Leonardo

On John M. Kennedy's Picture Perception AnalysisAuthor(s): John M. KennedySource: Leonardo, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter, 1977), p. 87Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1573677 .

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for their perception; they realize what is genuine and what is a result of skillful play in their own perceptual experience, so they are not fooled by the depth they see in simple line drawings. Thus, as a nominalist might contend, perceivers are skillful and productive, but, as a realist can satisfactorily add, this playful use of sensory materials is known by per- ceivers to be imaginative-it is not illusory and deceptive.

John M. Kennedy Psychology Department

Scarborough College University of Toronto

West Hill, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada

ON HYPOTHETICAL EXTRASENSORY PERCEPTION (ESP)

Richard I. Land in his Note [Leonardo 9, 306 (1976)] has most ably set the scene for his comments with his opening sentence, wherein he states 'there are numerous believers in ESP'. Rare are those who, like Land and me, have fairly examined the claims of the protagonists, who are aware of the nature of scientific proof, who can assess the evidential value of a datum and who can make a distinction between a forest and its trees.

A general belief or disbelief in anything has nothing what- soever to do with whether that thing is absolutely true, true in the light of current theories, true within the present limits of experimental error, unproveable, likely or any of a vast range of qualifying adjectives. An opinion taken from some- one whose opinion is worthless is a worthless opinion. Though this might seem incredibly naive, it is a fact often forgotten in this age when mediocrity has superceded merito- cracy (if that ever existed), just as the cult of the mediocre has taken over our politics, our policies, our morals and our morale.

Another aspect of the same phenomenon comes about from the assumption that an expert in one field can give a valid opinion in another. Worse-experts who should know better are afraid to say 'I do not know: I cannot offer a valid opinion. It is out of my field', so that the belief of say a writer like Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in spiritualism is quoted as though it makes any difference.

Having dealt with 'What is truth ?' we come to 'What is science?'. Aldous Huxley [Daedalus, p. 279 (Spring 1962)] defines science as '. . . the reduction of the bewildering diversity of unique events to manageable uniformity within one of a number of symbol units, and technology is the art of using these symbol systems so as to control and organize unique events. Scientific observation is always a viewing of things through the refracting medium of a symbol system, and technological praxis is always handling of things in ways that some symbol system has dictated.. . .'. If we agree with this viewpoint, parapsychology is not a science and has developed no technology. The current wider view is that 'scientific' implies a system wherein data are gathered and arranged. On the bases of the several arrangements possible, one or more hypotheses is formulated. Then a series of experiments is designed to differentiate between the hypotheses. Failure of an experiment to give consistent results would invalidate the underlying hypothesis. By this definition also, parapsychology is not now on a scientific basis.

The third point in Land's paper is less valid. I think that the claim that ESP 'plays a role in the making of a work of visual art' is in fact made far more often than is justified, both by artists and by their backers. They call it 'inspiration', meaning an ESP phenomenon-something from outside oneself, inexplicable, not possessed by all.

for their perception; they realize what is genuine and what is a result of skillful play in their own perceptual experience, so they are not fooled by the depth they see in simple line drawings. Thus, as a nominalist might contend, perceivers are skillful and productive, but, as a realist can satisfactorily add, this playful use of sensory materials is known by per- ceivers to be imaginative-it is not illusory and deceptive.

John M. Kennedy Psychology Department

Scarborough College University of Toronto

West Hill, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada

ON HYPOTHETICAL EXTRASENSORY PERCEPTION (ESP)

Richard I. Land in his Note [Leonardo 9, 306 (1976)] has most ably set the scene for his comments with his opening sentence, wherein he states 'there are numerous believers in ESP'. Rare are those who, like Land and me, have fairly examined the claims of the protagonists, who are aware of the nature of scientific proof, who can assess the evidential value of a datum and who can make a distinction between a forest and its trees.

A general belief or disbelief in anything has nothing what- soever to do with whether that thing is absolutely true, true in the light of current theories, true within the present limits of experimental error, unproveable, likely or any of a vast range of qualifying adjectives. An opinion taken from some- one whose opinion is worthless is a worthless opinion. Though this might seem incredibly naive, it is a fact often forgotten in this age when mediocrity has superceded merito- cracy (if that ever existed), just as the cult of the mediocre has taken over our politics, our policies, our morals and our morale.

Another aspect of the same phenomenon comes about from the assumption that an expert in one field can give a valid opinion in another. Worse-experts who should know better are afraid to say 'I do not know: I cannot offer a valid opinion. It is out of my field', so that the belief of say a writer like Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in spiritualism is quoted as though it makes any difference.

Having dealt with 'What is truth ?' we come to 'What is science?'. Aldous Huxley [Daedalus, p. 279 (Spring 1962)] defines science as '. . . the reduction of the bewildering diversity of unique events to manageable uniformity within one of a number of symbol units, and technology is the art of using these symbol systems so as to control and organize unique events. Scientific observation is always a viewing of things through the refracting medium of a symbol system, and technological praxis is always handling of things in ways that some symbol system has dictated.. . .'. If we agree with this viewpoint, parapsychology is not a science and has developed no technology. The current wider view is that 'scientific' implies a system wherein data are gathered and arranged. On the bases of the several arrangements possible, one or more hypotheses is formulated. Then a series of experiments is designed to differentiate between the hypotheses. Failure of an experiment to give consistent results would invalidate the underlying hypothesis. By this definition also, parapsychology is not now on a scientific basis.

The third point in Land's paper is less valid. I think that the claim that ESP 'plays a role in the making of a work of visual art' is in fact made far more often than is justified, both by artists and by their backers. They call it 'inspiration', meaning an ESP phenomenon-something from outside oneself, inexplicable, not possessed by all.

for their perception; they realize what is genuine and what is a result of skillful play in their own perceptual experience, so they are not fooled by the depth they see in simple line drawings. Thus, as a nominalist might contend, perceivers are skillful and productive, but, as a realist can satisfactorily add, this playful use of sensory materials is known by per- ceivers to be imaginative-it is not illusory and deceptive.

John M. Kennedy Psychology Department

Scarborough College University of Toronto

West Hill, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada

ON HYPOTHETICAL EXTRASENSORY PERCEPTION (ESP)

Richard I. Land in his Note [Leonardo 9, 306 (1976)] has most ably set the scene for his comments with his opening sentence, wherein he states 'there are numerous believers in ESP'. Rare are those who, like Land and me, have fairly examined the claims of the protagonists, who are aware of the nature of scientific proof, who can assess the evidential value of a datum and who can make a distinction between a forest and its trees.

A general belief or disbelief in anything has nothing what- soever to do with whether that thing is absolutely true, true in the light of current theories, true within the present limits of experimental error, unproveable, likely or any of a vast range of qualifying adjectives. An opinion taken from some- one whose opinion is worthless is a worthless opinion. Though this might seem incredibly naive, it is a fact often forgotten in this age when mediocrity has superceded merito- cracy (if that ever existed), just as the cult of the mediocre has taken over our politics, our policies, our morals and our morale.

Another aspect of the same phenomenon comes about from the assumption that an expert in one field can give a valid opinion in another. Worse-experts who should know better are afraid to say 'I do not know: I cannot offer a valid opinion. It is out of my field', so that the belief of say a writer like Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in spiritualism is quoted as though it makes any difference.

Having dealt with 'What is truth ?' we come to 'What is science?'. Aldous Huxley [Daedalus, p. 279 (Spring 1962)] defines science as '. . . the reduction of the bewildering diversity of unique events to manageable uniformity within one of a number of symbol units, and technology is the art of using these symbol systems so as to control and organize unique events. Scientific observation is always a viewing of things through the refracting medium of a symbol system, and technological praxis is always handling of things in ways that some symbol system has dictated.. . .'. If we agree with this viewpoint, parapsychology is not a science and has developed no technology. The current wider view is that 'scientific' implies a system wherein data are gathered and arranged. On the bases of the several arrangements possible, one or more hypotheses is formulated. Then a series of experiments is designed to differentiate between the hypotheses. Failure of an experiment to give consistent results would invalidate the underlying hypothesis. By this definition also, parapsychology is not now on a scientific basis.

The third point in Land's paper is less valid. I think that the claim that ESP 'plays a role in the making of a work of visual art' is in fact made far more often than is justified, both by artists and by their backers. They call it 'inspiration', meaning an ESP phenomenon-something from outside oneself, inexplicable, not possessed by all.

waterfalls. Presumably too, the very youngest children would not grasp the impossible nature of a perceptual goal if logically it lay at the end of an infinite regression. Some of my own research has been concerned with such questions. For example, I have shown to children 5 to 6 years of age a picture of a box that has on its front a picture of the picture of the box, and so on, so that the picture contains a picture of a picture of a picture, and so on. Asked 'how many pictures of a box are there', after some indecision, they said 'they go on forever'. Younger children seemed too baffled to attempt an answer or guessed some number like 6 or 9 at random.

In sum, may I again stress that there may be many per- ceptual processes and allow that some may be regressions and that some, but not all, regressions logically may be infinite.

John M. Kennedy Psychology Department

Scarborough College University of Toronto

West Hill, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada

ON JOHN M. KENNEDY'S PICTURE PERCEPTION ANALYSIS

In my book [A Psychology of Picture Perception (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974)] I tried to answer the question 'what enables a picture to communicate, to give us informa- tion?'. One of the puzzles I considered was 'how do outline drawings work?' and, in particular, I described some of the different kinds of edges and boundaries that outlines can depict. LeGrace G. Benson [Leonardo 9, 122 (1976)] has given a fine commentary on my analysis; indeed, of all the reviews of my book, I find that hers is clearly the best.

Given my appreciation of her comments, it may seem un- gracious to take issue with one of her most important points. So, let me admit that my book has a flaw because of an important omission. I failed to present a full analysis of the relationship between pictorial perception (as experience) and pictures as physical displays.

To rectify my omission it is necessary for me to be more explicit about perceptual experiences, on the one hand, and perceptual displays, on the other.

The fact I want to stress is that the perceptual experiences of viewers of certain kinds of pictures are not solely depen- dant on what a physicist would call the optic information projected by the picture. For example, one can see depth in a line drawing even when it is as simple as an outlined circle. My belief is that extant principles of optic information would state that there is no optic information for depth pro- jected by the circle. The depth is a result of perceivers' per- ceptual skill or 'play'. Similarly, I believe that, if one tries, one can experience transparency, occlusion, protruberance and any other feature of a simple line drawing that does not optically justify the perception of these features. This means to me that pictorial perceptual experience is to a certain degree and in certain circumstances not constrained by optical information.

Thus, I argue for the importance of optical information, but admit that there are special cases where the information does not predict the pictorial experience. As Benson notes, I can run afoul of both nominalists (who disavow notions of optical information) and realists (who abhor what I have called perceptual 'play'). My hope is that it will be possible to satisfy these critics by developing clear principles that will state when perceptual 'play' can occur. For example, I con- sider it is likely that under normal circumstances perceptual 'play' is feasible only when viewers are confronted with simple displays and that such 'play' is minimal or absent when viewers confront the optical profusion of the everyday world and pictures of it.

waterfalls. Presumably too, the very youngest children would not grasp the impossible nature of a perceptual goal if logically it lay at the end of an infinite regression. Some of my own research has been concerned with such questions. For example, I have shown to children 5 to 6 years of age a picture of a box that has on its front a picture of the picture of the box, and so on, so that the picture contains a picture of a picture of a picture, and so on. Asked 'how many pictures of a box are there', after some indecision, they said 'they go on forever'. Younger children seemed too baffled to attempt an answer or guessed some number like 6 or 9 at random.

In sum, may I again stress that there may be many per- ceptual processes and allow that some may be regressions and that some, but not all, regressions logically may be infinite.

John M. Kennedy Psychology Department

Scarborough College University of Toronto

West Hill, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada

ON JOHN M. KENNEDY'S PICTURE PERCEPTION ANALYSIS

In my book [A Psychology of Picture Perception (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974)] I tried to answer the question 'what enables a picture to communicate, to give us informa- tion?'. One of the puzzles I considered was 'how do outline drawings work?' and, in particular, I described some of the different kinds of edges and boundaries that outlines can depict. LeGrace G. Benson [Leonardo 9, 122 (1976)] has given a fine commentary on my analysis; indeed, of all the reviews of my book, I find that hers is clearly the best.

Given my appreciation of her comments, it may seem un- gracious to take issue with one of her most important points. So, let me admit that my book has a flaw because of an important omission. I failed to present a full analysis of the relationship between pictorial perception (as experience) and pictures as physical displays.

To rectify my omission it is necessary for me to be more explicit about perceptual experiences, on the one hand, and perceptual displays, on the other.

The fact I want to stress is that the perceptual experiences of viewers of certain kinds of pictures are not solely depen- dant on what a physicist would call the optic information projected by the picture. For example, one can see depth in a line drawing even when it is as simple as an outlined circle. My belief is that extant principles of optic information would state that there is no optic information for depth pro- jected by the circle. The depth is a result of perceivers' per- ceptual skill or 'play'. Similarly, I believe that, if one tries, one can experience transparency, occlusion, protruberance and any other feature of a simple line drawing that does not optically justify the perception of these features. This means to me that pictorial perceptual experience is to a certain degree and in certain circumstances not constrained by optical information.

Thus, I argue for the importance of optical information, but admit that there are special cases where the information does not predict the pictorial experience. As Benson notes, I can run afoul of both nominalists (who disavow notions of optical information) and realists (who abhor what I have called perceptual 'play'). My hope is that it will be possible to satisfy these critics by developing clear principles that will state when perceptual 'play' can occur. For example, I con- sider it is likely that under normal circumstances perceptual 'play' is feasible only when viewers are confronted with simple displays and that such 'play' is minimal or absent when viewers confront the optical profusion of the everyday world and pictures of it.

waterfalls. Presumably too, the very youngest children would not grasp the impossible nature of a perceptual goal if logically it lay at the end of an infinite regression. Some of my own research has been concerned with such questions. For example, I have shown to children 5 to 6 years of age a picture of a box that has on its front a picture of the picture of the box, and so on, so that the picture contains a picture of a picture of a picture, and so on. Asked 'how many pictures of a box are there', after some indecision, they said 'they go on forever'. Younger children seemed too baffled to attempt an answer or guessed some number like 6 or 9 at random.

In sum, may I again stress that there may be many per- ceptual processes and allow that some may be regressions and that some, but not all, regressions logically may be infinite.

John M. Kennedy Psychology Department

Scarborough College University of Toronto

West Hill, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada

ON JOHN M. KENNEDY'S PICTURE PERCEPTION ANALYSIS

In my book [A Psychology of Picture Perception (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974)] I tried to answer the question 'what enables a picture to communicate, to give us informa- tion?'. One of the puzzles I considered was 'how do outline drawings work?' and, in particular, I described some of the different kinds of edges and boundaries that outlines can depict. LeGrace G. Benson [Leonardo 9, 122 (1976)] has given a fine commentary on my analysis; indeed, of all the reviews of my book, I find that hers is clearly the best.

Given my appreciation of her comments, it may seem un- gracious to take issue with one of her most important points. So, let me admit that my book has a flaw because of an important omission. I failed to present a full analysis of the relationship between pictorial perception (as experience) and pictures as physical displays.

To rectify my omission it is necessary for me to be more explicit about perceptual experiences, on the one hand, and perceptual displays, on the other.

The fact I want to stress is that the perceptual experiences of viewers of certain kinds of pictures are not solely depen- dant on what a physicist would call the optic information projected by the picture. For example, one can see depth in a line drawing even when it is as simple as an outlined circle. My belief is that extant principles of optic information would state that there is no optic information for depth pro- jected by the circle. The depth is a result of perceivers' per- ceptual skill or 'play'. Similarly, I believe that, if one tries, one can experience transparency, occlusion, protruberance and any other feature of a simple line drawing that does not optically justify the perception of these features. This means to me that pictorial perceptual experience is to a certain degree and in certain circumstances not constrained by optical information.

Thus, I argue for the importance of optical information, but admit that there are special cases where the information does not predict the pictorial experience. As Benson notes, I can run afoul of both nominalists (who disavow notions of optical information) and realists (who abhor what I have called perceptual 'play'). My hope is that it will be possible to satisfy these critics by developing clear principles that will state when perceptual 'play' can occur. For example, I con- sider it is likely that under normal circumstances perceptual 'play' is feasible only when viewers are confronted with simple displays and that such 'play' is minimal or absent when viewers confront the optical profusion of the everyday world and pictures of it.

Selectionfrom the visible resources, not 'play' with the only available minimal features, is the rule when the light to the eye is profusely detailed. It should be added, too, that per- ceivers who do indulge in 'play' are quite aware of the bases

Selectionfrom the visible resources, not 'play' with the only available minimal features, is the rule when the light to the eye is profusely detailed. It should be added, too, that per- ceivers who do indulge in 'play' are quite aware of the bases

Selectionfrom the visible resources, not 'play' with the only available minimal features, is the rule when the light to the eye is profusely detailed. It should be added, too, that per- ceivers who do indulge in 'play' are quite aware of the bases

This last is the secret of the undoubted popular appeal of ESP. People believe what they want to believe-either that ESP powers are innate in all of us, and so each of us could learn to do mighty works of magic, or such things are for

This last is the secret of the undoubted popular appeal of ESP. People believe what they want to believe-either that ESP powers are innate in all of us, and so each of us could learn to do mighty works of magic, or such things are for

This last is the secret of the undoubted popular appeal of ESP. People believe what they want to believe-either that ESP powers are innate in all of us, and so each of us could learn to do mighty works of magic, or such things are for

Letters Letters Letters 87 87 87

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