Leonardo

On Art and the Mind: Essays and Lectures by Richard WollheimReview by: Virgil C. AldrichLeonardo, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Autumn, 1975), p. 347Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1573025 .

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(p. 250). Contrasting with this mentalistic caricature of art was the physicalistic exaggeration in the other direc- tion, resulting in the recent trend of minimal art (pp. 101- 111), with practically nothing to be seen 'in' it; mostly physical 'surface' presented with little work on the artist's part, involving neither prepared art-materials nor an inno- vative idea in advance of the presentation. (One might say that, as Goodman makes art logically flat, so these artists make it physically flat, the notion of 'content' suffering in both cases.)

Wollheim's own treatment of this central issue-shown especially in his essays on the art object (pp. 112-129 and pp. 3-30) and expression (pp. 84-100)-while aimed at right recognition of the above-mentioned duality, suffers from a failure to make the necessary distinctions. The crucial concept is 'surface of a painting'. Wollheim does not notice carefully enough the inherent ambiguity of this phrase, thanks to the ambiguity both of 'surface' and of 'a painting'. So, stressing as he does, that he is talking about the surface of a painting does not dispel the am- biguity; nor does it help to say, as he does, that the 'physicality' of a painting means it 'possesses a surface' (p. 119). After all, by 'a painting' one frequently means the 16 x 21 in. thing hanging on the wall whose surface has been painted with pigment that can be scraped off. Surely, something like this is the core of what is meant by saying that the painting is a physical object. Moreover, to look at and to see just this is to see nothing 'in' it. Wollheim's excellent criticism of minimal art was that it exhibits things that invite this sort of non-aesthetic perception. His mistake is the supposition that, since even aesthetic vision requires looking at the painted, physically flat thing hanging on the wall, that is what is seen simultaneously with what is 'in' it-the represented and expressed 'content' of the thing qua aesthetic object. The fact is that, when one sees what is 'in' x, x functions as a point of view, itself then not seen though looked at.

Eight of the 15 essays in this urbane and wise book are about other thinkers. Those not referred to here are Pater, Morelli, Freud, Eliot, Gombrich and Stokes. A magni- ficent Poussin (the author's ideal among artists) adorns the dust jacket.

Illusions in Nature and Art. R. L. Gregory and E. H. Gombrich, eds. Duckworth, London, 1973. 288 pp., illus. ?7.50. Paper, ?3.25. Reviewed by John Scott Willson**

This collection of extended essays by six distinguished academic specialists describes the theoretical background of a major exhibition about illusion at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, in 1973. Although the title implies a comprehensive study of all forms of illusion, the discussion is mainly restricted to the field of visual illusion, with only occasional references to illusions involving the other senses. The topics that are covered in great depth include abstract geometrical illusions, the portrayal of 3-D in two dimensions, the artistic representation of objects and the various forms of animal mimicry.

Blakemore reviews the present hypotheses about the physiology of vision and describes the recent experimental evidence that suggests that perception depends upon the detection and analysis of the lengths and orientations of the borders of objects. He concludes that many visual distortions are due to the processes of adaption, in which nerve cells lose their sensitivity by fatigue, and of mutual inhibition, in which the sensitivity of cells in the retina or in the visual cortex of the brain is reduced by the stimula- tion of adjacent cells.

Gregory shows that the characteristics of perceptual hypotheses are similar to those of scientific hypotheses and that illusions are analagous to erroneous scientific hypo-

(p. 250). Contrasting with this mentalistic caricature of art was the physicalistic exaggeration in the other direc- tion, resulting in the recent trend of minimal art (pp. 101- 111), with practically nothing to be seen 'in' it; mostly physical 'surface' presented with little work on the artist's part, involving neither prepared art-materials nor an inno- vative idea in advance of the presentation. (One might say that, as Goodman makes art logically flat, so these artists make it physically flat, the notion of 'content' suffering in both cases.)

Wollheim's own treatment of this central issue-shown especially in his essays on the art object (pp. 112-129 and pp. 3-30) and expression (pp. 84-100)-while aimed at right recognition of the above-mentioned duality, suffers from a failure to make the necessary distinctions. The crucial concept is 'surface of a painting'. Wollheim does not notice carefully enough the inherent ambiguity of this phrase, thanks to the ambiguity both of 'surface' and of 'a painting'. So, stressing as he does, that he is talking about the surface of a painting does not dispel the am- biguity; nor does it help to say, as he does, that the 'physicality' of a painting means it 'possesses a surface' (p. 119). After all, by 'a painting' one frequently means the 16 x 21 in. thing hanging on the wall whose surface has been painted with pigment that can be scraped off. Surely, something like this is the core of what is meant by saying that the painting is a physical object. Moreover, to look at and to see just this is to see nothing 'in' it. Wollheim's excellent criticism of minimal art was that it exhibits things that invite this sort of non-aesthetic perception. His mistake is the supposition that, since even aesthetic vision requires looking at the painted, physically flat thing hanging on the wall, that is what is seen simultaneously with what is 'in' it-the represented and expressed 'content' of the thing qua aesthetic object. The fact is that, when one sees what is 'in' x, x functions as a point of view, itself then not seen though looked at.

Eight of the 15 essays in this urbane and wise book are about other thinkers. Those not referred to here are Pater, Morelli, Freud, Eliot, Gombrich and Stokes. A magni- ficent Poussin (the author's ideal among artists) adorns the dust jacket.

Illusions in Nature and Art. R. L. Gregory and E. H. Gombrich, eds. Duckworth, London, 1973. 288 pp., illus. ?7.50. Paper, ?3.25. Reviewed by John Scott Willson**

This collection of extended essays by six distinguished academic specialists describes the theoretical background of a major exhibition about illusion at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, in 1973. Although the title implies a comprehensive study of all forms of illusion, the discussion is mainly restricted to the field of visual illusion, with only occasional references to illusions involving the other senses. The topics that are covered in great depth include abstract geometrical illusions, the portrayal of 3-D in two dimensions, the artistic representation of objects and the various forms of animal mimicry.

Blakemore reviews the present hypotheses about the physiology of vision and describes the recent experimental evidence that suggests that perception depends upon the detection and analysis of the lengths and orientations of the borders of objects. He concludes that many visual distortions are due to the processes of adaption, in which nerve cells lose their sensitivity by fatigue, and of mutual inhibition, in which the sensitivity of cells in the retina or in the visual cortex of the brain is reduced by the stimula- tion of adjacent cells.

Gregory shows that the characteristics of perceptual hypotheses are similar to those of scientific hypotheses and that illusions are analagous to erroneous scientific hypo-

(p. 250). Contrasting with this mentalistic caricature of art was the physicalistic exaggeration in the other direc- tion, resulting in the recent trend of minimal art (pp. 101- 111), with practically nothing to be seen 'in' it; mostly physical 'surface' presented with little work on the artist's part, involving neither prepared art-materials nor an inno- vative idea in advance of the presentation. (One might say that, as Goodman makes art logically flat, so these artists make it physically flat, the notion of 'content' suffering in both cases.)

Wollheim's own treatment of this central issue-shown especially in his essays on the art object (pp. 112-129 and pp. 3-30) and expression (pp. 84-100)-while aimed at right recognition of the above-mentioned duality, suffers from a failure to make the necessary distinctions. The crucial concept is 'surface of a painting'. Wollheim does not notice carefully enough the inherent ambiguity of this phrase, thanks to the ambiguity both of 'surface' and of 'a painting'. So, stressing as he does, that he is talking about the surface of a painting does not dispel the am- biguity; nor does it help to say, as he does, that the 'physicality' of a painting means it 'possesses a surface' (p. 119). After all, by 'a painting' one frequently means the 16 x 21 in. thing hanging on the wall whose surface has been painted with pigment that can be scraped off. Surely, something like this is the core of what is meant by saying that the painting is a physical object. Moreover, to look at and to see just this is to see nothing 'in' it. Wollheim's excellent criticism of minimal art was that it exhibits things that invite this sort of non-aesthetic perception. His mistake is the supposition that, since even aesthetic vision requires looking at the painted, physically flat thing hanging on the wall, that is what is seen simultaneously with what is 'in' it-the represented and expressed 'content' of the thing qua aesthetic object. The fact is that, when one sees what is 'in' x, x functions as a point of view, itself then not seen though looked at.

Eight of the 15 essays in this urbane and wise book are about other thinkers. Those not referred to here are Pater, Morelli, Freud, Eliot, Gombrich and Stokes. A magni- ficent Poussin (the author's ideal among artists) adorns the dust jacket.

Illusions in Nature and Art. R. L. Gregory and E. H. Gombrich, eds. Duckworth, London, 1973. 288 pp., illus. ?7.50. Paper, ?3.25. Reviewed by John Scott Willson**

This collection of extended essays by six distinguished academic specialists describes the theoretical background of a major exhibition about illusion at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, in 1973. Although the title implies a comprehensive study of all forms of illusion, the discussion is mainly restricted to the field of visual illusion, with only occasional references to illusions involving the other senses. The topics that are covered in great depth include abstract geometrical illusions, the portrayal of 3-D in two dimensions, the artistic representation of objects and the various forms of animal mimicry.

Blakemore reviews the present hypotheses about the physiology of vision and describes the recent experimental evidence that suggests that perception depends upon the detection and analysis of the lengths and orientations of the borders of objects. He concludes that many visual distortions are due to the processes of adaption, in which nerve cells lose their sensitivity by fatigue, and of mutual inhibition, in which the sensitivity of cells in the retina or in the visual cortex of the brain is reduced by the stimula- tion of adjacent cells.

Gregory shows that the characteristics of perceptual hypotheses are similar to those of scientific hypotheses and that illusions are analagous to erroneous scientific hypo-

the subject inspires. The aesthetic side of the subject is, I confess, by no means the least attractive to me. Especia- ally is its fascination felt in the branch which deals with light, and I hope the day may be near when a Ruskin will be found equal to the description of the beauties of color- ing, the exquisite graduations of light and shade, and the intricate wonders of symmetrical forms and combinations of forms which are encountered at every turn ....'

In lighter vein, he was a tennis champion and an expert at chess and billiards. After teaching in Cleveland, Ohio, and Worcester, Massachusetts, he was invited to head the physics department of the newly-formed University of Chicago, where he remained for over 35 years, bringing fame to himself and the university.

This life of Albert A. Michelson has been written by a daughter of his second wife. Because Dorothy was quite young when her father passed away, she in her maturity had to do extensive research. Her grasp of the scientific accomplishments of her father is quite remarkable. (On the human side, however, Dorothy unfortunately writes about herself in the third person.)

In Michelson's book, Light Waves and Their Uses (1903), the great physicist predicted a unique art of color: 'Indeed, so strongly do these color phenomena appeal to me that I venture to predict that in the not very distant future there may be a color art analogous to the art of sound-a color music, in which the performer, seated before a literally chromatic scale, can play the colors of the spectrum in any succession or combination, flashing on a screen all pos- sible gradations of color, simultaneously or in any desired succession, producing at will the most delicate and subtle modulations of light and color, or the most gorgeous and startling contrasts and color chords! It seems to me that we have here at least as great a possibility of rendering all the fancies, moods, and emotions of the human mind as in the older art.'

Such an art has since been effectively realized by a number of artists in kinetic and mobile color expression (cf., for example, T. D. Jones, The Art of Light and Color (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1972) (reviewed in Leonardo 8, 83 (1975)) and F. J. Malina, ed., Kinetic Art: Theory and Practice-Selections from the Journal 'Leonardo' (New York: Dover, 1974) (reviewed in Leonardo 8, 178 (1975)).

On Art and the Mind: Essays and Lectures. Richard Wollheim. Allen Lane, London, 1973. 349 pp., illus. ?6.00. Reviewed by Virgil C. Aldrich*

It is hard not to love a book that says in its preface: 'Philosophy has virtually nothing to offer those who would rifle it. Like paint, it requires that we find ourselves in it before it gives us anything.' The pity is that one who is not conversant with works of art will not understand the utterance.

But even some who are professionally conversant with art have difficulty with this notion of what it is for some- thing to be found or seen 'in' an art-work. For example, Goodman (p. 309), in his reply to Wollheim's penetrat- ing review of his Languages of Art, says: 'What we "can see in" a picture seems to me far from clear.' So he reduces the depth notion of a picture that shows you a man 'in' it to the flat notion of a man-picture. Wollheim wisely argues that what is missing here is the mind of the viewer-including the artist's-without which no sense can be made of the obvious fact that people do see things in things, under two descriptions: one that fits the picture qua picturing device, the other that fits what it pictures-what is 'in' it. 'Work of art' has this dual sense, in general.

Collingwood's mistake was to overlook this duality in too exclusive favour of the mind (imagination). So, for

the subject inspires. The aesthetic side of the subject is, I confess, by no means the least attractive to me. Especia- ally is its fascination felt in the branch which deals with light, and I hope the day may be near when a Ruskin will be found equal to the description of the beauties of color- ing, the exquisite graduations of light and shade, and the intricate wonders of symmetrical forms and combinations of forms which are encountered at every turn ....'

In lighter vein, he was a tennis champion and an expert at chess and billiards. After teaching in Cleveland, Ohio, and Worcester, Massachusetts, he was invited to head the physics department of the newly-formed University of Chicago, where he remained for over 35 years, bringing fame to himself and the university.

This life of Albert A. Michelson has been written by a daughter of his second wife. Because Dorothy was quite young when her father passed away, she in her maturity had to do extensive research. Her grasp of the scientific accomplishments of her father is quite remarkable. (On the human side, however, Dorothy unfortunately writes about herself in the third person.)

In Michelson's book, Light Waves and Their Uses (1903), the great physicist predicted a unique art of color: 'Indeed, so strongly do these color phenomena appeal to me that I venture to predict that in the not very distant future there may be a color art analogous to the art of sound-a color music, in which the performer, seated before a literally chromatic scale, can play the colors of the spectrum in any succession or combination, flashing on a screen all pos- sible gradations of color, simultaneously or in any desired succession, producing at will the most delicate and subtle modulations of light and color, or the most gorgeous and startling contrasts and color chords! It seems to me that we have here at least as great a possibility of rendering all the fancies, moods, and emotions of the human mind as in the older art.'

Such an art has since been effectively realized by a number of artists in kinetic and mobile color expression (cf., for example, T. D. Jones, The Art of Light and Color (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1972) (reviewed in Leonardo 8, 83 (1975)) and F. J. Malina, ed., Kinetic Art: Theory and Practice-Selections from the Journal 'Leonardo' (New York: Dover, 1974) (reviewed in Leonardo 8, 178 (1975)).

On Art and the Mind: Essays and Lectures. Richard Wollheim. Allen Lane, London, 1973. 349 pp., illus. ?6.00. Reviewed by Virgil C. Aldrich*

It is hard not to love a book that says in its preface: 'Philosophy has virtually nothing to offer those who would rifle it. Like paint, it requires that we find ourselves in it before it gives us anything.' The pity is that one who is not conversant with works of art will not understand the utterance.

But even some who are professionally conversant with art have difficulty with this notion of what it is for some- thing to be found or seen 'in' an art-work. For example, Goodman (p. 309), in his reply to Wollheim's penetrat- ing review of his Languages of Art, says: 'What we "can see in" a picture seems to me far from clear.' So he reduces the depth notion of a picture that shows you a man 'in' it to the flat notion of a man-picture. Wollheim wisely argues that what is missing here is the mind of the viewer-including the artist's-without which no sense can be made of the obvious fact that people do see things in things, under two descriptions: one that fits the picture qua picturing device, the other that fits what it pictures-what is 'in' it. 'Work of art' has this dual sense, in general.

Collingwood's mistake was to overlook this duality in too exclusive favour of the mind (imagination). So, for

the subject inspires. The aesthetic side of the subject is, I confess, by no means the least attractive to me. Especia- ally is its fascination felt in the branch which deals with light, and I hope the day may be near when a Ruskin will be found equal to the description of the beauties of color- ing, the exquisite graduations of light and shade, and the intricate wonders of symmetrical forms and combinations of forms which are encountered at every turn ....'

In lighter vein, he was a tennis champion and an expert at chess and billiards. After teaching in Cleveland, Ohio, and Worcester, Massachusetts, he was invited to head the physics department of the newly-formed University of Chicago, where he remained for over 35 years, bringing fame to himself and the university.

This life of Albert A. Michelson has been written by a daughter of his second wife. Because Dorothy was quite young when her father passed away, she in her maturity had to do extensive research. Her grasp of the scientific accomplishments of her father is quite remarkable. (On the human side, however, Dorothy unfortunately writes about herself in the third person.)

In Michelson's book, Light Waves and Their Uses (1903), the great physicist predicted a unique art of color: 'Indeed, so strongly do these color phenomena appeal to me that I venture to predict that in the not very distant future there may be a color art analogous to the art of sound-a color music, in which the performer, seated before a literally chromatic scale, can play the colors of the spectrum in any succession or combination, flashing on a screen all pos- sible gradations of color, simultaneously or in any desired succession, producing at will the most delicate and subtle modulations of light and color, or the most gorgeous and startling contrasts and color chords! It seems to me that we have here at least as great a possibility of rendering all the fancies, moods, and emotions of the human mind as in the older art.'

Such an art has since been effectively realized by a number of artists in kinetic and mobile color expression (cf., for example, T. D. Jones, The Art of Light and Color (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1972) (reviewed in Leonardo 8, 83 (1975)) and F. J. Malina, ed., Kinetic Art: Theory and Practice-Selections from the Journal 'Leonardo' (New York: Dover, 1974) (reviewed in Leonardo 8, 178 (1975)).

On Art and the Mind: Essays and Lectures. Richard Wollheim. Allen Lane, London, 1973. 349 pp., illus. ?6.00. Reviewed by Virgil C. Aldrich*

It is hard not to love a book that says in its preface: 'Philosophy has virtually nothing to offer those who would rifle it. Like paint, it requires that we find ourselves in it before it gives us anything.' The pity is that one who is not conversant with works of art will not understand the utterance.

But even some who are professionally conversant with art have difficulty with this notion of what it is for some- thing to be found or seen 'in' an art-work. For example, Goodman (p. 309), in his reply to Wollheim's penetrat- ing review of his Languages of Art, says: 'What we "can see in" a picture seems to me far from clear.' So he reduces the depth notion of a picture that shows you a man 'in' it to the flat notion of a man-picture. Wollheim wisely argues that what is missing here is the mind of the viewer-including the artist's-without which no sense can be made of the obvious fact that people do see things in things, under two descriptions: one that fits the picture qua picturing device, the other that fits what it pictures-what is 'in' it. 'Work of art' has this dual sense, in general.

Collingwood's mistake was to overlook this duality in too exclusive favour of the mind (imagination). So, for him, the whole work of art is 'in' the artist's head or mind

*Dept. of Philosophy, University of Utah, 338 Orson Spencer Hall, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, U.S.A.

him, the whole work of art is 'in' the artist's head or mind

*Dept. of Philosophy, University of Utah, 338 Orson Spencer Hall, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, U.S.A.

him, the whole work of art is 'in' the artist's head or mind

*Dept. of Philosophy, University of Utah, 338 Orson Spencer Hall, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, U.S.A.

theses. The false hypothesis can be caused either by the

**The Manchester Grammar School, Old Hall Lane, Manchester, M13 OXT, England.

theses. The false hypothesis can be caused either by the

**The Manchester Grammar School, Old Hall Lane, Manchester, M13 OXT, England.

theses. The false hypothesis can be caused either by the

**The Manchester Grammar School, Old Hall Lane, Manchester, M13 OXT, England.

Books Books Books 347 347 347

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