8
OFFICE OF OF ST ATELIENT Hit ler produ ced A bout ni no ty per cent of t he German Al l off i c0 r s of th o army shl.'.r ed t his day , if n ec ess ar y by f orc e of n rns. of Ge rmany was wo.Icon cd by DO . at t i t ude ·and thcr cfo:,e had no re as on t o oppose Hitl er . erect.Lon of the Polish Corr- Ldor and to Loss cn t he thr o2.t to s opar-at.cd I .. wa r to w ipe out the politi c2.l and economi c l oss r esul tin g fr om the East Prussi a s urroQDdod by Pol an d Lithunnk , w as r egar ded' as a s acr ed offic ers, b el i eved t hat the so t hr c :... qu ostions , outstand ing C'.tlong whi ch 'l ,a s th e quest ion of t he Poli sh C orr id or, would have to be se ttle d some duty a s nd The at fi rst (19 :)) .- 35) s ecr et and l at er unconcc e.Lcd r-c ar momcnt, I my se lf, as we ll as the whol e group of Ge r nk ,n st aff a nd fr ont the Polish C orri dor, t he Saa r and f-uhl' , and i-lcmo L, questions occu pi ed a ttent io n in Cormany, ,T j1e so wo re t he quest ions of 1919, and fr om 1924, thr ee t errit ori al pe ople were of the samo m ind t ho o:f iee rs on t ho Pol is h the res ult s which 2. 11 of us wr. rnl;Jr dc sd r cd, Afte r the an noxat .Lon of Cz cc hosLovaki.a we hop ed that thoPolish since we b el i eved thnt this Fr-anco and Englo.nd wo uld como t o the nogot.Lct.Lons crrno to naught , t he Pol is h qu est ion wo uld unavoddab Iy l end qu esti on wo uld bo set tl ed in c. poa cef'ul, f'a sh i.on t hr ough d iplomr.t i c mcar.s , As a of f c..ct we fo lt tho.t, if pol iti cO-l as s i.st .anco of t he ir c lly . to w".!' , thnt is , not onl.y w ith PoLend he rse lf, but al so wi t h tho rles to rn Pow ers 0 Vmcn in the m iddle of Jun o I r oc eived <'.n or der fr oQ the OKH to pr epar e myself f OT an at ta ck on Pol an d, I know t h''' .t t his wn r c a mo eve n be .J I th e re alm of poss ib ili ty . J.:his conc lu si on w<'- s on ly st re ngt he ned by the Fuehr er' s s pe ec h on 22 August, 1939 on t he Obcr sa.L zb e r r: wh en it cl e arly pnrtici pnte d in v arious di s cus si ons vrhi ch wont on betwe en t he OKH end t he 1 Scpt.c rnb cr 1939 t he membe rs of i'.1y stdf who were ong cgc c in prc pa r-at.Lon s , seemed to be an e.ct ua1i ty . B etweon th em iddle of Jun o 193 9 c. nd '4 1 - 1-

OFFICE OF U~S.CHIEF OF Fro~ particul~rly 'critic~l

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Page 1: OFFICE OF U~S.CHIEF OF Fro~ particul~rly 'critic~l

OFFICE OF U~S.CHIEF OF

STATELIENT

Hitler produ ced

About ni noty per cent of t he German

Al l offi c0 r s of tho army s hl.'.red t his

day, if necessary by f orce of nrns .

of Germany was wo.Iconcd by DO .

at t i t ude ·and thc r cfo:,e had no r eason t o oppose Hitler .

erect.Lon of the Polish Corr-Ldor and t o Losscn t he thr o2.t to s opar-at.cd

I .. war to wipe out the politic2.l and economi c l oss r esul ting from the

East Prussia surroQDdod by Polan d ,~d Lithunnk, was r egarded' as a sacred

officers, beli eved t hat the so t hrc :... quostions , outstanding C'.tlong whi ch

'l,as the que s t ion of t he Polish Corri dor, would have to be settled some

duty ~hough a s nd nccessity~

The at f i rst (19:)) .- 35) s ecret a nd l ater unconcce.Lcd r-carmomcnt,

I mysel f , as well as the whol e group of Ger nk,n staff a nd front

the Polish Corridor, t he Saar and f-uhl' , and i-lcmoL ,

questions occupied attention i n Cormany , , Tj1e so wore t he que s t ions of

Fro~ 1919, and particul~rly from 1924, three 'crit ic~l t erritorial

pe ople were of the samo mind ~3 t ho o:f ieers on t ho Pol ish quc stion~

the r e sult s which 2.11 of u s wr.rnl;Jr dc s dr cd,

After the annoxat.Lon of Czcchos Lovaki.a we hoped that tho Polish

since we beli eved thnt this tin~c Fr-anco and Englo.nd would como t o the

nogot.Lct.Lons crrno to naught , t he Pol ish question would unav oddabIy l end

question would bo s et tled in c. poacef'ul, f'ashi.on t hrough diplomr.t i c mcar.s ,

As a nw~to r of f c..ct we fol t tho.t , i f pol iti cO-las s i.st.anco of t heir clly .

t o w".!' , thnt is , not onl.y with PoLend he rsel f , but al so wi t h tho rles tor n

Powers 0

Vmcn in t he middle of Juno I r oceived <'.n order froQ the OKH to prepare

myself f OT a n at tack on Poland, I know t h'''.t t his wnr c amo even cl~s er be. J

I

the r ealm of possibi l i ty. J.:hi s conc lusion w<'-s only st rengt he ned by the

Fuehrer' s s peech on 22 August, 1939 on t he Obcr sa.Lzb e r r: when it clearly

pnrticipnted in various di s cus s i ons vrhi ch wont on between t he OKH end t he

1 Scpt.crnbc r 1939 t he membe r s of i'.1y stdf who were ongcgcc in prcpar-at.Lons ,

se emed t o be an e.ctua1i ty. Betweon the middle of Juno 1939 c.nd

'41

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Page 2: OFFICE OF U~S.CHIEF OF Fro~ particul~rly 'critic~l

strategic and general nature were di s cussed ~S fu"\d to do with ~y futur~

"

,. /

In fact it

" - }

/

TRANSLATION OF 'AFFIDAVIT No .5 (c ont d). OFF,Id£~ OFU~S..,CHIEF OF COUNSEL

"

During these discussioris"~uch mat.tcr-s of, <'. tC.·C't-i~J.l,

, \

During the Polish caopnign, pnrticul~rly during the Kutno operations,

personal r ecalls. - These front comm,nders-in-chicf thus act ually becarno

(Signed) BLASKOHITZ

Po'Li.sh .campea.gn ,

poed.td.on as Comraando'r-dn-C hf.cf of the Eighth :\rrry dur i ng the pl.cnncd

advi se r s to t ho OKH in t hei r own field so that the posi t ions shown in .:

\

army group.

t o be ' asked from t Imc t o time for c st.Lmct es of t ho sIt.uat.Lon and for

their r ecmrumcndations by telephone, t eletype or wi rele ss , as 'well as by

I was repeatedly in con~unicationwith tho Cornmand0r-in-Chicf of the Ar my,

'1~ S common prc.ctice f or commnndcrs-in-chicf of army groups and of ar mies

the at tached chart c~brnce that group which was the act~,l advi sor y

.councd.L of the High Comaand of the German /.rned Forces .

.and he, as wel l as the Fuehror, visited my headquarters.

'/

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i '

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Page 3: OFFICE OF U~S.CHIEF OF Fro~ particul~rly 'critic~l

CHl,RT

(Initialed) Bl. 10.11.45•

G~rinB

(later von Gr:eim)If

CHIEF OF THE G'ENERl.1 STlJ"FOF 'IRE J..IR FORCE

J eschonnek (later Kortan ,Kr eipe, Keller)

---COMMl>NDER IN CHIEF OF THEI.JR FORCE iND REICHSMINISTEROF 1.JR

COMflllJI\TD!ffiS IN CHIEF OF11JR FORCES

\

i .RMED-FORCES OPFRJ.TIONS STJ~ 1Chief: J odI -c , /'

Deputy Chief : War l imon t I._-- ...._-- ~--

------'- ---- ._- ..--

COMrv"d.NDER DJ CHIEFOF THE N1.VY

Hi tler

II

COMMJ.NDERS ill CHIEFIN THE N.J.VY

SUPR~ COMMl.NDER OFTHE I,RMED FORCES

. Raeder(later D'enitz)

ICEIEF OF NAVAL Wl,R STAFF

Schni ewindt (laterFricke. Meisel)

CHIEF OF THE HIGHCOMMAND OF THE J,RMED FOOCES

Keit~J

.----

COMNIjJ\TDERS IN CHIEFOF JiRMIES

von Brauchi tsch(later Hi t I er )

ICHIEF OF ~ GH.;f\TER 1.1STJiFF OF TIill JIRMY

Beck (leter Hal der •Zeitzler , Guderian,Krebs)

ICOMMbNDERS IN CHIEF

OF jiRMY GROUPS

COMMANDER IN CHIEFOF T~ lJiMY

.......

J

. \ .... , '

Page 4: OFFICE OF U~S.CHIEF OF Fro~ particul~rly 'critic~l

I , ' '''.LTER H. ni,PP, C .~.ptC'..in , Cava 'Lr-y , I.SN 0-4542.31 , hereby cert ify

th0.t I am thoroughly convcrs0-Qt with the EngLi.sh and G<HT:L<.....n Langu r.gc s ;

.)

t :

/

(

R:\ppR:,PPC~'lV

Ncul~nd

NEULiJ'TDOJiC

. ';:,.lter H.n;,LT2R H.Co..pt[1.in0-4542.31

Pnul t. .PUJL t..Me.jor0-385720

(Signe d)

( Si gne d )

/

. \ . '

CERTIFICi,TE OF TR:liSL,TIONOF DOCU1iEl:T

SS

(Tho nbovc a cknowledgment of o.::t h nppco..rcd intho origin~l in Z~glish)

".

Before mo , P,-.DL i. . NEUL;Jill, Lb. j or , QEC, AS!') 0-385720 , an

end thct the above is ~ true o..11C: correct t .rcns.La td.on .

CITY OF NUR!'JBERG:

officer duly quilifiod to tcl~c oo..t hs , o..ppoarcd Colonel Gcncro..l

JOHI.NIJES BV,SKO:J1TZ, to me knovm , who in my presenc e si:;nocl the

ntto..ched chnrt , w~s true on tho lOth d~y of 'November 1945 ~

chnrt initi:-\lcd h-r him, and swore thp.t tho samo , incluc:ing the

foregoing "Erklnru.Y1g" (st.at .omcrrt ) consisting of t wo pcgcs in tho

German Language wi t h amondmcrit.s initi"'.10d by him and an a t.t achcd

/I

;.

Page 5: OFFICE OF U~S.CHIEF OF Fro~ particul~rly 'critic~l

Al lo Offiziore de s Heere s t 8iltcn

ERKLARUliG

Bin Krieg urn die; durch die Schaffung des polnischen

: \/

Dcut.schLands wur de von rii r besrUsst .

wUrde, denn wi r glaubten , da ss diosr.~l Fr~1kroich und =ngland zur Hi l fo

polnischc Fr aga nunmchr fri cdlich .auf dip10ma't i sch\Jn : 'cgc goLost. vx.r-don

Nach dam Ansc hluss dol' , TschecL<:>",lowakoi hofft on wi.r , da ss die

Hitler brachto dio Erfolgc "l r~lcho wi r al lo hoiss cr sehnt .on ,

ihros Al1iiertcn kOlTImOn warden . In del' Ta~ rnr,ltcn wi r , dass dio pol ni sche

d.h . ni cht nul' mi t Polen solbst , s ondcrn auch L",it don ~:c str:l!!.chtGn .

Als ich Ei t to Juni v ein OKH ei nen Befc hl crhiol t mi.ch auf einen

Fr age , wenn pol i t i s che l.ias enabmcn sc hoitcrtcn , ZUEl Kricgc l'~""on musst,o ,/

;.ngr if f gegcn Polen vorzuboroiton, W\lsste ich da ss dioser Krieg nunmchr in

den Bereich del' l itl£J.i c hk ni t rUcktc . DiGS:) F '~>st,st (;l.~Ung ;':'\.u·dc dur ch clio

Die anf'angs (1933 - 35) gchoimc und spttt orhin of fo no ;;iederauf r tlst ung

Territorialfragen die Aufmerks~kcit Dcutschlands in Anspruch . Es waren

SOVlohl ich selbst , al s auch' die gosamte Gr uppe dout sche r Stabs-

Seit 1919 und insbesondere seit 1924 nahmen drei we sent l i che

des }Iiemcl l ande s •

1 -

dies die Fragen des polnischen Korridors, des Saapund Ruhrgebietes und

und Fr ontoffiziere glaubten, dass dios e dro i Fragen , unt OI' wol chen die

umfasst. ' /ar , zu vor mindar n vrurdc <::.l s ci ne hci l igQ Pflicht wcnn auch bittero

Notwendi gke i t botracht et .

Frage des polni schen Kar r idor s bes ondors hur vor t rat , ci ne s Tages gel Bst

wo r-den mtlssten , not i.genf'e.Ll,s durch l '!D.f .f(mgowalt ~ Ungeftthr neunzd.g Prozent

des dout schen VoD(os t oilten diose Ansi cht nQt den Of f i zieren buzUglich '

del' polnische~ Fraga .

, di ose Ans chauur.g und hatton doshal b keinen Gr und Hi tler zu opponieren .

, Korridors ent standeno politischo und wirtschaftliche Einbussc auszugleic00n '

une dio Bodrohung des abgot rcnnton Ostpreussons , dQS von Polcnund Litauen

, I

FUhrcrcnsprnche :~:22 . August 1939 auf dew Oborsalzbcrg nur noch betont und

',) er- schi.en nun aLs ci ne klr.rc: T:'tsQchc . Zwischon iiittc Juni 1939 und dcrn

1 .Sept u~ber 1939 nahmen I~oinc bearboitonden Stabs angehtlrigen ~n

r-

,' /

,

i.

\I,\

Page 6: OFFICE OF U~S.CHIEF OF Fro~ particul~rly 'critic~l

tats~chlichc Bcratcrkrcis des Obcrkommandos der dcutschen V~hrmacht war .

, .,.

. ,

"

Es war

10.1L45

AFFIDAVIT No'.5 (cont.d )i

goz , BL\SKOWITZ

- 2 -

,

. \

vm.hrcnd diescr Be spre chungen vrurden Dinge taktischer,

vrnhrend des polnischen Feldzuges, insbesondere wllhrend der Kutno

polnischen Feldzuges zu tUn hatten .

/

Heeres und er sowie der FUhrer besuchten mein Hauptquartier .

Uberhaupt Gepflogenheit, dass von Zeit zu Zeit Oberbefehlshaber von

KaIDpfe,war ich wied~rholt in Verbindung nut dem Oberbefehlshaber des

als auch durch pcrs~nliche Vorladungcn urn Situationsberichte und Rat

Heeresgruppen und Armeen durch Telcfon, Fernschreiber odor Funk sowohl

gefragt wurdon . In dar 'Tat wurden dann diose Frontoberbcfehlshaber

wurden.

Beratcr bc~ OKH in ihrem Sachbereich, sodass die in dar beilicgenden

Besprechungen teil, die zwischen dem OKH und der Hecresgruppe durchgeftihrt

Skizze aufgefUhrten Dienststellen jene Gruppc umfassen, die der

stelle als Oberbefehlshaber dar achten Armee wllhrend des geplanten

\' strategischer und allgemeiner Natur bcsprochcn, die nit mainer zukttnftigen

Page 7: OFFICE OF U~S.CHIEF OF Fro~ particul~rly 'critic~l

WEHRY..ACHTSFUHRUNGSTAB "Chef: J odISt~llvertretender Chef: I

VlarLimont ,

-------- - -------......,-

SKI ZZE

DKt 1U.s' j7·;~· .~·:,·,"; :T::4~

--ye·i3"t~~ =.:l~:i:( 31'.!iterKor t.en, ~):eipe ,

KaI Ie r )

lUFTF10TTENCHEFS

""""--~------_.-. ----.-...

OBERBEFEHlSB.i£ ER DElilUFTWJ3-,,~E l;NC :1 ~ICHS­

Mmm~~~J!2~ I UF· ::l'F~HRTG~;,·~.1g

( sp~ter von Gre im)!I

CHEF DES GENERj.ISTl~

. -1--'~-";;"':-- -1 . - . -~~.----: .~--

r!I

IOBEREEFEHLSHi .5t.=::R IN DER

KR I EGSNJ.F. l1'JE~~'-----

--....(; -

CHEF D"E3 S~'Kt'R IEt;,.qIF. l rnjNG- - Sc}lai ffiv{i-:d"t -( [;Y-iter · ~F:ri cke ,

Meisel )

II

OBERBEFEHlSHJ>EER DER KR lEGSI/J1.R INERaeder ( sp~ter- ·D~n i tz)

OBERSTER BEFEHlSHJ.BER Dm ViSERN.ACHT.Hi t Ler

ICHEF pES OBERKOMWkT\lDOS DER WEHRMJ.CHT

KeJ. tel

von tlL'i::;.·,;ch ':' ts ch( spt! l,Cr Hitler )

I

CH?F D~S G~NER ;lISTABS DESfITR.Cil!.S_ ._ _

Beck l s pDt e r Halder )Zeitzler , Guder ian ,Krebs)

IOE~BEF~HlSHAB~ DER__..;.;:H":F:..;;~=-t.=-·=l_ESGRUPPENOB~B~~"EHlSHABll:R D:<.R

IJU\1EEN

Page 8: OFFICE OF U~S.CHIEF OF Fro~ particul~rly 'critic~l

----........-.-.

'I,,

I,

\

"

:

. .~-,

f '

,\

I,

NeulandNEULAND

QLIC

Paul A.Pfi.UL A.Majo r0-385720

(Signed)

chart initialed by him, and swore trot the sru.ne , including the attached

ch~rt, was true on the lOth day of Novembor 1945.

J

Before ric, PAUL A. lillULAND, Ma j or , O)IC , ASN 0- 385720 , an

officer duly qualified tQ take oaths~ appeared Col one l GGncral

JOHANNES BLASKOVIITZ, to me known, who in my pr-esenc e signed the

foregoing ."Erkll!rung" (statement) consisting of t wo pages in the

Oorman Language with amendments initialed by him and an attached

CITY OF NQRNBERG: SS

, I