The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 26 | Number 2 | Article ID 3378 | Jun 28, 2010

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Okinawa and Guam: In the Shadow of U.S. and Japanese“Global Defense Posture”　　沖繩とグアム——日米「世界的防衛体制」の陰で

Yoshida Kensei

Okinawa and Guam: In the Shadowof U.S. and Japanese “GlobalDefense Posture”

Kensei YOSHIDA

Okinawa is Japan’s southernmostprefecture lying between mainlandJapan and Taiwan off China’s eastcoast. The main island measurestwice the size of Guam and has apopulation roughly seven timesgreater, or one-third the size ofNew York’s Long Island with50,000 more people. On i tsslender, irregularly shaped island,which constitutes a mere 0.3 percent of the country、Okinawahosts 75 per cent in size of all U.S.only military bases in Japan,exclusive of sea and air space. U.S.bases include the Marine Corpsjungle training, aviation, bombingand shooting ranges, landingt r a i n i n g g r o u n d s a n d a nammunition depot, the largest AirForce base in the region with itsown ammunition site, a navalstation often visited by nuclearsubmarines and Army facilities,adding in sum to roughly one-fifthof the densely populated island. Itis home to an estimated 24,600U.S. service personnel, out of atotal of 36,000 in all of Japan,many of them living with their

dependents in fenced-in “Americantowns” with schools, gyms, golfcourses, shopping centers andchurches. Nearly 90 per cent(about 15,000 in number) of theJ a p a n - b a s e d M a r i n e s a r econcentrated in Okinawa.

Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, located inthe middle of a residential area of the city ofGinowan (population 91,000) north of thecapital Naha, reportedly stations 2000 to 4000personnel of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing ofthe III Marine Expeditionary Force. Helicoptersand fixed/wing aircraft are constantly flying lowin circles over the residences, schools andhospitals for embarkation and touch-and-goexercises, creating roaring noise and thedanger of crashes. People are so concernedthat they have long been demanding its closureand return, with particular urgency since 2004when one of Futenma’s heavy helicoptersspiraled into the wall of the administrationbuilding of a university right across the fenceand splattered its broken pieces all over duringthe summer break. In 2006, the Japanese andU.S. governments agreed to relocate manyOkinawa-based Marines to Guam by 2014 tolessen the Okinawan people’s burdens or toaccommodate “the pressing need to reducefriction on Okinawa.” MCAS Futenma would bereturned, but only after being replaced by anew facility that Japan would construct withinOkinawa.

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Okinawa Prefectural Government, U.S.Military Bases in Okinawa (2004)

The U.S. Department of Defense chose theAmerican territory of Guam for the Marinerelocation from Okinawa from geopolitical andstrategic perspectives, saying:

“Guam is a key piece of thestrategic alignment in the Pacificand is ideally suited to supportstabil i ty in the region. It ispositioned to defend other U.S.territories, the homeland, andeconomic and political interests inthe Pacific region.” [1]

Japan’s Ministry of Defense agreed when itcalled Guam a “strategic point” located onlyabout three hours away by air and about threedays away by sea from principal cities in theAsia-Pacific region [2].

The Department of Defense owns 30 per cent ofthis 540 square kilometer westernmostterritory of the United States, lying betweenthe Pacific Ocean and the Philippine Sea. Adeep-water naval station at Apra Harbor withone of the largest ordnance complexes in theworld and a four-runway air force base at thenorthern end with its own ammunition storagearea and capacious fuel tanks have made Guama major military stronghold since the end of

World War Two. Andersen Air Force Base wasbuilt on the island’s northern plateau in 1944,then served as a B-29 staging point to attackJapan and its Pacific territories and later as aStrategic Air Command (SAC) base during theKorean and Vietnam wars. Thirteen times aslarge as the MCAS Futenma, it has two airfields with an ammunition site in the middle:one known as Andersen Air Force Base (AFB)a t the nor theas t and ano ther , AFBNorthwestern Field (NWF). AFB, with twopaved runways, has been used in recent yearsby B-1 and B-2 stealth bombers, B-52 bombers,F-16 and F-22 fighters deployed on a rotationalbasis from air bases in the continental UnitedStates. NWF also has two runways, but hasbeen virtually untouched for the last sixtyyears.

The redeployment of “8,000 III MarineExpeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and theirapproximately 9,000 dependents …fromOkinawa to Guam by 2014,” was agreed inMay, 2006 between the governments of Japanand the United States as part of their “roadmapf o r ( m i l i t a r y f o r c e ) r e a l i g n m e n timplementation.” Among the units to movewere the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)command element, 3d Marine Divisionheadquarters, 3d Marine Logistics Group(formerly known as Force Service SupportGroup) headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wingheadquarters, and 12th Marine Regimentheadquarters. Marine Air-Ground Task Forceelements, such as command, ground, aviation,and combat service support, as well as a basesupport capability would remain in Okinawa.

The 1st Marine Air Wing headquarters andunnamed aviation units at the MCAS Futenmawere included in the relocation agenda.“Airfield functions” and “training functions”such as “aviation training,” currentlyperformed at the MCAS Futenma would becarried out in Guam. But this would not besufficient to enable the closure and return ofthe MCAS. U.S. officials have insisted that the

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MCAS Futenma could not be closed until areplacement facility is constructed in Okinawaand the air station is relocated there.

It’s not clear how many U.S. personnel arestationed at Futenma [3], but Mark Thompsonof Time magazine reports (June 8, 2010):

“For many in Okinawa, Futenmaand its 2,000 American personnelhave been a perpetually noisy andpolluting symbol of continuing U.S.dominance. But U.S. militaryleaders insist that as long as the3rd Marine Expeditionary Force isbased on Okinawa, they need theair base, which allows them torapidly deploy Marines throughoutthe region. Stalder (Marine CorpsPacific Commander Lt. Gen. KeithStalder) uses the analogy of abaseball team to explain why theforce can't do without its aircraft:‘It does not do you any good tohave the outfielders practicing inone town, the catcher in anotherand the third baseman somewhereelse’.”

MCAS Futenma.

Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government, U.S.Military Issues in Okinawa (2004)

But the article leaves several questionsunanswered. If the Ⅲ Marine ExpeditionaryForce needs an air base, why do not they takeit with them to Guam, by including the 2,000troops at Futenma in the 8,000 to 8,600Marines moving to Guam by 2014 under the2006 agreement? If the team, outfielders, thecatcher and the third baseman, should staytogether, shouldn’t the aviation units of the ⅢMEF relocate to Guam together with the forcecommand and the 1st Marine Air Wingheadquarters? If the team needs to sticktogether under the field manager and coaches,with the support of dependents, who will staybehind and train at the new Marine Corps airfacility to be built in Okinawa against localprotests or at other Marine Corps facilities onthe island?

Japan agreed to contribute $6.09 billion of “thefacilities and infrastructure development costsfor the Ⅲ MEF relocation to Guam” while theU.S. would fund the remaining $4.18 billion.Japan’s pledge to cover more than 60 per centof the total cost was, according to theagreement, to meet “the strong desire ofOkinawa residents that such force relocation berealized rapidly.” The realignment wasdescribed as a deal to “maintain deterrenceand capabilities while reducing burdens of localcommunities.” The agreement specified thatthe money allocated was designed for theMarine relocation, but Japan’s contribution isbeing spent not only to design and build MarineCorps facilities but to subsidize infrastructureimprovement at Andersen Air Force base andat a Naval base. [4]

The relocation package was confirmed in theMay 2009 Guam Agreement between Japan’sLiberal Democratic administration and theObama administration and then, on May 28,

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2010, in the “Joint Statement of the U.S.-JapanSecurity Consultative Committee” betweenWashington and Japan’s new administrationunder Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama of theDemocratic Party. Having set out to put theU.S.-Japan relationship on an “equal footing,”review the realignment roadmap and torelocate the MCAS Futenma out of Okinawa,but unable to find a way out that would beacceptable to the Obama administration,Hatoyama’s government quickly lost its originalpopularity and he announced his resignation afew days after the joint statement was signed inWashington..

The “Roadmap” was a follow-up to theDecember, 1996 Japan-U.S. Special ActionCommittee on Okinawa (SACO) agreementwhich promised to return “approximately 21percent of the total space of the US facilitiesand areas in Okinawa excluding joint usefacilities and areas (approx. 40 squarekilometers),” including the MCAS Futenma anda large portion of the 50 square kilometerNorthern Training Area. The closure/return ofeach of the facilities/areas was contingent onrelocating most of their functions withinOkinawa. The MCAS Futenma, for example,would be returned “within the next five toseven years” after a sea-based facility (SBF)was established off the Henoko peninsula nearthe Marine Corps Camp Schwab trainingcomplex on the northeastern coast of the mainisland of Okinawa. The floating base, connectedto land by a pier or causeway, was chosen overtwo other alternatives—incorporating theheliport into the huge Kadena Air Force Baseor building a heliport at Camp Schwab. Theheliport, the two governments suggested,would enhance “safety and quality of life forthe Okinawan people while maintainingoperational capabilities of U.S. forces and couldbe removed when no longer necessary.”

Camp Schwab, Eastward to Henoko Pointand Oura Bay. Source: Okinawa Prefectural

Government, U.S. Military Issues inOkinawa (2004)

Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro recalled inJune 2005 that his government had tried toconvince the other prefectures to accept areplacement facility. Every one of them agreedwith the necessity of reducing Okinawa’sburden, he said, but none wanted a U.S. baseto be relocated to its backyard and therefore,he said, he had no choice but to settle onOkinawa for the sea-based facility.

The deadline is long past, but no light is seen atthe end of the tunnel. Why? The sea-basedfacility concept soon gave way to a landfill planand the “roadmap” introduced the idea ofMarine relocation of from Okinawa to Guam.

The Futenma Replacement Facility would beconstructed with v-shaped runways across thetip of the Henoko Peninsula and in the adjacentsea next to Camp Schwab, an ammunitionstorage area and a deep-water bay wherenuclear submarines and aircraft carriers couldbe based. The neighborhoods around theMCAS Futenma, located in the middle of aresidential area with schools, hospitals, shopsand restaurants, have long suffered thedisturbance of low-flying helicopter noise and

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accident danger. In August 2004, an MCAS-based cargo helicopter crashed into the wall ofthe administration building of a university some300 meters away from the fence line. It injuredno Okinawan but damaged some houses andcars. Many people were shocked and angerednot only by the crash but also by the colonialstatus of their island when U.S. forcescordoned off the off-base site of the crash fromlocal police, government officials and universityadministrators, and removed the remains of theburned helicopter without permission. TheJapanese government did not protest the U.S.invasion into the off-base civilian district andpaid compensation for the damage. Futenmacitizens and many other Okinawans reinforcedtheir demand that the dangerous Marine Corpsbase be closed and removed immediately.

Japan was made responsible for conducting apre-construction environmental assessment ofthe replacement site (known as a habitat ofdugong, an endangered species protectedunder Japanese and U.S. law), land-filling thewaters around the peninsula, building the newfacility at its cost by 2014, and then handing itrent-free to the United States for use by theMarine Corps. The Guam relocation wasconditional on “1) tangible progress towardcompletion of the FRF, and 2) Japan's financialcontributions to fund development of requiredfacilities and infrastructure on Guam.”

But local fishermen and other Henoko villagers,environmentalists, and peace activists,supported by many Okinawans outside Henokoand Japanese mainlanders, so fiercely andpersistently opposed the intrusion of a newU.S. military base on the island, one-fifth ofwhich is already occupied by U.S. forces, thatthe Japanese government has not been able toeven start the construction 14 years after theSACO agreement and four years after theroadmap agreement.

In April 2009, the Marine realignment to Guambecame an internat ional agreement

(Agreement Between the Government of theU.S. and the Government of Japan Concerningthe Implementation of the Relocation of the IIIMarine Expeditionary Force Personnel andTheir Dependents from Okinawa to Guam)when it was approved in the Lower House ofthe Diet by the Liberal Democratic Party andthe Clean Government Party, although it wasrejected in the Upper House where theDemocratic Party and the Social DemocraticParty held a majority.

The September, 2009 general election furthercomplicated the issue. The Democratic Party,which had campaigned on a platform calling for“equal partnership” with the United States anda review of the Status of Forces Agreement andthe contentious U.S. force realignment inJapan, came into power by a landslide victoryover the Liberal Democratic Party which hadgoverned Japan for the past half century almostwithout interruption. Before and after beingsworn in as prime minister, party leaderHatoyama Yukio vowed to fight to move theMarine Corps air station out of Okinawa.

A month later, U.S. Secretary of DefenseRobert Gates visited Tokyo and disputedHatoyama’s campaign pledge, demanding thenew Tokyo government to abide by the 2006roadmap agreement in view of the vitalimportance of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Withoutthe relocation of the MCAS by the deadline, hesaid, there would be no relocation of Marinesfrom Okinawa to Guam and no return offacilities south of Kadena, and that he could notguarantee congressional approval of U.S.funding for the Marine relocation. He wascontradicting himself. Gates had visited Guamin May 2008 to look at construction alreadystarted in preparation for the Marine relocationfrom Okinawa and called the military buildupon the island “one of the largest movements ofmilitary assets in decades,” which he saidwould “continue the historic mission of theUnited States military presence on Guam: serveas the nation’s first line of defense and

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maintain a robust military presence in a criticalpart of the world.” [5] “That’s especially criticalnow,” he added, “in light of the diffuse natureof the threats and challenges facing our nationin the 21st century -- a century that will beshaped by the opportunities presented by thedeveloping nations of Asia.” Most Japanesemedia sided with the U.S. position, calling onHatoyama to honor the 2006 roadmapagreement in adherence to the Japan-U.S.“(military) alliance” which Hatoyama himselfsaid formed the core of Japan’s foreign policyand the bilateral relationship.

In the meantime, the Marine relocation plan,now combined with U.S. Pacific Command’s“Guam Integrated Military Development Plan”has been making steady progress towardsbuilding command, training and housingfacilities for the Marines and their dependents,upgrading the Andersen Air Force Base,constructing a deep-water wharf in ApraHarbor for visiting nuclear aircraft carriers andinstalling an Army missile defense task force. Anumber of projects are already underway withthe money allocated by both governments, cost-sharing ratio unchanged.

Actually, the military expansion in Guampreceded the 2006 realignment agreement. According to the CRS (Congressional ResearchService) Report for Congress in January, 2010,“(A)s the Defense Department has facedincreased tensions on the Korean peninsula andrequirements to fight the wars in Afghanistanand Iraq, the Pacific Command (PACOM), since2000, has built up air and naval forces on Guamto boost U.S. deterrence and power projectionin Asia.” [6]

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, whovisited Guam in November, 2003, was quotedby a U.S. diplomat in Tokyo as sayingrepeatedly after the trip, “What about Guam?Let's build up Guam.'' [7] The U.S. had beenforced to close its naval base at Subic Bay, thePhilippines, in 1992 after the Philippine Senate

voted against extending the lease and, at home,Washington was about to kick off the fifthround of base realignment and closure (BRAC),or the first since the cold war ended. Accordingto Rumsfeld, the military, having built up basessince World War Two, had 24 per cent morecapacity than it needed.

As Rumsfeld indicated, Guam, home to theApra (harbor) Naval Base and Andersen AirForce Base, was excluded from the 2005 BRAClist; on the contrary, it was going to be rebuiltinto a major forward-deployed outpost underthe Pentagon’s “Global Defense Posture”program.

The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), orthe talks between U.S. and Japanese officialsthat began in 2002 to d i scuss forcerealignments in the Pacific, had a particularemphasis on reducing the U.S. presence inOkinawa “that could ameliorate longstandingfrustrations among the local population andimprove the local political support for thestable and enduring presence of the remainingU.S. forces .” I t led to the “Al l ianceTransformation and Realignment Agreement”(ATARA) in 2005. [8]

In addition to confirming the vitality of Japan-U.S. bilateral defense cooperation and thecontinued U.S. maintenance of forward-deployed bases in Japan, the two countriesapproved realignment of U.S. forces in Japanand the Japan Self-Defense forces. The latterwas formalized the next year as “the roadmapfor realignment implementation.” Two monthslater, in July 2006, the US. Pacific Commandreleased its “Integrated Military DevelopmentPlan.” Subsequently confirmed by theDepartment of Defense’s “Guam Joint MilitaryMaster Plan” of July 2008, the documentsenvisioned the western-most U.S. territory as amilitary stronghold with more than 20,000members of the Marine Corps, Navy, Air Forceand Army.

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Proposed Military Buildup in Guam (fromJoint Guam Program Office, United States

Navy, Proposed Action/Guam”)

Why Guam?

In November 2009, the Joint Guam ProgramOffice of the Naval Facilities EngineeringCommand, Pacific released for 90-day publiccomment Draft Environmental ImpactStatement / Overseas Environmental ImpactStatement: Guam and CNMI Mil i taryRelocation Relocating Marines from Okinawa,Visiting Aircraft Carrier Berthing, and Army Airand Missile Defense Task Force (Draft EIS). Asthe title suggests, the 8,000-to-10,000-pagedocument presented potential environmentaleffects of the proposed Guam military buildup,as required by the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act. The buildup would include facilitiesand infrastructure not only for the Marinesrelocating from Okinawa but for the nuclear

aircraft carriers visiting Guam and for an armymissile defense task force to be stationed onthe island. Tinian in the Commonwealth ofNorthern Mariana Islands, too, was surveyed,as Marines are scheduled to conduct shootingexercises there. The strategic and basing planin the Draft EIS, based on the “GuamIntegrated Military Development Plan” and the“Guam Joint Military Master Plan,” had to meetthe following requirements:

• “Position U.S. forces to defendthe homeland including the U.S.Pacific territories”

• “Location within a t imelyresponse range”

• “Maintain regional stability,peace and security”

• “Maintain flexibility to respond toregional threats”

• “Provide powerful U.S. presencein the Pacific region”

• “Increase aircraft carrierpresence in the Western Pacific”

• “Defend U.S., Japan, and otherallies’ interests”

• “Provide capabil it ies thatenhance global mobility to meetcontingencies around the world”

• “Have a strong local commandand control structure”

To meet the “pressing need to reduce frictionon Okinawa,” the U.S. consulted allies such asKorea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand andAustralia, but they were all “unwilling to allowpermanent basing of U.S. forces on their soil.”“The military’s goal,” the Draft EIS continued,

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“is to locate forces where thoseforces are wanted and welcomedby the host country. Because thesecountries within the region haveindicated their unwillingness andinability to host more U.S. forceson their lands, the U.S. militaryhas shifted its focus to basing onU.S. sovereign soil.”

Guam was “the only locat ion for thereal ignment of forces” that met “al lcriteria”—freedom of action, response times topotential areas of conflict and U.S. securityinterests in the Asia-Pacific region.” It was alsoconsidered “ideally” located. Says the JointGuam Program Office in “Why Guam -guambuildupeis.us”:

“Guam is a key piece of thestrategic alignment in the Pacificand is ideally suited to supportstabil i ty in the region. It ispositioned to defend other U.S.territories, the homeland, andeconomic and political interests inthe Pacific region.”

Accordingly, the United States, or thePentagon, decided to “relocate approximately8,600 Marines and their 9,000 dependents fromOkinawa to Guam,” consisting of the followingfour “military elements.” [9]

Command element, III Marine ExpeditionaryForce (MEF), known as Marine Corps’ forward-deployed Marine Air-Ground Task Force(MAGTF) . The e lement w i l l invo lveHeadquarters and supporting organizations(Estimated personnel: 3,046);

Ground combat element (GCE), 3rd MarineDivision units, which will provide infantry,armor, artillery, reconnaissance, anti-tank andother combat arms (Estimated personnel:

1,100);

Air combat element (ACE), 1st Aircraft Wingand subsidiary units, which operates from sea-and shore-based facilities to support MAGTF’sexpeditionary operations (Estimated personnel:1,856);

Logistics combat element (LCE), 3rd MarineLogistics Group (MLG), which will providecommunications, engineering support, motortransport, medical, supply, maintenance, airdelivery, and landing support (Estimatedpersonnel: 2,550).

To these will be added transient forces– aninfantry battalion (800 people), an artillerybattery (150 people), an aviation unit (250people) and other (800 people) – bringing thetotal number of Marines in Guam to more than10,000 personnel.

Guam Functions

In the Draft EIS, the Joint Guam Program Officedivides the major functions of the Marinesrelocating from Okinawa to Guam into thefollowing four:

First, “main cantonment area functions” which“include headquarters and administrativesupport, bachelor housing, family housing,supply, maintenance, open storage, communitysupport (e.g., retail, education, recreation,medical, day care, etc.), some site-specifictraining functions, and open space (e.g., paradegrounds, open training areas, open green spacein communities, etc.), as well as the utilitiesand infrastructure required to support thecantonment area.”

Second, “training functions” consisting of“firing ranges” for “live and inert munitionspractice,” “non-fire maneuver areas” for“vehicle and foot maneuver training, includingurban warfare training,” and “aviation trainingarea” to “practice landing/takeoff and air fieldsupport (including loading and unloading of

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fuel, ammunition, cargo and personnel).”

Third, airfield functions for “aviation units andaviation support units” relocating fromOkinawa (apparently the MCAS Futenma, theonly Marine Corps air station based inOkinawa). The units require runways, hangarsand an embarkation facility or the militaryversion of airport terminal for loading andunloading servicemen/women and theirweapons to and from aircraft.”

Fourth, waterfront or harbor functions for”transient” ships and assault craft which, notbased in Guam, will visit Guam and theCommonwealth of Northern Mariana Islandsfrom outside for training.

Guam Sites

After the Joint Guam Program Office examinedvarious alternative sites from the perspectivesof environmental impacts, political/publicconcerns and mission compatibility, it proposedthe following places as the best candidates forthe above functions. They will be formalized inthe final EIS expected to come out this summer(2010), officially authorizing the constructionprojects to start.

Main cantonment function: the Finegayan areaon the northwestern coast of the island. Airfieldfunctions (air embarkation and bed down) ofthe Air Combat Element: the northeasternairfield (which has two improved parallelrunways, 11,185 ft and 10,558 ft long) of theAndersen Air Force Base. To quote the DraftEIS:

“Although there are site limitations(i.e., alternative sites in Guam arelimited), Andersen AFB met all ofthe suitability and feasibilitycriteria (for airfield functions) andis the only reasonable alternative.It is an existing DoD airfield thath a s s u f f i c i e n t s p a c e t o

accommodate the (fixed and rotarywing) aircraft proposed forrelocation from Okinawa.” [10]

Aviation training for the air traffic controldetachment and tactical air operations: theNorthwest Field (NWF) at Andersen AFB andthe north ramp of AFB’s northeastern field.

Aviation training such as formation flights, fieldcarrier landing practice, aerial gunnery,helicopter insertion and extraction (fast rope,rappelling, helo-casting, and parachuteoperations in improved fields, drop zones, andwater operating areas) would be conducted atthe NWF and Orote Point Airfield on thesouthern coast of Apra Harbor as well, and air-to-air and air-to-surface training at “otherexisting aviation training areas” in theCommonwealth of Northern Mariana Islandsand international airspace. New unimprovedvertical lift landing zones (LZ‘s) would bedeveloped at Andersen South (former Air Forceresidential area) and the NMS (NavalMunitions Site).

The proposal identifies the Marine Corpsaircraft to be based at Andersen as 12 MV-22tilt-rotor vertical-takeoff-landing Ospreys, three3 UH-1 single-engine helicopters, six 6 AH-1twin-engine attack helicopters and four 4CH-53E heavy-lift helicopters.

Live-fire training and pistol training would beconducted at the coastal area south of the AFBnortheastern field, one of the few sites to benewly acquired by the military, and some onTinian.

Non-firing maneuver training, including urbanwarfare training, would take place at AndersenSouth.

The existing Andersen AFB Munitions StorageArea and the NMS, as well as the existingdemolition range at NWF would be used by theMarine Corps for the same purposes.

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Inner Apra Harbor would be renewed toaccommodate waterfront facilities andoperations for amphibious assault landing craft,aircraft carriers, and high speed transportships.

Guam Budget

To implement the plans, the U.S. Congressauthorized about $180 million for Guam’smilitary construction projects in the NationalDefense Authorization Act for FY2009 (thatbecame P.L. 110-417 on October 14, 2008). OnMay 7, 2009, shortly before Japan’s Dietratified the relocation agreement with theUnited States, Defense Secretary Gatessubmitted the proposed defense budget forFY2010, requesting $378 million to startconstruction in Guam to support the relocationof 8,000 marines from Okinawa, as part of thetotal U.S. contribution of $4.18 billion tor therelocation. The National Defense AuthorizationAct for FY2010 authorized roughly $734 millionas the first substantial incremental funding forthe relocation of Marines from Okinawa toGuam.

In the bill for the FY2011 National DefenseAuthorization Act, the Obama administrationproposed to spend $566 million for militaryconstruction projects in Guam and won theapproval of the House of Representatives at theend of May, leaving the Senate to discuss itfurther. The $566 million would include $50million to Andersen Air Force Base for GuamStrike Group operations and ramp upgrades,combat communications facilities, Red Horseengineering facilities and commando warriorbarracks; $426.8 million to the Navy for marineaviation ramp improvements, Apra Harborimprovements and defense access roadimprovements; and $70 million for the newNaval Hospital and nearly $20 million for theGuam Army National Guard the combinedsupport maintenance ship and the readinesscenter. [11]

For its part, the Japanese government

earmarked 35.3 billion yen or about $390million in its fiscal 2009 budget for therelocation projects and 47.9 billion yen orabout $530 million in 2010. Japan is committedto use its funds to develop infrastructure atFinegayan, the north area of Andersen AFB andApra Harbor, design and build a fire station,bachelor enlisted quarters at Finegayan andport operation unit headquarters building andmedical clinic at Apra Harbor, and design andbuild the MEF command and headquartersbuildings, a military police station, agymnasium and a restaurant all at Finegayan.[12]

Guam Opinions

How has Guam reacted to the Marinerealignment and the ensuing military buildup?

With the island mired in a deep slump in the1990s and the 2000s as a result of sluggishtourism and the post-cold war closure of anumber of bases, Guam’s political andeconomic leaders had been call ing onWashington to send back the military. ToGovernor Felix P. Camacho, with manybusinesses idle and workers out of jobs, theMarine relocation was a dream come true. Inhis “2008 State of the Island Address,”Camacho enthusiastically welcomed the Marinerelocation to the island:

“In a few short years, this island aswe know it, will be transformed bythe work we do today. The GuamBuildup, as I like to call it, hasgenerated much excitement andconfidence in the future. Theaccompanying investments,construction and populationgrowth will present tremendousopportunity for new and betterjobs , h igher wages and animproved quality of life for thecitizens of Guam. We have only oneopportunity to get it right. In this

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upcoming period of significantgrowth, we must not squander thisprec ious opportuni ty . Ourstewardship of the resourcesentrusted to us will determine theinheritance we leave futuregenerations.”

The Governor repeated the message in October2009 by stating:

“We are at the beginning of aperiod of tremendous opportunity.The growth in jobs, income, andthe long term improvement of ourroads, utilities and communityfacilities, which the military buildup will bring, is unprecedented.There has never been, in my lifetime, a greater opportunity toimprove the quality of life for allGuamanians.” [13]

The enthusiasm, however, was not unqualified,nor was it shared by all Guamanians. TheGovernor, Madeleine Z. Bordallo、non-votingdelegate to the U.S. House of Representatives,and other leaders, while supporting the militarybuild up, kept calling for infrastructureimprovements outside the fence, andexpressing environmental concerns such aspossible damage to the coral reef.

A reader of the Pacific Daily News probablysummed up the sentiment of many Guamaniansopposed to the build-up, particularly nativeChamorro people, when he wrote: “I think weall may have second thoughts about themilitary transfer but we don't count. They willdo whatever they feel they must do to enhanceNational security. We must accept that fact. Wecan grouse all we want and pitch a fit but noone in Washington, DC will hear or care.”Guam is an “unincorporated territory” of theUnited States inhabited by American citizens

without the full application of the U.S.constitution. Without voting rights in thePresidential and Congressional elections, theyhave little means of getting their voices heardor reflected in national politics.

People of Chamorro ancestry in Guam,estimated to number between 60,000 and70,000 (about one-third of the population), areconcerned about losing their identity andculture in the face of a sudden increase ofmilitary personnel, off-island constructionworkers and their dependents.

Conclusion

Prime Minister Hatoyama’s attempts, likeKoizumi’s, to relocate the MCAS Futenma outof Okinawa failed. On Okinawa, discontent withthe status quo was heating up. In the 2009general election, people elected only thosecandidates who were committed to opposingconstruction of the replacement facility withinOkinawa. Earlier this year, citizens of Nago,where Henoko is located, voted for a newmayor opposed to the construction, and thePrefectural Assembly adopted a unanimousresolution across party lines to demand theclosure and return of the MCAS Futenma. OnApril 25, a huge rally attended by GovernorNakaima, the president and all members of thePrefectural Assembly, mayors and an estimated90,000 people from all over the prefecture,most of them wearing yellow shirts or head-band or holding yellow placards to show theiropposition to the realignment roadmap, calledfor removal of the MCAS from Okinawa. Opinion polls suggested an overwhelmingmajority of Okinawan people wanted the MCASFutenma moved away and not replaced by anew air facility on their island.

Hatoyama’s appeal at the National Governors’Conference at the end of May, however, onlyconfirmed the results of the surveys conductedearlier by Kyodo News and the Asahi Shimbun:all other prefectures showed “unwillingness”and “inability” to accommodate a U.S. military

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base relocated from Okinawa. The entirenation, while mostly supporting the militaryalliance with the United States, was stronglyopposed to accommodating U.S. troops or anaviation training facility in their own localities,as Koizumi had discovered in 1995. TheHatoyama administration ultimately settled forthe Henoko coast, respecting the voice of themainland Japanese but disregarding that of theJapanese on Okinawa.

While the Marine relocation and other militarybuildup projects in Guam are making progressfor the targeted completion by 2014 in the wayof financial contributions, constructioncontracts and building of housing complexesfor off-island workers and their dependents, thefollowing questions remain.

1. Why doesn’t the United States respect thedemocratically expressed voice of theoverwhelming majority of Okinawan peoplewho want U.S. military bases closed andremoved together with their hazards, and whydoesn’t it follow its principle of locating forcesonly where those forces are “wanted andwelcomed”?

2. How many Marines will stay behind inOkinawa after 8,000 (in the realignmentagreement) or 8,600 (in the Draft EIS) move toGuam, and what units will use the replacementair station to be built off the Henoko coast innortheastern Okinawa?

3. Does the United States need to keep theMCAS Futenma, located in the middle of apopulated residential area, over the localprotests and concerns about noise and possibleaccidents such as crashes, until the completionof the replacement? Why cannot not the MarineCorps aviation units train at the Kadena AirBase as they did while the MCAS Futenma wasbeing renovated several months ago, at thespacious Air Force Base in Guam, or at a seabase made up of an aircraft carrier and itssupport vessels?

4. Why does the U.S. need to station so manyMarines in Japan (15,000 in Okinawa alone),way above the estimated 5,500 in Hawaii 20 inAlaska, 300 in Germany, 150 in Spain, 90 inU.K., about 130 each in South Korea andDjibouti? Why does it need to keep so manyMarine Corps training sites, as well as the hugeKadena Air Base, a naval station often visitedby nuclear submarines, etc., in this crowdedJapanese island? Why not relocate them all tothe United States, where many “excess”military installations have been closed over thelast three decades, often against the protests oflocal politicians, businessmen, war veterans,military workers and members of other interestgroups?

Okinawa’s Share of U.S. Forces Stationedin Japan

* U.S. Department of Defense, “Active DutyMilitary Personnel Strengths by Regional Area

and by Country, June 30, 2010”

** Figures, as of the end of September 2009,taken from the statistical booklet on militarybases in Okinawa published by the Okinawa

Prefectural Government in March 2010.

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Ministry of Defense

*There is no U.S.-only base in the remaining 34prefectures.

5. Why are the U.S. military bases in Japanconcentrated in the tiny island far away fromTokyo, the country’s political, economic,academic, communication and cultural centerwith one-tenth of the whole population? For thesame “geopolitical reasons” that the U.S. usedduring the cold war, the Vietnam War, theKorean War and the wars in Iraq andAfghanistan, and in recent years, for thenuclear threats of North Korea and China’srising military power to the United States? Isthe U.S. going to keep its military “footprint” inOkinawa, a prefecture of Japan, as long as whatit considers that “threats” exist in the region orelsewhere in the world, or so long as Japanleaves the bases and personnel under thecontrol of the United States and is willing tofund them so generously (providing three-quarters of the total cost?

Kensei Yoshida [Yoshida Kensei] is a native ofOkinawa who now lives in Naha after retiringin 2006 from Obirin University in Tokyo wherehe taught Canadian history and society,Canadian politics and foreign relations, U.S.politics, modern Okinawan history, andjournalism. Author of Democracy Betrayed:Okinawa under U.S. Occupation (2002),Kanada-wa Naze Iraq-Sensou-ni SansenShinakattanoka (Why did Canada NotParticipate in the Iraq War) (2005), Senso-waPeten-da (War Is A Racket: the Status of ForcesAgreement in the Eyes of General Butler)(2005)、and Gunji Shokuminchi Okinawa(Okinawa: A Military Colony) (2007). Earlierthis year, he published Beigun-no Guam Togo

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Keikaku: Okinawa-no Kaiheitai-wa Guam-e Iku(Guam Integrated Military Development Plan:U.S. Marines Are Relocating to Guam) fromKobunken Press in Tokyo.

Recommended citation: Kensei Yoshida,"Okinawa and Guam: In the Shadow of U.S. andJapanese 'Global Defense Posture,'" The Asia-Pacific Journal, 26-2-10, June 28, 2010.

Notes

[1] Joint Guam Program Office, “Why Guam -guambuildupeis.u0073”

[2] Ministry of Defense website on the Guamrelocation.

[3] According to the Marine Corps Camp S.D.Butler, Newcomers’ Information Booklet postedin 2007, the A ir Stat ion i s “home toapproximately 3,000 Marines and Sailors. It iscapable of supporting most aircraft and servesas the base for Marine Aircraft.”.

[4] Ministry of Defense, cit.

[5] American Forces Press Service, “GatesViews Massive Growth Under Way in Guam,”May 30, 2008.

[6] Shirley A. Kan and Larry A. Niksch, “Guam:U.S. Defense Deployments,” CongressionalResearch Service, CRS Report for Congress,May 22, 2009.

[7] James Brooke, “Looking for FriendlyOverseas Base, Pentagon Finds It Already HasOne,” New York Times, April 7, 2004.

[8] Joint Guam Program Office, Naval FacilitiesEngineering Command, Pacific, DraftEnvironmental Impact Statement /Overseas

Environmental Impact Statement Guam andCNMI Military Relocation Relocating Marinesfrom Okinawa, Visiting Aircraft CarrierBerthing, and Army Air and Missile DefenseTask Force（Draft EIS）, Volume 1: Overviewof Proposed Actions and Alternative, pp. 1-18.[9] Draft EIS, Volume 2, Marine Corpsrelocation: Guam, 2-1.

[10] Op.cit., 2-76.

[11] Mar-Vic Cagurangan, Marianas VarietyNews, “Guam gets $566M under ‘11 DoDbudget”(May 21, 2010)

[12] Ministry of Defense, cit.

[13] Office of the Governor of Guam, ”GovernorUnveils Guam's Vision to Address MilitaryBuildup” (Oct. 11, 2009).

See the following articles on Okinawan andGuam bases and anti-base movements:

Gavan McCormack, Ampo’s Troubled 50th:Hatoyama’s Abortive Rebellion, Okinawa’sMounting Resistance and the US-JapanRelationship

Furutachi Ichiro (video) and Norimatsu Satoko(text), US Marine Training on Okinawa and ItsGlobal Mission: a Birds-Eye View of Bases Fromthe Air

LisaLinda Natividad and Gwyn Kirk, FortressGuam: Resistance to US Military Mega-Buildup

Yoshio SHIMOJI, The Futenma Base and theU.S.-Japan Controversy: an Okinawanperspective

Kageyama Asako and Philip Seaton, Marines GoHome: Anti-Base Activism in Okinawa, Japanand Korea

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