Organizational Hierarchy Adaptation and Information Technology_2002

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Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182www.elsevier.com/locate/infoandorg

Organizational hierarchy adaptation andinformation technology

G.M. Schwarz

Department of Management, University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia

Abstract

Current debate on organization change is concerned increasingly with questioning the extentto which different organizational designs are effective. Consequently, many new forms oforganizing have been proffered. In particular, new-form theorists acknowledge hierarchy butrarely test it in generating a variety of information technology- (IT) related change outcomes.This paper focuses on the robustness of hierarchy by tracing its characteristics within twopublic organizations. It provides an understanding of the relationship between IT applicationsand structural change by examining how the process of IT adaptation unfolds. Specifically, itexplores how managements disposition to IT change discerns the nature of an organizationsstructure and the adaptation of that structure. I argue that the nature of managements appli-cation of information systemsand non-managements reaction to this practiceguides struc-tural modification. Discussion focuses on explaining the continued presence of hierarchy inIT environments where there is an expectation for significant structural change. 2002Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:Hierarchy; New organizational forms; Management roles; Information Technology change;

Organizational change

Ever since Weber (1968) introduced hierarchy as a fundamental part of organizinglabor, this key element of his bureaucracy abstraction has been well-explored inorganizational theory (Clegg, 1990). For several decades, acknowledging that manyIT applications exhibit Tayloristic work designs (Lyytinen & Ngwenyama, 1992),various theorists have either focused on the dysfunctions or have overlooked a dis-cussion of hierarchy in identifying an array of IT-related organizational changes

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E-mail address: [email protected] (G.M. Schwarz).

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154 G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

(Bahrami, 1992; Bennis, 1966; Wasserman, 1971). Historically, one of the dominantassumptions in organizational change literature is that the degradation of hierarchyis a necessity for organizations to prosper. This belief is the premise of current

change assessments in organizational theory. Although hierarchy is acknowledgedas a basic aspect of organizing, it is viewed as a well-worn concept, not necessarilyneeding to be tested further (Wareham, Bjrn-Anderson, & Neergaard, 1998).

The basis of this research position is that the value of organizational politics asa theoretical perspective is well established. From the 1970s there has been an abun-dance of research illustrating the persistence of existing formal structures, and thepolitical alignments that are created through the implementation of new informationtechnologies (Kraemer, 1991; Laudon, 1974; Markus, 1983; Orlikowski, 1991; Star-buck, 1989). As Boudreau and Robey (1996) illustrate, however, there are a numberof contradictions, ambiguities, and confusions surrounding the rationale for theorganization of power arrangements. This ambivalence is especially the case in pub-lic sector organizations which have historically relied on power elites to perpetuateestablished hierarchy schemes (Kraemer, King, Dunkle, & Lane).

With an understanding of the relationship between information technologies andpower, administrative reform, decision making and centralization, fewer researchershave been inclined to study the interaction between current era technology changeoutcomes and public sector management. This deficit has led to research on the useof computing in government [having] declined precipitously(Kraemer and Dedrick,1997:89). With this outlook as its stimulus, and recognizing that IT-related organiza-

tional change literature currently identifies a variety of change outcomes and theoreti-cal positions, this paper adopts Markuss (1983:441) research invitation to investigatethe management of information by examining hierarchy authority. Specifically, thepaper reconsiders an understanding of the relationship between IT applications andstructural change by examining how the process of IT adaptation unfolds in pub-lic organizations.

With Webers (1968) conceptualization of bureaucratic hierarchy as its center-piece, the research examines IT adaptation by investigating how management usestechnologies to enact change. To appreciate the nature of hierarchy in changing pub-lic technology environments, I acknowledge the contribution of previous manage-

ment control research. As such, I accept that the disposition of an organizationsmanagement to change must first be considered before a structural alignment effectcan be justified. The research is motivated by assumptions about changes to hierarchyin the new-forms of organizing literature (new-form). This literature proposes thatchanges within and around the organization induce significant structural modifi-cations (e.g., Halal, 1994; Wigand, Picot, & Reichwald, 1997). Such an outlookpromotes the democratizing effects of technology change, suggesting that new tech-nology applications have a decentralizing force on information and organizationalpolitics (Palmer & Dunford, 1997).

The research explores the association between technology and management self-

interest by reviewing the process of IT adaptation in two public organizations under-taking software changes, concentrating on the dialectic of authority (Orlikowski,1992; 2000). This assessment is based on a recognition that IT innovation tends to


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155G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

supplement rather than eliminate existing organizational structures (Townsend et al.,1998). The appraisal of hierarchy in changing technology environments begins witha clarification of the new-form call for structural change. In the next section, I provide

a review of the extant new-form literature and the confusion that exists within thisresearch. Having established the research basis, I then demonstrate the nature ofhierarchy and the pivotal role of domination (Giddens, 1984) in retaining hierarchy.Based on these findings, ensuing discussion centers on how management use IT toadapt structures and, consequently, on the implications of such action for manage-ment practice and change planning.

1. Background to the research

1.1. The study of technology in organizations

The legacy of Webers (1968) bureaucracy abstraction to organizational theoryhas simultaneously been its overriding contribution to the conceptualization of theorganization, and its significant influence on the direction of technology impactdebate. Weber focused attention on a prescribed framework for the organization bydepicting precise functional categories. He thereby constructed a formal configurationof organizational roles and procedures based on authority. This classification galvan-ized subsequent empirical tests to focus on, replicate and extend aspects of his frame-

work. Early technology research readily acknowledged the causal role of technologyin ushering structural change.The past decade, however, has witnessed the development of the structurational

perspective on technology as an alternative outlook on change (Barley, 1986;DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Lyytinen & Ngwenyama, 1992; Orlikowski & Robey,1991; Orlikowski, 1992; Poole & DeSanctis, 1992; Walsham, 1993). Drawing onGiddenss (1984) homeostatic process of agency and social structuring, this perspec-tive supports a duality of structure (1984:19). It acknowledges that agency andstructure are mediated by and guide human agents, invoking understandings of inter-pretive schemas (i.e., standardized, shared stocks of knowledge), norms (i.e., rules

governing conduct), and facilities (i.e., means through which power is exercised).This process guides the production or reproduction of an organizations social struc-ture.

The use of IT has thus been recognized as being strongly influenced by usersunderstandings of the properties and functionality of a technology, based on anagency/structure dichotomy (see Lyytinen & Ngwenyama, 1992, for a fuller reviewof structuration). Orlikowskis (2000) recent appraisal of structuration extends theperspective further. Examining the institutional, interpretive and technological con-ditions that shape different organizational structures, she proposes a practice-orientedlens for studying the use of technology in organizations. In doing so, she inverts the

structurational model by suggesting that a practice lens focuses on knowledgeablehuman action and how its recurrent engagement with a given technology constitutesand reconstitutes particular emergent structures of using the technology(2000:421).


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Orlikowski illustrates that the dimensions of Giddenss duality argument can alsobe a function of the recurrent use of technologies. As such, she expands our under-standing of generalizations held about the conditions and consequences of change.

1.2. New forms of organizing theory

Support for new-form organizational theory often adopts the structurational per-spective of technology. The fundamental assumption of the new-form organizationis that technological innovation is a critical component that is both driving andenabling change in different business environments. This debate is concernedincreasingly with questioning the extent to which conventional notions of design areeffective (Ashkenas, Ulrich, Jick, & Kerr, 1995). Although multiple types of new-form organizations are evident, the new-form is often described as an archetype.Building and maintaining competitive and strategic advantage requires the creationof dynamic core competencies. It also requires a focus on developing human capitalby implementing new IT that institutes a learning and innovative team-based culture(Palmer & Dunford, 1997).

The resultant flexibility of task, function and informal, decentralized and particip-ative project groupings has spawned the creation of many new organizational changelabels. The new-form organization is offered, among others things, as a boundaryless(Ashkenas et al., 1995), cellular (Miles, Snow, Miles, Mathews, & Coleman, 1997),

constellation (Bahrami, 1992), horizontal (Ostroff, 1999), post-bureaucratic(Nohria & Berkeley, 1994), spiders web, and virtual (Quinn, Anderson, & Fink-elstein, 1996) corporation. Five dominant elements of change are evident in thesenew-form listings: (i) organizational structure will be forced to become more flexible,(ii) organizations will have to forge strategic network partnerships, (iii) decentraliz-ation will become the norm, (iv) information dissemination will encompass thischange in authority relations, and (v) job specialization and standardization will benegated as peoples roles change.

New-form commentaries employ these elements of change to varying degrees, butall suggest that the organization achieves some pattern of structural transformation

when enabled by IT. For example, early research on the topic emphasized the needfor fundamental structural transformation (e.g., Bennis, 1966; Toffler, 1970). Suchopinion maintained that altered technological and economic environments demandedbasic structural modifications. Current views on such change often assert that struc-tural flexibility is fundamental to an organizations survival (e.g., Byrne, 1993;Ostroff, 1999). Conversely, other researchers have positioned the new-form elementsto present the altered organization as a recreated hierarchy, while still acknowledgingthe need for basic structural change alternatives (e.g., Quinn et al., 1996). This morefunctional assessment of change is far more tentative in offering absolute structuralalteration as the cornerstone of technological and environmental developments. This

viewpoint acknowledges the need to change and to have structural flexibility. Itargues, however, that organizational change is a matter of reworking the most appro-priate parts of the organization, rather than rededicating the whole organization


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(Mirvis, 1997). New-form research thus presents organizations with several structuralchange options when enabled by new technology.

1.3. Ambiguity in new-form research

Borrowing from Baskerville and Smithson (1995), and Boudreau and Robey(1996), and serving as the basis for this paper, recent debate suggests that claimsfor comprehensive structural change are overstated, based on the theoretical contra-dictions of new-form research. Not only are we being bombarded by one salvoafter another of organizational design solutions... (Keidel, 1994:12), as a result ofoversimplified or misleading attributions of change (Winter & Taylor, 1996), butnew-form theory is undermined by its enthusiasm for change. In particular, in aneffort to find an explanation for an orderly relationship between technology andchange, new-form theory has been eroded by research on the inaccurate represen-tation of IT as the keystone of success (e.g., Markus & Benjamin, 1997), the lackof appropriate empirical support (e.g., Ciborra, 1994), and research on the place andnature of authority in the organization (e.g., Zuboff, 1988). It is the authority ambi-guity that guides this research project.

As previously suggested, one of the main components of Giddenss (1984) struc-turation theory is that human interaction involves the application of normative sanc-tions, expressed through structures of domination and legitimation. These structuresretain and mediate order. The conditions and relations of power are key parts of the

structurational perspective of technology that have been generated from Giddenssforms of institution. New-form theory challenges the basis of such authority reten-tion. A series of research projects over the past twenty years, however, has illustratedthat the use of IT in organizations has not brought about significant change todecision making, authority or organizational political schema. Information systemshave been shown to maintain existing administrative structures (Kraemer & King,1979; Laudon, 1974; Perry & Kraemer, 1979), to centralize control (Danziger, Kra-emer, Dunkle, & King, 1993; Robey, 1981), and to enhance power for those inpositions of authority (Markus, 1983; Kraemer & Dedrick, 1997; Zuboff, 1988).

In particular, Kraemer (1991) illustrates that the introduction and use of computing

systems reinforces existing structures of authority, centralized communication andpower in organizations. Underpinning his political bias thesis is the recognition thatorganizations tend to conform to established institutional models while resistingattempts to reform. How technology is used determines its effects, and as such,whose interests are served. Management have thus tended to use IT to reinforcetheir position in organizations (supporting Danziger et al., 1993; Orlikowski, 1991;Kraemer & Dedrick, 1997; Kraemer & King, 1986; Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1997;Robey & Boudreau, 1999). Subsequently, managers see no need to change theirways. Quite the contrary. They have discovered that computing and other informationtechnologies are a powerful way to reinforce them (Kraemer, 1991:168). Laudons

(1974) analysis of computing and administration also reveals that despite the poten-tial for change, established interest groups obstruct administrative reformbased onthe threat to power and control. Using this political perspective, Markus (1983), like


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Zuboff (1988), argues that this bias is a process of the nature of interaction betweenpeople and the system. Markus illustrates that those in positions of power, and witha key role in systems decision making, are more likely to avoid changes that could

affect their authority base. This process of self-examination allows the managementgroup to perceive and understand other peoples reaction to the system, dictating theparameters of the implementation to serve their interests.

Recognizing Kraemers cumulative influence on the preceding authority retentiondebate, and drawing on Robey and Boudreaus (1999) causal logic of oppositionviewpoint, this paper reconsiders the relationship between IT and structural changein public organization. Although a weight of evidence supports the persistence ofexisting formal structures within the public sector (e.g., Robey & Sahay, 1996), theeffects of decentralized technologies on organizational politics is still not yet wellunderstood (Kraemer & Dedrick, 1997). Most research in this field does not usenew-form theory as a theoretical basis. Moreover, most research on the alignmentbetween structure and politics within changing IT environments examines therelationship between applications and organizational change. Internal factors underthe control of management are considered, but this is often done in terms of politicaltheory (e.g., Kraemer et al., 1989; Zuboff, 1988). With this observation in mind, Iexamine the process of IT adaptation within two public sector organizations.

2. Method

2.1. Research design and sample

To address the research topic, separate divisions within two Australian organiza-tions that were at different stages of introducing new software technology changeswere selected as critical cases. Each organization differed in their structural con-figuration at the time of IT change commencement, in size and age, and changeexpectations. Both, however, had established hierarchies in place. This sample buildson the recognition that historically, public-sector organizations have been highlybureaucratized (Meyer, 1968). The use of this sample is intended to give a clearer

understanding of the process of IT adaptation by concentrating on organizations thatare readily identifiable as hierarchical. With IT implementation changes at its base,I focus on the processes that shape hierarchy through the use of technology wherethere is no question that hierarchy is significant to the organization. This approachacknowledges that little substantive research exists about differences between public-and private-sector organizations within new-form theory. Furthermore, the choice ofthe public sector recognizes that public administrators are often eager to adopt newtechnological developments, and that information systems have long been viewed asan instrument of administrative reform (Kraemer, 1991).

Thefirst company reviewed, PubliTech, was a state-owned entity that was princi-

pally, but not solely, concerned with IT network management for the State public-sector. Mintzbergs (1979) professional bureaucracy characterized the organizationprior to the decision to implement the new system. The company specializes in


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network services (e.g., integrated network management and internet/intranetservices), but it has diversified to include IT services (e.g., bureau services andsoftware management), business systems (e.g.,financial and HR management bureau

services) and information services (e.g., interactive telephone services and videoconferencing). The company has just over 400 employees. Data collection concen-trated on the software reengineering experience of the corporate services division.Sixty persons were employed in this division at the time the new system was intro-duced. The new system, Information and Financial Management System (IFMS), isan enterprise resource planning system (ERP) implemented to replace the functionsof a fragmented manual waste management system. IFMS is a multi-faceted, inte-grated software package consisting of a suite of business process applications (ormodules) including financial accounting, investment management, human resourcedevelopment, controlling, logistics, treasury management and data managementcomponents (Table 1).

Table 1

Dimensions of case study companies

Dimension PubliTech WasteCo

Unit of Research Corporate Services Division Waste Management Division

Study Analysis

Information Information and Financial Waste Management Information

Technology Innovation Management System (IFMS): System (WMIS): employed to achieveemployed to better manage internal the coordination of externally

business processes while establishing determined environmental directives

platform for future consulting services with economic objectives

Context of Change History: Company provides network History: Division created by

Journey services for both public and private combining three separate entities to

sector. Division made up of 8 achieve waste minimization goals

separate departments. Company through the use of WMIS

moving towards corporatization and

IFMS seen as providing financial

basis for this

Size: Division employs 60 people, Size: Division employs 40 personnel,

while the company employs about while the three entities separately

400 people employ approximately 454 people

(47, 400 and 7 respectively)

Funding: State government Funding: Local government ($1.9

million over 5 years in a $50 million

waste management project)

Structural Professional Bureaucracy (Mintzberg, Divisionalized Form (Mintzberg,

Configuration Prior to 1979) 1979)

Information

Technology

Innovation

Dominant Change Extensive structural rededication with Fundamental changes to structure toExpectation at job function change and procedural bring about economic efficiencies.

Commencement and operational modification Radical changes to user behavior


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The second company, WasteCo, was an entity established to develop andimplement a new citywide Waste Management Information System (WMIS). Datacollection concentrated on the waste management division created to operate, manage

and maintain the system. The division was made up of three separate and independentunits, being the local government waste management authority, the information sys-tem service provider, and the private waste site operator. These units were forcedtogether to operate as one entity and consisted of approximately 40 individuals. Priorto the creation of WMIS the entity did not exist and local government manuallyoperated and maintained waste sites. As such, it is a byproduct of a centrally coordi-nated, centrally funded waste management program. Data collection centers on theimplementation and upgrade of a software system that coordinates the administrationof waste and landfill sites and directs the (physical) management of dumping on site(Table 1). It specifically examines the operation of five waste disposal sites as thethird and final phase of WMIS application was developed and progressivelyimplemented.

Mintzbergs (1979) divisionalized form of organizing characterized the organiza-tion prior to WMIS development. The system was implemented initially in 1992 andprogressively upgraded over a seven-year period. One of the first of its kind world-wide, it monitors (e.g., through point-of-sale computing as well as image capturecomputing), analyzes (e.g., weighbridges and data administration) and controls entryto and from recycling, refuse and landfill sites. It also provides financial and statisti-cal management information for the entire citys (population c.900,000) waste dis-

posal process. For both cases, management referred to throughout the paper relatesto senior management reaction to IFMS and WMIS. This focus recognizes Caudles(1990) observation that strategies for developing information technologies in govern-ment usually come from middle management, while key decisions about systemsimplementation and emphasis come from senior management.

The choice of the two sites was based on a replication logic (i.e., studying siteswith similar change intentions) over a sampling logic (i.e., studying sites of differentnatures). Following Dyer and Wilkins (1991) assessment of the merit of smallsamples, I preferred to develop a stronger explanation of how the process of ITadaptation unfolded, with a mind to testing my findings in different contexts in future

research (following Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1997). The case study design employedadopts Yins (1994) literal replication justification. The two cases were purposelyselected because they allowed direct comparison over time. Both had an acknowl-edged commitment by management to implement new systems in order to bringabout some form of change, and were undertaking similar technological changes. Byidentifying central change topics, and then clarifying the accuracy of these themes, areplication logic ensured that continual contrast and comparison of results betweencases took place throughout data collection.

2.2. Data collection and analysis

Data collection methods included non-participative observation, reviewing docu-mentation and archival records, and undertaking three waves of semi-structured inter-


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views. OKeefes (1979) approach to social interaction was adapted in two waysboth during and after data were collected. The first wave of data collection (JulyOctober 1997) was used to review and examine previous research themes, and then

to generate a research focus. The subsequent two waves (AprilJuly 1998; November1998March 1999) were used to test, expand and modify this initial research focus.In each case, the data collected and the analysis that followed immediately aftercollection informed other observations, insights and data subsequently undertaken.

The general data collection procedure was similar for each case. Documentationwas reviewed in thefirst wave of data collection, in order to contextualize the natureof the technology, organizational change objectives and to gain a better understand-ing of personnel roles and requirements. Both organizations had a variety of techni-cal-based documentation (e.g., what, where, when, cost) and strategy relevant infor-mation (e.g., cost/benefit analysis) that contextualized change decisions, changemotives, technology potential and company aspirations. Updated documents, in-house company and public domain publications supplemented the original notes inthe second and third wave of data collection. An understanding of the organizationalaspects (e.g., strategic direction, change in personnel, job specifications, workflowand reporting practices) was gained through in-depth semi-structured interviews withkey personnel involved in the implementation and use of the system. These inter-views dominated all data collection periods. In thefirst wave, the focus of the inter-views was on the persons experience of the system implementation and their expec-tations for change. The second and third waves explored attitudes towards the way

the system was being used, and to changes in outlook and in perceptions of theorganization.At PubliTech, the three waves of data collection encompassed two IFMS phase

releases. All participants were either members of the IFMS construction, implemen-tation and adaptation team or the departments that had gained access to the system.In the initial IFMS phase (first data collection period, four months into theimplementation), implementation was limited to core financial applications withinthe financial and administrative units. With the second phase, the system was pro-gressively introduced into all parts of the divisions operations (collection phaseswere 11 and 18 months into implementation). A total of 62 interviews were under-

taken over the twenty-month observation period with 21 key respondents, rangingfrom directors, project committees, project management, project engineers, systemsupport and HR personnel.

At WasteCo, interviews were arranged with individuals within the waste manage-ment division who had experience of the early versions of the system (1992 6), aswell as those involved with the development of its third release (19979). WMISconsultants who had built WMIS first phase release formed the largest sector ofparticipation in the first and second wave of data collection. Forty interviews wereundertaken with 14 individuals from all three parts of the conglomerate over theperiod of observation.

Questions were customized to capture the different experiences of each case. Ingeneral, however, they focused on new technology and the change process, changeexperiences, and authority. In attempting to build a picture of hierarchy, a hierarchy


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checklist was included in all interviews. The checklist was a list of questions thatreflected several components specific to Webers (1968) hierarchy. These compo-nents included questions relating to hierarchy as respondents saw it, control and

reporting systems, reporting structures, communication patterns, accountability,responsibility, and decision-making processes. The checklist enabled me to betterunderstand and characterize the difference between small-scale organizationalchanges (i.e., limited to the job and job processes), and large-scale changes (i.e.,fundamental structural reconfiguration) as technology use was being refined.

Following each period of data collection, I employed Wolcotts (1994) three-stepapproach of organizing qualitative data. As is typical of inductive research, thisapproach (description, analysis, and interpretation)first employed an analysis of datafor individual case studies, and then compared findings across cases. All interviewswere transcribed and coded. A coding scheme was developed by constructing dataout of the descriptive account given by respondents, and identifying and categorizingthe primary patterns in the data. This action was achieved by singling out informationthat I thought was noteworthy in terms of a research theme (e.g., exceptions orchallenges). I then relegated data that I thought to be less significant in terms of thistheme to the background (e.g., data relating to personal problems unrelated to thesystem). After identifying preliminary themes, I reviewed interview transcripts anddocumentation and coded text into these themes. I followed this by comparing codingclassifications and reviewing any discrepancies.

After developing the coding scheme I attempted to transform data into a more

consistent, organized scheme. I did this by relabelling information gathered as datawas collected across each wave of data collection. I was able to impose some orderon the data collected by highlighting particular findings, identifying patterned regu-larities, continuously comparing IFMS and WMIS case results, and contextualizingthe data to previous research. This step embodies the literal replication logic adoptedthroughout the research project. Having identified standards, sorted and ordered thedata collected, I set about reviewing these data patterns across both cases. I reliedon methods suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) to develop cross-case insights. In doingso, throughout the aforementioned inductive process, I initially compared casethemes to identify common issues and dilemmas and refine the unique aspects of

each case. I then reviewed each theme for similarities and differences to developthe emerging theoretical extension of myfindings. With each iteration, as this processevolved, I compared different sets of themes to refine my conceptual insights. Aftereach period of analysis, I went back through the individual cases to confirm myobservations.

3. Results: the constancy of hierarchy

The introduction, adaptation and manipulation of IFMS at PubliTech and WMIS

at WasteCo did not encourage fundamental structural transformation. New softwaretechnology did not bring about the demise of hierarchy or the fixtures of authoritythat had historically dominated these organizations. By using IFMS and WMIS to


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formalize behavior, specialize jobs, and create a reliance on functional groupings,some form of hierarchy authority was generally retained. Each case suggests thathierarchy has been able to adapt to new technology and the change aspects of

organizing labor, however, evidence indicates that hierarchy retention was contingentupon management reaction to both new systems. Table 2 presents a synthesis of thenature of hierarchy retention for both cases.

3.1. Overview of IFMS implementation

The implementation of IFMS began in May 1997, with the assistance of a well-known international consultant working closely with the implementation team. Theselection of IFMS technology was made by senior management guided by the needto replace a previously aging and unreliable financial management system, and to

Table 2

A synthesis of hierarchy stasis cross-case findings

Dimensions PubliTech WasteCo

Basis of the Initial New system commitment based on Commitment to constant system

Belief in the Need for the need to replace an aging and change and upgrade part of a wider

New System Changes unreliable information and financial waste reduction program. System

management system. System also seen as a means to win the war

viewed as a means to generate against waste and achieve promisedfuture revenue as the basis of the environmental and organizational

company becoming an IFMS service outcomes. Management commitment

provider. to creating a more ef ficient, more

profitable waste management

program.

Justification:Information Justification:Information

technology as a driver of change technology as means to significant

job change

Hierarchy Parts Stability of trend increasing job Three parts coming together to form

Sustained specialization, quasi-autonomous entities coupled

together by a central machine

bureaucracy administrative structure,

High formalization, Administrative centralization high,

Elaborate administrative structure, Standardization of waste

management task and procedure,

Minor internal rearrangement within Limited vertical decentralization,

individual divisions small role

sharing teams forming,

Operations and interaction between Formal and informal authority

divisions unchanged. differences increasingly manifest

Case Commonalities Rational-legal authority dominance Dominance of one unit over others

Centralization and high complexity Modification of management change

within changing operating expectationenvironment

Changes at job and unit level


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bolster PubliTechs eventual sale by government. The new system was viewed as ameans to generate future revenue, with PubliTech considering itself to be a potentialnational IFMS service provider. The implementation was initially concentrated in

the corporate services division, because its departments were seen as most likely toaid the organizations transition to corporatization. Moreover, its departments alreadyrelied on high technology use, thereby dispersing the system quickly and effectivelywithin this group.

IFMSs implementation and development was governed by a three-tier steeringcommittee structure. Senior management guided the process and made key decisions.This group of managers included representatives from across all divisions withinthe organization, and had the principal hand in determining commissioning contractguidelines. Despite lacking any substantive technical knowledge of the system, thedominant expectation of this group at the commencement of systems implementationwas that there would be extensive structural change. As an internal report endorsedby the group reiterates,

[IFMS] is a software product that unlocks the path to efficient organization unitsand to new structures....With its integrated processes for complete handling ofenterprise processes, it holds considerable potential for reengineering conventionalstructures and organizational methods. It enhances performance by redesigningcore business processes to revitalize and optimize them. This overcomes the

divisions of labor that restrict productivity (1997).

With senior managements ascendant role in PubliTechs IFMS strategy, thisexpectation guided the make-up of IFMS change decisions in the first phase ofimplementation. The second tier of the committee included project managers andimplementation coordinators who were responsible for acting on managementsdecisions in overseeing changes. This middle-management grouping were membersof the corporate services division and connected senior management and theimplementation team, having direct contact with both groups. Unlike senior manage-ment, most members of this group were drawn from a technical background, and

had previous knowledge of and experience with IFMS operations. This groups initialexpectations at the commencement of the implementation matched those of seniormanagement:

The implementation [of IFMS] will impact on the way people perform their jobs.In order to achieve this change and our business objectives, the implementationwill need to be accompanied by the redesign of structures and business processes.These changes are necessary to support new business processes. Simply touchingup current processes will not change behaviors (1997).

The third tier of IFMS implementation governance was IFMS consultants. Thisgroup was responsible for developing the system, based on senior managements


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instruction. They included the international consultant firm and IT contractors. OnceIFMS first phase was completed, consultants were also obligated to oversee oper-ational matters, such as maintaining IFMS configurations, data archiving, data backup

and solving user problems. Project management and consulting members of the com-mittee provided feedback to top tier management but had no veto rights overimplementation choices or the change process.

3.2. Impacts of IFMS on PubliTech

Far from fundamentally altering the corporate services division, IFMS at Publi-Tech promoted familiar but basic structural stability. Despite initial management-ledconfidence thatIFMS is magicits going to change the way that we structure thingsaround here (Deputy Director General, 1997), the application of IFMS did notreduce the basic command-and-control hierarchy. The completion of the first phaserelease of IFMS actually solidified differences between departments. Early in pro-ceedings senior management presented change almost as if it were a company doc-trine. Once IFMS first implementation phase began to take effect and once phasetwo commenced, however, management began candidly identifying with the valuesof what they were familiar withi.e., a parallel administration hierarchy with aprofessional bureaucracy at its base (Mintzberg, 1979). Such a hierarchy was charac-terized by the coordinating systems of this configuration, dependent on the task beingundertaken. For example, consulting services staff generally required a large degree

of operating independence, while finance staff required close supervision and stan-dardization of work processes. The junior project manager reflects on this outcome,

I think a more commercial entity presses for a flatter organization. However, weare in the middle of a struggle between change to a flat entity and no change,and I suspect its the traditional hierarchy thats winning. Whilst were a part ofgovernment, I guess we have to conform to it in some way (1998).

Despite initial assertions to the contrary, based for the most part on an expectation

of change, administrative roles were reinforced and strengthened by IFMSsimplementation. Nonetheless, the system did instill some work independence, as wasoriginally touted. This change gave those using IFMS or relying on its data to dotheir jobs an ability to define their own boundaries, access certain information andundertake a series of roles that they were previously unable to do. The implemen-tation, however, simultaneously restricted this new-found freedom. While it allowedsignificant changes in specific task handling, management, consultants and operatorsultimately still retained much the same jobs that they held prior to its implementation.For example, IFMS was originally promoted as enabling finance staff to initiatereports on their own accordwithout needing to consult the next level of manage-

ment at every step. The system was predicated on freeing information and onallowing concurrent task engineering for both finance operators and administrators.Accordingly, responsibilities for both groupings were presented as needing to be


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redefined, based on information access, and thus, accordant changes to the job. Bythe completion of the first phase, however, the system still retained established taskrestrictions associated with these functions. IFMS provided finance staff with far

more accurate and useful information. It allowed them to access, collate and manipu-late this data in new ways. Regardless, these functions were still curtailed. Operatordecisions relating to task commencement, task completion and then general approvalfor parts of job procedure (e.g., account undertakings) still needed to come fromthe next level of management. Administrators still needed middle managementsauthorization before they could use IFMS generated data in ways that differed fromthe norm. The systematic order of the administration of these tasks had not beenaltered in any notable fashion.

Notwithstanding the commercial reasoning for introducing IFMS, the adjustmentof managements change mindset has influenced users directly. Some individualspublicly held the expectation that IFMS would allow an increase in autonomy forsystem administrators. The procedural advantages of this action were viewed as tak-ing effect almost immediately. A financial controller argued that:

These new applications have allowed management to devolve decision makingfurther down the line....In effect, all this has done is enable senior managementto check on and oversee things a lot more effectively (1998).

Some staff were reluctant to commit to genuine changes that would rededicateroles or relationships. As a result, while IFMS originally offered some form ofchange at the administrative level of the division, promising to give us the abilityto be able to achieve all the flexibility that we need but cant have now (projectmanager, 1997), individual roles and the formalization of office remained much thesame. For example, twelve months after the initial release of the system, IFMSallowed finance administrators to do their jobs remotely. There was, however, nomanagerial commitment to encourage this change. Individuals were given no incen-tives to change their work habits, and as such, none had changed their workingpatterns. This outcome was particularly noteworthy because it was still easier to

work from a central office. Remote users required the same authorizations to com-plete operations as those working on-site. The system offered a variety of similarchanges to working habits and associated authority schemes, such as promoting agreater emphasis on teamwork by allowing all staff greater access to IFMS generateddata. But without any modifications to operations and procedures, there was anunwillingness by staff to be the first to commit to these changes.

3.3. Overview of WMIS implementation

WMIS was initiated in WasteCo in September 1992under instruction from local

governmentby the senior management group of the waste management authorityand site operator units of the division. The system was part of an integrated publiccampaign to reduce the waste going to the landfill by 50 percent by the year 2000


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(WasteCo Review, 1997). WasteCos troika partnership (waste management auth-ority, service provider, and site operator) was established to develop and implementa waste management system that would coordinate this process. The three units of the

division maintained a self-governing independence, with each historically operatingautonomously, having separate financial goals, public personae, and mission state-ments. Together, these units forged a new identity and common purpose, built aroundWMIS. It was anticipated that the system would achieve this purpose by coordinatingkerbside recycling, hardfill recycling, and commercial composting, creating a wasteaudit scheme (and the agencies to manage this scheme). To achieve this program ofwaste management, A$1.9 million was spent on WMIS software development. Thesystem was initially implemented at the citys landfill site (i.e., burial of solid waste)in 1992, and then progressively at each of the four smaller waste stations (handlingdomestic, commercial, and residential solid waste) from 1993 onwards. WMISsdevelopment, and its success in managing waste distribution, established WasteCoas a market leader. By 1997, the success of the system in achieving waste minimiz-ation goals and improving site management had encouraged the division to beginmarketing the technology to other Australian waste management operators.

WMIS replaced an antiquated, manual and previously labor-intensive waste man-agement process over its three-phase implementation period. The system was pro-moted in the early stages of its release as compelling users to change their behavior(and the features of the division that guided this behavior) in achieving long-termwaste management goals. The initial release specification constituted a development

of functional requirements (for operations), automation procedures (for data collec-tion and collation) and systems infrastructure (for data administration). The second(19934) and third (19979) phases focused on reviewing and upgrading these initiat-ives, while developing the systems interface. WMIS was instituted to allow the threeparts of the division to retain their operational independence, while still being partof a centrally funded public institution. The implementation of WMIS was governedby the WMIS coordination group, which included senior and project managementrepresentatives from all three WasteCo units. Drawing on the technical expertise andfeedback of the service provider, this grouping made all key decisions relating tothe nature and timing of the implementation.

3.4. Impacts of WMIS on WasteCo

In the first phase of WMIS implementation, the division operated as a series ofvertically integrated yet independent parts. Each unit shared responsibility foreffecting local-government determined waste management objectives, while playingan important role in the organization of WMIS activities. The progressive develop-ment of WMIS, however, saw WasteCos interdependent divisionalized form movetowards the more dependent, centralized configuration typical of the machinebureaucracy of the waste management authority unit. The division overturned the

advantages of operational integration by consolidating the routine, formalization andstandardization methods of coordination associated with the functional differentiationof this type of bureaucracy. This situation evolved despite initial promises that early


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on we were told that the system would flatten our hierarchy(systems administrator).As the same systems administrator points out, however, we now work on the pre-sumption that there is a manager, that each division is broken down into sections

and there are section heads and team leaders. We no longer have the situation wherewere allowing people to do their own thing.

The grouping of tasks and consolidation of the formulation, organization, andcoordination of waste management goals through WMIS use enabled the division tocentralize previously shared responsibilities. As such, the system fortified the func-tional distinctions that characterized waste management procedures prior to the pro-cess being computerized in 1992. Far from altering operations, functions and pro-cesses were strengthened over the three-phase release. As a result, a clear dividebetween administrators and operators was strengthened, in keeping with the centraliz-ation of decision-making that epitomized waste management administrative pro-cedures. A systems operator describes this situation:

Any changes that need to be madeeven the slightest changestill have to beapproved by the manager. Whether it is really his concern or not, thats the waythe division is structured now. The slightest change, whether it is something thatdoesnt affect the operating system still has to be approved, so that no one canreally make a low-level decision and say lets just change this because it doesntaffect anyone else, but its easy to do and saves us moneythis still has to go

to management (1998).

The functional requirements of gatehouse operator staff illustrate how this processhas compromised operator independence. Using WMIS to maintain the entrance toeach waste site, the informality and independence of this job has effectively beensubsumed by a subtle process of systems upgrade. By replacing a manual procedurewith an automated one, the division has been able to reinforce a centralization ofoperations. This change has enabled the waste authoritys management to controlaction in a far more concerted manner than they were able to prior to the system.Operators still meet and greet customers, still inspect waste and determine its type,

and still reject clients based on strictly established environmental criteria. This pro-cess, however, is now largely an automated one. Operators are no longer able todeal with, scrutinize or comment on data collected because this data now bypassesthem. The job, in effect, has been de-legitimized through a reliance on clear taskmarkers. Anyone with two days of WMIS training and an understanding of WasteCoenvironmental regulations could be employed in this position. Operator behavioris now guided by the system. As such, a clear divide between operators and dataadministrators and management is broadened. Authority is enforced by the implicitcontrol over operator actions, obscured behind the user-friendly, easy-to-use system.

The inherently menial nature of the gatehouse operators job has meant that this

process would always depend to some degree on the standardization of its operatingwork processes for coordination. Whereas the system was commissioned with thepromise ofhelping us improve our workflow by giving us more freedomsbecause


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after all, thats the blood, arteries and veins of what we do (operator), the tasksthat characterize this job have been increasingly centralized. This process ensuredthat by the systems second-phase release, part-time university student employees,

with computing but no waste management experience, began to replace long-servingwaste operators. Prior to WMIS, the operator job was far more of a social experiencethan it was about completing the task. Setting more rigidly enforced procedures inplace ensured a lack of ownership, as an operator bluntly observes:

I just dont care anymore, I just do whatever they [waste authority] wantI shrugmy shoulders and get into it. Go home, shake my head, kick the dog, whatever.But at the end of the day, my role here is to do what they want me to do (1998).

For a senior system consultant, this process reflects the logic of managementsthinking on change:

If youre going for an organizational change and use IT as part of that system,the IT has to reflect the organizational change, and the organizational changecomes from management. So the IT system has to reflect managements viewson organization change. I see nothing wrong with that (1997).

The gatehouse operator examplelike the waste spotter and site coordinatorrolesillustrates that WasteCos WMIS implementation has been an inherentlyunequal process. It has not diminished the features of the original hierarchy con-figuration, nor has it aided the dissemination of authority. Rather, technology inno-vation has been used to enhance managements operational control. WMISs appli-cation has thus remained much the same since its inception in 1992. While its third-phase release has allowed some changes to roles, the system has simultaneously beenused to enforce basic command-and-control structures. This decision was based onthe nature of system requirements, the perceived value of a machine bureaucracyhierarchy, and a belief in the absolute need to meet centrally established waste moni-

toring performance standards.

3.5. Explaining outcome similarities: managements role in maintaining hierarchy

Support for hierarchy authority retention illustrates that information technology ineach case did not necessitate a de-bureaucratization of the organization. New tech-nology reinforced the authority parts of Webers (1968) hierarchy because of theperceived stability and security accompanying the configuration. Each set of seniormanagers was adamant that legitimate authority was a necessary organizationalrequirement. Management, therefore, progressively interpreted systems implemen-

tation in a manner that enforced an authority distinction. This action aligns withWebers argument that a system of authority that limits itself to the appeal to materialor effectual or ideal motives as a basis for guaranteeing its continuance is ultimately


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self-effacing. Hierarchy was retained at PubliTech and WasteCo because manage-ment relied upon the authority that they had always held. Despite early commentsto the contrary, they did not encourage significant structural change. For PubliTechs

deputy director general, the need for an authority differentiation was tacitly logical:

We wanted benefits from [IFMS] and that was mainly management informationand the coordination of information....Ive seen situations when no ones takenthat role and I found that when someone walks in and has taken that role, some-how things are done better. Its almost as if they [subordinates] feel better....Theyall feel that their ideas are going somewhere, theyre being discussed, whereas Ifind that a group of individuals without someone driving a common purpose tendsto flake away. Its hard to keep that glue together to achieve something then(1998).

WasteCos senior systems administrator reiterates this viewpoint:

Its human nature. There are leaders and there are followers. And thats fine,because not everyone wants to make a decision. People need to be told what todo and how they have to do it, and if anything goes wrong, then its not theirfault. Thats what they are comfortable with and so thats what we do (1998).

In each case, management viewed IT as a means to enforce the controls associatedwith authority role differentiation, and thereby enhance existing authority relations.Management used each system to reinforce standardization, centralization and for-malization principles of a bureaucratic organizational construct. As such, once asystem had been implemented, management attempted to delineate parts of theorganization based on meeting its own requirements. This goal-oriented approachensured that management monitored the change situation, evaluated the nature ofstructural changes, and then took corrective action to adjust roles and relationships,and rules and procedures to meet their expectations. Such action describes a utili-

tarian preservation of self outlook. This outlook is characterized by IT being con-ceived, developed, coordinated and implemented by human agents who bring certainspecific interests and values to the change equation. As such, both sets of manage-ment primarily only promoted new IT once they were certain that it was likely tolead to a maintenance of the legitimate control of Weberian hierarchy.

Management action reflected their vested interest in the structural status quo, view-ing technology applications as an extension of the managerial position. They continu-ally assessed the potential change situation in this vein, as a project manager atPubliTech observed if you go and try to cater for everybody else and add all thebells and whistles and the sorts of things that everybody wants, the system would

just become totally bogged down. So the main purpose of [IFMS] now is to provideus with better information. Thats it. In both cases, several similar devices havemaintained management control. These included:


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1. A career system that depends on authority differentiation. Situational and insti-tutional properties still closely follow a pattern of organization (i.e., promotion,decision making, procedure) that is strongly linked to authority differentiation.

For PubliTech this situation reflects the influence of state government, while forWasteCo, the waste management unit.

2. A socialization process whereby most non-management staff members learn toritualize authority as a sanctioned management tool. For example, primary systemusers in both organizations were educated in this mindset through the trainingroutine employed. Finance and gatehouse operators were schooled only in thebasic parts of the system to enable them to do the minimum requirements ofthe job.

3. Internal behavioral controls that foster role differentiation (e.g., operator roles).The routine that this centralization engendered has subsequently promoted a con-stant cycle of recruitment, training, and systems familiarization, ensuring thatusers and operations management were disenfranchised.

4. A system of direct supervision that formalizes functional differentiation.

For example, at PubliTech, despite the ability of IFMS to encompass a wide rangeof new and sophisticated functions, senior management was reluctant to accept thesystem without reworking its parts to comply with their own requirements. By under-taking a process of adapting system modules to meet their (authority based) changeexpectations, it had subsequently become a means of upgrading rather than changing.

New system modules were continually forced to match the old system. Senior man-agement, wary of changes that they believed they might have no control over,enforced this constraint. The essential quality of this decision in managements eyeswas that it not only guaranteed stability, but that it was the rational thing to do.

The heart of managements utilitarian preservation posture at PubliTech was thatsenior management ostensibly commissioned a management information system.They selected particular IFMS modules to form the basis of the initial implemen-tation scheme. Accordingly, IFMS was regarded as a system meant to improve man-agements access to and control of information. Implementation team members con-tinually portrayed the system as an information system that achieved managements

goals first. Only once these were met were operator change objectives more closelyconsidered. The system was viewed as a means to improve reporting proceduresrather than a means to rationalize these procedures (as was originally touted). Animplementation team consultant reiterates this process:

There are management players that are actually working against the system...thereare a number of them thinking well, IFMS is going to expose me, so Ive gotto work against it. That force was very evident in this phase as to who wanted

what and why they wanted these things, and its part of the fact that weve beenin limbo for three months waiting for decisions about where were going. Forsome managers the longer the process went along, the happier they were...they


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were quite happy that [the implementation] was moving the way it was movingbecause it gave them time to position themselves (1999).

In accordance with this situation, the initial and overriding (information) advan-tages of IFMS primarily accrued to management. This result is not surprising giventhe nature of the organization. Most management had spent little time actively inter-acting with the system in the first phase release, however, despite their role in thedesign and commission. Consequently, most senior managers whose jobs weredirectly affected by the information accrued through the system did not understandhow it worked. Neither did they recognize how they could use IFMS or how theycould encourage others to apply it in a more efficient manner.

At WasteCo, the limitations of WMIS first phase release meant that it was neverreally going to threaten existing functional differentiation or the way informationwas shared. Yet management instructed the service provider unit to initiate 582change requests in the second phase release in order to centralize system generatedinformation, so that WMIS would always be a management system. On reflectionI dont think that theres been anything in the last five years that has changed that(WMIS Consultant, 1997). Only a select few at head office could review cross-siteinformation together with waste management goals. Consequently, controls that werepreviously embedded solely in rules, regulations, procedures, job titles and paygrades were transplanted onto the progressive upgrades of the system.

WasteCos management reacted to technology implementation only when they

perceived it as a threat to the information flow that defined the outer limits of theirposition of authority. Management assumed that they needed to use WMIS to anchortheir influence and to push the utilization of the system to ensure this influence. Ineffect, management action reflects a form of management self-preservation. Thisreaction is based partially on the fear of what a change to information flow couldmean for the management job, and partly on a belief that organizational rationalityis linked to authority differentiation (as in Weber, 1968). Assessing the situation,management considered to what extent they would need to defend their positions.They have then acted in accordance with this judgment. The key to this approachis that management action was a premeditated, self-interested action. By preserving

their decision-making positions, management did not restrict WMIS changes withoutreason. Instead, they protected their authority by not promoting the full extent ofthe system. As a systems administrator, points out:

The people who had worked closest with the system, who had implemented thesystem and saw it come to fruition, were comfortable with what was going on.People who had nothing to do with itlike managementviewed it with skepti-cism or just tried to find something wrong with it (1997).

In both cases, this purposive management action guided the use of each new sys-tem in a fashion that ensured beliefs about the legitimacy of authority were main-tained. Management continually appraised the situation in terms of how it affected


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their access to the information flow that characterizes rationallegal authority. If theywere satisfied that the initial changes (i.e., individual job change) were restricted toretaining original role and relationship differences (i.e., their authority needs met)

and maintained their authority, they did little to change this situation. When theyconsidered their positions to be under threat (i.e., authority needs unmet), however,they then acted to protect their authority.

4. Discussion and conclusion

In the present research, I aimed at empirically examining the nature of hierarchyauthority in public organizations by reflecting on the domination and legitimationmodalities of Giddenss (1984) structuration theory. Results indicate that IT is notnecessarily associated with flexible, decentralized new forms of organizing. Rather,technology change results in the strengthening of management-centered and manage-ment-determined control. This action is driven by a system of managerial self-preser-vation. Managements utilitarian action at PubliTech and WasteCo resulted in a step-like filtering down process. For management, the need to legitimize their positionwas dominant. In effect, managements utilitarianism is a form of managementinsecurity. This reaction is based partially on the fear of what a change to informationflow could mean for the management job (i.e., retaining domination) and partly ona belief that organizational rationality (i.e., legitimation) is linked to authority differ-

entiation (supporting Weber, 1968).Managements overarching hand in guiding the nature of structural change is notnew. These results confirm previous research in supporting why organizational struc-tures (such as hierarchy) and organizing values (such as hierarchy authority) endure,even in the face of elaborate programs of change. As previously illustrated, Kraemer(1991), Markus (1983), Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1997), Robey and Boudreau(1999) and Zuboff (1988) all indicate that IT does not bring about organizationaldemocracy because new technology has a power-restricting bias, thereby reinforcingexisting organizational arrangements. Similarly, Orlikowski (1991) and Starbuck(1989) both explicitly address managements role in retaining their positions of domi-

nance as technology changes. One may well question, then, why management actionat PubliTech and WasteCo is surprising. After all, both organizations were part ofa public sector that has traditionally been reliant on some form of centralization.With new-form theory as its basis, however, and unlike previous research, thesecases provide empirical evidence of how the process of adaptation unfolded. Thereare several conclusions and implications to draw from this process.

4.1. Theoretical conclusions of the research

To understand the retention of hierarchy at PubliTech and WasteCo, it is necessary

to recognize the basis of managements disposition to change. Management reactionin using IFMS and WMIS as self-enforcing tools of authority is reasonable for pub-lic-sector organizations. Management within these organizations is publicly respon-


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sible for their actions, as well as being accountable for expenses incurred to thepublic purse. Despite public administration feeling the pressure to become moreefficient and to compete more effectively in a changing economy, these organizations

still need to deliver services, provide access to, and interact with its constituents(Kraemer & Dedrick, 1997). Intentionally retaining the conditions of authority cantherefore be viewed as a prudent means of managing this process. Previous researchhas already debated the ways that public-sector managers have centralized computingfacilities to achieve this response (e.g., Danziger et al., 1993; Kraemer et al., 1989),while explaining the structural inertia or resistance response as a factor of organiza-tional politics (e.g., Markus, 1983; Zuboff, 1988). Applying Orlikowskis (2000)technology-in-practice extension of the structurational model, however, I suggest thatit is managements use of IFMS and WMIS in this prudent vein that explains theprocess of adaptation in the two case studies.

As stated earlier, Orlikowski argues (adapting Giddens) that human interactionwith technologies is recurrent as users enact organizational structure through the useof that technology. This enactment frames technology use because[f]ocusing atten-tion on how structures are constituted and reconstituted in recurrent social practicesacknowledges that while users can and do use technologies as they were designed,they can also circumvent inscribed ways of using technologies(2000:407). Applyingher practice lens for studying the use of technology to the utilitarian thesis, I proposethat PubliTech and WasteCo management action is a reasonable response for a publicorganization, based on the type of enactment that these managers employed. Adding

a tangent to Orlikowskis inertia type of enactment (2000:422/3), I offer a groupidentity technology-in-practice to explain the retention of hierarchy in these cases(Fig. 1). In doing so, I acknowledge that the preceding findings largely address non-management use of IFMS and WMIS.

I propose, however, that how non-management users employ technologies to sus-tain hierarchy (e.g., Orlikowskis limited-use technology-in-practice) is contingenton management action. That is, when non-management employees use IFMS andWMIS independent from management, they draw on the technological and structuralproperties guided by managements power over, knowledge, assumptions, and expec-tations about the technology and its intended use. This interaction is recurrent, ensur-

ing that management are able to reinforce a previously acknowledged position ofauthority around this technology use. In both cases, management has been able tofuse the implementation of each new system to hierarchy authority because thisprocess is supported by the identities that they have forged for themselves basedon such an enactment. For this reason, the technology-in-practice focus emphasizesmanagements application of IFMS and WMIS, while drawing conclusions in termsof the process of technological adaptation.

In this group identity practice of technology use, management rarely interactedwith WMIS and IFMS, involving themselves infrequently in the data and documentmanagement parts of the application. Most relied heavily on their subordinates to

guide them in applying more sophisticated functions. They had little advancedknowledge of the system, and were generally unmotivated to spend more timebecoming familiar with something that they regarded as outside their daily domain.


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Fig. 1. Group identity technology-in-practice authority stasis in two technology change environments

(applied to Orlikowski, 2000.)

This management use of technology supports Danziger et al. (1993), and Pinson-neault and Kraemer (1997). The senior management grouping in both cases thusforged a common identity based on their positions as administrators, with a clearauthority demarcation as its basis. Change for this group was often talked about asjob function change, operational redefinition or information dissemination. Itwas never spoken of in terms of authority or position modification. Regardless oforiginal statements of change, seniorityand the responsibility and accountabilitythat delimits the management rolewas viewed as the defining feature of each

organization and its operations. Accordingly, management classified organizationalmembers in terms of authority groupings. Results indicate that the modifications thatdid take place (i.e., limited job change), a belief in each system as an information


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management system rather than a transforming system (i.e., technology managementorientation), and the socialization processes employed to retain this orientation (i.e.,authority culture) all reinforced managements group perception.

The key to this group identity is that it is enacted through the recurrent use oftechnology. Unlike new-form theory, which usually concentrates on external effectson structures, the group identity enactment suggests that organizational change is afactor of its internal environment. Both sets of managers allowed a utilitarian arrange-ment to emerge from the ongoing interactions they had with their subordinates andthe technology. They did this by viewing the new technology as an extension of themanagerial position, and thereby allowing the system to be adapted in a manner thatreflected their vested authority interests. This change took place precisely becausestructures are not enacted in a social vacuum.

Group identity enactment is incongruous in places. For example, why would man-agement purposely commission a new technology application to reinforce currentstructures if the technology offered the potential to capitalize on new-form gains?More specifically, why would these management groupings ever be inclined to intro-duce new systems that potentially worked against their self-interest? Like DeSanctisand Poole (1994), Giddens (1984), Kraemer (1991), Orlikowski (2000), I suggestthat management draw on their institutional knowledge to guide their actions, whichmay obscure the long-term implications of their actions. This knowledge guides thenature of the management grouping reaction.

For example, at PubliTech, managements original change expectations were for

drastic structural reinvention. As IFMS took root, management continually reassessedthe viability of change, deliberately modified the properties of the technology, andhow they interacted with it. While the resultant technological changes were inten-tional, the structural consequences were less considered, contingent on this decision(supporting Orlikowski, 2000). Giddens presents this monitoring process as a con-tinuousflow of conduct because,human agents always know what they are doing onthe level of discursive consciousness. However...they may know little of the ramifiedconsequences of the activities in which they engage(1984:26). While they may nothave foreseen all the structural consequences of their actions, PubliTech and Was-teCo management knew, and non-management understood, what their immediate use

of new systems would bring about. This recognition is the basis of the utilitarianthesis with the institutional position of management in these organizations under-pinning management reaction. Technology use is thus established less by structuralchange than it is by group identity. After all, new IT is not an immutable object.

The key to this reaction is that non-management staff have been progressivelyconditioned to an authority scheme, based on the pervasive influence of a normativelycoordinated legitimate order (Fig. 1). Managers are not able to direct structuralchange outcomes unilaterally, but are dependent on a dialectic process of change(Robey & Boudreau, 1999). In these cases, similar to Zuboffs (1988) mutual depen-dency construct, managements utilitarian action only existed because it was

reinforced by the instantiation of normative codes and sanctions built around hier-archys legal framework. In both organizations, management used technologyimplementation as a vehicle of the need for control. This action was mediated by


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their organizational memory of the place of authority, whereby non-managementstaff were socialized to hierarchy through established, historically-based norms(supporting Boudreau & Robey, 1996, Walsh & Ungson, 1991). New-form theory

suggests that organizations will need to create a high-involvement environment ofpower sharing, ignoring an organizations institutional history. This observation ischallenged by the management action at the base of a group identity technology-in-practice.

The socialization of authority that follows from this action encouraged a con-ditioned response to change at PubliTech and WasteCo. Unlike March and Simons(1958) unobtrusive control, the type of enactment producing this action is explicit.Managements utilitarian response, and the group identity subsequently generated,is considered to be an elemental component of the management job. Managementauthority is sustained and strengthened because non-management staff viewed auth-ority as a path to functional stability when everything else around them was changing.This outcome is particularly evident in the manner that PubliTech financial staff andWasteCo gatehouse operators attempted to fall back onto manual procedures in thefirst phase of the new system implementation, thereby reinforcing existing roles andfunctions. While authority may be legitimately centralized, the utilitarian thesis relieson this interrelationship between management and their subordinates to sustain it.

Although the group identity technology-in-practice lens is based on an authorityrelationship, it is important to recognize that a claim for authority retention does notrefer to the use of IT as a tool to exercise a Bravermanian managerial prerogative.

Whereas new-form models of change downplay the presence of authority in theorganization (e.g., Byrne, 1993), the utilitarian thesis at the base of the group identitylens presents management action as a proactive stance that incorporates a combi-nation of the characteristics of the dimensions of control (supporting Storey, 1987).It is easy to present the way that non-management users employ technologies tosustain hierarchy, contingent on management action, as part of a deskilling effectsdiscussion. After all, as Zuboff (1988) reiterates, organizations are political entities.Management action at both PubliTech and WasteCo illustrates, however, the manipu-lation of control in this way does not specifically encompass the alienation, deskillingor control often associated with labor process theories (Garson, 1988), or social

action theories (Gorz, 1985). Management objectives are shaped by the wider socialand organizational structures within which managers function.Both cases indicate that to employ the controls of the labor process would be self-

defeating, potentially limiting IT efficiencies and associated financial returns. Theutilitarian thesis is not so much about explicitly controlling workers. Rather, it isabout maintaining the conditions under which authority is reproduced. In accordancewith the view that management enactment of technology in these cases was reason-able, technology-based control can be viewed as a reflection of the alignment betweenmanagement needs and user requirements. Like Robey and Sahay (1996) and Pinson-neault and Kraemer (1997), this bond infers that while similar technologies may be

introduced into different organizations, it is the social processes and the context ofimplementation that guides structural outcomes. This observation lends weight to thenotion that the value of information technology to an organization may well be


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dependent on how the systems function is integrated into the broader manage-ment process.

4.2. Implications of management action for managerial practice

Managements utilitarian response has three implications for undertaking IT inno-vation. First, managements self-preservation actions suggest that technology changemay represent an opportunity for management to use IT to manage changeimpressions (drawing on Goffman, 1970). Recognizing that impression managementis not necessarily uniform in its application, senior management may need to paycloser attention to the way that they commission technology change to achieve theirpreferred utilitarian results. Unlike new-form theory assumptions, this approach doesnot necessarily mean that management control needs to be curtailed or minimized(although this may be an outcome of a more responsive management). Differentchange situations may call for management to consider different approaches to thiscondition. For instance, in certain cases management may need to create moreencompassing programs of IT implementation whereby non-management staffinvolvement is far more apparent. Employees may need to be better involved along-side management in IT change preparation, implementation and upgrade to achievethis outcome. This approach would ensure that management are forced to betterexplain their change positions and to continuously justify their disposition towardsthe nature of the control systems built around the implementation. Management

would need to be outwardly focused rather than continuously and repeatedly examin-ing the change situation from a closeted perspective. Accepting that hierarchy is acentral feature of the organization, this action would not rid the organization of alldimensions of control. It would, however, limit some of the negative consequencesof the social categorization associated with the group identity enactment.

Second, as the routine monitoring of aspects of technological change and theirhistorical context takes place, the way that management present themselves to organi-zational members may influence staff to act in accordance with managements projec-tion of their definition of the change situation. Such a situation could have negativeimplications for working relationships, and team member perceptions of their sense

of worth. The risk of such an approach is that it relies on an internal divide. Theroutine created through the institutionalization of rules, procedures, and differen-tiation associated with hierarchy authority can lead to a sense of a lack of systemownership. It could also alienate those who perceive their roles being dictated to byothers when a new system promises change. Such a reaction strengthens the groupidentity technology-in-practice, sustaining authority differences. Management action,therefore, may not allow the potential of technology change to be fully realized.

Finally, the utilitarian thesis at the base of managements group identity reactionillustrates that how management restricts authority change is conditioned by theirunderstanding of the influence of technology on the organization. As the PubliTech

and WasteCo cases indicate, the success of systems change is a reciprocal process,rather than a unidirectional one. Management may therefore need to have a seriesof contingent approaches to systems implementation in place, if they intend to use


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IT to center modifications around hierarchy authority. This situation has clear impli-cations for change theory that redefines managements role. As change becomes afar more recurrent occasion, reliant upon management opinion and reaction, an alter-

ation to managements role is enforced. In new-form theory, the character of ITimplies that management generally takes a secondary position in managing thechange process. The utilitarian preservation thesis indicates a more central role forthis grouping. Management thus needs to be far more aware of the overt ramificationsof their technology change decisions. They must acknowledge the response theiractions provoke. Understanding this response, and setting in place procedures to reactto change, could potentially have several beneficial personnel consequences.

4.3. Limitations and future research directions

Like most research of this type, this study has limitations. Notably, I did notcompare the IT-enabled change experiences of private sector organizations with Pub-liCo and WasteTech findings. This approach, as previously stated, was purposelyundertaken, in recognizing that while the use of IT in the public sector has increasedgreatly over the past decade, research on this use has declined (Kraemer & Dedrick,1997). Nonetheless, this restrictive focusalong with the interpretive approachadoptedconstrains my ability to generalize findings beyond this sector (and,specifically, outside this setting). Moreover, I concentrated a discussion of the utili-tarian thesis at the senior management level of decision making, while drawing on

structuration and administrative authority literature that advocates the multidimen-sional nature of the management role. Similarly, drawing on Orlikowski and Iacono(2001), I recognize that IT is not neutral or universal. Because this technology iscommissioned, designed, implemented, and used by people with different interestsand values, any assumptions about change need to be tempered by the technologicalfeatures and context of my discussion. I acknowledge that IT is a complex, dynamicand fragmented entity that may not necessarily allow the non-specific theorizing thatI have presented.

These limitations aside, I argue in this paper that understanding managementsdisposition to IT change discerns the nature of an organizations structure and the

adaptation of that structure. By examining the process of IT adaptation in two publicorganizations, I have given an insight into how an espoused thrust to achieve new-form change is frustrated by the very people who propound the change, based ontheir use of the technology. Findings indicate that as long as these organizationshave limited resources and contain multiple perspectives, some form of authorityand role differentiation will always be needed. Accordingly, this research re-estab-lishes the viability of undertaking further, additional reviews of other aspects ofWebers (1968) hierarchy abstraction in changing technology environments.

A test of thesefindings could include a broader consideration of management rolesin other changing technology environments. This approach could also include closer

attention to issues relating to society and authority in IT change environments. Futureresearch might examine the utilitarian de

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Organizational Hierarchy Adaptation and Information Technology_2002