Olive Roots Fall 2011

oliverootsvolume I | issue II | spring 2011

OLIVE ROOTSVolume I | Issue III | Fall 2011

2 | Olive roots | Fall2011 Olive roots | Fall 2011 | 3

Cover Photography by Gerard Horton

olive roots Editorial board

Editor-in-ChiefJennifer Good

Managing EditorTamar Kaplan

Publicity DirectorMelissa CarlsonFinance Manager

Alice ChanLayout Artist

Tamar Kaplan

faculty advisory board

Chair of International and Strategic StudiesP. Edward Haley, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Literature Audrey Bilger, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor of GovernmentJennifer Taw, Ph.D.

Visiting Assistant Professor of LiteratureChristine Crockett

Olive Roots is an international undergraduate research journal on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The journal is published by the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Student Research Forum, a student group at Claremont McKenna College that seeks to promote intellectual discourse, mutual understanding, and a solution to the conflict.


contents

Security Implications of the Palestinian UN BidAnamaria Helvia Roman, University of London4

Bedtime Stories:The Legitimacy of Palestinian StatehoodIoan Nascu, King’s College London

9

In Peace Talks with Palestine, Israel SettlesTyler McBrien, Claremont McKenna College14

The Women of Gush EmunimJenna Weinberg, University of Michigan16

articles


On the 23rd of September, Pal-estinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas,

submitted his statehood application to the United Nations Organization, in order to receive recognition and full membership as an independent

state: Palestine.

U.S. and Israeli opinions

The United States and Is-rael viewed Palestine’s action as a “unilateral move”, which would only block the peace negotiation process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The White House vetoed the bid in the UN Se-curity Council, cut the funds for the United Nations Educational Scien-tific and Cultural Organization and threatened to stop financial support towards the UN. The Israeli response came shortly, when its representa-tives called the bid a “march of folly” during a Security Council Meeting, considering it to be premature and prone to failure. Moreover, they feared that recognizing the Palestin-ian state would be a greater threat than Hamas.

Are the 1967 borders a real solution?

Abbas’ strategy for approaching the UN enabled him to reiterate, in the world’s perception, the idea of Palestine’s right to have a state with the 1967 borders. Should the Secu-rity Council bid be rejected, Abbas would be able to address the Gen-eral Assembly for a “softer” recogni-tion. By doing this, his path towards future talks with Israel would start from a better position. Moreover, soft recognition will effectively help him in his political struggle against Hamas. Abdel Rahman Abu Nasser, the dean of the Law College of the Gaza-based al-Azhar University, emphasized that recognition of a state on the 1967 territories is of le-gal importance, saying “such a deci-sion will be considered an interna-tional reference for any future peace talks or a permanent peace deal to be reached with Israel. The decision will back the Palestinian position internationally within the frame of international law to stop settle-ment and the construction of the wall.” His point is backed up by the Palestinian UN envoy, who stated that Israel’s spreading construction in occupied territory will encourage

Security Implications of the Palestinian UN BID

Anamaria Helvia RomanUniversity of London


“terror rampages” by settlers. On the other hand, Abu Nasser acknowledged the negative impact of recognizing the Palestin-ian state on 1967 borders, which consists of depriving the Palestinian refugees the right to return to the 1948 territories. Furthermore, Abbas could not compromise on certain re-quests formulated by Israel, such as an all-out renunciation of this right, along with an explicit declaration of recognizing Israel as a Jewish nation-state and an agreement that will end any other Palestinian demands. Nevertheless, some EU rep-resentatives and world diplomats believe that Palestine’s status up-grade in the UN forum would be a step forward in clarifying the situa-tion of the disputed lands between Israel and Palestine. Moreover, many believe that this would be the key so-

lution to the conflicts involving the two.

Israeli security measures as a response to the future state of Palestine

In the context of Arab up-risings and the US withdrawal from Iraq, the risk of terrorists penetrat-ing through the West Bank is seen as a major threat. In this sense, it would be essential for Israel to maintain its presence in the Jordan Rift Valley and other strategic sites, in order to prevent rocket attacks target-ing central Israel and minimize the homeland security threat level. In addition, it would be crucial for the Israelis to secure the border crossing and the airspace between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, a fact which is unlikely to be accepted

Palestine - Gerard Horton


by Abbas. When considering terror-ism, it is important to keep in mind Palestine’s lack of control over the UN. This fact makes Yoam Schwit-zer, an expert on terrorism, state that it is unlikely for Palestine to engage in any attack, similar to the Second Intifada. His opinion is based on the principle that the Palestinians suf-fered a “boomerang effect” as a result of the Second Intifada, they would not risk their reputation by engaging in terrorist activity, especially since they need political support for the UN bid. Even though Hamas car-ried out several attacks during the year, the organization is not keen on launching any major attacks from the West Bank to Israel, mostly be-cause, as Schweitzer declares, they want international support in the still-isolated Gaza Strip and they do not want to be the motive for a UN bid failure. “Unless the internal strife within Hamas [takes hold], meaning the intention of the military wing to set the stage with fire, then I think at the first stage they will not try to operate against the Israelis or against this [UN] trend in an overt way,” said Schweitzer. “Covertly maybe, because there is also internal strife within Hamas concerning what to do about [the UN bid].” Considering that Judea and Samaria are home for tens of thousands of settlers, it is beyond the power and resources the Israeli government to conduct a process of evacuation. Almost certainly, this

mass migration would create im-mense overstretch on the part of Is-raeli security forces, and could even cause significant government insta-bility.

Conclusions

Palestine’s bid for statehood may cause some damage to the Is-raeli diplomacy, but, as odd as it may sound, the UN bid will also serve it well. The majority of the Israeli pop-ulation would gladly disengage from the Palestinians permanently. In addition, the UN bid will minimize support for Hamas, increase faith in Abbas, and diminish Palestinian frustration over the current diplo-matic impasse.

Likewise, the bid also re-duces the risk of another violent In-tifada. It gives Isreal, Palestine, and even the US a “time out”, which will help elucidate matters in the domes-tic Palestinian arena and in the Arab world, and allow Israel to identify its interests for a future peace treaty. The global public opinion is pressur-ing Israeli government to make an

Palestine’s bid for statehood may cause some damage to the Israeli diplomacy, but, as odd as it may sound, the UN bid will also serve it well.


effort towards solving the diplomat-ic deadlock and political isolation. At the same time, Abbas is likely to agree to compromises, chiefly be-cause he fears an unfavorable re-sponse to the UN bid. Netanyahu is aware that should the negotiations fail, Israel would be the one to take the blame in front of the international com-munity, an outcome that would make Israel more isolated and would threaten its security and economic wellbeing. Considering the facts pre-sented above, the UN initiative will be good for both sides and other par-ties involved, allowing them to come up with creative solutions to the is-sue at hand.

References

1. Ben-Yishai, Ron - UN bid good for Israel?, September 20, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4125012,00.

html2. Spurlock, Joshua - Israel Wary

of Additional Terror Attacks, September 1, 2011, http://www.bridgesforpeace.com/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=8069

3. Xinhua - Interview: Benefits, risks poised in Palestinian bid to UN for membership, September 11, 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/90854/7593430.html

4. Staff Writers, US says Palestin-ian UN bid threatens Mideast talks, October 24, 2011, http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/24/us-says-palestinian-un-bid-threat-ens-mideast-talks.html

Protest poster in jerusalem - Gerard Horton


Palestine - Wadi Qelt - Gerard Horton


Bedtime Stories:The legitimacy of palestinian stathood

Ioan NascuKing’s College London

“Enough, enough, enough,” says Abbas. “It is time for the

Palestinian people to gain their free-dom and their independence.”

The United Nations meeting on September 2011 will prove to be a pivotal point in Palestine’s attempt to gain statehood. Though the fu-ture seems glum, considering the US promise to veto Palestinian desires in the Security Council, and the general lack of support from other members of the UN, the action brought by Mahmoud Abbas was vital because it set in motion the mechanisms of in-ternational laws. It brought forth the claim for recognition in a clear and official manner. Based on the reactions of different countries – from the US support of Israel to Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal’s reaction that a veto would trigger a Saudi re-evaluation of cooperation with the United States – the issues seems to be clear-ly political. The problem is that they shouldn’t be political. States are the most impor-tant and most powerful subjects of international law. It is vital, there-fore, to understand when a certain entity qualifies as a state. Unfortu-nately, there are no clear checks and balances that must be ticked in order

for a state to be created. A starting point for such a discussion on state-hood is Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933 that stipulates that the “state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifi-cations: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a govern-ment; and (d) a capacity to enter into relations with other states.” This article attempts to cre-ate a harmonized system of interna-tional law, which is one of the aims of the United Nations. The UN must feel obligated by past conventions and customary international law to recognize the Palestinian state if it qualifies under the existing require-ments. As such, the political posi-tions of other states should be ig-nored.

Permanent population

The International Court of Justice defined “permanent popula-tion” when discussing the situation of the nomads from the Western Sa-hara – the link with the territory that the nomad tribes had was sufficient for them to be considered its popula-tion. There is a clear link between the Palestinian people and the ter-


ritory that they occupy, perhaps an even stronger link than between nomads and their home. The Pales-tinian people have symbolically con-structed a shared identity based on their land and the territory that they call home. There is much cultural and religious significance embedded in the very fiber of their society that stems from the territory they occupy.

Defined territory

A state must have some def-inite physical existence that marks it out clearly from its neighbors. The Oslo Accords provided for the cre-ation of the Palestinian National Au-thority, “for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip”.

It is important to note that disputes between states over the precise bor-der do not disqualify a state from having a ‘defined territory’. India and Pakistan have been disputing the ownership over the Jammu-Kashmir states since they gained indepen-dence from the UK, yet both are clearly states. Many commentators seem to believe that Palestine has a better claim than Israel for certain disputed territories. Even the Israeli Supreme Court seems to have acknowledged that parts of the land are ‘belligerent

territory’ and that ‘Israeli law does not apply in these areas. They have not been “annexed” to Israel’.

Government

The 1974 Arab League Summit first designated the Palestinian Libera-tion Organization (PLO) as the “sole legitimate representative of the Pal-estinian people,” and as of Septem-ber 2011, the PLO is empowered to act as the government of the State of Palestine. It would be hard to imagine the existence of a govern-ment without a permanent popu-lation that would be attached to it – as such, the acknowledgement of a government at international level means the acknowledgement of the population as well.

Capacity to enter into legal relations

This is a requirement that is hard to define as a matter of theory, and is the most controversial part of Palestine’s definition as a state.The capacity to enter into legal rela-tions denotes ‘independence’; that the state is not under the control, direct or indirect, of another state. A clear example is Hong Kong. Al-though it fulfills the first three re-quirements (population, territory and a government) it is not a state, because it remains under the lawful sovereign authority of ChinaIsrael cannot be said to be the law-ful sovereign authority of Palestine. If a territory declaring factual inde-

Israeli law does not apply in these areas. They have not been “annexed” to Israel.


pendence is able to claim the right of self-determination it will suffice in its claim for legal independence and hence statehood. In the Palestinian Wall Ad-visory Opinion (2004 ICJ Rep) there was no doubt that the peoples of the occupied Palestinian territory had the right to self-determination and that any action that infringes on this right is a violation of international law. Another point in favor of this position is that legal indepen-dence is generally seen as the capac-ity to enter into relations with other states. Of the 193 member states of the United Nations, 127 (65.8%)

have recognized the state of Pales-tine. This means that Palestine is given at least some capacity to enter into such relations – it is considered, by most existing states, to have the competency to act and represent the Palestinian people in international relations. Moreover, in bilateral (or multilateral) actions with states that have recognized it, Palestine is given the status of ‘state’. Clearly, Palestine encom-passes all the necessary elements that the Montevideo Convention considers to be prerequisites of state-hood. It has a permanent popula-tion, defined territory, a recognized government and the capacity to en-

Nabi Musa - Gerard Horton


ter legal relations. Despite this, the US is considering using its veto pow-er to block Palestine’s request in the UN without giving a clear response to the Palestinian statehood move-ment. US speculation that statehood would be “disruptive of the peace in the Middle East” has much too weak a link to the recognition of the Pal-estinian state and does not justify breaching existing conventions.Moreover, the issue from Israel’s point of view is not the denial of any kind of existence of a Palestinian state – as Ariel Sharon proclaimed in December 2001, the creation of a Palestinian state would be the only solution to the conflict and the Is-raeli government has accepted in general the idea that a Palestinian state is to be established. The real is-sue is the refusal to accept the 1967 border. Yet as stated, simply because the borders are disputed does not and should not disqualify an entity from gaining statehood. If the issues becomes a po-litical ping-pong game and the US manages to wrestle the UN into re-fusing to recognize the Palestinian state, then there will be no clear con-ventions through which a state may become recognized as one. This will create a mockery of the internation-al machinery, which will become less concerned with fairness and more concerned with empowering stron-ger players, who have the capacity to manipulate the system in their favor. Unfortunately, this is the most likely outcome – pure poli-tics, ignoring all the legal repercus-

sions. As the recent US decision to cut UNESCO’s funds for giving full membership for Palestine sug-gests, the issue of its statehood will become a matter of political ego for many of the countries involved. The only chance Palestine has is to bypass the Security Council and ap-peal to the General Assembly – the trick is that the GA cannot recognize it as a state, but it can upgrade its membership to “non-member state” status. For the long run, recognition of Palestinian statehood seems to be simply a bedtime story.

References

1. Martin Dixon, Textbook on Inter-national Law (6th Edition, Oxford University Press 2007)2. Western Sahara Case (1975) ICJ Rep 123. Robert I. Rotberg, ed. Israeli And Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History’s Double Helix. (Blooming-ton: Indiana University Press, 2006)4. Madiha Rashid al Madfai (1993). Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974–1991. (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press. p. 21)5. Yezid Sayigh (1999). Armed Strug-gle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993 (illustrated ed. Oxford University Press. p. 624) 6. Richard Adams. Palestinian UN bid for statehood: as it happened. The Guardian. September 23, 2011.7. Palestinian Wall Advisory Opin-ion (2004) ICJ Rep


8. Gershom Gorenberg, The Acci-dental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967–1977 (Mac-millan, 2007)

9. Mara’abe v The Prime Minister of Israel, HCJ 7957/04

Jerusalem - Gerard horton


In Peace talks with palestine, israel settles

As peace talks between Is-rael and Palestine stagnate once again, observers on both sides of the conflict have echoed the same apho-rism: “It’s the settlements, stupid” (Gorenberg). While this monocausal explanation, however pithy, does not suffice in a convoluted situation like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the presence of the Israeli settlers in Pal-estinian territory certainly does not ameliorate the situation in the eyes of the media, other countries, and especially the Palestinians. Ongoing points of contention in the settle-ment debate include the disconnect between the views of Israel and the international community on Israeli borders, the growing number of set-tlers, and Israel’s intransigent stance on the inclusion of the settlements in the Israeli state due to religious reasons. In order to appease the in-ternational community and further peace talks with Palestine, Israel should define her borders, work to stop growth in the settlements, and replace the religious argument with a historical one. Israel’s failure to declare her borders has resulted in great ambiguity. In the eyes of the in-ternational community, any land

settled by Israelis beyond the 1967 borders is seen as illegal settlement (Gorenberg). Historically, Israelis settled purposefuly, attempting to set borders for the nascent Israeli state. However, many today see the perpetuation of such tactical settle-ments as a rehashing of past ethnic conflict. While the Palestinians have demanded that the Israelis ac-cept the pre-1967 borders as a pre-condition for negotiation, the Israe-lis have countered with a desire to raise the issue in direct negotiations (Kershner). Palestine’s insistence on preconditions and Israel’s insistence on direct negotiations will always result in a stalemate. Israel’s hesi-tance to accept pre-1967 borders will result in Palestinian push back and potential derailment of peace talks. Therefore, a border declaration close to that of the pre-1967 lines would be a logical first step in eliminating the ambiguity of the situation. Howev-er, this precondition only addresses the creation of future settlements and not existing ones. One step backward and two steps forward seems to describe the recent narrative of the Israeli settle-ments. Despite ostensible reduc-tions of settlements, including the

Tyler McBrienClaremont McKenna College


recent Israeli Supreme Court deci-sion to evacuate the settlement of Migron by the end of March, the Is-raeli government and Prime Minis-ter Benjamin Netanyahu took steps toward legalizing the settlements at a time of heavy scrutiny from the United States and the United Na-tions (Bell). In January, Prime Min-ister Netanyahu offered financial incentives to prospective settlers and attempted to streamline the le-galization of settler outposts (AP). At this point in negotiations, such actions may not damage relations further, but they will certainly not improve them. Instead of viewing the settlements as bargaining chips in the negotiations, Netanyahu has remained uncooperative in his insis-tence of their inclusion, suported by the notion of the territories as “dis-puted.” The number of settlers has steadily grown, exceeding 300,000 in reports by the IDF (Levinson). In order to remain in the good graces of the international community, Is-rael will have to make major conces-sions in the way of the settlements, no matter what defenses it may offer for their continued existence - espe-cially the religious defense. A certain bloc of settlers include those settling the land for religious reasons, a self-proclaimed vanguard living within the biblical borders of the Land of Israel. How-ever, this antiquated argument holds no water because the Torah doesn’t outline precise geographic borders for Israel (Jerusalem Post). Instead of pursuing the religious argument,

the Israeli government should play up the largely legitimate “right of return” defense in the settlement of land where Jews had been driven out forcefully or eradicated entirely (FA). This rebranding shifts the argument from a hotly contested religious one to a more legitimate moral one. Ad-mittedly, the “right of return” argu-ment could potentially unleash a slippery slope scenario, with the Palestinians claiming the very same right. However, the religious argu-ment simply does not hold weight in the increasingly secular internation-al community. Israel remains one of the most scrutinized nations of today. The country often sustains unfound-ed and malicious accusations, such as the accusation of Apartheid poli-cies (Gladstone). Innocent on the count of Apartheid, at least by the 1998 Rome Statute definition, Israel nonetheless engages in some activi-ties counterproductive to the effort of peace and a two-state solution. With the Israeli settlements danger-ously approaching a tipping point and international opinion of Israel slowing turning sour, Israel must make some substantial, even pain-ful, concessions.


The Women of gush eminum

Jenna Weinberg University of Michigan

“They say it takes one generation to found a new language. These girls are a new language, believing that they belong to the land on which they were born, and sponsored by the gov-ernment they despise which pays for their roads and electricity. I wondered how this new generation will affect the narrative of struggle not only be-tween Israelis and Palestinians, but

also among Israelis themselves.”

Introduction

The quote above from Elizabeth Ru-bin’s September 2011 Tablet Maga-zine article describes the new gener-ation of female religious nationalist

settlers, the first generation born into the illegal settlements and its beliefs. Raised with the settler ide-ology and knowing no other place but Judea and Samaria as home, the girls find spirituality and meaning in the defense of the land against all

threats, both from the Palestinians and the Israeli government. With the recent United Nations bid for Palestinian Statehood without ne-gotiated borders, the Jewish settle-ment movement stands as one of the main roadblocks to any efforts for sustainable peace. Although a radical minority of the settlement enterprise, Jewish religious nation-alists justify all extremes in defense of their God-given right to settle on land they believe belongs to the Jew-ish people. Women settlers in par-ticular are “among the most extreme elements in the various right-wing political groups in Israeli society…even more than their spouses.” In fact, the women of Gush Emunim have used their agency as mothers and as religiously observant women to influence national politics since the beginning of the settlement movement. Yet, as the women be-come more directly resistant to the government through organized po-litical activism, they lose their ability to sway Israeli policies and become viewed as increasingly radical. While the women of Beit Hadassah and Rachelim in the earlier stages of the movement gained public sym-pathy by presenting the creation of their settlements as an organic birth, today, the Women in Green and the adolescent girls of Uplana Ma’ale Levona meet rejection from

The women of gush emunim have used their agency as mothers and as religiously observant women to influence politics since the beginning of the settlement movement.


mainstream society, resulting from their more organized and official resistance to state policies. Facing the threat of disengagement from a significant portion of the West Bank, the women of Gush Emunim are likely to become increasingly radical, threatening the peace process and the Israeli state. Understanding the intersections of gender, religion, and nationalism in relation to the evolv-ing discourse of the women of Gush Emunim is thus critical to grasping the difficulties the settlement move-ment poses to the current peace pro-cess and is essential to solving the internal struggles that Israel faces to control its own radical groups.

The History of the Gush Emu-nim Movement

The history of the religious nation-alist settlement movement largely began after the 1967 Six Day War. Although the official movement known as Gush Emunim, or Bloc of the Faithful, was established in 1974 and ceased to exist by the 1980s, the term is used here to describe the many affiliated organizations that today share Gush Emunim’s ideol-ogy. Proponents of the movement envisioned a “unitary Jewish Land of Israel,” opposing the two-state solution model formulated in the late 1970s among Israeli “radical” left circles. Instead, they sought to cre-ate “facts on the ground,” ensuring the incorporation of the disputed territories into Israel proper. From 1967-1977, the Israeli govern-

ment under the more left-wing La-bor party encouraged settlement in areas of strategic benefit, such as the Jordan Valley, the Golan Heights, and the Egypt-Gaza border, with the in-tention of annexing heavily Palestin-ian populated areas of the West Bank to Jordan. Yet, the new religious set-tlement movement challenged this plan, “establishing a renewed Jewish presence throughout the homeland, and making the return of territory to Arab rule a political and practical impossibility.” The electoral victory of the right-wing Likud party in 1977 led to a change in official policy with an “Israeli government unswervingly committed to the expansion of Jew-ish settlements in the territories.” In 1980-1981, Israel officially an-nexed East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights into Israel proper. Although only approximately 4,000 Jewish set-tlers lived beyond the Green Line in 1977, the dominance of Likud in the Israeli government between 1977 and 2005 ensured the expansion of the settlements. In 2009, an estimat-ed 296,700 Jews settled in the West Bank, not including East Jerusalem. By the 2nd Intifada in 2000, many hawkish Israeli leaders began to publicly affirm the inevitability of a Palestinian state and the evacuation of some Jewish settlements as a re-sult of the demographic realities of the region. While Jews constituted a 64 percent majority in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in 1967, by the end of 2003, the Jewish majority was reduced to 51 percent. Thus, “in or-der to remain both Jewish and dem-


ocratic, the borders of Israel would have to remain close to the 1949-1967 armistice lines (the ‘Green Line’)” to include only heavily Jewish popu-lated areas. Religious nationalists and other advocates of “The Whole Land of Israel” never provided a re-alistic solution to this “demographic dilemma.” Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005 required the evacuation of 21 Jewish settlements and approxi-mately 9,000 settlers in the Gaza Strip as well as four additional settle-ments in the West Bank. Most of the settlers, almost all religious nation-alists, waited to be forcibly removed by Israeli soldiers and instead par-ticipated in large-scale protests and a few minor public disturbances. Subsequently, the six years since the disengagement have witnessed in-creased radicalization of religious nationalist settlers’ politics and ac-tivism.

Judaism, Gender, and Zionism in Gush Emunim

Since the beginnings of the Gush Emunim movement, women have as-serted their agency both within their communities and through the public political sphere. Traditional Jewish gender roles, according to halachah, prescribe the home as the “princi-pal site for divine work by women.” While men are commanded to study Torah, women’s “spiritual mission” and religious duty lies in rearing and educating her children. So, by fully embracing their gender roles in a re-

ligious fundamentalist community that legitimates women’s inferior status, the women feel empowered, achieving meaning through an equal but separate purpose. Judaism provides the “divine justi-fication” for the community’s Zion-ist fervor in pioneering settlements, proclaiming, “the People of Israel in the Land of Israel in accordance with the Torah of Israel.” Feeling part of a national collective, religious Zionists strongly connect to the realization of Zionist goals through conquest of the land and personal sacrifice for the nation. The region of the West Bank, or Judea and Samaria, is of particular importance to religious Zionists as the exact location of an-cient Jewish history and a continu-ous Jewish presence from antiquity until 1948. Thus, by settling Judea and Samaria, they return to their god-given home and accelerate mes-sianic redemption. However, the Gush Emunim move-ment’s connection with Zionism, a largely secular, western campaign, places traditional Jewish gender roles against Zionism’s “egalitarian-so-cialist ideology.” Consequently, Gush Emunim simultaneously encour-ages women to serve the collective through participation in the public sphere but also demands that they concentrate on attaining personal fulfillment in the home. Yet, in the settler communities, “the entire set-tlement is perceived as ‘home,’” thus extending women’s agency beyond the nuclear family unit and blurring the lines between the domestic and


public spheres. In fact, the women see the Jewish Nation of Israel as one large extended family and the entire Land of Israel as home, ensur-ing that the women’s involvement in the public domain “does not threat-en the engendered religious code.” With a fundamentalist movement tied directly to the struggle over ter-ritories and settlements, women’s role in maintaining the home is es-pecially prominent, whereby “the struggle for a national home is con-ducted through the creation of pri-vate homes.” Since the women en-sure the establishment and survival of the settlements, which are a polit-ical project of the state, they serve as active participants in shaping state politics. Today, this contradictory trend of religious fundamentalist women as political agents continues as the religious Zionist community sways more religiously conservative, while its women become increasing-ly active in the public socio-political sphere.

The Beit Hadassah Women

As early as the 1970s, religious na-tionalist women lobbied Prime Min-ister Golda Meir to promote settle-ment in Shechem (Nablus) as a way of coping with the trauma experi-enced during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Yet, their efforts to establish the Jewish Community in Hebron in 1979 demonstrate not only the wom-en’s dedication to the settlement movement, but also their agency in influencing Israeli politics. The Jew-

ish Community of Hebron’s website tells the women’s story, presenting the women as Zionist heroines and women of valor dedicated to a pio-neering spirit with its roots in Jew-ish tradition – following Passover of 1979, a group of ten women and forty children left the settlement of Kiryat Arba in the middle of the night. With the help of their men, they set up an encampment in the abandoned Beit Hadassah building without running water, windows, or doors in the fa-cilities. A former medical clinic for Jews and Arabs, Beit Hadassah was abandoned after the 1929 riots, a massacre which caused the Jewish presence in Hebron, which had ex-isted since antiquity, to disappear. Not in favor of Jewish settlement in the heart of Hebron or of physically removing the women and children, Prime Minister Menachem Begin put Beit Hadassah under “siege;” anyone who left the building would not be allowed to reenter. Only after an attack on the male ye-shiva students in May of 1980 result-ing in six deaths did the Israeli Gov-ernment issue official authorization for Jewish settlement in Hebron. This course of events established an historical precedent for further settlement building in reaction to violence as an Israeli governmental policy, most recently implemented in the murder of the Fogel family in the Itamar settlement in March 2011. In response to the murders, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ap-proved the construction of five hun-dred new settlement homes, stating,




“They shoot, and we build.” Although the Israeli Gov-ernment only authorized the He-bron settlement after the deaths of men, the women put themselves on the frontlines, defying Israeli law and squatting on the land, claiming it as their own. Rather than being per-ceived as political actors, however, the women and children were seen as such, thus positioning the tradi-tional sympathy for religious women and children against the entire Is-raeli regime. By celebrating Jewish rituals and raising their children in Beit Hadassah, they solidified their spiritual and religious connection with the space. Evoking feminine images of “peaceful existence and established households,” the women displayed their rootedness in their newly established home, remaining untouchable by Israeli soldiers. In addition, the women manipulated the Israeli cultural view of observant Jewish women to their advantage and placed pressure on the govern-ment, in effect using themselves and their children as “human shields.” Thus, the women were empowered, holding the key to their movement’s future and the agency to influence the politics of the entire nation.

The Women of Rachelim

Although the Beit Hadassah settlement was founded through the agency of women, the death of their men was the final catalyst in gaining official governmental approval. Ad-ditionally, it remains unclear wheth-

er the women chose to squat in Beit Hadassah on their own initiative or through the influence of their men. Thus, the settlement of Rachelim is considered the first Jewish settle-ment “engineered, conceived, and headed solely by women.” On Octo-ber 27, 1991, Rachel Druk was killed when Palestinian terrorists opened fire on a bus leaving the settlement of Shiloh on its way to a political rally. In what they called a “fitting Zionist response,” a few dozen re-ligious-nationalist women, mostly married with children and from the most ideological West Bank settle-ments, established a settlement at the site of the murder to memorial-ize both Druk and Rachel Weiss, a woman who had similarly been mur-dered by terrorists along with her three children three years prior near Jericho. Thus, they named the set-tlement Rachelim, literally meaning “Rachels” in Hebrew, bringing life to a place of death. The women organized exclusively as women, making a statement as mothers and future mothers, including men only as an afterthought. Rather than depicting settlement as a masculine act associ-ated with “erection and penetration” of the land, they expressed their settlement as creation, giving birth in formerly barren hills. Embracing the concept of a maternal collective and a national family, they called upon all Jewish women to abandon their individual households to nur-ture the settlement, placing national defense on their own shoulders while


putting their individual families at risk. By turning Rachelim into the “social, political, and ritualistic cen-ter of the West Bank Jewish settlers’ community,” the women nurtured and developed their new home as they would a child until the settle-ment could sustain itself. Rachelim was founded fol-lowing the 1st Intifada, which began in December 1987. During this peri-od, 73 percent of men and 53 percent of children in the “ideological settle-ments” experienced Palestinian acts of violence at a rate of once a week or more on average. For Palestinians in the West Bank, Jewish settlers were the most visible and threaten-ing symbol of the Israeli occupation, possibly even more so than Israeli soldiers, as they settled with every intention of remaining indefinitely. Occurring only three days before the Madrid Conference, the first time that Israel and its Arab neighbors discussed peace around the same ta-ble in 43 years, the murder of Rachel Druk reflects tension surrounding the peace talks and general Palestin-ian discontent. In reaction to this surge in violence, “retaliation, deter-rence, and confidence boosting” be-came the main strategy of the settler leadership in ensuring the continua-tion of the settlements, resulting in further distancing from peace on the ground. The policies of the Labor government at the time prevented Rachelim’s official establishment, al-though it gained legal recognition in 1999 after another change of govern-ment.

Just as in the case of Beit Hadassah, a new settlement was formed in reaction to Palestinian violence and was not disbanded as a result of government sympa-thies towards religious nationalist

women. The women of Rachelim likewise understood the advantages of organizing solely as women, play-ing on Israeli gender stereotypes by promoting the settlement as an act of peace and rootedness in their newly established home. As Naomi Sapir, one of Rachelim’s founders stated, “We women don’t believe in the use of force, but rather in quiet protest and persuasion.” By framing the settlement as an act of creation with concern for their children’s safety rather than as a political act, the women gained sympathy from the government, the military, and the general public. The women of Rachelim decided to enter the politi-cal sphere officially in February 1992 with the formation of the Zionist Women’s Lobby, thus providing new possibilities for religious nationalist women’s formal political participa-tion.

Women in Green

Female religious national-ists’ political activism, in contrast

“We women don’t believe in the use of force, but rather in quiet protest and pursuasion” - Naomi Sapir


with simple participation in their earlier history, continued to grow and strengthen throughout the 1990s until the present day. Yet, despite an increase in their politi-

cal capabilities, the women began to lose the Israeli public’s sympa-thy; by more openly resisting Israeli policies, the women violated their perception as the nurturers of the

Bus over Bedoin - Gerard horton


Jewish religion, culture, and nation, instead being viewed as a possible threat to the very nation they sought to defend and expand. Women for Israel’s Tomor-row – Women in Green, founded in October 1993 by Ruth and Nadia Matar in response to the signing of the Oslo Agreements only a month prior, is perhaps the largest and most well known grassroots organization of women in Gush Emunim. Their name comes from the green hats they often wear to show their oppo-sition to retreating to the Green Line and contrasts the “Women in Black,” a well-known Israeli women’s peace organization that opposes Israeli occupation. Although they define themselves as both secular and reli-gious, Tami Jacoby met no secular or non-religious women involved with Women in Green during her field-work. This reflects a disconnect with the way Women and Green wish to portray themselves – as an organiza-tion extending beyond the national religious camp, and thus one that is less on the periphery – versus the reality of their extremist affiliation. With the Bible as their ultimate jus-tification for Jewish settlement in Ju-dea and Samaria (although biblical authority lies with their men), God’s will ultimately has the “potential to override state policy.” Thus the women break state law or organize in civil disobedience when they believe the government’s actions compete with the will of God. Consequently, despite identifying as “moderate, loyal, nationalist,” most Israelis view

the Women in Green as a “handful of irresponsible fanatics.” Their demonstrations at il-legal outposts display the evolving nature of the government’s reactions to religious-nationalist women. On

July 20, 1995, for example, Nadia Matar assembled ten women from the Jewish community of Efrat to settle Givat HaDagan in an effort to ensure that the area would not be returned to the Palestinians as part of the Oslo Agreements. Many con-nected this act with Beit Hadassah, although there exist striking differ-ences despite the ultimate success of both demonstrations. Dubbed “Bat-tle of the Hills” by the media, the military made numerous attempts to forcibly remove the women, many of whom chained themselves to the structures they erected and fought violently against both male and fe-male soldiers. Joined by many dem-onstrators, the military arrested a to-tal of 213 individuals in an emotional struggle that challenged the soldiers’ understandings of religious women. In contrast with the more “cordial re-lationship” between Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the Beit Ha-dassah women, the confrontation at Dagan reflected the “growing intol-

The women break state law or organize in civil disobedience when they believe the government’s actions compete with the will of god.


erance for illicit settlement activity in the 1990s” under Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin, who perceived “Jew-ish settlement as an impediment to the peace process.” Although the government was no longer hesi-tant to physically remove religious settlers from illegal outposts, the women eventually succeeded in es-tablishing a settlement on the Dagan Hill and continue to establish other illegal outposts.

Uplana Ma’ale Levona

Following the lead of the Women in Green, the newest gen-eration of religious nationalist girls appears more radical than ever be-fore, a reflection of the threats made to the settlements through the peace process. With its own separate edu-cational framework, the religious nationalist community promotes radicalization in the gender separate schooling system, the home, and their youth movement, maintaining complete control over the messages the girls receive. Ulpana Ma’ale Levona, founded in 1996 with approximately fifty students per class, is the school of choice for the girls who are of-ten the most vocal participants in anti-evacuation demonstrations. The girls tend to marry young, and by the end of 12th grade, half of the students are either engaged or mar-ried, showing their commitment to fulfilling their traditional religious gender roles. Even though they do not enlist in the military citing re-

ligious modesty concerns or receiv-ing marriage exemptions, they still exalt the image of the “woman war-rior,” replacing the figure of a “female solider in uniform” with the “female settler in disputed territory” who de-fends the entire nation on the front lines. Dubbed “a girls school of real men,” the school won its nickname from its students’ “incredible will-ingness to sacrifice themselves for the Greater Land of Israel – setting up illegal outposts, refusing to move in the face of police assaults, and sitting in jail for weeks in order not to give interrogators their names.” Students of the Ulpana were ac-tive participants in protests and demonstrations against the 2005 disengagement from Gaza, joining members of the Women in Green and other “hilltop youth” to fortify the numbers of settlers in Gaza at the time of disengagement. Many residents of Gush Katif, however, did not appreciate the protesters sup-port, believing that their extreme actions undermined their cause and isolating the settler movement from the mainstream. Understand-ing the settlers’ use of their children in preventing government action against the settlers, the government required the evacuation of children from Gaza before the official forced evacuation began. Female soldiers were dispatched to evacuate female settlers, who were overall more vio-lent than their male counterparts, knowing that less force would be used against them and lacking the respect for Israeli soldiers having not


served in the military themselves. Most recently, students of Ulpana Ma’ale Levona made Israeli head-lines on March 3, 2011 for their par-ticipation in the “Day of Rage,” a day of public demonstration and disrup-tion in response to the dismantling of illegal outposts. Holding signs such as “They shoot at Havat Gilad, we stop the State” and “The war is with the Arabs,” thirty girls blocked the El Al junction near Ben-Gurion Airport, resulting in the arrest of twenty and clashes with male and female Border Police. Despite the religiosity of the girls, male officers did not hesitate to forcibly remove the girls, reflecting the changing at-titudes towards religious nationalist women in the public discourse. Although the newest gener-ation of religious nationalist women is more politically active than ever before, they are actually losing their ability to influence Israeli policies. As a result of their zealous resistance to Israeli soldiers and police, the women and girls are now seen as rad-ical threats to the state instead of as the mothers of Jewish religious and national continuity. This paradox of their growing political power reflects a change in the way the women of Gush Emunim view themselves and the evolving politics and external pressures of the peace process.

Conclusions

As observed by the feminist peace philosopher Sara Ruddick, “A women’s politics of resistance is not

inherently a peace politics. Wom-en can organize to sabotage peace treaties or to celebrate the heroes and martyrs of organized violence.” The agenda of the women of Gush Emunim supports Ruddick’s claim, placing their religious obligation to settle in Judea and Samaria above any compromise for lasting peace. Asserting their role as mothers, they support the settlement ideology by organizing specifically as women, recognizing the significance of their collective voice within the frame-work of Israeli society. Their involve-ment in the settlement movement thus complicates notions of women and peace, shedding light on the complexities of the intersections of gender, religion, and nationalism. With the Palestinian bid for statehood and a return to nego-tiations pending the freeze of Israeli settlement activity, the settlement movement sits at the epicenter of the future of the Israeli-Palestinian Con-flict. Facing the threat of losing con-trol over much of the West Bank only six years after disengagement from the Gaza Strip, the settlers will turn to radical measures against both the Israeli government and Palestinians to fulfill what they believe is God’s will. Following the trends witnessed since 2005, women’s participation in radical activities, particularly that of adolescent girls, will increase in re-sponse to this threat. The paradox of their growing political activism while losing government and pub-lic sympathies will result in violent clashes between female and male


religious nationalist settlers and the Israeli authorities, both claiming to fight for the future of the Jewish na-tion.

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Olive Roots Fall 2011