BLUECOAT 5

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................................................................6NOTES ON CONTENT AND TERMINOLOGY........................................................................................................7INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................................9

PART ONE: BREAKING INChapter 1 LATE JULY: CAUMONT ......................................................................................................................................13Chapter 2 SUNDAY 30 JULY: JOCKS AND CHURCHILLS....................................................................31Chapter 3 SUNDAY 30 JULY: BAFFING UP THE CHARLIE LOVE ..........................................57Chapter 4 SUNDAY 30 JULY: REACTIONS ................................................................................................................67

PART TWO: ACROSS THE SOULEUVREChapter 5 MONDAY 31 JULY: DAWN’S EARLY LIGHT ..........................................................................79Chapter 6 MONDAY 31 JULY: DICKIE’S BRIDGE ............................................................................................85Chapter 7 MONDAY 31 JULY: AN ENEMY DIVIDED ................................................................................99Chapter 8 TUESDAY 1 AUGUST: LE BÉNY-BOCAGE....... ......................................................................107Chapter 9 MONDAY 31 JULY – TUESDAY 1 AUGUST: GUARDS GO SOUTH ......119

PART THREE: BREAKING THROUGHChapter 10 WEDNESDAY 2 AUGUST: HORNS OF THE BLACK BULL ............................139Chapter 11 WEDNESDAY 2 AUGUST: GUARDS ACROSS THE SOULEUVRE ........167Chapter 12 WEDNESDAY 2 AUGUST: ARRIVALS ..........................................................................................177

PART FOUR: BITE AND HOLDChapter 13 THURSDAY 3 AUGUST: EBB AND FLOW...............................................................................191Chapter 14 FRIDAY 4 AUGUST – SUNDAY 6 AUGUST: ON PERRIER RIDGE ........227

PART FIVE: THE HINGE OF NORMANDYChapter 15 SATURDAY 5 AUGUST – SUNDAY 13 AUGUST: ESTRY....... ..............................247Chapter 16 SATURDAY 5 AUGUST – SUNDAY 13 AUGUST: VIRE & GROUSE ....271Chapter 17 MORTAIN TO FALAISE....................................................................................................................................299

Index .......................................................................................................................................................................................334

APPENDIX I: BRITISH ARMY MAPS AND MAP REFERENCES 303APPENDIX II: GERMAN COMBAT TACTICS IN NORMANDY 306

APPENDIX III: ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE IN NORMANDY 311APPENDIX IV: RESTRUCTURING THE BRITISH ARMOURED DIVISIONS 316APPENDIX V: MONTGOMERY, BLUECOAT, AND THE QUESTION OF VIRE 325

BIBLIOGRAPHY & A BRIEF NOTE ON SOURCES 331

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INTRODUCTION

Few battle plans survive contact with the enemy. BLUECOAT is a case in point. Yet it was notonly enemy action but other unforeseen events that led to changes as the operation unfolded.The story of BLUECOAT is characterized by opportunities seized upon by individuals at the‘sharp end’, some of whose initiatives shaped the battle no less than the directives of generalsin the rear.

BLUECOAT was a very large operation indeed. In his earlier work on the subject, thisauthor chose to focus on the actions of the British VIII Corps. This occasioned some dismayto veterans and admirers of XXX Corps, who felt that its part had received insufficientrecognition. In the author’s defence: the post-war British Army Staff College tours of theBLUECOAT battlefield were principally concerned with VIII Corps operations. Indeed, thesefocused even more narrowly on the actions of 15th (Scottish) Division and 6th Guards TankBrigade during 30 and 31 July. Though now able to discourse at twice the length of theprevious work, the author still feels that the British side of the BLUECOAT story is best toldfrom an VIII Corps standpoint. This should in no way disparage the XXX Corps struggle forMont Pinçon and the Noireau, in spite of early tribulations and subsequent sackings. Theiractions, together with those of the Canadians and Poles still further east and the Americansin the west, all played their part in the victorious conclusion of the Normandy campaign. Allhave been well covered in the histories of the campaign. Less well represented in thehistories have been the strategic gains and tactical advances achieved by VIII Corps in thiscrucial period.

When this author first wrote about BLUECOAT, he was conscious of following in thefootsteps of an accomplished historian and soldier: Major J J (‘Joe’) How, whose 1981 studywas the first to do justice to this operation. Yet the intervening twenty-two years permittednew findings to be revealed. And now, a further six years on, although some repetition ofdetails from the author’s previous account of Operation BLUECOAT is inevitable, the ‘Overthe Battleground’ format allows the narrative to be presented in much greater detail thanpreviously. In particular, this study further extends the story into early August to include thestruggles for mastery of the Perrier Ridge and the bitter contest for possession of the Germanbulwark around the village of Estry as the battle for Normandy reached its climacticconclusion.

Lastly, the author continues to be surprised by the quantity of widely accepted Normandymyth that simply does not withstand close scrutiny. Wherever this work conflicts withnumerous other Normandy histories, the author respectfully points out that frequentrepetition of a story is no guarantee of accuracy. An appealing anecdote or a genuine mistakeof place or time recorded in the field by a harassed Intelligence Officer finds its way into ina regimental history, and unless cross-checked against other sources risks being repeated,gaining credibility in the repetition. As the late, great Colonel A H Burne pointed out, andothers have since echoed: ‘Whether history repeats itself may be a matter of doubt, but there can beno doubt that the gibe is true that historians repeat one another.’

Ian Daglish Alderley Edge 2009

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10

BLUECOAT 10

GOODWOOD

EPSOM

BLUECOAT

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BLUECOAT 11

11

EPSOM

GOODWOOD

GOODWOOD was the largest tank battle foughtin the 1944-45 campaign for north-west Europe.This important study goes back to originalsources, stripping away much of the myth thathas grown up around this famous operationwhile bringing to light important but hitherto lit-tle-known episodes. For the first time, an accu-rate chronology of events is presented, usingcontemporary reminiscences and officialrecords, supported by the hard evidence ofdetailed aerial reconnaissance photographstaken while the battle raged below

Operation EPSOM was the first of Montgomery'smajor, set-piece Normandy battles: in which highlytrained but largely inexperienced British 'follow-up'divisions confronted some of the best equipped, bestled, and most experienced combat formations of theThird Reich.EPSOM marked a turning point in the Normandycampaign. Before EPSOM, there remained thechance that a German counter-stroke in Normandymight seriously threaten the bridgehead. AfterEPSOM, the Allies retained the strategic initiativethrough to the liberation of France and Belgium.

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British carriers pause onthe road leading downfrom Point 218 intoPresles; Perrier Ridge onthe far horizon. (See page 149)

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Chapter 10

WEDNESDAY 2 AUGUST:THE HORNS OF THE

BLACK BULL

After a day spent in cautious and entirely necessary consolidation of 11thArmoured Division, Pip Roberts was prepared for a bold thrust south. Therewas every likelihood that enemies routed two days ago might soon regroup,so time was now of the essence if progress was to be made. Tiring of waitingfor Guards Armoured to arrive, Roberts’ division would look after its ownflanks as best it might. It was a calculated risk. ‘On this occasion it certainly paidto take the chance, though during the next few days many strange situations resultedfrom it and we became involved in one of the toughest battles we ever fought.’1

Meanwhile, ‘August 2nd was going to be an exciting day’.2

ORDERS

As Roberts completed preparations for the day’s advance, he received newsfrom VIII Corps. 11th Armoured Division was denied permission to enter thetown of Vire, which was now declared to be in the American sector. Robertsrecords, ‘This was in some ways frustrating; Vire was a very important road centreand its occupation by us would have made life very difficult for the Germans.’3 So, inthe early hours of 2 August, the axis of the day’s advance was changed: fromdue south towards Vire, to south-east into the German rear areas. The only11th Armoured forces to approach Vire on 2 August would be reconnaissancetroops of the Household Cavalry and the Cromwell tank squadrons of theNorthamptonshire Yeomanry charged with screening the divisional rightflank (which included Pip Roberts’ divisional headquarters when it settled atle Reculey).

The new direction of the division was assisted by neither roads nor terrain.The main thoroughfares in the sector radiated out from the important roadjunction of Vire. Running dead-straight from the city to the north-north-east,right across the path of the advance, ran the main Vire to Villers-Bocagehighway, the N 177 [modern D 577], already blocked by 11th Armouredbetween la Ferronnière and Cathéolles. An equally major artery, the N 812[modern D 512] traced a straight line due east in the direction of Vassy,towards Condé-sur-Noireau and distant Falaise. A third, smaller country roadbisected these two routes: the GC 55 [modern D 55] running north-east fromVire to Estry. Running across rather than along the axis of advance, these three

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roads did little to assist progress, but instead represented phase lines bywhich progress might be measured. Clockwise, from north to east, the threewere respectively codenamed ‘COVENTRY’, ‘WARWICK’, and ‘RUGBY’. So,with the bulk of the division now committed to a south-easterly advance, theonly roads available were a network of minor country lanes, little more thandirt tracks. And also lying at right angles to the divisional advance were twowhaleback ridges.

Several lessons had been drawn by 11th Armoured Division and itscommander from the experiences of GOODWOOD ten days before. One suchwas that the objective of a major operation should be a ‘tactical’ rather thanmerely ‘topographical’ feature, a truly defensible position rather than aconvenient line on a map. ‘The advantage of finishing on a tactical feature onwhich either hull down or covered posns could be occupied, is immense.’4 Hence PipRoberts’ decision that,

‘The Vire-Vassy road itself could not really be an objective… [but] we shouldhold these two very dominating ridges and then the Germans can attack us.Since we would be within the range of the corps artillery, we could inflict veryheavy casualties.’

The risks, of which Roberts was no less aware, were of exposed flanks and thelack of adequate roads behind the defensible ridges. Both of these werethreats to the resupply of petrol and ammunition, without which, herecognised, ‘an armoured division is not much use.’5

The force that was about to be launched into enemy territory wouldexemplify Roberts’ ideas about flexible organization between brigades.Indeed, rather than a structure based around two brigades, the division wasdivided into three regimental groups, each of an infantry battalion and a tankregiment. On the left of the division, the 23rd Hussars and 8th Rifle Brigadegroup was to follow the line: le Desert, Presles, Chênedollé. On their right, the2nd Fife and Forfar and 3rd Monmouths group had to find a way from leReculey to the Burcy ridge, and on to the Perrier ridge north of the Vire-Vassyroad. From Cathéolles and la Ferronnière, 3rd RTR and 4th KSLI were hopingto be relieved by Guards Armoured Division before following the leadcolumns, their role to head south-east behind the Hussars-Rifles group,screening the division’s open left flank. A fourth regimental group was notformed. Still recovering from their losses on ‘Black Sunday’ the 1st Herefordswere to remain in 159 Brigade reserve, out of action through the day. So, the2nd Northants Yeomanry would have to operate without infantry, ironicallyreverting to a function not dissimilar to that reconnaissance role whichRoberts had previously scorned. Operating on the extreme right flank, theywould cover the approaches to Vire, probing the main roads through leReculey and Étouvy, towards though not into Vire itself.

Accompanying or following closely behind these leading groups came thewhole mobile panoply of the 1944 armoured division. 29 Brigadeheadquarters commanded the Hussars and Rifles group, with 75th AntitankRegiment’s two batteries of self-propelled M10s6 and the twenty-four self-

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propelled ‘Sexton’ 25-pounder field guns of the 13th Royal Horse Artillery.159th Brigade HQ commanded the Fifes and Monmouths group, with the twotowed 17-pounder antitank batteries and the towed 25-pounders of the 151stField Regiment (the Ayrshire Yeomanry).

THE HUSSARS-RIFLES GROUP

The 23rd Hussars’ quiet night had been brusquely cut short. ‘These Norman folk are very hospitable and as soon as we are given our areas,tanks sort themselves out in different yards and gardens, and immediatelycamouflage the vehicles as there is talk of an air attack tonight. Digging in is

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WEDNESDAY 2 AUGUST: THE HORNS OF THE BLACK BULL • 143

Three regimental groups plunged into enemy territory.

23rd Hussars Shermanhalts at St-Martincrossroads as elementsof 11th ArmouredDivision move up.

‘CO

VENT

RY’

Reconnaissance

23 Hussars

8 Rifle Bde

2 Fife & Forfar

3 Mon

‘WARWICK’

‘RUGBY’

11th ArmouredDivision

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ordered and as my tank happens to be in a gravelled yard, this is a somewhattedious operation. However, villagers give us a drink which they describe as“Whiskey”, which is in fact, Calvados, an extremely potent liquid, distilledfrom apples. Hardly have we settled down for the night, when news is receivedthat orders will be issued at 3.30 a.m.’7

The Hussars formed-up with their new partners of 8th Battalion, The RifleBrigade. ‘It was the first occasion on which we had worked together as a group… butthe experience laid the foundations of a remarkable partnership between our twounits.’8 A novel experience for the Rifles as well, who had until recentlydeployed single motor infantry companies with each tank regiment. Unlikethe Monmouths’ ‘Motorized Infantry’ who had left their TCVs to ride on thetanks, the Rifles were ‘Motor Infantry’ with their own armoured vehicles,their companies now forming up to travel between the squadrons of Hussars.The column formed, and with the Hussars’ colonel giving ‘some extremely rudeorders about getting off the road wherever possible, and closing up our tail’, 9 thingsgot under way.

About 06.30 hours the column reached the little hamlet of la Tihardière,

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LE BÉNY-BOCAGE

LA TIHARDIÈRE

LE DOMAINE

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where a detachment of two German half-tracks was encountered. Thoughtrying to escape, both were quickly despatched by Sergeant Williams’ tank atthe head of the Hussars’ B Squadron. These were small, turreted half-tracks,model Sd.Kfz. 250/9, and on investigation turned out to belong to 2. Kompanieof the reconnaissance battalion of 9. SS-Panzerdivision. This first encounterwith the Hohenstaufen revealed the alacrity with which SS-HauptsturmführerGräbner had driven his Aufklärungs-Abteilung in advance of the division’smove to the new sector; revealed too the urgent need for Roberts’ division tomake progress before the German front could be stabilized.

A short time later the Hussars reached the main Vire road. A German tankwas reported and there ensued ‘a lot of excitement’ before it disappeared.Crossing the highway, with no major road to follow, the Hussars’ commanderLieutenant-Colonel Harding deployed his squadrons on a broad front, theRifle Brigade platoons in their half-tracks and carriers following closely. The

Two German half-tracks were despatched by Sergeant Williams’ tank at the head of theHussars’ B Squadron.

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BLUECOAT 147

Photograph of the route la Tihardière – Beaulieu, 24 June, 16.30 hours.

N

LE DOMAINE

BEAULIEU

LA CHAPELLE

LE DÉSERT

Viewpoint of the location shown opposite.

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