learning. The psychological facet specifies psychological states
that determine the extent to which individuals enact these behaviors. The
policy facet specifies how management can facilitate organizational learning.
Finally, the contextual facet specifies features of the organizational or task
environment that promote, or inhibit, organizational learning.
Productive learning
The question of what constitutes “productive” learning is entangled in
thorny conceptual, practical, and ethical questions. Huber (1991, p. 89)
suggested that an organization learns if “the range of its potential behaviors
changes” and if “any of its units acquires knowledge that it recognizes as
potentially useful to the organization.” This definition, however, raises the
question of whether learning requires not only a change in potential, or
insight, but also in actual behavior. Furthermore, in dynamic environments
6
it is difficult to determine at time t1 what will be the usefulness of knowledge
at some future time. Knowledge that seems worthless may eventually prove
critical for the organization’s survival, and lessons that seem worthwhile may
turn out to be the seeds of disaster. Finally, it is questionable whether
organizations that learn to excel in destructive or unethical practices, such as
genocide, manifest productive learning.
Rather than attempt to produce definitive answers to these dilemmas, we
adopt a pragmatic solution by positing two necessary but not sufficient
conditions for productive learning. The first condition is that learning
generate “valid” knowledge; that is, knowledge which has withstood critical
evaluation and is not based on willfully distorted information or unquestioned
interpretations. The second necessary, but not sufficient condition is that
knowledge should lead to action since lessons which are learned, but not
implemented, are of little consequence, regardless of their validity.
Our approach builds on Argyris and SchÖn (1996), who defined learning as
the “the detection and correction of error,” but also includes the discovery
and exploitation of opportunity. This definition, which includes both insight
and action, views learning as a cyclical process involving the evaluation of
past behavior, the discovery of error or opportunity, the invention of new
behaviors, and their implementation. Both errors and opportunities can
relate to an organization’s current perception of its environment, its goals
and standards for performance, and/or its strategies for achieving its goals.
According to our definition, productive learning is a process which (a) is
conscious and systematic, (b) yields valid information, and (c) results in
actions intended to produce new perceptions, goals, and/or behavioral
7
strategies. Thus, productive organizational learning is defined as a subset
subsumed by Barnett’s (n.d., p. 9) overarching definition of organizational
learning as “an experience-based process through which knowledge about
action-outcome relationships develops, is encoded in routines, is embedded
in organizational memory, and changes collective behavior.”
The structural facet of organizational learningThe structural facet addresses the central question of what conceptually
distinguishes learning in organizations from learning by organizations. The
very term “organizational learning” implicitly attributes a human capacity
(i.e. learning) to a non-human identity (i.e. organization). This problem of
anthropomorphism can be illustrated by a comparison between Figure 2-a,
which presents a slight adaptation of a well known model of how individuals
learn from experience (Kolb, 1984), and Figure 2-b, which presents a model
of organizational learning (Shaw & Perkins, 1992).
Except for “dissemination,” which does not fit into the star-shaped
configuration in Figure 2-b, the two figures are virtually identical. Although
individual and organizational learning both involve information processing, it
is not at all clear how organizations perform operations that can be plausibly
attributed to organisms that possess a central nervous system.
Furthermore, the awkward position of “dissemination” in Figure 2-b indicates
that non-trivial features of organizational learning have no analogue in
individual learning, evoking the question of how learning by individual
organizational members becomes “organizational.”
------------------------------Insert Figure 2 here
------------------------------
8
Treating organizations metaphorically, as if they were human beings, is a
helpful heuristic. In the final analysis, however, it cannot provide clear
guidance on how to identify, introduce, or improve organizational learning.
For learning to become organizational, there must be roles, functions, and
procedures that enable organizational members to systematically collect,
analyze, store, disseminate, and use information relevant to their own and
other members’ performance. We propose that in order to learn
organizations must have a non-metaphorical analogue to the central nervous
system. This analogue, which we term “organizational learning mechanisms”
(OLMs), are observable organizational sub-systems in which organization
members interact for the purpose of learning. Put differently, they are
antennas in which individuals can “reflect on behalf of the organization
(Argyris & SchÖn, 1996). The most frequently discussed OLM in the literature
is the after-action or post-project-review (Baird, Henderson, & Watts, 1997;
Carroll, 1995; Di Bella, Nevis, & Gould, 1996; Gulliver, 1987; Lipshitz, Popper,
& Ron, 1999; Popper & Lipshitz, 1998). Other types of mechanisms,
however, can also be found in organizations (Cheney, 1998; Dodgson, 1993;
Lipshitz & Popper, 2000). By relating individual to organizational learning,
OLMs warrant the attribution of a learning capacity to organizations.
Organizational learning mechanisms, which constitute the structural facet
of organizational learning, can be categorized according to two main
features: (1) who detects and corrects error through information processing
and (2) when and where this learning occurs relative to the task system (see
Table 1). An OLM is “integrated” to the extent that organizational members
9
who process information are the same as those who apply this new
knowledge. It is “non-integrated” to the extent that learning is carried out by
different individuals. An OLM is “dual-purpose” to the extent that learning
takes place in conjunction with task performance. It is “designated” to the
extent that task performance and learning are carried out at separate times
and in separate places.
Non-integrated and designated organizational learning mechanisms, such
as strategic planning, auditing, and quality control departments, are quite
common. These functions study aspects of the organizational environmental
or task system and pass that information to other units/roles to be acted
upon. Some organizations, such as Whirlpool, have developed non-
integrated and designated OLMs specifically for the purpose of promoting
organizational learning:
To achieve … the highest standards for information exchange across
divisions and functions, not to mention geographical borders …
[Whirlpool] established several programs that institutionalize
knowledge sharing, with institutionalize being the key word. [One of
the programs] takes place annually, when every Whirlpool business is
assessed by a cross-functional team from other parts of the
organization. During this process, each process documents up to five
of its best practices. If the assessment team agrees that the best
practices have value elsewhere in the organization, a brief description
and contact name are entered into the global Whirlpool database.
Other parts of the organization can match their particular business
needs with the practices that could improve performance most
10
swiftly. Simple guidelines, based on research and experience, are
published to make the transfers successful (Goeser, 1996, p. 28)
------------------------------Insert Table 1 here
------------------------------
Integrated and designated OLMs are exemplified by formal performance
reviews carried out jointly by relevant members of a task system. After
every mission fighter pilots in the Israel Air Force carry out an “post-flight
reviews” during which pilots and commanders jointly debrief the mission,
analyze data on their own and each other’s performance, and draw lessons
for the future (Popper & Lipshitz, 1998). Similarly Microsoft uses project
“postmortems” to improve its operations:
Since the later 1980’s, between half and two thirds of all Microsoft
projects have written postmortem reports and most other projects
have held postmortem discussion sessions. The postmortem
documents are surprisingly candid in their self-criticism, especially
because they are circulated to the highest levels of the company...
Groups generally take three to six months to put a postmortem
document together... The most common format is to discuss what
worked well in the last project, what did not work well, and what the
group should do to improve in the next project...The functional
managers usually prepare an initial draft and then circulate this via e-
mail to the team members, who send in their comments. The authors
collate these and create the final draft, which then goes out to team
members as well as senior executives and directors of product
development, and testing. The functional groups, and sometimes an
11
entire project, will then meet to discuss the postmortem findings.
Some groups...have also gotten into the habit of holding postmortem
meetings every milestone to make midcourse corrections; review
feature lists, and rebalance schedule. (Cusumano &, Selby, 1995, pp.
331-332)
As the Microsoft example shows, an integrated and designated OLM at the
level of the project team may actually function as non-integrated and
designated OLM at the organizational level by providing policy makers with
knowledge about product development processes. Furthermore, the above
quote illustrates how an integrated OLM can evolve towards “dual purpose”
OLM with the “postmortems” occurring during product development rather
than afterwards.
The advantage of integrated OLMs compared to non-integrated OLMs is
that they avoid the barriers between learners and doers, thereby increasing
the likelihood that lessons-learned will be implemented and that
implementation will be closer to original intentions (SchÖn, Drake, & Miller,
1984). The advantages of non-integrated OLMs are that (1) they are
relatively easy to install and operate (when they constitute the principal task
of their operators), and (2) they can be staffed by persons with specialized
expertise. In the final analysis, non-integrated OLMs become truly effective
only when their operators learn to respond to their clients’ needs, even at the
cost of considerable simplification of their tradecraft (Wack, 1985). The
advantage of dual-purpose OLMs is that learning proceeds practically
continuously on-line. This activity, however, is very difficult because it
requires people to “learn” and “do” simultaneously.
12
In his work on “reflection-in-action” SchÖn (1983) demonstrated how
exemplary practitioners seamlessly intertwine action and reflection.
Organizational reflection-in-action requires organizational members to reflect
jointly on practice without significantly interrupting task performance. For
this reason integrated and dual purpose OLMs may be the hardest to observe
and study. Nevertheless, Rayner (1993, pp. 287-289) provided a vivid
description how an integrated dual-purpose OLM emerged during a strike at
Globe Metallurgics:
As the union workers left the plant, about 35 salaried workers and 10
company managers stepped in to take over operation of two of the five
furnaces...I [the General Manager, Sims] was assigned to work on the
maintenance crew, the dirtiest job in the whole plant. I still don’t know
who made the assignments...The strike was a time of great stress but
also a time of great progress. We experimented with everything...A
few weeks after management took over operating the plant, output
actually improved by 20%...We were operating in a very fast,
continuous improvement mode. Everyday people would suggest ways
to improve the operation of the furnaces or the additive process or the
way we transported material around the plant. I kept a pocket
notebook, and if I saw something I’d note it down and discuss it with
the team over coffee or during meal. I filled a notebook every day...As
we made more changes and as we settled in to the routine of running
the plant we didn’t need first-line supervisors. We could produce the
product more effectively if everyone just worked together
13
cooperatively – welders, crane operators, furnace operators, forklift
drivers, stokers, furnace tapers, and taper assistants.
The experience of Global Metallurgic illustrates how organizational members
utilized the natural flows and rhythms of task performance to find time for
processing information. It also suggests that integrated and dual-purpose
OLMs tend to emerge in situations, such as a crisis, in which learning is
clearly essential for survival but there is no slack in the system. Nonaka and
Takeuchi (1995), on the other hand, described companies in which
knowledge-creation occurs all of the time and “everyone in a knowledge-
creating company is a knowledge creator” (p. 151).
Non-integrated and dual-purpose OLMs exist when organizational
members responsible for task performance work closely together with people
whose role is information processing. At the organizational level, this kind of
OLM may be exemplified by the newly emerging role of the “Chief Knowledge
Officer” as an essential organizational function. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995,
p. 128) saw middle managers as “knowledge engineers,” whose role is to
help their subordinates make sense of their experience by turning vast
amounts of vague, ambiguous, and scattered information into useful
knowledge. Program evaluation is a long-standing organizational learning
mechanism in social service, healthcare, and educational organizations.
While “summative” program evaluation serves as means of judging program
outcomes, “formative” evaluation provides information for the on-going
design and implementation of programs (Scriven, 1991). In formative
evaluation social scientists closely collaborate with program administrators
and practitioners in order to help them understand how their programs work
14
and how they can be improved (e.g. Campbell & Russo, 1999; Chen, 1990;
Friedman, 2000; Patton, 1997; SchÖn, et al. 1984).
Organizational learning mechanisms represent a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for productive organizational learning. For example,
Dave Moore, Microsoft's director for development, noted that despite the
proliferation of project postmortems errors kept repeating themselves, a
problem he attributed to insufficient accountability for following up on the
implementation of lessons learned (Cusumano & Selby, 1995). OLMs may
be ineffective because the learning may be ritualistic or limited by
defensiveness, impoverished or distorted information, organizational politics
and other "learning disabilities" (Senge, 1990 a). Argyris (1991, 1993) has
described how talented and well-intentioned professionals systematically
inhibit learning when they experience psychological threat in the process of
reflecting on practice. Thus, a useable model for guiding organizational
learning needs to go beyond the structural element to address those factors,
which are likely to promote or inhibit organizational learning.
Several authors have noted that effective organizational learning requires
a climate or culture that fosters inquiry, openness, and trust (Argyris &
SchÖn, 1978; Beer & Spector, 1993; Davenport, De Long, & Beers, 1998;
Davies & Easterby-Smith, 1984; Di Bella et al., 1996; McGill, Slocum, & Lei,
1993). If structures represent the relatively tangible "hardware" of
organizational learning, culture represents its "software."
The cultural facet of organizational learningThe cultural facet of organizational learning identifies five norms that are
likely to produce valid information and commitment to corrective action:
15
transparency, integrity, issue-orientation, inquiry, and accountability. These
norms are the observed manifestations of a set of shared values that
constitute an organizational culture conducive to productive learning.
Transparency is defined as exposing one’s thoughts and actions to others
in order to receive feedback. Transparency is manifested in the invitation
issued by BP’s CEO John Brown to members at all levels of BP to discuss its
operation, and in the means he adopts to make this possible:
A virtue of [our] organizational structure is that there is a lot of
transparency. Not only can the people within the business unit
understand more clearly what they have to do, but I and the other
senior executives can understand what they are doing. Then we can
have an ongoing dialogue with them and with ourselves about how to
improve performance and build the future (Prokesch, 1997, p. 164).
Integrity is defined as collecting and providing information regardless of
its implications. This means giving others feedback as fully and as accurately
as possible, and being willing to accept full and accurate feedback from
other. Integrity not only implies a willingness to be open about and to
accept one’s errors, it also means encouraging others to provide feedback.
For example, in describing the post-flight review, an F-16 pilot in the Israel
Defense Force said that “the first principle in debriefing yourself and others is
to be able to say honestly ‘here I made an error’ or ‘here you made an
error.’”
Issue-orientation is defined as focusing on the relevance of information to
the issues regardless of the social standing or rank of the recipient or the
16
source. Issue-orientation is a cornerstone of after-action reviews in the
Israeli Air Force flight units. As one full colonel said:
Rank does not count; everybody feels free to comment on the pilot’s
performance. In the debriefing room everyone is equal, irrespective of
‘religion’, ‘race’, ‘sex’, or ‘rank’.
Another full colonel described this norm as follows:
During the after-action review I take criticism like a good boy from a
captain who may debrief me. On some [training] flights I am number
one [mission’s leader], on others I am number four (Popper & Lipshitz,
1998). Our study of post-flight reviews in an F-16 fighter-planes
squadron showed that these statements are not mere stock phrases
(Ron, Lipshitz, & Popper, 2000).
Inquiry is defined as persisting in investigation until full understanding is
achieved. It implies a willingness to accept a degree of uncertainty and to
suspend judgment until a satisfactory understanding is achieved, and is
similar to the value of intellectual curiosity (questioning the status quo),
which Yeung et al. (1999) identify as one of the values of Harley Davidson’s
learning culture, and reluctance to simplify, which Weick, Sutcliffe, and
Ostfeld (1999) discuss in the context of high reliability organizations. Inquiry
is demonstrated in the following description of Pillsbury’s CEO, William
Spoor:[
Spoor is a challenger. He really takes nothing at face value, even after
you’ve worked with him for a long time. I’m as liable as ever to go up to
his office and be really grilled. He’s not doing it to grill me, but to really
penetrate, to see how carefully an idea has been thought through, how
17
ready it is to be hatched – and how strongly I believe in it. He may
oppose me and disguise his reason for opposition, just to see how deeply
I feel about a thing (Quinn, 1988, p. 400).
(Note: We conjecture that Spoor’s habit of disguising his intentions, which
is inconsistent with transparency, tended to generate caution that
hindered his inquiries).
Accountability is defined as assuming responsibility for both learning
and for implementing lessons-learned. Beer and Spector (1993, p. 648)
note the importance of taking responsibility for learning in their discussion
of “learning diagnosis,” an integrated and dedicated OLM that supports
continuous improvement:
A second imperative to support ongoing learning diagnosis is that
organizations must hold managers accountable for engaging in the
process if that process is to become an ongoing, institutionalized part
of the organization’s life. Such accountability should occur when a
significant part of a manager’s performance evaluation is based on
ability and willingness to undertake diagnosis within her or his unit and
among peers and subordinates.
In our own work in a hospital we encountered accountability for both
learning and implementation in the head surgeon of one of its surgery
wards:
18
I believe that if a patient dies or fails to heal it is our [i.e., the staff’s]
fault. This is a healthy attitude, even if factually it may not be true.
One can always rationalize that the patient was 80 years old, that his
heart was weak, that his wife nagged him to death, and so on and so
forth. There is an infinite number of excuses that one can find to CYA
[cover your ass]. For me, this attitude is unacceptable. If the basic
premise is that we are at fault, it follows that we should find out what
went wrong so that next time we will avoid this error. In my opinion,
that’s the key to constantly learning and improving.
As noted above, several authors noted the importance of culture,
organizational as well as national, to organizational learning. The rationale
for positing the particular set of values above as conducive for productive
learning is mapped in Figure 3. The top two rows of the figure assert that
productive organizational learning has cognitive (understanding) and
behavioral (implementation of lessons-learned) aspects. The bottom row
asserts that since organizational learning takes place in complex social
contexts, understanding requires the cooperation of others for obtaining
undistorted data, interpreting equivocal information, and reframing complex
and ill-defined “wicked” problems (SchÖn et al., 1984; Weick, 1979). The
main section of the Figure relates the values that we posit for a learning
culture to these assertions.
Inquiry, transparency, issue orientation and integrity, support
understanding, whereas accountability supports both understanding and
action. All these norms imply a willingness to incur costs in order to achieve
productive learning. Assuming that organizational learning involves tackling
19
non-trivial, ill-defined problems in complex and dynamic situations (Orasanu
& Connolly, 1993), understanding requires inquiry, that is, dogged, persistent
investigation in spite of difficulties. Inquiry, of course, is also required from
the physicist who might single-handedly solve a problem in advanced
quantum mechanics. In social contexts it requires the collaboration of others
and transparency, without which input from others will necessarily be limited
or flawed. Transparency is risky owing to the potential exposure of one’s
failures and faults. The ensuing anxiety induces defensive routines, which
can block inquiry or subvert its integrity:
When [sensitive] information…is made public…[it is] apt to make
participants uncomfortable…They may call for closure, rarely in the
name of being anxious, but rather in the name of getting on with the
task (Argyris & SchÖn, 1996, p. 57).
Integrity and issue orientation helps people proceed with inquiry despite
the threat that it involves. Integrity means that a person prefers the loss of
face and other costs incurred by public exposure to the loss of an opportunity
to learn and improve. Issue orientation prevents the triggering of defensive
behavior by messages that are perceived as disrespectful or offensive. The
benefits of issue orientation to the detection and correction of error were
observed by a shop-floor worker interviewed by Edmondson (1997, p. 28):
Lets’ say I just did a part and got drips on it. Now, if they (those next
in the production process) told me I got drips on the edge, I say
“thanks” – and then I’m glad I can get these drips off. Where it used
to be, when that happened, we’d just try to find something wrong that
person did – we’d keep an eye out for it! It wasn’t to be helpful, it was
20
to bring them down to your level, or something like that... Now we
think nothing of it. We just fix it.
I think that the reason we are now so open to that kind of thing is
because we feel that the people who are telling us are not telling us
because they want to pull us down and say we are doing a bad job but
because they want us to do a good job – to do the product good – so
they want to work together to make the product better.
------------------------------Insert Figure 3 here
------------------------------The norms of inquiry, integrity, transparency, and issue-orientation are
intimately linked to psychological safety, one of the two elements of the
psychological facet of organizational learning, to which we turn next.
The psychological facet of organizational learningProductive organizational learning is fairly rare because it requires two
psychological states that are difficult to maintain. The first state is
psychological safety, without which people are reluctant to take the risks
required for learning. The second state is organizational commitment,
without which they are reluctant to share information and knowledge with
others.
Psychological safety is a state in which people feel safe to make errors
and honestly discuss what they think, and how they feel. As Schein (1993,
p. 87) noted,
For habit and skill learning to take hold, we need opportunities to
practice and to make errors. We need consistent rewards not only for
correct responses but also for detecting errors so that they can be
corrected. Rewards for error detection are often lacking. This kind of
21
learning, therefore, is constrained not only by the difficulty of getting
the response in the first place, but by lack of a safe environment in
which to practice and make lots of errors.
A sense of psychological safety, thus, makes it easier to face the
potentially disturbing or embarrassing outcomes of inquiry, the exposure
of transparency, and the risks of accountability. This means that issue
orientation, which reduces threat, promotes psychological safety (as
evinced nicely in the words of the production worker quoted by
Edmondson above). In a series of studies Edmondson found empirical
evidence for the relationship between psychological safety (and trust
which it engenders) and team learning in organizational settings. In
particular her studies show that high and low learning teams differ in the
extent to which their members feel psychologically safe (Edmondson,
1999 a), that psychological safety increases nurses’ willingness to report
their mistakes (Edmondson, 1996), and that learning behavior mediates
between psychological safety and team performance (Edmondson, 1999
b).
Organizational commitment refers to the extent to which organizational
members identify with the organization’s goals and values and make no
distinction between promoting its interests and their own personal ones.
Acknowledging the relationship between organizational commitment and
learning, BP’s John Brown observed that “for people to learn how to deliver
performance and grow we had to make them feel that, individually and
collectively, they could control the destiny of our business” (Prokesch, 1997,
p. 157). Organizational commitment is particularly important for
22
counterbalancing the political considerations that inhibit managers from
producing transparency, integrity, or accountability.
The power of organizational commitment is revealed in a study of the
career tracks of Ford middle managers before and after undergoing a special
training program designed to stimulate the initiation of fundamental changes
(Spreitzer & Quinn, 1996). While innovation per se was positively correlated
with advancement, the most upwardly mobile managers were the ones who
made the most conservative changes while the managers who made the
most radical changes were the least upwardly mobile. In effect Ford, which
has been an industry leader in espousing "transformational" change, failed to
reward its middle managers (or even punished them) for challenging the
status quo. These managers, however, expressed very little bitterness or
cynicism at the price they had paid for their initiatives. On the contrary,
many expressed a deep sense of satisfaction in having done “‘the right thing’
rather than the ‘political thing’ or the ‘easy thing’ as in the past” (Spreitzer
& Quinn, 1996, p. 255).
Organizational learning is crucially dependent on people’s willingness to
care for and share knowledge with others. Davenport and Prusak (1998, p.
32) hint at the importance of organizational commitment as an inducement
for people to share their knowledge:
Time, energy, and knowledge are finite. They are very scarce
resources in most people’s workdays. In general, we won’t spend
scarce resources unless the expenditures brings a meaningful
return….In firms structured as partnerships, knowledge sharing that
improves profitability will return a benefit to the sharer, now and in the
23
future. Whether or not a knowledge seller expects to be paid with
equally valuable knowledge from the buyer, he may believe that his
being known for sharing knowledge readily will make others in the
company more willing to share with him. That is a rational assumption.
While we agree with Davenport and Prusak that the propensity of people to
share knowledge with others is problematic, and that a feeling of partnership
is key to overcoming this obstacle, we think that their solutions are couched
in an overly narrow economic framework. The literature on organizational
commitment and high-involvement organizations shows that organization
members do not have to own stocks and shares or to be rewarded only
materially or in kind in their “trucking and bartering” with the organization
and with fellow members in order to share valuable scarce resources. They
just need to be committed to the organization and to feel that they work for
the joint benefit of themselves, their fellow members, and the organization
(Lawler, 1988; Popper & Lipshitz, 1992).
As Figure 1 shows, a culture of learning helps to promote psychological
safety. In order to understand how management can promote both
psychological safety and organizational commitment we turn to the policy
facet of organizational learning.
The policy facet of organizational learningThe policy facet of organizational learning denotes the formal and
informal steps taken by management to promote organizational learning. As
its name indicates, this facet receives concrete expression through the
organization’s policies, rules, budgets, procedures, and so forth. Three
24
policies are particularly important for the facilitation of organizational
learning: commitment to learning, tolerance for error, and commitment to
the workforce.
Commitment to learning: Becoming a true “learning organization” is a
strategic decision that is expressed in both rhetoric and action. The rhetoric
expresses the belief that learning is essential for the success of the
organization. As BP’s CEO John Brown put it:
Learning is at the heart of a company’s ability to adapt to a rapidly
changing environment. It is the key to being able both to identify
opportunities that others might not see and to exploit those opportunities
rapidly and fully... In order to generate extraordinary value for
shareholders, a company has to learn better than its competitors and
apply that knowledge throughout its business faster and more widely than
they do... Anyone in the organization who is not directly accountable for
making a profit should be involved in creating and distributing knowledge
that the company can use to make profit Prokesch, 1997, p. 148).
Actions that manifest commitment to learning include investing in
education and training (Wills, 1993; the installation of OLMs and culture
change (Popper & Lipshitz, 2000, a); supporting experimentation and
dissemination of information (Goh, 1998); and recognition and reward
systems (e.g., skill-based pay system) that support rather than frustrate
learning (Ford & Field, 1996).
Commitment to learning may also be expressed in more subtle ways,
such as the way organizations allocate time. For example, in some elite units
of the Israel Air Force quarterly training plans include time slots specifically
25
reserved for after-action reviews. When one of us asked a commander how
and when this practice was instituted, he was truly puzzled and said that this
was how the unit had operated ever since he had joined it many years
before. Furthermore, he was not aware that work plans could be drawn in
any other way. This reaction indicates that after-action reviews are so
deeply ingrained that they virtually constitute a taken-for- granted basic
assumption (Schein, 1990).
Tolerance for error is expressed in a message that learning inevitably
generates errors, and that errors in the service of learning will not be
punished, but indeed valued as an opportunity for learning. This attitude is
captured in a well-known IBM legend:
At the heart of [learning]...is a mindset...that enables companies to
recognize the value of productive failure as opposed to unproductive
success...A young manager, after losing $10 million in a risky venture
was called into [IBM’s legendary founder] Thomas Watson’s office. The
young man, thoroughly intimidated, began by saying, “I guess you
want my resignation.” Watson replied “You can’t be serious. We just
spent $10 million educating you (Garvin, 1993, pp. 85-86).
A policy of tolerance error is management’s principal contribution to
psychological safety. Establishing it requires striking a delicate balance
between sanctioning errors for the purpose of learning and holding people
accountable for mistakes that either do not serve this purpose or reflect a
failure to learn. There are no standard solutions for tackling this dilemma.
The head surgeon at a hospital ward expressed it as follows: “When an
intern makes a mistake for the first time I point it out to him and explain to
26
him what he should have done. However, if he repeats this mistake I come
down on him without mercy.”
In order to encourage transparency and create opportunities for learning
from experience, the chief of the Anti-sabotage Division in the Israel Police
initiated a policy of shielding officers who reported on “near accidents” from
disciplinary action. As a result, the number of “near accidents” reported in
one of the Division’s three districts shot up dramatically, while those in the
other two districts remained stable. Although a high near-accident rate
reflects poor performance, the chief summoned all three subordinates to his
office in order to praise that officer who had the courage to implement the
new policy while the others sought refuge behind false statistics.
Commitment to the workforce is a policy which de-emphasizes status
differences, emphasizes fair treatment of subordinates, and guaranteeing
employment security. This policy promotes psychological safety through
employment security and generates organizational commitment by virtue of
the norm of reciprocity. Employment security is essential for organizational
commitment. First, employees will not and cannot be expected to contribute
to productive learning if as a result of higher efficiency and improved
performance they will lose their jobs. Numerous studies show that layoffs
(e.g. as a result of downsizing) increase alienation among survivors (Mishra,
Spreitzer, & Mishra). Clearly the real test of an organization’s commitment
to the workforce, and to learning, occurs at times when organizations must
made tough choices about where to cut and where to invest scarce
resources.
27
Large-scale layoffs are also detrimental to organizational learning because
they encourage voluntary turnover particularly among better qualified
employees who already possess valuable knowledge and who can best
contribute to future learning by the organization (Pfeffer, 1998). Ley and Hitt
(1995, p. 836) concluded that outsourcing, which involves personnel
reduction, “can erode the firm’s potential for organizational learning and
development of new technologies." Fisher and White (2000) found that
downsizing, another form of restructuring that involves personnel reduction,
also damages organizational learning. People who are let go take with them
valuable experience and knowledge, and, even more so, because it disrupts
the networks of interrelationships among individuals in which organizational
learning is generated.
Reciprocity has been uncovered in every civilization ever studied and has
even been observed among baboons; it is truly a ubiquitous rule of behavior.
The norm of reciprocity means that favors are returned and social obligations
are repaid. Commitment is reciprocal. It is difficult to think of situations, at
least in healthy, adult relationships, in which one side is committed and the
other is not (Pfeffer, 1998, p. 181.) Fairness and reciprocity are at the heart
of BP’s John Brown’s conception of the type of relationships required to
promote joint learning with partners, suppliers, and customers. This is all the
more true in regard to an organization’s relationship with its own members:
You can’t expect others to share their knowledge and resources with you
fully unless you have a strong relationship with them. You can’t create an
enduring business by viewing relationships as a bazaar activity – in which
I try to get the best of you and you of me – or in which you pass off as
28
much risk as you can to the other guy. Rather, we must view
relationships as coming together that allows us to do something no other
two parties could do – something that makes the pie bigger and is to your
advantage and to my advantage. (Prokesch, 1997, p. 154).
The contextual facet of organizational learning
The contextual facet focuses on exogenous factors which, at best, are
under management’s indirect control, or at worst, not under its control at all.
The five components of the contextual facet determine the likelihood that
organizational learning will evolve, or that organizational learning will be
productive, in an organization or one of its subsystems.
Error criticality refers to both the immediacy and the seriousness of the
consequences of error as well as its costs. Extrapolating from findings about
the effects of past errors on learning to the effects of potential error on
learning, we propose that a high perceived likelihood of costly error
facilitates learning. Abundant empirical evidence shows that people pay
more attention and are more likely to engage in learning after failure (Wong
& Weiner, 1981; Zakay, Ellis & Shevalsky, 1998), particularly if errors are of
modest scale (Sitkin, 1992). Consistent with this proposition, examples of
organizational learning often come from organizations under crisis (e.g. a
general walkout: Rayner, 1993), or from organizational settings in which
people routinely face potential catastrophic (e.g. life threatening) errors such
as nuclear power plants (Carrol, 1995; DiBella, Nevis, & Gould, 1996; Weick,
Sutcliffe, & Ostfeld, 1999), hospital surgery wards (Lipshitz & Popper, 1998),
and fighter flight units (Ron, Lipshitz, & 2000, 1999; Popper & Lipshitz,
29
1998). In addition, Ellis, Caridi, Lipshitz, and Popper (1998) found that
persons working in organizations with relatively high costs of error (air-traffic
controllers and managers in high-tech organizations) produced higher mean
scores on a values questionnaire that measures valid information,
transparency, accountability, and issue-orientation than persons working in
organizations with relatively low costs of error (psychiatrists and physicians
in a mental hospital and teachers).
Environmental uncertainty is a function of the rate of change (e.g., of new
products or new models) and the extent and intensity of competition in the
environment. Both factors have been repeatedly linked to the need for and
(less frequently) existence of organizational learning (Dodgson, 1993;
Edmondson & Moingeon, 1997; Ellis & Shpielberg, 1997; Fiol & Lyles, 1985;
Garvin, 1993; Goh, 1998). The logic underlying these relationships is
straightforward: change and competition require adaptation, which in turn
requires learning.
Task structure influences the feasibility of obtaining valid information and
people’s motivation to cooperate with colleagues in learning. Adler and Cole
(1993, p. 89) pointed out the relationship between task structure and valid
information in their comparison between Toyota-GM NUMMI and Volvo’s
Uddevalla auto plants:
Workers at both NUMMI and Uddevalla were encouraged to seek out
improvement. And to help them, both groups received feedback on their
task performance over their respective work cycles. But Toyota’s
standardized work system made this feedback far more effective in
sustaining improvement. At NUMMI, the work cycle was about 60 seconds
30
long, and performance of the cycle is very standardized. Therefore, it is
easy to identify problems, define improvement opportunities, and
implement improved processes. Uddevalla workers, too, had detailed
information on their work cycle performance, but as this cycle was some
two hours long, they had no way to track their task performance at a
more detailed level. This problem was exacerbated by the craft model of
work organization, which encouraged Uddevalla workers to believe they
should have considerable latitude in how they performed each cycle.
Its effects on performance contingent rewards moderate the influence of
task structure on the motivation to cooperate. For example, in an interview
about after-action reviews, an F-16 pilot testified that he, and his fellow
pilots, were intensely competitive, strove to be “number 1,” and always
believed they could attain this position. When asked why this intense
competitiveness did not interfere with behaviors that could reveal failure,
such as transparency and integrity, he responded that “since we fly in duos
and quartets, my chances of survival depend on them. I have as much
investment in their improvement as I have in my own.”
Proximity to the organization’s core mission increases the likelihood that
learning will occur in conjunction with a particular task system. Consistent
with this proposition, the Israel Air Force is far more successful in instituting
OLMs and values of learning in its flight units than in its technical and
support units. In addition, all of the fourteen different OLMs that we
identified in a university-affiliated hospital were associated with its core
missions: delivery of treatment and training of interns and students
(Lipshitz & Popper, 1998). The influence of proximity to core mission can be
31
tied to error criticality, as errors related to core mission are likely to be more
costly to the organization than errors in the performance of non-core
missions.
Leadership commitment and support is essential for successful change of
programs in general (Huber, Sutcliff, Miller, & Glick, 1993; Rodgers & Hunter,
1991), and for the success of cultural change in particular (Kanter, 1991;
Lundberg, 1985; Schein, 1990). Because organizational leaders set policy, it
is not surprising that the existence or absence of management’s commitment
can outweigh the absence or existence of all other contextual factors.
However, according to Goeser (1996), leadership plays a special role in
learning because it is “where the exchange of information is launched,
becomes systematic, and then is monitored and rewarded” (p. 28). The
crucial role played by leaders in the creation and promotion of organizational
learning in industry was recognized by Senge (1990 b) and confirmed by
Leithwood and Leonard (1998) in a study of organizational learning in
schools.
Popper and Lipshitz (2000, b) specified three specific roles for managers
in the context of the multi-facet model of organizational learning: making
organizational learning a central element in the organization’s strategy;
installing and institutionalizing OLMs; instilling the values of a learning
culture; and creating conditions that support psychological safety and
organizational commitment. Edmondson’s (1996) study of eight units in
three hospitals (1996) confirmed some of the relationships posited in Figure 1
between leadership and the contextual, policy, psychological, and behavioral
facets:
32
Leadership behavior influences the way errors are handled, which in
turn leads to shared perceptions of how consequent it is to make
mistake. These perceptions influence willingness to report mistakes,
and may contribute to a climate of fear or of openness which is likely
to endure and further influence the ability to identify and discuss
problems (p. 24).
Lipshitz and Popper (2000) found that, in spite of the head surgeon’s
indifference, the surgery ward was able to learn, because it was
characterized by a well-defined task and an ability to achieve
transparency through the use of closed-circuit TV to film operations. By
contrast, organizational learning in the internal-medicine ward, in which
task performance and outcomes were much less easily observable, was
primarily attributed to the open, supportive and trust-generating
leadership of its head physician.
Conclusion
Despite the explosive growth in publications on organizational learning
and learning organizations (Crossan & Guatto, 1996), this literature has yet
to add up to a coherent body of knowledge (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1997;
Gerhardi, 1999; Miller, 1996, p. 485). Huber’s (1991) earlier critique of the
organizational learning literature is echoed by Prange’s (1999) more recent
observations that the concept is used in a metaphorical and/or analogous
sense, that it lacks theoretical integration, that research is being done in a
non-cumulative way, and that the literature does not provide ‘useful’
knowledge for practitioners. Considering the diversity of disciplines and
33
perspectives from which organizational learning is being studied (Easterby-
Smith, 1997), the construction of an overarching theory is probably
impossible. Nevertheless, a theoretical systematization that acknowledges
the manifold nature of organizational learning and which integrates at least
some of its diverse literature should help both researchers and practitioners.
Our multi-faceted model of organizational learning has attempted to
address these gaps in the literature. First, the concept of “organizational
learning mechanisms” (OLMs) provides a non-metaphorical basis for defining
the phenomenon and addresses the difference between individual and
organizational learning. Organizational-level learning is similar to individual-
level learning in that both involve the collection, analysis, storage, and use of
information. It differs, however, from individual learning in its basic nature,
processing mechanisms, and products. While individual learning is primarily
a cognitive process, which occurs “inside people’s heads” and can be fairly
well understood through cognitive conceptual lenses, organizational learning
is a complex interpersonal process occurring through structural mechanisms
in a social arena. “Learning-by” organizations occurs when individual
“learning-in” occurs within the context of OLMs which ensure that people get
the information they need, that the products of their reflections are stored
and disseminated throughout the organization. Individual learning produces
individual insights and changes in habits, skills, and action. Organizational
learning produces changes in norms, doctrines, standard operating
procedures, structures and cultures. Consequently, organizational learning
cannot be properly understood without using social, political, and cultural
lenses in addition to cognitive lenses.
34
The cultural, psychological, policy, and contextual facets mapped in
Figure 1 represent a step towards an integrative theory of organizational
learning. They do not denote a set of necessary condition for learning; that
is, we do not hypothesize that all causal links in the map must be realized in
order for learning to occur. Rather, we assume that Figure 1 represents an
ideal whereby each positive link in the Figure increases the likelihood of
organizational learning. Different organizations, operating under different
circumstances, can manage to learn productively while enacting very
different configurations of the facets in the map.
The reference list of this paper attests that the multi-facet model has
attempted to integrate numerous previous contributions to the study of
organizational learning. Its largest single debt is probably owed to the
seminal work of Argyris and SchÖn (1978, 1996). However, in contrast to
their approach, our multi-facet model addresses the problem of
anthropomorphism by positing directly observable OLMs rather than non-
observable organizational theories of action which can only be attributed to
teams and organizations (Lipshitz, 2000; Popper & Lipshitz, 1998). Both
approaches pay attention to the influence of cultural values on the feasibility
and quality of organizational learning, but the multi-facet model neither
differentiates between single-loop and double-loop learning nor focuses on
defensive routines and their associated theories of action. Our model also
expands on Argyris and SchÖn (1996) by emphasizing the structural, cultural,
and contextual conditions that facilitate productive learning.
The multi-facet model can be used by managers and consultants as a
guide for building learning organizations and for estimating the likelihood of
35
success in this endeavor. Figure 1 provides a means for identifying the key
facets of organizational learning in an organization. It implies that attempts
at generating productive learning in a particular organization learns should
take all of the facets into account and attempt to characterize the
relationships among them. The map indicates there is no single path or one
best set of arrangements for creating learning organizations and that the
means of productive learning in one organization, or even a subsystem of the
same organization, cannot simply be reproduced somewhere else.
Practitioners can use the map as the basis for identifying alternative
configurations and for experimenting with them until the suitable
configuration for learning in a particular setting is found.
While the map is intended to be a useful guide for both researchers and
practitioners, it does not represent a blueprint for organizational change. In
order to meet the criteria of comprehensiveness, accuracy, and parsimony, it
has been developed at a level of generalization which does not yield directly
“actionable” knowledge (Argyris, 1993). Furthermore, the focus of this
paper has been on describing the conditions under which organizational
learning is likely to occur but not the process of creating those conditions.
Some facets, such as the degree of environmental uncertainty and the
costliness of error, may be beyond the control of managers. Other facets -
such as commitment to the workforce, psychological safety, organizational
commitment, and the cultural values - can be created or strengthened, but
specific prescriptions for doing so are beyond the scope of this paper, but has
been discussed elsewhere (e.g. Friedman, Lipshitz, & Overmeer, 2001;
Lipshitz, Popper, & Oz, 1996).
36
The debate around the feasibility and potential costs and benefits of
organizational learning has largely subsided and that organizational learning
is now widely accepted as essential for survival in increasingly volatile and
competitive environments (Argyris & SchÖn, 1996). We join this growing
consensus, but with two caveats. The first caveat is that it is very difficult,
outside the laboratory, to empirically establish direct causal relations
between organizational learning and organizational outcomes. Therefore, we
have constructed our argument by positing necessary but insufficient
conditions for productive organizational learning. The second caveat is
simply that productive organizational learning is difficult to achieve. Claims
that organization X is a “learning organization” or that a certain n-step recipe
is the algorithm for achieving this coveted status should never be taken at
face value.
Organizational learning is not a single process performed by the entire
organization in a uniform fashion. Rather, it an assemblage of loosely linked
sub-processes performed by a wide variety of OLMs, in which different
organizational units participating in different ways and at different levels of
intensity (Popper & Lipshitz, 2000). The concept of the “learning
organization,” quite fashionable among consultants and managers (Argyris &
SchÖn, 1996), is probably more of a visionary rhetorical device than a
realizable empirical entity. No organization can truly be classified as a
learning organization. Rather, the extent and quality of organizational
learning can be determined by assessing the number, variety, and
effectiveness of organizational learning mechanisms operating in different
37
units and at different levels as well as by identifying the horizontal and
vertical links among OLMs throughout the organization.
38
ReferencesAdler, P.S., & Cole, R.E. (1993). Designed for learning: A tale of two auto
plants. Sloan Management Review, 34, 85-94.
Argyris, C. (1982). Reasoning, learning and action. San Francisco: Jossey
Bass.
Argyris, C. (1991). Teaching smart people how to learn. Harvard Business
Review, 69, (3), 99-109.
Argyris, C. (1993). Knowledge for action: A guide to overcoming barriers to
organizational change. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Argyris, C., & SchÖn, D.A. (1978) Organizational learning: A theory of action
perspective. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
Argyris, C., & SchÖn, D.A. (1996) Organizational learning II: Theory,
methods and practice. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
Baird, L., Henderson, J.C., & S. Watts (1997). Learning from action: An
analysis of the center for army lessons learned (CALL). Human Resource
Management 36, 385-395.
Barnett, C. (n.d.). Rethinking organizational learning theories: A review and
synthesis of the primary literature. Unpublished manuscript, Whittemore
School of Business and Economics, University of New Hampshire.
Beer, M., & Spector, B., (1993). Organizational diagnosis: Its role in
organizational learning. Journal of Counseling and Development, 71, 642-
650.
Campbell, D. and Russo, J. (1999). Social experimentation. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
39
Carrol, J.S., (1995). Incident reviews in high-hazard industries: Sensemaking
and learning under ambiguity and accountability. Industrial and
Environmental Crisis Quarterly, 9, 175-197.
Chen, H. (1990). Theory-driven evaluations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Cheney, S. (1998). Evidence of effective learning environments in
organizations. Paper presented at the conference on Organizational
Learning: Moving from Theory to Research, George Washington
University, March 22-23.
Crossan, M. M., & Guatto, T. (1996). Organizational learning research profile.
Journal of Organizational Change Management, 9, 107-112.
Crossan, M. M., Lane, H.W., & White, R.E. (1997). Organizational learning:
Toward a theory. Working paper No. 98-05, The Richard Ivey School of
Business, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario.
Cusumano, M.A., & Selby, R.W., (1995). Microsoft secrets. New York: Free
Press.
Davenport, T.H., De Long, D.W., & Beers, M.C. (1998). Successful
knowledge-management projects. Sloan Management Review, 39, (2),
43-57.
Davenport, T.H., & Prusak, L. (1998). Working knowledge. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Business School Press.
Davies, J., & Easterby-Smith, M. (1984). Learning and developing from
managerial work experiences. Journal of Management Studies, 21, 169-
183.
DiBella, A., Nevis, E.C., & Gould, J.M., (1996). Understanding organizational
learning capability: Journal of Management Studies, 33, 361-379.
40
Dodgson, M. (1993). Organizational learning: A review of some literatures.
Organization Studies, 14, 375-394.
Easterby-Smith, M. (1997). Disciplines of the learning organization:
contributions and critiques. Human Relations, 50, 1085-1113.
Edmondson, A. (1996). Learning from mistakes is easier said than done:
Group and organizational influences on the detection and correction of
human error. Journal of Applied Behavioral science, 32, 5-28.
Edmondson, A. (1997). Learning when ’s safe: A group-level investigation of
antecedents and consequences of learning behavior. Boston, MA:
Harvard Business School Working Paper 07-069.
Edmondson, A. (1999 a). The view through a different lens: Investigating
organizational learning at the group level of analysis. Paper presented at
the 3rd International Conference on Organizational Learning, Lancaster,
UK, and 6-8 June.
Edmondson, A. (1999 b). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work
teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 350-383.
Edmondson, A., & Moingeon, B. (1997). From organizational learning to the
learning organization. Management Learning, 28, 499-517.
Ellis, S, Caridi, O., Lipshitz, R., & Popper, M. (1998). Error criticality and
organizational learning: An empirical investigation. Recanati Graduate
School of Business Administration, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.
Ellis, S., & Shpielberg, N. (1998). Organizational learning mechanisms and
managers’ perceived uncertainty. Paper presented at the conference on
Managerial and Organizational Cognition, Stern School of Management,
New York University, New York, May 7-8, 1998.
41
Fiol, M.C., & Lyles, M.A. (1985). Organizational learning. Academy of
Management Review, 10, 803-813.
Fisher, S.R., & White, M. A. (2000). Downsizing in a learning organization:
Are there hidden costs? Academy of Management Review, 25, 244-251.
Ford, L., & Field, B. (1996). Managing organizational learning: From rhetoric
to reality. Melbourne: Longman.
Friedman, V.(2000). Action evaluation and knowledge creation in social-
educational programs, paper presented at the Conference on Knowledge
and Innovation, Helsinki School of Economics, May 25-26, 2000.
Friedman, V., Lipshitz, R., & Overmeer, W. (in press). Creating conditions for
organizational learning. In M. Dierkes, J. Child, I. Nonaka, & A. Berthoin-
Antal (Eds.), Handbook of organizational learning. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Garvin, D.A. (1993). Building a learning organization. Harvard Business
Review, 73, (4), 78-91.
Gerhardi, S. (1999). Learning as problem-driven or learning in the face of
mystery? Organization Studies, 20, 101-124.
Goeser, L. (1996). How can David Martin save the company and take it into
the future? Harvard Business Review, (3), 74, 27-28.
Goh, S.C. (1998). Toward a learning organization: The strategic building
blocks. S.A.M. Advanced Management Journal, 63, (2), 15-21.
Gulliver, F.R. (1987). Posy-project appraisals pay. Harvard Business Review,
65, (2), 128-132.
Huber, G.P. (1991). Organizational learning: The contributing processes and
the literatures. Organizational Science, 2, 88-115.
42
Huber, G.P., Sutcliff, K.M., Miller, C.C., & Glick, W.H. (1993). Understanding
and predicting organizational change. In G.P. Huber & K.M. Sutcliff (Eds.),
Organizational Change and Redesign (215-265), Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Kanter, R M (1991) Championing change: An interview with Bell Atlantic's
CEO Raymond Smith. Harvard Business Review, 69 (1), 119-130.
Kolb, D.A., (1984). Experiential learning. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Lawler, E.E. III (1988). Choosing and involvement strategy. Academy of
Management Executive, 2, 197-204.
Leithwood, K., & Leonard, L. (1998). Conditions fostering organizational
learning in schools. Educational administration Quarterly, 34, 243-277.
Levitt, B., & March, J.G. (1988). Organizational learning. Annual Review of
Sociology 14, 319-340.
Ley, D., & Hitt, M.A. (1995). Strategic restructuring and outsourcing: The
effect of mergers and acquisitions on building firm skills and capabilities.
Journal of Management, 21, 835-859.
Lipshitz, R. (2000). Chic, mystique, and misconception: Argyris and SchÖn
and the rhetoric of organizational learning. Journal of Applied Behavioral
Science, 36, 456-473 .
Lipshitz, R., & Popper, M. (2000). Organizational learning in a hospital.
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 36, 345-361.
Lipshitz, R., Popper, M., & Oz, S. (1996). Building learning organizations:
The design and implementation of organizational learning mechanisms.
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 32, 292-305.
43
Lipshitz, R., Popper, M., & Ron, N. (1999). Post-flight reviews in the Israel
Defense Force as an organizational learning mechanism. Paper presented
at the 3rd International Conference on Organizational Learning, Lancaster,
UK, 6-8 June.
Lundberg, C.C. (1985). On the feasibility of cultural intervention in
organizations. In L. R. Pondy, R. Frost, P., Morgan, G., & T. Dandridge
(Eds.), Organizational symbolism. Greenwich CT: JAI Press.
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1976). Organizational learning and the ambiguity
of the past In J.G. March & J.P. Olsen (Eds.), Ambiguity and choice in
organizations (54-68). Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
Miller, D. (1996). A preliminary typology of organizational learning:
Synthesizing the literature. Journal of Management, 22, 485-505.
Mishra, K.E., Spreitzer, G.M., & Mishra, A.K., (1998). Preserving employee
morale during downsizing. Sloan Management Review, (2), 29, 83-95.
McGill, M.E., Slocum, J.W., & Lei, D., (1993). Management practices in
learning organizations. Organizational Dynamics, 22: (1), 5-17.
Nonaka, I. & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge creating company. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Orasau, J., & Connolly, T. (1993). The reinvention of decision making. In G.A.
Klein, J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, & C. Zsambok (Eds.), Decision
making in action: Models and methods (3-20). Norwood, CT: Ablex.
Patton, M. (1997). Utilization-focused evaluation, 3rd Edition. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Pfeffer, J. (1998). The Human equation: Building profits by putting people
first. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
44
Popper, M., & Lipshitz, R. (1992). "Ask not what your country can do for you":
Normative vs. instrumental organizational commitment. Journal of
Vocational Behavior, 41, 1-12.
Popper, M., & Lipshitz, R. (1998). Organizational learning mechanisms: A
cultural and structural approach to organizational learning. Journal of
Applied Behavioral Science, 34, 161-178.
Popper, M., & Lipshitz, R. (2000, a). Organizational learning: Mechanisms,
culture and feasibility. The Learning Organization, 235-144.
Popper, M., & Lipshitz, R. (2000, b). Installing mechanisms and instilling
values: The role of leaders in organizational learning. The Learning
Organization, 7, 235-144.
Prange, C. (1999). Organizational learning – desperately seeking theory? In
Easterby-Smith, M., Burgoyne, J. & Araujo, L. (Eds.), Organizational
learning and the learning organization (23-42) London: Sage Publications.
Prokesch, S.E., (1997). Unleashing the power of learning: An interview with
British Petroleum’s John Browne. Harvard Business Review, 75, (5), 147-
168.
Quinn. J.B. (1988). The Pillsbury Company. In J.B. Quinn, H. Mintzberg, &
R.M. James, (Eds.), The strategy process (398-421), Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Rayner, B., (1993). Trial by-fire-transformation: An interview with Globe
Metallurgical’s Arden C. Sims. In H. R. Howard & R.D. Haas (Eds.), The
learning imperative. (277-297), Cambridge, MA: HBS Press.
Rodgers, R , & Hunter, J. E. (1991). Impact of management by objectives on
organizational productivity. Journal of Applied Psychology, 76, 322-336.
45
Ron, N., Lipshitz, R., & Popper, M. (2000). Post-flight reviews in the Israel
Defense Force Air Force as an organizational learning mechanism:
Culture and context. Department of Psychology, University of Haifa,
Haifa, Israel.
Roth, G.L. (1996). Learning histories: Using documentation to assess and
facilitate organizational learning. Cambridge, MA: Center for
Organizational Learning, Sloan School of Management, M.I.T.
Schein, E. H. (1990). Organizational culture. American Psychologist, 45,
109-119.
Schein, E.H., (1993). How can organizations learn faster? The challenge of
entering the green room. Sloan Management Review, 34, (2), 85-92.
SchÖn, D. A., (1983). The reflective practitioner New York: Basic Books.
SchÖn, D. Drake, W.,(1984) and Miller, R. Social experimentation as
reflection-in-action. Knowledge Creation, Diffusion, and Utilization. 6(1),
5-36.
Scriven, M.(1991). Beyond formative and summative evaluation. in M.W.
McLaughlin and D.C. Phillips (Eds.) Evaluation and education: at quarter
century, 90th yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 18-64.
Senge, P. (1990 a). The fifth discipline: Tart and practice of the learning
organization. New York: Doubleday.
Senge, (1990 b). The leader’s new work: Building learning organization.
Sloan Management Review, 31 (1), 7-23.
Sitkin, S.B. (1992). Learning through failure: The strategy of small losses.
Research in Organizational Behavior, 14, 231-266.
46
Shaw, R.B., & Perkins, D.N.T. (1992). Teaching organizations to lea: The
power of productive failures. In D.A. Nadler, M.S. Gerstein, & R.B. Shaw
(Eds.), Organizational architecture (175-191). San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
Spreitzer, G.M. & Quinn, R.E. (1996). Empowering middle managers to be
transformational leaders. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 32, 237-
261.
Starkey, K. (1998). What can we learn from the learning organization?
Human Relations, 51, 531-546.
Stayer, R. (1993). How I learned to let my workers lead. In G. Wills (Ed.).
Your Enterprise School of Management (97-113). London: MCB Press.
Taylor, S., & Easterby-Smith, M. (1999). Culture and organizational learning:
Toward pluralism. Paper presented at the 3rd International Conference on
Organizational Learning, Lancaster, UK, 6-8 June.
Wack, P. (1985). Scenarios: Uncharted waters ahead. Harvard Business
Review, 63, (5), 73-89.
Weick, K.E. (1979). The social psychology of organizing. Reading, MA:
Addison Wesley.
Weick, K.E., Sutcliffe, K.M., & Obstfeltd, D. (1999). Organizing for high
reliability: Processes of collective mindfulness. Research in
organizational behavior, 21, 81-123.
Willard, B. (1994). Ideas on organizational learning: The “what”, “why”,
“how”, and “who”. IBM Canada Annual Leadership Development
Workshop Pre-work.
Wills, G. (1993). (Ed.). Your Enterprise School of Management. London: MCB Press.
47
Wong, P.T P., & Weiner, B. (1981). When people ask why-questions, and the
heuristic of attributional search. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 40, 650-663.
Yeung , A.K., Ulrich , P.O .Nason , S.W. & Von Glinow ,M.A.(1999).
Organizational Learning Capability . Generating and Generalizing Ideas
with Impact . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zakay, D., Ellis, S., & Shevalsky, M. (1998). Do managers learn from
experience? The negative outcome bias. Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv,
Israel.
48
Table 1: Types of OLMS
DesignatedLearning occurs separately from task performance.
Dual-purposeLearning occurs in close conjunction with task performance
IntegratedLearning carried out by those who perform the task.
Integrated/designatedQuality circlesAfter Action Review “Postmortems”
Integrated/Dual-PurposeReflection-in-actionKnowledge Crew
Non-integratedLearning carried out by people other than those who perform the task.
Non-integrated/DesignatedStrategic planning unitsKnowledge Sharing
Non-integratedDual-purposeFormative EvaluationChief Knowledge OfficersKnowledge Engineers
49
50
51
RequiresFacilitates
Figure 1: Facets of Organizational Learning
Environmental Uncertainty
Error Criticality
Tolerance for Error
Accountability
Inquiry
Psychological Safety
Transparency
Issue Orientation
ContextualFacet
PolicyFacet
PsychologicalFacet
CulturalFacet
Commitment to
Learning
Commitment to
the Workforce
OrganizationalCommitment
CommittedLeadership
Task Structure
Proximity to Core Mission
.
Integrity
ProductiveLearning
StructuralFacet
OLMS
A BA B
52
3
4
2
1Experience
ReflectExperiment
ConceptualizeRetain
Figure 2-a: Experiential learning
53
3
4
2
1Action
OutcomesKnowledge &belief systems
ReflectionInsight
Figure 2-b: Organizational learning
Dissemination
54
+
-
+
+
+
+
counteracts
-+
Accountability
Taking responsibility for
learning and implementation
of LL
valid knowledge
+implemented
lessons-learned
= Productive learning
ACTION
Inquiry
Persisting in investigation
until full understanding is
achieved
UNDERSTANDING
Transparency
Exposing one's thoughts and
actions for inspection
Threat
Integrity
Collecting and providing
information regardless of its
implications
undistorted information
multiple view points
critical thinking
understanding+ + =
Figure 3: Shared Values of a Learning Culture
Issue orientation
Ignoring irrelevant issues
(e.g., rank & status)
