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Lecture 1 Ontology as a Branch of Philosophy

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Page 1: Ontology (1)

Lecture 1Ontology as a Branch

of Philosophy

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A brief history of ontologyAristotle (384 BC – 322 BC)Realist theory of categories

Intelligible universals extending across all domains

Central role of organisms

Medieval scholastics: Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, … (1200 – 1600)Aristotelianism as philosophia perennis

Common panscientific ontology and controlled vocabulary (Latin)

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A brief history of ontologyDescartes (1596 – 1650)

Sceptical doubt initiates subversion of metaphysics, rise of epistemology

Central role of mindDualism of mind and matter

Kant (1724 – 1804)Reality is unknowableMetaphysics is impossibleWe can only know the quasi-fictional domains

which we ourselves create3

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A brief history of ontologyBrentano (1838 – 1917)Rediscovery of Aristotle

Methods of philosophy and of science are one and the same

Husserl (1859 – 1938)Inventor of formal ontology as a discipline distinct from formal logicShowed how philosophy and science had become detached from the ‘life world’ of ordinary experience

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The Four Phases of Philosophy

rapid practical scepticism mysticism progress interest

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First Cycle

Thales to Stoicism and Pyrrho, Neo-Pythagoreans, Aristotle Epicureanism Eclectics Neo-Platonists

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Second Cycle

up to Scotism Ockham, Lull, Aquinas Nominalists Nicholas of Cusa

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Third Cycle

Bacon, Rationalists Hume, Berkeley, Kant Locke Reid German Idealism

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A brief history of ontologyWittgenstein 1 (ca. 1910 – 1918)Author of TractatusBases ontology on formal logic in reductionistic atomism

Vienna Circle (1922 – ca. 1938)Schlick, Neurath, Gödel, Carnap, Gustav Bergmann …Centrality of logic to philosophy Construction of philosophy from either physics or sensations as base

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A brief history of ontologyWittgenstein 2 (ca. 1930 – 1951)Centrality of language and of language gamesMetaphysics = language goes on holiday

British Ordinary Language philosophyPhilosophical problems to be solved by the study of the workings of languageSpeech Act Theory (J. L. Austin, 1911-1960)

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A brief history of ontologyQuine (ca. 1930 – 1951)Ontological commitment (study not: what there is, but: what sciences believe there is when logically formalized)

Analytical metaphysics (from ca. 1980): Chisholm, Lewis, Armstrong, Fine, Lowe, … beginnings of a rediscovery of metaphysics as first philosophy

What next?11

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Fourth Cycle (Continental)

Brentano Husserl Heidegger Derrida and Polish School the French

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Fourth Cycle (Analytical)

Frege Vienna Circle Wittgenstein 2 RortyWittgenstein 1 Quine Russell

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Each cycle begins with rediscovery of Aristotle and a new theoretical orientation

From the 3rd cycle markedby invention of new disciplines3. Empirical natural science4. Psychology, logic

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Fifth Cycle

Analytical Metaphysics Ontology Rediscovery of Aristotle

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An example of a practical problem

Increasingly, publishers are exploring ways to tag scientific literature in ways designed to make their contents more easily accessible to computers

For maximal effect, a single set of terms should be used for tagging all literature published in a given domain

How do we select the set of terms (‘ontology’) for each domain?

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from: http://www.ploscompbiol.org/doi/pcbi.1000361

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http://www.biocurator.org

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Most successful ontology venture thus far

$100 mill. invested in literature and database curation using the Gene Ontology (GO)over 11 million annotations relating gene products (proteins) described in the UniProt, Ensembl and other databases to terms in the GO

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GO provides a controlled system of representations for use in annotating

data and literature that is

• multi-species• multi-disciplinary• multi-granularity, from molecules

to population

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are structured representations of the domains of molecules, cells, diseases ... which can be used by researchers in many different disciplines who are focused on one and the same biological reality

The GO and its sister ontologies

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The goal: virtual science

• consistent (non-redundant) annotation• cumulative (additive) annotation

yielding, by incremental steps, a virtual map of the entirety of reality that is accessible to computational reasoning

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This goal is realizable if we have a common ontology framework

data is retrievabledata is comparabledata is integratable

only to the degree that it is annotated using a common controlled vocabulary – compare the role of seconds, meters, kilograms … in unifying science

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To achieve this end we have to engage in something like philosophy

is this the right way to organize the top level of this portion of the GO?how does the top level of this ontology relate to the top levels of other, neighboring ontologies? 26

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Aristotle’s Metaphysics

The world is organized via types/universals/categories which are hierarchically organized

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This holds, too, of the biological world28

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Porphyrian Hierarchy

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Linnaean Hierarchy

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From Species to Genera

canary

animal

bird

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From Species to Genera

animal

bird

canary can singis yellow

has wingscan flyhas feathers

has skin

moves

eatsbreathes

species-genus hierarchyas inference machine

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From Species to Genera

animal

bird

canary can singis yellow

has wingscan flyhas feathers

has skin

moves

eatsbreathes

fishhas finscan swimhas gills

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animal

bird

canary

From Species to Genera

can singis yellow

has skin

moves

eatsbreathes

has wingscan flyhas feathers

species-genus hierarchyas inference machine

XX

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Question: Why are species-genus hierarchies good ways to represent the world for purposes of reasoning?

Answer: They capture the way the world is (Aristotelian realism)

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Transcription is_a biological processTranscription part_of gene expression

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Species-genusgenus trees can be represented also as map-like partitions

If Aristotelian realism is right, then such partitions, when correctly built are transparent to the reality beyond

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From Species to Genera

canary

animal

bird

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From Species to Genera

animal

bird

canarycanary

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Alberti’s Grid c.1450

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Ontologies: windows on

the universals in reality 41

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Artist’s Grid

as through a transparent grid42

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Species-Genera as Map/Partition

animal

bird

canary

ostrich

fish

canary

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siamese

mammal

cat

organism

substancespecies, genera

animal

instances

frog

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Aristotle’s Metaphysics is focused on objects (things, substances, organisms)

The most important universals in his ontology are substance universals

cow man rock planet

which pertain to what a thing is at all times at which it exists

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For Aristotle, the world contains also accidents

which pertain to how a thing is at some time at which it exists:

= what holds of a substance per accidens

red hot suntanned spinning

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Accidents, too, instantiate genera and species

Thus accidents, too, form trees of greater and lesser generality

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Accidents: Species and instances

this individual accident of redness (this token redness – here, now)

quality

color

red

scarlet

R232, G54, B24

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Nine Accidental Categoriesquid? substance quantum? quantity quale? qualityad quid? relationubi? placequando? timein quo situ? status/contextin quo habitu? habitusquid agit? actionquid patitur? passion

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= relations of inherence(one-sided existential dependence)

John

hunger

Substances are the bearers of accidents

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Aristotle 1.0

an ontology recognizing:substance tokensaccident tokenssubstance typesaccident types

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Aristotle’s Ontological SquareSubstantial Accidental

Second substance man cat ox

Second accident headache sun-tan dread

First substance this man this cat this ox

First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread

Uni

vers

alP

artic

ular

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Some philosophers accept only part of this four category

ontology

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Standard Predicate Logic – F(a), R(a,b) ...

Substantial Accidental

Attributes F, G, R

Individuals a, b, c this, that

Uni

vers

alP

artic

ular

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Bicategorial NominalismSubstantial Accidental

First substance this man this cat this ox

First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread

Uni

vers

alP

artic

ular

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Process MetaphysicsSubstantial Accidental

EventsProcesses

“Everything is flux”

Uni

vers

alP

artic

ular

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In fact however we need more than the ontological square

Not everything in reality is either a substance or an accident

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Positive and negative parts

positivepart

negativepartor hole

(made of matter)

(not made of matter)

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Shoes

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Pipe

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Niches, environments are holes

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Places are holes

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Places are holes

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Nine Accidental Categoriesquid? substance quantum? quantity quale? qualityad quid? relationubi? placequando? timein quo situ? status/contextin quo habitu? habitusquid agit? actionquid patitur? passion

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Places

For Aristotle the place of a substance is the interior boundary of the surrounding body (for example the interior boundary of the surrounding water where it meets a fish’s skin)

For holes, we need an extension of Aristotle’s metaphysics

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A hole in the ground

Solid physical boundaries at the floor and walls

but with a lid that is not made of matter:

hole66

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Holes involve two kinds of boundaries

bona fide boundaries which exist independently of our demarcating acts

fiat boundaries which exist only because we put them there

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Examples

of bona fide boundaries:an animal’s skin, the surface of the planet

of fiat boundaries:the boundaries of postal districts and census

tracts

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Mountain

bona fide upper boundaries with a fiat base:

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where does the mountain start ?

... a mountain is not a substance70

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Cerebral Cortex

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Aristotle 1.5

an ontology ofsubstances + accidents+ holes (and other entities not made of matter)+ fiat and bona fide boundaries+ artefacts and environments

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Question

How do those parts and dimensions of reality which we encounter in our everyday experience relate to those parts and dimensions of reality which are studied by science?

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Aristotle 2010scientific realism coupled with realism about the everyday world

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Universe/Periodic Tableanimal

bird

canaryostrich

fish folk biology

partition of DNA space

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Universe/Periodic Tableanimal

bird

canaryostrich

fish

both are transparent partitions of one and the same reality

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An organism is a totality of atoms

An organism is a totality of molecules

An organism is a totality of cells

An organism is a single unitary substance

... all of these express veridical partitions

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Multiple transparent partitions

at different levels of granularity

operating with species-genus hierarchies and with an ontology of substances and accidents along the lines described by Aristotle

substances and accidents reappear in the microscopic and macroscopic worlds of e.g. of chemistry and evolutionary biology

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we do not assert

that every level of granularity is structured in substance-accident form -- perhaps there are pure process levels, perhaps there are levels structured as fields

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PerspectivalismPerspectivalismDifferent partitions may represent cuts through the same reality which are skew to each other

Not all need be structured in substance-accident terms – perhaps there are pure process levels, perhaps there are levels structured as fields

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Periodic Table

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Scientific partitions like the Periodic Table or the Gene Ontology

are transparent to the hierarchical order of an associated domain of objects

they capture reality at different levels of granularity

cellular constituents are visible to the GO, molecular constituents not

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Perspectivalism

PerspectivalismDifferent partitions may represent cuts through the same reality which are skew to each other

Different partitions may capture reality in ways which involve different degrees of vagueness

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From Species to Genera

animal

bird

canary can singis yellow

has wingscan flyhas feathers

has skin

moves

eatsbreathes

fishhas finscan swimhas gills

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From Species to Genera

animal

bird

canary can singis yellow

has wingscan flyhas feathers

has skin

moves

eatsbreathes

fishhas finscan swimhas gills

ostrichhas long thin legsis tallcan‘t fly

yy86

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From Species to Genera

animal

bird

canary can singis yellow

has wingscan flyhas feathers

has skin

moves

eatsbreathes

fishhas finscan swimhas gills

ostrichhas long thin legsis tallcan’t fly

yy87

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Theory of vagueness

How can -based conceptualizations be transparent,if the world is shaped like this

?

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Observe that no such problems arise for the closed worlds constructed in information systemshierarchies as reasoning tools work very well for the closed worlds of database engineers

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whether a file is in a given folder on your hard-drive is completely determinate:

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Dewey Decimal Classification

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Dewey Decimal Classification (Detail)

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No borderline cases in the closed world of a databaseEvery book is assigned a determinate Dewey Classification Number at birth

111.560xxx

this yields a classificationthat is completely crisp

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... and always up-to-dateTo be a book = to have a reference number in the Catalogue System

Each of the ontologies produced by ontological engineers deals with objects which are constructed (Kant would say “constituted”) by the database itself

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Kant

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Sharpness of database reality vs. vagueness of flesh and blood realityHow to deal with the problemof vagueness of our representations?

How to create adequate representations beyond the quasi-Kantian realm of database engineers

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Kantian ConstructivismThere are no species-genus hierarchies in reality unless we put them there

The world – insofar as it is accessible to us through our concepts at all – is a closed system tailored by us to fit those concepts

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Kantianism seems to work very well for the closed worlds of database environments

There Midas-touch epistemology is appropriate

If our database recognizes only two genders, then the world represented in the database is a world in which there are only two genders

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hard vs. soft categories

Kantianism: we constitute/shape (empirical) reality in such a way that it corresponds to our categories

Aristotelianism: reality in itself is messy, but our categories fit nonetheless

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For Aristotelians

when we apply general terms to reality we are aware that we may have to deal with an opposition ... between standard or focal or prototypical instances of the corresponding universals... and non-standard or ‘fringe’ instances

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birds

ostrich

Natural categories have borderline cases

sparrow

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... they have a kernel/penumbra structure

kernel of focal

instances

penumbra of borderline cases

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Species Genera as Tree

canary

animal

bird fish

ostrich

103

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Species-Genera as Map/Partition

animal

bird

canary

ostrich

fish

canary

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animal

bird

canary

ostrich

fish

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Coarse-grained Partition

what happens when a fringe instance arises ?

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Aristotle 2010you seek to find a finer grained partition which will recognize the phenomenon in question and allow an explanation of why it deviates from the prototype

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The advance of science

is not an advance away from Aristotle towards something better.Provided Aristotle is interpreted aright, it is a rigorous demonstration of the correctness of his ontological approach

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Kantianism

each partition gives only a partial view (no complete map) of any reality beyondand thus it gives a distorted view

– we can only really know what we ourselves have constructed

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For the Aristotelian, there are two sorts of partitions:

those which relate merely to a created, surrogate world (Library of Congress Catalog)

those which are transparent to some independent reality beyond (Gene Ontology)

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Concepts vs. categorieson the Kantian reading species are concepts, which we bring to reality

on the Aristotelian reading the world itself exhibits a species-genus structure independently of how we conceive it and we do our best to map this structure in our representations

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Basic Formal Ontology (BFO)

Continuant Occurrent(Process)

IndependentContinuant

DependentContinuant

..... ..... ........112