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Opportunities and Constraints for the
Disarmament & Repatriationof the FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALU
in the DRC
Hans RomkemaConflict & Transition Consultancies
For the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP)
Scope Objectives
Methodology
Overview of AGs
D&R To Date
Opportunities
Constraints
Recommendations
Impact of fighting in North Kivu
Objectives of this Study
Goal: provide recommendations to ‘enhance the success of the D&R process for foreign AGs in the DRC’
Key-objective: To analyse ‘the opportunities and constraints faced by male and female foreign combatants and their dependents in the DRC seeking to disarm and repatriate to their countries of origin’
COFSEx-COFS
Communities
Others
Interviews with key-informants (≥ 200) X X X X
Questionnaires(45) X
Focus group discussions (13) X
Comparative study(5 territories) X X
LiteratureX
Methodology
Estimated numbers of COFS in DRC
AG Origin Estimated #
FDLR Rwanda 7,000
FNL Burundi 200-300
ADF Uganda 900 max(of which 60-70%
Congolese)NALU Uganda
Overview of the FDLR Today
FDLR is concentrated in the North and South Kivu provinces
FDLR objectives
Human rights abuses
Parallel authority
Control over resources and trade
Internal control structures
Internal conflicts/divisions
D&R To Date The number of FDLR combatants decreased from
more than 20,000 (1999) to about 7,000 (2007)
Disarmament and repatriation have been progressing slowly since 2002 Voluntary repatriation is reaching its limits (e.g., MONUC SRSG Swing
recently acknowledged the potential need for military intervention)
There is a widespread acknowledgement that the COFS problem needs to be resolved
On the Rwandan side, returning COFS and their dependents receive demobilization and reintegration support through the RDRP
D&R Military Operations to Date
Past RPA/RDF/RCD (1998-2001) operations weakened the FDLR considerably
Recent military operations (FARDC and MONUC) had little D&R impact
MONUC engaged the FDLR under the mandate to ‘protect the population’ only, and this did not advance D&R
FARDC was not sufficiently equipped, trained and supported
The operations were isolated events, not based on a larger overall strategy related to D&R
Opportunities for D&R Today
Majority of FDLR combatants in favour of D&R
FDLR Rome Declaration (March 2005)
Internal Divisions
Better cooperation among regional states ICGLR Security Pact, Tripartite Plus Joint
Commission
Elected government in DRC
RDRP in place
Planned FDLR leadership meeting in eastern DRC next week
Constraints for D&R Today FDLR command structures extreme
(200 – 300 leaders hold many ‘hostage’)
FDLR control structures powerful
GoDRC lacks policy, strategy and institutional arrangements to tackle D&R of foreign AGs systematically
FARDC military weakness
MONUC D&R mandate constraints (‘voluntary only’) and execution uneven
Too few D&R opportunities, especially in remote areas
Limited action against political leadership operating largely from Europe and North America
Fighting in North Kivu
June 2006
FDLR Presence Around Mwenga
Recommendations on FDLR D&R Way Forward
First, try once more a non-violent solution Point of entry: Rome Declaration (March 2005)
Coordinated pressure from GoDRC, region and IC ‘Last chance’ meeting GoRDC-FDLR If FDLR responds favourably give them limited time An obstacle could be the 200-300 men who are
unlikely to accept any solution
If (parts of) the FDLR decide(s) to be cooperative, countries of the region and IC need to provide timely and effective support to D&R and other aspects of the operation
Recommendations to GoDRC
Make it clear that it will no longer tolerate the FDLR on its territory
Develop its own D&R policy and strategy, and establish institutional arrangements for planning, coordination and implementation
Mandate the FARDC, PNC and the local administration to receive, protect and facilitate the (voluntary and non-voluntary) D&R of COFS
Terminate collaboration between Congolese individuals / local armed groups and FDLR
Secure regional political and military support if necessary
Recommendations to GoR Reaffirm at high levels the commitment of GoR to encourage and
facilitate the return and reintegration of Rwandese COFS E.g., making it clear that younger COFS cannot have been involved in the
genocide
RDRC needs to continue its current demobilization and reintegration activities Enhance cross-border sensitization with a focus on information sharing on:
Active involvement of relatives and friends of COFS
Overall (economic) situation in Rwanda, Gacaca and reintegration package
Share information on RDRP with relevant GoDRC officials
Further strengthen regional collaboration (on COFS and with GoDRC in particular)
Consider options for addressing the obstacle of 200-300 FDLR leaders
Recommendations to MONUC
Improve the D&R field approach and increase its presence in the field Remote deployments, flexible and timely
repatriation, transit sites, etc.
Share D&R experiences with the GoDRC and help it to develop its own D&R capacity
Support a D&R lessons-learned exercise
Continue efforts to strengthen FARDC
Recommendations to MDRP Partnership
Continue to provide technical and financial support to the national demobilization and reintegration programs in the Great Lakes region so that COFS can be received
Enhance support activities to D&R of foreign armed groups Strategy development and capacity-building in the DRC if
requested Facilitation of confidence-building, coordination and
planning among relevant countries
Support efforts to strengthen FARDC
Recommendations to the International Community UNSC should review mandate of MONUC regarding
‘voluntary only’ D&R approach for foreign AGs Inhibit political and fund-raising activity as well as travel
of FDLR political leaders (in Africa, Europe and N. America). Make it clear that will not tolerate presence.
Systematically pursue and prosecute the war criminals and those who have committed crimes against humanity
Participate in the reflection on options for 200-300 FDLR leaders
Support the development of a D&R capacity in the DRC and support strengthening of FARDC
Strengthen support to regional collaboration initiatives Encourage greater cooperation among governments, MDRP
and relevant UN agencies (e.g., UNHCR, MONUC, UNICEF, etc.)
Military Dimensions
Intensify military pressure on FDLR to increase willingness to accept voluntary D&R If credible, may in itself be sufficient to “crack”
FDLR leadership control
If voluntary D&R fails within a few months military operations should start Target disabling and dismantling FDLR command
and control and splitting leaders from rank & file Focus on D&R of maximum number, with option of
forcible D&R Take measures to protect civilian population
If necessary, reinforcements from AU, Tri-Partite, bilateral, etc. should be considered
Fighting in North Kivu
As long as the fighting goes on, D&R in that province cannot be effective
Government should look for a negotiated solution It cannot afford to loose (and it might)
Nkunda and his men may have chosen the wrong attitude and line of action but some of their concerns are legitimate
International community should help finding a negotiated solution Why are there no (apparent) attempts?
Questions & discussion