ON THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS · PDF filethe organization of american states and the 2001 united nations conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light

THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE 2001 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

ON THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

TACKLING THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

By William Godnick

ABOUT THE AUTHORWILLIAM GODNICK is a PhD candidate in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford (UK). He is an independent researcher and consultantin the areas of weapons collection and small arms proliferation, with a primaryfocus on Central and Latin America.

In writing and revising this paper, Mr. Godnick was assisted by Elizabeth Clegg,Michael Crowley, Sarah Meek, Greg Puley, and Carlos Walker Uribe.

ABOUT THIS PAPERThis paper is a joint publication of the British American Security InformationCouncil, International Alert and Saferworld (as “Biting the Bullet”), ProjectPloughshares and the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, with fund-ing from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

BITING THE BULLET is a joint project of BASIC, INTERNATIONAL ALERT

and SAFERWORLD. This project seeks to advance the agenda for the UN 2001Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspectsby facilitating a wide-ranging and well-informed debate among governments andbetween governments and civil society.

THE BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL (BASIC)

is an independent research organization that analyzes international security issues.BASIC works to promote awareness of security issues among the public, policy-makers, and the media to foster informed debate on both sides of the Atlantic.website: www.basicint.org

INTERNATIONAL ALERT is an independent NGO which analyzes the causes of conflicts within countries, enables mediation and dialogue to take place, setsstandards of conduct that avoid violence, helps to develop the skills necessary toresolve conflict non-violently and advocates policy changes to promote sustainablepeace. website: www.international-alert.org

SAFERWORLD is an independent foreign affairs think tank working to identify,develop and publicize more effective approaches to tackling and preventing armed conflicts. As well, Saferworld aims to work with governments and non-gov-ernmental groups on the ground in regions of conflict to better control flows of, and reduce demand for, arms. website: www.saferworld.co.uk

Founded in 1976, PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES is a Canadian ecumenical NGO, sponsored by the Canadian Council of Churches, that carries out policyresearch, analysis, dialogue and public education programs in Canada and interna-tionally to identify, develop and advance approaches that build peace and preventwar, and that promote the peaceful resolution of political conflict.website: www.ploughshares.ca

THE ARIAS FOUNDATION FOR PEACE AND HUMAN PROGRESS aims to promote just and peaceful societies in Central America and other regions. The Foundation’s work is divided among three active programs: The Center forHuman Progress, The Center for Peace and Reconciliation, and The Center forOrganized Participation. website: www.arias.or.cr

First printed January 2002

ISBN 1-895722-31-4

The Organization of American States andthe 2001 United Nations Conference onthe Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light

Weapons in All Its Aspects: Tackling the illicit trade in small arms

and light weapons By William Godnick

Section 1: IntroductionThis monograph is a modified version of abackground paper prepared for a conference thattook place in Ottawa, Canada in May 2001,bringing together representatives of the MemberStates of the Organization of American States(OAS), non-governmental organizations (NGOs)and civil society to discuss issues related to theJuly 2001 United Nations (UN) Conference on theIllicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in AllIts Aspects (hereafter referred to as the UNConference). This version takes into account theProgramme of Action (PoA) adopted by the UNMember States as well as other emerging orconsolidated initiatives in the western hemisphere.1

The UN Conference brought to urgent internationalattention the need to prevent the proliferation andmisuse of small arms and light weapons. One ofthe key considerations of the conference was thePoA’s interaction with the multiple regionalmeasures and initiatives already in place, such asthe Inter-American Convention Against the IllicitManufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms,Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials(hereafter referred to as the Inter-AmericanConvention) adopted by the OAS in 1997.2 TheInter-American Convention had previously provedan important regional forerunner and buildingblock towards the development of the UN Protocolagainst the Illicit Manufacturing of and Traffickingin Firearms, Their Parts, Components andAmmunition (hereafter referred to as the UNFirearms Protocol).

While the UN Conference did not live up to thehigh expectations of many governments andNGOs, it did provide the opportunity to build onregional action while establishing the need for, ifnot the prospect of, international action. The

failure of the Conference to agree on adequatesteps at the international level has placed the onuson regional institutions and initiatives as the majordriving force for addressing the small armsproblem on the ground. The attention paid to theissue of the illicit arms trade by the UN and itsMember States has the potential to spur newregional initiatives, advance the implementation ofinitiatives already underway and provide financialand technical vehicles that will support suchimplementation. Representatives and MemberStates of regional organizations were diligentduring the conference proceedings in making surethat actions taken in the international arena wereconsistent with the unique and particular needs ofthe world’s regions and sub-regions in terms ofpriorities, approaches and experience.

Ambassador Camilo Reyes of Colombia presidedat the UN Conference. Following the Conference,as the chair of the UN Security Council, theGovernment of Colombia initiated a debate onsmall arms and completed a PresidentialStatement on small arms policy.3 In addition toColombia, it is important to recognize the keyroles played by Brazil, Canada, Mexico and theUnited States in the outcome of the UN Conference.

The Brasilia Declaration4

From 22 to 24 November 2000 the representativesof the Latin American and Caribbean states,including Cuba, gathered in Brasilia to seek acommon approach in order to contribute aregional perspective to the work of the UNConference. In addition to supporting the UNsmall arms process and parallel work on theFirearms Protocol, the representatives agreed toseek to accomplish the following goals:

The Organization of American States and the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms

and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Tackling the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons

By William Godnick

W I L L I A M G O D N I C K 3

• consolidate a global and balanced approach tothe issues involved, taking into considerationthe specific characteristics of regions, sub-regions and countries;

• strengthen international cooperation in thefollowing areas: judicial, technical, financial andlaw enforcement;

• recognize the importance of national efforts torecover small arms in post-conflict settings andof international support for such efforts;

• recommend the adoption of concrete measures;

• acknowledge that civil society has an importantrole to play; and

• promote constructive and pragmatic approacheswithin the scope of the UN Conference.

The meeting of Latin American governments andthe Brasilia Declaration demonstrate that many ofthe OAS Member States appreciate the importanceof regional approaches within the UN context. Inthe third meeting of the Conference PreparatoryCommittee in March 2001, Brazil endorsed specificproposals for follow-up to the PoA, including:

• establishing an ad hoc follow-up mechanismsubsidiary to the General Assembly;

• convening regional or sub-regional follow-upmeetings and conferences; and

• convening a Review Conference involving allparties no later than 2006.

The final UN Conference PoA adopted the conveningof biennial meetings and a 2006 Review Conferenceas official follow-up to the Conference. The Governmentof Chile and the United Nations Department forDisarmament Affairs (UNDDA) agreed to allocatethe resources for a regional follow-up meeting ofthe Latin American and Caribbean States for the2001 UN Conference in November 2001.5

The Managua DeclarationPrior to the UN Conference the Swedish Fellowshipof Reconciliation, an NGO, took the initiative togather parliamentarians from Europe, CentralAmerica and Brazil to discuss the issue of smallarms proliferation and misuse and considerCentral American involvement in the UN process.

The second meeting of this initiative took place inManagua in April 2001 where the Central Americanparticipants made the following commitments inanticipation of the UN small arms process:6

• to demand the active participation of missionsfrom each Central American country in the UN2001 Conference;

• to make a call to members of parliament of allCentral American nations, including the CentralAmerican Parliament, to work with theirrespective ministries of foreign affairs in orderto promote the most qualified participation andsignificant presence in the UN 2001 Conference;

• to elaborate and present a unified CentralAmerican position before the UN 2001Conference using the Brasilia Declaration (seebelow) as a model; and

• to recommend that government missionsparticipating in the UN 2001 Conference arriveinformed and with the relevant information onarms proliferation, misuse and laws from theirhome countries.

The governments of Central America chose toadhere to and support the conference statementmade by the representative of the government ofChile on behalf of the Rio Group (see below)instead of presenting a unified position for thesub-region. However, representatives of CostaRica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama andNicaragua did make individual statements on theConference floor.7

Section 2: Building onExisting InitiativesThe Inter-American Convention, Inter-AmericanDrug Abuse Control Commission’s (CICAD) ModelRegulations for the Control of the InternationalMovement of Firearms, Their Parts and Componentsand Ammunition and several sub-regional initiativesin Central and South America provide usefulpoints of reference for consensus building at theglobal level. These existing initiatives illustrate theareas where it is possible to build politicalconsensus around combating the illicit arms trade.

4 W I L L I A M G O D N I C K

Small arms as a crime controlissue: The Inter-AmericanConventionThe Inter-American Convention is the only legallybinding regional agreement in the world thatdeals with firearms proliferation in the context oflaw enforcement and crime control. All OASMember States, with the exception of Dominica,have signed the agreement while thirteen havereached the point of ratification. By the conclusionof the UN Conference the states that have ratifiedthe Convention included: Bahamas (1998), Belize(1997), Bolivia (1999), Brazil (1999), Costa Rica(2000), Ecuador (1999), El Salvador (1999),Mexico (1998), Nicaragua (1999), Panama (1999),Paraguay (2000), Peru (1999) and Uruguay (2001).

The Convention broadly defines firearms as “anybarreled weapon which will or is designed to ormay be readily converted to expel a bullet orprojectile by the action of an explosive – anyother weapons or destructive device such as anexplosive, incendiary or gas bomb, grenade,rocket launcher, missile, missile system or mine.”The breadth of this definition is a principalstrength of the Inter-American Convention. Whilein some other fora the range of weapons coveredunder such definitions is much more limited, theInter-American Convention can be applied to therange of small arms and light weapons responsiblefor death, injury and trauma in the westernhemisphere. The aims of the Convention are to8

• criminalize illicit manufacturing and trafficking;

• mark weapons at manufacture and import;

• establish an effective export, import and transitlicensing system;

• strengthen controls at export points;

• exchange information on producers, dealers,importers and exporters, routes and techniquesused in illicit trafficking; and

• exchange experience and training in areas suchas identification, detection, tracing andintelligence gathering.

Prior to the UN Conference, in May 2001, theConsultative Committee of the Inter-AmericanConvention met in Washington, DC to approve thework program for 2001-2002 as well as to review

the ratifications of the Convention, discuss the casestudy presented by the Government of Mexico,identify points of contact within each nationalgovernment as well as central authorities responsiblefor the legal and legislative aspects of ratification,adoption and implementation.9 Some of the keyactivities of the 2001-2002 work program are:

• Encourage participation, by all conventionsignatories, in the questionnaire approved at the First Meeting of Parties to the Convention.As of 15 June 2001,10 only 16 of the 33signatories to the Convention have respondedto the questionnaire that allows for bureaucratic,technical and political monitoring and follow-up.

• Update the inventory of measures adopted byStates as indicated in the above-mentionedquestionnaire.

• Create private e-mail lists for information sharingamong national entities and central authorities.

• Develop a register of arms suppliers within theOAS region.

• Formalize contact and relationships with theUN, European Union (EU) and otherinternational organizations interested inmultilateral cooperation.

• Publish a Convention website with differentlevels of private and public access.

• Invite States to develop and present casestudies, such as the one presented by Mexico inMay 2001, regarding the illegal arms traffickingenvironment and the status of Conventionratification and implementation.

• Advance the development of model legislationneeded to implement the Convention, but notcontemplated in CICAD Model Regulations (seediscussion below).

Participation in the UN Conference and theBrasilia Declaration were also discussed in theMay consultation. On 11 July 2001 therepresentative of the Government of Mexico, aschair of the Convention’s Consultative Committee,made a presentation to the Conference on behalfof the Rio Group. In the days following thispresentation, the chair met with the UN Under-secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, theDirector of the UN Regional Centre for Peace,Disarmament and Development in Latin Americaand the Caribbean (UN-LiREC) and representativesof the EU to discuss future modes of cooperation.


It is clear that the parties to the Inter-AmericanConvention took advantage of the UN Conferenceto bolster support for the Inter-AmericanConvention and its implementation. Thesemeetings and the apparent political will to moveforward in a collaborative fashion build on theMemorandum of Understanding (MOU) signedbetween UNDDA and the OAS on 26 January 2001that set out a legal framework for cooperationwith regard to measures to reduce illegaltrafficking in firearms in the region. UN-LiREC andCICAD were already established as the respectiveimplementing institutions of this agreement whenthe UN Conference began.

CICAD Model RegulationsConcurrent to the Inter-American Conventionnegotiations, the OAS Member States alsoformulated a set of practical guidelines tocomplement the effective implementation of theConvention. Developed under the auspices ofCICAD the Model Regulations were also adoptedin November 1997. These Model Regulationsconsist of a series of harmonized measures andprocedures for monitoring and controlling theinternational movement of commercially tradedfirearms, their parts and components among OASstates that have adopted them and guidelines forminimum standards required for harmonizedlicensing. It also outlines proposals for record-keeping and information sharing on imports andexports, including the quantity, type and serialnumbers of firearms.11

There are three key weaknesses to theseregulations that make it difficult to fully preventsmall arms from entering the illicit market. First,the Model Regulations are not directly connectedto the Inter-American Convention and only applyto OAS Member States that adopt them.12 Theyhave no effect on other States with which OASMember States do business or OAS States thathave not adopted them. When a manufacturer orbroker from an OAS Member State sells firearmsto brokers and buyers from noncompliant OASstates, or non-members, with lax controls andregulations there is a danger that these arms willenter the international black market. It should benoted here that in many parts of the Americas asimilar phenomenon of ‘slippage’ from licit toillicit markets also occurs through the sale or

export of firearms from relatively strict domesticregulation of firearms possession, use and resaleto areas of relatively lenient domestic regulation.

Second, the Convention and Model Regulationsare limited to commercially traded firearms,leaving state-to-state small arms transfers to avariety of military, security and police end-usersinadequately regulated. A further gap in controlsexists with regard to state transfers of arms tonon-state actors. The end product of the UNConference indicates that there is still a lack ofpolitical will, both inside and outside of the OAS,to take aggressive action on these two areas ofgovernment-sanctioned transfers.

Third, the adoption and the implementation ofthe Model Regulations are not well coordinatedwith other Inter-American agreements andimplementing organs such as those aimed atfighting corruption. For this reason the ModelRegulations do not take advantage of potentialsynergies with other relevant regional initiatives.

Despite its weaknesses, the CICAD ModelRegulations provide a practical, hands-onopportunity for multilateral technical cooperation.In 2000 and 2001 UN-LiREC in cooperation with CIDAD held Model Regulation awareness-building workshops in Peru, Martinique andTrinidad and Tobago open to all UN MemberStates in Latin America, including Cuba. Theseseminars are scheduled to continue into 2002.Furthermore, beginning in February 2002, the EUtogether with the Governments of the Netherlandsand Sweden have agreed to finance relatedtraining activities on a sub-regional level for policeand customs officers involving UN-LiREC, CICADand potentially INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization.

The need for a comprehensiveapproach: The OAS Resolutions on small armsOAS Member States have further recognized themulti-dimensional aspects of the proliferation andillicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons.A 1999 Resolution of the General Assembly calledfor “integrated action that addresses matters ofsecurity; the collection of weapons fromdemobilized combatants, the destruction of thoseweapons, and the reintegration of such persons


into civilian life; humanitarian issues; cultural andeconomic circumstances and the legal aspects ofarms control.”13 This suggests that for some timewithin the OAS there has been at least aminimum level of consensus for an approach thatgoes beyond crime control and law enforcementalone. The UN Conference PoA together with theInter-American Convention provide OAS MemberStates with important international political toolsto combine approaches to combat small armsproliferation according to differing national andsub-regional contexts. However, both initiativeshave significant blind spots (for example, neitherexplicitly prohibits small arms transfers to humanrights abusers) which must be addressed if theyare to prove effective in tackling the problem inits entirety.

A month prior to the UN 2001 Conference at theOAS General Assembly another resolution waspassed on the “Proliferation of and Illicit Traffickingin Small Arms and Light Weapons.”14 Thisresolution took note of the UN Conference, theBrasilia Declaration, the Inter-American Conventionand the CICAD Model Regulations as well as theUS government’s offer of “bilateral technical andfinancial assistance available for destruction ofsurplus weapons, as well as illegal weapons seizedas a result of interdicting illicit trafficking.” The2001 OAS small arms resolution also called for thefollowing actions, among others:

• Encourage Member States to adopt CICADModel Regulations.

• Instruct the Committee on HemisphericSecurity to undertake a study on small arms /light weapons brokering and transit.

• Encourage Member States to adopt measuresrelating brokering and transit in order tocombat illicit trafficking.

• Request that CICAD provide assistance toMember States to build capacity and implementthe Inter-American Convention.

• Request that the Committee on HemisphericSecurity hold a seminar on stockpile management,destruction and identification of small arms.

• Encourage states to destroy surplus and seizedsmall arms and light weapons as well as takemeasures to prevent theft and leakage fromofficial inventories.

Coordinating approaches

Some countries require a broader, multi-disciplinaryapproach to small arms proliferation as outlinedin the 2001 OAS resolution. Guatemala has notyet ratified the Inter-American Convention becauseof legislative obstacles related to its constitution,the difficulty of passing more restrictive firearmscontrol legislation in the present environment ofinsecurity and delays in the implementation ofrelevant aspects of the Peace Accords.15 Thesection of the accords dealing with the‘Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role ofthe Armed Forces in a Democratic Society’ calledfor the transfer of power over the control of arms,ammunition and explosives from the Ministry ofDefense to the newly created Ministry of theInterior.16 In a May 1999 referendum with highlevels of voter absenteeism, voters rejected apackage of 50 amendments to the constitutionapproved by the congress a year earlier, whichhad been prepared in accordance with the UN-brokered peace plan. The rejection of the packagemade reforming the law on arms, ammunitionand explosives difficult, in addition to hamperingthe progress of many other laws including thatwhich governs private security companies.

Guatemala provides a good example of a countrywhich, in order to adhere to a small arms controltreaty in the context of crime prevention, mustalso deal with the issue in the context of post-conflict peace-building. The United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) “Violence in aSociety in Transition Program” in neighboring ElSalvador specifically focuses part of its efforts onstrengthening mechanisms for small armscontrol.17 It would be to Guatemala’s advantage towork toward a similar agreement while the UnitedNations Observer Mission and UNDP still haveactive mandates in the country. These small armsand light weapons (SALW) pilot projects should bewatched carefully by OAS members and non-members alike.

Sub-regional initiativesBoth MERCOSUR and the Central Americancountries have made sub-regional politicalcommitments to control the illicit arms trade. TheMERCOSUR agreement should be seen in thecontext of a sub-region with two important smallarms-producing countries, Argentina and Brazil, as


well as Paraguay, a country challenged by asignificant black market trade. All of the CentralAmerican countries have been affected by theCold War conflicts of the previous decades, as wellas the increased drug trafficking in the region,and this has led to sub-regional cooperationacross a range of issues.

MERCOSUR

Following the Southern Cone Presidential Declarationon Combating the Illicit Manufacturing andTrafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and RelatedMaterials signed in April 1998 the interior ministersof the countries belonging to the South AmericanCommon Market (MERCOSUR) – Argentina, Brazil,Paraguay and Uruguay – and their associatesBolivia and Chile agreed to develop a joint registrationmechanism for firearms, ammunition, explosivesand other related materials within the MERCOSURSecurity Information System to include:18

• register(s) of individuals and legal entities thatbuy, sell, exchange, import, export anddistribute firearms;

• register(s) of ports of shipment andimportation, including intermediate points; and

• national registers of individual and institutionalfirearms owners.

The parties also agreed to use the CICAD ModelRegulations framework to establish national dataprocessing centers to ensure compliance. Theframework for collaboration between UN-LiRECand CICAD provides an opportunity to pursue andadvance the development of the mechanism.

MERCOSUR decisions are obligatory and do notrequire approval or ratification by nationallegislatures. In November 2000 the MERCOSUR,Bolivian and Chilean Interior Ministers met in Riode Janeiro where a common nomenclature wasadopted establishing definitions for the followingcategories of firearms: civilian, conditional-usecivilian, prohibited, collectable, military-exclusiveand component / accessories. Since November2000 no progress has been made in this areabecause of differences of opinion regarding thebest software to use for implementation of theMERCOSUR Security Information System.19

In addition to the region-wide joint CICAD/UN-LiREC training for police and customs officers,UN-LiREC is in the process of developing databaseson firearms, ammunition and explosives in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean financed by the EUand in cooperation with the Stockholm InternationalPeace Research Institute and the UN Institute forDisarmament Research.20 These tools will bemade available to police and customs officials andrepresent significant steps toward progress on thetechnical / bureaucratic level. What remain to beseen are substantial moves toward political anddiplomatic follow-up on the part of theMERCOSUR governments and their associates.

Central America

Because of the high levels of weaponryproliferating in the Central American sub-regionas a result of the countries’ civil conflicts and thedynamics of the Cold War, the isthmus has beenhost to a number of measures and proposals tocontrol arms at the national and sub-regionallevels. Recently, the Brasilia Declaration took noteof the 1997 Summit of Central AmericanPresidents that created the still unfulfilledDeclaration on the Recovery of Illicit Arms in theHands of Civilians in Central America.21

Another agreement, dating from 1995, “TheFramework Agreement for Democratic Security inCentral America,” involves all Central Americancountries and is even more comprehensive andfar-reaching.22 It calls for the establishment of auniform register of arms, equipment andexplosives; modernization and harmonization ofrelevant laws; and dispute resolution systems forcases of arms trafficking involving more than onenational jurisdiction. However, the Costa RicanLegislative Commission has voted unanimously toreject ratification of the treaty, citing lack ofdistinction between the roles of the military andcivilian security forces.23 A review of the treaty isnow planned by Costa Rica. Panama and Belizeofficially support the Costa Rican position.

In addition, the OAS has already coordinated acomprehensive landmine detection and removalprogram in Central America involving Guatemala,Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Thisdemonstrates the possibilities for positivecollaboration between international donors, the


OAS beneficiary countries, their governments andmilitary institutions and technical advisors fromwithin the region provided by the Inter-AmericanDefense Board (IADB).24 Similar structures andarrangements might be useful for tackling theillicit arms trade in Central America, particularlythe trade in handguns and assault rifles bound forthe conflict in Colombia.

While positive steps have been taken in nationalcontexts, sub-regional efforts in Central Americatend to be weak due to the numerous territorialdisputes involving virtually all countries and ageneral climate of distrust. One possibility forcooperation would be for the Central American

Integration System (SICA) to sign an agreement orMOU with UN-LiREC as has been done with theEconomic Commission for Latin America in theeconomic arena. Central American governmentsare already eligible for support from UN-LiREC ona national level; however, such a sub-regionalagreement could foster trust and collaborationamongst Central American states in the fightagainst arms trafficking, without getting caught upin the existing differences of opinion related tothe Framework Agreement for Democratic Security.


Highlights in small arms control in El Salvador

March 1992 – August 1993United Nations Observer Mission (ONUSAL) oversees the surrender and destruction of weapons held bythe Frente Farabundo Martía de Liberación Nacional including 10,230 small arms, 4,032,000 rounds ofammunition and 9,228 grenades.25

1996 – PresentThe Patriotic Movement Against Crime, a private sector association, in cooperation with the CivilianNational Police, Ministry of Defense, Catholic Church, Office of the President, the Legislative Assembly andthe Rotary Club carry out the Goods for Guns program, exchanging vouchers for foodstuffs, shoes andpharmaceuticals in exchange for weapons. In the first four years the program succeeded in collecting anddestroying 1,354 pistols and revolvers, 3,043 long arms including assault rifles, 3,180 grenades and 129,696rounds of ammunition.26

8 January 1999El Salvador ratifies the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking inFirearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials, deposited at the OAS on 18 March 1999.

May 1999The Central American University’s Institute for Public Opinion publishes a study on cultural norms andattitudes towards violence, including the use and possession of firearms.27 The study paves the way for theCentral American University’s further research in the area of small arms and public security.

1 July 1999El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly approves a new law for the control and regulation of firearms,ammunition, explosives and similar articles. While far from perfect it better reflects the nation’s post-conflict reality and is a starting point for continued national debate.

Section 3: Tackling SmallArms – The Supply SideThe OAS has been a pioneer among regionalorganizations to stem the supply of small armsthat are manufactured and traded illegally. Thesigning of the Inter-American Convention and thedevelopment of CICAD’s Model Regulations areevidence of this. The Inter-American Conventionhas served as a model and primary input for theUN Firearms Protocol.

OAS Member States have also taken unilateral stepsto prevent legally manufactured and traded firearmsfrom entering illegal and grey markets. InNovember 2000, the Brazilian government levieda 150 per cent export tax on handguns andammunition bound for Central America, the Caribbeanand South America, with the exception of Argentina,Chile and Ecuador because they have strict gun-control laws and effective anti-smuggling efforts.28

In 1999, the US government suspended sales ofhandguns to Venezuelan companies out ofconcern that many weapons were ending up inthe hands of drug traffickers and guerrillaorganizations in neighboring Colombia.29

TracingThere is a relatively broad international consensusthat firearms being sold commercially should beuniquely marked at the time of manufacture sothat they can be traced, should that benecessary.30 However, marking at the point ofimport or the marking of weapons designated foruse by military or security forces are more hotlydebated issues in the international arena. In thefight against the illicit arms trade, where theoriginal importer may be several countriesremoved from where the illegal weapons areseized, information on the weapon that identifiesmore recent importation is valuable to lawenforcement efforts to trace the route by whichthose weapons were transported and to identify atwhich stage the weapons crossed over from thelegal to the illegal market. Marking at import hasbeen agreed in the UN Firearms Protocol, as havemeasures to ensure that weapons are markedwith unique serial numbers, name of manufacturerand place of manufacture. In addition, theProtocol requires countries to mark weapons thatare transferred from military stocks into the

civilian market, a first step in promoting effortstowards universal marking of military weapons.

The Firearms Protocol is also a significantadvance in efforts to trace seized weapons, as itpromotes information sharing between countries,specifically for the purpose of tracing weaponsand learning more about the methods and meansby which weapons are trafficked illegally. Dataexclusively from manufacturers is only of limitedutility as arms may change hands legally severaltimes before they reach the black market.

Article VI of the Inter-American Convention callsfor marking at the time of manufacture,importation and confiscation, including not onlyfirearms, but also grenades and other weaponscovered by the Convention. Article XI refers torecord-keeping, but is quite vague and Article XIIIdeals with information exchange in a fairly broadway. Unfortunately the limited number ofratifications of the Convention and the lowresponse rate to the official conventionquestionnaire (see above) indicate that the OASStates have a long way to go before there will bean effective tracing regime in place.

Attempts to trace a fully and uniquely markedweapon are frequently frustrated by inadequaterecord-keeping.31 Lack of traceability in generalobstructs efforts to obtain information relating todiversion points of specific weapons. The level ofinformation exchange necessary to identifydiversion requires a level of confidence betweenstates that can be challenging across the entireregion or within sub-regions. Nevertheless, in theabsence of the ability to trace weapons flowsaccurately with the help of official governmentdocumentation, authorities will have to placemore effort on intelligence gathering activities.

While the UN Conference PoA leaves the majorityof the responsibility for marking and tracing toindividual states it does encourage the allocationof financial and technical support for Statesinterested in developing such capacity andutilizing new technologies. In terms ofinternational tracing the boldest move taken bythe UN Conference PoA in this regard was thedecision to undertake a study for “examining thefeasibility of developing an internationalinstrument to enable States to identify and tracein a timely and reliable manner illicit small armsand light weapons.” However, the lack of international


commitment vis-à-vis the establishment ofinternational cooperation on tracing, must, in theabsence of enhanced political will, place aquestion mark over the prospects that any suchfeasibility study will yield positive results.

As well as fully implementing the Inter-AmericanConvention provisions on marking andinformation exchange, the OAS Member Statescan play a very useful catalytic and leadership roleat the international level. By sharing theirpractical regional experiences, OAS States canhelp develop international best practice, and arewell placed to promote a climate whereinternational cooperation on marking and tracingis encouraged and the process of developing aninternational instrument has begun.

BrokeringDespite increasing evidence of the consequencesof unregulated arms brokering and transportation,many OAS Member States lack legislation for thecontrol of such activities. A notable exception isthe United States, which does have extensiveprovisions for registering and licensing of armsbrokers, including full extraterritorial application.However, recently questions have arisen regardingthe effectiveness of the implementation of theseprovisions.32

Although the Inter-American Convention does notexplicitly address the issues of arms brokeringand transportation, a number of provisions couldbe regarded as applying to the control of theseactivities. For example, the definition of illicittrafficking as the “import, export, acquisition,sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms,ammunition, explosives and other relatedmaterials from across the territory of one StateParty to that of another State Party, if any one ofthe States Parties concerned does not authorize it”could conceivably apply to the activities of armsbrokering and transport agents if arms aretransferred without authorization from source,transit and end-user states who are parties to theConvention. Moreover, the States Parties haveagreed to exchange information that could berelevant to control illicit arms brokering andtransportation, including details of “authorizedproducers, dealers, importers, exporters and,wherever possible, carriers of firearms,ammunition, explosives and other related

materials” and “routes customarily used bycriminal organizations engaged in illicittrafficking.” Finally, the ‘controlled delivery’ offirearms where suspect cargoes are monitored asthey pass through territories of one or more statesparties with a view to “identifying personsinvolved in the commission of offenses” couldyield important information on arms brokeringand transport agents.

As with marking and tracing, the UN ConferencePoA leaves measures to control arms brokers upto national governments, though as a follow-upactivity it does agree to consider further steps to“enhance international cooperation in preventing,combating and eradicating illicit brokering.” TheOAS did take some steps towards dealing withbrokering and transit of small arms in the abovementioned 2001 General Assembly resolution thatcalls for a hemispheric study and encouragesStates to adopt domestic legislation to preventillegal brokering and transit activities. At this pointOAS Member States who feel not enough is doneto control brokering activities can lead the way inimplementing (albeit voluntarily) the provisionsfor registration and licensing of brokers that arecontained in the UN Firearms Protocol.

Domestic firearms regulationThe importance of effective domestic firearmsregulation in reducing the proliferation andmisuse of small arms and light weapons has beenaffirmed by the United Nations in several differentcontexts: the UN Security Council Resolution 1209(1998); the Report of the Disarmament Commissionconsidered at the General Assembly (1999); andthe Report of the UN Commission on CrimePrevention and Criminal Justice (1997), which callson all countries to introduce regulations to ensurelicensing, safe storage and tracing of firearms.

The UN Conference PoA lays out 25 measures tobe taken by Member States at the national levelthat range from putting in place laws governingproduction of small arms to preventing the use ofsmall arms against children in armed conflict.One key area of contention that did not end up inthe PoA was the specific issue of the civilianpossession of small arms. During the negotiationssome States called for a ban on civilian ownershipof military-style small arms and light weaponswhile opponents claimed that any such action


would interfere with issues of national sovereignty.However, none of the discussion at the UNConference resulted in action to control andinfluence behavior at the local level where decisionsto obtain and use small arms are often made.

Domestic regulations are indispensable tocombating the illicit trade in small arms. Virtuallyevery illegal small arm was, in the first instance, alegal small arm, whether in the hands of the state,non-state actors or civilians. There is a range ofways by which such weapons are diverted fromlicit to illicit markets including:33

• illegal sales by dealers;

• illegal resale and purchases by surrogateparties;

• loss or theft;

• diversion from surplus; and

• falsification of documents and illegalimportation (e.g., by concealment).

Countries or regions where there is little effectivedomestic regulation often play a major role infeeding an illicit supply of small arms and lightweapons to countries where regulations may bemore restrictive. The implementation of armscontrol treaties already signed and ratified bygovernments often requires the passage of newlegislation. In the specific case of Canada, a majorsupporter of the Inter-American Convention yet toratify that instrument, the measures contemplatedin a treaty or convention must be fully adopted innational legislation before ratification can takeplace. This requires the passage of legislation andthe development of bureaucratic procedures aswell as political negotiation in national legislaturesand, frequently, harmonization with state,provincial or municipal governments.

The international system of which the UN andOAS are part is based largely on nationalsovereignty. Curbing the illicit arms trade presentsgovernments with the difficult task of balancingnational security with public safety. This balanceis increasingly referred to as human security. TheInter-American Convention and the UN ConferencePoA will not be effective policy tools withoutparallel and complementary legislation by nationalgovernments.

Financial regulationAnother factor contributing to the ease with whichillicit arms transfers can be made in the westernhemisphere is the presence of a multitude offinancial and tax havens in Anguilla, Antigua andBarbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Belize, British andAmerican Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica,Grenada, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St. Lucia,St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Turks and Caicosand others.34 The lack of regulation and oversightof financial transactions, which typifies theoperation of tax havens, greatly assists thefinancial dimensions of the illicit small arms trade.

Article XII of the Inter-American Conventionstipulates that States Parties will exchangeinformation on “techniques, practices, andlegislation to combat money laundering related toillicit manufacturing of and trafficking infirearms,” but does not stipulate any concreteactions to be taken in this regard. The UNConference PoA does not make any directreference to financial regulation though it doesencourage States to ratify international legalinstruments on transnational organized crime.Exploratory efforts to control arms brokeringactivities might be indirectly related to the issueof financial regulation, but this area continues tobe one that requires more thorough treatment.

Linking small arms to other regional measures

The Inter-American Convention and other regionalagreements and moratoria have raised the level of discourse on the illicit arms trade exponentially.However, corruption in general and the lack ofpolitical will to adopt and implement themeasures after making political agreementsminimize the effectiveness of these measures. At the international level, the only OAS MemberStates to respond to and provide detailedinformation to the United Nations in Vienna’s1997 International Study on Firearm Regulationwere Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, CostaRica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Trinidadand Tobago and the United States. In 1999,Guatemala was added to this list. Lack ofresponses from the region may be due to lack ofinstitutional capacity, data gathering practices,changes in ministerial responsibilities andbureaucratic voids left after national elections.


Section 4: Tackling SmallArms — The Demand SideIt is generally recognized that the long-termmeasures to curb the demand for small arms willhave to be a concert of economic, political,security sector reform and rule of law programs.Recent NGO conferences in Durban, Nairobi andToronto emphasized that the underlying demandfor arms is closely linked to the issues of gender,sustainable development and human security andthat poverty alleviation must be given priority inthis context.35 The proliferation of private securitycompanies and experiences with weaponscollection in the OAS region are two areas thatprovide insights into the demand aspects of smallarms proliferation, albeit from different angles.

The privatization of public securityand small arms proliferationIn Latin American in general, but most specificallyCentral America and Colombia, private securitycompanies using high powered weaponry, often ofmilitary design, have proliferated where publicsecurity forces have been unable to providecitizens with a sense of security. Demand forthese services is fueled by the need felt by manybanks, delivery trucks, businesses and residencesfor armed protection. The weapons used byagencies providing these services fuel the legalfirearms trade while the lack of governmentcontrol over the agencies, their employees andtheir weapons makes it potentially easy for armsto slip into the black market and end up in thehands of criminals. Again the lack of economicopportunity and rule of law accelerates the viciouscycle of small arms demand creation.

The transition made by military-controlled policeforces to civilian operations in the three CentralAmerican post-conflict countries – Guatemala, ElSalvador and Nicaragua – plus Honduras hasresulted in the deficient delivery of public securityto the population during times of increased crimeand violence outside the context of politicalconflict. In this environment well-armed privatesecurity companies have filled the marketdemand to guard and protect banks, hotels,commercial centers, government buildings andwealthy individuals. Panama and Costa Rica are

also experiencing rapid growth in the number ofprivate security companies and agents.36

In Guatemala, for example, the Chamber ofIndustry reports 52 private security enterprises,while the government reports an even greaternumber: 116 companies employing 35,000agents.37 The figure represents more than twicethe number of civilian police officials in thecountry since the last count of 14,800 in 1999.38

As well as unease over the growing numbers ofsuch private security companies, the lack ofadequate training, regulation and accountability isalso of grave concern. In El Salvador, at thebeginning of 1999, only 8,118 of 17,000 privatesecurity agents had completed the five-day courserequired for that profession by the National PublicSecurity Academy.39 The police in El Salvadorstate that approximately 25 per cent of theweapons confiscated nationwide are taken fromprivate security agents. The most commoninfraction is non-compliance with licensingregulations.40

In Honduras, at least a dozen private securityagencies maintain AK-47s in their inventorieseven though assault weapons are, by law, reservedfor the exclusive use of the military.41 La Armería,a subsidiary of the Honduran military pensioninstitute, and the Ministry of Defense are the onlyentities in the country authorized to import andsell firearms and have never sold AK-47s throughtheir public outlets. Neither does the militarymaintain AK-47s in its inventories. In response tothis situation, in October 2000 the HonduranMinistry of Security ordered all private securitycompanies to turn in machine guns, sub-machineguns, assault rifles and semi-automatic pistols.42

The first company to comply turned in 33 illegalweapons and others followed suit.

Increasingly, employees of private securitycompanies are implicated in criminal activitiesincluding armed assault and arms trafficking.Until there is more effective control and regulationof the way these companies procure, store anddistribute their firearms it is highly likely thatsignificant numbers of private security weaponswill continue to enter the black market andcontribute to increased levels of violence andinsecurity. Of course the pace of privatization ofpublic security functions can be most effectivelychallenged by adequate investment in civilian


police forces and competent judiciariesaccompanied by parallel efforts to remove corruptofficials. However, these goals are only feasibleover the long term and there exists an urgentneed to prevent leakage from private securityarsenals in the interim. Some measures thatmight be appropriate in the context of privatesecurity include: reviews of current practices, theestablishment of effective systems formanagement and accountability, ensuringadequate and detailed standards and procedures,ensuring good record-keeping and regularstocktaking, and ensuring that losses are properlyreported and investigated.43

States should introduce national legislation tocontrol these activities of private providers ofmilitary and security services who should berequired to register and apply for authorization foreach contract they enter into. Such applicationsshould be assessed in accordance with publiclyavailable criteria based on human rights standardsand international humanitarian law.

States should also promote measures to ensurethat the employers of private military and securitycompanies introduce sufficient safeguards toprevent breaches of human rights norms andstandards, international humanitarian law, orother aspects of international law by theiremployees. Such personnel should not have arecord of human rights abuses and there shouldbe strictly enforced controls governing when forceand firearms can be used. These controls shouldbe in accordance with international standards onthe use of force, including the UN Code ofConduct for Law Enforcement Officials and theUN Basic Principles on the Use of Force andFirearms by Law Enforcement Officials. Allpersonnel should be properly trained in andcommitted to respect such standards.

Neither the Inter-American Convention nor theUN Conference PoA makes specific statements orproposals in relation to the small arms held byprivate security firms though many measurescould be indirectly interpreted as pertaining tothem. For this reason, the control of privatesecurity companies and their resources continuesto rest in the hands of national governments.

Weapons collection and destructionThe collection and destruction of illicit weaponscan be seen as both a micro-supply side issue andas a demand issue. During the UN Conferencepreparatory meetings the Government ofArgentina suggested wording be added on theissue of voluntary weapons collection and disposalin order to promote and consolidate a culture ofnon-violence. The UN Conference PoA did not linkweapons collection with non-violence though itdid agree to “promote a dialogue and a culture ofpeace by encouraging, as appropriate, educationand public awareness programmes on theproblems of the illicit trade in small arms” at aglobal level. At the same time weapons collectionand destruction was one of the recurring areas ofconsensus within the UN Conference PoA.

Post-conflict disarmament in the Americas

Over the course of the last decade the countriesof the western hemisphere have contributed richexperiences in the area of weapons collection anddestruction, both in terms of post-conflict peace-building and crime prevention. The experience ofthe US Army in buying back weapons in the post-conflict environs of Panama (1989-90) and Haiti(1994), where 10,000 and 3,389 weaponsrespectively were collected, forewarned furthercollection efforts of the risk of stimulating blackmarket transactions when cash incentives areused to motivate people to surrender weapons.44

In the period between these two experiences, theGovernment of Nicaragua created the SpecialDisarmament Brigades (BED) (1992-93) to collectweapons from ex-combatants and irregularmilitias. The BED collected and destroyedapproximately 142,000 functional and non-functional arms.45 Seventy-eight thousand wererecovered through police confiscation while anadditional 64,000 were bought back in exchangefor cash and micro-credit loans from a fundsponsored by the Italian government.

The United Nations observer missions in ElSalvador and Guatemala also carried out weaponscollection efforts as part of their mandates in thedemobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. In El Salvador tens of thousands of


weapons were recovered at the end of the conflictwhile fewer than two thousand were turned in bythe guerrilla forces in Guatemala.46 Whileimportant, these efforts have proven to beincomplete as military-style weaponry continuesto proliferate throughout Central America. In ElSalvador, a private sector association known asthe Patriotic Movement Against Crime took noteof this and initiated a “Goods for Guns’ programthat over a five-year period has collected fromcivilians more than 4,000 firearms, 3,000grenades and hundreds of thousands of rounds ofammunition. This effort has served as a model forother collection efforts around the world both inpost-conflict and crime prevention settings.

An important aspect of all the above-mentionedpost-conflict collection efforts was the destructionof the weapons. In Nicaragua and El Salvadorweapons were destroyed publicly to symbolize theend of conflict and to ensure that those turning inweapons did not fear that they would be re-usedagainst them or their families.

Weapons collection for crime prevention

Many OAS Member States have problems with theillegal possession and circulation of small armsyet most do not fit neatly into the categories ofconflict or post-conflict societies. IncreasinglyNGOs, local, state and provincial governments aredeveloping their own firearms turn-in programsthat integrate elements of post-conflict peace-building with those of gun buy-back programsimplemented in the United States. Severalmunicipalities carried out firearms amnestyprograms in the late 1990s with a focus on thedisarmament of youth gangs.47

More recently, Latin American state and provincialgovernments have begun to enact weaponscollection programs because it has been easier tobolster support at this level than at the national.In Monterrey, Nuevo León, Mexico the stategovernment exchanged vouchers worth 500Mexican pesos for illegal and unwanted firearms,recovering many different types of weapons, themost common being .22 caliber pistols.48 Themost high profile effort of late has been the ArmsExchange Program of the provincial governmentof Mendoza, Argentina that collected more than2,000 firearms, mostly revolvers and shotgunsproduced in Argentina, in two rounds of collection

during the first half of 2001.49 The program inMendoza focused as much effort on publicawareness-raising and the development ofcommunity / government relations as it did onweapons collection and destruction.

Additionally, the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio hasorganized several large-scale weapons collectionand destruction efforts in cooperation with thestate government of Rio de Janeiro and withpolitical support from the federal government.The latest coincided with the beginning of the UNConference on 9 July 2001, a day coined ‘SmallArms Destruction Day’. The prior year’s effortsresulted in the destruction of more than 100,000small arms recovered by the police, 73 per centBrazilian-made. At the UN Conference the BrazilianMinister of Justice proposed that Small ArmsDestruction Day be repeated on an annual basisand that every act of destruction leave behind adetailed data base of arms destroyed, so that thetrade practices can be identified that made it soeasy for criminals to flood society with weapons.50

Viva Rio activities highlight good government /NGO partnership and the fact that weaponscollection and destruction programs can not bedone in isolation and need to be one strand of astrategy to increase community security.

Evaluating the effectiveness of weaponscollection

The jury is still out as to whether or not weaponscollection programs in any context contribute totangible, measurable reductions in the illegalproliferation and misuse of small arms. In fact it isvery difficult to isolate the variables to measuretheir effectiveness, even in the United Stateswhere years of historical data is available.51 Policyanalysts in this field increasingly believe that thequantifiable benefits, in terms of crime and riskreduction, are more visible at the individualhousehold level than at the community level.52

In El Salvador, with both UN-sponsored and civilsociety-initiated disarmament programs,approximately 14,000 firearms were collectedalong with millions of rounds of ammunition. Thisquantity pales in comparison with the estimated400,000 firearms (of which 145,000 are legallyregistered) still circulating in El Salvador,suggesting that weapons collection must takeplace in the context of a more comprehensive


solution.53 However, the UNDP has made an effortto develop performance indicators after theirdirect participation in the ‘Weapons forDevelopment’ program in Albania that includedmeasures of recovery, crime, black market trends,program cost and death and physical injury riskreduction.54 Even with well developed methodologiesthe quality of a quantitative evaluation stilldepends on the quality of the statistics, a problemin many developing and post-conflict countries.

A global and regional consensus on weapons collection?

The UN Conference PoA, the Inter-AmericanConvention and the most recent OAS GeneralAssembly resolution provide ample politicalsupport and access to the necessary technical andfinancial assistance for weapons collection anddestruction programs dealing with voluntarilysurrendered, confiscated and surplus weapons.The US did sign onto the non-binding PoA,although it did not sign the legally binding OttawaTreaty to ban landmines. Furthermore, it doesappear to be replicating the program of supportfor humanitarian de-mining through the above-mentioned offer to provide technical and financialassistance to OAS Member States seeking todestroy surplus and confiscated weapons. Thisdemonstrates the more recent US history ofcarrying out bi-lateral programs on the ground evenwhen it has not signed international agreements.

The UN PoA (Paragraph 17) makes severalattempts at developing an international norm onweapons collection and destruction, calling onStates “to ensure that all confiscated, seized orcollected small arms and light weapons aredestroyed,” though it leaves room forinterpretation when it also says in regard to theformer, “unless another form of disposition or usehas been officially authorized.” The PoA(Paragraph 21) is a bit more positive when it goeson to encourage States “[t]o develop andimplement, including in conflict and post-conflictsituations, public awareness and confidencebuilding programs on the problems andconsequences of the illicit trade in small arms andlight weapons in all its aspects, including whereappropriate, the public destruction of surplusweapons and the voluntary surrender of smallarms and light weapons, and if possible in

cooperation with civil society and NGOs.…”

Additionally, there appeared to be significantconsensus regarding the need to provideassistance to build the capacity to store and protectnational stocks held by armed forces, police andother authorized government institutions. It wouldbe a welcome measure for future internationalsmall arms processes to encourage or promoteconcrete measures on the control of privatesecurity companies, especially transnationalenterprises, and their weapons inventories.

Section 5: Combating the Illicit Trade through State-Authorized Transfers

The OAS declaration on small arms transfersThe OAS declaration on small arms transfers isone regional initiative not discussed in Section 2.Responding to concerns that the Inter-AmericanConvention on illicit trafficking took a narrowapproach by focusing purely on crime control andcommercial transactions, the OAS Committee onHemispheric Security met in March 2000 todiscuss the development of controls of statetransfers of weapons. The meeting resulted in adraft proposal on “Responsible Small Arms andLight Weapons Transfers.”55 The draft proposaloutlines the following criteria to be consideredwhen assessing small arms and light weapons:

• the legitimate defense and security needs of the recipient country;

• the recipients’ involvement in peacekeepingoperations;

• the technical ability of the recipient country toensure effective export controls; and

• the technical ability of the recipient country toensure effective management and security ofstockpiles.

Under the proposed draft, OAS Member Stateswould also commit to

• respect international commitments such asarms embargoes;


• take into account gross violations of humanrights and humanitarian law in the recipientcountry;

• not transfer weapons if there is a clear risk thatthey will be used for internal repression;

• take into account the internal situation of therecipient country, in particular the existence ofarmed conflict or high levels of violence;

• not transfer weapons that may provoke orexacerbate conflicts or existing tensions;

• not permit the transfer of weapons to countriesundertaking international armed aggression;

• take into account the high risk of diversion; and

• consider transfers in the context of developmentand economic needs of the recipient country.

The proposal was discussed at the OAS GeneralAssembly meeting in Windsor, Canada in June2000 where a resolution was adopted giving theCommittee on Hemispheric Security a mandate todevelop a declaration specifically addressing theUN 2001 Conference; however, there was nomention of the proposed policy for ‘ResponsibleTransfers’ nor the above-mentioned elements ofthat proposal.56 The UN Conference PoA doesinclude language to address diversion and thetechnical ability of States to manage stockpiles.Nonetheless, the PoA lacks action on most of thepoints of the proposed OAS policy on‘Responsible Transfers’ including a startlingomission of any mention of human rights.

Inter-regional complementarity? The OSCE document on small armsIt is worth noting that the United States andCanada agreed to a set of criteria similar to theOAS ‘Responsible Transfers’ proposal when theysigned the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE) Document onSmall Arms and Light Weapons on 24 November2000 (this also builds on the OSCE Principles forConventional Arms Transfers of 1993).57 Theyhave also endorsed the principles of the EuropeanCode of Conduct on arms exports whichembodies a comparable set of concerns. In factthe scope of the OSCE agreement is even broaderthan that of the OAS proposal, and includes:

• taking into account whether the transfers wouldcontribute to an appropriate and proportionate

response by the recipient country to themilitary and security threats confronting it;

• avoiding transfers to countries where

- there is a risk of threatening the national security of other States;

- weapons might be either re-sold or re-exported for purposes contrary to those of the OSCE document;

- weapons might support or encourage terrorism and organized crime; or

- weapons might be used other than for purposes of legitimate defense and security of the recipient country.

The need for legally binding export controls based oninternational lawWhile the regional and extra-regional initiativesmentioned above are important, most are onlypolitically binding and the fact remains that state-to-state transfers are still authorized in violation ofexisting international commitments and obligations.There is an urgent need for a legally bindingconvention that explicitly ties states’ obligationsunder international law to arms transfers. Suchcontrols would, at a minimum, prohibit transfersunder the following circumstances:

• if the transfers would violate the exportingstate’s direct obligations under internationallaw, such as decisions of the UN SecurityCouncil or treaties to which the state is bound;

• if the weapons in question are likely to be usedin violation of the prohibitions on: the threat oruse of force, threat to the peace, breach of thepeace or acts of aggression, or unlawfulinterference in the internal affairs of anotherstate; or

• if the weapons in question are likely to be usedto perpetrate serious violations of human rights,to perpetrate serious violations of the law ofwar or to commit genocide or crimes againsthumanity.

A model of such an agreement – a FrameworkConvention on International Arms Transfers –drafted by a group of NGOs and internationallawyers, is currently being circulated in the UNand other international fora.58


In an encouraging step, the PoA did commit statesto “assess applications for export authorizationsaccording to strict national regulations andprocedures that cover all small arms and lightweapons and are consistent with States’ existingresponsibilities under relevant international lawtaking into account in particular the risk ofdiversion of these weapons into the illegal trade”(emphasis added). It is crucial that all statesrecognize that these responsibilities include thethree categories elaborated above, and worktowards the establishment of correspondingexport criteria at the national, regional andinternational levels.

The need for supportingtransparency mechanismsOnly by ensuring transparency and accountabilityin the government-authorized trade in small armsand light weapons can the illicit trade be clearlyidentified and effectively addressed. Theincreasing experience of the OAS States indeveloping and agreeing to criteria governingstate-to-state conventional arms transfers suggeststhat a common approach to deal with this issue inthe context of small arms is possible.59

The UN Conference PoA makes no explicitmention of transparency measures at thenational, regional or global levels. The documentalludes to some transparency at the national levelwhen it calls for States “to make everyeffort…without prejudice to the right of States tore-export small arms and light weapons that theyhave previously imported, to notify the originalexporting State in accordance with their bilateralagreements before the retransfer of thoseweapons.” However, this still falls short of theexpectation of many governments in this regardand some believe this to be a backward step thatundermines the development of a norm of no re-exportation without the agreement of theoriginal exporter.

In terms of transparency in state-authorizedtransfers, the United States could contribute agreat deal to regional efforts since it regularlypublishes data on foreign military sales and directcommercial sales of all types, including smallarms transfers to governments, with theimportant exception of covert sales. Two NGOs,the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers

and the Federation of American Scientists, makethis data available on the Internet athttp://www.nisat.org andhttp://www.fas.org/asmp/index.html.60 Canada isanother OAS Member State that also makes dataon arms transfers available, although there issome room for improvement in the Canadianreporting system.61 Unfortunately, transparencyboth in terms of exports and imports ofcommercial and government small arms sales islimited among the rest of the OAS. Other MemberStates need to be encouraged to publish reportsnot only on commercial exports and imports, butalso on the acquisitions made for military andsecurity institutions.

Colombia, an OAS Member State greatly affectedby the illicit trade in small arms and lightweapons, made a bold proposal to devise aninternational mechanism within the UNframework at the third preparatory meeting forthe UN Conference in March 2001 to promotetransparency and information sharing. The proposalincluded eleven specific types of information tobe shared on a voluntary basis and used tomeasure progress on the UN PoA. The proposalincluded sharing information on the following:

1. legislation which includes the illicit trade insmall arms as a criminal offense;

2. types of penalties applied to those convictedof illegal arms trafficking;

3. number of ongoing investigations into illegalarms trafficking;

4. number of persons detained for illegaltrafficking by year;

5. number of persons processed and convictedfor illegal arms trafficking;

6. number of small arms and light weaponsconfiscated by type;

7. number and description of successfuloperations by government authorities;

8. number of small arms collected and destroyed;

9. requests for legal and technical assistance andcooperation in arms trafficking cases;

10. number and types of small arms lost or stolenfrom military warehouses; and

11. sources and routes identified as used in theillegal arms trade.


The UN PoA was not as explicit in terms of follow-up as the Colombian proposal though it did call forStates to convene meetings every two years to reviewthe national, regional and global implementationof the PoA. Many aspects of the Colombianproposal could be presented in this context. At thesame time, the 2001 OAS Small Arms Resolutionthat calls for States to produce reports on the illegalarms trafficking environment in their country aswell as steps towards implementation of the Inter-American Convention provides Colombia andother OAS Member States with the opportunity fordetailed follow-up. However, this mechanism doesnot go far enough in promoting informationexchange on the legal trade or reporting officialgovernment inventories. Thus, it will have alimited impact in identifying and addressing thelinks between the legal and illicit trade in smallarms and light weapons.

Section 6: ConclusionSmall arms crime control initiatives are now welldeveloped in the OAS region and significantpotential is associated with these agreements.Implementation, however, lags behind for avariety of reasons, some political, some financialand some technical. The UN Conference hasaddressed many of these issues, helping togenerate political momentum, and to support theprovision of increased financing and technicalassistance available to OAS Member Statesthrough CICAD, UN-LiREC, UNDP and bilaterallythrough the Defense and State Departments ofthe Government of the United States.

In order to work toward the implementation ofthe Inter-American Convention, for example,more than 16 of 33 signatories need to respond tothe approved questionnaire identifying points ofcontact and responsible central authorities andmove toward taking inventory of related measuresand legislation already in place. Technicalassistance will be of limited use and financialresources will be wasted if States do not have aclear picture of their situation and capabilitiesfrom the beginning. At the same time the OAS,NGOs and other multilateral institutions have tofind ways to maintain momentum towardsratification and implementation when there arechanges in national governments or transfers ofresponsibility from one ministry to another.

The non-governmental International ActionNetwork on Small Arms (IANSA) points out thatthe UN PoA lacks any measures to commit tonegotiate international treaties on arms brokeringor the marking and tracing of weapons, and notesthe absence of any reference to regulate civilianpossession of weapons or to protect humanrights.62 It is up to the OAS Member States topursue areas of regional consensus in these areasand to adopt bilateral or domestic measures.

It is also time for the OAS to alter the way inwhich it frames the issues and analyze measuresto combat small arms trafficking and itsconsequences. For several reasons, manydistinctions between government and commercialsales as well as military and civilian firearms needto be reconsidered and made more flexible:

• Criminals and irregular armed groups do notmake these distinctions.

• Many times these distinctions are made on thebasis of marketing decisions made by smallarms manufacturers.

• While the potential impact of certain weaponsis greater than others the real impact of certaintypes of weapons is important to take intoconsideration.

• Most illegal small arms began as legallyproduced and commercialized products.

• Military, police and private security forces canalso misuse weapons.

For example, in Colombia, where most think ofthe problems related to arms trafficking in termsof assault rifles, rocket launchers, guerrillas andparamilitaries, a recent study concluded that 80per cent of all political and crime-relatedhomicides were committed with .32, .38 and 9mm caliber pistols and revolvers and thatapproximately 80 per cent of homicides arerelated to crime and delinquency, and not directlyarmed conflict.63

Tackling the illicit trade in small arms and lightweapons is more complex than the alreadychallenging disciplines of crime control and post-conflict peace-building. It also requiresinterventions in the fields of public health, youthand popular culture, human rights, internationallaw and the trade in goods and services.Internationally, many governments have protected


their interests in the trade in small arms and lightweapons. Within the OAS it is in the interest ofmany States to protect themselves from theadverse impact of these weapons on political,economic and social development.


1 United Nations General Assembly, DraftProgramme of Action to Prevent Combat andEradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and LightWeapons in All Its Aspects, A/CONF.192/L.5.Rev.1,20 July 2001. Available online in English athttp://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/smallarms/confdoc.htm and in Spanish at http://www.un.org/spanish/conferences/smallarms/confdoc.htm.

2 Organization of American States GeneralAssembly, Inter-American Convention Against theIllicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking In Firearms,Ammunition, Explosives and Related Materials,November 1997. Full text available online inEnglish, Spanish, French and Portuguese atwww.oas.org.

3 UN Security Council Presidential Statement onsmall arms can be found online athttp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/statements/2001/prest21e.

4 Brasilia Declaration for the 2001 United NationsConference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms andLight Weapons in All Its Aspects, RegionalPreparatory Meeting of the Latin American andCaribbean States for the 2001 United NationsConference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms andLight Weapons in All Its Aspects, Brasilia, 24November 2000.

5 Author e-mail correspondence with BjornHolmberg, Head of the Regional Clearing-houseon Firearms, Ammunitions and Explosives, UnitedNations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmamentand Development in Latin America and theCaribbean, 16 August 2001.

6 Julieta Castellanos, “El Compromiso de Managua,”El Heraldo, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 2 May 2001.

7 Statements made by regional organizations andUN Member States can be found on the UN 2001Conference website at http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/smallarms/statements.htm.

8 Ellizabeth Clegg, Owen Greene, Sarah Meek andGeraldine O’Callaghan, Regional Initiatives and theUN Conference: Building Mutual Support andComplementarity, London: BASIC, InternationalAlert and Saferworld, February 2001.

9 Author e-mail correspondence with JessicaCascante, Office of the Director for the UNSystem, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Governmentof Mexico, 6 August 2001.

10 See Jessica Cascante. The states that havepresented their completed questionnaires to theOAS are Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,Guyana, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad andTobago, and Venezuela.

11 Clegg, et al.

12 According to the Small Arms Survey 2001:Profiling the Problem, Oxford University Press, p.254, as of September 2000, the following OASMember States had adopted the CICAD ModelRegulations: Argentina, Belize, Canada, ElSalvador, Panama and the United States. Thefollowing States had either partially implementedor were in the process of doing so: Bahamas,Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica,Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti,Jamaica, Nicaragua, Peru, Santa Lucia andTrinidad and Tobago.

13 Organization of American States GeneralAssembly, Resolution on the Proliferation of andIllicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons,AG/RES. 1642 (XXIX-0/99), 7 June 1999.

14 Organization of American States GeneralAssembly, Resolution on the Proliferation of andIllicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons,AG/RES. 1797 (XXXI-0/01), 5 June 2001.

15 Author interview with Dr. Gabriel Aguilera,former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs,Government of Guatemala, Guatemala City, 24November 1999.

16 United Nations Observer Mission to Guatemalaand the United Nations Development Programme,La Construcción de la Paz en Guatemala: Compendiode Acuerdos de Paz, Guatemala City: EditorialServiprensa, 1997, pp. 311-329.

17 Author telephone interview regarding UNDPactivities in El Salvador with Robert Scharf,Emergency Response Division, United NationsDevelopment Programme, 13 August 2001.

18 South American Common Market (MERCOSUR),Mecanismo Conjunto de Registro de Compradoresy Vendedores de Armas de Fuego, Municiones,Explosivos y otros materiales relacionados PARAEL MERCOSUR, MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No 7/98,Buenos Aires, 7 July 1998.


Notes

19 Author e-mail correspondence with SantiagoVillalba, Office for International Security andNuclear Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Government of Argentina, 27 August 2001.

20 Bjorn Holmberg, see note 5.

21 See note 4.

22 Central American Integration System (SICA),Tratado Marco de Seguridad Democrática enCentroamérica. Central American Presidential Summit,San Pedro Sula, Honduras, 15 December 1995.

23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government ofCosta Rica, “Costa Rica confirma no-ratificacióndel Tratado Marco Seguridad Democrática,” PressRelease, 4 April 2001.

24 The Inter-American Defense Board is anindependent international organization withheadquarters in Washington D.C., presided byofficial military representatives of the followingcountries: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, DominicanRepublic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru,Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguayand Venezuela. The IADB mandate is to dealcollectively with security issues in the WesternHemisphere. The relationship of the IADB relativeto the OAS is currently under deliberation.

25 United Nations Observer Mission to El Salvador(ONUSAL), “Análisis del armamento verificado ydestruido al FMLN, Marzo 1992-Agosto 1993.”

26 José Miguel Cruz and Maria Antonieta Beltrán,Las Armas en El Salvador: Diagnóstico Sobre SuSituación y Su Impacto, San Salvador: InstitutoUniversitario de Opinión Pública de la UniversidadCentroamericana José Simeón Cañas and theArias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress,June 2000.

27 Instituto Universitario de Opinón Pública,Universidad Centroamericana “José SimeónCañas,” Normas Culturales y Actitudes sobre laViolencia: Estudio ACTIVA, San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA, May 1999.

28 JTO Wire, “Brazil Levies Tax on Firearms toPrevent Killings,” Join Together Online,http://www.jointogether.org 17 November 2000.

29 Ray Bonner, “U.S. Suspends Sales of Handgunsto Venezuela,” The New York Times, 6 May 1999.

30 Sarah Meek, “Combating Arms Trafficking:Progress and Prospects,” in Lora Lumpe, ed.,Running Guns: The Global Black Market in SmallArms, London: Zed Books, 2000.

31 Owen Greene, Enhancing Traceability of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Developing anInternational Marking and Tracing Regime, London:BASIC, International Alert and Saferworld, 2000.

32 For a perspective on the U.S. government’simplementation of provisions to prevent illicitbrokering see the Fund for Peace report entitled“Casting the Net” available at http://www.fundforpeace/org/resources/pubs/thenet.pdf.

33 Wendy Cukier, Combating the Illicit Trade inSmall Arms and Light Weapons: StrengtheningDomestic Regulations, London: BASIC,International Alert and Saferworld, March 2001.

34 Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem,Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 105.

35 Arghavan Gerami, “Addressing the demand sideof the small arms complex: ensuring balance atthe 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade inSmall Arms and Light Weapons,” The PloughsharesMonitor, March 2001, p. 21.

36 For a comprehensive discussion of the currentchallenges of the public security sector in CentralAmerica see Adam Isacson, Altered States: Securityand Demilitarization in Central America,Washington, D.C., and San José: Center forInternational Policy and Arias Foundation forPeace and Human Progress, 1997.

37 Mario Rodriguez, “Diagnóstico sobre lasituación actual de las armas ligeras y la violenciaen Guatemala,” paper presented to the FirstCentral American Forum on Small ArmsProliferation, Antigua, Guatemala, 27 June 2000.

38 Rodriguez.

39 Elder Gómez, “Podrian cerrar más empresas deseguridad,” El Diario de Hoy, San Salvador, 18February 1999.

40 Cruz and Beltrán.

41 Julieta Castellanos, Honduras: armamentismo yviolencia, Tegucigalpa: Arias Foundation for Peaceand Human Progress, CIPRODEH and ForoCiudadano, June 2000.


42 Ninfa Arias, “Desmantelarán y desarmarian lasagencies de seguridad,” La Tribuna, Tegucigalpa,25 October 2000 and “SISTEC, primera empresaen entregar armas prohibidas,” Diario Tiempo,San Pedro Sula, 28 October 2000.

43 For a more in-depth discussion of these typesof measures see Owen Greene, Stockpile Securityand Reducing Surplus Weapons, London: BASIC,International Alert and Saferworld, September2000.

44 United States General Accounting Office,Conventional Arms Transfers: U.S. Efforts to Controlthe Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons,Washington, D.C.: GAO, July 2000.

45 Edward Laurance, The New Field of Micro-Disarmament: Addressing the Buildup of Small Armsand Light Weapons, Bonn: Bonn InternationalCenter for Conversion, September 1996.

46 Edward Laurance and William Godnick,“Weapons Collection in Central America: ElSalvador and Guatemala,” in Sami Faltas andJoseph Di Chiaro III, eds., Managing the Remnantsof War: Micro-Disarmament as an Element of Peace-Building, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2001.

47 Vicente Archibold, “Panamá: Diagnóstico deArmas de Fuego,” paper presented to the FirstCentral American Forum on Small ArmsProliferation, Antigua, Guatemala, 27 June 2000.

48 “Tiene Exito Programa de Canje de Armas porBonos en Nuevo León,” Notimex, Monterrey,Mexico, 6 May 2001.

49 Author telephone interview with MartinAppiolaza, Coordinator, Plan Canje de Armas porMejores Condiciones de Vida, Ministry of Justiceand Security, Government of Mendoza, Argentina,26 July 2001.

50 See the comments of Viva Rio’s ExecutiveDirector, Rubem César Fernandes, to the UNConference at http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/smallarms/statements/Ngo/viva.html.

51 Martha Plotkin, ed., Under Fire: Gun Buy-Back,Exchanges and Amnesty Programs, Washington,D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1996.

52 Michael Romero, Garen Wintemute and JonVernick, “Characteristics of a gun exchangeprogram, and an assessment of potentialbenefits,” Journal of Injury Prevention 1998:4, pp.206-210.

53 Cruz and Beltrán.

54 See Chapter 4 of John Hughes-Wilson andAdrian Wilkinson, Safe and Efficient Small ArmsCollection and Destruction Programmes: A Proposalfor Practical Technical Measures, New York: UnitedNations Development Programme, EmergencyResponse Division, July 2001.

55 Clegg, et al.

56 See Organization of American States GeneralAssembly, OAS Declaration on Small Arms andLight Weapons, AG/RES. 1743 (XXX-0/00), 5 June2000 and Organization of American StatesGeneral Assembly, Support for the United NationsConference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms andLight Weapons in All Its Aspects, AG/RES. 1796(XXX1-0/01), 5 June 2001.

57 Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope, OSCE Document on Small Arms and LightWeapons, ESC.DOC/1/00, 24 November 2000.

58 The Nobel Laureates Framework Conventioncan be found in English, French and Spanish athttp://www.armslaw.org.

59 See Organization of American States GeneralAssembly, Inter-American Convention onTransparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions,AG/RES. 1607 (XXIX-0/99), 7 June 1999. Thisconvention includes some weaponry that couldalso be considered light weapons, namelymachine guns, howitzers and military pieces withcalibers of 100 and above. As of July 2001 onlyCanada, Ecuador and Guatemala had ratified theconvention.

60 In addition to OAS Member States Canada andthe United States, the Norwegian Initiative onSmall Arms Transfers Database also includes smallarms export data from Belgium, Denmark,Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands,Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and theUnited Kingdom. Many of these countries exportto other OAS Member States.

61 In addition to the NISAT Small Arms TransfersDatabase, Canadian small arms export data canalso be obtained from the Canadian MilitaryIndustry Database by contacting ProjectPloughshares at [email protected].

62 See the International Action Network on SmallArms at http://www.iansa.org.


63 Robert Muggah and Eric Berman,Humanitarianism Under Threat: The HumanitarianImpact of Small Arms and Light Weapons, StudyCommissioned by the Reference Group on SmallArms of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee,Geneva: Small Arms Survey and the Centre forHumanitarian Dialogue, July 2001, p. 12.


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ON THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS · PDF filethe organization of american states and the 2001 united nations conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light