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Operations Planning Process

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  • CF OPP NOTES

    1/24 OPP NOTES (15 Aug 2013) For Educational Purposes Only Canadian Forces College, Toronto

    SUB-PROCESS NOTES

    THE CF OPP - INTRODUCTION

    The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CF OPP) a coordinated process to determine the best method of

    accomplishing assigned operational tasks and to plan possible future tasks. Having great similarity to the formal Estimate

    of the Situation carried out at the tactical level, the CF OPP is intended to be conducted collaboratively and

    simultaneously by all staff branches within a formation headquarters (HQ) and with significant interaction throughout

    the process between superior and subordinate formations and units.

    The CF OPP is a tool or framework to help commanders and staffs solve complex problems in mutually-supporting yet

    complimentary roles. The staffs are objective and rational. They analyze facts, make logical deductions, draw

    conclusions, propose solutions and solve problems. Meanwhile, the Commander is more subjective and imaginative,

    drawing upon his experience and intuition and capitalizes on opportunities to demonstrate the operational art while

    expressing his intent. To be successful in planning, the Commander must provide guidance to his staff and monitor their

    progress.

    The CF OPP is formalized problem-solving incorporated with analytical step-by-step approach to decision-making at the

    operational level. Like the Estimate of the Situation, it applies the same simple formula of first stating the aim to be

    achieved, identifying and analyzing the facts, devising courses open and making a plan. It has the following main

    advantages:

    a. It allows strategic control to be maintained during the development of a plan; b. It enables the commander and staff to translate strategic or superior objectives into operational-level military

    objectives;

    c. It standardizes the planning process within the HQ and across the CF, and indeed also across NATO; d. It enables commanders to guide development of the plan including the synchronization of operational combat

    functions; and

    e. It maximizes the commanders and staffs creative thinking and associated thought processes.

    STAGE 1 - INITIATION

    Introduction Stage 1 is about the Commanders initial assessment, assisted by a small number of key staff and advisors to understand the problem and tasks received from his

    Superior. Its important to realize that initiation of planning does not confer the authority to execute an operation. Usually, forces required will have to be identified,

    requested to higher authority, approved and sourced sometimes from multiple commands or nations. It is quite possible and indeed common - that you are perhaps planning an operation for a Task Force that does not yet exist, except for the HQ or

    the Commander-designate.

    Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2013

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    Input Superior Comds Initiating Directive

    Operations planning may be initiated at any level in response to either political or

    military events. An Initiating Directive is a generic term for the instrument issued by

    an Initiating Authority (IA) that triggers operations planning and it could take the

    form of a written directive, an operations plan (OPLAN), planning guidance, warning

    order, or informal means such as telephone call, email or verbal instruction. The IA

    can be considered as being one level above the Commander who is in receipt of

    direction to carry out planning for and execution of an operation. In other words, the

    IA is the Commanders commander and throughout the CF OPP is referred to as the Superior Commander. The CF OPP might also be initiated by a commander on his

    own initiative for his staff to carry out planning for contingencies, branches or

    sequels.

    In the Canadian context (see CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine), at the strategic

    level the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) is the principal military advisor to the

    Government of Canada and responds to government direction for military operations

    by the CF. It is the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) who analyze domestic or global

    situations and translate government direction in order to provide the CDS with

    decision-making support thus enabling his strategic command. The SJS might take

    part in the preliminary stages of operational planning with other government

    departments, CF operational and environmental commands, and the strategic staffs of

    Canadas allies. The SJS enables the CDS strategic level planning, initiation, direction, synchronization and control of operations whilst also translating the CDS intent into strategic directives. Thus for CDS-directed operations, the CDS would

    issue an Implementation Order that directs the implementation of a Plan.

    At the operational level, for example the Commander Canadian Joint Operations

    Command (CJOC) as the Superior Commander would be the IA that directs a Joint

    Task Force Commander (JTFC) to plan and execute operations.

    In the NATO context, at strategic level, SACEUR would issue an Activation Order to

    initiate the Transfer of Authority for national forces to him and authorizes the

    deployment of NATO forces as well as the release of NATO common funding.

    Commanders Initial Assessment - Tasks

    The Comd needs to assess the tasks he has been assigned by his Superior Comd, the

    general situation within which he will carry out his operation and the main factors

    that characterize it. He should ask himself, "What have I been asked to do?"

    Commanders Initial Assessment -

    Operational Timelines

    The Comd needs to consider timelines applicable to operational activities and also to

    planning.

    Commanders Initial Assessment - Threats to

    Planning

    The Comd needs to consider any threats that might impact on operational activities or

    on his planning. He should do so in the grand context of Diplomatic, Informational,

    Military or Economic (DIME) or Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure

    and Informational Systems (PMESII).

    Commanders Initial Assessment -

    Comd's Initial Assumptions

    The Comd may have to make assumptions in order to carry out planning of the

    operation.

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    Commanders Initial Assessment -

    Initial End State

    The Comd should have a reasonable idea of a likely desired End State, based on

    Superior Comd's Initiating Directive, intent or concept of operations. In the Canadian

    context, it is likely that the Military End State would be determined by the SJS.

    Commanders Initial Assessment -

    Required Staff Products

    At this early stage, the Comd may have a reasonable idea of which staff products or

    critical information requirements will be necessary. There may be an applicable

    Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in use within the HQ.

    Activate Planning Staff -

    Organization

    In the context of a major Joint HQ, the core planning staffs are known as the Joint

    Operations Planning Group, or JOPG, and they are described in detail in the HQ

    SOPs and Terms of Reference (TOR). The JOPG could be a permanent branch within

    the HQ, but most likely is ad hoc and activated when necessary by the COS. The

    JOPG is a cross-functional working group led by COS and/or the Joint Plans Branch

    (a.k.a. J5 or Chief JOPG) and is responsible for the process of operational level

    planning to develop the operational design and associated plans. It includes planners

    from all staff branches, subject matter experts (SME), and liaisons representing all the

    required functional areas and disciplines, depending on the type and level of operation

    being conducted and taking into account political, economic, civil and military

    instruments. It is responsible for the coordination and production of operational plans,

    contingency plans, Statement of Requirements (SOR), branch plans and sequel plans.

    The JOPG will be supplemented by other important Staff Groups and Boards such as

    the Information Operations Coordination Committee (IOCC), the Joint Targeting

    Coordination Board (JTCB), the Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC), the Joint Fusion

    Centre and the Joint Operations Centre (JOC). Further, the JOPG will be

    supplemented by augmentees, liaison personnel and specialist staff such as legal

    advisor (LEGAD), political advisor (POLAD) and medical advisor (MEDAD). The

    key roles in the JOPG are the J5 and the J2.

    Roles for all JOPG members should be described in HQ SOP or TOR. Broadly, these

    could be as follows:

    J1 Personnel, human resources J2 - Adversary strategic, operational factors; environment; geomatics J3 Operational considerations J4 Logistics considerations; Lines of Communication (LOC), deployment; sustainment; Host Nation (HN) support

    J5 Mission guidance; Alliance strategy, operational factors J6 C2 factors; C2 options for Opposition/Allied/IO/Space J7 Training and exercise considerations J8 Financial considerations J9 HN strategic and operational factors; HN support

    The nature of recent global challenges has highlighted the importance for military

    officers to consider the comprehensive aspect of planning to work alongside other

    players and within not only a joint but interagency, inter-governmental, multinational

    and public (JIIMP) environment. To achieve interoperability, commanders and staffs

    will have to be ready to include those other players in the JOPG whenever possible.

    Activate Planning Staff -

    Establish Liaison

    In Stage 1, the Comd might direct that the staff initiate liaison with higher, lower and

    flanking formations.

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    Activate Planning Staff -

    Battle Rhythm

    Most likely, the HQ will have an established and well-described battle rhythm

    published in their SOPs. Chief JOPG, or COS, is the principal staff officer

    responsible for the battle rhythm of the JOPG. Among other considerations, the battle

    rhythm should consider team assignments, working hours and locations, meetings and

    conferences, briefings, deliverables and staff products.

    Activate Planning Staff -

    Gather Planning Tools

    To support the JOPG workspace organization, all necessary planning tools are

    gathered, such as higher HQ directives, orders, maps, overlays, briefing templates and

    other information sources such as country studies and strategic assessments.

    Commander's Direction to

    Staff - General

    The Comd will issue direction to his staff for the conduct of Stage 2. The format will

    vary depending on the HQ, but this could likely be drafted by the COS or Chief JOPG

    who also leads internal staff coordination efforts.

    Commander's Direction to

    Staff - Type of Planning

    The Comd will direct his staff regarding the type of planning they are to conduct,

    whether deliberate or crisis action and whether they are to abbreviate or modify any

    aspect of the OPP. For example, the Comd may wish to receive a mission analysis

    briefing before the staff commences factors analysis or operational design. Types of

    planning include:

    a. Deliberate planning. Deliberate planning consists of initiating and developing plans in anticipation of a known or anticipated future event or circumstances

    that Canada might or could reasonably face. The outputs are Operations Plans

    (OPLAN) or Contingency Plans (CONPLAN);

    b. Crisis Action planning. Crisis Action planning consists of initiating and developing plans in response to a current or developing crisis. It requires

    expeditious coordination and approval. While following the same stages as in

    deliberate planning, some activities are truncated to meet time constraints.

    The outputs are the same as for deliberate planning;

    c. NATO Fast-Track Decision-Making (FTDM). This applies only to NATO, for those situations requiring an urgent response of rapidly-deployable forces

    (for example the NATO Response Force (NRF)) when an existing relevant

    and current contingency plan is available. Based on his strategic assessment,

    SACEUR may recommend to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) that the

    FTDM process be used.

    Commander's Direction to

    Staff - Initial Time Allocation

    for Planning and for Operations

    The Comd, COS and Chief JOPG will consider the operational timeline and the time

    available for planning since this could significantly affect the battle rhythm and the

    potential to produce various staff products.

    Commander's Direction to

    Staff - Authorized Movement,

    Including Initial Recce and

    Liaison

    The Comd will consider issuing direction regarding liaison and authorized

    movements of forces, personnel or equipment.

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    Commander's Direction to

    Staff - Additional Tasks for

    Staff

    As necessary.

    Commander's Direction to

    Staff - Initial Comds Critical Information Requirements

    (CCIR)

    CCIR guide information gathering and dissemination, synchronize joint activities and

    assist in resource allocation. They concern the operational status and capability of

    friendly forces, operational status, capabilities and intentions of the adversary and the

    battle space environment. CCIR derive from analysis of key factors that highlights

    gaps in information essential to the planning and execution of operations. Staff should

    include those information requirements identified by the Comd during Stage 1 and

    those Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR), Essential Elements of Friendly

    Information (EEFI) or Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) deemed

    sufficiently important to the Comd during Stage 2. At this point in Stage 1, based on

    the Comd's initial assessment, he may have identified initial CCIR that should be

    relayed to the staff. Further staff consideration of factors during subsequent sub-

    processes should enhance refinement of CCIR which then can be finalized and

    approved following operational design.

    OUTPUT:

    Comd's Stage 2 Direction

    This direction is provided to the staff to initiate their Stage 2 efforts.

    OUTPUT:

    Warning Order (WNG O)

    If applicable, the Comd might issue a WNG O to subordinate formations and units

    about the probable operation to come.

    STAGE 2 - ORIENTATION

    Introduction In Stage 2, through deductive reasoning, the Comd and staff become oriented to the

    situation, the problem to be solved and the tasks to be accomplished. The Staff will

    define the situation as it currently exists, determine what needs to happen to change

    the situation from its current state to the desired end state and define what the

    situation should look like when the operation is done. In other words, the Comd and

    staff must determine What is the mission? Among the more significant details to be drawn out during Stage 2 analysis are:

    a. Operational Military End State. The military situation that needs to exist

    when an operation has been completed;

    b. Criteria for Success. Measurable criteria that determine when the End State is

    achieved; and

    c. Operational Objectives. These should be assessed within the context of

    DIME.

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    Mission Analysis Mission Analysis (MA) comprises the analysis of the Superior Comds intent, tasks, assumptions and limitations. This sets the scene for operational design. MA usually

    begins as a brainstorming session involving the Comd, COS, J5, J2 and perhaps key

    members of the JOPG. MA is a logical process for extracting and deducing from a

    superiors orders the tasks necessary to fulfill a mission. It places in context what effect is to be achieved in the overall op design and results in the Comd's mission

    statement. Possibly, the Commander and staff might conclude that the mission

    cannot be achieved by a single operation and hence a campaign plan consisting of

    multiple operations may be required.

    The Comd may prefer that a Mission Analysis Briefing be conducted immediately

    following this sub-process in order to clearly state for his staff and subordinates with

    a unified purpose what effect is to be achieved in the overall operational design. Such

    statement not only triggers, but regulates the remainder of the analysis and planning

    process. Alternatively, the Comd may prefer that the briefing be conducted later in

    Stage 2 so as to include the results of factors analysis, operational design and initial

    risk assessment.

    Intent Analysis - Superior

    Comd's Initiating Directive and

    Op Design

    Here the staff will consider the Superior Comds initiating directive, op design and if known his concept of ops (CONOPS). A Comd is required to understand the Intent of

    his Superior Comd two levels up, and the Intent and CONOPS of his Superior Comd

    one level up. The first issues to be agreed upon are the nature of the problem to be

    solved and the results to be achieved. The boundaries of the problem need to be

    established. The guidelines provided by the Superior Comd must be defined and

    interpreted and any physical, military or political conditions that may affect the

    mission determined. Examine whatever intelligence is available at this time; this may

    be little more than a summary of background reports or country studies, or it may be

    very detailed intelligence products already prepared. Collate the known facts from

    any and all other sources books, references, staff-officers handbooks, liaison reports. The Superior Comd might have made assumptions contained within his

    direction.

    Task Analysis - Assigned

    Tasks

    Assigned tasks or Specified Tasks - are explicitly stated in the directives or orders received from the Superior Comd. With respect to the Comd's operational design,

    they can translate into potential decisive points (DP), objectives or lines of operation

    (LOO).

    Task Analysis - Implied Tasks Implied tasks are other activities that must be carried out in order to achieve the

    mission, including the requirement to support the Superior Comds Main Effort, but which are not explicitly stated in higher directives. These are derived from a detailed

    analysis of the Superior Comds directives and orders and also the key factors. For example, we can be tasked to conduct offensive action in a theatre and it is implied

    that we must enter the theatre to achieve this.

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    Task Analysis - Essential Tasks Once all assigned and implied tasks have been identified, they should be analyzed to

    determine those that require an allocation of resources and must be executed to

    accomplish the mission or would result in mission failure if not completed

    successfully. They have high correlation with objectives and drive the op design.

    These are known as Essential Tasks. Such a list generally requires approval by the

    Comd during the MA Briefing. A comparison of all tasks against the Superior Comd's

    intent should lead to an initial deduction of the critical activity required or the Main

    Effort.

    Assumptions & Limitations -

    Superior Comd's Assumptions

    In the absence of positive proof, assumptions may be made to provide necessary

    information in order to enable commanders and staff to continue the planning process

    and to ultimately decide upon a course of action. They must however realize that

    assumptions must later be validated before a plan could be considered reliable. Any

    assumptions listed in the Superior Comds Initiating Directive should be noted and considered during subsequent planning.

    Assumptions & Limitations -

    Own Assumptions

    Then, the JOPG should identify and highlight any assumptions necessary for

    continuation of planning. Throughout the OPP, any further assumptions identified

    should be incorporated into the list.

    Assumptions & Limitations -

    Limitations

    Limitations may be either assigned or implied and may apply to planning or execution

    of an op, or both. A commander may place some limitations on his subordinate

    commanders that restrict their freedom of action.

    Constraints take the form of a requirement to do something (for example, maintain a

    reserve of one division, maintain a fighter squadron on alert, conduct maritime

    interdiction operations in a specific area).

    Restraints are prohibitions on action (for example, no reconnaissance forward of a

    line before H-hour).

    Mission Statement At this point, the Commander and staff should be able to derive the mission statement

    which will underpin all remaining planning and execution of the operation. The

    mission statement is a clear expression by the Commander that describes: who will

    execute actions; what type of action will be executed (attack, defend, deter etc); when

    will the action begin (e.g. on order); where will the action occur and why will this action be carried out (e.g. in order to).

    In the event the Comd was not intimately involved in the analysis thus far, it may be

    worthwhile for the staff to formally brief him and seek approval of the proposed

    mission statement. In some organizations, it has become customary to consider this an

    initial mission statement at this time, allowing further staff consideration during

    subsequent sub-processes then to finalize the mission statement as an output of

    operational design (included within the Mission Analysis Briefing).

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    Evaluate Friendly Forces -

    General

    An evaluation of facts should lead to many deductions and conclusions translating

    into identifiable elements of all aspects of OPP such as operational timeline,

    operational design, risk management, Commanders Planning Guidance, Courses of Action (COA), OPLAN, supporting plans and annexes (coordinating measures,

    logistics planning, targeting, intelligence collection to name just a few). Staff should

    identify the key factors - those that can affect the mission in fundamental ways.

    During this process, the analyst asks the question So what? in order to make those deductions. Consider and assess all factors concerning all "actors", namely own

    forces, alliance forces and partners.

    OPERATIONAL TIMELINE

    In anticipation of the timeline comparison step at the end of this sub-process, JOPG

    should now begin development of the own forces operational timeline, enhancing and refining it throughout Stages 2 and 3.

    TERMINOLOGY

    Planners should consult the Defence Terminology Bank (DTB) (at DWAN

    http://terminology.mil.ca/) for operational definitions, such as :

    D-Day: The day on which an operation, whether hostilities or any other operation,

    commences or is due to commence; or, the day on which an operation commences or

    is due to commence. This may be the commencement of hostilities or any other

    operation.

    G-Day: The day on which an order is or is due to be given to deploy a unit. Note:

    Such an order is normally a national one.

    M-Day: The day on which mobilization commences or is due to commence.

    Evaluate Friendly Forces -

    Impact of the Operational

    Environment

    The operational environment is primarily considered during Step 2 of the Joint

    Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) and the information

    is treated by both the J2 in subsequent JIPOE steps and by the JOPG during OPP

    Stage 2. Consequently, close cooperation and staff interaction will be essential

    between the JOPG and J2 Branch. To facilitate this, the JOPG battle rhythm should

    include periodic J2 JIPOE update briefings.

    Evaluate Friendly Forces -

    Strengths & Weaknesses

    While examining own forces and adversary forces, it is common to consider their

    strengths and weaknesses. There are various techniques commonly employed,

    however one of the more useful methods employed is the CC/CR/CV Analysis in

    which you examine the Centre(s) of Gravity (COG) or End State to determine its

    Critical Capabilities (CC), Critical Requirements (CR) and Critical Vulnerabilities

    (CV).

    Evaluate Friendly Forces -

    Centre of Gravity

    NATO AAP-6 defines COG (a noun) as that characteristic, capability or locality from

    which a military force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, physical

    strength or will to fight. Clausewitz described COG as the "hub of all power and

    movement, upon which everything depends...and the principal source of strength and

    power for achieving one's aim." Example, Iraqi Republican Guard during the 1991

    Persian Gulf War.

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    Evaluate Friendly Forces -

    CC/CR/CV

    Ref: US Joint Pub 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational

    Environment

    At this point, staff should examine their own forces with a view toward identifying

    critical vulnerabilities that should be shielded. The method associated with this is

    called the Strange Analysis, named for Mr Joseph Strange, an instructor at the US Marine Corps War College. For this analysis, a Centre of Gravity (COG) is assessed

    for its associated Critical Capabilities (CC), then those capabilities are assessed for

    their Critical Requirements (CR) and finally those requirements are assessed for their

    Critical Vulnerabilities (CV).

    Alternatively, when the COG is not readily apparent the staff may assess an End State

    for its associated CC, CR and CV. This is known as the Modified Strange Analysis.

    Critical Capabilities (CC) - (a verb) those means that are considered crucial enablers

    for a COG to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the

    specified objective or assumed objective. CC is a strength. Analysts may find it useful

    to think of CC as an "ability to...". Examples: "ability to dominate sea lanes of

    communication (SLOC)", "ability to communicate with...", "ability to counter...".

    Critical Requirements (CR) - (a noun) the conditions, resources and means that enable

    a CC to become fully operational or to sustain the CC with its strength. In operational

    context, CR are "high-level" descriptions of capabilities such as "Air Force capable of

    Close Air Support or Interdiction", "secure environment", "mobile rocket or missile

    launchers", "advance warning capability", "SAM umbrella".

    Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) - (a noun with modifiers) those aspects or components

    of CR that are deficient, or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner

    achieving decisive or significant results. CV expose the CC. However, in identifying

    CV, the J2 or JOPG analysts must also compare their criticality with their

    accessibility, vulnerability, redundancy, ability to recuperate and impact on the

    civilian populace. Examples: "vulnerability of ports to attack", "Network of radars".

    Adversary CV are your potential targets. Own CV should be protected from attack (as

    in "Shield DP").

    High Value Targets (HVT) Among the important staff inputs from the J2 branch following their evaluation of the

    adversarys critical vulnerabilities (CV) will be a list of the adversarys assets, resources, organizations or persons that J2 assesses the adversary requires for the

    successful completion of his mission. The loss of any of these assets would be

    expected to seriously degrade important adversary functions and thus successful

    targeting against them would be a high value action for our own operation. These

    HVT should be considered when staff design the operation and prepare courses of

    action.

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    Evaluate Friendly Forces -

    Initial Capability Requirements

    Deductions and conclusions drawn from the analysis of factors thus far should allow

    the JOPG to prepare the broad initial list of capabilities the Task Force (TF) would

    require. This will be further amplified and detailed following the op design and

    during Stage 3 to become the Joint Statement of Requirements (JSOR). In comparison

    to those forces presently available a shortfall will be identified and the staff may

    assess the initial level of operational risks as a result. Staff may also be able to design

    the initial broad TF C2 structure.

    Evaluate Friendly Forces -

    Time/ Space / Force Analysis

    For a detailed description of this activity, please refer to JIPOE Step 2.

    These factors impact on travel, movement, decision-making, reaction time,

    sustainment, exhaustion of resources, tempo, initiative and so forth. Taking into

    consideration the available intelligence products from the JIPOE Step 2, the JOPG

    should assess in greater fidelity the time, space and force relationships applicable to

    friendly forces. This analysis has four aspects: time vs. force; space vs. time; force vs.

    space; and time vs. space vs. force.

    Evaluate Friendly Forces -

    Adversary vs. Blue Timeline

    Comparison

    Consider and compare operational timelines of adversary versus own forces. These

    will need to be synchronized for the purpose of the COA War Game during Stage 3.

    Determine if there are any windows of vulnerability, i.e. when the adversary actions

    could not be sufficiently countered due to own forces not being operationally ready.

    For the adversary, consider the estimate of soonest achievement of capability. For

    own forces, consider reference from a "G-day" (to be defined by the staff).

    Operational Design vs.

    Campaign Design

    The CF OPP applies equally to the planning of either operations or campaigns, whilst

    the product of Stage 2 will be either an operation design or a campaign design. Thus

    the process is the same but the level at which the activity is planned and led will vary

    from the operational level to the strategic level. Similarly, the term operational level

    also applies equally to either operations or campaigns, and is defined by the Defence

    Terminology Board (DTB) as the level of conflict concerned with producing and

    sequencing a campaign which synchronizes military and other resources to achieve

    the desired end state and military strategic objectives. Military actions at the

    operational level are usually joint and often combined. Likewise, our British allies

    describe the operational level as the level at which campaigns and major operations

    are planned, conducted and sustained within theatres or areas of operation, to achieve

    strategic objectives. Military campaigns are orchestrated in concert with other actors

    and agencies and are most effective as part of a comprehensive approach to crisis

    management.

    A campaign may be characterized as a major operation or a series of operations

    intended to achieve an end state having national, multinational, strategic or

    operational objectives. NATO defines a campaign as a set of military operations

    planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and

    geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. Hence, a

    campaign plan provides the framework for a series of related plans. As described in

    UK JDP 01, campaigns and their objectives relate to a single Theatre of Operations

    and fall under the jurisdiction of a single Joint Force Comd (JFC). Therefore, in a

    global conflict there may be multiple campaigns to be waged, each with their own

    JFC and campaign plan.

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    SUB-PROCESS NOTES

    An operation is a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service,

    training, or administrative military mission, or the process of carrying on combat,

    including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the

    objectives of any battle or campaign.

    Operational design is the practical expression of operational art and should be driven

    by the essential tasks while considering the situation and the adversarys capabilities and likely intentions. Knowing these, the JOPG designs an operation to accomplish

    objectives set by the Superior Commander and by your own commander, while

    determining objectives for subordinate commands and the end state criteria.

    Operational Design - End State End State is a descriptive statement of the military or political conditions or situation

    to be attained at the end of an operation and that indicate that the objectives have been

    attained or in order to achieve defined policy goals. Defining the End State is the

    most important concept in operational design. Example - territorial integrity of nation

    X restored.

    Operational Design - Criteria

    for Success

    Because desired End-states are broad in nature a requirement exists to set out

    measurable criteria which determine that they have actually been achieved. These are

    called Criteria for Success and are closely linked to objectives.

    Example - foreign nationals within territory X are safe and secure.

    Operational Design -

    Objectives

    NATO AAP-6 describes an objective as a clearly defined and attainable goal for a

    military operation. Existing on the physical and psychological planes, objectives are

    desired outcomes essential to a commanders plan and towards which the operation is directed. Objectives can also be considered as the constituent elements, which when

    combined achieve the End State. They may be described in terms of force applied

    against the adversary (e.g. expel, defeat, destroy, contain, neutralize, isolate,

    convince), space (e.g. seize, secure, defend, control, deny) or time (e.g. gain time for

    build-up of forces).

    Operational Design - Decisive

    Points Development

    A DP is a point from which a hostile or friendly COG can be threatened, and when

    acted upon allows a Commander to gain an advantage over an adversary or

    contributes significantly to achieving success. This could be an event, geographic

    place, critical factor or function that may exist in time, space or the information

    environment. If described as an event, the successful outcome would be a pre-

    condition to the defeat or neutralization of a COG, achievement of an objective or

    End State. DPs indicate conditions or effects that must be set in order to achieve the

    aim of the campaign for example sea lanes of communication opened or attainment of air superiority or commitment of the adversarys reserve. They can also be considered as intermediate operational objectives and can be assigned resources to

    protect, control or achieve them. They are usually the main focus of a war game. DPs

    are deduced primarily during mission analysis, factors analysis and JIPOE Step 3

    evaluation of the adversary, and they derive from the essential tasks, critical factors,

    own CVs you want to protect and the adversarys CVs you want to target. The art of identifying DPs and selection of those to be addressed is a highly important part of

    operational design. In Stage 2, the staff develops initial DPs, describing what effect is

    to be achieved or what event is to take place and what Measures of Effectiveness

    (MOE) apply. Then, during Stage 3, the staff refines the operational design to include

    adding fidelity in close coordination with Component staffs about how the DP is

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    to be achieved. In other words, during Stage 3, DP development looks at specific

    tasks and resource allocation necessary. DPs are described by several specific

    characteristics.

    Effect to be achieved Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), example build-up to xx% of TF in theatre or Adversary degraded to xx% or Adversary pushed back to within their own territory

    Date to be completed Tasks Resources required Associated Risks

    Example DP: APOD X open, SLOC secured

    To deduce a DP:

    1. List the essential tasks 2. List CV that you want to target 3. List major deductions from your analysis of the operational environment 4. List major deductions from your analysis of forces 5. List major deductions from your analysis of time 6. List Own CV that you must protect ("Shield" DP)

    Operational Design - Decision

    Points Development

    US Joint Publication 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational

    Environment describes a decision point as a point in space and time when the

    Commander anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action.

    Some allied nations may also refer to this as a Commanders Decision Point (CDP). In either case, this clearly shows that it is the Commanders decision and nobody elses. A decision point should be located to provide sufficient time for friendly forces to engage the adversary in a specific target area of interest (TAI). The locations

    of decision points depend both on the availability and response time of friendly forces

    as well as the anticipated activity, capabilities, and movement rates of adversary

    forces.

    If there is a branch in a line of operation (LOO), a Decision Point may be required.

    This will be depicted on the operational design as a star and it highlights the trigger

    for the decision. Staffs need to consider the CCIR/PIR associated with the indications

    & warnings (I&W) required to cue the Commander that the trigger item(s) has

    occurred. (e.g. a decision point might be based on adversary forces massing of troops,

    deployment of strategic and major assets such as submarines, etc.). Decision points

    should be designed to allow as much warning as is necessary to change from one state

    to another state of operational readiness (e.g. go from deter posture to a defend or

    offensive posture).

    Operational Design - Measures

    of Effectiveness

    Described above

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    Operational Design - Lines of

    Operation

    Lines of operation (LOO) establish the relationship between decisive points and

    produce a critical path in time and space to threaten the adversarys COG. The operational commander uses them to synchronize and integrate capabilities such as

    firepower, deception, manoeuvre, special operations, etc. as well as ensure that

    military effort is coordinated with the actions of other elements of national power in

    the execution of a Whole of Government strategy or campaign plan. LOO can

    describe the efforts of a functional component, an operational function, an objective, a

    desired effect, or a family of activities. Usually an op might have several LOOs.

    Operational Design -

    Sequencing & Phasing

    Sequencing is the specific ordering and synchronizing of events, in other words DPs,

    along the line of operations in an order that is most likely to achieve the desired End

    State. Phasing is a way of organizing the extended and dispersed activities of the

    campaign or major operation into more manageable parts that allow for flexibility in

    execution. Often, logistic and strategic lift capabilities will be predominant

    considerations.

    Phasing is a method of organizing activities into manageable parts or groupings. They

    may have overall themes, such as deployment, deterrence, counter-attack etc. and

    should have specific and identifiable conditions for termination and transition to the

    next. The op design or OPLAN may have specific C2 relationships (supported/

    supporting) to be determined by phase.

    Operational Design -

    Transition Conditions

    Transition conditions describe how the JTF will move to from one phase to the next

    and they describe the end state conditions which should tie directly to the initiation

    conditions for the subsequent operation. They are the hinge to sequel operations or a

    state of military readiness and they may define the initiation, expansion, conversion,

    reduction or exit of military forces. Key considerations include the structures,

    capabilities and postures required next.

    Operational Design - Potential

    Branch & Sequel Plans

    An important feature of any plan, no matter how detailed, is its usefulness as a

    common basis for change under rapidly changing circumstances while preserving

    freedom of action. Therefore the commander and staff must build flexibility into the

    operational design, anticipate contingencies and plan for them. Contingency planning

    requires continual focusing of effort toward attainment of the objectives while

    envisioning sequential and alternate outcomes to proposed actions. There are two

    kinds of contingency plans:

    a. Branch Plans are executed when necessary in response to an anticipated

    opportunity or reversal, to provide the Commander with the flexibility to retain

    the initiative while preserving freedom of action and ensuring maintenance of

    the intended operational design; and

    b. Sequel Plans are options for subsequent operations within a campaign. They

    are planned on the basis of the likely outcome of the current operation in order

    to provide the Commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative and/or

    enhance operational tempo and to achieve subsequent objectives. Once a sequel

    is determined, Staff must anticipate that its requirements might influence the

    planning and execution of the current operation.

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    OUPUT: Mission Statement In the event that the mission analysis sub-process produced only an initial mission

    statement, then it should now be finalized.

    OUTPUT: CCIR CCIR should now be finalized.

    OUTPUT: Comd's Intent The staff will now have to consult the Commander and assist him in preparation of

    his written intent for the operation. In accordance with B-GL-300-003/FP-000

    Command, Mission Command, the Canadian Forces philosophy of command within

    the manoeuvre warfare approach to fighting, has three enduring tenets: the importance

    of understanding a Superior Commanders intent, a clear responsibility to fulfill that intent and timely decision-making. The underlying requirement is the fundamental

    responsibility to act within the framework of the Commanders intentions. Thus in order to allow subordinates to exercise their initiative but in a way that will satisfy the

    Commanders mission and operational design, it is paramount that the Commander expresses his intent in terms of what needs to be achieved towards his desired End

    State and it should be captured within his CONOPS. This intent will drive the

    development of COA during Stage 3.

    OUTPUT:

    Initial Force Estimate

    Considering the broad initial list of capabilities requirements prepared earlier, the

    staff should then estimate with greater fidelity the actual forces necessary to satisfy

    the operation designed. This will be further amplified during Stage 3 to become the

    Joint Statement of Requirements (JSOR). In comparison to those forces presently

    available a shortfall will be identified and the staff may assess the initial level of

    operational risks as a result.

    OUTPUT:

    Preliminary C2 Concept and

    Task Organization

    At this point in the OPP, the Staff will have identified preliminary C2 arrangements

    necessary for the operation and a probable organizational structure necessary. These

    should be depicted in a Task Organization Matrix.

    Risk Assessment - General

    Ref: B-GJ-005-052/FP-000 Risk Management for CF Operations

    Risk Management concerns the assessment, controls and mitigation for each threat

    posed: by the adversary; by the op environment; towards own forces; by time; by

    civilians; and by national powers or alliances. Risk management is a process that

    assists decision makers in determining how to reduce or offset risk and to make

    informed decisions that weigh risks against mission benefits. Risk management

    assists in the identification of the optimum course of action (COA) and ensures that

    the implications of the residual risks are understood by the Commander, his staff and

    subordinate commanders. The failure to manage risk can lead to the loss of resources,

    lives and ultimately catastrophic mission failure. The level of risk is often related to

    potential gain, so commanders must be able to weigh the gains versus the costs and

    the risks.

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    The fundamental aim of risk management is to enhance operational capabilities and

    mission accomplishment, with minimal loss. Risk assessment involves threat

    identification and assessment. A threat is a source of danger, such as an opposing

    force, condition or circumstance with the potential to have a negative impact on the

    accomplishment of the mission or to degrade mission capability. Examples of threats

    are: actions of the adversary (use of weapons of mass destruction); actions of own

    forces (early provocation of adversary, complex synchronization requirements);

    environmental factors (weather); other actors (Host Nation, Other Government

    Departments, Non-Government Organizations, contractors, refugees); or operational

    design (threats to achieving DPs, ability to pursue LOO).

    Assessment of the level of risk considers probability and severity estimates for each

    threat. For this, the staff questions whether the threat impacts our ability to achieve

    one or more DP, to pursue a LOO or to achieve operational objectives. Probability is

    the estimate of the likelihood that a threat will occur. Severity is the expected

    consequence of a threat on the achievement of the mission. Assessment is done with

    the following steps:

    Step 1 Identify threat (example TF Capability Shortfall, ability to detect submarines beyond their torpedo range)

    Step 2 Assess threats level of Risk IAW matrix (probability versus severity) Step 3 Determine controls to reduce the threat impact Step 4 Determine mitigations for each threat Step 5 Assess the overall residual post-mitigation risk for the op

    Threat Controls

    Risk mitigation means development of controls in line with the commander's risk

    guidance that either eliminate the threat or reduce the risk and consequences

    associated with it and making appropriate operational decisions. For each threat,

    determine which controls may be implemented, such as:

    Engineering (technologies, materiel) Administrative (policies, SOP, personnel management) Education & Trg (individual, collective and joint trg) Physical Controls (barriers, guards, protective equipment, fences) Operational Controls (avoid threat, delay actions, pace or tempo, reassignment of task or resources, boundaries, fire control measures, ROE, airspace control, exercises,

    rehearsals, rectify training deficiency); or

    Accept threat and its impact without action

    Threat Mitigations

    These are actions or measures taken to reduce the impact of threats. These usually

    involve avoidance, delay, transfer, reduction or acceptance of Risk. The Comd alone

    must decide whether the controls are sufficient and to accept the mitigations and

    residual risks for the operation.

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    OUTPUT:

    Initial Risk Assessment

    Matrix

    Commanders need to know how likely a risk is to occur, whether it can be avoided or

    controlled and can we mitigate the consequences. The matrix depicts all identified

    threats for the operation, their assessed level of risk and an overall level of residual

    risk with all threats, their controls and mitigations considered. During Stage 3, staff

    will also prepare a risk assessment matrix for each COA. Staff recommendations

    should be expressed as:

    Unacceptable spectrum of risk management actions cannot reduce risk to an acceptable level

    Conditionally acceptable risk can be reduced to an acceptable level if certain risk management actions are taken

    Acceptable no risk management actions necessary

    The matrix may also be used to prioritize resources, to resolve risks, to standardize

    threat notification or to determine response actions.

    It will be important to update this matrix during Stages 3, 4 and 5, particularly after

    the COA War Game, Plan War Game and Stage 5 War Game (or Exercise). As well,

    risk should be frequently re-assessed during the execution of an operation.

    Mission Analysis Briefing Although the Commander might have already been consulted in the development of

    the mission statement, he will need to be appraised of the results of staff efforts for all

    of Stage 2. The venue for this will be the Mission Analysis Briefing, which highlights

    mission analysis, evaluation of friendly forces, operational design and risk

    assessment. It should also include an updated JIPOE briefing by the J2 branch.

    Following the briefing, the staff seeks the Commanders approval of the (final) mission statement, the operational design and the list of CCIR.

    OUTPUT:

    Commander's Planning

    Guidance

    The Comds Planning Guidance (CPG) is a formal, written document intended for two audiences, namely: his own staff for further planning; and for the Superior

    Commander who will be interested to see that the plan being developed meets the

    higher or even strategic objectives. The CPG includes operational design, mission

    analysis, mission statement, intent, confirmation of the area of operations or the Joint

    Operations Area (JOA), Area of Influence, Area of Interest, CCIR, required

    capabilities and direction on COA development.

    OUTPUT:

    Commander's Initiating

    Directive

    The Comds Initiating Directive is intended for subordinate commanders and supporting commanders as initiation for their planning. Like the CPG, it should

    include mission analysis, mission statement, intent, confirmation of the area of

    operations or JOA, Area of Influence, Area of Interest, CCIR and direction on COA

    development.

    STAGE 3 COA DEVELOPMENT

    COA Development - Introduction

    A COA is a possible option that would accomplish the mission. It is initially stated in

    broad terms, with further details determined during the COA War Gaming and COA

    Evaluation. A COA should follow logically from the deductions and conclusions

    already derived from the Mission Analysis and Factors Analysis. Staff should

    consider the Comds Planning Guidance whilst developing a range of ideas in COA design. Periodically, the Comd may wish update briefings to allow him to provide

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    further direction, focusing of efforts and possibly to call for modification or

    elimination of some COA. Requirements for the number of COA will vary from one

    Comd to another and might be situation-dependent; however the Staff should expect

    to prepare at least three friendly COA. The chosen COA will form the basis for the

    Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and supporting Joint Statement of Requirements

    (JSOR). The J2 Branch should as a minimum develop an Adversary Most Likely

    COA and an Adversary Most Dangerous COA.

    COA Development - Develop

    COA

    A COA should satisfy the Essential Tasks already identified and is usually comprised

    of four elements:

    Intent Scheme of Manoeuvre Main Effort End State

    A COA should answer the questions:

    When does the activity begin or end? Consider phasing and sequencing. Who will conduct the activity? Consider capabilities required. What military operations are to happen? Consider offensive and defensive activities. Where will the activity be performed? Why is the activity to be conducted? Consider "in order to..." How will the activity be conducted?

    Staff should highlight the Advantages and Disadvantages for each COA, prepare an

    accompanying sketch or graphic portrayal, Task Organization Chart, Synchronization

    Matrix, Risk Assessment Matrix and Initial Joint Statement of Requirements (JSOR).

    Staff should also consider the intended effects - that should be developed into Joint

    Effects Guidance (JEG) - and therefore the resulting targeting needs. Staff may

    prepare a Joint Troops to Task List (JTTL) for each COA.

    Given that all COA must satisfy the operational design, which is purpose-built to

    achieve a mission along LOO in a prescribed sequence, then the COA at the

    operational level will vary only in time, space or force aspects in other words, Scheme of Manoeuvre and possibly Main Effort. Staff should consider variations in

    the treatment of key factors analyzed during the mission analysis and factors analysis.

    Example COAs could be fast and light, slow and heavy, invade by land, invade by sea. For each DP, staff should determine the desired effect, tasks to be fulfilled, JTF elements that could fulfill those tasks (with supported and supporting

    Components identified) and MOE. Consider variations in the application of

    operational functions, component tasks and objectives, main effort, transition

    conditions, composition and employment of the operational reserve, logistics support

    concept, C2 relationships etc.

    COA Development - COA

    Validity Test

    Each COA must be tested for validity, namely that it is:

    1. Suitable: accomplishes the mission and the essential tasks, meets the Comds Intent, focuses on Objectives and Adversarys COG;

    2. Feasible: it is possible to accomplish, you have now or expect to have Force structure and resources to mount and sustain;

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    3. Acceptable: it is efficient, worth the risk, politically acceptable, manageable within resource limitations, satisfies rules of engagement (ROE)

    requirements, counters Adversary COAs;

    4. Exclusive: is unique, fundamentally distinguishable from other COAs (with respect to scheme of manoeuvre, main effort, task organization, composition

    or use of the operational Reserve and so forth); and

    5. Complete: it has an Intent, Scheme of Manoeuvre, Main Effort, End State. It addresses supported and supporting efforts. It answers the questions who, what, where, when, how.

    COA Development - Refine

    Op Design

    After designing COAs, the staff may have further ideas to enhance the detail within

    the operational design, particularly with input from component or specialist staff

    planning processes to date. For example, there may now be available detailed MOE

    developed for certain DP. The staff should review all aspects of the operational design

    with a view to updating anything applicable. Regarding DPs for example, as

    described earlier, during Stage 2, the staff develops initial DP, describing what effect

    is to be achieved or what event is to take place and what MOE apply. Then, during

    Stage 3, the staff adds fidelity, in close coordination with Component staffs, about

    how the DP is to be achieved. In other words, during Stage 3, DP development looks

    at specific tasks and resource allocations necessary.

    COA Development - Joint

    Statement of Requirements

    (JSOR)

    For those occasions when the Commanders own forces are insufficient to carry out the operation, or in the event the Commanders HQ does not normally have any subordinate forces assigned, a JSOR is developed that lists in broad terms those

    forces required to carry out such a COA: for example two carrier groups, two

    armoured divisions, one marine expeditionary force, one bomber wing. The JSOR

    should build from the Initial Force Estimate developed during Stage 2. Initially during

    Stage 3, a JSOR is prepared for each COA but later after one COA is chosen, it will

    be enhanced in greater detail to allow other elements of the CF or nations in the NATO context to realize the type and scale of forces being sought and an opportunity to assess the costs, risks and feasibility of deployment, employment and

    sustainment of such an operation. In preparing the JSOR, the staff should base it on

    the requirements of component commands and include preliminary deployment

    information according to the JFCs required force flow into Theatre. In the Canadian context, the CJSOR might also be accompanied by a provisional Table of

    Organization & Equipment (TO&E) that prescribes the specific organization,

    personnel and equipment necessary for the operation.

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    COA Development - Synchronization Matrix

    Each COA should be accompanied by a Synchronization Matrix describing the

    activities and events and the timeframe when they will occur whether by date or by

    phase. The matrix is oriented towards Joint Effects Guidance and is organized in

    effects-based language focused on DPs drawn from the Op Design. Staff should identify each DP, when it should be achieved, the effects to be achieved, the measures

    of effectiveness, the tasks or purpose for each major element of the JTF for example the Air Component the date to be completed and any other key operational aspects necessary to portray the activities of the operation. The matrix associates participating

    forces with time and space. Time elements of interest are:

    Critical dates Times affected by Constraints or Restraints Critical distances versus time Time to achieve specific elements or options Time for Adversary to react to Own actions

    COA Development - Risk Assessment Matrix

    Each COA should be accompanied by a Risk Assessment Matrix.

    Information Briefing -

    General

    The format for the Info Briefing might vary, depending on the preferences of the

    Comd, the SOPs for the HQ, the time available or whether the Comd has been

    involved thus far in the COA Development. The purpose is to update the Comd on

    the status of planning thus far, to give him an opportunity to acknowledge or concur

    with certain COA, to narrow the broad range of options or to confirm the Comds preferences for COA comparison criteria.

    Information Briefing - J2

    JIPOE

    J2 provides a JIPOE update, including a review of the predicted Adversary COA

    Information Briefing - Op

    Design Update

    J5 highlights any updates or fidelity made to the Op Design since the Mission

    Analysis Briefing

    Information Briefing - COAs J5 or COA Development teams present the details of each Friendly COA (as

    described above). The J5 might preface with a summary of those aspects common to

    all COA. The J5 should conclude with presentation of open issues and requests for

    specific guidance from the Comd. A suggested format to describe a COA is:

    Overall concept, by phase Timeline comparison of COA vs. Adversary Main tasks for each Component Start/end dates for each phase DPs to be achieved during each phase Transition conditions Task Organization Advantages and disadvantages Risk assessment and management options Plans for COA refinement Identification of necessary supporting plans to be developed

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    OUTPUT:

    COA Refinement

    The Commander should approve the COA or direct a return to initial COA

    development if required, provide guidance to the staff for refinement of COA and

    most importantly he should provide guidance to the staff for COA comparison

    criteria.

    OUTPUT:

    COA Comparison Criteria

    The J5 should propose to the Commander for his approval a set of COA comparison

    criteria that will focus the war gaming effort and provide a framework for data

    collection by the staff. The Comd will use these to select the COA that will be

    developed into a CONOPS. Consider Commanders intent, CPG, critical characteristics of each LOO, Principles of War, limitations on casualties,

    exploitations of adversary weaknesses, defeat of the adversarys COG, opportunity for manoeuvre, concentration of combat power, logistics requirements, political

    considerations, force protection, impact on local populations, collateral damage and

    so forth. Criteria must be differentiable and measurable. Examples: rapidly enhances

    deterrence, provides early support to humanitarian assistance, allow maximum

    operational flexibility, shows minimum risk, ensures long-term sustainability or

    supports early internal security.

    COA War Game - General War Gaming is an interactive simulation of military operations that is crucial to

    decision-making and it is just one way to compare COA. It can range from informal

    discussions around a map to the use of sophisticated computer modeling software. In

    Stage 3, the purpose of war gaming is to evaluates the COA ability to accomplish the

    mission and provide the Commander with objective tools to discern one COA from

    another in order to allow him to decide which COA will be used for the Operation.

    Potentially, the war game might assist in identifying planning deficiencies, potential

    risks and opportunities and synchronization of key actions however those are more

    likely benefits of the Plan War Game in Stage 4. In a war game, a friendly COA is

    played against an adversary COA in order to test its merits, advantages,

    disadvantages, effectiveness in accomplishing the mission, risks incurred and so forth.

    In order to prepare for the war game, staff will have to know which method is to be

    used and to have prepared a synchronization matrix for each COA and to have

    compared own operational timelines versus adversary timelines. Ideally, and

    depending on the time available, each friendly COA will be played against each

    adversary COA. If the time is short, the Commander or COS might direct that each

    friendly COA be played against only one adversary COA perhaps the Most Dangerous or the Most Likely.

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    COA War Game -

    Conduct War Game(s)

    Generally, there are four Steps:

    1. Plan

    2. Prepare

    3. Conduct

    4. Analyze war game products

    There are many considerations for planning and preparation of a war game. Here are

    just a few:

    Step 1 Plan Method (e.g.. belt, phase, focal DPs, LOO, battle space segments) Comparison criteria Which COA Selection of focal DP, associated MOE and key phase transition criteria Forces dispositions at game Start Operational timeline synchronization Determine Participants (Control, Adversary, Blue, White, Green, Referee, Scribes, Analysts, Observers)

    Requirements for Operational Analysis (OA) Use of simulation Requirements for any initial coordination Boards (e.g.. Joint Targeting Board)

    Step 2 Prepare Identify and prepare the Control, Referees and Analysis Teams Selection and definition of turns including preparation of a Master Synchronization Matrix describing events to be played during each turn

    Master Events List (MEL), Joint Effects Guidance (JEG) Gather tools, maps, data (etc.) available Room set-up Briefing for participants, including ground rules and duties

    Step 3 Conduct Turns Side with initiative for that turn goes first Action Reaction Counter-Action Cognition (assessment) Identify decision points Identify branches and sequels Identify risks and opportunities

    Step 4 - Analyze

    Examine and compare results, Adversary COA vs. Own COA; Own COA vs. Own COA

    COA relative advantages and disadvantages COA Comparison Matrix Identify critical issues

    COA War Game - COA

    Refinement or COA Evaluation

    Following the COA War Game(s), the staff should either proceed to the COA

    Evaluation process or refine the COA and if necessary submit them to War Gaming.

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    OUTPUT:

    Decision Support Template

    (DST)

    Each COA should be accompanied by a DST, updated with War Game results.

    OUTPUT:

    High Payoff Target List

    (HPTL)

    Each COA should be accompanied by a HPTL, updated with War Game results.

    OUTPUT:

    Refined Initial JSOR

    Each COA should be accompanied by a refined Initial JSOR, updated with War Game

    results.

    OUTPUT:

    Operational Analysis Results

    Each COA should be accompanied by updated Op Analysis results.

    COA Evaluation - General Using the results of the war game, the Stage 2 analysis and the JIPOE, the Staff now

    evaluates and compares COA relative to each other based on the following.

    COA Evaluation -

    Friendly vs. Adversary

    This is a comparison of the relative effectiveness of each Own COA to each

    Adversary COA.

    COA Evaluation -

    Friendly vs. Friendly

    This is a comparison of the relative merits of each Own COA versus other Own COA.

    COA Evaluation -

    Timeline Comparison

    COA Evaluation -

    Risk Assessment

    OUTPUT:

    COA Comparison Matrix

    A COA Comparison Matrix should be prepared for the Decision Briefing.

    Decision Briefing - General The purpose of the Decision Briefing is to allow the Commander to decide upon one

    of the COA that will be used for the Operation. At the same time, the Commander

    should confirm his Op Design and any C2 relationships that the staff have proposed.

    Subordinate commanders and liaison officers from other stakeholders might attend in

    order to glean the thrust of the plan, get a heads-up on any potential issues and to

    offer direct advice in their areas of expertise or responsibility. This briefing is usually

    orchestrated by the COS according to the SOP of the HQ. Staff should focus on the

    results of COA Comparison and recommend one of the COA. The selected COA will

    be developed into a CONOPS. The Commander should instruct the staff on

    development of Branches or Sequels and provide additional CCIR, if applicable.

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    OUTPUT:

    Concept of Operations

    (CONOPS)

    The CONOPS has several purposes: it guides staff during Stage 4; it advises the

    Superior Commander or Initiating Authority of the Commanders intentions and provides an instrument for concurrence and/or approval; and it informs subordinate

    commanders and supporting formations of the scope, nature and likely tasking

    required for their plans, forces and capabilities needed, timelines and supporting plans

    required. The CONOPS contains an overview of situation, mission statement,

    Commanders intent, outline concept for execution, outline force capability requirements, outline administrative or logistic support concept, key C2

    arrangements, public affairs polices or requirements. It does not include detailed

    annexes or supporting plans.

    OUTPUT:

    JSOR

    Once a COA is chosen, its Initial JSOR should be refined. It lists the forces necessary

    for the operation, is based on requirements of the component commanders, includes

    preliminary deployment information based on JFCs required force flow into Theatre and might be accompanied by a provisional Table of Organization & Equipment

    (TO&E) which prescribes the specific organization, personnel and equipment

    necessary. For specific reference to a Canadian context, refer to CF Force

    Employment Planning Process.

    STAGE 4 PLAN DEVELOPMENT

    Plan Preparation During Stage 4, the approved CONOPS will be amplified into a Plan or Order.

    Preparation of the Plan will involve the whole Staff due to the complexity, length and

    detail of such a product. Key activities include:

    a. Any remaining issues will be identified and resolved by the Staff. This will typically involve detailed Staff Checks and SME advice.

    b. All annexes and supporting plans (SUPLAN) need to be synchronized with the main Joint Plan and approved by the JFC. Annexes and SUPLANs are

    integral parts of the plan. An Annex is used to provide details concerning a

    specific aspect of the plan. The use of Annexes keeps the size of the body of

    the plan manageable, and allows selected addressees to receive copies of only

    those annexes that are of direct interest to them. SUPLANs are used when the

    amount of detail required is too great for the use of an annex. SUPLANs are

    stand-alone plans that support another plan by providing detailed direction

    and information on a particular aspect of that plan.

    c. If necessary, the staff will initiate the OPP for the development of Branch Plans and Sequel Plans that were identified during the planning process.

    Plan War Game During Stage 4, a War Game of the Plan is employed as a tool for drawing out the

    details in order to enhance and validate the OPLAN, to highlight any planning

    deficiencies, to identify any new potential risks or opportunities and to synchronize

    key actions. It may be planned and conducted in the same manner as the COA War

    Game during Stage 3.

  • CF OPP NOTES

    24/24 OPP NOTES (15 Aug 2013) For Educational Purposes Only Canadian Forces College, Toronto

    SUB-PROCESS NOTES

    OUTPUT:

    Operation Order (OP O) or

    Operation Plan (OPLAN) or

    Contingency Plan

    (CONPLAN)

    The aim of the OPP to plan an operation and issue a plan. It may need to be submitted

    to the IA for approval before general distribution. Implementation of the plan may

    require that the IA issue an Implementation Order (IMPL O) and/or that the JTFC

    issue an OP O to subordinate formations and units. Consequently, after Stage 4 the

    Commander will be able to issue one of the following:

    a. Operation Order (OP O) a directive issued for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an Operation; or

    b. Operational Plan (OPLAN) used to plan and prepare well in advance for a known upcoming operation for which the Government has specifically tasked

    the CF to prepare and execute; or

    c. Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) - prepared for contingencies that can be

    reasonably anticipated; reflects potential response options but having no

    specific time set for the Operation.

    STAGE 5 PLAN REVIEW

    Plan Review - General A Plan or OP O must be reviewed regularly to evaluate its viability. The evaluation

    may be conducted through exercises, war gaming or Staff analysis. The options

    available may be dependent on time available before its anticipated that the operation might be executed, or by the resources available to carry out a review. There are two

    main applications of a review:

    1. Progress Review through the pre-execution and execution phases of an operation , the existing plans, supporting plans, orders and Force Generation must be

    continually reviewed to ensure that Force Generation and preparation is proceeding as

    required, and any necessary changes can be incorporated while ensuring the mission

    remains viable.

    2. Periodic Review All plans have a limited period of validity due to the changing circumstances upon which they were based. Plans and associated supporting plans

    must be reviewed on a periodic basis in light of current or anticipated conditions.

    An Information Briefing may be conducted to update the Commander on the findings

    of the review. If it is deemed that the existing plan is no longer viable or not

    satisfying the mission, then the Commander may likely direct the staff to reinitiate the

    OPP at an appropriate Stage. If the required changes to the plan are reasonably

    minor, it may be updated and re-promulgated.

    War Game and/or Exercise During Stage 5, a War Game of the Plan is employed as a tool for validating, testing

    or refining it whilst an exercise may be conducted to rehearse the participants in the

    Operation. Such a war game may be planned and conducted in the same manner as

    the COA War Game during Stage 3.

    OUTPUT:

    Revised OPLAN or

    CONPLAN