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OPTIMISTIC EXPLANATORY STYLE AND THE PERCEPTION OF HEALTH PROBLEMS CHRISTOPHER PETERSON AND MECHELE E. DE AVILA

University of Michigan

Eighty-six adults completed questionnaires that measure explanatory style and perception of health problems. Subjects on the average saw themselves as below average in risk for a variety of health problems. Those subjects with an optimistic explanatory style, who explained bad events with external, unstable, and specific causes, in particular saw themselves as less at risk (r = .30, p < .01). They also believed that they were more able to prevent these health problems. Partialling out perceived preventability reduced to nonsignificance the correlation between explanatory style and perceived risk, which suggests that perceived preventability may mediate this link.

Explanatory style is a cognitive personality variable that reflects how a person habitually explains the causes of bad events (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). Some in- dividuals explain bad events with internal, stable, and global causes (“it’s me; it’s going to last forever; it’s going to affect everything that happens”); we identify them as pessimistic. Other individuals favor external, unstable, and specific causes (“it was just one of those things”); we identify them as optimistic. Explanatory style emerged from the attributional reformulation of the learned helplessness model as a way of explain- ing variation in response to bad events (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). This

We thank Neil Weinstein for making available to us copies of the questionnaires he devised for measur-

Correspondence should be addressed to Christopher Peterson, Department of Psychology, University ing perceptions of health problems.

of Michigan, 580 Union Drive, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1346.

Optimistic Explanatory Style 129

variable has been examined most frequently with regard to depression, but recent work has examined as well the link between explanatory style and physical health.

Studies show that an optimistic explanatory style is linked with good health opera- tionalized in a variety of ways (Peterson & Bossio, 1991). Explanatory style presumably affects outcomes, including physical health, through its effect on one’s expectations about the future controllability of bad events. The optimistic individual expects that he or she can do things that make bad events less likely. These expectations translate into active coping, which, in turn, may be beneficial. In several studies, we have found that in- dividuals with an optimistic explanatory style are indeed more likely than their pessimistic counterparts to engage in health-promoting activities (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993).

The research reviewed so far is coherent, but juxtaposition of these findings on ex- planatory style with the literature on risk perception creates an apparent contradiction. Specifically, Weinstein (1989) has shown that individuals consistently underestimate their own risk for a variety of health problems. Although it is impossible in any given case to characterize an individual’s expectations as realistic or unrealistic, this can be done for a group of people asked to compare their relative risk to that of people in general. People on the average see themselves as below average in risk, and this cannot be strictly accurate.

The danger of unrealistic optimism like that demonstrated in Weinstein’s research is that it may lead people to neglect health care and promotion. However, research on optimistic explanatory style suggests that “optimism” is useful insofar as it catalyzes action that reduces one’s risk for health problems.

The resolution of the explanatory style literature and the risk perception literature may entail the recognition that optimistic explanatory style is a special sort of optimism, one infused with agency (McKenna, 1993). So, an optimistic explanatory style is not to be confused with the blithe expectation of a rosy tomorrow. Instead, an optimistic explanatory style leads one to expect a better world by enhancing his or her personal control. By this line of reasoning, explanatory style is associated with reduced risk percep- tion because of its effect on one’s perception of the controllability of health problems. (Cf. Hoorens & Buunk, 1993.)

In the present research, subjects completed questionnaires that measured their ex- planatory style, as well as their perception of health problems, along several dimen- sions, including their relative risk and the preventability of problems. The relationship between “optimistic” explanatory style and “optimistic” risk perception was determined, as well as factors that may mediate any association that exists between them.

METHOD

Subjects and Procedure Research participants in this study were 86 adult volunteers (43 males, 43 females)

from the Ann Arbor community. Most (85%) were students, with an average age of 22.1 years (SD = 7.89). Subjects completed questionnaires in small groups in single sessions.

Participants completed several questionnaires. First, they answered the Beck Depres- sion Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967), a 21-item questionnaire frequently used to measure the extent and severity of common depressive symptoms. Symptoms are rated from 0 to 3 and are summed; higher scores indicate more depressive symptoms. The cautious use of the BDI is to gauge not clinical depression, but, rather, the extent of dysphoric feelings. In the present research, BDI scores were used as a covariate to see whether relationships between explanatory style and risk perception existed independently of negative mood, which arguably might influence both. In the present sample, the reliability of the BDI, estimated by Cronbach’s (1951) alpha, was .82.

130 Journal of Clinical Psychology, January 1995, Vol. 51, No. I

Next, subjects completed a series of parallel questionnaires that asked them to rate each of 11 health problems (heart attack, arthritis, food poisoning, skin cancer, alcohol problem, serious injury in an auto accident, stroke, pneumonia, deafness, senility, and asthma) in terms of:

1.

2. 3. 4. 5 .

6.

7. 8.

Perceived personal risk (7-point scale, with the midpoint = average for men/women my age, scored - 3 to +3) Seriousness (5-point scale, scored 1 to 5) Preventability (Cpoint scale, scored 1 to 4) Past contact @-point scale, scored 1 to 5) Likelihood that problem would arise in the future if it had not yet arisen (3-point scale, scored 1 to 3) Frequency of problem in the general population (percentile rating, scored 0 to loo) How much people in general worry about problem (Cpoint scale, scored 1 to 4) Associated embarrassment (Cpoint scale, scored 1 to 4).

For each scale, high scores indicated more of the characteristic in question, low scores less. Finally, subjects completed the Expanded Attributional Style Questionnaire (EASQ;

Peterson & Villanova, 1988), which presents respondents with 24 bad events that in- volve the self. They are asked to provide in writing the “one major cause” of each event if it had happened to them and then to rate each cause along 7-point scales that cor- responded to its internality, stability, and globality. Ratings typically are averaged across events for the three attributional dimensions and then across the three dimensions to yield an overall estimate of a person’s optimistic (low score) vs. pessimistic (high score) explanatory style. In the present sample, the reliability of the composite ASQ, estimated by Cronbach’s (1951) alpha, was .95.

RESULTS ’ An optimistic “bias” is reflected by individuals who perceive themselves as less at

risk for a given health problem than are other individuals. Table 1 shows the mean scores for the 11 different health problems included in the questionnaires. As can be seen, a marked optimistic tendency was present for almost all of the problems, as shown by the negative signs of the means, although there was considerable variation across the health problems.

Does it make sense to regard such optimism as an individual difference? We created a composite scale by averaging each of the 11 ratings, and its internal consistency as estimated by Cronbach’s (1951) alpha was satisfactory (.81), which indicates that it is a meaningful individual difference. Analogous composites were formed for each of the rating scales, and their reliabilities were of similar magnitude. Subsequent analyses that entailed the perception of health problems used these composite measures.

Consistent with Weinstein’s previous findings, an optimistic view of one’s personal risk for health problems was associated positively with perceived preventability (r = .43, p < .001) and associated negatively with past contact (r = - .21, p < .05) and presumed frequency (r = - .24, p < .05). The other composite ratings were not related significantly to perceived risk.

An optimistic explanatory style, in which bad events are attributed to external, un- stable, and specific causes, was associated with decreased risk perception (r = .30, p < .01). Also, optimistic explanatory style was correlated with the perceived preventability of

‘Controlling for sex and age of subject did not affect any of the results reported. Controlling for BDI scores similarly did not affect any of the results reported.

Optimistic Explanatory Style 131

Table 1 Perception of Risk

Health problem Mean perception of personal risk t

Heart attack Arthritis Food poisoning Skin cancer Alcohol problem Serious injury in auto accident Stroke Pneumonia Deafness Senility Asthma

-.68 (1.58)

-.31 (1.43)

- .82 (1.31)

-.76 (1.53)

- 1.45 (1.65)

-.13 (1.08)

- .62 (1.25)

-.56 (1.26)

-.57 (1.32)

-.56 (1.23)

-1.17 (1.32)

3.99. 2.01.

5.80.

4.60*

8.15.

1.30

4.60.

4.12’

4.00.

4.22.

8.22.

Note. -Mean rating of 0 = average for medwomen my age. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

* p < .05. t-tests were conducted to evaluate the null hypothesis that mean = 0.

problems (r = .47, p < .001). Explanatory style was unrelated to the other composite ratings. Considered individually, each of the three dimensions of explanatory style - internality, stability, and globality- showed the same pattern of correlations as did the composite measure of explanatory style.

The partial correlation between explanatory style and risk perception, with perceived preventability held constant, was computed and proved to be nonsignificant (r = .12, ns). This suggests that the relationship between explanatory style and risk perception may be mediated by an individual’s belief that health problems can or cannot be prevented.

DISCUSSION

In keeping with Weinstein’s previous findings, we found that our subjects on the average viewed themselves as less at risk than people in general for a variety of health problems. We also found that explanatory style was linked to one’s perceptions of risk for illness. Those who explained bad events with external, unstable, and specific causes in particular saw themselves as being at reduced risk.

As Weinstein has noted, we cannot say whether or not any given individual is realistic about the future, but we can observe that the present subjects were at least consistent in how they saw things. Granted that explanatory style does have health consequences and that it does predispose behavior that in turn has health-promoting consequences, the optimism expressed by our subjects may have some basis in reality. The fact that the perceived preventability of problems appeared to mediate the link between ex- planatory style and risk perception further supports this interpretation.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that at least some instances or aspects of optimism about one’s future health risks should not be decried. To the degree that optimism en- tails perceived control over health problems, it leads people to act in healthy ways. Health psychologists like Weinstein have done a service to the general public by pointing out that people may underestimate their risk for certain problems. The contribution of the present research is our suggestion that only part of this tendency is unhealthy. Future

132 Journal of Clinical Psychology, January 1995, Vol. 51, No. 1

communication with the general public should instruct people how to translate this op- timism into healthy practices.

Limitations to the present research certainly exist and should be acknowledged. We relied exclusively on self-report measures. While this makes sense when one’s focus is on perceptions and beliefs, a more complete study would have included behavioral measures to determine whether these cognitions foreshadow concrete action. Our sample for the most was young, well-educated, and in good health. Whether the present results generalize to samples with severe illnesses or disabilities is an open question. Finally, we used a cross-sectional design and partial correlation procedures to infer mediation. Actually following our subjects over time would have been a preferable strategy.

Nonetheless, our study adds to the literature in two ways. First, it extends the research on explanatory style and health; one of the ways in which people’s explanatory style is pertinent to their health status is by its influence on the perception of health problems, specifically, their preventability and hence their future likelihood. Second, it qualifies the research on optimistic “bias” in risk perception; people’s optimistic tenden- cies may be based in part on reality.

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